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Diplomacy
A brilliant, sweeping history of diplomacy that includes personal stories from the noted former Secretary of State, including his stunning reopening of relations with China.
The seminal work on foreign policy and the art of diplomacy.
Moving from a sweeping overview of history to blow-by-blow accounts of his negotiations with world leaders, Henry Kissinger describes how the art of diplomacy has created the world in which we live, and how America’s approach to foreign affairs has always differed vastly from that of other nations.
Brilliant, controversial, and profoundly incisive, Diplomacy stands as the culmination of a lifetime of diplomatic service and scholarship. It is vital reading for anyone concerned with the forces that have shaped our world today and will impact upon it tomorrow.
The seminal work on foreign policy and the art of diplomacy.
Moving from a sweeping overview of history to blow-by-blow accounts of his negotiations with world leaders, Henry Kissinger describes how the art of diplomacy has created the world in which we live, and how America’s approach to foreign affairs has always differed vastly from that of other nations.
Brilliant, controversial, and profoundly incisive, Diplomacy stands as the culmination of a lifetime of diplomatic service and scholarship. It is vital reading for anyone concerned with the forces that have shaped our world today and will impact upon it tomorrow.
912 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1994
About the author
Henry Kissinger
235 books1,664 followersHenry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.
During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.
During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.
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September 13, 2016
Whatever one may think about Kissinger, he is an indispensable theorist of realpolitik, balance of power politics, and the national interest. I originally picked the book up because I wanted something that covered a large span of history and was written clearly and simply. The book did not let me down. What is accomplished in 850 odd pages? There are two major themes that run throughout the book: that countries have survived and prospered largely when they have been practitioners of realpolitik; but also, that leaders have performed best when balancing the necessities of survival in the international system with their own domestic needs (the converse of this is when leaders understand domestic needs in a way that allows them to work effectively in international politics). In a sense, then, the book creates some of the fabric for Lebow's A Cultural Theory of International Relations.
For some, his portrayal of international relations may be too simplistic. But there is something to be said for simplicity when it weaves over 200 years of diplomacy into a coherent narrative. In addition, the problems he explores in the post-cold war world (he wrote the chapter amazingly in 1994) in retrospect seem prescient. In part he says that the US will need to figure out whether it should be a beacon or a crusader (presumably of liberty and democracy). The country is now suffering the hangover of being a crusader and is now struggling to regain its stature as a beacon. The challenge he specifies-- for the US to find a national interest-- is now the one that the US is facing--if not overtly. He is even able to go beyond his realpolitik framework and identify the way the world may be progressing (in at least some ways) toward a post-soveriegnty, postnational, and in some areas supranational regions and issue areas. In this respect, Buzan and Weaver's Regions and Powers is a great complement to the book.
In terms of the issues Kissinger identifies in the last chapter, these problems have been explored fairly well in the pages of Foreign Affairs and International Security (see also the Cambridge Series in International Relations).
For some, his portrayal of international relations may be too simplistic. But there is something to be said for simplicity when it weaves over 200 years of diplomacy into a coherent narrative. In addition, the problems he explores in the post-cold war world (he wrote the chapter amazingly in 1994) in retrospect seem prescient. In part he says that the US will need to figure out whether it should be a beacon or a crusader (presumably of liberty and democracy). The country is now suffering the hangover of being a crusader and is now struggling to regain its stature as a beacon. The challenge he specifies-- for the US to find a national interest-- is now the one that the US is facing--if not overtly. He is even able to go beyond his realpolitik framework and identify the way the world may be progressing (in at least some ways) toward a post-soveriegnty, postnational, and in some areas supranational regions and issue areas. In this respect, Buzan and Weaver's Regions and Powers is a great complement to the book.
In terms of the issues Kissinger identifies in the last chapter, these problems have been explored fairly well in the pages of Foreign Affairs and International Security (see also the Cambridge Series in International Relations).
June 29, 2020
Κλείνοντας (για πολλοστή φορά) το μεγαλειώδες αυτό βιβλίο, πήρα τηλέφωνο έναν συμμαθητή συμφοιτητη και φίλο επί τριακονταετιας ο οποίος υπηρετεί σήμερα σε μια υψηλή διπλωματική θέση εκτός Ελλάδος (...) Η συζήτηση ήταν και για το παρόν βιβλίο του συμβούλου εθνικής Ασφαλείας και πρώην Υπουργό Εξωτερικών των ΗΠΑ, Henry Κισσινγκερ· διανθιστηκε όμως με την εικόν�� του φίλου για το γερόλυκο ΗΚ, αδύνατο κ γέρο πια στα 97 του χρόνια, αλλά με μια καθαρότητα σκέψης, λόγου κ αντίληψης που ακόμα γοητεύει. Η ικανότητα αυτού του ανθρώπου να αντιλαμβάνεται το καίριο σε κάθε πρόβλημα, να έχει δε ακόμα καθαρές σκέψεις για ένα αντικείμενο και να μπορεί τις διατυπώνεις εξ ίσου καθαρά, είναι ένα από τα κύρια χαρακτηριστικά αυτής της αμφιλεγόμενης προσωπικότητας.
Για τον Κίσινγκερ θα έχετε ακούσει μάλλον. Επί χρόνια κυκλοφορούσε η αποκάλυψη περί της δήθεν φράσης του κατά των Ελλήνων, διάσημο hoax που διέδωσε το περιοδικό Νέμεσις. Φυσικά πρόκειται για έναν Μοναδικό Διπλωμάτη, με συμμετοχή σε μερικά από τα πιο σημαντικά γεγονότα του τελευταίου αιώνα (ακόμα κ σε κάποια αμφιλεγόμενης ηθικής όπως στην Αργεντινή ή την Χιλή). Ωστόσο σε αυτό το έργο είναι όλο το απαύγασμα των σκέψεων και ιδεών ενός ανθρώπου που το τελευταίο που τον απασχολησε ποτε είναι η...υστεροφημια του.
Ο Κίσινγκερ αναπτύσσει με μοναδική επιχειρηματολογία, καθαρότητα ιδεών, κριτική ανάλυση, Γνώση και Κατανόηση των Αιτιων, με μια εν ολίγοις Θουκυδίδεια Γραφή, την ιστορία της Διπλωματίας από την εποχή του Ρισελιε μέχρι κ την πτώση της ΕΣΣΔ.
Το μισό βιβλίο μέχρι την έναρξη του ΒΠΠ είναι ΑΡΙΣΤΟΥΡΓΗΜΑΤΙΚΟ - μια πανευρωπαϊκή ιστορία.
Με οδηγό την θεωρία του καρδινάλιου Ρισελιε για το δίκαιο του κράτους έναντι όλων (raison d état) και υπερ των συμφερόντων αυτού, η Γαλλία κατάφερε να κρατήσει διχοτομημενη την Γερμανία χάρη στον Τριακονταετη πόλεμο για δύο αιώνες. Αυτό οδήγησε στην συνθήκη της Βεστφαλιας(1640), την πρώτη επίσημη ίδρυση κρατών στην Ευρώπη. Η raison d état κράτησε σχεδόν 170 έτη και μετά την ήττα του Ναπολέοντα στο συνέδριο της Βιέννης οι Μετερνιχ κ Καστλριτζ επέλεξαν να οδηγήσουν την Ευρώπη μέσα από την θεωρία της Ισορροπίας των δυνάμεων και των συνθηκών, περισσότερο ως αδυναμία των περιφερειακων λαών παρά σαν ισχύ των Μεγάλων Δυνάμεων. Αν και η ισχυρή προσωπικότητα του Μπισμαρκ πέτυχε να γύρει την ισορροπία υπέρ μιας ενιαίας Γερμανίας το 1870, αυτή άντεξε αλλά 45 χρόνια μέχρι που η υπερβολική αύξηση ισχύος όλων οδήγησε σε έναν πόλεμο.
Στο σημείο αυτό ο Κ βάζει στο παιχνίδι την Αμερική ως τον κύριο παράγοντα, έκτοτε, διαμόρφωσης των ιδεών περί Διπλωματίας, όπου η Ισχύ καθορίζεται από τον Κυρίαρχο. Με τον Πρόεδρο Ουιλσον η Αμερική μπαίνει στον Α παγκόσμιο πόλεμο με μια νέα ιδεολογία· τον ουιλσονικο ανθρωπισμο, την πίστη δλ των Αμερικανών στην μεσσιανικη αποστολή τους ως υπέρμαχοι των πανανθρωπινων αξιών κ ως σταυροφοροι στον αγώνα για να κυριαρχήσει η δημοκρατία και η ελευθερία. Πίστη που γέννησε το κίνημα της αυτοδιάθεσης των λαών κ οδήγησε στην δημιουργία των νέων ευρωπαϊκών κρατών. Αν κ η Αμερική αρνήθηκε τελικά το ρόλο του υπέρμαχου, κ υποχώρησε στα ενδότερα.
Με αυτή τη σκέψη ουσιαστικά διαφωνεί εδώ ο Κ, που επιχειρηματολογει - επιτυχημένα ομολογω - εναντίον της. Άλλωστε όταν χρειάστηκε να ασκηθεί αυτή η ανθρωπιστική ιδεολογία των κρατών απέναντι στην απειλή, ο Χίτλερ απέδειξε ότι "μπροστά σε ένα πιστόλι κάθε διπλωματικός φάκελος δικογραφιας είναι άχρηστος..."
Κατά τον πόλεμο, Ρούσβελτ Τσόρτσιλ κ Στάλιν επανέρχονται στην λογική του 19ου αιώνα περί ισορροπίας δυνάμεων. Αν και ο Τσόρτσιλ καταλάβαινε το διακύβευμα σε Γιάλτα κ Πότσνταμ, η απώλεια ισχύος της Βρετανίας δεν επέτρεψε να αλλάξει το πεπρωμένο της μεταπολεμικά. Τουλάχιστον οι Άγγλοι κατάλαβαν πιο νωρίς το τέλος της αποικιοκρατιας σε σύγκριση με τους στενοκεφαλους Γάλλους. Όμως η Αμερική μετά το γνωστό τηλεγράφημα του Κενναν από την Μόσχα το 1947 οδηγείται στην λογική της Ανασχεσης του Κομμουνισμου με την Ουιλσονικη ιδεολογία του έθνους που καλείται να σώσει την ελευθερία. Απέναντι τους στέκεται η ιδεολογία της εξέλιξης της ιστορίας του Μαρξισμου, αποδεικνύοντας τελικά ότι αυτό που ονομάστηκε Ψυχρός πόλεμος ήταν μια σύγκρουση καθαρών ιδεολογιών, γεννημένων πριν τον ΑΠΠ. Ωστόσο όσοι χειρίστηκαν τα γεγονότα μετά την Γιάλτα ήταν όλοι παιδιά αυτής της εποχής πιστά σε δόγματα κ ιδέες άλλης εποχής. Αλλά οι εποχές αλλάζουν πιο γρήγορα από τις γενιές... Η Αμοιβαία Βεβαιότητα Καταστροφής που γέννησε ο πυρηνικός πόλεμος ουσιαστικά άλλαξε τον θεωρία του πολέμου και της πολιτικής ριζικά!!!
Και σε αυτό το σημείο το υπόλοιπο βιβλίο γίνεται ντοκουμέντο καθώς ο Κ. εισερχεται σταδιακά στο πλάνο, ως σύμβουλος ασφαλείας επί Αιζενχαουερ κ Κένεντι μέχρι την άνοδο του στο Υπ. Εξωτερικών επί Νίξον. Εναντίον της ιδέας της Ανάσχεση, μια μορφή καταναγκασμο�� δια της εμμονής στο Καλό, η οποία κατέστησε την Αμερική έρμαιο της ιδέας να περιφρουρει και να επεμβαίνει σε κάθε σύγκρουση σε όλο το πλανήτη, οδηγώντας την σταδιακά στα λάθη που την οδήγησαν στο Βιετνάμ, και την διχοτόμηση της αμερικανικής κοινωνίας.
- - - το κομμάτι με τις διαπραγματεύσεις για το τέλος του πολέμου στο Βιετνάμ είναι μακράν το πιο ενδιαφέρον του έργου αν και αρκετά λεπτομερές, άλλωστε όλη η διαπραγμάτευση ήταν...μοναδικά ψυχοβγαλτικη για τους Αμερικανούς· ορατε στο τέλος - - -
Την ίδια στιγμή η ΕΣΣΔ πίεζε κ μπλοφαρε συστηματικά, αναγκάζοντας την άλλη πλευρά να υποχωρεί μπροστά στο φόβο της δήθεν ισχύος που ο Στάλιν καλλιεργήσε, χωρίς φόβο αντίστασης από το εσωτερικό ή τα κράτη της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης. Όμως αυτή η ψευδαίσθηση κατάντησε πίστη και οδήγησε την ΕΣΣΔ στην λάθος εικόνα του άτρωτου κ του ισχυρού, γεγονός που πλήρωσε άμεσα. Για τον Κ η ΕΣΣΔ ουδέποτε έφτασε στα επίπεδα ισχύος που ο κόσμος πίστευε.
Όταν με τον Νίξον κ τον Κ επιλέχτηκε ως οδηγός πολιτικής εξωτερικής, ξανά, η θεωρία της raison d état, το Συμφέρον του Κράτους δηλαδή, αντί του ουιλσονικου ανθρωπισμού, και η Αμερική άνοιξε τον δρόμο με την Κίνα και έπλεξε να στρέψει την ατζέντα στην Ύφεση , η ΕΣΣΔ έπελεξε να "ανοιχτεί" με την σειρά της, σε έναν δρόμο στήριξης κάθε διαμαρτυρομενου, με σκοπό την ψευδή όπως απεδείχθη επέκτασης της ισχύος της, από Μέση Ανατολή και Λατινική Αμερική μέχρι Αφρική. Όμως ούτε η στρατιωτική ούτε κυρίως η οικονομική δύναμή της μπορούσαν να αντέξουν καν αυτή την έκταση ισχύος. Μέσα στο '80 η ΕΣΣΔ κατέρρευσε οικονομικά κ ιδεολογικά πιεζομενη τόσο από την πολιτική του Ρηγκαν για τον έλεγχο των όπλων, όσο και τα κινήματα που γέννησε η Χαρτα του Ελσίνκι το 1975 υπέρ των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων (αυτή η άγνωστη εν πολλοίς αιτία των ανθρωπιστικων κινημάτων σε Πολωνία, Ουγγαρία, Τσεχία, - Βατσλαβ Χαβελ, Λεχ Βαλεσα), ενω παράλληλα με τις εκατομβες Τσερνομπίλ κ Αφγανιστάν, έγινε φανερό ότι η γενιά μετά τους Μπρεζνιεφ, Αντροποφ, Τσερνιενγκο αδυνατούσε να στηρίξει τον γίγαντα με πήλινα πόδια που κληρονόμησε.
Κλείνω με την αναγκαία προτροπή να διαβάσετε αυτό το βιβλίο όσοι γνωρίζετε καλά την ιστορία, και για τα ανωτέρω αλλά και για τις ενδιαφέρουσες συνομιλίες του Κ με τους Αντενάουερ και Ντε Γκολ αλλά και τις πικάντικες αναφορές στις διπλωματικές επαφές του με τους Βιετναμεζους στο Παρίσι. Όπου αναγκάζονταν να ακούει επί μία ώρα συνεχώς τον Ντε Ντιο Θω να κωλλυσιεργει, αναλυοντας μονότονα μαρξιστική θεωρία για την πολιτική υπέροχη του Βορείου Βιετνάμ έναντι της Αμερικής. Όταν ο Κ τόλμησε να θέσει μια παράμετρο της λενινιστικης θεωρίας, ο Θω τον διέκοψε με άλλον ένα δεκάλεπτο μονόλόγο, επιτιμοντας τον, γιατί αυτός δεν ��πιτρέπεται να χρησιμοποιεί καν την μαρξιστική λενινιστικη ανάλυση ως Αμερικανός!
Στιγμές μεγαλείου υπομονής και διπλωματικού σουρεαλισμου...
Για τον Κίσινγκερ θα έχετε ακούσει μάλλον. Επί χρόνια κυκλοφορούσε η αποκάλυψη περί της δήθεν φράσης του κατά των Ελλήνων, διάσημο hoax που διέδωσε το περιοδικό Νέμεσις. Φυσικά πρόκειται για έναν Μοναδικό Διπλωμάτη, με συμμετοχή σε μερικά από τα πιο σημαντικά γεγονότα του τελευταίου αιώνα (ακόμα κ σε κάποια αμφιλεγόμενης ηθικής όπως στην Αργεντινή ή την Χιλή). Ωστόσο σε αυτό το έργο είναι όλο το απαύγασμα των σκέψεων και ιδεών ενός ανθρώπου που το τελευταίο που τον απασχολησε ποτε είναι η...υστεροφημια του.
Ο Κίσινγκερ αναπτύσσει με μοναδική επιχειρηματολογία, καθαρότητα ιδεών, κριτική ανάλυση, Γνώση και Κατανόηση των Αιτιων, με μια εν ολίγοις Θουκυδίδεια Γραφή, την ιστορία της Διπλωματίας από την εποχή του Ρισελιε μέχρι κ την πτώση της ΕΣΣΔ.
Το μισό βιβλίο μέχρι την έναρξη του ΒΠΠ είναι ΑΡΙΣΤΟΥΡΓΗΜΑΤΙΚΟ - μια πανευρωπαϊκή ιστορία.
Με οδηγό την θεωρία του καρδινάλιου Ρισελιε για το δίκαιο του κράτους έναντι όλων (raison d état) και υπερ των συμφερόντων αυτού, η Γαλλία κατάφερε να κρατήσει διχοτομημενη την Γερμανία χάρη στον Τριακονταετη πόλεμο για δύο αιώνες. Αυτό οδήγησε στην συνθήκη της Βεστφαλιας(1640), την πρώτη επίσημη ίδρυση κρατών στην Ευρώπη. Η raison d état κράτησε σχεδόν 170 έτη και μετά την ήττα του Ναπολέοντα στο συνέδριο της Βιέννης οι Μετερνιχ κ Καστλριτζ επέλεξαν να οδηγήσουν την Ευρώπη μέσα από την θεωρία της Ισορροπίας των δυνάμεων και των συνθηκών, περισσότερο ως αδυναμία των περιφερειακων λαών παρά σαν ισχύ των Μεγάλων Δυνάμεων. Αν και η ισχυρή προσωπικότητα του Μπισμαρκ πέτυχε να γύρει την ισορροπία υπέρ μιας ενιαίας Γερμανίας το 1870, αυτή άντεξε αλλά 45 χρόνια μέχρι που η υπερβολική αύξηση ισχύος όλων οδήγησε σε έναν πόλεμο.
Στο σημείο αυτό ο Κ βάζει στο παιχνίδι την Αμερική ως τον κύριο παράγοντα, έκτοτε, διαμόρφωσης των ιδεών περί Διπλωματίας, όπου η Ισχύ καθορίζεται από τον Κυρίαρχο. Με τον Πρόεδρο Ουιλσον η Αμερική μπαίνει στον Α παγκόσμιο πόλεμο με μια νέα ιδεολογία· τον ουιλσονικο ανθρωπισμο, την πίστη δλ των Αμερικανών στην μεσσιανικη αποστολή τους ως υπέρμαχοι των πανανθρωπινων αξιών κ ως σταυροφοροι στον αγώνα για να κυριαρχήσει η δημοκρατία και η ελευθερία. Πίστη που γέννησε το κίνημα της αυτοδιάθεσης των λαών κ οδήγησε στην δημιουργία των νέων ευρωπαϊκών κρατών. Αν κ η Αμερική αρνήθηκε τελικά το ρόλο του υπέρμαχου, κ υποχώρησε στα ενδότερα.
Με αυτή τη σκέψη ουσιαστικά διαφωνεί εδώ ο Κ, που επιχειρηματολογει - επιτυχημένα ομολογω - εναντίον της. Άλλωστε όταν χρειάστηκε να ασκηθεί αυτή η ανθρωπιστική ιδεολογία των κρατών απέναντι στην απειλή, ο Χίτλερ απέδειξε ότι "μπροστά σε ένα πιστόλι κάθε διπλωματικός φάκελος δικογραφιας είναι άχρηστος..."
Κατά τον πόλεμο, Ρούσβελτ Τσόρτσιλ κ Στάλιν επανέρχονται στην λογική του 19ου αιώνα περί ισορροπίας δυνάμεων. Αν και ο Τσόρτσιλ καταλάβαινε το διακύβευμα σε Γιάλτα κ Πότσνταμ, η απώλεια ισχύος της Βρετανίας δεν επέτρεψε να αλλάξει το πεπρωμένο της μεταπολεμικά. Τουλάχιστον οι Άγγλοι κατάλαβαν πιο νωρίς το τέλος της αποικιοκρατιας σε σύγκριση με τους στενοκεφαλους Γάλλους. Όμως η Αμερική μετά το γνωστό τηλεγράφημα του Κενναν από την Μόσχα το 1947 οδηγείται στην λογική της Ανασχεσης του Κομμουνισμου με την Ουιλσονικη ιδεολογία του έθνους που καλείται να σώσει την ελευθερία. Απέναντι τους στέκεται η ιδεολογία της εξέλιξης της ιστορίας του Μαρξισμου, αποδεικνύοντας τελικά ότι αυτό που ονομάστηκε Ψυχρός πόλεμος ήταν μια σύγκρουση καθαρών ιδεολογιών, γεννημένων πριν τον ΑΠΠ. Ωστόσο όσοι χειρίστηκαν τα γεγονότα μετά την Γιάλτα ήταν όλοι παιδιά αυτής της εποχής πιστά σε δόγματα κ ιδέες άλλης εποχής. Αλλά οι εποχές αλλάζουν πιο γρήγορα από τις γενιές... Η Αμοιβαία Βεβαιότητα Καταστροφής που γέννησε ο πυρηνικός πόλεμος ουσιαστικά άλλαξε τον θεωρία του πολέμου και της πολιτικής ριζικά!!!
Και σε αυτό το σημείο το υπόλοιπο βιβλίο γίνεται ντοκουμέντο καθώς ο Κ. εισερχεται σταδιακά στο πλάνο, ως σύμβουλος ασφαλείας επί Αιζενχαουερ κ Κένεντι μέχρι την άνοδο του στο Υπ. Εξωτερικών επί Νίξον. Εναντίον της ιδέας της Ανάσχεση, μια μορφή καταναγκασμο�� δια της εμμονής στο Καλό, η οποία κατέστησε την Αμερική έρμαιο της ιδέας να περιφρουρει και να επεμβαίνει σε κάθε σύγκρουση σε όλο το πλανήτη, οδηγώντας την σταδιακά στα λάθη που την οδήγησαν στο Βιετνάμ, και την διχοτόμηση της αμερικανικής κοινωνίας.
- - - το κομμάτι με τις διαπραγματεύσεις για το τέλος του πολέμου στο Βιετνάμ είναι μακράν το πιο ενδιαφέρον του έργου αν και αρκετά λεπτομερές, άλλωστε όλη η διαπραγμάτευση ήταν...μοναδικά ψυχοβγαλτικη για τους Αμερικανούς· ορατε στο τέλος - - -
Την ίδια στιγμή η ΕΣΣΔ πίεζε κ μπλοφαρε συστηματικά, αναγκάζοντας την άλλη πλευρά να υποχωρεί μπροστά στο φόβο της δήθεν ισχύος που ο Στάλιν καλλιεργήσε, χωρίς φόβο αντίστασης από το εσωτερικό ή τα κράτη της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης. Όμως αυτή η ψευδαίσθηση κατάντησε πίστη και οδήγησε την ΕΣΣΔ στην λάθος εικόνα του άτρωτου κ του ισχυρού, γεγονός που πλήρωσε άμεσα. Για τον Κ η ΕΣΣΔ ουδέποτε έφτασε στα επίπεδα ισχύος που ο κόσμος πίστευε.
Όταν με τον Νίξον κ τον Κ επιλέχτηκε ως οδηγός πολιτικής εξωτερικής, ξανά, η θεωρία της raison d état, το Συμφέρον του Κράτους δηλαδή, αντί του ουιλσονικου ανθρωπισμού, και η Αμερική άνοιξε τον δρόμο με την Κίνα και έπλεξε να στρέψει την ατζέντα στην Ύφεση , η ΕΣΣΔ έπελεξε να "ανοιχτεί" με την σειρά της, σε έναν δρόμο στήριξης κάθε διαμαρτυρομενου, με σκοπό την ψευδή όπως απεδείχθη επέκτασης της ισχύος της, από Μέση Ανατολή και Λατινική Αμερική μέχρι Αφρική. Όμως ούτε η στρατιωτική ούτε κυρίως η οικονομική δύναμή της μπορούσαν να αντέξουν καν αυτή την έκταση ισχύος. Μέσα στο '80 η ΕΣΣΔ κατέρρευσε οικονομικά κ ιδεολογικά πιεζομενη τόσο από την πολιτική του Ρηγκαν για τον έλεγχο των όπλων, όσο και τα κινήματα που γέννησε η Χαρτα του Ελσίνκι το 1975 υπέρ των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων (αυτή η άγνωστη εν πολλοίς αιτία των ανθρωπιστικων κινημάτων σε Πολωνία, Ουγγαρία, Τσεχία, - Βατσλαβ Χαβελ, Λεχ Βαλεσα), ενω παράλληλα με τις εκατομβες Τσερνομπίλ κ Αφγανιστάν, έγινε φανερό ότι η γενιά μετά τους Μπρεζνιεφ, Αντροποφ, Τσερνιενγκο αδυνατούσε να στηρίξει τον γίγαντα με πήλινα πόδια που κληρονόμησε.
Κλείνω με την αναγκαία προτροπή να διαβάσετε αυτό το βιβλίο όσοι γνωρίζετε καλά την ιστορία, και για τα ανωτέρω αλλά και για τις ενδιαφέρουσες συνομιλίες του Κ με τους Αντενάουερ και Ντε Γκολ αλλά και τις πικάντικες αναφορές στις διπλωματικές επαφές του με τους Βιετναμεζους στο Παρίσι. Όπου αναγκάζονταν να ακούει επί μία ώρα συνεχώς τον Ντε Ντιο Θω να κωλλυσιεργει, αναλυοντας μονότονα μαρξιστική θεωρία για την πολιτική υπέροχη του Βορείου Βιετνάμ έναντι της Αμερικής. Όταν ο Κ τόλμησε να θέσει μια παράμετρο της λενινιστικης θεωρίας, ο Θω τον διέκοψε με άλλον ένα δεκάλεπτο μονόλόγο, επιτιμοντας τον, γιατί αυτός δεν ��πιτρέπεται να χρησιμοποιεί καν την μαρξιστική λενινιστικη ανάλυση ως Αμερικανός!
Στιγμές μεγαλείου υπομονής και διπλωματικού σουρεαλισμου...
November 2, 2019
http://nwhyte.livejournal.com/1312207.html
This is a somewhat frustrating book. The opening chapters, based apparently on the author's PhD thesis about diplomacy in the nineteenth century, are pretty dull, even soporific. But once Kissinger gets to the twentieth century, it all gets rather exciting - particularly as regards the foreign policy of Germany in the period between the two world wars and between 1945 and 1961; I don't think I have read a better analysis. But then, rather surprisingly, as Kissinger himself becomes an actor the book becomes less interesting; his fascination with the characters of Nixon and Reagan robs him of any ability to judge their efforts objectively, and even his account of ending the Vietnam War is repetitious and oddly unenlightening.
The book fails to establish its main intellectual theses which are that a) America is unique in bringing its own moral values to international diplomacy and b) that this is only successful when these are consciously married to a realist perception of what is possible. The first proposition is easily falsified by the large number of other countries which have attempted to export their own ideologies to the rest of the world. America has been more successful, admittedly (though the jury must surely still be out on the Chinese), but that's not the same as being unique.
The second proposition is trickier. Kissinger's bête noire is John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, who he blames for Suez, Hungary and the initial and irreversible commitment to Vietnam. But on Kissinger's evidence, the problem with Dulles was not faulty ideology but poor personal management skills; Dulles made speeches without reference to his own officials' painstakingly compiled research, containing commitments on which he was utterly unable to deliver (or, worse, from which it was impossible for him to disengage). It was, on Kissinger's account, fortunate for Dulles that for most of his term of office the Soviet Union was led by Khrushchev, whose own personal management skills were even worse.
Kissinger's praise for Ronald Reagan, despite his total lack of intellectual depth (which Kissinger describes in a couple of devastating phrases), is further evidence for my view that knowing a lot about international relations in theory is not a good qualification for actually being involved in practice. I'm dubious anyway about the genuine value of Reagan's legacy - again, on Kissinger's own evidence, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze first discussed how to change the Soviet Union years before Reagan came to power, thanks to the CSCE process started by Nixon and ended by Ford; SDI had little to do with it. But if you think Reagan was in any way successful, that in itself is a serious strike against the idea that studying IR is any use at all (other than for potentially generating literature to be read by other IR scholars, rather than practitioners). Kissinger damns Carter by barely mentioning him.
I also found fault with Kissinger's analysis of American discourse. He singles out the Vietnam war as having been a uniquely divisive and horrible event in the American psyche. But the more I read about American history, the more it seems to me that the nasty, viscerally horrible debate that was happening 40 years ago about Vietnam, the brutal debate happening now about health care, the question of slavery which sparked armed conflict in the 1860s, the division between John Adams and Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s, that this style is all fairly characteristic of the standard mode of American discourse. It's not for the faint-hearted, and it's not for me, but it's a recurrent phenomenon through history. I'm sure that for Kissinger and for many of his colleagues, Vietnam was a uniquely searing experience. But in the context of American history, it seems less so (at least to me).
Cyprus conspiracy theorists will be (and already have been) disappointed that the island is not mentioned even once in the book.
This is a somewhat frustrating book. The opening chapters, based apparently on the author's PhD thesis about diplomacy in the nineteenth century, are pretty dull, even soporific. But once Kissinger gets to the twentieth century, it all gets rather exciting - particularly as regards the foreign policy of Germany in the period between the two world wars and between 1945 and 1961; I don't think I have read a better analysis. But then, rather surprisingly, as Kissinger himself becomes an actor the book becomes less interesting; his fascination with the characters of Nixon and Reagan robs him of any ability to judge their efforts objectively, and even his account of ending the Vietnam War is repetitious and oddly unenlightening.
The book fails to establish its main intellectual theses which are that a) America is unique in bringing its own moral values to international diplomacy and b) that this is only successful when these are consciously married to a realist perception of what is possible. The first proposition is easily falsified by the large number of other countries which have attempted to export their own ideologies to the rest of the world. America has been more successful, admittedly (though the jury must surely still be out on the Chinese), but that's not the same as being unique.
The second proposition is trickier. Kissinger's bête noire is John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, who he blames for Suez, Hungary and the initial and irreversible commitment to Vietnam. But on Kissinger's evidence, the problem with Dulles was not faulty ideology but poor personal management skills; Dulles made speeches without reference to his own officials' painstakingly compiled research, containing commitments on which he was utterly unable to deliver (or, worse, from which it was impossible for him to disengage). It was, on Kissinger's account, fortunate for Dulles that for most of his term of office the Soviet Union was led by Khrushchev, whose own personal management skills were even worse.
Kissinger's praise for Ronald Reagan, despite his total lack of intellectual depth (which Kissinger describes in a couple of devastating phrases), is further evidence for my view that knowing a lot about international relations in theory is not a good qualification for actually being involved in practice. I'm dubious anyway about the genuine value of Reagan's legacy - again, on Kissinger's own evidence, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze first discussed how to change the Soviet Union years before Reagan came to power, thanks to the CSCE process started by Nixon and ended by Ford; SDI had little to do with it. But if you think Reagan was in any way successful, that in itself is a serious strike against the idea that studying IR is any use at all (other than for potentially generating literature to be read by other IR scholars, rather than practitioners). Kissinger damns Carter by barely mentioning him.
I also found fault with Kissinger's analysis of American discourse. He singles out the Vietnam war as having been a uniquely divisive and horrible event in the American psyche. But the more I read about American history, the more it seems to me that the nasty, viscerally horrible debate that was happening 40 years ago about Vietnam, the brutal debate happening now about health care, the question of slavery which sparked armed conflict in the 1860s, the division between John Adams and Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s, that this style is all fairly characteristic of the standard mode of American discourse. It's not for the faint-hearted, and it's not for me, but it's a recurrent phenomenon through history. I'm sure that for Kissinger and for many of his colleagues, Vietnam was a uniquely searing experience. But in the context of American history, it seems less so (at least to me).
Cyprus conspiracy theorists will be (and already have been) disappointed that the island is not mentioned even once in the book.
May 28, 2023
That's one of the bibles of international relations, written by a follower of realpolitik. But, unfortunately, Kissinger still needs to correct a big mistake: working in an administration that constantly mixes political and economic affairs. In these circumstances, diplomacy stops being a public service tool and becomes a lobby.
As I am a defender of freedoms of any kind, I'm afraid I have to disagree with many of his statements in this work.
As I am a defender of freedoms of any kind, I'm afraid I have to disagree with many of his statements in this work.
December 29, 2021
To give this book 5* is a gross understatement. To call it monumental is a cliché. Epic? Masterful? The same. Yet, all these characterizations are totally true.
I was not expecting this. I knew that it is considered one of the essential readings, but to think that I had it on my shelf for more than 20 years and only picked it up now is shameful. Or maybe not, maybe now, after so many other books, I was better prepared.
There is great polemic surrounding Kissinger. We Greeks are especially prone to hating him because of his stance during our hounta/dictatorship and Cyprus’ invasion by Turkey (and his total lack of explanation, description of events and his part in it). It is true that he stirs intense reactions. Nevertheless, that’s besides the point. There is no doubt, even among his hate fan-club, that he has a brilliant mind and a thorough knowledge of international affairs. Whether one likes him or not, agrees with him or not, is irrelevant.
One has to keep in mind that the biggest part of the book is historical, dating back from the 17th century, together with an anatomic description of specific events leading to and culminating in the two WWs and of the Cold War, not its entirety. Kissinger is famous for stressing a specific point and masterfully avoiding other, more unpleasant ones.
His favorite personalities, Richelieu and Bismarck take center-stage. The Vienna accord (1815) is his favorite system and the cynicism oozing from the above permeates the whole book. But it’s a cynicism which is fitting and justifiable. And it goes hand in hand with substantial empathy. Kissinger’s EQ is comparable to his IQ and even though there is doubt about his sincerity when he expresses empathy there are still plenty of “cracks” scattered in the book which directly show that since he is talking about state affairs, not charity institutions, his assessment doesn’t shy away from admitting that the US (his much beloved, adored rather, adopted country) lives with the frequent contradiction between its moral (crusade-like) values and its actions.
The book was written in 1994 and therefore has no 9/11, Putin, 2nd Iraq war, Internet, Euro, Arabian spring, Trump and ….Covid. This doesn’t make it dated; on the contrary, Kissinger foresees a lot and for those that he doesn’t he couldn’t. As to its historical pickings, these are plenty and all extremely insightful. The two WWs, the Suez crisis, the Cold War theories and evolution, the Korean war, Hungary, Berlin, Vietnam (of course). However, it is also the first part which is historically amazing: Richelieu, then Bismarck, Napoleon III, the balance of powers (Kissinger’s mantra throughout), the invention, realization and assessment of Realpolitik. There is a Stalin analysis like no other I have come across. A Hitler one as well, sober yet chirurgical. Adenauer earns his respect, as does De Gaule, Churchill, FDR. The list is big, the “targets” of his study are all complicated people, people who have shaped our society and quite possibly our future.
I am itching to write much more, there are endless quotes one could reproduce, passages which show the man’s acute perception of personalities, crises, chain events, indirect apologies (or lacks). Kissinger is artful in interpreting events in a way that both suits his theories and avoid pitfalls. But as no one is really reading this review and as I dislike overtly long ones myself, suffice it to say that despite its 900+ pages and the dense meaning and substance of virtually every sentence this is a magnificent ride and an indispensable reading companion of the Cold War era and its analysis. It will -and should- be read multiple times. Perhaps I will be editing this review going forward - just so to read it myself, to remind me of the wisdom that this book offers.
I was not expecting this. I knew that it is considered one of the essential readings, but to think that I had it on my shelf for more than 20 years and only picked it up now is shameful. Or maybe not, maybe now, after so many other books, I was better prepared.
There is great polemic surrounding Kissinger. We Greeks are especially prone to hating him because of his stance during our hounta/dictatorship and Cyprus’ invasion by Turkey (and his total lack of explanation, description of events and his part in it). It is true that he stirs intense reactions. Nevertheless, that’s besides the point. There is no doubt, even among his hate fan-club, that he has a brilliant mind and a thorough knowledge of international affairs. Whether one likes him or not, agrees with him or not, is irrelevant.
One has to keep in mind that the biggest part of the book is historical, dating back from the 17th century, together with an anatomic description of specific events leading to and culminating in the two WWs and of the Cold War, not its entirety. Kissinger is famous for stressing a specific point and masterfully avoiding other, more unpleasant ones.
His favorite personalities, Richelieu and Bismarck take center-stage. The Vienna accord (1815) is his favorite system and the cynicism oozing from the above permeates the whole book. But it’s a cynicism which is fitting and justifiable. And it goes hand in hand with substantial empathy. Kissinger’s EQ is comparable to his IQ and even though there is doubt about his sincerity when he expresses empathy there are still plenty of “cracks” scattered in the book which directly show that since he is talking about state affairs, not charity institutions, his assessment doesn’t shy away from admitting that the US (his much beloved, adored rather, adopted country) lives with the frequent contradiction between its moral (crusade-like) values and its actions.
The book was written in 1994 and therefore has no 9/11, Putin, 2nd Iraq war, Internet, Euro, Arabian spring, Trump and ….Covid. This doesn’t make it dated; on the contrary, Kissinger foresees a lot and for those that he doesn’t he couldn’t. As to its historical pickings, these are plenty and all extremely insightful. The two WWs, the Suez crisis, the Cold War theories and evolution, the Korean war, Hungary, Berlin, Vietnam (of course). However, it is also the first part which is historically amazing: Richelieu, then Bismarck, Napoleon III, the balance of powers (Kissinger’s mantra throughout), the invention, realization and assessment of Realpolitik. There is a Stalin analysis like no other I have come across. A Hitler one as well, sober yet chirurgical. Adenauer earns his respect, as does De Gaule, Churchill, FDR. The list is big, the “targets” of his study are all complicated people, people who have shaped our society and quite possibly our future.
I am itching to write much more, there are endless quotes one could reproduce, passages which show the man’s acute perception of personalities, crises, chain events, indirect apologies (or lacks). Kissinger is artful in interpreting events in a way that both suits his theories and avoid pitfalls. But as no one is really reading this review and as I dislike overtly long ones myself, suffice it to say that despite its 900+ pages and the dense meaning and substance of virtually every sentence this is a magnificent ride and an indispensable reading companion of the Cold War era and its analysis. It will -and should- be read multiple times. Perhaps I will be editing this review going forward - just so to read it myself, to remind me of the wisdom that this book offers.
May 26, 2022
“Международен ред, който не се смята за справедлив, рано или късно ще бъде атакуван.”
Кисинджър знае какво говори, сам той е бил част от градежа на международния ред в знаков момент от историята на 20 век, познава отвътре и отблизо всички скрипци, механизми и носещи конструкции, актьорите на сцената и кукловодите зад нея. Където не е бил пряк участник в ��олямата дипломация, разказва за нея така, сякаш творците на история лично са му разяснявали концепциите си за световен ред.
От Виенския конгрес, с който се закрепва новия световен ред след Наполеоновите войни, до рухването на Желязната завеса – дипломацията е смазката, която задвижва тромавите механизми на междудържавните отношения. Тя е крайният продукт на избистрена държавническа концепция, която трябва да докаже своята далновидност и устойчивост в сблъсъка си с други такива концепции на международната сцена. В конкуренцията за величие на техните страни, личности като Ришельо, Метерних и Бисмарк играят успешно най-сложната игра – тази, в която текущите тенденции не пречат на дългосрочните цели, а моралните и религиозните съображения, идеологията и симпатиите не информират крайните политически решения.
Разбира се, и дипломацията подлежи на еволюция. Кабинетните договорки между аристократи от 19 век отстъпват на натиска на общественото мнение, с което дори междувоенните войнолюбци се съобразяват в следващия. Дипломацията е и въпрос на национален стил. Англичаните обичат гъвкавите и разтегливи договорки, неясните обещания и хлабавите ангажименти, които да им позволят лесно оттегляне в островната черупка. Французите (след Ришельо) така и не успяват да уцелят приемлива формула, която да поддържа илюзията им, че все още контролират европейските съдбини. Американският идеализъм и затварянето в строго юридически формуливовки тежи като догма. Руските претенции и неотстъпчивост стигат до крайна антидиалогичност. Излиза, или поне това е моят личен извод, че голямата дипломация е игра с малко на брой и добре познати играчи, в която (почти) винаги печелят англичаните, защото (почти) винаги знаят кога да стоят настрана и кога е абсолютно наложително да се намесят.
Разбира се, че “Дипломацията” е взискателна и изискваща време книга, каквито са всички големи обяснения за това, което наричаме политическа страна на историята. Задължителна за всеки човек, който иска да си обясни силите, които движат света, макрокартината, големите личности, но и историята като процес на случване, като механизъм и логика. Няма как да не се изумим и от широтата на мисълта и пределно аналитичния ум на Кисинджър, чийто умения за синтез, съдържателност и илюстративна конкретика са абсолютен интелектуален връх.
“От историческа гледна точка Германия е била или твърде слаба, или твърде силна за мира в Европа.”
“Парадоксите са най-характерната черта на Русия. Независимо че е постоянно във война и че се разширява във всички посоки, тя непрекъснато се смята за заплашена.”
“Да унижиш една голяма страна, без да я отслабиш, винаги означава да играеш опасна игра.”
“Държавниците успяват или се провалят в зависимост от способността си да схващат тенденциите.”
Кисинджър знае какво говори, сам той е бил част от градежа на международния ред в знаков момент от историята на 20 век, познава отвътре и отблизо всички скрипци, механизми и носещи конструкции, актьорите на сцената и кукловодите зад нея. Където не е бил пряк участник в ��олямата дипломация, разказва за нея така, сякаш творците на история лично са му разяснявали концепциите си за световен ред.
От Виенския конгрес, с който се закрепва новия световен ред след Наполеоновите войни, до рухването на Желязната завеса – дипломацията е смазката, която задвижва тромавите механизми на междудържавните отношения. Тя е крайният продукт на избистрена държавническа концепция, която трябва да докаже своята далновидност и устойчивост в сблъсъка си с други такива концепции на международната сцена. В конкуренцията за величие на техните страни, личности като Ришельо, Метерних и Бисмарк играят успешно най-сложната игра – тази, в която текущите тенденции не пречат на дългосрочните цели, а моралните и религиозните съображения, идеологията и симпатиите не информират крайните политически решения.
Разбира се, и дипломацията подлежи на еволюция. Кабинетните договорки между аристократи от 19 век отстъпват на натиска на общественото мнение, с което дори междувоенните войнолюбци се съобразяват в следващия. Дипломацията е и въпрос на национален стил. Англичаните обичат гъвкавите и разтегливи договорки, неясните обещания и хлабавите ангажименти, които да им позволят лесно оттегляне в островната черупка. Французите (след Ришельо) така и не успяват да уцелят приемлива формула, която да поддържа илюзията им, че все още контролират европейските съдбини. Американският идеализъм и затварянето в строго юридически формуливовки тежи като догма. Руските претенции и неотстъпчивост стигат до крайна антидиалогичност. Излиза, или поне това е моят личен извод, че голямата дипломация е игра с малко на брой и добре познати играчи, в която (почти) винаги печелят англичаните, защото (почти) винаги знаят кога да стоят настрана и кога е абсолютно наложително да се намесят.
Разбира се, че “Дипломацията” е взискателна и изискваща време книга, каквито са всички големи обяснения за това, което наричаме политическа страна на историята. Задължителна за всеки човек, който иска да си обясни силите, които движат света, макрокартината, големите личности, но и историята като процес на случване, като механизъм и логика. Няма как да не се изумим и от широтата на мисълта и пределно аналитичния ум на Кисинджър, чийто умения за синтез, съдържателност и илюстративна конкретика са абсолютен интелектуален връх.
“От историческа гледна точка Германия е била или твърде слаба, или твърде силна за мира в Европа.”
“Парадоксите са най-характерната черта на Русия. Независимо че е постоянно във война и че се разширява във всички посоки, тя непрекъснато се смята за заплашена.”
“Да унижиш една голяма страна, без да я отслабиш, винаги означава да играеш опасна игра.”
“Държавниците успяват или се провалят в зависимост от способността си да схващат тенденциите.”
November 25, 2015
Αυτο το βιβλίο πρέπει να το μελετήσεις, όχι απλά να το διαβασεις.
January 7, 2018
This opus by Henry Kissinger is not for the faint of heart. While shorter than his White House memoirs, the book still clocks in at 835 pages. Unfortunately, many of these pages are consumed with Kissinger dissecting foreign policy moves and counter-moves, some from centuries ago. If the reader does not have a firm grasp of 20th century American foreign policy history and/or European military history from the past few centuries, he may find himself quickly sinking in the diplomatic quicksand. Kissinger seems to presume that the reader has at least a working knowledge of such events as the Crimean War.
At times, especially while reviewing European diplomatic maneuvers from the 1800s, even Kissinger admits that it can get confusing. That is saying something, as this man is one of the foremost experts on foreign policy and diplomacy. Notably, this book is only focused on certain areas: Europe, the United States, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. All areas or countries that Kissinger is familiar with. There is almost no mention of Latin America, Central America, Australia, or Africa. Repeating a pattern from his White House books, Kissinger ignores Japan except where it concerns the country's involvement in WWII and a few pages at the end about its relationship with China. This seems to be a glaring weakness of the book, given Japan's importance in the world economy following WWII. Kissinger clearly has no interest in Japan, or the other areas mentioned, thus he makes it seems as only Europe and the U.S. matter where foreign policy is concerned.
In addition, his focus on the U.S. is mainly from WWI on up. Aside from an early chapter that seemed somewhat out of place comparing and contrasting Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, you would not think that America had any diplomacy before WWI. There is almost no mention of one of this country's most respected diplomats: John Quincy Adams. No mention of the negotiations with Spain over Florida in the 1810s/1820s or with Great Britain over the Oregon territory in the 1840s. No review of the annexation of Texas or the War with Mexico. There is only a brief mention of the Cuban Missile Crisis. How can the moment where the U.S. and the Soviet Union came closest to a nuclear war not be discussed in a book about diplomacy? Especially one that spends so much time discussing U.S.-Soviet relations? Deft diplomacy by John F. Kennedy (after many serious foreign policy stumbles) and Nikita Khrushchev backing down are the two things that kept that crisis from becoming a nuclear war. Apparently, Kissinger thinks that if he wasn't involved in it or didn't study it, then it is not worth writing about. This is unfortunate as diplomacy is more than just European, or Kissinger-involved American foreign policy, in nature.
Fortunately, once Kissinger gets to WWII, his writing style become far more engaging, and the narrative is easier to follow. For example, when writing about the Potsdam Conference involving Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin on page 434: “The Potsdam Conference rapidly turned into a dialogue of the deaf.” Kissinger obviously feels most at home discussing Cold War diplomacy because he lived it. In his chapters about FDR, Churchill, and Stalin he succeeds in showing each man's view and how it colored the geopolitical lens through which he looked at things. While Kissinger is certainly not unbiased when it comes to the Soviets, he is able to fairly present the concerns that Stalin and those after him had about democracies trying to contain the Soviet sphere of influence. Kissinger argues that, while mistakes were certainly made by American politicians, in all likelihood nothing that they would have done or said would have appeased Stalin other than total capitulation to the Soviet Union unilaterally expanding its presence across Central Europe and the Middle East.
When Kissinger turns to Vietnam, he provides an excellent analysis of how the U.S. slowly got itself entangled in Vietnam. Kissinger takes pains to point out the reasoning that Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and even Kennedy, used and how, in retrospect, their decisions appear misguided, their judgments faulty, and U.S. strategy clearly off-the-mark. But at the time that some of these decisions were made, they appeared to just be extensions of the global containment policy that began immediately following WWII. Kissinger does not give Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Lyndon Johnson a pass on their Southeast Asian decisions. But he does provide some needed context to help explain- especially in the cases of Truman and Eisenhower – the reasoning they used in making their decisions. With Kennedy and Johnson he, appropriately, less forgiving as by then the U.S. was becoming more arrogant than wise in its thinking about trying to contain communism. As for his own role in the Nixon Administration, he does not give much of a personal account as he did in his memoirs. Instead we get a summation of the negotiations.
Following Vietnam, Kissinger lapses into a few chapters concerning Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan's relationships with Soviet leadership. As Kissinger tended to do in his White House memoirs, unfortunately he gets bogged down in interminable discussions about the nuclear arms race. While this clearly was a top concern of policymakers on both sides, Kissinger simply goes into too much detail for the average reader. Discussing strike force capabilities and so forth causes one to struggle at times to get through the narrative. Also of note in this part of the book: zero mention of Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords. How can this be left out? That, to me, is a prime example of the good that an American president can do on the diplomatic front. To not discuss such a major accomplishment, but yet spare no ink in discussing SALT, leaves me wondering what exactly was Kissinger's purpose in writing this book.
Kissinger concludes with a chapter on the state of American relations with the world in 1993/1994, when he wrote this book. While he is generally spot-on with his analysis, I do question is assertion on page 834: “Through most of its history, America knew no foreign threat to its survival.” Somehow I think James Madison, watching the White House get torched by the British in the War of 1812, would disagree. This is a worthwhile read mainly for those interested in global politics, especially European and 20th century. But for a general reader or casual student of history, ultimately this may not be worth the effort.
At times, especially while reviewing European diplomatic maneuvers from the 1800s, even Kissinger admits that it can get confusing. That is saying something, as this man is one of the foremost experts on foreign policy and diplomacy. Notably, this book is only focused on certain areas: Europe, the United States, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. All areas or countries that Kissinger is familiar with. There is almost no mention of Latin America, Central America, Australia, or Africa. Repeating a pattern from his White House books, Kissinger ignores Japan except where it concerns the country's involvement in WWII and a few pages at the end about its relationship with China. This seems to be a glaring weakness of the book, given Japan's importance in the world economy following WWII. Kissinger clearly has no interest in Japan, or the other areas mentioned, thus he makes it seems as only Europe and the U.S. matter where foreign policy is concerned.
In addition, his focus on the U.S. is mainly from WWI on up. Aside from an early chapter that seemed somewhat out of place comparing and contrasting Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, you would not think that America had any diplomacy before WWI. There is almost no mention of one of this country's most respected diplomats: John Quincy Adams. No mention of the negotiations with Spain over Florida in the 1810s/1820s or with Great Britain over the Oregon territory in the 1840s. No review of the annexation of Texas or the War with Mexico. There is only a brief mention of the Cuban Missile Crisis. How can the moment where the U.S. and the Soviet Union came closest to a nuclear war not be discussed in a book about diplomacy? Especially one that spends so much time discussing U.S.-Soviet relations? Deft diplomacy by John F. Kennedy (after many serious foreign policy stumbles) and Nikita Khrushchev backing down are the two things that kept that crisis from becoming a nuclear war. Apparently, Kissinger thinks that if he wasn't involved in it or didn't study it, then it is not worth writing about. This is unfortunate as diplomacy is more than just European, or Kissinger-involved American foreign policy, in nature.
Fortunately, once Kissinger gets to WWII, his writing style become far more engaging, and the narrative is easier to follow. For example, when writing about the Potsdam Conference involving Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin on page 434: “The Potsdam Conference rapidly turned into a dialogue of the deaf.” Kissinger obviously feels most at home discussing Cold War diplomacy because he lived it. In his chapters about FDR, Churchill, and Stalin he succeeds in showing each man's view and how it colored the geopolitical lens through which he looked at things. While Kissinger is certainly not unbiased when it comes to the Soviets, he is able to fairly present the concerns that Stalin and those after him had about democracies trying to contain the Soviet sphere of influence. Kissinger argues that, while mistakes were certainly made by American politicians, in all likelihood nothing that they would have done or said would have appeased Stalin other than total capitulation to the Soviet Union unilaterally expanding its presence across Central Europe and the Middle East.
When Kissinger turns to Vietnam, he provides an excellent analysis of how the U.S. slowly got itself entangled in Vietnam. Kissinger takes pains to point out the reasoning that Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and even Kennedy, used and how, in retrospect, their decisions appear misguided, their judgments faulty, and U.S. strategy clearly off-the-mark. But at the time that some of these decisions were made, they appeared to just be extensions of the global containment policy that began immediately following WWII. Kissinger does not give Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Lyndon Johnson a pass on their Southeast Asian decisions. But he does provide some needed context to help explain- especially in the cases of Truman and Eisenhower – the reasoning they used in making their decisions. With Kennedy and Johnson he, appropriately, less forgiving as by then the U.S. was becoming more arrogant than wise in its thinking about trying to contain communism. As for his own role in the Nixon Administration, he does not give much of a personal account as he did in his memoirs. Instead we get a summation of the negotiations.
Following Vietnam, Kissinger lapses into a few chapters concerning Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan's relationships with Soviet leadership. As Kissinger tended to do in his White House memoirs, unfortunately he gets bogged down in interminable discussions about the nuclear arms race. While this clearly was a top concern of policymakers on both sides, Kissinger simply goes into too much detail for the average reader. Discussing strike force capabilities and so forth causes one to struggle at times to get through the narrative. Also of note in this part of the book: zero mention of Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords. How can this be left out? That, to me, is a prime example of the good that an American president can do on the diplomatic front. To not discuss such a major accomplishment, but yet spare no ink in discussing SALT, leaves me wondering what exactly was Kissinger's purpose in writing this book.
Kissinger concludes with a chapter on the state of American relations with the world in 1993/1994, when he wrote this book. While he is generally spot-on with his analysis, I do question is assertion on page 834: “Through most of its history, America knew no foreign threat to its survival.” Somehow I think James Madison, watching the White House get torched by the British in the War of 1812, would disagree. This is a worthwhile read mainly for those interested in global politics, especially European and 20th century. But for a general reader or casual student of history, ultimately this may not be worth the effort.
July 31, 2013
I simply do not have the knowledge to be able to manage the author's continuous stream of biases and errors, and if I did have that much knowledge what would be the point of reading the book?
October 21, 2017
Има писатели и всякакви политически анализатори, които изключително много ме дразнят с начина, по който изразяват вярванията си. Проблемът не е в това, което казват, тъй като аз не съм достатъчно компететна да преценя дали са прави, а по-скоро е в начина, по който го казват. Не мога да възприема този манталитет на „всичко мога, всичко знам“, който подтиква някои хора да са твърде убедени в анализите си, в правотата на идеологията си, в това, че тяхната истина е единствена и свята.
За мое щастие книгата на Кисинджър не е от този вид. Той много се е постарал да е обективен, до колкото това изобщо му е възможно от гледна точка на работата, която е вършел и хората, за които е работил. Спестил си е квалификациите на събития и исторически личности (е, прощавам му изрази като „тъпоумният Рибентроп“, няколкото епитета за Хитлер, Молотов, първата и втората световна война – и Кисинджър е човек, все пак). Но въпреки цялото старание личната му идеология прозира през редовете. Без да се оправдава и да лицемерничи, подкрепя политиката на баланса на силите и смята, че идеализъм и алтруизъм имат много малко място във външната политика на Америка (и не само). Сблъсъкът на интересите на държавите предизвиква конфликти – т��ка е било и така ще бъде, но следването на неясни морални принципи в твърде мътните води на дипломатическите отношения и националните политики освен, че е неефективно, има и ужасяващи последици.
Книгата обогати общата ми култура. Напр. вече не ми е толкова чудно защо Великобритания избра да излезе от Европейския съюз. Като се има предвид изолационистката политика, която е водила спрямо Европа в продължение на цели векове, е по-чудно как изобщо е станала част от такъв съюз. За Виетнамската война не знаех почти нищо, кото да не е научено от американските филми; кризата в Суец ми беше непозната, както и смисълът на доктрината Мънро, идеологиите на Теодор Рузвелт и Удро Уилсън, историята около Версайския договор и т.н. Не знам до колко съм си разширила кръгозора и съм си променила начина на мислене, но поне някои неща вече имат по-голям смисъл.
Друго полезно за мен беше да си припомня, че политиката се прави от хора, които са подвластни на различни влияния, породени от собствените им разсъждения, философия и мироглед, от натиска на различни интереси, от образованието и възпитанието им, а много често повлияни и от страх, гордост, нерешителност, ограничени умствени възможности и какви ли не още обичайни човешки качества. Политиците, съветниците им, анализаторите, интелектуалците, от които зависи животът и благоденствието на обикновените хора са човешки същества. Не са благословени винаги да взимат правилните решения и да виждат всички последствия от действията си. А това е отрезвяваща и плашеща мисъл. Затова винаги е добре да има някаква коригираща сила на волята на политиците. До сега като че ли демокрацията осигуряваше адекватни корекции, но в наши дни светът отново се променя и на яве излизат слабостите на тази демокрация. Но ако алтернативата е еднолично управление – историята познава твърде много провали, за да можем да си го позволим отново. Така че кой ще каже кой е верният път?
Не получих отговор на един въпрос, който ме тормози от много дълго време – коя външна политика е по-добра – изолационистката или политиката на световен полицай. Подозирам, че самият въпрос не е правилен, т.е. когато се говори за външна политика няма абсолютни категории като „добро“ и „зло“ (с изключение на нацизма, геноцида, убийсвата на цивилни, терора, анексиране на мирни държави и още няколко подобни извращения). Отношенията между хората са твърде сложни, за да се натикват само в две категории и няма смисъл да се лицемерничи по въпроса.
За мое щастие книгата на Кисинджър не е от този вид. Той много се е постарал да е обективен, до колкото това изобщо му е възможно от гледна точка на работата, която е вършел и хората, за които е работил. Спестил си е квалификациите на събития и исторически личности (е, прощавам му изрази като „тъпоумният Рибентроп“, няколкото епитета за Хитлер, Молотов, първата и втората световна война – и Кисинджър е човек, все пак). Но въпреки цялото старание личната му идеология прозира през редовете. Без да се оправдава и да лицемерничи, подкрепя политиката на баланса на силите и смята, че идеализъм и алтруизъм имат много малко място във външната политика на Америка (и не само). Сблъсъкът на интересите на държавите предизвиква конфликти – т��ка е било и така ще бъде, но следването на неясни морални принципи в твърде мътните води на дипломатическите отношения и националните политики освен, че е неефективно, има и ужасяващи последици.
Книгата обогати общата ми култура. Напр. вече не ми е толкова чудно защо Великобритания избра да излезе от Европейския съюз. Като се има предвид изолационистката политика, която е водила спрямо Европа в продължение на цели векове, е по-чудно как изобщо е станала част от такъв съюз. За Виетнамската война не знаех почти нищо, кото да не е научено от американските филми; кризата в Суец ми беше непозната, както и смисълът на доктрината Мънро, идеологиите на Теодор Рузвелт и Удро Уилсън, историята около Версайския договор и т.н. Не знам до колко съм си разширила кръгозора и съм си променила начина на мислене, но поне някои неща вече имат по-голям смисъл.
Друго полезно за мен беше да си припомня, че политиката се прави от хора, които са подвластни на различни влияния, породени от собствените им разсъждения, философия и мироглед, от натиска на различни интереси, от образованието и възпитанието им, а много често повлияни и от страх, гордост, нерешителност, ограничени умствени възможности и какви ли не още обичайни човешки качества. Политиците, съветниците им, анализаторите, интелектуалците, от които зависи животът и благоденствието на обикновените хора са човешки същества. Не са благословени винаги да взимат правилните решения и да виждат всички последствия от действията си. А това е отрезвяваща и плашеща мисъл. Затова винаги е добре да има някаква коригираща сила на волята на политиците. До сега като че ли демокрацията осигуряваше адекватни корекции, но в наши дни светът отново се променя и на яве излизат слабостите на тази демокрация. Но ако алтернативата е еднолично управление – историята познава твърде много провали, за да можем да си го позволим отново. Така че кой ще каже кой е верният път?
Не получих отговор на един въпрос, който ме тормози от много дълго време – коя външна политика е по-добра – изолационистката или политиката на световен полицай. Подозирам, че самият въпрос не е правилен, т.е. когато се говори за външна политика няма абсолютни категории като „добро“ и „зло“ (с изключение на нацизма, геноцида, убийсвата на цивилни, терора, анексиране на мирни държави и още няколко подобни извращения). Отношенията между хората са твърде сложни, за да се натикват само в две категории и няма смисъл да се лицемерничи по въпроса.
June 15, 2018
Никога нищо няма да промени твърдото ми убеждение, че познаването на историята и политическите процеси води до натрупването на огромен интелектуален капитал, с помощта на който може да се твори много добро. С други думи - подобен тип литература учи на много полезни неща (с изключение на типично Кисинджъровото припяване за безкористното величие на Америка, в което ми е трудно да повярвам). Книгата е страхотна.
June 24, 2018
Kissinger's Diplomacy is essentially four books.
1. The first is a diplomatic history of Europe from the 1600s until WWI.
2. The second is a US and Europe-centric diplomatic history from WWI until the early Cold War.
3. The third is part memoir, part justification for Kissinger's own political decisions, including a full three chapters devoted to the Vietnam War.
4. The fourth is the final chapter, an essay making predictions and policy prescriptions for the US circa 1994 when the book was written.
Unlike some of the other reviewers, I found that the first two books to be the most thorough, engaging, and educational. The first two books helped me understand just how much I don't know about European history, and about US-European relations during the WWI to mid-Cold War era.
The main thesis that Kissinger pushes is that the world is best off when statesmen identify their country's national interests and act accordingly, eschewing other norms when necessary (essentially, Realism). Kissinger's historical examples generally make good cases for this argument.
Kissinger's examples from US policy during the Cold War generally make bad cases for this argument.
Once Kissinger moves to examples that his audience is more aware of, the emptiness of the idea of the "national interest" is laid bare. The phrase becomes almost tautological-- states do best when statesmen do what's best for them. The question that is glossed over is how to systematically discover what those true national interests are. Kissinger seems to think that some people have a talent for it and some do not. Oh, and what a coincidence, Kissinger's own understanding of the national interest happens to be the objectively correct one.
In book three, when Kissinger is attempting to justify and explain his own decisions, he often describes two extreme schools of thought, and places himself in the middle, having taken the best from each school while rejecting their excesses. This might be something he learned from working in the American bureaucracy: a common tactic of bureaucrats is to offer to policy makers a Goldilocks set of three choices to their superiors, one too hot, one too cold, and one "just right." By intentionally offering choices that are too hot and too cold, the policy maker is essentially left with no choice but to accept the one that the bureaucrat thinks is "just right." The tactic is completely disingenuous.
Book four is interesting today mostly because of its historical value. It should be assigned as a standalone essay in history classes about the 1990s and US foreign policy.
Diplomacy deserves credit for being a thorough history book. But its central thesis focusing on the national interest is empty.
1. The first is a diplomatic history of Europe from the 1600s until WWI.
2. The second is a US and Europe-centric diplomatic history from WWI until the early Cold War.
3. The third is part memoir, part justification for Kissinger's own political decisions, including a full three chapters devoted to the Vietnam War.
4. The fourth is the final chapter, an essay making predictions and policy prescriptions for the US circa 1994 when the book was written.
Unlike some of the other reviewers, I found that the first two books to be the most thorough, engaging, and educational. The first two books helped me understand just how much I don't know about European history, and about US-European relations during the WWI to mid-Cold War era.
The main thesis that Kissinger pushes is that the world is best off when statesmen identify their country's national interests and act accordingly, eschewing other norms when necessary (essentially, Realism). Kissinger's historical examples generally make good cases for this argument.
Kissinger's examples from US policy during the Cold War generally make bad cases for this argument.
Once Kissinger moves to examples that his audience is more aware of, the emptiness of the idea of the "national interest" is laid bare. The phrase becomes almost tautological-- states do best when statesmen do what's best for them. The question that is glossed over is how to systematically discover what those true national interests are. Kissinger seems to think that some people have a talent for it and some do not. Oh, and what a coincidence, Kissinger's own understanding of the national interest happens to be the objectively correct one.
In book three, when Kissinger is attempting to justify and explain his own decisions, he often describes two extreme schools of thought, and places himself in the middle, having taken the best from each school while rejecting their excesses. This might be something he learned from working in the American bureaucracy: a common tactic of bureaucrats is to offer to policy makers a Goldilocks set of three choices to their superiors, one too hot, one too cold, and one "just right." By intentionally offering choices that are too hot and too cold, the policy maker is essentially left with no choice but to accept the one that the bureaucrat thinks is "just right." The tactic is completely disingenuous.
Book four is interesting today mostly because of its historical value. It should be assigned as a standalone essay in history classes about the 1990s and US foreign policy.
Diplomacy deserves credit for being a thorough history book. But its central thesis focusing on the national interest is empty.
March 10, 2016
This book places the birth of diplomacy in the 17th century, but is mostly concerned with the past 200 years. In this respect it adds a refreshing perspective to my fields of interest. Highlights such as the Vienna Congres that would disintegrate in dull details at book length are presented crisply. The sections on pre-war Great Power diplomacy & the Versailles Treaty are strong even if it's simply impossible to tell the complete story; by the logic of Clausewitz it's just a bit odd to omit the wartime completely. This is not the case for WWII, where the wartime summits cannot be separated from the larger origin story of the Cold War. Needless to say, with Henry Kissinger behind the pen, that from Vietnam on, the text is at its strongest. It would be nice to get a second edition that includes a perspective on the War on Terror era up to the Arab Spring. I wouldn't, however, call this 'elegantly written' : Kissinger tends to repeat himself a lot.
May 10, 2020
Πρόκειται για ένα καταπληκτικό, εκτενές και άκρως κατατοπιστικό βιβλίο σε σχέση με την Παγκόσμια ιστορία και την γεωπολιτική στρατηγική των υπερδυνάμεων της κάθε εποχής, ξεκινώντας από τις αρχές του 17ου αιώνα και τον Τριακονταετή πόλεμο. Θα πρέπει όμως να διαβασθεί έχοντας σαν δεδομένα: α) του ποιος είναι ο συγγραφέας, που ως γνωστόν δεν είναι μόνον διαπρεπής ακαδημαϊκός αλλά συμμετείχε για σχεδόν 20 χρόνια στην χάραξη και στην υλοποίηση της γεωπολιτικής στρατηγικής των ΗΠΑ (που σημαίνει ότι τα κεφάλαια 28-30 θα πρέπει να διαβασθούν με μεγαλύτερη κριτική επαγρύπνηση), και β) το ότι το βιβλίο γράφτηκε το 1994, οπότε αν και είχε τελειώσει ο Ψυχρός Πόλεμος και στον επίλογο (κεφάλαιο 31) υπάρχει μια διερεύνηση της επόμενης γεωστρατηγικής πρόκλησης, δεν προβλέπει ότι αυτή θα είναι ο ισλαμικός φονταμενταλισμός. Τέλος ενώ υπάρχει μια εκτενής βιβλιογραφία (που για τους περισσότερους αναγνώστες είναι άχρηστη), δεν υπάρχει ένας αναλυτικός δείκτης - ευρετήριο που θα έκανε ευκολότερη για τον αναγνώστη την μελλοντική αναζήτηση συμβάντων και προσώπων.
"Οι διανοούμενοι αναλύουν τη λειτουργία των διεθνών συστημάτων, οι πολιτικοί τα οικοδομούν. Και υπάρχει μια τεράστια διαφορά ανάμεσα στην οπτική γωνία ενός αναλυτή και ενός πολιτικού. Ο αναλυτής μπορεί να διαλέξει το πρόβλημα που θέλει να μελετήσει, ενώ ένα πολιτικός δεν μπορεί να επιλέξει τα προβλήματα με τα οποία θα ασχοληθεί, αυτά απλώς του επιβάλλονται. Ο αναλυτής μπορεί να διαθέσει τον χρόνο που χρειάζεται για να φτάσει σε ένα σαφές συμπέρασμα. Η μεγαλύτερη πίεση για έναν πολιτικό είναι η πίεση του χρόνου. Ο αναλυτής δεν διατρέχει κινδύνους. Σε περίπτωση που αποδειχθεί ότι έχει βγάλει λάθος συμπεράσματα, μπορεί να γράψει μια άλλη διατριβή. Ο πολιτικός μπορεί μόνο μια φορά να μαντέψει.Τα λάθη του είναι αμετάκλητα. Ο αναλυτής ε΄χει στη διάθεση του όλα τα στοιχεία. Θα τον κρίνουν για τις διανοητικές του ικανότητες. Ο πολιτικός πρέπει να ενεργήσει βάσει εκτιμήσεων που δεν μπορούν να αποδειχθούν τη στιγμή που τις κάνει. Η ιστορία θα τον κρίνει με βάση το πόσο σοφά χειρίστηκε την αναπότρεπτη αλλαγή..."
"Οι διανοούμενοι αναλύουν τη λειτουργία των διεθνών συστημάτων, οι πολιτικοί τα οικοδομούν. Και υπάρχει μια τεράστια διαφορά ανάμεσα στην οπτική γωνία ενός αναλυτή και ενός πολιτικού. Ο αναλυτής μπορεί να διαλέξει το πρόβλημα που θέλει να μελετήσει, ενώ ένα πολιτικός δεν μπορεί να επιλέξει τα προβλήματα με τα οποία θα ασχοληθεί, αυτά απλώς του επιβάλλονται. Ο αναλυτής μπορεί να διαθέσει τον χρόνο που χρειάζεται για να φτάσει σε ένα σαφές συμπέρασμα. Η μεγαλύτερη πίεση για έναν πολιτικό είναι η πίεση του χρόνου. Ο αναλυτής δεν διατρέχει κινδύνους. Σε περίπτωση που αποδειχθεί ότι έχει βγάλει λάθος συμπεράσματα, μπορεί να γράψει μια άλλη διατριβή. Ο πολιτικός μπορεί μόνο μια φορά να μαντέψει.Τα λάθη του είναι αμετάκλητα. Ο αναλυτής ε΄χει στη διάθεση του όλα τα στοιχεία. Θα τον κρίνουν για τις διανοητικές του ικανότητες. Ο πολιτικός πρέπει να ενεργήσει βάσει εκτιμήσεων που δεν μπορούν να αποδειχθούν τη στιγμή που τις κάνει. Η ιστορία θα τον κρίνει με βάση το πόσο σοφά χειρίστηκε την αναπότρεπτη αλλαγή..."
December 10, 2022
Monografia lui Kissinger, cea mai amplă scriere a sa, este un tur de forță în istoria tumultuoasă a lumii, dar din perspectiva relațiilor între națiuni. Diplomația este motorul din spatele istoriei națiunilor aflate în plin avânt de afirmare a idealurilor și intereselor lor. Lucrarea conține 31 de capitole bogate în informații istorice amplu prezentate în care actorii principali sunt Europa și Statele Unite, pentru că jocul de pe cele două scene au modificat în mod dramatic traseul umanității. Desprinsă din Europa, nația nord americană s-a dezvoltat în paralel și a căpătat o serie de idei despre lume diferite de ale strămoșilor lor europeni. Când, în cele din urmă, cei doi actori, european și american, au trebuit să colaboreze, distanța ideologică dintre ei a vădit adevărate incompatibilități de viziuni, însă nu insurmontabile. Armonizarea ambilor parteneri au creat real progres pentru atât pentru Occident, cât și pentru lume în general. Confruntările istorice au adus noutățile în fața cărora actorii au trebuit să-și remodeleze idiosincraziile acumulate pe parcursul lor istoric.
October 11, 2022
The first sixteen chapters of this work are quite enlightening. However, once America became the focal point of Kissinger's analysis the mental gymnastics he undergoes began hurting my brain. For example, asserting American exceptionalism and moralism in the sphere of international relations while demanding that presidents embrace Realpolitik/balance of power politics (ie. America doesn't interfere in the internal affairs of other nations - but sometimes the CIA needs to back a coup or a dictatorship).
However, the amount of copium included in his chapters on the Vietnam War are amusing, as is his Nixon-dickriding.
However, the amount of copium included in his chapters on the Vietnam War are amusing, as is his Nixon-dickriding.
December 23, 2018
A historical telling, written with the means of justifying its author’s criminal acts of war. Skewed and lacking. In reality this deserves 0/5 stars.
January 27, 2010
A great book to help one understand real politik - if Bush the 2nd had read this and taken away its lessons, he would have realized that Afghanistan had to be finished first and Iraq would have gone nowhere.
Kissinger does overplay his hand at the end - he almost becomes rigid in his application of real politik as the idealists that he preaches against.
As with most things in life, the truth is somewhere between these two ideals....
Kissinger does overplay his hand at the end - he almost becomes rigid in his application of real politik as the idealists that he preaches against.
As with most things in life, the truth is somewhere between these two ideals....
June 15, 2022
After 1.5 years I finally finished it! Took me a while mainly because it's a very detailed manuscript, converting several centuries and many countries.
Most interesting it became last autumn and there were more and more examples I could compare book to real life..
Absolutely worth a read, if you have time to dedicate
Most interesting it became last autumn and there were more and more examples I could compare book to real life..
Absolutely worth a read, if you have time to dedicate
November 29, 2018
I always wanted to read a book written by a super-villian. Turns out the guy can't write and no one cared enough to edit this repetitive work of fiction. How can you not notice two paragraphs in a row with the same first words? Only reinforces the notion that these type of people get in power by accident or by virtue of their servitude, as opposed to their aptitude. Then again, who would want Nixon's bourbon breath whispering into your ear? Basically a history of madness. DNF.
July 29, 2023
There is no book i have read more penetrating both in depth and breadth on the internal workings of diplomacy, geopolitics and international relations of the last 200 years like this one.
I knew Kissinger was a genius on foreign policy during Nixon's administration, but i didn't know he was such a world caliber historian.
The book starts explaining the difference between personal interest and the national interest and invokes the case of cardinal Richelieu during the 30 years war, who, despite being a staunch catholic, he departed from his beliefs and did whatever was necessary for his country's security , adopting a strategy known as "Raison d'etat" or national interest , playing his enemies between themselves.
The book covers most of the 19 century after Napoleon's defeat with all its crises , the perennial players : Austro Hungary , Ottomans, Germany (Prussia) , Russia , UK , Italy and the intricate web of relationships and reasoning behind their leaders.
Special attention is given to the buildup of events which have led to world war I , buildup which started with the Crimean War dismantling Metternich's "concert of Europe", continuing with Italy reunification and the fatal year of 1870 when France was defeated at Sedan becoming a mortal enemy of the reunified Germany, seeking from then on to envelop the latter through an Alliance with Russia.
The book then moves to the 20 century covering the interesting parts of the pre WW1 dynamics of Europe , Germany's reemergence in the interwar period and then continues for the rest of the book with USA and USSR struggle during the cold war and the crises that have shaped american way of throught and as well as foreign relations. ( Berlin Blockade , Korea War , Vietnam , NATO and EU formation).
Very thorough analysis of Teddy Roosevelt , Woodrow Wilson, FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan presidencies, the rise of China to world power , and the triangle Washington-Beijing-Moscow during the Brezhnev era , the fall of USSR during Gorbachev and Reagan's tenures.
Nowadays many people see Americans as stupid and naive in their decisons , but they just didn't have experience in foreign policy, and thus lacked flexibility during the last century. They learned like all great powers that any advantage evaporates in time and there can only be so much to be done until overextension and erosion .
Americans are witnessing now in the 2020's the same thing France had after Napoleon , Britain at the end of the XIX century and USSR in the late 80s , which is exhaustion and decay, something that for me looks irreversible....That is, the juice , the energy of a nation can't flow forever and it will be interesting to see how american idealism will have to shift to national interest, to stop caring about democracy worldwide and focus on domestic issues, how USA from a superpower will become one of the many nations of the world.
I would have loved an updated version on this book covering at least the 2010 and i would definetly wanted to know what Kissinger thinks of this multipolar world that is emerging, about new blocks like BRICS and the rise of African nations.
It is funny how France has been the arch enemy of a united Germany after the Franco-Prussian war and fought 2 world wars and even after to keep it in check, to in the end decide that its power projection and significance in the world stage would depend on its relationship with her eastern neighbour in the second part of the XX century and pursuing a policy of unification and consolidation of Europe (EU).
Its also interesting to think that North Korea might have not existed if America would press forward during the Korean war to the chinese border and would have incorporated Pyongyang. We would have no Kim Jong Un now. America stopped right before xomplete victory due to fear of a Soviet intervention (which was the last thing Stalin wanted).
Same thing happened in Vietnam war, America having a phase of idealism and global interventionalism followed by its own doubts and stalemating and crumbling on itself.
Super, collosal, hollistic undertaking. A must read for anyone interested in why countries act in ways that look unreasonable and how foreign policy is dictated.
I knew Kissinger was a genius on foreign policy during Nixon's administration, but i didn't know he was such a world caliber historian.
The book starts explaining the difference between personal interest and the national interest and invokes the case of cardinal Richelieu during the 30 years war, who, despite being a staunch catholic, he departed from his beliefs and did whatever was necessary for his country's security , adopting a strategy known as "Raison d'etat" or national interest , playing his enemies between themselves.
The book covers most of the 19 century after Napoleon's defeat with all its crises , the perennial players : Austro Hungary , Ottomans, Germany (Prussia) , Russia , UK , Italy and the intricate web of relationships and reasoning behind their leaders.
Special attention is given to the buildup of events which have led to world war I , buildup which started with the Crimean War dismantling Metternich's "concert of Europe", continuing with Italy reunification and the fatal year of 1870 when France was defeated at Sedan becoming a mortal enemy of the reunified Germany, seeking from then on to envelop the latter through an Alliance with Russia.
The book then moves to the 20 century covering the interesting parts of the pre WW1 dynamics of Europe , Germany's reemergence in the interwar period and then continues for the rest of the book with USA and USSR struggle during the cold war and the crises that have shaped american way of throught and as well as foreign relations. ( Berlin Blockade , Korea War , Vietnam , NATO and EU formation).
Very thorough analysis of Teddy Roosevelt , Woodrow Wilson, FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan presidencies, the rise of China to world power , and the triangle Washington-Beijing-Moscow during the Brezhnev era , the fall of USSR during Gorbachev and Reagan's tenures.
Nowadays many people see Americans as stupid and naive in their decisons , but they just didn't have experience in foreign policy, and thus lacked flexibility during the last century. They learned like all great powers that any advantage evaporates in time and there can only be so much to be done until overextension and erosion .
Americans are witnessing now in the 2020's the same thing France had after Napoleon , Britain at the end of the XIX century and USSR in the late 80s , which is exhaustion and decay, something that for me looks irreversible....That is, the juice , the energy of a nation can't flow forever and it will be interesting to see how american idealism will have to shift to national interest, to stop caring about democracy worldwide and focus on domestic issues, how USA from a superpower will become one of the many nations of the world.
I would have loved an updated version on this book covering at least the 2010 and i would definetly wanted to know what Kissinger thinks of this multipolar world that is emerging, about new blocks like BRICS and the rise of African nations.
It is funny how France has been the arch enemy of a united Germany after the Franco-Prussian war and fought 2 world wars and even after to keep it in check, to in the end decide that its power projection and significance in the world stage would depend on its relationship with her eastern neighbour in the second part of the XX century and pursuing a policy of unification and consolidation of Europe (EU).
Its also interesting to think that North Korea might have not existed if America would press forward during the Korean war to the chinese border and would have incorporated Pyongyang. We would have no Kim Jong Un now. America stopped right before xomplete victory due to fear of a Soviet intervention (which was the last thing Stalin wanted).
Same thing happened in Vietnam war, America having a phase of idealism and global interventionalism followed by its own doubts and stalemating and crumbling on itself.
Super, collosal, hollistic undertaking. A must read for anyone interested in why countries act in ways that look unreasonable and how foreign policy is dictated.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 6, 2017
It is a must read book about diplomacy and foreign affairs. In his book, Kissinger gives a historic overview about diplomacy that dates back to the 16th century. He discusses the different schools of foreign affairs supported with historic examples. He then continues to describe the evolution of American foreign affairs with all its strengths and weaknesses. It is one of the fundamental books in political science and it is very rich in history and diplomacy spiced up with Kissinger exceptional analytic critic.
April 24, 2016
Shaman! That was a long book. A fantastic one though. Make sure you have a good solid month to get through this one. Over 300 years old diplomacy in one solid book. 836 pages. Make sure you are very steeped in European history before you tackle this Achilles of history. I cannot begin to state the amount I have learned from this single book. Now for a long nap.
March 3, 2024
ამ წიგნის წაკითხვით უფრო მეტი გავიგე მე-19 და მე-20 საუკუნის საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობებსა და პოლიტიკის ისტორიაზე, ვიდრე 4 წლის მანძილზე უნივერსიტეტში სწავლით.
დიპლომატიური, მაგრამ გასაგები ენით დაწერილი წიგნია, ის ადამიანებიც იდეალურად წაიკითხავენ, ვისაც არანაირი წინარე ცოდნა არ აქვთ ისტორიულ თუ პოლიტიკურ საკითხებზე.
დიპლომატიური, მაგრამ გასაგები ენით დაწერილი წიგნია, ის ადამიანებიც იდეალურად წაიკითხავენ, ვისაც არანაირი წინარე ცოდნა არ აქვთ ისტორიულ თუ პოლიტიკურ საკითხებზე.
September 22, 2012
Very worthwhile read. Was shocking how little I knew about these topics.
Very helpful historical context around raison de'etat, Realpolitik, balance of power, collective security, etc. Was challenging to read the historical conflicts and imagine libertarian foreign policy responses.
I was struck wondering what the response would be to a Romney-esque comment, "Nations are people, too."
Thought provoking to see the impact that individuals can have on the world. And, likewise, the power of the billions of people that give those few the authority. I'm sure there is some simplification of the lesser personalities supporting people like Bismarck and other notable statesmen ... but if their impacts were due to even a small team, amazing.
Was especially nice contrast to "The Prize"'s oil-centric focus on history; the Suez Crisis felt like a different event in each book.
I think I have a much better chance of winning Diplomacy (the game) next time around :-)
some quotes I wanted to remember...
"Metternich would have considered [Bismark's views] heresy, but Frederick the Great would have applauded a disciple's clever adaptation of his own rationale for conquering Silesia."
Bismark quote:
"We have three threats available: (1) an alliance with Russia; and it is nonsense to swear at once that we will never go with Russia. Even if it were true, we should retain the option to use it as a threat."
"Stalin was indeed a monster; but in the conduct of international relations he was the supreme realist - patient, shrewd, and implacable, the Richelieu of his period."
"According to the journalistic practice of the day [FDR], the President always met with the press off-the-record, which meant that he could neither be quoted nor identified, and these rules were respected."
"In American thinking foreign policy and strategy were compartmentalized into successive phases of national policy. In the ideal American universe, diplomats stayed out of strategy and military personnel completed their task by the time diplomacy started - a view for which America was to pay dearly in the Korean and Vietnam wars. By contrast, for Churchill, war strategy and foreign policy were closely linked. ..."
"Amazingly, the State Dept document asserted that NATO was not designed to defend the status quo... the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations happily accepted this conceit ... No history graduate student would have received a passing grade for such an analysis."
"[stopping offensive operations to in Korean conflict] was a classically American gesture. Because of their conviction that peace is normal and goodwill natural, American leaders have generally sought to encourage negotiations by removing elements of coercion and by unilateral demonstrations of goodwill. In general, diplomats rarely pay for services already rendered -- especially in wartime. Typically, it is pressure on the battlefield that generates the negotiation. Relieving the pressure reduces the enemy's incentive to negotiate seriously, and it tempts him to drag out the negotiation in order to determine whether other unilateral gestures may be forthcoming."
"According to a Newsweek poll, Americans believed that Khrushchev had finally understood "that Americans from the President on down genuinely want peace." If that was Khrushchev's actual judgement, the effect was surely double-edged. Any any event, he kept that particular insight a state secret."
"Dulles was Secretary of State to a President who was passionately opposed to war in the way only an experienced military man can be. ... To Eisenhower, the Suez crisis was not sufficiently threatening to merit the use of force. ... Dulles was caught between an adamant Eisenhower and an outraged group of European allies."
"[Addenauer] asked how much of my time was spent working as a White House consultant. When I told him about 25 percent, he replied calmly: "In that case, I shall assume you are telling me 75 percent of the truth."
"in 1959, in one of the truly original articles of the Cold War period, the then Rand Corporation analyst Albert Wohlstetter showed that common sense was not an adequate guide to nuclear relationships. The fact that nuclear weapons were carried on airplanes concentrated on a relatively few bases might make it technically possible to destroy the adversary's strategic forces before they were launched. ... According to Wolhlstetter, the nuclear balance was in fact highly unstable."
"[Chinese] negotiating style was as different from that of their Soviet counterparts as was possible. Soviet diplomats almost never discussed conceptual issues. Their tactic was to select a problem of immediate concern to Moscow and to batter away at its resolution with a dogged persistence designed to wear down their interlocutors rather than to persuade them. The insistence and vehemence with which Soviet negotiators put forward the Politburo consensus reflected the brutal discipline and internal strains of Soviet politics..."
Very helpful historical context around raison de'etat, Realpolitik, balance of power, collective security, etc. Was challenging to read the historical conflicts and imagine libertarian foreign policy responses.
I was struck wondering what the response would be to a Romney-esque comment, "Nations are people, too."
Thought provoking to see the impact that individuals can have on the world. And, likewise, the power of the billions of people that give those few the authority. I'm sure there is some simplification of the lesser personalities supporting people like Bismarck and other notable statesmen ... but if their impacts were due to even a small team, amazing.
Was especially nice contrast to "The Prize"'s oil-centric focus on history; the Suez Crisis felt like a different event in each book.
I think I have a much better chance of winning Diplomacy (the game) next time around :-)
some quotes I wanted to remember...
"Metternich would have considered [Bismark's views] heresy, but Frederick the Great would have applauded a disciple's clever adaptation of his own rationale for conquering Silesia."
Bismark quote:
"We have three threats available: (1) an alliance with Russia; and it is nonsense to swear at once that we will never go with Russia. Even if it were true, we should retain the option to use it as a threat."
"Stalin was indeed a monster; but in the conduct of international relations he was the supreme realist - patient, shrewd, and implacable, the Richelieu of his period."
"According to the journalistic practice of the day [FDR], the President always met with the press off-the-record, which meant that he could neither be quoted nor identified, and these rules were respected."
"In American thinking foreign policy and strategy were compartmentalized into successive phases of national policy. In the ideal American universe, diplomats stayed out of strategy and military personnel completed their task by the time diplomacy started - a view for which America was to pay dearly in the Korean and Vietnam wars. By contrast, for Churchill, war strategy and foreign policy were closely linked. ..."
"Amazingly, the State Dept document asserted that NATO was not designed to defend the status quo... the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations happily accepted this conceit ... No history graduate student would have received a passing grade for such an analysis."
"[stopping offensive operations to in Korean conflict] was a classically American gesture. Because of their conviction that peace is normal and goodwill natural, American leaders have generally sought to encourage negotiations by removing elements of coercion and by unilateral demonstrations of goodwill. In general, diplomats rarely pay for services already rendered -- especially in wartime. Typically, it is pressure on the battlefield that generates the negotiation. Relieving the pressure reduces the enemy's incentive to negotiate seriously, and it tempts him to drag out the negotiation in order to determine whether other unilateral gestures may be forthcoming."
"According to a Newsweek poll, Americans believed that Khrushchev had finally understood "that Americans from the President on down genuinely want peace." If that was Khrushchev's actual judgement, the effect was surely double-edged. Any any event, he kept that particular insight a state secret."
"Dulles was Secretary of State to a President who was passionately opposed to war in the way only an experienced military man can be. ... To Eisenhower, the Suez crisis was not sufficiently threatening to merit the use of force. ... Dulles was caught between an adamant Eisenhower and an outraged group of European allies."
"[Addenauer] asked how much of my time was spent working as a White House consultant. When I told him about 25 percent, he replied calmly: "In that case, I shall assume you are telling me 75 percent of the truth."
"in 1959, in one of the truly original articles of the Cold War period, the then Rand Corporation analyst Albert Wohlstetter showed that common sense was not an adequate guide to nuclear relationships. The fact that nuclear weapons were carried on airplanes concentrated on a relatively few bases might make it technically possible to destroy the adversary's strategic forces before they were launched. ... According to Wolhlstetter, the nuclear balance was in fact highly unstable."
"[Chinese] negotiating style was as different from that of their Soviet counterparts as was possible. Soviet diplomats almost never discussed conceptual issues. Their tactic was to select a problem of immediate concern to Moscow and to batter away at its resolution with a dogged persistence designed to wear down their interlocutors rather than to persuade them. The insistence and vehemence with which Soviet negotiators put forward the Politburo consensus reflected the brutal discipline and internal strains of Soviet politics..."
July 31, 2019
Such a great book to understand international relationships in contemporary history. Also, Kissinger writes so well that reading this book is very pleasant.
April 27, 2021
Pretty good with the exception of a few fawning and utterly boring chapters on Nixon and Reagan that add very little to the book.
Foreign policy is one of the state functions most open to populism from both sides of the political spectrum, mostly due to the fact that pundits rarely have to sow the consequences of their policies. Here Kissinger writes a treaty on the virtues of reality-based Foreign Policy, one that leaves open space for some idealism but focus on the balance of power.
He is utterly prescient about the developments of the immediate world after the crowning of the US as the greater global hegemon. Most of his predictions have become true - the UK has unmoored itself from continental Europe, Russia has returned to its expansionist impulses, Germany positioned itself firmly as the center of Europe, Japan has become more aggressive with its foreign policy and the post-communist world not immediately annexed by NATO and the EU became a no-man's land of constant Russian intervention. He only missed the mark on China - perhaps he thought that the country would be much less aggressive than it turned out to be. We'll see if that was a good idea or not. He is right when saying that the US now sees itself in a bizarre situation, where it is the undisputed military leader of the world (and it is fair to say, the economic as well, no matter how many smokes and mirrors China pulls) but is unable to project its power in the world, as the nations have been broken into a number of local powers that are in constant conflict between each other, and tend to mostly follow their own interests.
He is also surprisingly candid about the mistakes in Vietnam, considering the whole thing a disastrous adventure. There are, in fact, many words to say about a US foreign policy based on aimless trashing based on totalising and idealistic visions of democracy and Human Rights, and its dangers of over-extension. Consider, for example, the main conflicts the US has embroiled itself in the last 2 decades, Iraq and Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the US had both a strong moral and strategical reason for intervention and was mostly well-received by a population that detested both the soviets and the Taliban. Instead of concentrating on wiping out the remaining Taliban and rebuilding a war-torn country, the US government involved itself in a useless war with extremely obscure reasons, that diverted attention and logistics from the challenge of rebuilding Afghanistan. The consequence was not only the further destabilisation of the Middle East and a growing influence of Iran in the region but the abandoning of the Afghans, the resurgence of the Taliban and the growth of an exceptionally isolationistic public. In the end, nothing was accomplished - much like it happened in Vietnam.
Much of it, of course, is the work of hindsight. I am not knowledgable on Kissinger's roles as a policymaker himself, but I don't think they are relevant to the lessons presented in the book. If he went against most of his ideas - which he admits doing many times - worse for him, not for the ideas themselves.
Foreign policy is one of the state functions most open to populism from both sides of the political spectrum, mostly due to the fact that pundits rarely have to sow the consequences of their policies. Here Kissinger writes a treaty on the virtues of reality-based Foreign Policy, one that leaves open space for some idealism but focus on the balance of power.
He is utterly prescient about the developments of the immediate world after the crowning of the US as the greater global hegemon. Most of his predictions have become true - the UK has unmoored itself from continental Europe, Russia has returned to its expansionist impulses, Germany positioned itself firmly as the center of Europe, Japan has become more aggressive with its foreign policy and the post-communist world not immediately annexed by NATO and the EU became a no-man's land of constant Russian intervention. He only missed the mark on China - perhaps he thought that the country would be much less aggressive than it turned out to be. We'll see if that was a good idea or not. He is right when saying that the US now sees itself in a bizarre situation, where it is the undisputed military leader of the world (and it is fair to say, the economic as well, no matter how many smokes and mirrors China pulls) but is unable to project its power in the world, as the nations have been broken into a number of local powers that are in constant conflict between each other, and tend to mostly follow their own interests.
He is also surprisingly candid about the mistakes in Vietnam, considering the whole thing a disastrous adventure. There are, in fact, many words to say about a US foreign policy based on aimless trashing based on totalising and idealistic visions of democracy and Human Rights, and its dangers of over-extension. Consider, for example, the main conflicts the US has embroiled itself in the last 2 decades, Iraq and Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the US had both a strong moral and strategical reason for intervention and was mostly well-received by a population that detested both the soviets and the Taliban. Instead of concentrating on wiping out the remaining Taliban and rebuilding a war-torn country, the US government involved itself in a useless war with extremely obscure reasons, that diverted attention and logistics from the challenge of rebuilding Afghanistan. The consequence was not only the further destabilisation of the Middle East and a growing influence of Iran in the region but the abandoning of the Afghans, the resurgence of the Taliban and the growth of an exceptionally isolationistic public. In the end, nothing was accomplished - much like it happened in Vietnam.
Much of it, of course, is the work of hindsight. I am not knowledgable on Kissinger's roles as a policymaker himself, but I don't think they are relevant to the lessons presented in the book. If he went against most of his ideas - which he admits doing many times - worse for him, not for the ideas themselves.
April 8, 2014
Let's get the most obvious thing out of the way: this is an 835 page read and at no point did I feel like giving up. The man can write about complicated subjects and yet remain interesting, which cannot be said of most academics.
As for the content, I was impressed. The Congress of Vienna, the rise of Bismarck and its overthrow of balance of power, the increasing deadlock that led to World War I, and the aftermath in Versailles that was doomed to fail are explained clearly and in depth. The Cold War aspect is of course a little more controversial, but Kissinger comes off as giving an honest approach as he sees it.
The theme of this book: the conflict between Wilsonian goals (collective security, international dialogue, peaceful resolution of all international problems, self-determination) and balance of power (keeping the strongest guy in check even if he isn't openly hostile right now). America is a strange fit because of our geographic location, where for centuries we could do the Wilsonian game because the closest thing to a threat is Canadian Geese, whereas Europe lives in a world where your neighbors are powerful enough to dismember your nation, as Poland sadly exemplified multiple times. This was acceptable until the United States becomes the dominant force in the world. Now we expect our allies to put themselves potentially in harms way by applying our moral theory of international politics but increasingly finding ourselves conducting the balance of power approach to the USSR that we supposedly disdain.
This book is well worth your time. In the decade after the last Iraq War, I've wondered about foreign policy and what justifies actions there. In domestic terms, I've turned into a libertarian, but I haven't found a good libertarian approach to foreign policy yet. The Ron Paul "everything would be great if we just did nothing and never left home" approach is nonsense; we tried that in the 1930's and I wouldn't say the results were acceptable. Every time an international event pops up, the side supporting intervention uses Wilson's "we must promote liberty" while the opposition questions what is in it for us (note that the major parties openly switch depending on whether they support or disapprove of a particular intervention).
And that is the question Kissinger ends his book on. When is it appropriate for us to intervene? We run the risk of overstretching ourselves if we intervene too much, but also run the risk of giving tyrants a free hand if we become isolationists.
Very good analysis on Russia at the end; I would have liked to see some more about Islamic fundamentalists and basically failed states in places like Africa, both of which he mentions as likely future threats, but given that the Cold War had just ended I can understand why his focus was primarily on Russia and Eastern Europe.
As for the content, I was impressed. The Congress of Vienna, the rise of Bismarck and its overthrow of balance of power, the increasing deadlock that led to World War I, and the aftermath in Versailles that was doomed to fail are explained clearly and in depth. The Cold War aspect is of course a little more controversial, but Kissinger comes off as giving an honest approach as he sees it.
The theme of this book: the conflict between Wilsonian goals (collective security, international dialogue, peaceful resolution of all international problems, self-determination) and balance of power (keeping the strongest guy in check even if he isn't openly hostile right now). America is a strange fit because of our geographic location, where for centuries we could do the Wilsonian game because the closest thing to a threat is Canadian Geese, whereas Europe lives in a world where your neighbors are powerful enough to dismember your nation, as Poland sadly exemplified multiple times. This was acceptable until the United States becomes the dominant force in the world. Now we expect our allies to put themselves potentially in harms way by applying our moral theory of international politics but increasingly finding ourselves conducting the balance of power approach to the USSR that we supposedly disdain.
This book is well worth your time. In the decade after the last Iraq War, I've wondered about foreign policy and what justifies actions there. In domestic terms, I've turned into a libertarian, but I haven't found a good libertarian approach to foreign policy yet. The Ron Paul "everything would be great if we just did nothing and never left home" approach is nonsense; we tried that in the 1930's and I wouldn't say the results were acceptable. Every time an international event pops up, the side supporting intervention uses Wilson's "we must promote liberty" while the opposition questions what is in it for us (note that the major parties openly switch depending on whether they support or disapprove of a particular intervention).
And that is the question Kissinger ends his book on. When is it appropriate for us to intervene? We run the risk of overstretching ourselves if we intervene too much, but also run the risk of giving tyrants a free hand if we become isolationists.
Very good analysis on Russia at the end; I would have liked to see some more about Islamic fundamentalists and basically failed states in places like Africa, both of which he mentions as likely future threats, but given that the Cold War had just ended I can understand why his focus was primarily on Russia and Eastern Europe.
April 23, 2020
হেনরি কিসিঞ্জার এর লেখায় যোসেফ স্তালিনের প্রতি প্রচ্ছন্ন সমীহ দেখতে পাই। রতনে রতন চেনে। সোভিয়েত রাশিয়ার রুগ্ন অর্থনীতি ব্যতিরেকে স্রেফ মাইন্ডগেম খেলে স্তালিন আমেরিকার প্রেসিডেন্টদের দৌড়ের উপর রেখেছিলেন। স্তালিনের মতো ঝানু রাজনীতিককে টেক্কা দেবার মতো নেতা তখন আমেরিকায় পয়দা হতো। সময়ের প্রয়োজন নেতা তৈরি করে। এখন আমেরিকার নেতৃত্বের লড়াই ডোনাল্ড ট্রাম্প আর জো বাইডেনে পর��যবসিত হয়েছে।
রোনাল্ড রিগান মিখাইল গর্বাচেভকে আমেরিকা ঘুরিয়ে দেখিয়ে পুঁজিবাদে দীক্ষিত করতে চেয়েছিলেন। সোভিয়েতের শ্রমিকরা যেখানে বস্তিতে থাকে, সেখানে আমেরিকার কারখানা শ্রমিকরা সুইমিং পুল যুক্ত ডুপ্লেক্স বাসা নিয়ে ছিমছাম মধ্যবিত্ত জীবনযাপন করে - রিগান ভেবেছিলেন পুঁজিবাদী দেশের এহেন মনোরম চিত্র দেখিয়ে সোভিয়েত রাশিয়ার মুখে এক আদর্শিক চপেটাঘাত মারবেন। কালাবর্তে সেই আমেরিকায় এখন কারখানা শ্রমিকদের চাকুরি নাই; যাদের আছে, তাদের একাধিক চাকুরি করে দিনে এনে দিনে খেতে হয়, বাড়ি কেনা তো গাঁজাখুরি স্বপ্ন। পুঁজিবাদের অধঃপতন মার্ক্সের অঙ্কিত রেখা অনুসরণ করেনি, নিজেই নিজের পথ চিনে নিয়েছে।
কিসিঞ্জারের বইতে বাংলাদেশ প্রসঙ্গ আসবে ভেবেছিলাম, কিন্তু আসেনি। সোভিয়েত রাশিয়ার সাথে চীনের সম্পর্কে যখন চিড় ধরলো, তখন কিসিঞ্জার মওকা পেয়ে গেলেন। চীনের সাথে পর্দার অন্তরালে সংলাপ স্থাপনের জন্য পাকিস্তান এগিয়ে এলো। বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা সংগ্রাম পাকিস্তানের অস্তিত্বকে হুমকির মুখে তো ফেললোই, চীন-মার্কিন সম্ভাব্য আঁতাতকেও বিপর্যস্ত করলো। কিসিঞ্জারের কাছে কমিউনিজমের বিস্তার ঠেকানো সর্বাধিক গুরুত্বপূর্ণ; মানবাধিকার মাড়িয়ে, ছোট কমিউনিস্টের সাথে আঁতাত করে বড় কমিউনিস্টকে যদি বেকায়দায় ফেলা যায়, তবে তা-ই সই। পুঁজিবাদ বনাম সমাজতন্ত্রের বৃহৎ মঞ্চে বাংলাদেশের সংগ্রাম কিসিঞ্জারের কাছে উৎপাত মাত্র।
মার্কিন পররাষ্ট্রনীতির চালকের আসনে বসে কিসিঞ্জার মার্কিন স্বার্থের আলোকে সব কিছু দেখেন। বাংলাদেশের মানুষ কেন পাকিস্তানের বিরুদ্ধে সংগ্রাম করলো, ইরানিরা কেন রেজা শাহকে হটালো, ভিয়েতনাম যুদ্ধে কমিউনিজম থেকে মানুষকে রক্ষা করতে গিয়ে মার্কিনীরা কিভাবে নাপাম বোমা মেরে একটা দেশ ভস্ম করলো - কোন কিছুই কিসিঞ্জারের চশমায় ধরা পড়ে না। আমেরিকার ট্রেড ইউনিয়ন আন্দোলন, সিভিল লিবার্টি আন্দোলনের সমাজতন্ত্রী অনুপ্রেরণা প্রসঙ্গে তিনি নীরব।
কমিউনিজম সংবরণ আর মুক্ত বাজারিপনার বিস্তারের পদতলে বাকি সবকিছু ফুটনোট। হেনরি কিসিঞ্জার আর তার ভাবশিষ্যদের রাজনীতির এটাই সারমর্ম।
রোনাল্ড রিগান মিখাইল গর্বাচেভকে আমেরিকা ঘুরিয়ে দেখিয়ে পুঁজিবাদে দীক্ষিত করতে চেয়েছিলেন। সোভিয়েতের শ্রমিকরা যেখানে বস্তিতে থাকে, সেখানে আমেরিকার কারখানা শ্রমিকরা সুইমিং পুল যুক্ত ডুপ্লেক্স বাসা নিয়ে ছিমছাম মধ্যবিত্ত জীবনযাপন করে - রিগান ভেবেছিলেন পুঁজিবাদী দেশের এহেন মনোরম চিত্র দেখিয়ে সোভিয়েত রাশিয়ার মুখে এক আদর্শিক চপেটাঘাত মারবেন। কালাবর্তে সেই আমেরিকায় এখন কারখানা শ্রমিকদের চাকুরি নাই; যাদের আছে, তাদের একাধিক চাকুরি করে দিনে এনে দিনে খেতে হয়, বাড়ি কেনা তো গাঁজাখুরি স্বপ্ন। পুঁজিবাদের অধঃপতন মার্ক্সের অঙ্কিত রেখা অনুসরণ করেনি, নিজেই নিজের পথ চিনে নিয়েছে।
কিসিঞ্জারের বইতে বাংলাদেশ প্রসঙ্গ আসবে ভেবেছিলাম, কিন্তু আসেনি। সোভিয়েত রাশিয়ার সাথে চীনের সম্পর্কে যখন চিড় ধরলো, তখন কিসিঞ্জার মওকা পেয়ে গেলেন। চীনের সাথে পর্দার অন্তরালে সংলাপ স্থাপনের জন্য পাকিস্তান এগিয়ে এলো। বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা সংগ্রাম পাকিস্তানের অস্তিত্বকে হুমকির মুখে তো ফেললোই, চীন-মার্কিন সম্ভাব্য আঁতাতকেও বিপর্যস্ত করলো। কিসিঞ্জারের কাছে কমিউনিজমের বিস্তার ঠেকানো সর্বাধিক গুরুত্বপূর্ণ; মানবাধিকার মাড়িয়ে, ছোট কমিউনিস্টের সাথে আঁতাত করে বড় কমিউনিস্টকে যদি বেকায়দায় ফেলা যায়, তবে তা-ই সই। পুঁজিবাদ বনাম সমাজতন্ত্রের বৃহৎ মঞ্চে বাংলাদেশের সংগ্রাম কিসিঞ্জারের কাছে উৎপাত মাত্র।
মার্কিন পররাষ্ট্রনীতির চালকের আসনে বসে কিসিঞ্জার মার্কিন স্বার্থের আলোকে সব কিছু দেখেন। বাংলাদেশের মানুষ কেন পাকিস্তানের বিরুদ্ধে সংগ্রাম করলো, ইরানিরা কেন রেজা শাহকে হটালো, ভিয়েতনাম যুদ্ধে কমিউনিজম থেকে মানুষকে রক্ষা করতে গিয়ে মার্কিনীরা কিভাবে নাপাম বোমা মেরে একটা দেশ ভস্ম করলো - কোন কিছুই কিসিঞ্জারের চশমায় ধরা পড়ে না। আমেরিকার ট্রেড ইউনিয়ন আন্দোলন, সিভিল লিবার্টি আন্দোলনের সমাজতন্ত্রী অনুপ্রেরণা প্রসঙ্গে তিনি নীরব।
কমিউনিজম সংবরণ আর মুক্ত বাজারিপনার বিস্তারের পদতলে বাকি সবকিছু ফুটনোট। হেনরি কিসিঞ্জার আর তার ভাবশিষ্যদের রাজনীতির এটাই সারমর্ম।
April 12, 2020
There is Kissinger the statesman and Kissinger the intellectual. And while I maintain bottomless contempt for the former, whose policy workings stirred chaos instead of order and killed innocent people, I am surprised by the latter. This book surveys just what exactly diplomacy is. It’s a masterclass genealogy of diplomatic relations beginning with Cardinal Richelieu and ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall. He gets a star for the sheer amount of research that went into this thing. His sources comprise 50 pages of single-spaced size 10 font.
On top of that, it’s funny to read his descriptions of various world leaders. He swoons for Nixon the same way he swoons for Bismarck. He describes Stalin’s foreign policy with such reverence that one can only extrapolate admiration from Kissinger. He will call Wilsonian idealism misguided and feckless while spending 100 pages blaming everyone else for our failures in Vietnam. This tome has everything a student of foreign policy, international relations, or history could want. It’s just a shame a war criminal wrote it.
On top of that, it’s funny to read his descriptions of various world leaders. He swoons for Nixon the same way he swoons for Bismarck. He describes Stalin’s foreign policy with such reverence that one can only extrapolate admiration from Kissinger. He will call Wilsonian idealism misguided and feckless while spending 100 pages blaming everyone else for our failures in Vietnam. This tome has everything a student of foreign policy, international relations, or history could want. It’s just a shame a war criminal wrote it.
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