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Strategy
"The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time." – Library Journal
This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Strategy is a seminal work of military history and theory, a perfect companion to Sun-tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clauswitz’s On War.
Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibility, and surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit.
This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Strategy is a seminal work of military history and theory, a perfect companion to Sun-tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clauswitz’s On War.
Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibility, and surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit.
448 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1941
About the author
B.H. Liddell Hart
132 books254 followersSir Basil Henry Liddell Hart usually known before his knighthood as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart was an English soldier, military historian and leading inter-war theorist.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 95 reviews
July 24, 2021
The book in one sentence: no one wins through a direct approach. In the course of history, the most significant battles are the ones that was won using the theory of indirect approach. The aspects discussed there are very much applicable in our daily lives and relevant. The indirect approach can be applied in busniesses, in our work place, in our relationships, in selling our ideas, and more. I highly suggest that you should read this book along with "The Prince" by Machiavelli.
October 16, 2013
'Oh wow, a modern thinker who heavily cites Sun Tzu and loves the Mongols, I better read this.' I thought to myself for both personal and academic reasons. 'Sounds like a perfect fit for me.'
Well, the good news is there are occasional flashes of insight and it certainly is worth reading to complete the repertoire in strategy. The author's views of the genius of General Sherman were particularly spot on.
The bad news is that for a guy who quotes Sun Tzu alot he really doesnt seem to have understood anything the man was trying to say. In fact, in his well intentioned (and quite possibly psychologically inspired from the author's service in the WWI) obsession with the indirect approach makes him predictable as a strategist...and Sun Tzu was above all things about surprise and winning before the fight has even started. Someone who actually understood Master Sun's methods would easily defeat BH Liddel-Hart by seeing his monolithic, if unconventional, doctrine, and adjusting for it. Sun Tzu said do what the enemy is least prepared for, sometimes that is indirect, and sometimes it is shockingly direct.
The North Vietnamese won the battle for South Vietnam by bringing the fight to American public opinion in the very direct and tactically calamitous Tet Offensive. Even worse for this book, the author ignores things which had happened before he wrote the text in his insistent cherry-picking. The Franco-Prussian war is excused off as a fluke and the failure of Gallipolli is viewed as one of tactics and not strategy, as if there was an easy way to assault Istanbul from an amphibious campaign. There is also a fundamental misunderstanding about the Japanese objectives in 1904-5 which causes him to somewhat throw that case too.
Overall, I am not so impressed.
Well, the good news is there are occasional flashes of insight and it certainly is worth reading to complete the repertoire in strategy. The author's views of the genius of General Sherman were particularly spot on.
The bad news is that for a guy who quotes Sun Tzu alot he really doesnt seem to have understood anything the man was trying to say. In fact, in his well intentioned (and quite possibly psychologically inspired from the author's service in the WWI) obsession with the indirect approach makes him predictable as a strategist...and Sun Tzu was above all things about surprise and winning before the fight has even started. Someone who actually understood Master Sun's methods would easily defeat BH Liddel-Hart by seeing his monolithic, if unconventional, doctrine, and adjusting for it. Sun Tzu said do what the enemy is least prepared for, sometimes that is indirect, and sometimes it is shockingly direct.
The North Vietnamese won the battle for South Vietnam by bringing the fight to American public opinion in the very direct and tactically calamitous Tet Offensive. Even worse for this book, the author ignores things which had happened before he wrote the text in his insistent cherry-picking. The Franco-Prussian war is excused off as a fluke and the failure of Gallipolli is viewed as one of tactics and not strategy, as if there was an easy way to assault Istanbul from an amphibious campaign. There is also a fundamental misunderstanding about the Japanese objectives in 1904-5 which causes him to somewhat throw that case too.
Overall, I am not so impressed.
May 7, 2016
Главная мысль всей книги, можно сказать, звучит так:
- "Глубочайшая правда войны состоит в том, что исход битвы решается в умах военачальников, а не в телах их воинов".
А главный метод, которым должен обладать великий полководец и стратег состоит в том как применять метод "непрямых действий" для достижения побед в военных сражениях при этом нести минимальные потери или вообще обходиться без последних. То есть, применять нестандартные способы атаки и обороны в сражениях, таким образом чтобы вступать в бой только при таких обстоятельствах, когда положение противника наиболее ослабленное, а положение своих войск, наоборот, в наиболее благоприятных условиях для сражения.
Книга весьма обстоятельная и хорошая. Для военных людей она в самый раз! Также будет весьма интересной и для тех, кто интересуется историей и особенно историей военного искусства.
- "Глубочайшая правда войны состоит в том, что исход битвы решается в умах военачальников, а не в телах их воинов".
А главный метод, которым должен обладать великий полководец и стратег состоит в том как применять метод "непрямых действий" для достижения побед в военных сражениях при этом нести минимальные потери или вообще обходиться без последних. То есть, применять нестандартные способы атаки и обороны в сражениях, таким образом чтобы вступать в бой только при таких обстоятельствах, когда положение противника наиболее ослабленное, а положение своих войск, наоборот, в наиболее благоприятных условиях для сражения.
Книга весьма обстоятельная и хорошая. Для военных людей она в самый раз! Также будет весьма интересной и для тех, кто интересуется историей и особенно историей военного искусства.
January 9, 2024
I have read B.H. Liddell Hart commentary before. He has been frequently cited in World War 2 history. Reading this book is several years in the making for a military history buff like myself.
I rather enjoyed the overlying philosophy or lens through which Hart views successful military conflict: through the indirect approach.
I admit I have not studied ancient warfare as much. The Sparta-Theban campaign was quite illuminating. Particularly about Epaminondas the Theban commander.
The First 60% of the book was completing a survey of significant campaigns, battles, and their commanders. Pointing out their strategic successes and their failures.
The lessons from this came down to the following maxims:
"The most consistently successful commanders, when faced by an enemy in a position that was strong naturally or materially, have hardly ever tackled it in a direct way. And when, under the pressure of circumstances, they have risked a direct attack, the result has commonly been to blot their record with a failure."
“In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance.”
“The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.”
I came to this book, not so much as a commentary on a particular campaign or battle but rather for military thinking and education. In this respect, this book was everything I needed.
The icing on the cake was WW1 and WW2 strategic thinking in the last chapters of the book.
My only complaint is that the campaign and battle movements were sometimes difficult to follow (directionally) without a map for reference (audio version only).
I rather enjoyed the overlying philosophy or lens through which Hart views successful military conflict: through the indirect approach.
I admit I have not studied ancient warfare as much. The Sparta-Theban campaign was quite illuminating. Particularly about Epaminondas the Theban commander.
The First 60% of the book was completing a survey of significant campaigns, battles, and their commanders. Pointing out their strategic successes and their failures.
The lessons from this came down to the following maxims:
"The most consistently successful commanders, when faced by an enemy in a position that was strong naturally or materially, have hardly ever tackled it in a direct way. And when, under the pressure of circumstances, they have risked a direct attack, the result has commonly been to blot their record with a failure."
“In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance.”
“The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.”
I came to this book, not so much as a commentary on a particular campaign or battle but rather for military thinking and education. In this respect, this book was everything I needed.
The icing on the cake was WW1 and WW2 strategic thinking in the last chapters of the book.
My only complaint is that the campaign and battle movements were sometimes difficult to follow (directionally) without a map for reference (audio version only).
October 25, 2007
I bought this on recommendation of a military-history-buff friend. It was then booknapped for the better part of a year by a housemate who works in politics.
I finally read it and really enjoyed it. It's amazing to think that Hart was one of the first military thinkers of the modern era to discuss tangential strategy. That is, if you're pursuing a goal you should always be finding and employing the least costly method to reach that goal, even if it doesn't appear to be directly related to the goal.
For Hart it was interrupting supply lines and being smart about the direct engagements you choose for your army. If you take a few steps back his ideas have infinite application (though very well tread-upon since the 20s when this was written).
This is a terrible paraphrase of a terrific book I read several years ago, but the bottom line is you should get it. Don't take it to literally or the case studies will bog you down.
I finally read it and really enjoyed it. It's amazing to think that Hart was one of the first military thinkers of the modern era to discuss tangential strategy. That is, if you're pursuing a goal you should always be finding and employing the least costly method to reach that goal, even if it doesn't appear to be directly related to the goal.
For Hart it was interrupting supply lines and being smart about the direct engagements you choose for your army. If you take a few steps back his ideas have infinite application (though very well tread-upon since the 20s when this was written).
This is a terrible paraphrase of a terrific book I read several years ago, but the bottom line is you should get it. Don't take it to literally or the case studies will bog you down.
April 18, 2020
Книга потрясающая!!!
November 5, 2023
This should be illuminating
Liddell Hart and the Weight of History
John Mearsheimer
Cornell University Press
For almost half a century, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970) was the most highly regarded writer on strategy and military matters in the English-speaking world and even today, his ideas are still discussed and debated. Although he helped to formulate Great Britain's military doctrine after the First World War, it was his critique of British strategic policy before and during the early years of the Second World War that earned him a seemingly unassailable reputation as a brilliant strategist.
In this unflinching but balanced book, John J. Mearsheimer reexamines Liddell Hart's career and uncovers evidence that he manipulated the facts to create a false picture of his role in military policy debates in the 1930s. According to Liddell Hart's widely accepted account, his progressive ideas about armored warfare were rejected by the British army and adopted instead by the more far-sighted German generals. The Wehrmacht's application of his theory of blitzkrieg, he claimed, resulted in the defeat of France in 1940, a disaster he foresaw.
Setting the historical record straight, Mearsheimer shatters once and for all the myth of Liddell Hart's prescience in the interwar period. Liddell Hart had, in fact, "been quite wrong on the basic military questions of the 1930s," Mearsheimer finds, "and his writings helped lead the British government into serious error. Wide recognition of Liddell Hart's misjudgments badly damaged his reputation during the war, and Mearsheimer shows how he mounted a successful campaign to restore his image. Although some of Liddell Hart's military theories are still relevant, Mearsheimer warns that they should be applied with caution.
This troubling book offers a striking illustration of how history can be used and abused—how a gifted individual can create their own self-serving version of the past. Based on scrupulously documented evidence, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History is certain to be of great interest to those concerned with military policy and history.
.........
Basically a book that can range from 1 star to 4 stars for how far you tolerate doctored history, and how he really understood or didn't understand Sun-Tzu, or if he was the sole voice saying something was lacking in British strategy in World War One.
and how peculiar Liddell Hart and JFC Fuller were for being, oh slightly fascist on a couple of things, if you look at their lives and how strange they were in the politics.
Liddell Hart and the Weight of History
John Mearsheimer
Cornell University Press
For almost half a century, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970) was the most highly regarded writer on strategy and military matters in the English-speaking world and even today, his ideas are still discussed and debated. Although he helped to formulate Great Britain's military doctrine after the First World War, it was his critique of British strategic policy before and during the early years of the Second World War that earned him a seemingly unassailable reputation as a brilliant strategist.
In this unflinching but balanced book, John J. Mearsheimer reexamines Liddell Hart's career and uncovers evidence that he manipulated the facts to create a false picture of his role in military policy debates in the 1930s. According to Liddell Hart's widely accepted account, his progressive ideas about armored warfare were rejected by the British army and adopted instead by the more far-sighted German generals. The Wehrmacht's application of his theory of blitzkrieg, he claimed, resulted in the defeat of France in 1940, a disaster he foresaw.
Setting the historical record straight, Mearsheimer shatters once and for all the myth of Liddell Hart's prescience in the interwar period. Liddell Hart had, in fact, "been quite wrong on the basic military questions of the 1930s," Mearsheimer finds, "and his writings helped lead the British government into serious error. Wide recognition of Liddell Hart's misjudgments badly damaged his reputation during the war, and Mearsheimer shows how he mounted a successful campaign to restore his image. Although some of Liddell Hart's military theories are still relevant, Mearsheimer warns that they should be applied with caution.
This troubling book offers a striking illustration of how history can be used and abused—how a gifted individual can create their own self-serving version of the past. Based on scrupulously documented evidence, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History is certain to be of great interest to those concerned with military policy and history.
.........
Basically a book that can range from 1 star to 4 stars for how far you tolerate doctored history, and how he really understood or didn't understand Sun-Tzu, or if he was the sole voice saying something was lacking in British strategy in World War One.
and how peculiar Liddell Hart and JFC Fuller were for being, oh slightly fascist on a couple of things, if you look at their lives and how strange they were in the politics.
January 22, 2020
Hart theorizes that the best way to complete your goal and win, with an army or a politician is thru the indirect approach. The more you fight and push, the more push back you receive. Like getting out of quicksand, slow, stead and distributed are the best ways to obtain your purpose.
Why I started this book: Yeah for finding more Professional Reading titles recently released as audio.
Why I finished it: Very interesting to read this after reading Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare because Gray gives his opinions (negative and dismissive) of Hart's work. And while I agree on the main with Gray (the indirect way is just saying hit where the enemy isn't expecting and know when to stop), Hart was writing during the 1930s and beginning of 1940s and trying to synthesize his theories while Hitler was rampaging and on the upswing of his conquering Europe. And frankly with Trump in office, I feel like a real read along is also Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. Every action has a consequence and an unintended side effect.
Why I started this book: Yeah for finding more Professional Reading titles recently released as audio.
Why I finished it: Very interesting to read this after reading Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare because Gray gives his opinions (negative and dismissive) of Hart's work. And while I agree on the main with Gray (the indirect way is just saying hit where the enemy isn't expecting and know when to stop), Hart was writing during the 1930s and beginning of 1940s and trying to synthesize his theories while Hitler was rampaging and on the upswing of his conquering Europe. And frankly with Trump in office, I feel like a real read along is also Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. Every action has a consequence and an unintended side effect.
September 1, 2014
I really enjoyed this book, especially its broad range of historical studies to back up his conclusions. The 4-star rating is mainly due to the fact that this is an old book (Liddell Hart of course wrote doctrine that was ignored by the allies, but the Germans loved it!). No fault of the author's though. Since this is an old book, many of the terms used in today's militaries are not included. No big deal.
I guess that is another reason to read this book. Liddell Hart's work is early. His ideas were used in warfare. He saw his ideas used then wrote about those who used his ideas. That is the interesting aspect if you read this book. Here is a perfect example of a person with ideas and those ideas become reality.
I enjoyed it and recommend this for its historical and strategic discussions.
I guess that is another reason to read this book. Liddell Hart's work is early. His ideas were used in warfare. He saw his ideas used then wrote about those who used his ideas. That is the interesting aspect if you read this book. Here is a perfect example of a person with ideas and those ideas become reality.
I enjoyed it and recommend this for its historical and strategic discussions.
June 20, 2019
For anyone who wants to gain a basic understanding of strategy and tactics and how they developed over time through various wars and battles, this is the book to read. Even after having read it in the early 1980s, "STRATEGY" continues to resonate with me.
March 6, 2022
Published in 1954 (second edition), renowned strategist Liddell-Hart discusses the "indirect approach" of "subverting expectations" and avoiding direct conflict in favour of identifying and exploiting the constant dynamic of ever-changing strengths and weaknesses, thereby severing your enemy's "strategic balance."
The goal of the indirect approach is to place your enemy at a "psychological disadvantage," using "movement and surprise," expressed as lures, traps, deception, distraction and flanking maneuvers to dislocate the distribution of, and divide, enemy forces; attacks on supply to demoralise the enemy; and prevent retreat by threatening escape routes to psychologically break the enemy.
Liddell-Hart contends that true strategy aims for bloodless victory. And the proximity to a bloodless win serves as the measure for strategy effectiveness. He argues that a direct attack consolidates psychological equilibrium, rather than dislocating it, increasing the costs of battle victory to a point where it may compromise the grand strategy.
The first part of the book is exploring examples of the indirect approach used throughout history. Although they were interesting, the concepts were not particularly generalisable. Nevertheless, the lack of explicit summaries in each case avoids the Feynman Trap historians often encounter in justifying the causal outcomes of military strategy after the fact and then assuming such hypotheses are predictive in their general use. It also allows for procedural learning, where the subtle nuances between the examples allows for a deeper intuited understanding of Liddell-Hart's thesis.
However, Liddell-Hart relies on the reader having enough knowledge of history to know the details of the story to gain much insight from his analysis of the battles. If you, like I, had little understanding of who the sides are, who their great leaders were and what they wanted, you were left either confused as to what's going on, or needing to go off and research the background of the story.
Finally, the book emphasised grand strategy as the approach to victory. This unduly promotes the idea that the general and commander must be an omniscient being, and all armed forces should be under centralised control. This reduces flexibility, opens the possibility of loss due to poor decisions and bias, and adds bureaucratic layers that slows responsiveness. Another huge issue with grand strategy is the idea that all political and military choices are within the sphere of control of the grant strategist. However, the sphere of control is often an illusion, and the broader the range of influence is, the more dynamic and complex a system is that the strategist operates, requiring adaptability, and therefore intelligence (information) and flexibility to maneuver, which is precisely the context where centralised grand strategy fails.
Nevertheless, Liddell-Hart's emphasis on psychological warfare is as important as it is impacting. There's no doubt that it had profound effect on modern-day military strategy, while it also explains, through lack of execution, many of the failures in counterinsurgency demonstrated in recent years, which has tended to concentrate insurgency resolve, as opposed to disolating it.
The goal of the indirect approach is to place your enemy at a "psychological disadvantage," using "movement and surprise," expressed as lures, traps, deception, distraction and flanking maneuvers to dislocate the distribution of, and divide, enemy forces; attacks on supply to demoralise the enemy; and prevent retreat by threatening escape routes to psychologically break the enemy.
Liddell-Hart contends that true strategy aims for bloodless victory. And the proximity to a bloodless win serves as the measure for strategy effectiveness. He argues that a direct attack consolidates psychological equilibrium, rather than dislocating it, increasing the costs of battle victory to a point where it may compromise the grand strategy.
The first part of the book is exploring examples of the indirect approach used throughout history. Although they were interesting, the concepts were not particularly generalisable. Nevertheless, the lack of explicit summaries in each case avoids the Feynman Trap historians often encounter in justifying the causal outcomes of military strategy after the fact and then assuming such hypotheses are predictive in their general use. It also allows for procedural learning, where the subtle nuances between the examples allows for a deeper intuited understanding of Liddell-Hart's thesis.
However, Liddell-Hart relies on the reader having enough knowledge of history to know the details of the story to gain much insight from his analysis of the battles. If you, like I, had little understanding of who the sides are, who their great leaders were and what they wanted, you were left either confused as to what's going on, or needing to go off and research the background of the story.
Finally, the book emphasised grand strategy as the approach to victory. This unduly promotes the idea that the general and commander must be an omniscient being, and all armed forces should be under centralised control. This reduces flexibility, opens the possibility of loss due to poor decisions and bias, and adds bureaucratic layers that slows responsiveness. Another huge issue with grand strategy is the idea that all political and military choices are within the sphere of control of the grant strategist. However, the sphere of control is often an illusion, and the broader the range of influence is, the more dynamic and complex a system is that the strategist operates, requiring adaptability, and therefore intelligence (information) and flexibility to maneuver, which is precisely the context where centralised grand strategy fails.
Nevertheless, Liddell-Hart's emphasis on psychological warfare is as important as it is impacting. There's no doubt that it had profound effect on modern-day military strategy, while it also explains, through lack of execution, many of the failures in counterinsurgency demonstrated in recent years, which has tended to concentrate insurgency resolve, as opposed to disolating it.
July 31, 2008
I read this after I'd joined the Navy and before I reported for boot-camp. Even though my brother (an ex-Marine) told me I wouldn't need to know anything the book had to offer, I thought I might as well learn all I could about military thinking before I went in. It was an engaging read.
I was surprised to learn that one of the most effective military strategies is economic sanctions. The author posed the theory that WWII wouldn't have lasted nearly as long if England and France had taken sanctions against Germany instead of plunging headlong into war like they did, allowing Germany to maintain its economy and gear up for war.
I also understood better Gen. Scott's "Anaconda" theory for the Civil War and was able to see the reasoning behind some of the Civil War campaigns while reading Shelby Foote's Civil War series.
I recommend this book to anyone in the military and to those interested in military history.
I was surprised to learn that one of the most effective military strategies is economic sanctions. The author posed the theory that WWII wouldn't have lasted nearly as long if England and France had taken sanctions against Germany instead of plunging headlong into war like they did, allowing Germany to maintain its economy and gear up for war.
I also understood better Gen. Scott's "Anaconda" theory for the Civil War and was able to see the reasoning behind some of the Civil War campaigns while reading Shelby Foote's Civil War series.
I recommend this book to anyone in the military and to those interested in military history.
July 4, 2022
"Instead of giving excessive emphasis to one means, which circumstances may render ineffective, it is wiser to choose and combine whichever are the most suitable, most penetrative, and the most conservative of effort."
I've previously myself come up with the idea of path ambivalence, which I view as choosing the most effective means to reach an objective and caring about the destination rather than the journey. I'm happy to have found an intellectual flagbearer for this idea in Liddell Hart. This is an even more compelling idea having previously encountered John Lewis Gaddis' hedgehog and fox dichotomy and of course understanding that one must simultaneously be a hedgehog and a fox. Know what you want, be open-minded and knowledgeable the many different ways to get there and then choose the most effective path.
To Liddell Hart, the most effective path will be that which is indirect, and not obviously straightforward. In his own words, "[i]n strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home." A historical example of such execution would be the decision by Lenin, an arch Marxist, to temporarily permit capitalism in the Soviet countryside in the form of the New Economic Plan.
There's a lot of wisdom in these pages, however, the reader has to understand that the reason Liddell Hart is so gung-ho about the indirect approach is that he lost a lot of good men in the pointless direct frontal assaults which were an unfortunate feature of the Great War. Those years scarred him for the rest of his life and that's what makes his support of indirectness almost militant in nature.
For the most part, the indirect approach is the best approach but there are also times where you need to be direct. Knowing when to be which is what ultimately separates the wise from the meek and foolish.
I've previously myself come up with the idea of path ambivalence, which I view as choosing the most effective means to reach an objective and caring about the destination rather than the journey. I'm happy to have found an intellectual flagbearer for this idea in Liddell Hart. This is an even more compelling idea having previously encountered John Lewis Gaddis' hedgehog and fox dichotomy and of course understanding that one must simultaneously be a hedgehog and a fox. Know what you want, be open-minded and knowledgeable the many different ways to get there and then choose the most effective path.
To Liddell Hart, the most effective path will be that which is indirect, and not obviously straightforward. In his own words, "[i]n strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home." A historical example of such execution would be the decision by Lenin, an arch Marxist, to temporarily permit capitalism in the Soviet countryside in the form of the New Economic Plan.
There's a lot of wisdom in these pages, however, the reader has to understand that the reason Liddell Hart is so gung-ho about the indirect approach is that he lost a lot of good men in the pointless direct frontal assaults which were an unfortunate feature of the Great War. Those years scarred him for the rest of his life and that's what makes his support of indirectness almost militant in nature.
For the most part, the indirect approach is the best approach but there are also times where you need to be direct. Knowing when to be which is what ultimately separates the wise from the meek and foolish.
April 15, 2024
I’ve had this book for almost twenty years and it has always been on my to-read list. I finally got around to it and it was a bit of a let down. This book is more-so written to those who already have a thorough understanding of world military history. I think I spent 90 minutes watching YouTube videos to develop enough background information to understand the Byzantine war section. Eventually, I realized if I kept doing this it was going to take me a long time to get through this book. After the Medieval War section I skipped to WWI because I at least had a basic understanding of the politics, geography, people, and armies involved. It got better as I read the WWII section as I already had a solid understanding of those battles. This foundation made reading his analysis of WWII strategy more exciting and understandable. It got more interesting towards the end when he delved into the the theories of strategy and its implications. Provided food for thought as I think about the situation the United States is in today and what is going on in the world. History tends to repeat itself.
March 2, 2019
This is the quintessential book about strategy of the Twentieth Century. B.H. Liddell Hart provides a thorough analysis of military strategy through history and looking forward into the future. The book reads like a chronological narrative of military history and what strategies prevailed in select wars. This classic is definitely recommended to anyone who wants to study strategy and should be mandated reading for all military officers. Military history enthusiasts should take the limited scope with a grain of salt, since it only focuses on prevailing strategies and how they can be applied into the future. Like most books about military strategy, although that may be the overarching topic, if a reader looks deep enough, there are lessons that can also be applied in fields such as business or sports.
The book is Western-Centric, although Hart does mention how the Mongols were more strategically sound in the wars of the Middle Ages, while the West demonstrated a lack of sound strategy in the many wars waged during the time. The first part tries to cover over two thousand years, but Hart is able to cover that ground well, citing important examples and establishing his themes for chapters to come. I particularly took an interest in Hart's emphasis on the strategic acumen of Belisarius, who I often overlook in my studies of historical military commanders.
The next two part covers each World War. The greater emphasis given on the World Wars makes sense since they were waged on an unprecedented scale and were fresh in the author's memory. However, Hart gives little emphasis to the middle years of the First World War, which also makes sense since that time was overall stagnant. Hart focuses on the strategic maneuvers, which is why he has more material on the Second World War. Although he published his first edition between the wars, the revised edition bridges the two World Wars well. The parts remain Western-Centric and there is minimal coverage of the Pacific Theater of World War II, although there is significant coverage of the Middle Eastern theater of World War I.
The final part is a summary of everything covered in history and looking forward to the future. Hart corrects the great 19th Century strategist Carl von Clausewitz, while annotating that he admitted he could be mistaken and his masterpiece was cut short by his untimely death. He uses that for his theme that strategy will change with the times and admonishes readers about the failure of military leaders to realize that. I also found the appendix interesting in that it contained fan mail. This is not merely flattery, but actually puts the book into context. It was interesting to note that during the Israeli War of Independence, an Israeli army officer captured a copy of this book from an Egyptian army officer, who failed to learn from it.
The book is Western-Centric, although Hart does mention how the Mongols were more strategically sound in the wars of the Middle Ages, while the West demonstrated a lack of sound strategy in the many wars waged during the time. The first part tries to cover over two thousand years, but Hart is able to cover that ground well, citing important examples and establishing his themes for chapters to come. I particularly took an interest in Hart's emphasis on the strategic acumen of Belisarius, who I often overlook in my studies of historical military commanders.
The next two part covers each World War. The greater emphasis given on the World Wars makes sense since they were waged on an unprecedented scale and were fresh in the author's memory. However, Hart gives little emphasis to the middle years of the First World War, which also makes sense since that time was overall stagnant. Hart focuses on the strategic maneuvers, which is why he has more material on the Second World War. Although he published his first edition between the wars, the revised edition bridges the two World Wars well. The parts remain Western-Centric and there is minimal coverage of the Pacific Theater of World War II, although there is significant coverage of the Middle Eastern theater of World War I.
The final part is a summary of everything covered in history and looking forward to the future. Hart corrects the great 19th Century strategist Carl von Clausewitz, while annotating that he admitted he could be mistaken and his masterpiece was cut short by his untimely death. He uses that for his theme that strategy will change with the times and admonishes readers about the failure of military leaders to realize that. I also found the appendix interesting in that it contained fan mail. This is not merely flattery, but actually puts the book into context. It was interesting to note that during the Israeli War of Independence, an Israeli army officer captured a copy of this book from an Egyptian army officer, who failed to learn from it.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 20, 2020
I so wanted to like this book, but was listening to the text on Audible (and partially reading on Kindle), but was disappointed at the lack of sufficient depth in what I read/listened to. A clarification also, the Audible version of this text seems to be read from the original version of the text which ends before the Allied turn in WW2 (possibly somewhere after 1941, but before 1943. So, the reading of the text ends with the author suggesting that the Third Reich will not prevail because Germany will not be able to prevail itself simultaneously on all it’s conquered lands, and that eventually, the collective partisan/resistance fighters in occupied Europe would be too much for the German forces to control, and they would have to sue for peace out of exhaustion.
Suffice to say, that is not how WW2 ended, but it’s absurd to strike that prediction-error against the author. The author suggests that Germany and the Allied powers likely settle for a negotiated peace, whereas in history, the Allies imposed an unconditional surrender demand in exchange for the cessation of hostilities. At the very least, this version of the text is an interesting historical curiosity.
WIth respect to the content, there are some interesting ideas here, though not enough for me to be entirely impressed given other books in this genre that have taken the field in more interesting directions (e.g. John Boyd’s work, or even the work of the mathematicians contextualizing certain kinds of war as a ‘game’). Further, the narration can be confusing or hard-to-follow (at least on audio), as the author recounts the sequence of events that characterize the flow of a particular battle in history, and without much personal context (or context from a previous study of these events). It can be challenging to understand the importance of a “parrying thrust on _such a such_ part of the front” being a “master stroke”, or that a “feint onto the left flank of the opposition being “keen insight” of the commander etc.
Such a narration-style would be greatly aided by a set of detailed maps, with icons, legends, and ancillary diagrams. However, the only maps that are in the Kindle version of this text are theater-level, and/or country-wide maps of the particular conflict, making their utility as a tool of pedagogy minimal. However, despite these disappointments there are kernels of insight here that are important for any reader on the history of war to understand that Liddel Hart successfully communicates. The first is that war cannot be characterized entirely (or even in the majority) as a sequence of actions found in battle. As mentioned early on, commanders in the ancient world often deployed strategies of avoidance (a la Fabian) to great effect, and despite the romanticist view of the subject, ‘great battles’ of spectacle were much less frequent than the paintings (or movies) would lead one to believe.
This leads to the second thing Liddell Hart gets right, which is that military strategy is subservient to political goals. The notion that “ideal” war is “total war” is an absurdity, and attributions to this notion to Von Clausewitz are clearly by people who did not read “On War” or did not understand his style of argumentation. Von Clausewitz does indeed mention this notion of “ideal” or “pure” war, but it is introduced within the context of a reductio ad-absurdum. Almost all subject areas throughout the 1800s aimed to mimic the “style” of mathematical argumentation since it was viewed as the most successful of the subject areas (outside of physics), so Von Clausewitz constructing his arguments in the “ideal” are often designed to extract some essence of the phenomena he is analyzing (in this case war), and either showing this essence is fallacy (the reductio from analysis) or declaring this essence as an essential or axiom (the synthesis). Liddell Hart knows this to be true and mentions it several times, towards the end of the book.
Iif military strategy is subservient to political goals, then the Fabian strategy may be the most ideal and optimal from a risk/reward standpoint. As committing to battle in the ancient world could often lead to unexpected outcomes given the inherent randomness of events (in some cases in ancient battle, the poor placement of a road, or the lack of one could be all that is needed to bring decisive victory to one side or the other). This insight, though only briefly mentioned at the end of his book, is a key to the nature of war that is often ill-understood in Western thinkers of the subject matter. As Liddell Hart mentions, it sits contrary to Von Clausewitz’s own statements, who believe that battle should be taken to achieve the maximalist effect (the destruction of the adversary’s material will to prosecute war).
However, as an aside, reading Von Clausewitz, one realizes that his thesis is very much drawn from his experience during the Napoleonic wars. Much of the ‘practical’ chapters in “On War” focus on the drill, the march, and other elements of maneuver. The reason is that these things were key to the notion of tempo and exploiting advantage (or achieving advantage through positioning by-way-of greater movement vis-a-vis your adversaries) in the field. As Liddell Hart recounts, Napoleon’s victories tended to bifurcate to two types: 1. Defeat-in-depth 2. Marshalling greater resources (e.g. the ‘levee en-masse’). From reading Lindell Hart, the later seems to have promoted the greater development of the linear-line style of warfare, and it is this phenomena that Von Clausewitz seems to be writing towards in his book when he emphasizes the need to “decisively” shift mass where the opponent is weakest to bring up the rout.
But when is something “decisive”? Or how can one know where the lines are at their “critical” juncture? Likewise with Liddell Hart, what are strict criterions to know if a set of actions are indirect or direct? It seems to me that after my initial reading, labelling something as indirect or direct cannot occur until after the battle has completed and all of the paths by which the opponents took to achieve victory (or fail in defeat) are known to the commander. I didn’t catch a clear definition from the author. Instead, the book is outlined as an “exposition by case”. The author takes well known battles in history, including from the era of the Greek city states, Republican and Imperial Rome, all the way to the start of WW2, and after a lengthy decomposition of the event, shows why this commander won via the deployment of indirect-battle.
And since the author’s thesis is that victory is (almost) only achieved via indirect-battle, the whole structure of this exposition becomes tedious (and increasingly less believable). I was not convinced. Still, as mentioned, there are enough insightful statements on the nature of battle, and the accounting of events, a reading of this book not a total waste to the armchair historian. The book would get at least 1 whole star if they included an annotation with tables for some of the sequencing of events. In fact, an annotated version of this book is sorely needed to be efficiently digestible by a modern reader. Conditional recommendation, but I will update once I’ve read the last few chapters of the kindle discussing strategy from the second world war.
Suffice to say, that is not how WW2 ended, but it’s absurd to strike that prediction-error against the author. The author suggests that Germany and the Allied powers likely settle for a negotiated peace, whereas in history, the Allies imposed an unconditional surrender demand in exchange for the cessation of hostilities. At the very least, this version of the text is an interesting historical curiosity.
WIth respect to the content, there are some interesting ideas here, though not enough for me to be entirely impressed given other books in this genre that have taken the field in more interesting directions (e.g. John Boyd’s work, or even the work of the mathematicians contextualizing certain kinds of war as a ‘game’). Further, the narration can be confusing or hard-to-follow (at least on audio), as the author recounts the sequence of events that characterize the flow of a particular battle in history, and without much personal context (or context from a previous study of these events). It can be challenging to understand the importance of a “parrying thrust on _such a such_ part of the front” being a “master stroke”, or that a “feint onto the left flank of the opposition being “keen insight” of the commander etc.
Such a narration-style would be greatly aided by a set of detailed maps, with icons, legends, and ancillary diagrams. However, the only maps that are in the Kindle version of this text are theater-level, and/or country-wide maps of the particular conflict, making their utility as a tool of pedagogy minimal. However, despite these disappointments there are kernels of insight here that are important for any reader on the history of war to understand that Liddel Hart successfully communicates. The first is that war cannot be characterized entirely (or even in the majority) as a sequence of actions found in battle. As mentioned early on, commanders in the ancient world often deployed strategies of avoidance (a la Fabian) to great effect, and despite the romanticist view of the subject, ‘great battles’ of spectacle were much less frequent than the paintings (or movies) would lead one to believe.
This leads to the second thing Liddell Hart gets right, which is that military strategy is subservient to political goals. The notion that “ideal” war is “total war” is an absurdity, and attributions to this notion to Von Clausewitz are clearly by people who did not read “On War” or did not understand his style of argumentation. Von Clausewitz does indeed mention this notion of “ideal” or “pure” war, but it is introduced within the context of a reductio ad-absurdum. Almost all subject areas throughout the 1800s aimed to mimic the “style” of mathematical argumentation since it was viewed as the most successful of the subject areas (outside of physics), so Von Clausewitz constructing his arguments in the “ideal” are often designed to extract some essence of the phenomena he is analyzing (in this case war), and either showing this essence is fallacy (the reductio from analysis) or declaring this essence as an essential or axiom (the synthesis). Liddell Hart knows this to be true and mentions it several times, towards the end of the book.
Iif military strategy is subservient to political goals, then the Fabian strategy may be the most ideal and optimal from a risk/reward standpoint. As committing to battle in the ancient world could often lead to unexpected outcomes given the inherent randomness of events (in some cases in ancient battle, the poor placement of a road, or the lack of one could be all that is needed to bring decisive victory to one side or the other). This insight, though only briefly mentioned at the end of his book, is a key to the nature of war that is often ill-understood in Western thinkers of the subject matter. As Liddell Hart mentions, it sits contrary to Von Clausewitz’s own statements, who believe that battle should be taken to achieve the maximalist effect (the destruction of the adversary’s material will to prosecute war).
However, as an aside, reading Von Clausewitz, one realizes that his thesis is very much drawn from his experience during the Napoleonic wars. Much of the ‘practical’ chapters in “On War” focus on the drill, the march, and other elements of maneuver. The reason is that these things were key to the notion of tempo and exploiting advantage (or achieving advantage through positioning by-way-of greater movement vis-a-vis your adversaries) in the field. As Liddell Hart recounts, Napoleon’s victories tended to bifurcate to two types: 1. Defeat-in-depth 2. Marshalling greater resources (e.g. the ‘levee en-masse’). From reading Lindell Hart, the later seems to have promoted the greater development of the linear-line style of warfare, and it is this phenomena that Von Clausewitz seems to be writing towards in his book when he emphasizes the need to “decisively” shift mass where the opponent is weakest to bring up the rout.
But when is something “decisive”? Or how can one know where the lines are at their “critical” juncture? Likewise with Liddell Hart, what are strict criterions to know if a set of actions are indirect or direct? It seems to me that after my initial reading, labelling something as indirect or direct cannot occur until after the battle has completed and all of the paths by which the opponents took to achieve victory (or fail in defeat) are known to the commander. I didn’t catch a clear definition from the author. Instead, the book is outlined as an “exposition by case”. The author takes well known battles in history, including from the era of the Greek city states, Republican and Imperial Rome, all the way to the start of WW2, and after a lengthy decomposition of the event, shows why this commander won via the deployment of indirect-battle.
And since the author’s thesis is that victory is (almost) only achieved via indirect-battle, the whole structure of this exposition becomes tedious (and increasingly less believable). I was not convinced. Still, as mentioned, there are enough insightful statements on the nature of battle, and the accounting of events, a reading of this book not a total waste to the armchair historian. The book would get at least 1 whole star if they included an annotation with tables for some of the sequencing of events. In fact, an annotated version of this book is sorely needed to be efficiently digestible by a modern reader. Conditional recommendation, but I will update once I’ve read the last few chapters of the kindle discussing strategy from the second world war.
December 21, 2014
There are a few universally recognized and seminal works on the nature of warfare – notably Sun Tzu’s ART OF WAR and Clausewitz’s ON WAR (and maybe Miyamoto Musashi’s BOOK OF FIVE RINGS, if one is able to extrapolate hand-to-hand combat to warfare/conflict in general).
I would also count B.H. Liddell Hart’s STRATEGY among these seminal works. Liddell Hart accomplishes the monumental task of analyzing pretty much the entire history of warfare, from ancient Greece to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in a single coherent book. Fascinatingly, Liddell Hart distills every successful military campaign (ones not won simply through the application of brute strength, or by the phenomenal blundering of the opposition) to what he calls the “indirect approach.” He shows repeatedly – whether the forces involved were phalanxes, chariots, horse cavalry, or tanks – that it was the proper application of the indirect approach that led to overwhelming military success.
Interestingly, Liddell Hart was a captain in the British army, but his observations were not immediately embraced by the British military. They found their first and most receptive audience within the most forward-thinking members of the German wermacht – notably officers like the brilliant Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel, who incorporated Liddell Hart’s principles into their revolutionary concepts of mechanized warfare.
The book can be a bit dry at times – but if one sets aside the need for romantic language, sits back, and accepts the lessons being told – one will be rewarded with a truly sweeping EPIC that reveals, time and again, that the machinery of war may have changed throughout history, but that the underlying principles have not.
I would also count B.H. Liddell Hart’s STRATEGY among these seminal works. Liddell Hart accomplishes the monumental task of analyzing pretty much the entire history of warfare, from ancient Greece to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in a single coherent book. Fascinatingly, Liddell Hart distills every successful military campaign (ones not won simply through the application of brute strength, or by the phenomenal blundering of the opposition) to what he calls the “indirect approach.” He shows repeatedly – whether the forces involved were phalanxes, chariots, horse cavalry, or tanks – that it was the proper application of the indirect approach that led to overwhelming military success.
Interestingly, Liddell Hart was a captain in the British army, but his observations were not immediately embraced by the British military. They found their first and most receptive audience within the most forward-thinking members of the German wermacht – notably officers like the brilliant Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel, who incorporated Liddell Hart’s principles into their revolutionary concepts of mechanized warfare.
The book can be a bit dry at times – but if one sets aside the need for romantic language, sits back, and accepts the lessons being told – one will be rewarded with a truly sweeping EPIC that reveals, time and again, that the machinery of war may have changed throughout history, but that the underlying principles have not.
October 16, 2023
The discovery that my public library had the works of Liddell Hart and other writers on strategy was a delight to me when I was in high school. It was also an introduction to the reality that Liddell Hart did in fact write and rewrite his books to reflect at best his changing views over time but sometimes also to demonstrate that he had been correct all along - as long as you concentrated on his most recent writings rather than the books now gathering dust on the shelves that he had written years earlier. Such endeavors also complicate platforms like Goodreads as it attempts to catalog B H Liddell Hart's many and often overlapping works. It appears that I've actually read about 3 versions of this book and possibly a fourth as my current shelf copy is marked as the Second Revised Edition! printed in 1991.
December 22, 2014
What a pity for the dreadful lay-out! The first part requires a lot of background about the main historical battles and even the fight itself is very concisely discussed. It would have been better to spend at least a hundred pages extra on the pre-20th century wars. The author has a clear preference for the indirect method, which he clearly illustrates along history.
On the other hand, I liked the parts on WW I and WW II very much. Both from a military and psychological point of view, it provides new insights. Fascinating to read the difference in opinion about the link politics and the military between Hitler and Ludendorff. As the book abruptly ends around 1941, I wonder what the writer would have added along the WW II-road to further illustrate his indirect method philosophy.
On the other hand, I liked the parts on WW I and WW II very much. Both from a military and psychological point of view, it provides new insights. Fascinating to read the difference in opinion about the link politics and the military between Hitler and Ludendorff. As the book abruptly ends around 1941, I wonder what the writer would have added along the WW II-road to further illustrate his indirect method philosophy.
August 21, 2013
Wonderfully reasoned and argued thesis. The most successful military campaigns (also applies to non-military campaigns) were pursued through an indirect route. Hart provides evidence to support his thesis from almost every war/battle since the beginning of recorded history.
My only issue with the book lies in his consistency in giving little background or setting for many of the battles. If you are not already well versed on a particular conflict you will be completely lost. The little bit of ancient history I have read left me prepped for the 1st quarter of the book, but know very little about medieval military campaigns and was completely lost during that portion.
My only issue with the book lies in his consistency in giving little background or setting for many of the battles. If you are not already well versed on a particular conflict you will be completely lost. The little bit of ancient history I have read left me prepped for the 1st quarter of the book, but know very little about medieval military campaigns and was completely lost during that portion.
June 17, 2016
The phrase that comes to mind is "belaboring the point."
Still, I thought it was an interesting look through military history and strategic thinking.
The book is written as a piece of military scholarship, and targets readers who are familiar with the field - which I am not. As a result, I had to do a decent amount of outside reading (on the conflicts, and people involved in them) to get context for this book, which may be why it took me so long to finish. Overall though, I feel it was well worth my time.
Still, I thought it was an interesting look through military history and strategic thinking.
The book is written as a piece of military scholarship, and targets readers who are familiar with the field - which I am not. As a result, I had to do a decent amount of outside reading (on the conflicts, and people involved in them) to get context for this book, which may be why it took me so long to finish. Overall though, I feel it was well worth my time.
February 2, 2016
A very interesting book, but I think he may be stretching in the conclusions he draws from his case studies. Essentially, his argument regarding the superiority of the "indirect approach" to the "direct approach" could more accurately be called maneuver. While maneuver is important (and indeed, a Principle of War), offensive and mass are also critical. The strength of this book lies in his analysis of WWII. He also offers a strong rebuttal to Clausewitz' perceived fixation upon the offensive.
Not world changing, but a required read for any strategic thinker.
Not world changing, but a required read for any strategic thinker.
June 7, 2016
Liddell Hart's "Strategy" comes from the influence of his study of the great strategists of history (especially Sun Tzu, Napoleon, and Belisarius) and their victories, and his understanding of Ju-Jitsu.
His strategy of the "Indirect Approach" offers examples from 2500 years of military history to substantiate his thesis.
This book has influenced many military strategists including Israel's since 1948 to present day.
Liddell Hart is a brilliant strategist and I highly recommend this book for anyone who has an interest in grasping the true art of military history or military thinking.
His strategy of the "Indirect Approach" offers examples from 2500 years of military history to substantiate his thesis.
This book has influenced many military strategists including Israel's since 1948 to present day.
Liddell Hart is a brilliant strategist and I highly recommend this book for anyone who has an interest in grasping the true art of military history or military thinking.
September 3, 2019
If only some famous (and infamous) generals and politicians had read this and taken it to heart, millions of people who have died in the 20th century would be alive today. With many specific examples of general principles, Liddell Hart presented lessons he had learned in the trenches in World War I. The underlying idea is that of the indirect approach.
April 2, 2009
Enthralling. Outstanding. Fantastic. Hart is the stodgy-looking professor who you're ready to like but then you find yourself completely in love and it's AWESOME. I don't agree with all of his conclusions, or even all of his reasoning, but the man is a genius. It is impossible to understate how important he's been to our understandings of modern warfare.
August 27, 2009
The book is more fun to read if you use a British accent while reading...
At times the book drags but culminates in Part IV with an insightful and fair minded critic of Clausewitz. Depending on ones interests they could probably read this section and forgo the prior 300+ pages and still get a great deal from the book.
At times the book drags but culminates in Part IV with an insightful and fair minded critic of Clausewitz. Depending on ones interests they could probably read this section and forgo the prior 300+ pages and still get a great deal from the book.
February 23, 2019
Modern classic of military strategy. This non-military reader found useful carryover to competitive strategy in other fields. The theory of indirect approach, designed for the adversarial situations of modern society and amply filled out in detail and illustrated with examples, may provide more to today's organizational strategists than eg sun tzu.
December 27, 2013
Loved it but I got the impression that Liddell Hart is sorta full of himself.
I was still a good book.
Also the book itself is 414 pages with the rest of the pages taking up references and the index.
I was still a good book.
Also the book itself is 414 pages with the rest of the pages taking up references and the index.
July 25, 2012
Read this many years ago. The Western classic on strategy, written before World War II, lifts a lot from (and credits) Sun Tzu long before most Westerners had heard of him.
September 11, 2016
Western military strategy was dissected with precise paragraphs pointing on that in each era of history the indirect approach has worked better than direct assaults.
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