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The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology
Integrates valid insights of both science and philosophy to examine the mysterious origin of ethics in human nature, arguing that biology alone cannot account for our behavior patterns or altruistic social ties
190 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1981
About the author
Peter Singer
153 books8,788 followersPeter Singer is sometimes called "the world’s most influential living philosopher" although he thinks that if that is true, it doesn't say much for all the other living philosophers around today. He has also been called the father (or grandfather?) of the modern animal rights movement, even though he doesn't base his philosophical views on rights, either for humans or for animals.
In 2005 Time magazine named Singer one of the 100 most influential people in the world, and the Gottlieb Duttweiler Institute ranked him 3rd among Global Thought Leaders for 2013. (He has since slipped to 36th.) He is known especially for his work on the ethics of our treatment of animals, for his controversial critique of the sanctity of life doctrine in bioethics, and for his writings on the obligations of the affluent to aid those living in extreme poverty.
Singer first became well-known internationally after the publication of Animal Liberation in 1975. In 2011 Time included Animal Liberation on its “All-TIME” list of the 100 best nonfiction books published in English since the magazine began, in 1923. Singer has written, co-authored, edited or co-edited more than 50 books, including Practical Ethics; The Expanding Circle; How Are We to Live?, Rethinking Life and Death, The Ethics of What We Eat (with Jim Mason), The Point of View of the Universe (with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek), The Most Good You Can Do, Ethics in the Real World and Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. His works have appeared in more than 30 languages.
Singer’s book The Life You Can Save, first published in 2009, led him to found a non-profit organization of the same name. In 2019, Singer got back the rights to the book and granted them to the organization, enabling it to make the eBook and audiobook versions available free from its website, www.thelifeyoucansave.org.
Peter Singer was born in Melbourne, Australia, in 1946, and educated at the University of Melbourne and the University of Oxford. After teaching in England, the United States and Australia, he has, since 1999, been Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. He is married, with three daughters and four grandchildren. His recreations include hiking and surfing. In 2012 he was made a Companion of the Order of Australia, the nation’s highest civic honour.
In 2005 Time magazine named Singer one of the 100 most influential people in the world, and the Gottlieb Duttweiler Institute ranked him 3rd among Global Thought Leaders for 2013. (He has since slipped to 36th.) He is known especially for his work on the ethics of our treatment of animals, for his controversial critique of the sanctity of life doctrine in bioethics, and for his writings on the obligations of the affluent to aid those living in extreme poverty.
Singer first became well-known internationally after the publication of Animal Liberation in 1975. In 2011 Time included Animal Liberation on its “All-TIME” list of the 100 best nonfiction books published in English since the magazine began, in 1923. Singer has written, co-authored, edited or co-edited more than 50 books, including Practical Ethics; The Expanding Circle; How Are We to Live?, Rethinking Life and Death, The Ethics of What We Eat (with Jim Mason), The Point of View of the Universe (with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek), The Most Good You Can Do, Ethics in the Real World and Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. His works have appeared in more than 30 languages.
Singer’s book The Life You Can Save, first published in 2009, led him to found a non-profit organization of the same name. In 2019, Singer got back the rights to the book and granted them to the organization, enabling it to make the eBook and audiobook versions available free from its website, www.thelifeyoucansave.org.
Peter Singer was born in Melbourne, Australia, in 1946, and educated at the University of Melbourne and the University of Oxford. After teaching in England, the United States and Australia, he has, since 1999, been Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. He is married, with three daughters and four grandchildren. His recreations include hiking and surfing. In 2012 he was made a Companion of the Order of Australia, the nation’s highest civic honour.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 48 reviews
December 21, 2012
4 1/2 stars. I had initially planned on giving this book a slightly lower rating, mostly due to two factors: Singer's strong commitment to the fact/value distinction and the ambivalence he displays in regards to objective normative truths. In the new afterword to the edition I have, he now repudiates the latter view, which is a move I welcome. However, he doesn't mention that values may be just a special class of facts, and I think admitting the existence of objective normative truths entails this view. Maybe Singer would agree, but he doesn't explicitly mention the fact/value distinction in the afterword, so I'm left guessing as to his position.
Just a few more things I'd like to comment on. First, the general thesis that our moral circle is expanding, and has expanded--historically speaking--is entirely correct. Going off this point, the idea that we can use our reason to make sure the circle continues to expand, that we are not entirely the slaves to our desires, as Hume held, is also correct. So like most of what I've read of Singer, his arguments once again succeed. And finally, the parts of sociobiology that he is critical of (which now seem pretty obvious today) are spot on. He is careful, however, not to be wholly critical of the implications an evolutionary understanding of human behavior has for ethics. He rightly emphasizes the worth that studying humans from an evolutionary perspective may have for ethical doctrines.
Just a few more things I'd like to comment on. First, the general thesis that our moral circle is expanding, and has expanded--historically speaking--is entirely correct. Going off this point, the idea that we can use our reason to make sure the circle continues to expand, that we are not entirely the slaves to our desires, as Hume held, is also correct. So like most of what I've read of Singer, his arguments once again succeed. And finally, the parts of sociobiology that he is critical of (which now seem pretty obvious today) are spot on. He is careful, however, not to be wholly critical of the implications an evolutionary understanding of human behavior has for ethics. He rightly emphasizes the worth that studying humans from an evolutionary perspective may have for ethical doctrines.
June 11, 2016
هذا هو أحد أفضل الكتب التي قرأتها موخرًا، وهو من الأسباب التي تجعلني سعيدًا لامتلاكي جهاز الكندل مؤخرًا، حيث أردت قراءته لفترة طويلة ولكن لم استطع ذلك بسبب عدم وجود نسخة مسموعة مجانية.
يتطرق الكتاب للنتائج الأخلاقية المترتبة على معرفتنا للأصول البيولوجية للأخلاق كما وضعها عالم البيولوجيا التطورية إدوارد ويلسون في كتابه البيولوجيا الاجتماعية (سوشيوبيولوجي) والتي صارت تعرف بعلم النفس التطوري في ما بعد. الرائع في هذا الكتاب هو أن الكاتب فيلسوف، ولذلك فهو يتجنب ارتكاب الأخطاء الفلسفية التي يرتكبها العلماء في أحيان كثيرة عند محاولة تحليل النتائج التي تؤدي إليها اكتشافاتهم ونظرياتهم، وهو خطأ ارتكبه ويلسون بالمناسبة، ولكن هذا لا يقوّظ من صحة الأسس البيولوجية للأخلاق.
إن المواضيع التي يتطرق لها الكتاب كثيرة جدًا، فهو يطرح أسئلة من قبيل، ما هي الأسس البيولوجية للأخلاق؟ كيف يمكن تفسير صفات مثل الإيثار من وجهة نظر تطورية؟ ماذا عن أفعال الإيثار التي لا تنطوي على أي فائدة تطورية؟ هل يجب أن نحارب الطبيعة البشرية المبرمجة من قبل الجينات أم نعتمدها كمصدر مطلق للأخلاق؟ أم أن هناك خيارات أخرى؟ هل يؤدي التفسير البيولوجي للأخلاق إلى الشكوك الأخلاقي والعدمية الأخلاقية؟ وما هي البدائل لذلك؟
لقد كنت أتشوق لقراءة كتاب يتناول مثل هذه المواضيع، وهو بلا شك سيغيّر طريقة تفكيرك عن الأخلاق، ولكن الكتاب لا يعطي إجابات مشبعة، بل يطرح أسئلة أكثر من أجوبة ويحفز على مزيد من القراءة والتفكير. إنه النوع الممتاز من الكتب. أنصح به بشدة.
يتطرق الكتاب للنتائج الأخلاقية المترتبة على معرفتنا للأصول البيولوجية للأخلاق كما وضعها عالم البيولوجيا التطورية إدوارد ويلسون في كتابه البيولوجيا الاجتماعية (سوشيوبيولوجي) والتي صارت تعرف بعلم النفس التطوري في ما بعد. الرائع في هذا الكتاب هو أن الكاتب فيلسوف، ولذلك فهو يتجنب ارتكاب الأخطاء الفلسفية التي يرتكبها العلماء في أحيان كثيرة عند محاولة تحليل النتائج التي تؤدي إليها اكتشافاتهم ونظرياتهم، وهو خطأ ارتكبه ويلسون بالمناسبة، ولكن هذا لا يقوّظ من صحة الأسس البيولوجية للأخلاق.
إن المواضيع التي يتطرق لها الكتاب كثيرة جدًا، فهو يطرح أسئلة من قبيل، ما هي الأسس البيولوجية للأخلاق؟ كيف يمكن تفسير صفات مثل الإيثار من وجهة نظر تطورية؟ ماذا عن أفعال الإيثار التي لا تنطوي على أي فائدة تطورية؟ هل يجب أن نحارب الطبيعة البشرية المبرمجة من قبل الجينات أم نعتمدها كمصدر مطلق للأخلاق؟ أم أن هناك خيارات أخرى؟ هل يؤدي التفسير البيولوجي للأخلاق إلى الشكوك الأخلاقي والعدمية الأخلاقية؟ وما هي البدائل لذلك؟
لقد كنت أتشوق لقراءة كتاب يتناول مثل هذه المواضيع، وهو بلا شك سيغيّر طريقة تفكيرك عن الأخلاق، ولكن الكتاب لا يعطي إجابات مشبعة، بل يطرح أسئلة أكثر من أجوبة ويحفز على مزيد من القراءة والتفكير. إنه النوع الممتاز من الكتب. أنصح به بشدة.
December 7, 2017
Singer's book feels strikingly contemporary in 2017, as other reviewers have also pointed out.
The "expanding circle" is a wonderful metaphor of how we can improve our ethical rules by being more inclusive in who we include in our moral calculations. And it also makes for a wonderful book, which provides plenty of interesting arguments in defence of the (careful and conservative) integration of the insights of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology into moral philosophy. Singer's book came out just a few years after E.O. Wilson's "Sociobiology" and Richard Dawkins's "The Selfish Gene" and it suffers a little from the comparison, since it is more summative than groundbreaking. However, Singer's work also benefits from the comparison in other respects. For one, it is perhaps the shortest introduction to the topic of sociobiology to the lay reader, even today. It is written in an engaging and probing manner, unlike the dry tomes of most philosophers. For the educated reader, the more important distinction is that Singer's philosophical skills are very sophisticated compared to the often crude and amateurish remarks on naturalistic ethics made by Wilson and Dawkins.
Singer not only summarizes a lot of the groundbreaking work on kin altruism, group altruism and reciprocal altruism (as also discussed by Dawkins, Wilson and others), but he also exposes many of the logical fallacies and philosophical dilemmas that naturalists often leave unexplored. For example, he points out how deriving an "ought" from an "is" is no simple matter, as philosophers since Hume have known. A merely descriptive analysis of human psychology can shed light on why we act in ways that we do, but it still leaves open the possibility that we have radical freedom. I'm not sure I completely agree with Singer's existentialist and libertarian emphasis on the question of free will, but it serves as a powerful challenge to the naive derivations of the sociobiological canon.
Secondly, Singer eloquently defends the rationalist impulses of human nature, and he ties them up to the radical freedom mentioned above, as the possibility of moral progress and expansion. He argues that while the capacity to reason has evolved to allow us to publically defend our actions to the members of our in-group (in an effort to further reciprocal, group and kin cooperation), it has also allowed us to care about logical consistency and unbiased obedience to valid argumentation.
Thus, our rational capacities, while kept in check by a rainbow coalition of passions and intuitions, have allowed human cultures and literate societies to develop political institutions where public discourse has expanded the concern of selfish interests towards the concern for the interests of others. There exists a march of reason towards an ever-expanding circle of consideration for the welfare of others. Singer calls this "the principle of the equal consideration of interests." Our passions and reason can coincide, he claims, when we try to alleviate our cognitive dissonance from purely self-interested motivations and to spread our moral concern to all sentient beings equally.
The resulting framework should not surprise anyone who is familiar with Singer's prior or later work. He advocates for egalitarian humanitarian ethics which calls for the maximization of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, country, age, sexual orientation - or even species membership. But he also prudently advocates for a public allegiance to simple systems of ethics that incorporate easy and fast rules of practical reason. He claims that universal ethics is the end goal, but we need to be efficient in moving towards it, and simply ignoring human nature (of the sort that evolutionary psychology explains) will lead to counterproductive consequences. His discussion is remarkably prescient and tantalizing, and I wish more contemporary advocates for evolutionary ethics would take Singer's admonitions seriously.
It still seems to me that sociobiology is a work in progress, and the integration of Darwinism into moral philosophy has barely begun. The New Ethics faces many hurdles that need to be overcome. It forces us to rethink our intuitions and customs about how we organize our social institutions, what principles we rely on to guide our private decisions, and what it means to be rational human. Not all of its answers are simple or straightforward - and Singer's analysis is one of the most foresighted among the bunch in this regard - but all of its questions cut to the very core of our humanity. If we take the metaphor of the "Expanding Circle" seriously, and set our goals on reworking our lives around the central insights of evolutionary ethics, we can use Singer's work as a point of departure for an ethical revolution that might take many centuries to complete.
The "expanding circle" is a wonderful metaphor of how we can improve our ethical rules by being more inclusive in who we include in our moral calculations. And it also makes for a wonderful book, which provides plenty of interesting arguments in defence of the (careful and conservative) integration of the insights of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology into moral philosophy. Singer's book came out just a few years after E.O. Wilson's "Sociobiology" and Richard Dawkins's "The Selfish Gene" and it suffers a little from the comparison, since it is more summative than groundbreaking. However, Singer's work also benefits from the comparison in other respects. For one, it is perhaps the shortest introduction to the topic of sociobiology to the lay reader, even today. It is written in an engaging and probing manner, unlike the dry tomes of most philosophers. For the educated reader, the more important distinction is that Singer's philosophical skills are very sophisticated compared to the often crude and amateurish remarks on naturalistic ethics made by Wilson and Dawkins.
Singer not only summarizes a lot of the groundbreaking work on kin altruism, group altruism and reciprocal altruism (as also discussed by Dawkins, Wilson and others), but he also exposes many of the logical fallacies and philosophical dilemmas that naturalists often leave unexplored. For example, he points out how deriving an "ought" from an "is" is no simple matter, as philosophers since Hume have known. A merely descriptive analysis of human psychology can shed light on why we act in ways that we do, but it still leaves open the possibility that we have radical freedom. I'm not sure I completely agree with Singer's existentialist and libertarian emphasis on the question of free will, but it serves as a powerful challenge to the naive derivations of the sociobiological canon.
Secondly, Singer eloquently defends the rationalist impulses of human nature, and he ties them up to the radical freedom mentioned above, as the possibility of moral progress and expansion. He argues that while the capacity to reason has evolved to allow us to publically defend our actions to the members of our in-group (in an effort to further reciprocal, group and kin cooperation), it has also allowed us to care about logical consistency and unbiased obedience to valid argumentation.
Thus, our rational capacities, while kept in check by a rainbow coalition of passions and intuitions, have allowed human cultures and literate societies to develop political institutions where public discourse has expanded the concern of selfish interests towards the concern for the interests of others. There exists a march of reason towards an ever-expanding circle of consideration for the welfare of others. Singer calls this "the principle of the equal consideration of interests." Our passions and reason can coincide, he claims, when we try to alleviate our cognitive dissonance from purely self-interested motivations and to spread our moral concern to all sentient beings equally.
The resulting framework should not surprise anyone who is familiar with Singer's prior or later work. He advocates for egalitarian humanitarian ethics which calls for the maximization of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, country, age, sexual orientation - or even species membership. But he also prudently advocates for a public allegiance to simple systems of ethics that incorporate easy and fast rules of practical reason. He claims that universal ethics is the end goal, but we need to be efficient in moving towards it, and simply ignoring human nature (of the sort that evolutionary psychology explains) will lead to counterproductive consequences. His discussion is remarkably prescient and tantalizing, and I wish more contemporary advocates for evolutionary ethics would take Singer's admonitions seriously.
It still seems to me that sociobiology is a work in progress, and the integration of Darwinism into moral philosophy has barely begun. The New Ethics faces many hurdles that need to be overcome. It forces us to rethink our intuitions and customs about how we organize our social institutions, what principles we rely on to guide our private decisions, and what it means to be rational human. Not all of its answers are simple or straightforward - and Singer's analysis is one of the most foresighted among the bunch in this regard - but all of its questions cut to the very core of our humanity. If we take the metaphor of the "Expanding Circle" seriously, and set our goals on reworking our lives around the central insights of evolutionary ethics, we can use Singer's work as a point of departure for an ethical revolution that might take many centuries to complete.
February 14, 2017
An excellent introduction to the ethical system of universal well-being. One of the best ideas Singer presents here is that science is the fulcrum upon which reason exerts leverage on ethics. You can find the full text on a quick Google search and I would highly recommend you read this as a foundation for ethical reasoning.
April 12, 2020
Argues that ethics cannot be derived from biology. Argues that ethics is based on being impartial but does not justify that ethics should be based on impartiality as he admits in the afterword.
February 17, 2016
This was an interesting analysis on the connect between evolution and ethics and does a good job of arguing that evolution and biology cannot explain everything about morality largely because of the is/ought distinction which most students of philosophy will already have come across. As usual it's written in Peter Singer's accessible style and doesn't take an age to get through. To me this book felt a little broad, but it's a good introduction to the topic.
March 22, 2020
Overall a fairly interesting read. I was familiar with most of this before picking the book up, but there were two aspects of this book I found particularly interesting.
Firstly, Singer has recently responded to evolutionary debunking arguments by suggesting that moral principles derived from the use of reason are immune to them because these principles derive from a faculty that generally discovers truth, and are therefore not debunkable. I was previously quite sceptical of this response because it seemed as though reason may be structured such that it provides us with principles which convey adaptiveness, and if so then these principles may be debunked on the same grounds as others. However, his more extended discussion of reason in this book makes this concern less significant as he makes a compelling case that - although reason is adaptive in certain ways - having and using reason produces non-adaptive moral principles. This seems to bolster his response to evolutionary debunking arguments.
Secondly, Singer seems in recent years to have endorsed an objective account of morality. I am quite sceptical of these accounts (for the normal reasons). But Singer here seems more ambivalent about his metaethical commitments, and even seems to lean towards a constructivist view (which I believe was his view at the time). I think his general account of the demands of ethical justification and reason (and his use of these in his response to evolutionary debunking arguments) are probably more plausible given this view because it allows him to demonstrate how evolutionary debunking arguments fail to debunk all moral principles (even if reason does not track objective moral facts).
Firstly, Singer has recently responded to evolutionary debunking arguments by suggesting that moral principles derived from the use of reason are immune to them because these principles derive from a faculty that generally discovers truth, and are therefore not debunkable. I was previously quite sceptical of this response because it seemed as though reason may be structured such that it provides us with principles which convey adaptiveness, and if so then these principles may be debunked on the same grounds as others. However, his more extended discussion of reason in this book makes this concern less significant as he makes a compelling case that - although reason is adaptive in certain ways - having and using reason produces non-adaptive moral principles. This seems to bolster his response to evolutionary debunking arguments.
Secondly, Singer seems in recent years to have endorsed an objective account of morality. I am quite sceptical of these accounts (for the normal reasons). But Singer here seems more ambivalent about his metaethical commitments, and even seems to lean towards a constructivist view (which I believe was his view at the time). I think his general account of the demands of ethical justification and reason (and his use of these in his response to evolutionary debunking arguments) are probably more plausible given this view because it allows him to demonstrate how evolutionary debunking arguments fail to debunk all moral principles (even if reason does not track objective moral facts).
March 13, 2019
Magnifique livre, j'ai failli y donner 5 étoiles. Singer est clair, plaisant à lire et convaincant dans ses arguments.
Les 2 premiers chapitres sont dédiés à une explication de l'origine biologique de l'éthique. En fait, ce que tente de défendre Singer est qu'il y a des avantages de ''fitness'' à être altruiste, qu'il est logique du point de vue de la sélection naturelle que nos ancêtres avec des gênes altruistes se sont reproduis. Il parle de 3 différentes sortes d'altruisme ''naturelles'' (naturelles dans le sens qui se sont développé non pas parce la raison, mais parce qu'avoir ces traits était avantageux à la survie). Le ''kin altruism'', le ''reciprocal altruism'' et le ''group altruism''. L'altruisme = favoriser la survie de qq1 d'autre avant la sienne dans certaines circonstances. Kin altruism = favoriser qq1 de sa famille, reciprocal altruism = favoriser qq1 qui te rend un service, group altruism je m'en rappelle moyen hihi.
Bref, l'idée étant que même si ça parait contradictoire, il est avantageux pour les individus de ne pas favoriser sa propre survie. Dans le cas du kin altruism c'est que la sélection naturelle se fait au niveau des gènes, puis que les membres d'une même famille partagent les gènes. Donc, si un individu se sacrifie pour ses parents/frères soeurs voir même cousins/neveux ca peut souvent être avantageux au point de vue de la transmission de ses gènes. Si, par exemple, en se sacrifiant il sauve 6 membres de sa famille il y a plus de chance que ses gènes soient transmis que s'il est égoiste. Dans le cas du reciprocal altruism c'est plus simple, c'est juste que parfois un échange de service est bénéfique à la survie, que le moment où tu avantages l'autre personne te sera redonné plus tard. Certaines tâches ne peuvent être accomplies seules, une entente tacite entre individus qui tentent de se protéger permet d'améliorer la fitness.
Après avoir avancé cela, il défend dans le 3e chapitre qu'il y a une différence entre la morale « naturelle » et la bonne moralité, ce qui est à privilégier. Il cite E.O. Wilson qui tente, dans son livre publié en 1975 de dire que les philosophes devraient cesser de s'intéresser à l'éthique, que ca devrait plutôt être la tâche des sociobiologistes qui, en trouvant les tendances naturelles de l'homme trouvent en même temps ce qu'ils doivent faire. Singer argument qu'il y a une différence fondamentale. Elle se trouve dans le ''is ought gap'', les faits n'ont pas, contrairement aux valeurs, la capacité de motiver mes actions. ''No science will ever discover ethical premises inherent in our biological nature, because ethical premises are not the kind of thing discovered by scientific investigation''. Par là il veut dire que la science découvre des faits, puis que le contenu de l'éthique n'est pas factuel, puisque fondamentalement il cherche à donner des raisons d'agir et que les faits ne peuvent pas donner des raisons d'agir. Essentiellement c'est ce qu'il fait dans ce chapitre, prouver que la différence est fondamentale, mais il admet que la science aide beaucoup l'éthique, la science permet de dire ce qu'est le monde et quand on prend des décisions on se base sur des valeurs, certes, mais l'application de ces valeurs varie selon l'état du monde, donc science et éthique doivent collaborer pour que les individus aient de bonnes raisons d'agir.
Le 4e et de loin meilleur chapitre selon moi est celui où Singer fait de la philosophie morale à proprement parler, il défend sa conception morale et la justifie. Sa justification est tellement alléchante, bien justifiée, simple qu'elle me convainc. Le seul hic est qu'il ne parle pas d'utilitarisme, ce qu'il justifie est la chose suivante:
(1)L'éthique commence quand des individus tentent de justifier leur conduite auprès des autres membre de leurs groupes
(2) Toute tentative de justification, si elle veut être convaincante, doit être impartiale, dans les mots de Singer, il faut que la personne qui tente de justifier sa conduite soit désintéressée.
(3) À partir de là, la raison intervient et ce que Singer appelle ''ethical thinking'' devient un sujet auquel la raison pense et développe des arguments. Le ''ethical thinking'' a commencé par une tentative de justifier sa conduite aux autres et à partir de cela, la raison a commencé à réfléchir à l'éthique en tant que tel et le but a graduellement modifié à tentative de convaincre ses concitoyens à trouver ce que les individus doivent faire. à
(4) Mais on n'a pas le contenu du ''ethical thinking'', je vais citer Singer au moment où il explique son raisonnement, il est clair et fait le lien entre le début de l'éthique et où la raison peut le mener ''Reasoning in ethics is not limited to the negative task of rejecting custom as a source of moral authority. We can progress toward rational settlement of disputes over ethics by taking the element of disinterestedness inherent in the idea of justifying one's conduct to society as a whole and extending this to the principle that to be ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests of all affected by it''.
(5) Il a étayé son critère moral, il faut être impartial, et avoir une égale considération des intérêts. Pour avoir des intérêts il faut que des choses puissent être bonne ou mauvaise pour soi.
(6) Il rejette ensuite les autres théories morales en disant qu'ils supposent un réalisme méta éthique et avance l'argument de la bizzarerie de Mackie pour défendre pourquoi cela est faux. Donc si qq1 défend que quoi que ce soit d'autre que le simple fait que ses intérêts ont autant de valeur que ceux des autres a de la valeur morale, il doit justifier que ce critère moral X qu'il invoque est vrai, pour ce faire il tente de prouver que le réalisme moral est vrai, et le réalisme moral est faux donc c'est impossible.
(7) Il parle de d'autres choses, chapitre absolument passionnant, mais c'est l'essentiel.
Je vais continuer plus tard pour les autres chapitre, mais le 4e sur la raison est jouissif, magnifique.
Les 2 premiers chapitres sont dédiés à une explication de l'origine biologique de l'éthique. En fait, ce que tente de défendre Singer est qu'il y a des avantages de ''fitness'' à être altruiste, qu'il est logique du point de vue de la sélection naturelle que nos ancêtres avec des gênes altruistes se sont reproduis. Il parle de 3 différentes sortes d'altruisme ''naturelles'' (naturelles dans le sens qui se sont développé non pas parce la raison, mais parce qu'avoir ces traits était avantageux à la survie). Le ''kin altruism'', le ''reciprocal altruism'' et le ''group altruism''. L'altruisme = favoriser la survie de qq1 d'autre avant la sienne dans certaines circonstances. Kin altruism = favoriser qq1 de sa famille, reciprocal altruism = favoriser qq1 qui te rend un service, group altruism je m'en rappelle moyen hihi.
Bref, l'idée étant que même si ça parait contradictoire, il est avantageux pour les individus de ne pas favoriser sa propre survie. Dans le cas du kin altruism c'est que la sélection naturelle se fait au niveau des gènes, puis que les membres d'une même famille partagent les gènes. Donc, si un individu se sacrifie pour ses parents/frères soeurs voir même cousins/neveux ca peut souvent être avantageux au point de vue de la transmission de ses gènes. Si, par exemple, en se sacrifiant il sauve 6 membres de sa famille il y a plus de chance que ses gènes soient transmis que s'il est égoiste. Dans le cas du reciprocal altruism c'est plus simple, c'est juste que parfois un échange de service est bénéfique à la survie, que le moment où tu avantages l'autre personne te sera redonné plus tard. Certaines tâches ne peuvent être accomplies seules, une entente tacite entre individus qui tentent de se protéger permet d'améliorer la fitness.
Après avoir avancé cela, il défend dans le 3e chapitre qu'il y a une différence entre la morale « naturelle » et la bonne moralité, ce qui est à privilégier. Il cite E.O. Wilson qui tente, dans son livre publié en 1975 de dire que les philosophes devraient cesser de s'intéresser à l'éthique, que ca devrait plutôt être la tâche des sociobiologistes qui, en trouvant les tendances naturelles de l'homme trouvent en même temps ce qu'ils doivent faire. Singer argument qu'il y a une différence fondamentale. Elle se trouve dans le ''is ought gap'', les faits n'ont pas, contrairement aux valeurs, la capacité de motiver mes actions. ''No science will ever discover ethical premises inherent in our biological nature, because ethical premises are not the kind of thing discovered by scientific investigation''. Par là il veut dire que la science découvre des faits, puis que le contenu de l'éthique n'est pas factuel, puisque fondamentalement il cherche à donner des raisons d'agir et que les faits ne peuvent pas donner des raisons d'agir. Essentiellement c'est ce qu'il fait dans ce chapitre, prouver que la différence est fondamentale, mais il admet que la science aide beaucoup l'éthique, la science permet de dire ce qu'est le monde et quand on prend des décisions on se base sur des valeurs, certes, mais l'application de ces valeurs varie selon l'état du monde, donc science et éthique doivent collaborer pour que les individus aient de bonnes raisons d'agir.
Le 4e et de loin meilleur chapitre selon moi est celui où Singer fait de la philosophie morale à proprement parler, il défend sa conception morale et la justifie. Sa justification est tellement alléchante, bien justifiée, simple qu'elle me convainc. Le seul hic est qu'il ne parle pas d'utilitarisme, ce qu'il justifie est la chose suivante:
(1)L'éthique commence quand des individus tentent de justifier leur conduite auprès des autres membre de leurs groupes
(2) Toute tentative de justification, si elle veut être convaincante, doit être impartiale, dans les mots de Singer, il faut que la personne qui tente de justifier sa conduite soit désintéressée.
(3) À partir de là, la raison intervient et ce que Singer appelle ''ethical thinking'' devient un sujet auquel la raison pense et développe des arguments. Le ''ethical thinking'' a commencé par une tentative de justifier sa conduite aux autres et à partir de cela, la raison a commencé à réfléchir à l'éthique en tant que tel et le but a graduellement modifié à tentative de convaincre ses concitoyens à trouver ce que les individus doivent faire. à
(4) Mais on n'a pas le contenu du ''ethical thinking'', je vais citer Singer au moment où il explique son raisonnement, il est clair et fait le lien entre le début de l'éthique et où la raison peut le mener ''Reasoning in ethics is not limited to the negative task of rejecting custom as a source of moral authority. We can progress toward rational settlement of disputes over ethics by taking the element of disinterestedness inherent in the idea of justifying one's conduct to society as a whole and extending this to the principle that to be ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests of all affected by it''.
(5) Il a étayé son critère moral, il faut être impartial, et avoir une égale considération des intérêts. Pour avoir des intérêts il faut que des choses puissent être bonne ou mauvaise pour soi.
(6) Il rejette ensuite les autres théories morales en disant qu'ils supposent un réalisme méta éthique et avance l'argument de la bizzarerie de Mackie pour défendre pourquoi cela est faux. Donc si qq1 défend que quoi que ce soit d'autre que le simple fait que ses intérêts ont autant de valeur que ceux des autres a de la valeur morale, il doit justifier que ce critère moral X qu'il invoque est vrai, pour ce faire il tente de prouver que le réalisme moral est vrai, et le réalisme moral est faux donc c'est impossible.
(7) Il parle de d'autres choses, chapitre absolument passionnant, mais c'est l'essentiel.
Je vais continuer plus tard pour les autres chapitre, mais le 4e sur la raison est jouissif, magnifique.
August 13, 2021
The Expanding Circle is one of the best and most concise ways of thinking about the evolution of moral philosophy and ethics, specifically as it pertains to our moral considerations for those outside of our family, outside our community, outside our nation, outside our race, and outside our species.
Peter Singer puts forward astute and compelling reasoning in establishing this view of moral progress, using discoveries from biology to illustrate the flaws in our outdated perception of humankind being an elite species worthy of exalted moral status who have the moral right to use and abuse other life to our own gain. The differences between us and the others on this planet are not nearly as vast as we once believed, and we are finding through improved research and inquiry that the qualities we once thought separated us from the “lower animals” are little more than folk wisdom and myths. Even attentive and anecdotal experience with animals is often enough to dispel many of these myths, and yet like most bad ideas, they persist to a degree that is disproportionate to their merit.
In ages past, humans gave moral consideration to themselves, centered on their own survival, and extended it only to their immediate family or tribe. This was survival. Anyone or anything outside that moral circle was a threat, an enemy, a victim, or a tool, and to those within the circle, anything was allowable toward those outside it. The obvious problem here is that everyone has their own tiny circle, and the same attitude toward those outside of it. Violence and hostility reign. This model goes a long way toward explaining the moral character of much of human history.
As survival becomes established and concerns for immediate life and death can be put to lower priority, and as tribes unite and settle, the moral circle expands to include a broader set of individuals, those who make up your community and your immediate, every day life. You depend on them, they depend on you. This dependence is your justification for extending your moral circle to include them, still rooted in self-interest. Leaving them out of your moral circle may hinder your own existence.
Singer traces out the expansion of this moral circle through human history, and how progression in human civilization leads to progress in moral consideration and the broadening of compassion, as we slowly but surely expand that circle to include those outside of our community, then those outside our nation, and only very recently and not quite completely, to those outside our race. This is all expounded on in rock solid moral reasoning that is Singer’s strength, and he talks through the benefits and the obstacles and history of these growing moral considerations.
Despite this grand moral progress through the ages, there is much further to go, and this extension is met today with the same resistance that moral expansion has always been met with in the past: an artificial categorization in which the self is placed at the center and the moral circle is only extended as far as the self is willing to stretch its conception of allowable difference. While we have, as a species, largely overcome and rightfully stigmatized the limitation of that moral circle based on genetics, nationality, or race, our species still operates under the assumption that limiting that moral consideration and compassion along species lines is a justifiable thing.
An illuminating thought experiment is brought to mind. If you’re a person who looks disapprovingly on people in the past for their acceptance of slavery or indentured servitude or other forms of use and abuse of people for self-serving gain, you might want to reflect on what you think your own attitude would have been toward slavery 200 years ago. If you believe you would have been morally sophisticated enough to oppose slavery 200 years ago, there is a simple test you can take to check.
The moral circle of the general society in the US 200 years ago had extended only to those of the same skin color. This is why slavery of blacks was widely accepted and defended — they were not included in the moral circle of mainstream society. By definition, almost everyone’s moral circle was limited by this factor. The only way you can believe you would have transcended the boundaries of the moral circle of mainstream US society 200 years ago is if you transcend the boundaries of the moral circle of mainstream society today.
Where does that mainstream boundary lie? It lies at the species barrier. It is reasonable to say that unless your own moral circle extends beyond the species barrier and you included all non-human species in your moral considerations, extending them the same kinds of compassion and non-violence with which you treat your fellow humans, you cannot realistically suppose you would have been capable of seeing beyond similar societal moral boundaries 200 years ago. You would have been just as ruled by majority moral sentiment as you are today. Your moral circle is only as wide as that of the general population, and so it would have been when that moral circle excluded blacks and others not similar enough to you. The expansion of the moral circle means expanding the allowable differences between you and those to whom you extend compassion and moral treatment.
Singer illuminates the science and the logic that discredits the common justifications given for drawing our moral boundaries at the species line, and as usual, his expertise in ethics provides a stimulating and invigorating approach to moral and ethical thinking that makes more sense and stands up to greater scrutiny than any competing moral philosophy I have ever studied or learned about.
Peter Singer puts forward astute and compelling reasoning in establishing this view of moral progress, using discoveries from biology to illustrate the flaws in our outdated perception of humankind being an elite species worthy of exalted moral status who have the moral right to use and abuse other life to our own gain. The differences between us and the others on this planet are not nearly as vast as we once believed, and we are finding through improved research and inquiry that the qualities we once thought separated us from the “lower animals” are little more than folk wisdom and myths. Even attentive and anecdotal experience with animals is often enough to dispel many of these myths, and yet like most bad ideas, they persist to a degree that is disproportionate to their merit.
In ages past, humans gave moral consideration to themselves, centered on their own survival, and extended it only to their immediate family or tribe. This was survival. Anyone or anything outside that moral circle was a threat, an enemy, a victim, or a tool, and to those within the circle, anything was allowable toward those outside it. The obvious problem here is that everyone has their own tiny circle, and the same attitude toward those outside of it. Violence and hostility reign. This model goes a long way toward explaining the moral character of much of human history.
As survival becomes established and concerns for immediate life and death can be put to lower priority, and as tribes unite and settle, the moral circle expands to include a broader set of individuals, those who make up your community and your immediate, every day life. You depend on them, they depend on you. This dependence is your justification for extending your moral circle to include them, still rooted in self-interest. Leaving them out of your moral circle may hinder your own existence.
Singer traces out the expansion of this moral circle through human history, and how progression in human civilization leads to progress in moral consideration and the broadening of compassion, as we slowly but surely expand that circle to include those outside of our community, then those outside our nation, and only very recently and not quite completely, to those outside our race. This is all expounded on in rock solid moral reasoning that is Singer’s strength, and he talks through the benefits and the obstacles and history of these growing moral considerations.
Despite this grand moral progress through the ages, there is much further to go, and this extension is met today with the same resistance that moral expansion has always been met with in the past: an artificial categorization in which the self is placed at the center and the moral circle is only extended as far as the self is willing to stretch its conception of allowable difference. While we have, as a species, largely overcome and rightfully stigmatized the limitation of that moral circle based on genetics, nationality, or race, our species still operates under the assumption that limiting that moral consideration and compassion along species lines is a justifiable thing.
An illuminating thought experiment is brought to mind. If you’re a person who looks disapprovingly on people in the past for their acceptance of slavery or indentured servitude or other forms of use and abuse of people for self-serving gain, you might want to reflect on what you think your own attitude would have been toward slavery 200 years ago. If you believe you would have been morally sophisticated enough to oppose slavery 200 years ago, there is a simple test you can take to check.
The moral circle of the general society in the US 200 years ago had extended only to those of the same skin color. This is why slavery of blacks was widely accepted and defended — they were not included in the moral circle of mainstream society. By definition, almost everyone’s moral circle was limited by this factor. The only way you can believe you would have transcended the boundaries of the moral circle of mainstream US society 200 years ago is if you transcend the boundaries of the moral circle of mainstream society today.
Where does that mainstream boundary lie? It lies at the species barrier. It is reasonable to say that unless your own moral circle extends beyond the species barrier and you included all non-human species in your moral considerations, extending them the same kinds of compassion and non-violence with which you treat your fellow humans, you cannot realistically suppose you would have been capable of seeing beyond similar societal moral boundaries 200 years ago. You would have been just as ruled by majority moral sentiment as you are today. Your moral circle is only as wide as that of the general population, and so it would have been when that moral circle excluded blacks and others not similar enough to you. The expansion of the moral circle means expanding the allowable differences between you and those to whom you extend compassion and moral treatment.
Singer illuminates the science and the logic that discredits the common justifications given for drawing our moral boundaries at the species line, and as usual, his expertise in ethics provides a stimulating and invigorating approach to moral and ethical thinking that makes more sense and stands up to greater scrutiny than any competing moral philosophy I have ever studied or learned about.
October 21, 2013
This is an intelligent, highly-readable piece of philosophy that, for the most part, is still relevant to modern discussions about the tension between biology and ethics. Written as a direct response to E.O. Wilson's texts Sociobiology and On Human Nature, this book is a good primer for anyone interested in the longstanding debate concerning whether we ought to look to science or philosophy to resolve our deepest moral quandaries. Like any balanced author, Singer proposes a hybrid approach: we need to couple scientific facts with philosophically-derived ethical principles. While this position isn't very novel today, I imagine it was probably much more so in the early '80s when most of the world was still busy demonizing E.O. Wilson for his incredibly insightful and regrettably inflammatory work.
Before reading this, Singer was known to me as someone who achieved notoriety by advocating a rather harsh form of utilitarianism, but I've come to understand that (unsurprisingly) his approach is more nuanced than that. Singer essentially argues that we shouldn't give up on the notion that our ethical ideals about equality and fairness have merit simply because biology and psychology might reveal humans to be a generally brutal and selfish species. It's arguable whether or not science actually does this, but in my opinion, recent insights from numerous fields have gone a long way in debunking many of the rosier elements of modern liberal thinking. It's not that we aren't capable of genuinely good acts, but rather that our potential benevolence is often obstructed by the one-two combination of our routine use of motivated reasoning and our incredible tolerance for apathy toward those we perceive to be outside of our in-group. Singer doesn't deny these facts, but like a good philosopher he also won't accept that the facts are the end of the story. He makes a cogent argument that an increase in the use of sound reasoning will not only allow individuals to behave in more ethically appropriate ways, but will also aid societies in imagining and implementing structures that "nudge" people in the right direction without dictating morals in a top-down fashion.
In general, I agree with Singer's perspective and think that, despite the numerous problems faced by the 21st century world, we have made demonstrably positive progress since this book was first published. Still, there were many points in this book where I felt like Singer was expecting far too much of average people. His final chapter ameliorated this problem somewhat, but I still felt that many of his claims amounted to something like "people will be better if they become more reasonable." To Singer, this means achieving an "objective" perspective that allows us to see that our personal desires and needs aren't truly any more important than those of strangers anywhere in the world. And while I agree with Singer on this point theoretically, I also think that hell would have to freeze over for people to actually start living this way. Additionally, I think Singer often misrepresents and makes a straw man out of E.O. Wilson, but I am perhaps biased here as Wilson is one of my all-time favorite writers. I think Wilson's ability to cut through the cultural noise and state matters clearly and directly has often been misconstrued as hubris. Singer is certainly not the only offender in this regard, and unlike some of Wilson's other critics, Singer does a good job of occasionally giving Wilson credit where credit is due.
My other big complaint is that, for someone concerned with social justice, Singer makes no mention in this text of socioeconomic or racial privilege. It seems to me that the ability to engage in the kind of ethical reasoning Singer promotes is almost entirely dependent on the availability of education and basic resources, which are in no way evenly distributed throughout the world. So while he does a good job of advocating generally for bettering the lives of impoverished people, Singer doesn't situate our ability to effectively pursue this project within the proper context of equitable distribution of wealth and/or opportunity. This seems like a big piece of the puzzle that is missing from this text. Perhaps Singer addresses the issue elsewhere.
Overall, this is a quick, smart journey into the mind of one of the most respected and readable philosophers out there.
Before reading this, Singer was known to me as someone who achieved notoriety by advocating a rather harsh form of utilitarianism, but I've come to understand that (unsurprisingly) his approach is more nuanced than that. Singer essentially argues that we shouldn't give up on the notion that our ethical ideals about equality and fairness have merit simply because biology and psychology might reveal humans to be a generally brutal and selfish species. It's arguable whether or not science actually does this, but in my opinion, recent insights from numerous fields have gone a long way in debunking many of the rosier elements of modern liberal thinking. It's not that we aren't capable of genuinely good acts, but rather that our potential benevolence is often obstructed by the one-two combination of our routine use of motivated reasoning and our incredible tolerance for apathy toward those we perceive to be outside of our in-group. Singer doesn't deny these facts, but like a good philosopher he also won't accept that the facts are the end of the story. He makes a cogent argument that an increase in the use of sound reasoning will not only allow individuals to behave in more ethically appropriate ways, but will also aid societies in imagining and implementing structures that "nudge" people in the right direction without dictating morals in a top-down fashion.
In general, I agree with Singer's perspective and think that, despite the numerous problems faced by the 21st century world, we have made demonstrably positive progress since this book was first published. Still, there were many points in this book where I felt like Singer was expecting far too much of average people. His final chapter ameliorated this problem somewhat, but I still felt that many of his claims amounted to something like "people will be better if they become more reasonable." To Singer, this means achieving an "objective" perspective that allows us to see that our personal desires and needs aren't truly any more important than those of strangers anywhere in the world. And while I agree with Singer on this point theoretically, I also think that hell would have to freeze over for people to actually start living this way. Additionally, I think Singer often misrepresents and makes a straw man out of E.O. Wilson, but I am perhaps biased here as Wilson is one of my all-time favorite writers. I think Wilson's ability to cut through the cultural noise and state matters clearly and directly has often been misconstrued as hubris. Singer is certainly not the only offender in this regard, and unlike some of Wilson's other critics, Singer does a good job of occasionally giving Wilson credit where credit is due.
My other big complaint is that, for someone concerned with social justice, Singer makes no mention in this text of socioeconomic or racial privilege. It seems to me that the ability to engage in the kind of ethical reasoning Singer promotes is almost entirely dependent on the availability of education and basic resources, which are in no way evenly distributed throughout the world. So while he does a good job of advocating generally for bettering the lives of impoverished people, Singer doesn't situate our ability to effectively pursue this project within the proper context of equitable distribution of wealth and/or opportunity. This seems like a big piece of the puzzle that is missing from this text. Perhaps Singer addresses the issue elsewhere.
Overall, this is a quick, smart journey into the mind of one of the most respected and readable philosophers out there.
February 16, 2014
A fascinating exploration of the relationship between ethics and science, especially sociobiology. Singer argues that certain kinds of altruism - kin, reciprocal, even group - may result in an evolutionary advantage, so that these traits may come to be strongly coded in our genes. The fact that these forms of altruism are 'natural' however, does not, by itself make them ethical (Singer is especially good, in Chapter 3, on drawing a distinction between the ability of science to understand and predict the behavior of human beings and the likely consequences of their actions; and its inability to help us decide which of those behaviors is ethical, while retaining our responsibility for our own actions). As reasoning beings, humans must either reject or defend their instinctive choices through the use of reason, specifically through a reference to the principle of impartiality, where everyone else's interests count as much as our own.
The appeal to this principle, which may begin as a way of codifying and justifying our instinctive choices, soon takes on a life of its own, however. For one thing, the codification of the conclusions arrived at through these principles helps to strengthen and enhance our natural altruistic (i.e. social) tendencies at both the individual and group levels, while making such ethical choices both cognitively less taxing for the individual, and easier to coordinate across the group. At the same time, the application of these principles naturally leads to an expansion of the circle of altruism, as our definition of 'everyone' expands beyond our family, friends and neighbors, to include our community, our nation, human beings, and eventually all sentient living things. Singer suggests that this process of expansion is driven by the cognitive dissonance we experience as rational beings when we apply the principle of impartiality to some cases but not to others, and is made compatible with evolution precisely because this kind of ethical expansion is associated with higher reasoning powers, so that the evolutionary disadvantage of generalized benevolence is offset by the evolutionary advantage of better reasoning.
That said, Singer is quick to recognize that for an ethical code for society to be viable it must not run entirely counter to our natural impulses, even though it may not (and should not) be entirely dictated by them. A social code that insisted on complete impartiality and denied our natural tendency to give primacy to our family and friends would serve as little purpose as one that fully justified these impulses as being natural. The former code would not only be too onerous for the majority of people to follow, it would, if followed, impose large costs by disrupting behaviors we currently take for granted. The solution, then, is a kind of compromise: a social moral code that allows for the primacy of kin and reciprocal loyalties while pushing us to reason impartially towards others when these loyalties are not threatened. And an individual ethic that encourages us to consider forms of generalized altruism that we would not penalize others for not attempting, and tied to a recognition that for those of us living comfortable modern lives the genetically coded imperatives to limit the circle of altruism no longer make sense.
The appeal to this principle, which may begin as a way of codifying and justifying our instinctive choices, soon takes on a life of its own, however. For one thing, the codification of the conclusions arrived at through these principles helps to strengthen and enhance our natural altruistic (i.e. social) tendencies at both the individual and group levels, while making such ethical choices both cognitively less taxing for the individual, and easier to coordinate across the group. At the same time, the application of these principles naturally leads to an expansion of the circle of altruism, as our definition of 'everyone' expands beyond our family, friends and neighbors, to include our community, our nation, human beings, and eventually all sentient living things. Singer suggests that this process of expansion is driven by the cognitive dissonance we experience as rational beings when we apply the principle of impartiality to some cases but not to others, and is made compatible with evolution precisely because this kind of ethical expansion is associated with higher reasoning powers, so that the evolutionary disadvantage of generalized benevolence is offset by the evolutionary advantage of better reasoning.
That said, Singer is quick to recognize that for an ethical code for society to be viable it must not run entirely counter to our natural impulses, even though it may not (and should not) be entirely dictated by them. A social code that insisted on complete impartiality and denied our natural tendency to give primacy to our family and friends would serve as little purpose as one that fully justified these impulses as being natural. The former code would not only be too onerous for the majority of people to follow, it would, if followed, impose large costs by disrupting behaviors we currently take for granted. The solution, then, is a kind of compromise: a social moral code that allows for the primacy of kin and reciprocal loyalties while pushing us to reason impartially towards others when these loyalties are not threatened. And an individual ethic that encourages us to consider forms of generalized altruism that we would not penalize others for not attempting, and tied to a recognition that for those of us living comfortable modern lives the genetically coded imperatives to limit the circle of altruism no longer make sense.
March 9, 2019
I remember enjoying Singer's style not long ago. Now I find it much too fluid for my taste. It's difficult to extract out the key points because everything is presented in a continuous chain of reasoning.
As far as I could tell this book is trying to do two things. First, to make the observation that over time people extend moral consideration to an expanding circle of beings, initially just kin and those one is frequently in contact with (so that reciprocal altruism is important), then to neighbouring tribes/villages, then to neighbouring countries, then different races/genders, then different species, and then who knows. This expansion is nicely illustrated by Plato advocating for Greeks to only enslave barbarians and not other Greeks.
The second thing the book does is propose a mechanism for the expanding circle. I think Singer's theory of Expanding Circle Mechanics can be summed up with two quotes. First, a quote by Marx (which is reproduced in The Expanding Circle):
Although Singer wouldn't restrict this to just the ruling class, it seems more obvious how this would work for the ruling class. Everyone needs to justify their actions to others in universal terms. Singer:
In particular, this process is mostly progressed by a small number of superior moral thinkers (Plato and Mill are two obvious candidates, and probably Singer himself) who notice inconsistencies in prevalent moral paradigms and champion radical new moral theories.
All pretty interesting stuff, but I think got all the key points from the two-page summary in The Better Angels of our Nature.
As far as I could tell this book is trying to do two things. First, to make the observation that over time people extend moral consideration to an expanding circle of beings, initially just kin and those one is frequently in contact with (so that reciprocal altruism is important), then to neighbouring tribes/villages, then to neighbouring countries, then different races/genders, then different species, and then who knows. This expansion is nicely illustrated by Plato advocating for Greeks to only enslave barbarians and not other Greeks.
The second thing the book does is propose a mechanism for the expanding circle. I think Singer's theory of Expanding Circle Mechanics can be summed up with two quotes. First, a quote by Marx (which is reproduced in The Expanding Circle):
Each new class which displaces the one previously dominant is forced, simply to be able to carry out its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all members of society, that is, ideally expressed. It has to give its ideas the form of universality and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones … Every new class, therefore, achieves dominance only on a broader basis than that of the previous class ruling.
Although Singer wouldn't restrict this to just the ruling class, it seems more obvious how this would work for the ruling class. Everyone needs to justify their actions to others in universal terms. Singer:
If we do not understand what an escalator is, we might get on it intending to go a few meters, only to find that once we are on, it is difficult to avoid going all the way to the end. Similarly, once reasoning has got started it is hard to tell where it will stop. The idea o a disinterested defence of one’s conduct emerges because of the social nature of human beings and the requirements of group living, but in the thought of reasoning beings, it takes on a logic of its own which leads to its extension beyond the bounds of the group.
In particular, this process is mostly progressed by a small number of superior moral thinkers (Plato and Mill are two obvious candidates, and probably Singer himself) who notice inconsistencies in prevalent moral paradigms and champion radical new moral theories.
All pretty interesting stuff, but I think got all the key points from the two-page summary in The Better Angels of our Nature.
December 7, 2023
Serviceable theory on morality, firmly grounded in the premise that biology dictates much, if not all, of our behaviour; in particular the author stresses the importance to deduce values from facts (and not the reverse), in order to determine a course of action; i.e. there is no 'following nature' as guiding principle; we have to deliberately choose our values (how Nietzschean!);
"The error in moving from facts to values—also known as committing “the naturalistic fallacy,” although strictly speaking this is the fallacy of defining values in terms of facts, rather than simply deducing values from facts—is not difficult to grasp. Values must provide us with reasons for action."
"Neither evolutionary theory, nor biology, nor science as a whole, can provide the ultimate premises of ethics."
"We have to choose our ultimate ethical premises ourselves. Is there anything more to be said about the choice? Existentialist philosophers, who agree that we must choose our ethical premises, say there is not. Insisting that our freedom to choose means that we are not limited to merely “following nature”—“existence precedes essence,” as they obscurely put this point—they propose that the choice of ultimate values is simply a commitment, a “leap of faith,” which is beyond any rational assessment, and thus ultimately arbitrary. This conclusion smacks of desperation, for it implies that the leap of faith which one existentialist philosopher (Heidegger) made to Nazism is, in the end, no less justifiable than the leap which another existentialist (Sartre) made to resistance to the Nazis."
"The error in moving from facts to values—also known as committing “the naturalistic fallacy,” although strictly speaking this is the fallacy of defining values in terms of facts, rather than simply deducing values from facts—is not difficult to grasp. Values must provide us with reasons for action."
"Neither evolutionary theory, nor biology, nor science as a whole, can provide the ultimate premises of ethics."
"We have to choose our ultimate ethical premises ourselves. Is there anything more to be said about the choice? Existentialist philosophers, who agree that we must choose our ethical premises, say there is not. Insisting that our freedom to choose means that we are not limited to merely “following nature”—“existence precedes essence,” as they obscurely put this point—they propose that the choice of ultimate values is simply a commitment, a “leap of faith,” which is beyond any rational assessment, and thus ultimately arbitrary. This conclusion smacks of desperation, for it implies that the leap of faith which one existentialist philosopher (Heidegger) made to Nazism is, in the end, no less justifiable than the leap which another existentialist (Sartre) made to resistance to the Nazis."
September 7, 2009
Singer is his usual self. He sets up a lot of argument's he still uses now in this book. This was not quite the page turner I was hoping for, but he has several shining moments in this whereby his philosophy becomes poetic and that's why it earns three stars. A heart felt argument for the inclusion of animals rights into our daily lives...
September 30, 2012
Singer argues very convincingly on the tendency of ethics to become more universal and less parochial once reasoning is involved. I find his line of thinking very appealing. It is not inconsistent with our evolutionary tendencies, but still explains how morality may expand beyond narrow boundaries of self, kin, and tribe.
July 26, 2016
Fantastic book but be sure to read the 2011 edition for the new afterword that summarises the scientific developments since the first edition (particularly Haidt and J. Greene's work) as well as Singer's Parfit-inspired shift to accepting the existence of objective moral truths.
February 21, 2011
This book is a short, lucid essay on the implications of sociobiology for ethical philosophy
January 6, 2020
an exceptional book which explains the conflict between our moral intuitions driven by evolution and what is actually moral when derived from reason
December 28, 2021
David Hume observed that there is an impenetrable wall between facts and values. Facts tell us the way things are -- for example, the sun is a giant ball of hydrogen and helium. Values give us reasons for action -- thou shalt not kill. One can never derive a value from only facts. As Hume wrote, anytime someone does this, there is a hidden value being silently added to the argument. Uncle Sam needs you to defend America, so you should sign up today! It may be true that America's defense requires young men to sign up for military service. This is a fact, not a value. Alone it is not a reason to join the army. Only when paired with a value like "it is virtuous to do what is necessary to defend one's country" does it follow that you should join the army.
We can learn facts about the would through observation and testing -- the scientific method. But how can one test a value? Consider two children arguing about which color is the prettiest. What test could ever be designed to settle the argument?
According to Singer in his 1981 book "The Expending Circle," sociobiologists in the 1970's thought they had figured out a way to crack morality. Using gene inheritance and evolutionary fitness, they were able to underpin many moral intuitions with facts about the world. For example, the reason people in many societies (all societies?) care more about the welfare of their own children than random children is the fact that their own children care their genes. Genes which cause parents to be indifferent between children would be bred out of the species.
So far that is all fact. But fact and values align here. A friend of mine's sister got in trouble with the law and went to prison. She has several children, the father is not in the picture, and a couple of them were headed for foster care. My friend is married, but has no children. He has lived abroad for many years. I was surprised that many people I know felt my friend was wrong for not offering to move back to his hometown to take care of his nephews. Obviously no one thinks he has an obligation to care for unrelated children. The fact of genetic relationship has turned into a moral obligation. Sociobiologists believed they could ground all moral intuition in evolutionary fact in this fashion.
The point of Singer's book is to rain on their parade. Well, not really rain, maybe just drizzle on the marching band. Singer actually ind there is a lot useful in the evolutionary approach. It just doesn't solve ethics. His main argument is that the sociobiologists' evolutionary account ignores reason. Through reasoning, and in particular trying to justify actions to others, people must use universal language. "You should buy this book because it is good to make Singer rich" doesn't go far in marketing. Impartial reasoning eventually leads to utilitarianism or something like it -- the greatest good for the greatest number. The evolutionary method helps by flagging intuitions not based on reason. We should be suspicious of our intuitions if their is a clear evolutionary origin.
The writing is typical Singer. It is extremely well-organized and for the most part explains complicated philosophical ideas in simple language with illuminating examples. Singer is the model of how to express serious philosophical ideas in clear prose.
I'm not going to detail his argument, though, because of the best chapter in the book. In the 2011 edition, Singer writes an afterward 30 years after the book was published. Here Singer is critical of some of his earlier views. In particular he brings in new arguments to show that one needs more than just rationality to justify the impartial utilitarian's point of view. One needs outside moral knowledge.
Singer writes in a footnote that he has been trying to show that any rational being would be a utilitarian for 30 years -- this was his PhD advisors position -- but he no longer believes that the position is defensible. Hume told us facts alone don't imply values. Singer, in his post-script argues reason alone isn't enough either.
We can learn facts about the would through observation and testing -- the scientific method. But how can one test a value? Consider two children arguing about which color is the prettiest. What test could ever be designed to settle the argument?
According to Singer in his 1981 book "The Expending Circle," sociobiologists in the 1970's thought they had figured out a way to crack morality. Using gene inheritance and evolutionary fitness, they were able to underpin many moral intuitions with facts about the world. For example, the reason people in many societies (all societies?) care more about the welfare of their own children than random children is the fact that their own children care their genes. Genes which cause parents to be indifferent between children would be bred out of the species.
So far that is all fact. But fact and values align here. A friend of mine's sister got in trouble with the law and went to prison. She has several children, the father is not in the picture, and a couple of them were headed for foster care. My friend is married, but has no children. He has lived abroad for many years. I was surprised that many people I know felt my friend was wrong for not offering to move back to his hometown to take care of his nephews. Obviously no one thinks he has an obligation to care for unrelated children. The fact of genetic relationship has turned into a moral obligation. Sociobiologists believed they could ground all moral intuition in evolutionary fact in this fashion.
The point of Singer's book is to rain on their parade. Well, not really rain, maybe just drizzle on the marching band. Singer actually ind there is a lot useful in the evolutionary approach. It just doesn't solve ethics. His main argument is that the sociobiologists' evolutionary account ignores reason. Through reasoning, and in particular trying to justify actions to others, people must use universal language. "You should buy this book because it is good to make Singer rich" doesn't go far in marketing. Impartial reasoning eventually leads to utilitarianism or something like it -- the greatest good for the greatest number. The evolutionary method helps by flagging intuitions not based on reason. We should be suspicious of our intuitions if their is a clear evolutionary origin.
The writing is typical Singer. It is extremely well-organized and for the most part explains complicated philosophical ideas in simple language with illuminating examples. Singer is the model of how to express serious philosophical ideas in clear prose.
I'm not going to detail his argument, though, because of the best chapter in the book. In the 2011 edition, Singer writes an afterward 30 years after the book was published. Here Singer is critical of some of his earlier views. In particular he brings in new arguments to show that one needs more than just rationality to justify the impartial utilitarian's point of view. One needs outside moral knowledge.
Singer writes in a footnote that he has been trying to show that any rational being would be a utilitarian for 30 years -- this was his PhD advisors position -- but he no longer believes that the position is defensible. Hume told us facts alone don't imply values. Singer, in his post-script argues reason alone isn't enough either.
January 16, 2022
"It is our capacity for reasoning that makes moral progress possible."
I found this book very insightful and eye-opening.
After reading Peter Singer's book on Doing Good Better and finding his approach to doing good insightful, I became interested to read this book. He didn't get to the part about the expanding circle until chapter 4. The first 3 chapters are background information. I think this works because the background info is very important for the case he makes.
After reading this, I'm inspired to read more books on this topic, especially toward the practical ones. This will probably include more book(s) by Peter Singer.
I found this book very insightful and eye-opening.
After reading Peter Singer's book on Doing Good Better and finding his approach to doing good insightful, I became interested to read this book. He didn't get to the part about the expanding circle until chapter 4. The first 3 chapters are background information. I think this works because the background info is very important for the case he makes.
After reading this, I'm inspired to read more books on this topic, especially toward the practical ones. This will probably include more book(s) by Peter Singer.
June 28, 2020
An absolutely fantastic book that philosophizes with both a hammer and a scalpel. In the same sentence it will demolish the work Hume while observing that the is some value to be extracted and taking care to cut around the edges.
Moral philosophy is perhaps one of the most parodied fields, yet this book does not suffer from the traditional tropes of inventing hexasyllabic words to describe principles. Instead, it is rooted in but not stuck in a biological perspective of where our moral compasses stem from and looks to where evolutionary thinking meets a limit.
Ultimately it finds a subtle advocacy for virtue ethics, one based in moral imperatives and selective and secretive violations of these principles that is surprisingly congruent with many modern religious intuitions.
This book isn’t groundbreaking as much as it is a wonderful cut of philosophy, one that avoids as much fat as possible. It is a starting place for an ethical code that is not ignorant of science - a trope that ironically philosophers today suffer from more than religions.
My one disappointment comes from the discussion of trolly (or trolley as the author writes) problems in the end. The bridge scenario is discussed and the author attempts to use fMRI to categorize the difference between the switch scenario. The (to me) more accessible solution is the uncertainty of the bridge scenario which is why emotions prevail. With the switch the outcome is very certain while with the bridge, I’ve always said I couldn’t predict if pushing the individual off the bridge would stop a trolly and I’m honestly doubtful it would if the trolly is moving with enough speed to kill the pedestrians. The uncertainty would force a more emotional state (as the calculating faculty cannot be relied on for outcomes) and therefore the moral rule of don’t take a life predominates.
Moral philosophy is perhaps one of the most parodied fields, yet this book does not suffer from the traditional tropes of inventing hexasyllabic words to describe principles. Instead, it is rooted in but not stuck in a biological perspective of where our moral compasses stem from and looks to where evolutionary thinking meets a limit.
Ultimately it finds a subtle advocacy for virtue ethics, one based in moral imperatives and selective and secretive violations of these principles that is surprisingly congruent with many modern religious intuitions.
This book isn’t groundbreaking as much as it is a wonderful cut of philosophy, one that avoids as much fat as possible. It is a starting place for an ethical code that is not ignorant of science - a trope that ironically philosophers today suffer from more than religions.
My one disappointment comes from the discussion of trolly (or trolley as the author writes) problems in the end. The bridge scenario is discussed and the author attempts to use fMRI to categorize the difference between the switch scenario. The (to me) more accessible solution is the uncertainty of the bridge scenario which is why emotions prevail. With the switch the outcome is very certain while with the bridge, I’ve always said I couldn’t predict if pushing the individual off the bridge would stop a trolly and I’m honestly doubtful it would if the trolly is moving with enough speed to kill the pedestrians. The uncertainty would force a more emotional state (as the calculating faculty cannot be relied on for outcomes) and therefore the moral rule of don’t take a life predominates.
December 30, 2021
"The Expanding Circle" explores the evolutionary origins of altruism, and argues that expanding one's circle of concern to encompass all people - call it ethics - is a necessary consequence of rationality. The first half, concerned with sociobiology, is quite good. The second half shifts towards philosophy and falls short: Singer tries, and fails, to derive an "ought" from an "is," though it wouldn't be fair to accuse him of the naturalistic fallacy, since investigating whether or not it is a fallacy is his explicit concern.
I came across this book in the footnotes of The Moral Animal, where it's referenced as a seminal work of sociobiology. On the whole, "The Moral Animal" is much better (standing on the shoulders of giants and all). But whereas Wright hints we might be able to derive ethics from biology, kudos to Singer for actually trying to do so.
And double kudos to Singer for conceding he was wrong. In an extra chapter added for the 20th anniversary edition, Singer explain that he no longer thinks his argument succeeds, and pretty much nails the reasons why. Interestingly, he continues to believe ethics have a foundation in reason, and he concludes by pointing the reader to the works of Derek Parfit for support. Parfit, here we come!
I came across this book in the footnotes of The Moral Animal, where it's referenced as a seminal work of sociobiology. On the whole, "The Moral Animal" is much better (standing on the shoulders of giants and all). But whereas Wright hints we might be able to derive ethics from biology, kudos to Singer for actually trying to do so.
And double kudos to Singer for conceding he was wrong. In an extra chapter added for the 20th anniversary edition, Singer explain that he no longer thinks his argument succeeds, and pretty much nails the reasons why. Interestingly, he continues to believe ethics have a foundation in reason, and he concludes by pointing the reader to the works of Derek Parfit for support. Parfit, here we come!
September 7, 2020
I saw a taped conversation between Peter Singer and Richard Dawkins (The Genius of Darwin: The Uncut Interviews - Richard Dawkins), and at one point Peter Singer suggested that he had assimilated evolutionary science better than had Dawkins. His comment in that interview completely changed my perspective about evolution, because it conveys that the most meaningful outcome of evolutionary thought is that humans have no moral claim whatsoever to dominion over animals. While Dawkins and the other scientists are busy with documenting everything possible about the intellectual subject of animals, Singer and other vegan philosophers are advocating for the equal consideration of interests of animals on the grounds of their conscious experience.
This book, in combination with "Animal Liberation", form - in my opinion - the most impactful assimilation of evolutionary thought, because they communicate an ethically-imperative outgrowth of scientific discovery.
Singer's characterization of reason reminds me of Dawkins' characterization of memes, because both are pseudo-autonomous agents that only arise once the human mental habitat is sufficiently evolved.
This book, in combination with "Animal Liberation", form - in my opinion - the most impactful assimilation of evolutionary thought, because they communicate an ethically-imperative outgrowth of scientific discovery.
Singer's characterization of reason reminds me of Dawkins' characterization of memes, because both are pseudo-autonomous agents that only arise once the human mental habitat is sufficiently evolved.
February 27, 2023
Singer is admirably clear and readable in presenting what sociobiology can and can't do for us in the realm of ethics. Very brief summary: We have evolved to have certain tendencies that helped us survive, including helping our relatives and engaging in reciprocal altruism. Having developed reason, we can now use reason to expand our circle of concern beyond our family or group to all of humanity or even all feeling creatures. Sociobiology can explain where many behaviors and impulses came from, but cannot declare them good or bad. The ethical principle we should all follow as individuals is to consider the interests of all equally, not giving preference to ourselves and our group. However, this principle is too demanding in a number of ways to use for an entire society, so societies need rules such as "no killing", "no stealing", and "no lying", which are easier to teach, to make everyday decisions with, and to apply under pressure than the general principle--even though the need for exceptions is inevitable. Sociobiology can help us design rules that are well-suited to our natures and lead to better general well-being.
October 18, 2021
The deconstruction of a sociobiological basis for morality is strong enough to convince skeptics who overly rely on rationalism as if it were the only scaffolding available to build life's meaning around; a much needed foil to Dawkins' unidimensional view. A There is a lot of overlap with Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons but this is to be expected. The afterword is a welcome addition in that there is a shift to accepting the existence of objective moral truths - but this too seems like a weak admission. The hurdle of deriving ought from is, can be bridged, but not by using tools that rely on syllogism; for such an attempt will always be self defeating IMO. A shift in thinking that abandons abductive reasoning might be the only way to view the big picture - which for e.g. might include the radical admission that moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem are resolved rather easily if one allows for the time horizon for reasoning to be extended to beyond the death of either track occupants, as an eternal chain of causality.
August 14, 2023
Maybe more like 3.5 stars. I always enjoy reading Singer, and have found most of his arguments fairly persuasive. The first half of this book didn't engage me as much, largely because I am already familiar with the work of Wilson, Dawkins, et al. But I guess at the time of the book's writing, sociobiology was still a pretty new topic and merited some explanation and analysis. Anyway, the second half of the book was much more engaging. Singer makes a compelling argument that humanity's morality derives (increasingly) from our capacity to reason, and thus our more biologically-based kin altruism and reciprocal altruism are only part of the ethical picture--functioning more like stepping stones to our current moral capacity. His arguments tackle (and largely answer) a question I have long had about the value and completeness of altruistic behavior as described by sociobiology and "selfish genes," and I very much appreciate his insights.
April 24, 2022
Singer, Peter. The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology. 1981. Princeton UP, 2011.
In The Expanding Circle, Peter Singer traces the evolution of altruism. In the animal world, he finds altruism based on kinship, and in primates, he finds the beginnings of reciprocal altruism—i.e., you groom me, I’ll groom you. In human beings, he finds in the history of ethics, and an expansion of altruism to larger and larger groups. That history, he says, involves a “division between our nature as biological beings and our capacity to follow impartial reasoning” and a “clash between individual and social points of view.” We must combat the evolutionary mandate of what Richard Dawkins called the “selfish gene” and an expanding moral community that includes all human beings and eventually “to all beings with interests of whatever species.” 4 stars.
In The Expanding Circle, Peter Singer traces the evolution of altruism. In the animal world, he finds altruism based on kinship, and in primates, he finds the beginnings of reciprocal altruism—i.e., you groom me, I’ll groom you. In human beings, he finds in the history of ethics, and an expansion of altruism to larger and larger groups. That history, he says, involves a “division between our nature as biological beings and our capacity to follow impartial reasoning” and a “clash between individual and social points of view.” We must combat the evolutionary mandate of what Richard Dawkins called the “selfish gene” and an expanding moral community that includes all human beings and eventually “to all beings with interests of whatever species.” 4 stars.
August 23, 2019
A very useful and enjoyable outline of the origins of ethics from a biological, then rational, standpoint. Singer does a brilliant job of boiling the 'morass' of ethics down to simple, yet not simplistic, conclusions creating a memorable framework for conceptualising modern morality. This gives a robust pathway for how we ought to act in accordance with that framework, individually and collectively.
For me, it clarifies a lot of my intuitions about utilitarian and evolutionary morality in a direct and systematic fashion. While now rather dated (the data to back these up could do with some refreshing) it seems to still hit the nail on the head of the abstract ideas.
For me, it clarifies a lot of my intuitions about utilitarian and evolutionary morality in a direct and systematic fashion. While now rather dated (the data to back these up could do with some refreshing) it seems to still hit the nail on the head of the abstract ideas.
April 5, 2022
i shouldn't even rate this really.
it was way too much for me.
i've read other singer books - how are we to live, the life you can save, the ethics of what we eat, animal liberation - and found them simple and approachable and chockfull of real wisdom. he's changed the way i live, really.
but i couldn't understand this. it was dense and way over my head.
that's on me, not on the book, of course.
but if you're average iq, or below average, which i guess i might be, then you're probably not gonna have a good time with this.
it was way too much for me.
i've read other singer books - how are we to live, the life you can save, the ethics of what we eat, animal liberation - and found them simple and approachable and chockfull of real wisdom. he's changed the way i live, really.
but i couldn't understand this. it was dense and way over my head.
that's on me, not on the book, of course.
but if you're average iq, or below average, which i guess i might be, then you're probably not gonna have a good time with this.
September 3, 2020
Morality has its origins in our evolutionary history, kin selection and reciprocal altruism. However once Humans begin to reason, we see that the only objective place to reason from is one where every individual is treated equally. Once we start reasoning however, we don't know where we'll end up. Trying to undo contradictions in conventional morality we see that the circle of encompassing what has moral worth expands, to other tribes, other races and ultimately to all sentient life.
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