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No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn
The world is on the cusp of a global turn. Between 1500 and 1800, the West sprinted ahead of other centers of power in Asia and the Middle East. Europe and the United States have dominated the world since. But today the West's preeminence is slipping away as China, India, Brazil and other emerging powers rise. Although most strategists recognize that the dominance of the West is on the wane, they are confident that its founding ideas--democracy, capitalism, and secular nationalism--will continue to spread, ensuring that the Western order will outlast its primacy.
In No One's World, Charles A. Kupchan boldly challenges this view, arguing that the world is headed for political and ideological diversity; emerging powers will neither defer to the West's lead nor converge toward the Western way. The ascent of the West was the product of social and economic conditions unique to Europe and the United States. As other regions now rise, they are following their own paths to modernity and embracing their own conceptions of domestic and international order.
Kupchan contends that the Western order will not be displaced by a new great power or dominant political model. The twenty-first century will not belong to America, China, Asia, or anyone else. It will be no one's world. For the first time in history, the world will be interdependent--but without a center of gravity or global guardian.
More than simply diagnosing what lies ahead, Kupchan provides a detailed strategy for striking a bargain between the West and the rising rest by fashioning a new consensus on issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, and governance. Thoughtful, provocative, sweeping in scope, this work is nothing less than a global guidebook for the 21st century.
In No One's World, Charles A. Kupchan boldly challenges this view, arguing that the world is headed for political and ideological diversity; emerging powers will neither defer to the West's lead nor converge toward the Western way. The ascent of the West was the product of social and economic conditions unique to Europe and the United States. As other regions now rise, they are following their own paths to modernity and embracing their own conceptions of domestic and international order.
Kupchan contends that the Western order will not be displaced by a new great power or dominant political model. The twenty-first century will not belong to America, China, Asia, or anyone else. It will be no one's world. For the first time in history, the world will be interdependent--but without a center of gravity or global guardian.
More than simply diagnosing what lies ahead, Kupchan provides a detailed strategy for striking a bargain between the West and the rising rest by fashioning a new consensus on issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, and governance. Thoughtful, provocative, sweeping in scope, this work is nothing less than a global guidebook for the 21st century.
272 pages, Hardcover
First published January 21, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
April 12, 2012
A great overview of how the West and the Rest got to where they are today and how to manage the future. The first half of the book wherein Kupchan walks the reader through the roots of Western primacy and the circumstances that held back the rest is the book's strongest point. As he advances into analysis of the current American predicament of dysfunctional politics an international overreach, however, he falls back on some of the cliches that plague contemporary commentary. "Serious thinkers" are obligated to present themselves as non-partisan, blaming the heinous political gridlock on both parties being excessively polarized; the truth, of course, is otherwise. Holding up the Simpson-Bowles commission to reduce the deficit as a great centrist idea to reduce the deficit, he accuses both sides of ignoring when, in fact, Obama undercut it from the Right in his constant tactic of giving up before negotiating. Meanwhile, the Republican Party, unable to accept even what was once their own policy, flee ever further right-ward.
Kupchan's policy prescriptions for handling the emerging multilateral order are sound, despite an overly rosy tint. If only he'd stood up and said what needed to be said about the domestic front...
Kupchan's policy prescriptions for handling the emerging multilateral order are sound, despite an overly rosy tint. If only he'd stood up and said what needed to be said about the domestic front...
July 16, 2014
Having come in with fairly high expectations, I was disappointed by No One’s World. The book read as a loosely stitched together collection of tired op-eds (“Restoring Western Solvency,” “Managing No One’s World”) and cosmetic descriptions of the world as it exists today (African leaders are “The Strongmen,” while Latin America is governed by “The Populists”). At times, the work seemed more concerned with finding neat categories for the world’s governance structure (an ironic diversion, I might note, given the impending chaos upon which the effort is premised), than with exploring the niceties of the discussions this topic must surely provoke.
Claims and contentions were casually presented throughout the text with too few supporting data points to appear as anything more than anecdotal evidence, and too little attention to grant me many substantive take-aways from the read. This style made me less trusting of the offered information, which increasingly began to appear as cherry-picked facts made to further a pre-existing argument than as an academic treatment. Too much peddling of conventional wisdom, too little original research and argument.
Two stars: One for making vaguely interesting points about the rise of the West and how the United States should manage China, the other for teaching me the word ‘comity,’ which is pretty dope.
Claims and contentions were casually presented throughout the text with too few supporting data points to appear as anything more than anecdotal evidence, and too little attention to grant me many substantive take-aways from the read. This style made me less trusting of the offered information, which increasingly began to appear as cherry-picked facts made to further a pre-existing argument than as an academic treatment. Too much peddling of conventional wisdom, too little original research and argument.
Two stars: One for making vaguely interesting points about the rise of the West and how the United States should manage China, the other for teaching me the word ‘comity,’ which is pretty dope.
February 14, 2021
I liked it and found the on the whole pretty reasonable. Don’t know enough to judge his ultimate recommendations, but I thought the middle part—descriptions of successful non-liberal democratic governments (+why they’re not liberal democracies)—was cool and I learned from it
May 5, 2013
I found much of the book unconvincing. The historical sections were superficial and tended to assume that what happened in history was inevitable and depended on characteristics that he does not really explain. For instance, he claims that Europe developed scientifically while the Islamic world didn't because Islam is a law-based religion while Christianity is based on faith. But plenty of Christian sects have plenty of rules (and Catholicism for many years had rules scientists had to obey, just ask Galileo.
June 24, 2014
Important but somewhat superficial
Kupchan's No One's World argues that the increasing prosperity of non-western countries will not lead to "China taking over the world", nor will it (in the near- or medium-term) lead to a convergence towards liberal democracy. Instead we are more likely to see a political and ideological diversity not seen since Europe embarked on its colonial project. There will be several competing versions of modernity, none of which will be able to completely dominate the others.
Because of this, the argument goes, the West (most notably America) will have to retrench its global ambitions to a formula commensurate with is diminishing means. The Atlantic democracies will have to stomach treating these alternative modernities as legitimate actors. Thus, there is an acute need for establishing fundamental principles that are to rule the future. Most importantly, there must be a redefinition of regime legitimacy. That is to say, we must extend the concept of legitimacy to those regimes that govern "responsibly" (whether the nation safeguards the welfare of its citizens and refrains from compromising the security of other states - eg. aggression, exporting WMD, sponsoring terrorism.), be they democratic or autocratic. He also argues that now is the most opportune window to establish such rules.
One of the strongest findings of international relations theory is that large and abrupt changes in the relative capabilities of states (aka the global pecking order), especially with regards to the current hegemon, is extremely dangerous. With the exception of the transfer of hegemony from Britain to the USA, and the fall of the Soviet Union, such changes have almost always led to large-scale warfare. The destabilizing presence of climate change, as well as nuclear weapons, means that the next 50 years is likely to be amongst the most dangerous ever encountered by our species. It is thus critical that we establish ground rules acceptable to all major parties before the onset of anarchic thinking so ably described by the realist school of international relations (See Waltz, Theory of International Politics).
To make his point that the world is not going to embrace liberal democracy, he spends a couple of chapters describing the history of the rise of the West. This, of course, is one of the biggest questions in history (see Morris, Why the West Rules—for Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future for a good overview of the competing theories, as well as an attempt at synthesis), and Kupchan's treatment of this major subject is, in my opinion, flimsy. And more importantly, he doesn't seem to acknowledge the ongoing debate surrounding this topic, instead he simply states his thesis as it was a fact.
His only point for bringing this up though, is to argue that the rise of the West followed a trajectory that was unique to the material conditions of early modern Europe, and that today's rising powers are each following different paths toward modernity based on their own political, demographic, and socioeconomic conditions.
What follows is two chapters describing why similar development did not occur in the rest of world, and what modern political institutions have arisen there instead. These chapters have, in my opinion, similar problems to the previous one in that they are convincing -possibly even correct- but superfluously treated and not engaging with the debates surrounding these questions. At times I felt that the writing was on the verge of devolving into oriental despotism-style cultural determinism. In essence: "their centralized and hierarchical institutions of political control engendered more order and stability than in Europe—but at a high cost. Centralization prevented the socioeconomic dynamism that was Europe’s greatest asset."
The following chapter then explores what Kupchan identifies as the main alternatives to Westernization. Some of these are so stereotypical that they border on parodies. In short, he just takes the simplest narratives established by the relevant area studies. This part exemplifies my main problem with area studies, that they have a tendency to create patterns of explanation that does not readily apply to other regions. This isn't really a fault of area studies per se, since creating broader theories is the responsibility of comparative politics. Kupchan really excelled at this in his previous book How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, where he took the data created by area studies and incorporated it into a convincing framework with more-or-less universal application.
That kind of approach is not on display here, and instead we are presented with simple versions of the prevailing narratives concerning the different non-western regions: Chinese "communal" autocracy, Russian "paternal" autocracy, Iranian theocracy, African strongman dictatorship, Persian Gulf "tribal" autocracy, Latin American populism, etc. This part just seemed lazy to me. And by just tagging a stereotype to the most famous countries, he fails to expand these labels to the rest of world, thus depriving us of some sense of the extent of these forms. For example, is Indonesia a tribal autocracy? A liberal democracy? What about Pakistan?
On the whole, the book feels either too short or too long. Too short to be truly convincing in its presentation, and too long not to feel tedious for the casual reader. This was a disappointment, seeing how good I thought his previous book, How Enemies Become Friends, was.
The publishers introduction also claims that "More than simply diagnosing what lies ahead, Kupchan provides a detailed strategy for striking a bargain between the West and the rising rest by fashioning a new consensus on issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, and governance." I'd say that claiming that the book has a "detailed strategy" is pure hyperbole. And the same goes for the chapter that purports to explain how to "revive the West". These chapters have a lot of good ideas, but they are, once again, short and superfluous.
This turned out to be a policy book though, and not a rigorously scholarly examination of the subject, so its superfluousness is perhaps understandable, given the medium. Nor does my objections significantly detract from his main argument, which I wholeheartedly agree with, making this work both timely and important. I just wish it could be more convincing in its presentation.
Kupchan's No One's World argues that the increasing prosperity of non-western countries will not lead to "China taking over the world", nor will it (in the near- or medium-term) lead to a convergence towards liberal democracy. Instead we are more likely to see a political and ideological diversity not seen since Europe embarked on its colonial project. There will be several competing versions of modernity, none of which will be able to completely dominate the others.
Because of this, the argument goes, the West (most notably America) will have to retrench its global ambitions to a formula commensurate with is diminishing means. The Atlantic democracies will have to stomach treating these alternative modernities as legitimate actors. Thus, there is an acute need for establishing fundamental principles that are to rule the future. Most importantly, there must be a redefinition of regime legitimacy. That is to say, we must extend the concept of legitimacy to those regimes that govern "responsibly" (whether the nation safeguards the welfare of its citizens and refrains from compromising the security of other states - eg. aggression, exporting WMD, sponsoring terrorism.), be they democratic or autocratic. He also argues that now is the most opportune window to establish such rules.
One of the strongest findings of international relations theory is that large and abrupt changes in the relative capabilities of states (aka the global pecking order), especially with regards to the current hegemon, is extremely dangerous. With the exception of the transfer of hegemony from Britain to the USA, and the fall of the Soviet Union, such changes have almost always led to large-scale warfare. The destabilizing presence of climate change, as well as nuclear weapons, means that the next 50 years is likely to be amongst the most dangerous ever encountered by our species. It is thus critical that we establish ground rules acceptable to all major parties before the onset of anarchic thinking so ably described by the realist school of international relations (See Waltz, Theory of International Politics).
To make his point that the world is not going to embrace liberal democracy, he spends a couple of chapters describing the history of the rise of the West. This, of course, is one of the biggest questions in history (see Morris, Why the West Rules—for Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future for a good overview of the competing theories, as well as an attempt at synthesis), and Kupchan's treatment of this major subject is, in my opinion, flimsy. And more importantly, he doesn't seem to acknowledge the ongoing debate surrounding this topic, instead he simply states his thesis as it was a fact.
His only point for bringing this up though, is to argue that the rise of the West followed a trajectory that was unique to the material conditions of early modern Europe, and that today's rising powers are each following different paths toward modernity based on their own political, demographic, and socioeconomic conditions.
What follows is two chapters describing why similar development did not occur in the rest of world, and what modern political institutions have arisen there instead. These chapters have, in my opinion, similar problems to the previous one in that they are convincing -possibly even correct- but superfluously treated and not engaging with the debates surrounding these questions. At times I felt that the writing was on the verge of devolving into oriental despotism-style cultural determinism. In essence: "their centralized and hierarchical institutions of political control engendered more order and stability than in Europe—but at a high cost. Centralization prevented the socioeconomic dynamism that was Europe’s greatest asset."
The following chapter then explores what Kupchan identifies as the main alternatives to Westernization. Some of these are so stereotypical that they border on parodies. In short, he just takes the simplest narratives established by the relevant area studies. This part exemplifies my main problem with area studies, that they have a tendency to create patterns of explanation that does not readily apply to other regions. This isn't really a fault of area studies per se, since creating broader theories is the responsibility of comparative politics. Kupchan really excelled at this in his previous book How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, where he took the data created by area studies and incorporated it into a convincing framework with more-or-less universal application.
That kind of approach is not on display here, and instead we are presented with simple versions of the prevailing narratives concerning the different non-western regions: Chinese "communal" autocracy, Russian "paternal" autocracy, Iranian theocracy, African strongman dictatorship, Persian Gulf "tribal" autocracy, Latin American populism, etc. This part just seemed lazy to me. And by just tagging a stereotype to the most famous countries, he fails to expand these labels to the rest of world, thus depriving us of some sense of the extent of these forms. For example, is Indonesia a tribal autocracy? A liberal democracy? What about Pakistan?
On the whole, the book feels either too short or too long. Too short to be truly convincing in its presentation, and too long not to feel tedious for the casual reader. This was a disappointment, seeing how good I thought his previous book, How Enemies Become Friends, was.
The publishers introduction also claims that "More than simply diagnosing what lies ahead, Kupchan provides a detailed strategy for striking a bargain between the West and the rising rest by fashioning a new consensus on issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, and governance." I'd say that claiming that the book has a "detailed strategy" is pure hyperbole. And the same goes for the chapter that purports to explain how to "revive the West". These chapters have a lot of good ideas, but they are, once again, short and superfluous.
This turned out to be a policy book though, and not a rigorously scholarly examination of the subject, so its superfluousness is perhaps understandable, given the medium. Nor does my objections significantly detract from his main argument, which I wholeheartedly agree with, making this work both timely and important. I just wish it could be more convincing in its presentation.
February 12, 2017
Kupchan’s No One’s World is an ideal read for historical neophytes. Kupchan chronicles the West, the East and all things in between for the last two hundred years.
But, if you have read Zakaria’s The Post American World or Bernard Lewis’s What When Wrong, both of whom he sites in his book, you may find this redundant. However, unlike either of those books which provide a historical perspective with a nod to the contemporary landscape, neither offer a solution to the inevitable decline of the West’s global supremacy.
If you read this book for nothing else, Kaupchan’s chapter on “Managing No One’s World” concisely outlines a strategic framework for how the West can co-manage alongside the emerging powers.
TD is on the fence about this one.
But, if you have read Zakaria’s The Post American World or Bernard Lewis’s What When Wrong, both of whom he sites in his book, you may find this redundant. However, unlike either of those books which provide a historical perspective with a nod to the contemporary landscape, neither offer a solution to the inevitable decline of the West’s global supremacy.
If you read this book for nothing else, Kaupchan’s chapter on “Managing No One’s World” concisely outlines a strategic framework for how the West can co-manage alongside the emerging powers.
TD is on the fence about this one.
March 19, 2024
A solid analysis of the new world order. Outlines the steps that the western world should take to stay in the fight for power in the international system. Chiefly among these, is the humility and restraint to transform the international system into the west image of a liberal democratic order. Instead the west should allow for diversity and tolerance towards different ways of governing, that is not strictly liberal democratic.
In essence, the west should promote the values that lead to the Westphalian peace and religious tolerance in the 15th century, in the international system.
Unfortunately, since the book came out, the west - primarily the US - have done the opposite, making enemies out of possible friends, relatively speaking. A shame.
In essence, the west should promote the values that lead to the Westphalian peace and religious tolerance in the 15th century, in the international system.
Unfortunately, since the book came out, the west - primarily the US - have done the opposite, making enemies out of possible friends, relatively speaking. A shame.
June 21, 2021
Lotta ideologica e politica tra le più grandi potenze mondiali, libro fondamentale per capire le cause dell’affermazione di Cina India e Brasile.
February 17, 2014
This book presents a strong argument that, not only is US hegemony unlikely to continue in the coming decades, but that we are not well-served by policies based on the belief that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government. After somewhat tediously opening with a review of the rise of liberal democracy in Europe and the US (needed to support his thesis that liberal democracy is not inevitable), Kupchan describes why he believes that the "communal, paternal, and tribal autocracies" of China, Russia, and the Middle East emirates are likely to remain stable, dominant world players. Further, he argues that our efforts to promote liberal democracy have mostly backfired, as can be seen not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in the "strongman" nations of Africa, where elections produce winner-take-all corruption. Even in Latin America, where democracy has taken hold, its effects are often not in US power interests, but have resulted in left-leaning populist leaders who take an understandably dim view of US meddling. In the final chapter, he prescribes changes to US and Western European policy and practice that may help smooth the inevitable transition to a world with no dominant power, including acceptance of other measures of a government's legitimacy, strengthening of financial regulations and broad reductions in US military spending.
January 30, 2014
Kupchan has written a book for popular audiences on the current challenges to U.S. foreign policy stemming from the growing influence of governments outside the traditional circle of Western great powers. It is an intellectually ambitious book in that the first three chapters attempt to synthesize a variety of ideas about the differences between the democratic industrialized nations of the West and the nations that arose in the wake of the breakup of the Ottoman empire. He enunciates an interesting but perhaps not compelling theory about the role of Protestants vs. Catholics in the West and Shiites vs. Sunnis in the Ottoman world in the second and third chapters. The rest of the book is devoted to a description of the rise of the so-called BRICs and suggestions for how to think about a world in which it will not be possible to rely on the imposition of Western values on everyone else to forge a new world order.
May 1, 2012
This ultimately struck me an a "No Sh*t" book. It is a terrific history of how the west became dominant in forgien policy and offers some insights into what to expect from this point forward. But the books conclusion that we are headed to a multi polar world just seems obvious to me. The author also doesn't adaquately take on the American Firsters other than to say that we cannot maintain our dominance that we currently enjoy. While I agree, there are many that think we should do all we can to maintain our dominance, including taking a stronger military posture. While it seems to me it is a war we cannot win, the author doesn't address this line of thinking.
All in all, a good history and a good job laying out the current and near future landscape. But no great insights and it is unwilling to take on other points of view.
All in all, a good history and a good job laying out the current and near future landscape. But no great insights and it is unwilling to take on other points of view.
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June 18, 2013'The good news is that Kupchan’s book is just the right size—around 200 pages—with not too many endnotes and a short but valuable bibliography. Kupchan is readable without being too glib. He is clearly an “insider” (he is a former National Security Council staffer) but exhibits a healthy level of detachment. And Kupchan displays a commendable willingness to adjust his grand vision to changing realities.'
Read the full review, "We Are Not All Americans Now," on our website:
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
Read the full review, "We Are Not All Americans Now," on our website:
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
February 17, 2014
A useful read explaining the shift of power from a more postmodern perspective. Kupchan is considered one of today's IR experts and is worth reading in order to understand accepted paradigms among the experts.
April 18, 2016
The book presents a fascinating view of how the new international order will be shaped. We are used to the idea of one or two nations being the most significant and the most impactful. Kupchan argues that the new order will be driven by many powers having to collaborate and cooperate.
March 31, 2013
Very good book that helped me expand my thinking on global governance issues. Very reasonable proposals are presented by Kupchan. Recommended for those less tolerant of others...
February 17, 2014
Good for context on this subject but not that startling in its insights. I don't honestly remember many of them: not a good sign.
September 27, 2013
Bloody excellent book.
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews