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๐Ÿงต๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ
Does China distance itself from Russia because of war against Ukraine? A terrific @FT piece helps to understand how Beijing wants its policy towards Moscow to be seen in Western capitals. Spoiler alert: the real policy might be very different. Let me help to unpack it. 1/
This excellent piece in @FT by @JKynge, @sunyu1117, Liu Xinning, @HenryJFoy, @rwmcmorrow is well worth your time. Bottom line: after securing his third term, Xi does a course correction on foreign policy and tries to win back friends in Europe. 2/ www.ft.com/content/e592033b-9e34-4e3d-ae53-17fa34c16009
This includes efforts to distance China from Russia (or at least tell the West that Beijing is doing so), because ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ leadership sees that China's reluctance to criticize the Kremlin and join Western sanctions is viewed in Europe as tacit support for Putin's brutal war effort. 3/
"Several ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ officials in private conversations with the @FT strove to put clear daylight between Beijing and Moscow on the issue of ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ โ€” a message that has been repeated to some ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ diplomats." โ€œPutin is crazy,โ€ says one ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ official, who declined to be identified. 4/
Other ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ talking points on Russia policy include:
1) Putin didn't tell Xi about his plans to invade ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ during 2/4 summit in Beijing, and thus an idea still so popular in the West that Putin must have told Xi something because of "no limits partnership" is wrong. 5/
2) Demotion of vice-minister Le Yucheng ไน็Ž‰ๆˆ, @MFA_China's top ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ expert, happened because he was held responsible for the intelligence failure on ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ invasion. In 2023 he was a likely successor to Wang Yi as head of MFA, but the job went to ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณambo in ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ @AmbQinGang instead. 6/
3) China is willing to use the closeness of its relationship with Moscow to restrain Putin from resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and readouts of Xi's meetings with @Bundeskanzler, @POTUS, @EmmanuelMacron attest to that (in ๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช,๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ,๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท versions though, not ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ) 7/
4) Finally, "๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ now perceives a likelihood that ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ will fail to prevail against ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ and emerge from the conflict a โ€œminor powerโ€, much diminished economically and diplomatically on the world stage." Thus ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ should think that China will prioritize ties with EU over ties with ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ 8/
Let's look at the merit and novelty of these ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ talking points before trying to unpack what China's actual policy towards Russia is now, nearly a year into horrors of this war, and why Chinese diplomats want to spin it the way they do in talking to ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ audiences. 9/
The "Putin is crazy" quote shouldn't shock as it reflects a pretty widespread attitude towards Putin's impulsiveness and emotionality among many ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ officials including people working on ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ in MFA, MSS, NDRC, MofCom, expert community at least since 2014 annexation of Crimea 10/
This attitude builds on a degree of disrespect towards Russia that's common among some members of ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ elite ("๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ was USSR ่‹่”ๅคงๅ“ฅ, but now it's a third world country with nukes run by crooks"). But to think that this attitude dictates Beijing's policy towards ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ is a mistake. 11/
Chinese sources of @FT are right when they say Putin didn't tell Xi anything, and China was not aware of the invasion. Well. He didn't tell his PM and governor of the Central Bank. Why would he tell a foreign leader? "Partnership without limits" are just words... 12/
... that some observers and officials in the West have taken much more serious than the Chinese and the Russians, who are pretty cynical about those pompous phrases. The most significant proof that ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ was not aware of ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ plans was failure to evacuate ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณcitizens before the war 13/
As for Le Yucheng's demotion, it looks like an attempt to put blame on someone who was hardly in charge given his rank and MFA's low role in managing the relationship with and intelligence on Russia. ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ system simply got Putin wrong - like many other governments, by the way 14/
A reminder: for quite some time before the war Team Biden tried to work with ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ through @AmbQinGang, as @ewong reported in @nytimes, sharing intel about upcoming ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ invasion of ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ (@CIA was super protective of sources&methods for obvious reasons) /15 www.nytimes.com/2022/02/25/us/politics/us-china-russia-ukraine.html
And then... "After one diplomatic exchange in December, U.S. officials got intelligence showing Beijing had shared the information with Moscow, telling ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ that ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ was trying to sow discord." Not sure this could have happened without a nod from Xi or at least Yang Jiechi. 16/
As for ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ claims that Beijing works behind the scenes to convince Putin to seek peaceful resolution or at least not use nukes in ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ if he feels that he is losing the war and it might be the end of his regime and him... we don't have any evidence that China actually does it. 17/
On the record, even in readouts of Western leaders' meetings with Xi, the Chinese leader doesn't go beyond banalities like "sky is blue, peace is better than war, nuclear weapons are terrifying and shouldn't be used." Neither do other Chinese officials. 18/
As for view in Beijing that Moscow will emerge from this war weakened, truth is that a weakened ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ will be dependent on ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ, and it will be an asset in Beijing's quest for regional and global power. Look for some nuance in this @ForeignAffairs piece 19/ www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-new-vassal
Russia's economic and tech dependency on China is growing day by day, and so is ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ leverage. @JKynge and I have talked about it back in March, just 30 days into this ugly war, and unfortunately, major takeaways from this conversation remain relevant. 20/ www.ft.com/video/bec85cd0-6687-48b9-baa8-7bdc35fc9a48
For the quantitative metrics of ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ, we see an across-the-board growth in 2022: more trade, more military exercises, more deals in RMB etc. I've summed it up in this thread. There is nothing to suggest that China changes course on Russia. 21/

In fact, Beijing's strategy on Russia was pretty consistent long before 2/24. It's about deepening engagement on China's terms while managing Western red lines carefully. My colleague @EvanFeigenbaum got it explained on the day the war started. 22/ carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/24/china-faces-irreconcilable-choices-on-ukraine-pub-86515
China knows that its problems with the West are not rooted in Xi's bromance with Putin, but in issues like ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ rivalry, Taiwan, tech etc. Even if Xi drops Putin under the bus, ties with the U.S. will not structurally improve absent China's fundamental change to ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ liking 23/
However, ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ is somewhat different. Having survived crash course in decoupling from ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ, major EU economies don't want to go that road with China, at least for now. Amid fears of recession in eurozone, ๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡น leaders rush to Beijing to secure market access, new deals etc. 24/
This gives ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ a slight opening to drive a wedge between ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ and ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ, capitalizing on other disputes between them, and delay cementation of anti-China tech coalition led by the U.S. thus buying Beijing the precious time of having access to European tech&money&markets 25/
In order to create additional reasons for ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ leaders to go to China and strike deals there, Beijing is using the ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ card. It wants to create an impression that with a little bit of accommodation of ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ by Europe, China is actually willing to do more to restrain Putin. 26/
And it seems to be working! @Bundeskanzler went to China in November, declining @EmmanuelMacron's idea to go together in order to speak in one ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡บ voice. Berlin then framed the trip as effort to bring China on board addressing ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ aggression against ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ. 27/ www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-scholz-tests-china-ties-with-inaugural-visit-discuss-ukraine-20...
Now @EmmanuelMacron & @GiorgiaMeloni will follow this pattern, and Beijing's subtle hints that it might be ready to put pressure on Putin help to frame these trips not as self-interested steps that affects Transatlantic unity on ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ, but as part of a noble cause of helping ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ 28/
Bottom line: it's clear why Beijing wants to portray itself distancing from Moscow, and why ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ officials are ready to talk about it. Facts and figures, however, don't suggest there is any real U-turn of Chinese policy towards Russia. ะจั‚ะพัˆ. 29/END www.ft.com/content/e592033b-9e34-4e3d-ae53-17fa34c16009
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