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1/ A pervasive theme of modern Chinese history is the substantial power invested by central government in local-level government leadership, and one manifestation of that was fate of Nationalist Army officers following Civil War of 1927-50. Ironically, while many Nationalist

2/ generals captured by communists ended up surviving captivity, following years to decades of "re-education" efforts to transform them from "war criminals" into redeemed new citizens of Red China, many more junior Nationalist military officers holding ranks from lieutenant to
3/ colonel were executed by early 1950s, during Suppression of Counter-revolutionary Movement. How did this difference come to be? Many Nationalist generals who ended up in communist captivity as "war criminals" had already been designated as such on communists' publicly declared
4/ "war criminals list" as Civil War was drawing to a close. When those Nationalist generals were captured, either on battlefield such as Gen. Huang Wei of 12th Mechanized Corps in 2nd phase of Huaihai Campaign, or by forced defection or surrender such as

5/ military spymaster Lt. Gen. Shen Zui during Yunnan Mutiny of December 1949, they were directly arraigned into long-term captivity as "war criminals" by central Party leadership. Those Nationalist generals designated "war criminals" were ultimately corralled into one central
6/ prison in outskirts of Peking (the Peking War Criminal Management Facility), in which Nationalist generals underwent extensive communist re-education lectures and small-group seminar sessions, and were then released in batched cohorts over succeeding years and decades, the
7/ last and most unrepentant cohort (which included Lt. Gen. Huang Wei) in 1975. Of course, those Nationalist generals who were "fortunate" enough to remain imprisoned during Cultural Revolution, were spared from effects of Red Guard and rebel mob action that befell many other
8/ ex-Nationalist cadres during that tumultuous period. On other hand, many more junior Nationalist military officers holding ranks from lieutenant to colonel were released back into society following their capture by communists in Civil War. While a number of them had sensed
9/ that there was to be no future for them in Red China and fled as refugees (often to Hong Kong), many others remained in China after end of Civil War. Central Party leadership briefly tolerated their presence in society as they also tolerated capitalist urban business owners
10/ during the brief lull before outbreak and intensification of Korean War. But once Korean War got into full-swing, Mao Zedong took advantage of distraction of Korean War to unleash 1st major post-Civil War communist campaign, Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries Movement.
11/ During that movement, Mao Zedong explicitly instructed for executions of "counter-revolutionary" elements in major cities, often with attached numerical quotas for local-level government leadership to meet. While local governments throughout country took up Mao Zedong's call
12/ to action with varying levels of enthusiasm and speed, a common theme was that essentially anyone in society who local police authorities could identify as having had former affiliation with Nationalists, was at risk of being arrested and then executed to meet Mao Zedong's
13/ numerical quotas. Many of those ex-Nationalists who were rounded up by local police authorities ended up being ex-Nationalist military officers who were spared of imprisonment as "war criminals", i.e. former lieutenants to colonels. When Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries
14/ Movement ultimately drew to a close, with 0.131% of population executed (exceeding Mao Zedong's quota of 0.1%), a net effect of local governments' zealous interpretation of who counted as "counter-revolutionaries" was decimation of ex-Nationalist junior to mid-level military
15/ officer class who had remained in country. Thus, whereas many Nationalist generals survived aftermath of Civil War as reformed "war criminals" who were later re-integrated into Red society with ceremonial political posts and opportunities to publish their war experiences and
16/ memoirs, many Nationalist lieutenants to colonels ultimately did not survive. This also served communists' propaganda and United Front efforts, as executing well-known Nationalist generals would have made communists look bad to the many Nationalists on Taiwan and in exile
17/ abroad who communist United Front would in subsequent decades try to woo to their side, whereas communist propaganda had less to lose from eliminating relatively nameless and forgotten Nationalist lieutenants and colonels who were never written into history to begin with. /e
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