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America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present
An important, urgently needed book--a hugely ambitious, illuminating portrait of the two-century long entwined history of Iran and America, the first book to examine in all its aspects, the rich and fraught relations between these two powers, once allies, now adversaries. By admired historian, author of Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil ("he would do Graham Greene proud" --Kirkus Reviews).
In this rich, fascinating history, John Ghazvinian traces the complex story of the relations of these two powers back to the eighteenth-century's Persian Empire, the subject of great admiration of Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams and for the Iranians, an America seen as an ideal to emulate for its own government.
Drawing on years of archival research both in the US and Iran--including access to Iranian government archives rarely available to western scholars--the Iranian-born, Oxford-educated historian leads us through the four seasons of US-Iran relations: the 'spring' of mutual fascination; the 'summer' of early interactions; the 'autumn' of close strategic ties; and the long, dark 'winter' of mutual hatred.
Ghazvinian, with grasp and a storyteller's ability, makes clear where, how, and when it all went wrong. And shows why two countries that once had such heartfelt admiration for each other became such committed enemies; showing us, as well, how it didn't have to turn out this way.
In this rich, fascinating history, John Ghazvinian traces the complex story of the relations of these two powers back to the eighteenth-century's Persian Empire, the subject of great admiration of Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams and for the Iranians, an America seen as an ideal to emulate for its own government.
Drawing on years of archival research both in the US and Iran--including access to Iranian government archives rarely available to western scholars--the Iranian-born, Oxford-educated historian leads us through the four seasons of US-Iran relations: the 'spring' of mutual fascination; the 'summer' of early interactions; the 'autumn' of close strategic ties; and the long, dark 'winter' of mutual hatred.
Ghazvinian, with grasp and a storyteller's ability, makes clear where, how, and when it all went wrong. And shows why two countries that once had such heartfelt admiration for each other became such committed enemies; showing us, as well, how it didn't have to turn out this way.
688 pages, Hardcover
First published August 4, 2020
About the author
John Ghazvinian
7 books19 followersJohn Ghazvinian is an Iranian-American journalist and historian. He is the Executive Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.
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January 14, 2024
این کتاب، روابط ایران با امریکا رو از زمانی که کسی امریکا رو نمی شناخت تا چند سال اخیر بررسی میکنه. سخت میشه نویسنده ایرانی امریکایی رو که مواضعش رنگ و بوی چپی میده بیطرف ارزیابی کرد، اما بررسی های تاریخی و تحلیلهاش در مجموع جذاب و خوندنیه.
یکی از نکات جالب خدمات امریکایی ها در اخر قاجار و پهلوی اوله. در صورتی که از اواسط دوره پهلوی دوم رویکرد کشیش مسیحی امریکایی ها به سیاست خارجی یهودی نزدیکتر میکنه و منفعت بیشتری طلب میکنن. این آغاز چالش ایران و امریکاست.
از مسائل جدید مطرح شده اینکه چندجای کتاب مثل زمان بوش پدر و پسر نشون میده با وجود ارسال پیام ایران بر اینکه از مواضعمون در مورد همه چی دست می کشیم ما رو بیخیال شو، امریکا دست رد به سینه ایران میزنه و تهاجمی تر میشه.
کتاب نیازی به اطلاعات پایه خواننده نداره. اگرچه حجیمه ولی روان بودن باعث میشه خوندنش راحت باشه.
یکی از نکات جالب خدمات امریکایی ها در اخر قاجار و پهلوی اوله. در صورتی که از اواسط دوره پهلوی دوم رویکرد کشیش مسیحی امریکایی ها به سیاست خارجی یهودی نزدیکتر میکنه و منفعت بیشتری طلب میکنن. این آغاز چالش ایران و امریکاست.
از مسائل جدید مطرح شده اینکه چندجای کتاب مثل زمان بوش پدر و پسر نشون میده با وجود ارسال پیام ایران بر اینکه از مواضعمون در مورد همه چی دست می کشیم ما رو بیخیال شو، امریکا دست رد به سینه ایران میزنه و تهاجمی تر میشه.
کتاب نیازی به اطلاعات پایه خواننده نداره. اگرچه حجیمه ولی روان بودن باعث میشه خوندنش راحت باشه.
June 9, 2021
This study of American-Iranian interactions from the early eighteenth century to the Trump presidency is most interesting during its early chapters, when John Ghazvinian teases out the evolving relations between first the young republic and the ancient empire, and then the burgeoning world power and the emerging democracy. There's a lot of fascinating cultural history here, particularly about American "Persophilia", that shows many little known connections and roads-not-taken.
However, the closer we get to the present day, the more America and Iran faltered for me. Ghazvinian—an Iranian-born American—is understandably very invested in seeing more normalised, settled relations between the two countries. But this results in him trying to handwave as much as possible in the two countries' respective domestic and foreign policies for the last 50 years or so, often seeking to displace the reason for ongoing U.S.-Iranian hostilities onto Israel. (Which, don't get me wrong, the Netanyahu administration in particular can't be described as good faith actors, but nor are they the only actors here.)
The cultural history also largely drops out in the latter part of the book, replaced by a fairly old-school political history, which focuses on the manoeuverings of upper-level male politicians. There's one anecdote given in passing about Jackie Kennedy, the Empress Farah, and competing tiara sizes, that made me long for a book which looked much more at the history of "soft power" and which actually seemed to care about women.
However, the closer we get to the present day, the more America and Iran faltered for me. Ghazvinian—an Iranian-born American—is understandably very invested in seeing more normalised, settled relations between the two countries. But this results in him trying to handwave as much as possible in the two countries' respective domestic and foreign policies for the last 50 years or so, often seeking to displace the reason for ongoing U.S.-Iranian hostilities onto Israel. (Which, don't get me wrong, the Netanyahu administration in particular can't be described as good faith actors, but nor are they the only actors here.)
The cultural history also largely drops out in the latter part of the book, replaced by a fairly old-school political history, which focuses on the manoeuverings of upper-level male politicians. There's one anecdote given in passing about Jackie Kennedy, the Empress Farah, and competing tiara sizes, that made me long for a book which looked much more at the history of "soft power" and which actually seemed to care about women.
January 15, 2021
A readable and accessible history of US-Iran relations. It attempts to understand why relations haven’t been restored since the revolution but also points to how much There is to gain for both if diplomatic relations were re-established. All in all an enjoyable read.
June 24, 2021
This was such an interesting book. I learned so much about Iran and its relationship with the United States. It was written in a balanced way up until the last sections when it seemed that Iran tried many times to repair the relationship, only to have the US and Israel block any such moves. But that may just be true.
I particularly enjoyed the sections on Mossadegh ( who is quickly becoming my favorite historical person) and Mohammed Reza Shah (I really lost a lot of respect for him). So many mistakes were made in this period by both Iran and the US. Who knows what could have been. I also found the section on the nuclear "crisis" very interesting.
I think it is so important that Iran and the world repair their relationship. The people of Iran are really suffering. It was looking so good during the Obama administration. But history keeps on repeating itself with Iran getting betrayed, even though they had done all that was asked of them.
I will give this book 5 stars. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the current events in the Middle East. It was just so educational.
I particularly enjoyed the sections on Mossadegh ( who is quickly becoming my favorite historical person) and Mohammed Reza Shah (I really lost a lot of respect for him). So many mistakes were made in this period by both Iran and the US. Who knows what could have been. I also found the section on the nuclear "crisis" very interesting.
I think it is so important that Iran and the world repair their relationship. The people of Iran are really suffering. It was looking so good during the Obama administration. But history keeps on repeating itself with Iran getting betrayed, even though they had done all that was asked of them.
I will give this book 5 stars. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the current events in the Middle East. It was just so educational.
September 8, 2021
When I was an undergrad, after I declared History as my major my roommate asked me, "Why history?" I responded, "Because there's nothing more interesting than learning the truth." It's books like
America and Iran
that remind of why I love history and why it's so important to study it and keep it in our thoughts as we witness emotionally charged political events and policy decisions.
As John Ghazvinian mentions at the start of his book... if you ask an American where the US-Iran story begins, they'd say 1979 (the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran). If you ask an Iranian they'd say 1953 (the CIA's overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh). But both sides ignore the long and colorful history between the two nations, and how the recent hostilities were almost an accident of history--and one that could still potentially change.
America and Iran is a well-written, accessible revisionist history of US-Iranian relations from 1720 to the present. Ghazvinian explores the relationship from both sides; doing an exemplary job of laying out the sociopolitical climate of both countries and explaining the domestic and international pretexts that laid the foundation for the 1953 and 1979 conflicts. The book continues up to the US's unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Pres. Trump, and finishes with the author musing on the current state of affairs. Although Ghazvinian admits it's not his place as a historian to provide policy recommendations, he essentially does so, albeit in a rather evenhanded and scholarly way.
It's clear to the reader the author--an Iranian-American--would prefer for the US and Iran to get along better than they do, and that there were so many chances for our shared history to evolve differently. In that regard, this is a very unusual history book. It has an almost palpable moralizing tone to it. Nevertheless, it's understandable. Overall a very good book and one I'd recommend to anyone interested in Western or Central Asian history, political science, or international relations.
As John Ghazvinian mentions at the start of his book... if you ask an American where the US-Iran story begins, they'd say 1979 (the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran). If you ask an Iranian they'd say 1953 (the CIA's overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh). But both sides ignore the long and colorful history between the two nations, and how the recent hostilities were almost an accident of history--and one that could still potentially change.
America and Iran is a well-written, accessible revisionist history of US-Iranian relations from 1720 to the present. Ghazvinian explores the relationship from both sides; doing an exemplary job of laying out the sociopolitical climate of both countries and explaining the domestic and international pretexts that laid the foundation for the 1953 and 1979 conflicts. The book continues up to the US's unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Pres. Trump, and finishes with the author musing on the current state of affairs. Although Ghazvinian admits it's not his place as a historian to provide policy recommendations, he essentially does so, albeit in a rather evenhanded and scholarly way.
It's clear to the reader the author--an Iranian-American--would prefer for the US and Iran to get along better than they do, and that there were so many chances for our shared history to evolve differently. In that regard, this is a very unusual history book. It has an almost palpable moralizing tone to it. Nevertheless, it's understandable. Overall a very good book and one I'd recommend to anyone interested in Western or Central Asian history, political science, or international relations.
June 9, 2022
قضاوت درباره این کتاب دشوار است. در آغاز این کتاب از دوران قاجار به ریشه روابط ایران و آمریکا می‌پردازد حتی پیش از آن‌که روابط رسمی شروع شود. این تکه از کتاب فوق‌العاده است و خواندنش حتی برای متخصصین نیز مفید چون حقیقتا اغلب کتابهای تاریخی درباره این موضوع از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد شروع می‌کنند و از آغاز روابط غافل می‌شوند اما دانستن درباره این پیش‌زمینه بسیار مفید است. اما هنگامی که کتاب از این آغاز درخشان دور می‌شود و به امروز نزدیک می‌شود نکته تازه‌ای دربر ندارد. این را هم می‌توان پذیرفت چون مخاطب کتاب خواننده غربی است که این مسائل را نمی‌داند و ممکن است آشنایی با این جنبه‌ها بسیار مفید باشد. البته اگر بگذریم از اشتباهات متعدد، مثلا اینکه نویسنده نوشته که دولت کارتر پس از انقلاب فقط با لیبرال‌های دولت موقت مذاکره کرده و نه با اطرافیان آیت‌الله خمینی که یعنی نویسنده مذاکرات مفصل آمریکا با آیت‌الله بهشتی را نادیده گرفته است. اما هنگامی که کتاب به دوره باراک اوباما می‌رسد روایتی آن‌چنان جانب‌دارانه و یکسونگرانه ارائه می‌کند که انگار می‌شد در روزنامه کیهان هم چاپ شود و قطعا به زده شدن مخاطب غربی هم منجر خواهد شد و هرچه کتاب رشته کرده بود پنبه می‌شود تا همدردی مخاطب آمریکایی نسبت به ایران جلب شود. بنابراین شروع کتاب عالی، وسط آن متوسط، و پایان آن بسیار بد است
من کتاب را با ترجمه محسن عسگری جهقی خواندم که ترجمه بسیار ضعیفی بود که اندکی از سطح گوگل ترنسلیت فراتر بود. تقریبا تلفظ یک اسم درست ضبط نشده بود و سراسر کتاب پر از اشتباهات خنده‌دار بود، مثلا این که آمریکا خودش را یک قدرت خوشخیم می‌داند
من کتاب را با ترجمه محسن عسگری جهقی خواندم که ترجمه بسیار ضعیفی بود که اندکی از سطح گوگل ترنسلیت فراتر بود. تقریبا تلفظ یک اسم درست ضبط نشده بود و سراسر کتاب پر از اشتباهات خنده‌دار بود، مثلا این که آمریکا خودش را یک قدرت خوشخیم می‌داند
Read
May 7, 2024For those interested, chapter 26 and forward detail the influence of the Israel lobby on the US legislative process and foreign policy as it relates to Iran. It would be a good companion volume to John Mearsheimer’s Israel Lobby.
Briefly, the story of US-Iranian diplomatic relations, as told by Ghazvinian, is the story of Israeli sabotage, especially during the Netanyahu period. Iran is an obstacle to Israel’s regional hegemony, thus there is an imperative to manufacture a conflict and hostility between the US and Iran, even though Iranians had an adulatory view of the US during the 19th and early 20th century.
So, Ghazvinian offers an explicit critique of the notion that the US and Iran are embroiled in a civilizational conflict and destined to be enemies by the ineluctable forces of history. Implicitly, he offers a critique of US-Israeli relations. Far from being a strategic asset, Israel appears as a strategic liability for the US.
Israel demands unconditional financial, military, and diplomatic support, yet is unwilling to yield to US diplomatic pressure, as present events in Gaza demonstrate. They also demonstrate the Jewish dominance of the US media and political process, as every UN veto for Israeli war crimes exhausts US political capital and escalation to a regional war is not in US interests. American and Iranian interests align: neither country desires a war.
Briefly, the story of US-Iranian diplomatic relations, as told by Ghazvinian, is the story of Israeli sabotage, especially during the Netanyahu period. Iran is an obstacle to Israel’s regional hegemony, thus there is an imperative to manufacture a conflict and hostility between the US and Iran, even though Iranians had an adulatory view of the US during the 19th and early 20th century.
So, Ghazvinian offers an explicit critique of the notion that the US and Iran are embroiled in a civilizational conflict and destined to be enemies by the ineluctable forces of history. Implicitly, he offers a critique of US-Israeli relations. Far from being a strategic asset, Israel appears as a strategic liability for the US.
Israel demands unconditional financial, military, and diplomatic support, yet is unwilling to yield to US diplomatic pressure, as present events in Gaza demonstrate. They also demonstrate the Jewish dominance of the US media and political process, as every UN veto for Israeli war crimes exhausts US political capital and escalation to a regional war is not in US interests. American and Iranian interests align: neither country desires a war.
January 10, 2022
What starts off as an interesting history falls apart somewhere around the Carter administration. Instead of a balanced account of the complications of the America-Iran relationship, we're presented with a myopic narrative in which Iran has shown nothing but non-stop eagerness to repair its relationship with the US, only to be unfairly rebuffed time and time again. What's standing between these two? The all-mighty Israel, which manages to control nearly all events on the world stage. Is there an element of truth in this argument? Sure, but the reality is more complex and I would have expected a more balanced analysis given the strong start to this book.
February 19, 2021
A Historical Context Behind the Endless Hostility Between America and Iran
Please visit I. David’s blog at: https://www.goodreads.com/author/show...
In America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present author John Ghazvinian describes the history of the relationship between America and Iran. Ghazvinian is a historian, author and former journalist who was born in Iran and educated in England. He is currently the Executive Director of the Middle East Center in the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. He wrote this history to provide context for the current status of the relationship between America and Iran. And he has done as excellent job.
America and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since 1979 when, after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian students stormed the United States embassy in Tehran and held American diplomats hostage for more than 400 days. Efforts at rapprochement since then have been unsuccessful with each side blaming the other for increasing hostility. Ghazvinian’s warm feelings for both Iran and America are clearly evident in this book. He seems like a man who cannot understand why two beloved feuding relatives cannot put their petty differences behind them and just start to get along.
Ghazvinian asserts that, from a historical perspective, there was every reason to believe that America and Iran should have had friendly relations. He explains that, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Iran was dominated by Russia and England. Iranians thought that America, a former colony that had obtained its own freedom from England, would be sympathetic to Iran’s plight and would help Iran wrest its freedom from the two European imperialists.
America, however, took little interest in Iran until the early 1950s when, to retain its rights in Iranian oil, England convinced American diplomats that Iran’s newly elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, was going to align the country with the Soviet Union. In the shadow of the Cold War the Central Intelligence Agency, working with England, engineered a coup that replaced Mosaddegh with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
America supported the Shah and his ruthless dictatorship for the next 26 years until he was finally overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Ghazvinian explains that America’s participation in the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s freely elected government and its continuing support of the Shah have made Iranians suspicious of virtually every American action. Because of the 1979 hostage crises and the subsequent belligerence of Iran’s leaders, Americans have been equally suspicious of every Iranian action.
But this endless dispute between America and Iran appears to be as much a matter of perception as it is a matter of reality. Ghazvanian demonstrates this difference between reality and perception through Iran’s recent effort to develop a nuclear capability. The reality is that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear capability. The perception in America, according to its government and the media, is that Iran is hell-bent on developing a nuclear bomb which it could use to destroy Israel or even the United States. The perception in Iran, as described by Ghazvinian, is that Iran is only interested in using its “nuclear capability” for peaceful purposes, that Iran would not be interested in building a bomb because such a weapon would be against the principals of Islam, and that the position of the American government and the American media is based largely on influence from Israel which is mostly concerned that improved relations between America and Iran would cause Israel to lose its position as America’s most important ally in the Middle East.
Because America and Iran have lacked diplomatic relations for so long each country has been forced to develop its own interpretation of the other’s words and actions. Misunderstandings and misrepresentations are unavoidable. In describing the combustible relationship between the two countries authoritative resources are likely to provide conflicting viewpoints. Therefore, while America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present is a highly readable book that comprehensively covers the history of the relationship between America and Iran it should be viewed as an excellent starting point for further understanding of that relationship. I give it a 4 star rating.
Thanks to #netgalley and to Alfred A. Knopf for my early release copy of this book in exchange for my honest review.
Please visit I. David’s blog at: https://www.goodreads.com/author/show...
In America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present author John Ghazvinian describes the history of the relationship between America and Iran. Ghazvinian is a historian, author and former journalist who was born in Iran and educated in England. He is currently the Executive Director of the Middle East Center in the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. He wrote this history to provide context for the current status of the relationship between America and Iran. And he has done as excellent job.
America and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since 1979 when, after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian students stormed the United States embassy in Tehran and held American diplomats hostage for more than 400 days. Efforts at rapprochement since then have been unsuccessful with each side blaming the other for increasing hostility. Ghazvinian’s warm feelings for both Iran and America are clearly evident in this book. He seems like a man who cannot understand why two beloved feuding relatives cannot put their petty differences behind them and just start to get along.
Ghazvinian asserts that, from a historical perspective, there was every reason to believe that America and Iran should have had friendly relations. He explains that, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Iran was dominated by Russia and England. Iranians thought that America, a former colony that had obtained its own freedom from England, would be sympathetic to Iran’s plight and would help Iran wrest its freedom from the two European imperialists.
America, however, took little interest in Iran until the early 1950s when, to retain its rights in Iranian oil, England convinced American diplomats that Iran’s newly elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, was going to align the country with the Soviet Union. In the shadow of the Cold War the Central Intelligence Agency, working with England, engineered a coup that replaced Mosaddegh with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
America supported the Shah and his ruthless dictatorship for the next 26 years until he was finally overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Ghazvinian explains that America’s participation in the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s freely elected government and its continuing support of the Shah have made Iranians suspicious of virtually every American action. Because of the 1979 hostage crises and the subsequent belligerence of Iran’s leaders, Americans have been equally suspicious of every Iranian action.
But this endless dispute between America and Iran appears to be as much a matter of perception as it is a matter of reality. Ghazvanian demonstrates this difference between reality and perception through Iran’s recent effort to develop a nuclear capability. The reality is that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear capability. The perception in America, according to its government and the media, is that Iran is hell-bent on developing a nuclear bomb which it could use to destroy Israel or even the United States. The perception in Iran, as described by Ghazvinian, is that Iran is only interested in using its “nuclear capability” for peaceful purposes, that Iran would not be interested in building a bomb because such a weapon would be against the principals of Islam, and that the position of the American government and the American media is based largely on influence from Israel which is mostly concerned that improved relations between America and Iran would cause Israel to lose its position as America’s most important ally in the Middle East.
Because America and Iran have lacked diplomatic relations for so long each country has been forced to develop its own interpretation of the other’s words and actions. Misunderstandings and misrepresentations are unavoidable. In describing the combustible relationship between the two countries authoritative resources are likely to provide conflicting viewpoints. Therefore, while America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present is a highly readable book that comprehensively covers the history of the relationship between America and Iran it should be viewed as an excellent starting point for further understanding of that relationship. I give it a 4 star rating.
Thanks to #netgalley and to Alfred A. Knopf for my early release copy of this book in exchange for my honest review.
February 28, 2021
Great primer for those uninitiated with Iran's complex history but fails with some of its post 1979 observations. The objective eye of a historian begins to flail in the latter chapters, seemingly falling for the trappings of a less informed geopolitical analyst.The author seems to intentionally mischaracterize Iran's strategic decision to support terrorism abroad. This is apparent in a lack of input on Iran's decision to provide safe harbor to al-Qaeda'a senior most leaders, directing the Khobar Towers attack, and the successful and attempted assassination of several diplomats to name a few.
June 30, 2021
4.5 rounded up for keeping me thoroughly engaged for almost 700 pages. The older history was completely new to me and the modern history provided much food for thought.
January 25, 2022
Really interesting. I’m glad it started in 1720 so that a deeper and richer review of Iran’s history was possible. It also was far enough back to cover the European colonial age and its impact on Iran. Several books I’ve read in the last eighteen months highlight attempts at nation building and manipulation. Britain and Russia jockeyed for influence and control over Iran from the chapters of the book. The fight for Iran’s oil started as The Great War waned. Russia was guilty of nation building and influence peddling long before the communism took control.
Iran’s desire for diplomatic relations with the United States and their attempts at establishing it were enlightening. And disappointing in their failure. I knew the US supported the Shah and even propped up his regime but Ghazvinian’s description of the CIA’s support of the British instigated coup in 1953 really started the US and Iran on a combative course deferred only during the Shah’s rule.
John Ghazvinian seems to have researched this book extensively. It was both interesting and confusing.
Not having a perspective of Iran, I reached out to a coworker who is Iranian to get her perspective. Turns out the author is the cousin of her friend. Less than six degrees of freedom and, while it doesn’t alleviate the need to question what is written, it strengthens my tendency to accept Ghazvinian’s points. Perhaps I’m guilty of familiarity bias.
My confusions are how much to believe the author’s assertions of Iran’s attempts at reconciliation with the US. He cites numerous examples of Israeli influence to manipulate US support (which I find easy to believe) but not the only force stifling reconciliation. Ghazvinian cites efforts by Iran to free US hostages in Syria at the behest of Bush’s commenting he would view it a favorable move by Iran but failed to reciprocate in a quid-pro-quo which led to Iran’s president being forced out of office. He also cites Obama’s inauguration speech and a video recorded for the Iranian people attempting to open dialogue that was thwarted by both Israeli lobbyists and government hardliners including Hillary Clinton.
Some injustices are apparent. An easy example is depriving Iran of low-grade nuclear material used in medical treatments like cancer forcing suspense or cancellation of treatments. Iran needs to process some low-grade material or purchase it. Ghazvinian says they’ve run out of their medical supplies that’s a shame and the US shouldn’t be stopping it.
It seems the lack of communication between governments made missed opportunities more likely and that, as much as Israeli lobbying, have prevented reconciliation. The real losers here are the people of Iran.
A really interesting first half providing a historical perspective on Persia but more of a political tit-for-tat in the back half. Great fading to good as my reading progressed.
Iran’s desire for diplomatic relations with the United States and their attempts at establishing it were enlightening. And disappointing in their failure. I knew the US supported the Shah and even propped up his regime but Ghazvinian’s description of the CIA’s support of the British instigated coup in 1953 really started the US and Iran on a combative course deferred only during the Shah’s rule.
John Ghazvinian seems to have researched this book extensively. It was both interesting and confusing.
Not having a perspective of Iran, I reached out to a coworker who is Iranian to get her perspective. Turns out the author is the cousin of her friend. Less than six degrees of freedom and, while it doesn’t alleviate the need to question what is written, it strengthens my tendency to accept Ghazvinian’s points. Perhaps I’m guilty of familiarity bias.
My confusions are how much to believe the author’s assertions of Iran’s attempts at reconciliation with the US. He cites numerous examples of Israeli influence to manipulate US support (which I find easy to believe) but not the only force stifling reconciliation. Ghazvinian cites efforts by Iran to free US hostages in Syria at the behest of Bush’s commenting he would view it a favorable move by Iran but failed to reciprocate in a quid-pro-quo which led to Iran’s president being forced out of office. He also cites Obama’s inauguration speech and a video recorded for the Iranian people attempting to open dialogue that was thwarted by both Israeli lobbyists and government hardliners including Hillary Clinton.
Some injustices are apparent. An easy example is depriving Iran of low-grade nuclear material used in medical treatments like cancer forcing suspense or cancellation of treatments. Iran needs to process some low-grade material or purchase it. Ghazvinian says they’ve run out of their medical supplies that’s a shame and the US shouldn’t be stopping it.
It seems the lack of communication between governments made missed opportunities more likely and that, as much as Israeli lobbying, have prevented reconciliation. The real losers here are the people of Iran.
A really interesting first half providing a historical perspective on Persia but more of a political tit-for-tat in the back half. Great fading to good as my reading progressed.
April 17, 2021
John writes ambitiously and unreservedly, with deep passion and clear rigour, and he has a great grip of Iran-US relations. If you want to have a glimpse into that relationship, this is a great book and does not disappoint.
My only concern lies with John’s impartiality and whether he has been able to maintain it throughout. Although his criticism toward the hardliners of the Iranian government and the traditional “war-mongering hawks of the DC” was evident, I felt he put too much emphasis on certain parts of history while ignoring others (did he do this intentionally? Or did he feel sympathetic to certain actions, leading to certain events?)
For example, the lengthy chapter on Mossadeq and the 1953 coup would make an unfamiliar reader think that all of Iran’s problems were caused by the coup and that all would have ended well had the US + U.K. not orchestrated it.
Or another example: John was also very eager to portray the Rafsanjani administration as the “gate opener of Iran to the world” and giving an impression of him as the “lesser of the evils”, ignoring that Rafsanjani was responsible for some of the most cruel chain murders in Iran. But then again, the human rights record of the IRI was never a central component of the book anyway.
I would’ve appreciated a bit more stern stance on Iran, and certainly the conclusion I felt was too forcibly optimistic (re: possibility of being strategic allies). For as long as there are hard liners in place, making a career out of this enmity with the US-Iran, there will be no peace (similarly certain lobbyists in the US).
In every chaos lies opportunity, and sometimes you perpetuate a chaos yourself in order to foster opportunities. And that’s where Iran is currently at. But here’s hoping for better days...
Overall 4/5. Thank you, John.
My only concern lies with John’s impartiality and whether he has been able to maintain it throughout. Although his criticism toward the hardliners of the Iranian government and the traditional “war-mongering hawks of the DC” was evident, I felt he put too much emphasis on certain parts of history while ignoring others (did he do this intentionally? Or did he feel sympathetic to certain actions, leading to certain events?)
For example, the lengthy chapter on Mossadeq and the 1953 coup would make an unfamiliar reader think that all of Iran’s problems were caused by the coup and that all would have ended well had the US + U.K. not orchestrated it.
Or another example: John was also very eager to portray the Rafsanjani administration as the “gate opener of Iran to the world” and giving an impression of him as the “lesser of the evils”, ignoring that Rafsanjani was responsible for some of the most cruel chain murders in Iran. But then again, the human rights record of the IRI was never a central component of the book anyway.
I would’ve appreciated a bit more stern stance on Iran, and certainly the conclusion I felt was too forcibly optimistic (re: possibility of being strategic allies). For as long as there are hard liners in place, making a career out of this enmity with the US-Iran, there will be no peace (similarly certain lobbyists in the US).
In every chaos lies opportunity, and sometimes you perpetuate a chaos yourself in order to foster opportunities. And that’s where Iran is currently at. But here’s hoping for better days...
Overall 4/5. Thank you, John.
January 10, 2023
A splendid, big-hearted history.
If you’ve ever asked the question, “why do they hate us so much?”, this book will make you say, “oh, I get it.” The author traces the surprisingly close relationship of America and Iran through the centuries. He has a special gift for noting the missed opportunities the nations have had for real breakthroughs of understanding and partnership at pivotal moments. As time goes by, these moments add up and the effect is tragic.
I especially appreciated the Iranian perspective. It was fascinating to hear from the other side in a way that American media rarely portray.
Ghazvinian is very critical of Israel and the influence Israel has over American foreign policy. He also seems to lay a lot of blame for the disconnect at the feet of America. Oddly, once he gets into the 1980s, he begins to treat the Iranian government as monolithic. I wonder if this is because it is harder to get sources that are more current (or maybe bc the old guys are out of power?). At times he seems overly apologetic for Iranian positions. But on the whole, it was fascinating and powerful.
If you’ve ever asked the question, “why do they hate us so much?”, this book will make you say, “oh, I get it.” The author traces the surprisingly close relationship of America and Iran through the centuries. He has a special gift for noting the missed opportunities the nations have had for real breakthroughs of understanding and partnership at pivotal moments. As time goes by, these moments add up and the effect is tragic.
I especially appreciated the Iranian perspective. It was fascinating to hear from the other side in a way that American media rarely portray.
Ghazvinian is very critical of Israel and the influence Israel has over American foreign policy. He also seems to lay a lot of blame for the disconnect at the feet of America. Oddly, once he gets into the 1980s, he begins to treat the Iranian government as monolithic. I wonder if this is because it is harder to get sources that are more current (or maybe bc the old guys are out of power?). At times he seems overly apologetic for Iranian positions. But on the whole, it was fascinating and powerful.
February 28, 2021
Thorough and very engaging history of Iran and the impact that the US has had (and vice versa) over the past 200 years. There’s so much ‘new’ here for someone not well versed in the topic. Standouts for me were early involvement of American Christian missionaries as well as the somewhat ham fisted initial stabs at diplomacy from the US in the mid 18th century. Perhaps the best section is the one about Mosaddegh which the author does an admirable job in teasing out just the right amount of background on this interesting character and leads one to think about a lot of what-ifs had the coup in ’53 not been successful. The meatiest section is of course on the revolution and the ousting of the Shah, but this isn’t before touching on the Shah’s tenure. There’s also quite a bit on the nuclear negations and the US shortcomings in partnering with Iran in the wake of 9/11. The writing is top notch and though the author is clearly very sympathetic to Iran, it doesn’t feel dogmatic or solely one sided.
March 26, 2022
This is a fascinating telling of the relationship between the United States and Iran going back to before the US was an independent country. The book starts there, when things were good, and then goes through a very detailed retelling of how it went wrong over and over again up until the present day.
Iran had so much promise as an ally in the Middle East. Somehow along the way that perspective got warped. Iran was different religiously than many of the other countries in the region with a predominantly Shiite population, and one where the separation between mosque and state was established. They had a colonial relationship with Britain they were eager to shed and had no love of Russia back in the beginning of the 20th century. There were so many mistakes made along the way, but the fist one was installing the Shah in 1953, which squashed democracy in its infancy and as time went on, the Shah made the country ripe for revolution. The subsequent chain of events pushed Iran further from the west, and then the demonizing was ramped up to what is possibly the point of no return. Very sad course of events.
Iran had so much promise as an ally in the Middle East. Somehow along the way that perspective got warped. Iran was different religiously than many of the other countries in the region with a predominantly Shiite population, and one where the separation between mosque and state was established. They had a colonial relationship with Britain they were eager to shed and had no love of Russia back in the beginning of the 20th century. There were so many mistakes made along the way, but the fist one was installing the Shah in 1953, which squashed democracy in its infancy and as time went on, the Shah made the country ripe for revolution. The subsequent chain of events pushed Iran further from the west, and then the demonizing was ramped up to what is possibly the point of no return. Very sad course of events.
April 18, 2021
Honestly one of the best books I've read about Iran-US relations. I think that often there is this Eurocentric gaze when writing about Iran that tends to get it extremely wrong, but Ghazvinian does no such thing. The book felt like a novel, and the people etched into this history felt like characters you followed along, making this text not only accessible to a wide audience but also one that's intriguing and lacks the generic icy boringness of historical works. It provides a strong analysis of an Iranian perspective that an American audience could use some severe insight on. Absolutely one of my favorites and will be recommending to friends.
June 1, 2021
Awesome book! I really love how author was able to discuss the history of Iran first and then do in details about the relationship of the different emperors and kings and their relationship with USA and presidents of each nation. Excellent research!!
March 23, 2021
A real eye opener and one of the most engaging history books I've ever read.
April 29, 2021
This was so well researched and written! It's a great book for anyone looking to delve into the world of America's role in the making of the modern Middle East.
November 27, 2021
As fascinating as it is thought-provoking. It took me forever to read because every few pages sparked an hour-long discussion in my house where, whether or not we all reached the same conclusions as Ghazvinian, all learned a lot and gained new perspective. Highly recommend.
December 3, 2023
god... the west is sickeningly stupid and racist and absolutely vile. netanyahu you jackass you will pay for your crimes.
April 27, 2021
An excellent and necessary read of Iranian-US relations
April 14, 2022
In a world where the war in Ukraine and economic sanctions dominate foreign policy discussions relations with Iran could have been pushed to the back burner instead they are now coming to the fore. As the Russian army continues its bloody war against Ukrainian civilians, the need to sanction Moscow’s energy industry which finances its genocide is paramount. The Biden administration is focusing on increasing the world’s supply of energy and to this end has reengaged with Iran after the Trump administration abrogated the Iran nuclear deal negotiated during the Obama administration. The odds of coming to a quick agreement with Iran is very low, in part because Russia was a signatory of the original agreement and Iran’s contorted history with the United States since the 1950s. To understand the background to the American relationship with Iran which emphasizes the viewpoints from Washington and Tehran John Ghazvinian, a former journalist, and currently the Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania has filled this major gap with his new book, AMERICA AND IRAN: A HISTORY 1720 TO THE PRESENT. Written in a clear and concise style Ghazvinian provides insightful analysis, a deep understanding of the issues between Iran and the United States, and with a degree of subjectivity focuses on the motivations and actions of the major historical figures involved.
In tackling the American-Iranian conundrum one comes across many watershed moments and dates be it the competition between England and Russia during the 19th century through World War II better known as “the Great Game,” the emergence of the United States filling the vacuum created by London’s withdrawal from the region, the American “love affair” with Reza Pahlavi Shah beginning with the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism spear headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 1979 hostage situation, the Iran-Iraq War, and the overt and covert war between the two countries that continues to this day. For scholars and the general public these issues are quite familiar, however, Ghazvinian brings a deft pen and immense knowledge in presenting a fresh approach to this historical relationship.
Ghazvinian goal was objectivity, hoping to avoid casting dispersions on either side, and dispensing with the ideological baggage that has encumbered past writings on the subject. Despite this goal, periodically he falls into the trap of bias. Having been born in Iran he conducted ten years of research and was allowed access to Iranian sources that were not available to most western scholars. One of Ghazvinian’s major themes is that the United States and Iran, at least in the 18th and 19th centuries through the end of World War I could have been natural allies. Decade after decade Iranian governments looked to the United States as a “third force” that could counteract the pressures of Britain and Russia. Presenting the early American thoughts of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, Iran perceived the United States as an anti-colonial power so there seemed to be a community of fate between the two countries that Ghazvinian successfully investigated.
Ghazvinian explores America’s romanticized version of “Persophilia” and Washington’s impact on Iran through missionary work that provided hospitals, schools, and trade with Tehran. It is clear that the United States, despite its interest in Iran was hindered by an amateurish group of “diplomats” who were sent to Tehran during the late 19th century to promote American interests. Most had little or no foreign experience and they did little to foster a new relationship. With the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Iran could no longer play off the two competing powers against each other so Tehran invited the United States to assume the role of counterbalancing the “new” allies to the point of inviting and allowing an American citizen who would become a hero to the Iranian people, W. Morgan Shuster to take control of Iran’s convoluted finances. The author goes on to trace Iranian attitudes and hopes that were fostered by Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points and the concept of self-determination.
A second dominant theme that Ghazvinian introduces is Iran’s battle to achieve modernity and not being viewed as a backward desert kingdom that was more than a source of oil. To that end it seemed that no matter who was the Shah this issue had to be dealt with which resulted in policies that provided wealth and a lifestyle for the Pahlavi Dynasty but poverty and ignorance for the masses.
The concept that historian J.C. Hurewitz developed dealing with the Middle East that regional actors “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity” applies to Iranian-American relations after World War II. Ghazvinian skillfully explores the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq and his removal from power in 1953 by the CIA and as he does in a number of instances sets straight the historical record. The issue for the United States was its fear of communism as is evidenced by the Russian refusal to withdraw from northern Iran in 1946. Supposedly the stalemate was settled when Harry Truman issued an ultimatum to Moscow, which Ghazvinian points out that there was no record of such an ultimatum. However, the fear of Russian expansion in the Persian Gulf drove American policy. In addition to this fear of the Soviet Union, Washington had to deal with British arrogance and stupidity (repeatedly referring to Tehran as Persian pip-squeaks) in trying to establish a sound relationship with the Mosaddeq government.
Mosaddeq was not a communist, he was an Iranian nationalist, but in the American diplomatic lexicon nationalist meant communist. The result was that the Eisenhower administration ignored reports that Mosaddeq was “a Western educated aristocrat with no reason to be attracted to socialism or communism.” Rather than listen to the advice of his own spies and bureaucrats, Eisenhower supported a policy designed to undermine Mosaddeq’s government which would lead to his overthrow and assist the return of the Shah to Tehran where despite his autocratic and megalomaniac tendencies the US would support at various levels until his overthrow in 1979.
Another major theme put forth by Ghazvinian is the role played by the 1953 coup in Iranian ideology. From the end of World War II to the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeini the Shah was faced with three domestic enemies that wanted to curb his power or overthrow his monarchy - the Iranian left made up of a diverse group of Marxists that leaned toward the Soviet Union, the religious establishment, and a coalition of secular liberals, democrats, and progressive nationalists. Despite the diverse nature of the opposition, they all believed that the 1953 coup could be repeated at any time should the Shah’s reign end. This belief forms the background to any American-Iranian negotiation, particularly the 1979 hostage situation.
Ghazvinian cleverly compares the attitudes of the different presidents towards the Shah. For Eisenhower, named the “coup president” by historian Blanche Wiesen Cook, his policy was driven by the anti-communism of the Dulles brothers to provide the Shah with loans and military hardware. Once John F. Kennedy assumed the oval office he put pressure on the Shah to reform his reign, but once he was assassinated the Shah was relieved since Lyndon Johnson was too busy with Vietnam and appreciated an anti-communist ally who would help control rising Arab nationalism and the Persian Gulf. The key was Richard M. Nixon who developed a friendship with the Shah during the Eisenhower administration and with pressure from the likes of Henry Kissinger to honor any military requests that the Shah asked for resulted in billions for the American military-industrial complex and advanced weaponry for the Iranian army. The result was a man who believed he had card blanche from the United States resulting in violent domestic opposition against the Shah in Iran. Finally, Jimmy Carter’s human rights rhetoric scared the Shah, but he too would give in to the Shah’s demands until his overthrow.
Ghazvinian’s discussion of the rise of Khomeini and American ignorance concerning the proliferation of his ideas and support in Iran is well thought out. From exile in Iraq and later Paris the United States made no attempt to understand the reasons behind Khomeini’s rise and the conditions of poverty and oppression that existed among the Iranian masses. Washington’s blindness and tone deafness is highlighted by the appointment of former CIA Director Richard Helms as US Ambassador to Iran in 1973.
Once the Shah is overthrown Ghazvinian explains the different factions that existed in Iran and that it was not a foregone conclusion that Islamic fundamentalism would be victorious. American intelligence underestimated Khomeini’s skill as a politician, not just a religious leader. The reader is exposed to intricate details about the creation of the Islamic Republic, the hostage situation, and the Iran-Iraq War which found the US playing a double game of supporting both sides. This would lead to the Iran-Contra scandal that showed the duplicitous nature of the Reagan administration that should have ended the Reagan presidency.
Though Ghazvinian breezy history is immensely readable it becomes biased as he delves into the post 1988 Iranian-American relations. The author discusses efforts by George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama to reset the relationship between Teheran and Washington ultimately to be thwarted by disinterest after the Soviet Union collapsed and the role of the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu whose bombast was designed to block any Iranian-American rapprochement. At times slipping into partiality, Ghazvinian downplays the bombast of the Iranian government and its avoidance of the nuclear issue, its role in Lebanon with its ally Hezbollah, and arming Hamas in the West Bank. I realize the many flaws and general stupidity of Bush’s neocon gang, but the soft presentation of Iran under Mahmoud Ahmadinjad also leaves a lot to be desired.
Despite some areas that could be developed further, Ghazvinian has produced a needed reappraisal of his subject and the quality of the writing makes the book an easy read for the general public which makes it a valuable contribution despite some shortcomings.
In tackling the American-Iranian conundrum one comes across many watershed moments and dates be it the competition between England and Russia during the 19th century through World War II better known as “the Great Game,” the emergence of the United States filling the vacuum created by London’s withdrawal from the region, the American “love affair” with Reza Pahlavi Shah beginning with the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism spear headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 1979 hostage situation, the Iran-Iraq War, and the overt and covert war between the two countries that continues to this day. For scholars and the general public these issues are quite familiar, however, Ghazvinian brings a deft pen and immense knowledge in presenting a fresh approach to this historical relationship.
Ghazvinian goal was objectivity, hoping to avoid casting dispersions on either side, and dispensing with the ideological baggage that has encumbered past writings on the subject. Despite this goal, periodically he falls into the trap of bias. Having been born in Iran he conducted ten years of research and was allowed access to Iranian sources that were not available to most western scholars. One of Ghazvinian’s major themes is that the United States and Iran, at least in the 18th and 19th centuries through the end of World War I could have been natural allies. Decade after decade Iranian governments looked to the United States as a “third force” that could counteract the pressures of Britain and Russia. Presenting the early American thoughts of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, Iran perceived the United States as an anti-colonial power so there seemed to be a community of fate between the two countries that Ghazvinian successfully investigated.
Ghazvinian explores America’s romanticized version of “Persophilia” and Washington’s impact on Iran through missionary work that provided hospitals, schools, and trade with Tehran. It is clear that the United States, despite its interest in Iran was hindered by an amateurish group of “diplomats” who were sent to Tehran during the late 19th century to promote American interests. Most had little or no foreign experience and they did little to foster a new relationship. With the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Iran could no longer play off the two competing powers against each other so Tehran invited the United States to assume the role of counterbalancing the “new” allies to the point of inviting and allowing an American citizen who would become a hero to the Iranian people, W. Morgan Shuster to take control of Iran’s convoluted finances. The author goes on to trace Iranian attitudes and hopes that were fostered by Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points and the concept of self-determination.
A second dominant theme that Ghazvinian introduces is Iran’s battle to achieve modernity and not being viewed as a backward desert kingdom that was more than a source of oil. To that end it seemed that no matter who was the Shah this issue had to be dealt with which resulted in policies that provided wealth and a lifestyle for the Pahlavi Dynasty but poverty and ignorance for the masses.
The concept that historian J.C. Hurewitz developed dealing with the Middle East that regional actors “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity” applies to Iranian-American relations after World War II. Ghazvinian skillfully explores the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq and his removal from power in 1953 by the CIA and as he does in a number of instances sets straight the historical record. The issue for the United States was its fear of communism as is evidenced by the Russian refusal to withdraw from northern Iran in 1946. Supposedly the stalemate was settled when Harry Truman issued an ultimatum to Moscow, which Ghazvinian points out that there was no record of such an ultimatum. However, the fear of Russian expansion in the Persian Gulf drove American policy. In addition to this fear of the Soviet Union, Washington had to deal with British arrogance and stupidity (repeatedly referring to Tehran as Persian pip-squeaks) in trying to establish a sound relationship with the Mosaddeq government.
Mosaddeq was not a communist, he was an Iranian nationalist, but in the American diplomatic lexicon nationalist meant communist. The result was that the Eisenhower administration ignored reports that Mosaddeq was “a Western educated aristocrat with no reason to be attracted to socialism or communism.” Rather than listen to the advice of his own spies and bureaucrats, Eisenhower supported a policy designed to undermine Mosaddeq’s government which would lead to his overthrow and assist the return of the Shah to Tehran where despite his autocratic and megalomaniac tendencies the US would support at various levels until his overthrow in 1979.
Another major theme put forth by Ghazvinian is the role played by the 1953 coup in Iranian ideology. From the end of World War II to the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeini the Shah was faced with three domestic enemies that wanted to curb his power or overthrow his monarchy - the Iranian left made up of a diverse group of Marxists that leaned toward the Soviet Union, the religious establishment, and a coalition of secular liberals, democrats, and progressive nationalists. Despite the diverse nature of the opposition, they all believed that the 1953 coup could be repeated at any time should the Shah’s reign end. This belief forms the background to any American-Iranian negotiation, particularly the 1979 hostage situation.
Ghazvinian cleverly compares the attitudes of the different presidents towards the Shah. For Eisenhower, named the “coup president” by historian Blanche Wiesen Cook, his policy was driven by the anti-communism of the Dulles brothers to provide the Shah with loans and military hardware. Once John F. Kennedy assumed the oval office he put pressure on the Shah to reform his reign, but once he was assassinated the Shah was relieved since Lyndon Johnson was too busy with Vietnam and appreciated an anti-communist ally who would help control rising Arab nationalism and the Persian Gulf. The key was Richard M. Nixon who developed a friendship with the Shah during the Eisenhower administration and with pressure from the likes of Henry Kissinger to honor any military requests that the Shah asked for resulted in billions for the American military-industrial complex and advanced weaponry for the Iranian army. The result was a man who believed he had card blanche from the United States resulting in violent domestic opposition against the Shah in Iran. Finally, Jimmy Carter’s human rights rhetoric scared the Shah, but he too would give in to the Shah’s demands until his overthrow.
Ghazvinian’s discussion of the rise of Khomeini and American ignorance concerning the proliferation of his ideas and support in Iran is well thought out. From exile in Iraq and later Paris the United States made no attempt to understand the reasons behind Khomeini’s rise and the conditions of poverty and oppression that existed among the Iranian masses. Washington’s blindness and tone deafness is highlighted by the appointment of former CIA Director Richard Helms as US Ambassador to Iran in 1973.
Once the Shah is overthrown Ghazvinian explains the different factions that existed in Iran and that it was not a foregone conclusion that Islamic fundamentalism would be victorious. American intelligence underestimated Khomeini’s skill as a politician, not just a religious leader. The reader is exposed to intricate details about the creation of the Islamic Republic, the hostage situation, and the Iran-Iraq War which found the US playing a double game of supporting both sides. This would lead to the Iran-Contra scandal that showed the duplicitous nature of the Reagan administration that should have ended the Reagan presidency.
Though Ghazvinian breezy history is immensely readable it becomes biased as he delves into the post 1988 Iranian-American relations. The author discusses efforts by George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama to reset the relationship between Teheran and Washington ultimately to be thwarted by disinterest after the Soviet Union collapsed and the role of the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu whose bombast was designed to block any Iranian-American rapprochement. At times slipping into partiality, Ghazvinian downplays the bombast of the Iranian government and its avoidance of the nuclear issue, its role in Lebanon with its ally Hezbollah, and arming Hamas in the West Bank. I realize the many flaws and general stupidity of Bush’s neocon gang, but the soft presentation of Iran under Mahmoud Ahmadinjad also leaves a lot to be desired.
Despite some areas that could be developed further, Ghazvinian has produced a needed reappraisal of his subject and the quality of the writing makes the book an easy read for the general public which makes it a valuable contribution despite some shortcomings.
March 3, 2023
Illuminating - I didn't know almost anything in this book. It should be noted that since this is a book about foreign policy it completely ignores internal human rights violations. It's noted by other reviewers and I caught this same drift about 2/3 the way through the book when discussing more recent events the tone shifts from impartial observer to heavily political / biased in one direction. It's very clear the author is passionate and becomes worrying to the reader that we're getting a bias confirming narrative. It's an interesting direction however because it's in neither traditional American parties' interest, as the author points out support for Israel is one of the only bipartisan agreements in the US. Reading this as a Jewish, Iranian American was icky to say the least.
“History, like almost everything else, has become a casualty in the long running war of words between Iran and the United States.”
“Along with China, Egypt, Greece, and Ethiopia, Iran is one of the very few nation states that can legitimately claim to have existed more or less continuously since antiquity. It is also one of only 7 or8 nations that were never colonized by European powers.”
“At its height, in the 5th century BC, the Persian empire ruled over 60M of the world’s 100M people, making Persepolis, for all intents and purposes, the capital city of all humanity.”
“Successive Iranian governments had looked to the US as a potential third force that could counteract the pressures from Britain and Russia. Decade after decade Americans looked to Iran as a mystical, benevolent, faraway Persian kingdom that seemed more appealing than the radical, hostile, Arab world. This belief in an alternative force lying just over the horizon proved powerful and durable in both the American psyche and the Iranian. And arguably only fully disappeared after 1979.”
Persians vs Turks/Ottomans in British writing (consumed in US)
“In the 18th and 19th century, ordinary Americans had an easy intimacy with the glories of the ancient Persian empire. A form of cultural literacy that entirely vanished in recent generations.” Cyrus the great, Darius, Xerxes
“Almost certainly the first Americans and Persians to interact in person were rum traders.”
“And over the next several years Americans set up a thriving community of earnest young Presbyterians, all eager to ‘run their hose through the fields of the lord’, ‘sow the seeds of holy salvation’, and generally indulge their fascination with agricultural metaphors.”
“They even had a word for it. One virtually impossible to translate into any western tongue. Ritual, respect, protocol, form, ceremony, courtesy. The Persians called it all tashrifat and you ignored it at your peril. This was a lesson the US would learn again and again in its dealings with Iran.”
“Once again, the occidental mind was proving an irrational and mercurial thing.”
“And a merchant selling Persian zalabia - a sort of sweet lattice pastry - made a historic contribution to American popular culture when he wrapped one of his concoctions around a scoop of ice cream. Thus, introducing Americans to the concept of the waffle cone.”
“In 1912 when the new general post office building in NY was searching for a motto to adorn its grandiose columns above 8th avenue it turned to the ancient Greek historian Herodotus who had written admiringly of the Persian empire’s efficient postal system. ‘Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds��� reads the inscription that was chiseled above the columns.”
“The Shah declared January 7th, the anniversary of the new law, a national holiday: Women’s Emancipation Day. But few women felt emancipated. Embarrassed at being seen in public unveiled many women abandoned their studies or gave up their jobs. A law intended to advance women’s progress thus achieved the opposite effect. The law was repealed in 1941 but by then a generation of Iranian women had lost the opportunity to become educated or enter the workforce.”
“...Germany officially considered Iran an Aryan nation, an honorary member of the master race, superior to the Semitic Arabs. The word Aryan is derived from the latin word aryanus meaning Iranian. So if anyone should have been handing out certificates of racial purity, it was Iran.”
“Aware that the Iranian people were desperate for greater personal freedom after years of tyranny, Mohammad Reza Shah nursed a vague aspiration to go down in history as a liberalizing monarch. But the temptation to play the benevolent king often conflicted with the nagging worry that he would be perceived as weak. Never sure if he would rather be loved for being a democrat or feared for being a dictator, Mohammad Reza would, at different times during his 37 years in power, try out both roles and succeed at neither.”
“In many quarters and for many of its residents, Tehran was less of an imperial capital than a collection of private lives held together by walls and doors and muffled conversations….Hopes and frustrations were beginning to seep out from behind closed doors and onto the street and politics was no exception.”
“But he did not worship blindly at the altar of pseudo modernity the way Reza Shah had, hoping neurotically that if Iran could just build enough railways and factories or rip enough veils from the heads of women the west would finally take it seriously.”
“They now recognized they could not risk acting recklessly against the mood on the streets.”
“The reality however was that he was dealing with two positions that had become existentially irreconcilable. One nation, determined to exercise control over its natural resources and the other determined never to let that happen. There was no middle ground.”
“If you said you were tired of listening to the bald, frail, and bedridden intellectual droning on about freedom of the press and constitutional government and you just wanted a bit of red blooded, brass-knuckled authoritarianism to quicken your pulse, the there was not question about it. Zahedi was your man.”
“In Iran, however, Amini inspired only that timeless lack of enthusiasm that befalls a politician who tries to be all things to all people.”
“It was hard to imagine in 1964 that a cantankerous cleric delivering lectures in the dust bowl of Mesopotamia could ever cause a serious problem to the shah of shahs. But the Ayatollah was a patient man and he believed God was on his side.”
“For a lucky few there would be rivers of champagne, mountains of caviar, and a merry go round of favors, blandishments, and personal wealth. But for most it would be only stagnation and spiraling poverty together with political agitation, violent protests, and confrontations with the government that seemed to have lost touch with the needs of its people.”
“Before long Iranians learned that no one was to be trusted and it was best not to discuss politics at all. ‘The walls have mice and the mice have ears’ went a traditional Iranian saying.”
“Back in the 1930s it was often said no one had dared tell Reza Shah a lie. Now, no one dared tell his son the truth.”
“In a nation where direct criticism of the government was dangerous, the metaphors and parables of religious teaching became the only opportunity for something resembling an open political discussion.”
“And among the old Mosaddegh liberals with their salaried jobs and their comfortable middle class lives, there was an almost total failure to connect with the anger of Tehran’s youth. Left, right, and center: radicalism was the name of the game now, with Youth and anger the only currencies that carried any weight. And in a way this was the most tragic consequence of the coup of 1953. Because if anyone could have held the middle ground between the socialist left and the religious right, creating a meaningful, constructive opposition movement during the 1950s and 1960s and preventing the steady drift to extremism at both ends, it was probably the liberal nationalists. But they had never had a chance.”
“The key to Shariati's immense popularity among Tehran’s young intellectuals was his ability to recast Shi'a Islam as a progressive, dynamic revolutionary force, unique suited to the 20th century struggle against social injustice and the oppression of the poor. Rather than indulge in defeated, fatalistic displays of weeping and mourning over the martyrdom of Hussein and Ali every year, he suggested, Shi'a Muslims should remember that they beloved leaders died rebelling against tyranny and follow suit.”
“Severe and unforgiving, the portraits suggested someone of flinty determination who could step in and take control as needed. A far cry from the lithe and statuesque accessory in a tiara who had been photographed by the Shah’s side for so many years.” (empress Farah Pahlavi)
“If the people of Iran decided they had had enough of their Shah in 1979 it was because they had decided they had enough of their shah. And if they cheered on the students at the embassy and burned American flags on the street, it was as much an expression of a fury whose roots could be traced to the policies of Nixon, Kissinger, and Eisenhower as it was the fault of any democratic administration.”
“Throughout most of 1979 and 1980 the religious right and extreme left had grudgingly tolerated each other as they made common cause against the moderates. But now, with Bazargan gone, an unmistakable rift opened between religious and secular radicals. This in many ways was the real battle for the soul of the Islamic Republic. And it quickly turned ugly.”
“But it had something to do with the timeless ability of pragmatism to triumph over idealism. Both Iran and America, At some point in the early to mid-1980s, grandiose, transcendent, world-defining ideologies had begun to take a backseat to the more prosaic realities of statecraft and international relations.”
“Those who write about the Iran-Iraq war almost variably end up quoting the American statesman Henry Kissinger who is said to have quipped, in a moment of private indiscretion, that it was ‘a pity both sides can't lose’. And it is almost impossible, looking at the tremendous toll on the bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, libraries, graveyards, public memorials, factories, offices, and natural environment of Iran and Iraq to escape the conclusion that this is exactly what happened. But as catastrophic as the losses Sustained by Iran and Iraq were, they are nothing compared to the subtle wounds and perforations That made their way and continue to make their way into the psyches of both countries.”
“What all these analyzes miss was what they had always missed and what they continue In some form to miss even today. However affected the Iranian people might have been with specific policies of its government, it's loyalty to the Islamic Revolution and to the political philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeni was unshakable…It is not so much that the radicals hijacked the revolution - in many ways it was theirs all along. It is perhaps more the case that the hostage crisis in the Iraq war created a polarized atmosphere in which radical religious ideologies found a more receptive audience among the Iranian public than they might have under calmer, more ordinary circumstances.”
“It might well have been decades of liberal opposition to the Shaw in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s that chipped away at the old order and paved the way for the titanic backlash that followed. But it was in the crucible of 1980s that the revolution was truly cemented.”
“This tension, this awkward coexistence between Pragmatism and ideology would become a defining feature of the Islamic Republic's politics.”
“In 1991 however, with Saddam crippled and the Arab states committed to an American sponsored peace plan, Israel changed its tune. It launched a vigorous public relations campaign in Washington aimed at convincing Americans that the greatest danger to world peace no longer came from Arab states like Iraq but from Iran.”
“As [Khatami’s] star began to rise he warned publicly that the Islamic Republic was following a dangerous trend. If it continued to insist on a rigid, dogmatic interpretation of religion it risked alienating the public from the very idea of an Islamic Republic, even from Islam itself.”
“The idea of Iran as the greatest threat to American interests in the Middle East had become a permanent fixture of Washington thinking and there was no deviating from the script.”
“What Americans did not always fully appreciate was that every time Ahmadinejad made a hostile statement about Israel, he was speaking to multiple audiences. One of them was his domestic Iranian audience which never tired of being reminded that the days of the Shah's servility to the United States were over. Another audience was regional: Middle Easterners who dearly wished their own leaders had the gumption to speak so bluntly to the world’s only superpower. And finally he was speaking to a silent majority scattered around the globe from London to Sao Paulo to Calcutta, who were reflexively anti-American or were concerned about the growing unilateralism in American foreign policy or were frustrated with Bush's one-sided approach towards Israel and Palestine. It was a high-risk strategy and one a more experienced politician might not have pursued. For a while it seemed to work.”
“...Ahmadinejad has often been compared to his American counterpart George W Bush. This is surely unfair to Bush who is the product of a democratic tradition and an Ivy League education. But certain similarities in their political styles are hard to deny. Both were seen by much of the world as reckless, even dangerous adventurists, with a disregard for international norms of behavior. Both had somehow failed to travel abroad before becoming president and seemed largely untroubled by that fact. Both had a unique ability to speak the language of the masses, to sneer and smirk and thumb their noses at the nerds and intellectuals who were always horrified and concerned by what they had to say. Both had a measure of homespun schoolboy charm and in the end both spoke with a kind of cool certainty, a certainty born of a very personal relationship with God and a knowledge that a silent majority of their constituency was always very much behind them.”
“Iran was clearly living in a dangerous neighborhood. With a nuclear Israel to its west, a nuclear Russia to its north, a nuclear and highly volatile Pakistan to its east, as well as an Iraqi neighbor that nursed megalomaniac tendencies and had a history of using chemical weapons, not to mention the enduring antipathy of the United States, Iranians understood that they were in no position to be overly relaxed about their security needs.”
“Put another way, [the carrots and sticks policy] treated Iran as a problem to be solved, rather than as a nation with legitimate aspirations, legitimate security concerns, a legitimate perspective on regional affairs, and long running grievances against the United States. A growing number of critics pointed out that the United States needed to take a much larger and more imaginative approach to Iran. One that acknowledged Iran's place in the world and and recognized the extraordinary opportunities to come out of a positive constructive US-Iranian relationship. In the absence of a basic atmosphere of trust and goodwill, these critics said, America's attempts to coerce a change in Iran's policy on a specific issue like nuclear energy would inevitably fail.”
“For nearly four years Netanyahu had bluffed and blustered about how close his country was to taking military action against Iran, effectively blackmailing the US into placing the most severe sanctions in history on the Islamic Republic. As his leverage over the American presidency increased and Obama’s domestic political position weakened, Netanyahu had only demanded more and more action against Iran and usually received it.”
“If there was an overwhelming, universal popular desire on the part of citizens to overturn the Islamic Republic today, no amount of repressive measures and intimidation would be enough to stop it. There are surely other factors which rarely receive a hearing in the United States and might even be politically inconvenient to point out which are equally important to understanding the resilience of the Islamic Republic. For starters it is worth remembering that a people that perceive themselves to be under siege from a foreign power will not generally turn against their own leaders. One is hard pressed to find examples from history in which a nation subjected to economic embargoes, currency debasements, medical shortages, sanctions, acts of terror, drones flights, computer viruses, and threats of war, all directed at it from a hostile overseas power, has reacted with anything other than a stalwart show of patriotic defiance and unity. However much the Iranian people might resent their politicians, they resent foreign interference in their affairs even more. And this resentment has worked out rather well for the powers that be.”
“Today Enmity between the United States and Iran has become almost an industry in its own right with a vast spectrum of actors dedicated to his perpetuation. Specifically four highly important and highly influential political constituencies have a clear stake in not seeing relations improve between the two countries. We might call them four nodes of opposition.”
Iran’s Hardline revolutionary right wing - need American boogeyman to direct public animosity.
Israel - allowing Iran to become a major player in the middle east may reduce their own influence
Sunni-Arab political establishment (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Gulf Sheikdoms, Egypt) - reduces their own influence
Traditional American right - US power and prestige depend on never showing weakness to the world
“History, like almost everything else, has become a casualty in the long running war of words between Iran and the United States.”
“Along with China, Egypt, Greece, and Ethiopia, Iran is one of the very few nation states that can legitimately claim to have existed more or less continuously since antiquity. It is also one of only 7 or8 nations that were never colonized by European powers.”
“At its height, in the 5th century BC, the Persian empire ruled over 60M of the world’s 100M people, making Persepolis, for all intents and purposes, the capital city of all humanity.”
“Successive Iranian governments had looked to the US as a potential third force that could counteract the pressures from Britain and Russia. Decade after decade Americans looked to Iran as a mystical, benevolent, faraway Persian kingdom that seemed more appealing than the radical, hostile, Arab world. This belief in an alternative force lying just over the horizon proved powerful and durable in both the American psyche and the Iranian. And arguably only fully disappeared after 1979.”
Persians vs Turks/Ottomans in British writing (consumed in US)
“In the 18th and 19th century, ordinary Americans had an easy intimacy with the glories of the ancient Persian empire. A form of cultural literacy that entirely vanished in recent generations.” Cyrus the great, Darius, Xerxes
“Almost certainly the first Americans and Persians to interact in person were rum traders.”
“And over the next several years Americans set up a thriving community of earnest young Presbyterians, all eager to ‘run their hose through the fields of the lord’, ‘sow the seeds of holy salvation’, and generally indulge their fascination with agricultural metaphors.”
“They even had a word for it. One virtually impossible to translate into any western tongue. Ritual, respect, protocol, form, ceremony, courtesy. The Persians called it all tashrifat and you ignored it at your peril. This was a lesson the US would learn again and again in its dealings with Iran.”
“Once again, the occidental mind was proving an irrational and mercurial thing.”
“And a merchant selling Persian zalabia - a sort of sweet lattice pastry - made a historic contribution to American popular culture when he wrapped one of his concoctions around a scoop of ice cream. Thus, introducing Americans to the concept of the waffle cone.”
“In 1912 when the new general post office building in NY was searching for a motto to adorn its grandiose columns above 8th avenue it turned to the ancient Greek historian Herodotus who had written admiringly of the Persian empire’s efficient postal system. ‘Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds��� reads the inscription that was chiseled above the columns.”
“The Shah declared January 7th, the anniversary of the new law, a national holiday: Women’s Emancipation Day. But few women felt emancipated. Embarrassed at being seen in public unveiled many women abandoned their studies or gave up their jobs. A law intended to advance women’s progress thus achieved the opposite effect. The law was repealed in 1941 but by then a generation of Iranian women had lost the opportunity to become educated or enter the workforce.”
“...Germany officially considered Iran an Aryan nation, an honorary member of the master race, superior to the Semitic Arabs. The word Aryan is derived from the latin word aryanus meaning Iranian. So if anyone should have been handing out certificates of racial purity, it was Iran.”
“Aware that the Iranian people were desperate for greater personal freedom after years of tyranny, Mohammad Reza Shah nursed a vague aspiration to go down in history as a liberalizing monarch. But the temptation to play the benevolent king often conflicted with the nagging worry that he would be perceived as weak. Never sure if he would rather be loved for being a democrat or feared for being a dictator, Mohammad Reza would, at different times during his 37 years in power, try out both roles and succeed at neither.”
“In many quarters and for many of its residents, Tehran was less of an imperial capital than a collection of private lives held together by walls and doors and muffled conversations….Hopes and frustrations were beginning to seep out from behind closed doors and onto the street and politics was no exception.”
“But he did not worship blindly at the altar of pseudo modernity the way Reza Shah had, hoping neurotically that if Iran could just build enough railways and factories or rip enough veils from the heads of women the west would finally take it seriously.”
“They now recognized they could not risk acting recklessly against the mood on the streets.”
“The reality however was that he was dealing with two positions that had become existentially irreconcilable. One nation, determined to exercise control over its natural resources and the other determined never to let that happen. There was no middle ground.”
“If you said you were tired of listening to the bald, frail, and bedridden intellectual droning on about freedom of the press and constitutional government and you just wanted a bit of red blooded, brass-knuckled authoritarianism to quicken your pulse, the there was not question about it. Zahedi was your man.”
“In Iran, however, Amini inspired only that timeless lack of enthusiasm that befalls a politician who tries to be all things to all people.”
“It was hard to imagine in 1964 that a cantankerous cleric delivering lectures in the dust bowl of Mesopotamia could ever cause a serious problem to the shah of shahs. But the Ayatollah was a patient man and he believed God was on his side.”
“For a lucky few there would be rivers of champagne, mountains of caviar, and a merry go round of favors, blandishments, and personal wealth. But for most it would be only stagnation and spiraling poverty together with political agitation, violent protests, and confrontations with the government that seemed to have lost touch with the needs of its people.”
“Before long Iranians learned that no one was to be trusted and it was best not to discuss politics at all. ‘The walls have mice and the mice have ears’ went a traditional Iranian saying.”
“Back in the 1930s it was often said no one had dared tell Reza Shah a lie. Now, no one dared tell his son the truth.”
“In a nation where direct criticism of the government was dangerous, the metaphors and parables of religious teaching became the only opportunity for something resembling an open political discussion.”
“And among the old Mosaddegh liberals with their salaried jobs and their comfortable middle class lives, there was an almost total failure to connect with the anger of Tehran’s youth. Left, right, and center: radicalism was the name of the game now, with Youth and anger the only currencies that carried any weight. And in a way this was the most tragic consequence of the coup of 1953. Because if anyone could have held the middle ground between the socialist left and the religious right, creating a meaningful, constructive opposition movement during the 1950s and 1960s and preventing the steady drift to extremism at both ends, it was probably the liberal nationalists. But they had never had a chance.”
“The key to Shariati's immense popularity among Tehran’s young intellectuals was his ability to recast Shi'a Islam as a progressive, dynamic revolutionary force, unique suited to the 20th century struggle against social injustice and the oppression of the poor. Rather than indulge in defeated, fatalistic displays of weeping and mourning over the martyrdom of Hussein and Ali every year, he suggested, Shi'a Muslims should remember that they beloved leaders died rebelling against tyranny and follow suit.”
“Severe and unforgiving, the portraits suggested someone of flinty determination who could step in and take control as needed. A far cry from the lithe and statuesque accessory in a tiara who had been photographed by the Shah’s side for so many years.” (empress Farah Pahlavi)
“If the people of Iran decided they had had enough of their Shah in 1979 it was because they had decided they had enough of their shah. And if they cheered on the students at the embassy and burned American flags on the street, it was as much an expression of a fury whose roots could be traced to the policies of Nixon, Kissinger, and Eisenhower as it was the fault of any democratic administration.”
“Throughout most of 1979 and 1980 the religious right and extreme left had grudgingly tolerated each other as they made common cause against the moderates. But now, with Bazargan gone, an unmistakable rift opened between religious and secular radicals. This in many ways was the real battle for the soul of the Islamic Republic. And it quickly turned ugly.”
“But it had something to do with the timeless ability of pragmatism to triumph over idealism. Both Iran and America, At some point in the early to mid-1980s, grandiose, transcendent, world-defining ideologies had begun to take a backseat to the more prosaic realities of statecraft and international relations.”
“Those who write about the Iran-Iraq war almost variably end up quoting the American statesman Henry Kissinger who is said to have quipped, in a moment of private indiscretion, that it was ‘a pity both sides can't lose’. And it is almost impossible, looking at the tremendous toll on the bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, libraries, graveyards, public memorials, factories, offices, and natural environment of Iran and Iraq to escape the conclusion that this is exactly what happened. But as catastrophic as the losses Sustained by Iran and Iraq were, they are nothing compared to the subtle wounds and perforations That made their way and continue to make their way into the psyches of both countries.”
“What all these analyzes miss was what they had always missed and what they continue In some form to miss even today. However affected the Iranian people might have been with specific policies of its government, it's loyalty to the Islamic Revolution and to the political philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeni was unshakable…It is not so much that the radicals hijacked the revolution - in many ways it was theirs all along. It is perhaps more the case that the hostage crisis in the Iraq war created a polarized atmosphere in which radical religious ideologies found a more receptive audience among the Iranian public than they might have under calmer, more ordinary circumstances.”
“It might well have been decades of liberal opposition to the Shaw in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s that chipped away at the old order and paved the way for the titanic backlash that followed. But it was in the crucible of 1980s that the revolution was truly cemented.”
“This tension, this awkward coexistence between Pragmatism and ideology would become a defining feature of the Islamic Republic's politics.”
“In 1991 however, with Saddam crippled and the Arab states committed to an American sponsored peace plan, Israel changed its tune. It launched a vigorous public relations campaign in Washington aimed at convincing Americans that the greatest danger to world peace no longer came from Arab states like Iraq but from Iran.”
“As [Khatami’s] star began to rise he warned publicly that the Islamic Republic was following a dangerous trend. If it continued to insist on a rigid, dogmatic interpretation of religion it risked alienating the public from the very idea of an Islamic Republic, even from Islam itself.”
“The idea of Iran as the greatest threat to American interests in the Middle East had become a permanent fixture of Washington thinking and there was no deviating from the script.”
“What Americans did not always fully appreciate was that every time Ahmadinejad made a hostile statement about Israel, he was speaking to multiple audiences. One of them was his domestic Iranian audience which never tired of being reminded that the days of the Shah's servility to the United States were over. Another audience was regional: Middle Easterners who dearly wished their own leaders had the gumption to speak so bluntly to the world’s only superpower. And finally he was speaking to a silent majority scattered around the globe from London to Sao Paulo to Calcutta, who were reflexively anti-American or were concerned about the growing unilateralism in American foreign policy or were frustrated with Bush's one-sided approach towards Israel and Palestine. It was a high-risk strategy and one a more experienced politician might not have pursued. For a while it seemed to work.”
“...Ahmadinejad has often been compared to his American counterpart George W Bush. This is surely unfair to Bush who is the product of a democratic tradition and an Ivy League education. But certain similarities in their political styles are hard to deny. Both were seen by much of the world as reckless, even dangerous adventurists, with a disregard for international norms of behavior. Both had somehow failed to travel abroad before becoming president and seemed largely untroubled by that fact. Both had a unique ability to speak the language of the masses, to sneer and smirk and thumb their noses at the nerds and intellectuals who were always horrified and concerned by what they had to say. Both had a measure of homespun schoolboy charm and in the end both spoke with a kind of cool certainty, a certainty born of a very personal relationship with God and a knowledge that a silent majority of their constituency was always very much behind them.”
“Iran was clearly living in a dangerous neighborhood. With a nuclear Israel to its west, a nuclear Russia to its north, a nuclear and highly volatile Pakistan to its east, as well as an Iraqi neighbor that nursed megalomaniac tendencies and had a history of using chemical weapons, not to mention the enduring antipathy of the United States, Iranians understood that they were in no position to be overly relaxed about their security needs.”
“Put another way, [the carrots and sticks policy] treated Iran as a problem to be solved, rather than as a nation with legitimate aspirations, legitimate security concerns, a legitimate perspective on regional affairs, and long running grievances against the United States. A growing number of critics pointed out that the United States needed to take a much larger and more imaginative approach to Iran. One that acknowledged Iran's place in the world and and recognized the extraordinary opportunities to come out of a positive constructive US-Iranian relationship. In the absence of a basic atmosphere of trust and goodwill, these critics said, America's attempts to coerce a change in Iran's policy on a specific issue like nuclear energy would inevitably fail.”
“For nearly four years Netanyahu had bluffed and blustered about how close his country was to taking military action against Iran, effectively blackmailing the US into placing the most severe sanctions in history on the Islamic Republic. As his leverage over the American presidency increased and Obama’s domestic political position weakened, Netanyahu had only demanded more and more action against Iran and usually received it.”
“If there was an overwhelming, universal popular desire on the part of citizens to overturn the Islamic Republic today, no amount of repressive measures and intimidation would be enough to stop it. There are surely other factors which rarely receive a hearing in the United States and might even be politically inconvenient to point out which are equally important to understanding the resilience of the Islamic Republic. For starters it is worth remembering that a people that perceive themselves to be under siege from a foreign power will not generally turn against their own leaders. One is hard pressed to find examples from history in which a nation subjected to economic embargoes, currency debasements, medical shortages, sanctions, acts of terror, drones flights, computer viruses, and threats of war, all directed at it from a hostile overseas power, has reacted with anything other than a stalwart show of patriotic defiance and unity. However much the Iranian people might resent their politicians, they resent foreign interference in their affairs even more. And this resentment has worked out rather well for the powers that be.”
“Today Enmity between the United States and Iran has become almost an industry in its own right with a vast spectrum of actors dedicated to his perpetuation. Specifically four highly important and highly influential political constituencies have a clear stake in not seeing relations improve between the two countries. We might call them four nodes of opposition.”
Iran’s Hardline revolutionary right wing - need American boogeyman to direct public animosity.
Israel - allowing Iran to become a major player in the middle east may reduce their own influence
Sunni-Arab political establishment (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Gulf Sheikdoms, Egypt) - reduces their own influence
Traditional American right - US power and prestige depend on never showing weakness to the world
May 30, 2021
Summary: The book reviews the catastrophic relationships between Iran and the UK, Russia and US. The author is supportive if Iran and claims that it will not build nuclear weapons because it is against Islam. Iran just wants to be free from foreign actors riding their resources and pushing them towards modernization and support of western policies and this is why most Iranians support their government.
My thoughts: There is no doubt that the ongoing sanctions are a disaster for the ordinary person. The author lightly mentions the abuse of power in the new Islamic republic. I feel the biggest take away from reading this book is that there is no solution to the Iran-US conflict. And this situation is just another thorn in the never ending chaos in the Mideast. There were despots and cruel shahs before the west arrived....the west made it worse by pumping billions into the region. European, US, and Russian governments all rushed into Iran for oil, control of oil and to install a friendly ruler who will police the area.
Now, more than ever it's time to end consumption of fossil fuels. The oil producing area in the Mideast should look inward and take care of their people. The US needs to back away from the region...there's only more suffering ahead. It's not a problem for outsiders to solve. The US should offer new trade agreements, and diplomatic relations to any country that recognizes human rights, religious freedom, freedom of speech, fair elections, etc.
Notes: As a start this book, I am astonished how deep the history between the US and Iran is...going back to late 1700's. And a love-hate relationship seesawing through the centuries. Of course, Iran as with many other countries was being pulled by the puppet masters in the UK, Russia too. In the early 1900's, an American was hired by Iran and as a financial steward and stood with the Iranians seeking a constitutional government to against Russian usurpation of the nation's riches and governance. Unfortunately, the US government did not get behind the movement at that time. Many revolts against the earlier kings/shahs which indicates that the US should have been much more mindful of the unfolding swift turn to fundamentalist passions in the 1970's. Britain tried to bribe its' way into control and citizens erupted, urged by clerics. In the same way, the grasping fingers of Russians on Iran continues, with a brief interruption after the Russian revolution.
It seems that the various Shahs resisted a constitutional government and a moderate approach. Instead, their heavy hands, corruption, and greed gave more support to the extremists, and combined with the meddling of the UK, Russia and later the US doomed the country. Apparently the US did try to convince the last shah to support more democratic participation but he argued that it was not possible and kept pressing for more cash and weapons.
The author claimed that women stopped going to school and work when the modernity laws were introduced in 1936. He stated that women were embarrassed to go out unveiled. I find this explanation as absurd....did the author talk to women? Very little accurate information is known about Iran today but it is widely acknowledged that education and career opportunities for girls and women are severely restricted. I'll be curious what the author says about the current Iranian lifestyle in later chapters or if he will address the rampart oppression of speech and civil rights that includes imprisonments, corporal punishments and more.
Iran wanted to stop foreign involvement in their own affairs. Yet, Iran joined Russia in backing Assad and that means Iran has no difficulty in backing a dictator in another country. Iran rushed back into the Russian bear's influence to counter the trade sanctions. Now reading this book in 2021, Iran signed a twenty-five year $400 billion deal with China for oil. So, it seems that the Iranians now have a new foreign power calling the shots. The Chinese play the long-game well and are adept chess masters, they will have their in Iran.
Interestingly, the covert operations in Iran were started by Eisenhower. The Shah played Eisenhower by threatening to cozy up with the the USSR....and that causes Eisenhower to give the Shah the weapons and money that he demanded. And later, JFK shaw the Shah has a despot and urged him to increase democracy and improve the lives of his people....and to understand internal unrest will topple him.
I'm now reading CH 24 about former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Fun Fact : May27, 2021 : He has called himself now as a liberal democrat and registered to run for president again. But those revolutions guards that supported him previously have now told him to be quiet and that he was disqualified by the religious guardian council from running for office. So much for democracy in Iran.
My thoughts: There is no doubt that the ongoing sanctions are a disaster for the ordinary person. The author lightly mentions the abuse of power in the new Islamic republic. I feel the biggest take away from reading this book is that there is no solution to the Iran-US conflict. And this situation is just another thorn in the never ending chaos in the Mideast. There were despots and cruel shahs before the west arrived....the west made it worse by pumping billions into the region. European, US, and Russian governments all rushed into Iran for oil, control of oil and to install a friendly ruler who will police the area.
Now, more than ever it's time to end consumption of fossil fuels. The oil producing area in the Mideast should look inward and take care of their people. The US needs to back away from the region...there's only more suffering ahead. It's not a problem for outsiders to solve. The US should offer new trade agreements, and diplomatic relations to any country that recognizes human rights, religious freedom, freedom of speech, fair elections, etc.
Notes: As a start this book, I am astonished how deep the history between the US and Iran is...going back to late 1700's. And a love-hate relationship seesawing through the centuries. Of course, Iran as with many other countries was being pulled by the puppet masters in the UK, Russia too. In the early 1900's, an American was hired by Iran and as a financial steward and stood with the Iranians seeking a constitutional government to against Russian usurpation of the nation's riches and governance. Unfortunately, the US government did not get behind the movement at that time. Many revolts against the earlier kings/shahs which indicates that the US should have been much more mindful of the unfolding swift turn to fundamentalist passions in the 1970's. Britain tried to bribe its' way into control and citizens erupted, urged by clerics. In the same way, the grasping fingers of Russians on Iran continues, with a brief interruption after the Russian revolution.
It seems that the various Shahs resisted a constitutional government and a moderate approach. Instead, their heavy hands, corruption, and greed gave more support to the extremists, and combined with the meddling of the UK, Russia and later the US doomed the country. Apparently the US did try to convince the last shah to support more democratic participation but he argued that it was not possible and kept pressing for more cash and weapons.
The author claimed that women stopped going to school and work when the modernity laws were introduced in 1936. He stated that women were embarrassed to go out unveiled. I find this explanation as absurd....did the author talk to women? Very little accurate information is known about Iran today but it is widely acknowledged that education and career opportunities for girls and women are severely restricted. I'll be curious what the author says about the current Iranian lifestyle in later chapters or if he will address the rampart oppression of speech and civil rights that includes imprisonments, corporal punishments and more.
Iran wanted to stop foreign involvement in their own affairs. Yet, Iran joined Russia in backing Assad and that means Iran has no difficulty in backing a dictator in another country. Iran rushed back into the Russian bear's influence to counter the trade sanctions. Now reading this book in 2021, Iran signed a twenty-five year $400 billion deal with China for oil. So, it seems that the Iranians now have a new foreign power calling the shots. The Chinese play the long-game well and are adept chess masters, they will have their in Iran.
Interestingly, the covert operations in Iran were started by Eisenhower. The Shah played Eisenhower by threatening to cozy up with the the USSR....and that causes Eisenhower to give the Shah the weapons and money that he demanded. And later, JFK shaw the Shah has a despot and urged him to increase democracy and improve the lives of his people....and to understand internal unrest will topple him.
I'm now reading CH 24 about former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Fun Fact : May27, 2021 : He has called himself now as a liberal democrat and registered to run for president again. But those revolutions guards that supported him previously have now told him to be quiet and that he was disqualified by the religious guardian council from running for office. So much for democracy in Iran.
January 31, 2022
A great (and fascinating) read/listen on the US-Iran relationship. Very striking how “close” both countries used to be, until very recently.
March 13, 2023
I found this to be a very informative and interesting read as it taught me a lot about the historical relationships between Iran and the United States with highlights on the failures by both countries and a good explanation for the nuclear "crisis" that is the supposed attempts by Iran to build a nuclear weapon. That said, I do think that it glossed over the protests of the last fifteen years in Iran, the oppressive nature of the Iranian government to its own citizens when they oppose it, and the linkages between Iran and groups abroad such as Hezbollah. However, it does rightfully show how the United States's actions haven't always been pure in regards to Iran and the questionable actions of the Israeli government. I would definitely recommend for those who seek to learn more about the history of Iran and its relationships vis-à-vis America.
October 14, 2021
A masterpiece. Finally, a book that tells the history of Iran and its relations with the US in an accessible narrative style that will land for both American (left and right) and Iranian (left and right) audiences because it spends each chapter, save the last two in which the author provides his own views, explaining how and why each group interprets history in the ways it does. I can’t think of a person in either county who won’t learn something here.
January 27, 2024
Excellent
This book was absolutely fascinating and a page turner. I have a huge interest in the Middle East, but many things in this book were completely new to me - and shocking. I wish our elected officials and government workers would read this book because there are many issues that are presented differently by our media. I appreciate the context this book provides and will move forward with a forever altered view of Iran.
This book was absolutely fascinating and a page turner. I have a huge interest in the Middle East, but many things in this book were completely new to me - and shocking. I wish our elected officials and government workers would read this book because there are many issues that are presented differently by our media. I appreciate the context this book provides and will move forward with a forever altered view of Iran.
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