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The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series
Political Order in Changing Societies
This now-classic examination of the development of viable political institutions in emerging nations is a major and enduring contribution to modern political analysis. In a new Foreword, Francis Fukuyama assesses Huntington’s achievement, examining the context of the book’s original publication as well as its lasting importance.
“This pioneering volume, examining as it does the relation between development and stability, is an interesting and exciting addition to the literature.”—American Political Science Review
“’Must’ reading for all those interested in comparative politics or in the study of development.”—Dankwart A. Rustow, Journal of International Affairs
“This pioneering volume, examining as it does the relation between development and stability, is an interesting and exciting addition to the literature.”—American Political Science Review
“’Must’ reading for all those interested in comparative politics or in the study of development.”—Dankwart A. Rustow, Journal of International Affairs
488 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1968
About the author
Samuel P. Huntington
52 books595 followersSamuel Phillips Huntington was an American political scientist who gained prominence through his "Clash of Civilizations"(1993, 1996) thesis of a new post-Cold War world order. Previously, his academic reputation had rested on his analysis of the relationship between the military and the civil government, his investigation of coups d'etat and for his more recent analysis of threats posed to the U.S. by contemporary immigration.
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April 3, 2008
Sammy is a leading High Priest of Political Power. He is one of the main sources of intellectual justification for some of the most fucked up shit that’s happened over the last several decades. Of course, this means he gets to be one of the most highly respected Ivy League professors in the US. What he has really got a knack for is taking an argument that has some grain of truth to it and twisting it into support for super fucked up policies. For example, this book, published in the 60s, takes the fact that most First World countries had developed their economies before they became democratic, and turned this around to argue that “democracy” in a poor country is premature and unsustainable and therefore we should support all the dictatorships around the world and even overthrow the “premature” democracies around the world until they become rich countries. He was very “influential”, consulted for the CIA, and his arguments were used for decades to support the overthrow a bunch of democracies around the world and support tons of brutal neo-fascist dictatorships. This, of course, makes his book a Political Science classic, that all beginner polisci students are forced to read. He then “consulted” for the Apartheid regime, Suharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile and other friendly characters. His later books did a similar thing, for example arguing that different “civilizations” (such as Christian and Muslim) around the world are bound to war against each other so it makes sense to attack Muslims. Now he is claiming that the Hispanic immigrants in this country are destroying our way of life so we should crack down on them.
Now don’t get me wrong. I am not saying his ideas caused any of these policies. That’s not the way the world works. Elites don’t do what they do because they believe some such “ideas”. They already know what they wanna do and look around for the ideas that justify their policies. Mushy-headed liberals and “head-in-the-cloud” academics tend to mix these two things up. They end up thinking that if bad ideas are causing all this bad shit, then all we have to do is come up with good ideas and we can change the world. Get real! There’s never been a shortage of alternative ideas. It’s just that “good ideas” simply are not in the interest of or useful to the people at the top of the social order. Instead, the rich and powerful look around for the obsequious sycophants who are willing (in order to get ahead) to come up with the “bad ideas” that do serve their interests. Then these intellectual maggots rise to very high positions of “influence” and “respect” as the new versions of the High Priests who used to serve the Emperors, Pharaohs, Czars and Kings in a similar way. In this sense, Huntington rivals his better-known fellow High Priest of Political Power, Milton Friedman, for having created the leading theories and ideas that serve to justify the brutal, repressive and militaristic policies that help to support the iron-fist rule by the rich and powerful and the exploitation and impoverishment of everyone else. Changing all this isn't going to come from coming up with nicer ideas. Repeating “another world is possible” endlessly, or finding new ways to talk nicely to our enemies so that “we can all just get along”, isn't going to change a damn thing. You want to change the world, you’ve got to replace the whole damn system, starting with the people at the top.
As some old fart once said, “ideas don’t do anything on their own, you need real people using real force to give those ideas real power.” (or something like that – if you can't find that quote anywhere then that old fart must have been me).
I’ll get off my high-horse now. ( :
Now don’t get me wrong. I am not saying his ideas caused any of these policies. That’s not the way the world works. Elites don’t do what they do because they believe some such “ideas”. They already know what they wanna do and look around for the ideas that justify their policies. Mushy-headed liberals and “head-in-the-cloud” academics tend to mix these two things up. They end up thinking that if bad ideas are causing all this bad shit, then all we have to do is come up with good ideas and we can change the world. Get real! There’s never been a shortage of alternative ideas. It’s just that “good ideas” simply are not in the interest of or useful to the people at the top of the social order. Instead, the rich and powerful look around for the obsequious sycophants who are willing (in order to get ahead) to come up with the “bad ideas” that do serve their interests. Then these intellectual maggots rise to very high positions of “influence” and “respect” as the new versions of the High Priests who used to serve the Emperors, Pharaohs, Czars and Kings in a similar way. In this sense, Huntington rivals his better-known fellow High Priest of Political Power, Milton Friedman, for having created the leading theories and ideas that serve to justify the brutal, repressive and militaristic policies that help to support the iron-fist rule by the rich and powerful and the exploitation and impoverishment of everyone else. Changing all this isn't going to come from coming up with nicer ideas. Repeating “another world is possible” endlessly, or finding new ways to talk nicely to our enemies so that “we can all just get along”, isn't going to change a damn thing. You want to change the world, you’ve got to replace the whole damn system, starting with the people at the top.
As some old fart once said, “ideas don’t do anything on their own, you need real people using real force to give those ideas real power.” (or something like that – if you can't find that quote anywhere then that old fart must have been me).
I’ll get off my high-horse now. ( :
July 7, 2018
ساموئل هانتینگتون از خبرگان علوم سیاسی جهان، در سراسر اثر کلاسیک خویش، به دنبال نشان دادن مسيرِ فرايند نهادمند شدنِ مشارکت سياسي در کشورهاي در حال نوسازي است. مسئله وي استواري، ثبات جامعه و سياست در جوامع در حال گذار است.
در پیشگفتار کتاب اینگونه آمده است که؛
«...تجزيه و تحليل پژوهشگرانه راهها و وسايل پيشبردِ سامان سياسي ، با وجود اختلافهايي که بر سر مشروعيت و خوشايندي اين هدف وجود دارد بايد مورد توجه يک دانشمند علوم سياسي باشد. ... سامان سياسي تا اندازه اي به رابطه ميان توسعه نهادهاي سياسي و تحرک نيروهاي اجتماعي به صحنه سياست ، بستگي دارد.»
هانتینگتون در این اثر که حول کلیدواژگانِ دولت، نظم سیاسی، ثبات، نهاد و احزاب است در پی آن است که بگوید فرایند توسعه سیاسی کشورها مسیری جدا از توسعه اقتصادی و اجتماعی است و شرط لازم برای دموکراتیزاسیون کشورها وجودِ یک نظم سیاسی و تمرکز قدرت است.
هانتیگتون در این کتاب قصد دارد تاریخ توسعه کشورهای جهان سوم و در حال گذار را در بستری تاریخی شرح دهد و با نگاه به تاریخ و تحولات آن کشورها از آن تئوری استخراج کند.
کتاب «نظم و زوال سیاسی» نوشته فرانسیس فوکویاما به نوعی بازنویسی کتابِ استاد (هانتیگتون) توسط شاگرد (فوکویاما) است که اخیرا نیز به فارسی ترجمه شده است و حتی عنوان کتاب فوکویاما نیز گرفتهشده از عنوان فصل اول کتاب هانتیگتون است.
کتاب هانیتگتون که در سال 1968 نوشته شده است شاید چندان با حال و روز کنونیِ ما و دنیای امروز مرتبط نباشد و کتابی است «برای زمانه خویش!» اما با خود اینگونه پنداشتم که بهتر است برای فهمِ کتاب ارزشمندِ فوکویاما (نظم و زوال سیاسی) ابتدا این کتاب را مطالعه کنم.
در پیشگفتار کتاب اینگونه آمده است که؛
«...تجزيه و تحليل پژوهشگرانه راهها و وسايل پيشبردِ سامان سياسي ، با وجود اختلافهايي که بر سر مشروعيت و خوشايندي اين هدف وجود دارد بايد مورد توجه يک دانشمند علوم سياسي باشد. ... سامان سياسي تا اندازه اي به رابطه ميان توسعه نهادهاي سياسي و تحرک نيروهاي اجتماعي به صحنه سياست ، بستگي دارد.»
هانتینگتون در این اثر که حول کلیدواژگانِ دولت، نظم سیاسی، ثبات، نهاد و احزاب است در پی آن است که بگوید فرایند توسعه سیاسی کشورها مسیری جدا از توسعه اقتصادی و اجتماعی است و شرط لازم برای دموکراتیزاسیون کشورها وجودِ یک نظم سیاسی و تمرکز قدرت است.
هانتیگتون در این کتاب قصد دارد تاریخ توسعه کشورهای جهان سوم و در حال گذار را در بستری تاریخی شرح دهد و با نگاه به تاریخ و تحولات آن کشورها از آن تئوری استخراج کند.
کتاب «نظم و زوال سیاسی» نوشته فرانسیس فوکویاما به نوعی بازنویسی کتابِ استاد (هانتیگتون) توسط شاگرد (فوکویاما) است که اخیرا نیز به فارسی ترجمه شده است و حتی عنوان کتاب فوکویاما نیز گرفتهشده از عنوان فصل اول کتاب هانتیگتون است.
کتاب هانیتگتون که در سال 1968 نوشته شده است شاید چندان با حال و روز کنونیِ ما و دنیای امروز مرتبط نباشد و کتابی است «برای زمانه خویش!» اما با خود اینگونه پنداشتم که بهتر است برای فهمِ کتاب ارزشمندِ فوکویاما (نظم و زوال سیاسی) ابتدا این کتاب را مطالعه کنم.
July 27, 2022
The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.
The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.
Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems.
---
A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.
Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence.
A coup d’etat in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not necessarily involve changes in the social structure.
The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.
Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems.
---
A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.
Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence.
A coup d’etat in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not necessarily involve changes in the social structure.
December 31, 2018
في هذه الدراسه القيمة ينتقد هنتنجتون نظرية التحديث والتي تبحث العلاقة بين التطوير والاستقرار، حيث يدعوا منظروا التحديث بأن اعطاء التحديث قيمة معيارية قوية لأن تكون البلاد حديثه ، فكل ماهو خير في الحداثة يميل الى أن يترابط بعضه مع بعض .
فالتطوير الأقتصادي وتغيير العلاقات الإجتماعية سيعزز بدوره السياسة الحديثة ، وهكذا يتوقف بعضه على بعض .
فعبر هذا الطرح يناقش المؤلف هذه النظرية ويدحض مرتكزاتها الأساسية من الأحداث التاريخية ، ويستخلص بأن النظام السياسي خير في حد ذاته ولن ينشأ تلقائياً من عملية التحديث ، أي بمعنى دون نظام سياسي لا يمكن للتطوير الاقتصادي ولا التطوير الاجتماعي أن يمضيا بنجاح .
وأخيرا الكتاب مليء جداً بالمعلومات الهامه والقيمة للمهتمين بدراسة التطوير السياسي والاقتصادي والاجتماعي .
June 5, 2016
The best one-sentence summary of Huntington's book I can think of is an update of Aristotle's Politics for the 20th century. Huntington's "big point"--the most important source of political variation between countries is their degree of government, not their type of government--is straight out of Aristotle's distinction between proper and degenerate regime types. A lot of people read Huntington as a conservative and a defender of elite privilege, but in this book at least Huntington is not really making a liberal/conservative point. It's a political point to be sure, but the political agenda commonly associated with Huntington is narrower than the one he's really pursuing here which is an institutionalist, elitist, gradualist conservatism against most forms of radicalism.
Huntington's arguing against a once widely-held view in political science called "modernization" theory that held, to simplify greatly, that countries were on a smooth escalator of development in which democratization, economic development, and the emergence of a modern society all move together. Huntington argues against modernization view that modernization misses a vital necessary condition of political institutionalization. Without political institutionalization, modernization actually leads to political decay and instability rather than political order. Political institutionalization refers to the growth in complexity, adaptability, autonomy, and coherence of political organizations like parties, the military, the bureaucracy, the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. Political institutionalization, Huntington claims, allows political organizations to mediate the social and economic forces unleashed by development and modernization and pursue the common interest rather than the interests of particular factions (again echoing Aristotle).
Huntington's basic evidence for his critique of modernization is increasing political instability in developing countries during the 1950s and 60s in the form of coups, revolutions, and protests. Rather than a smooth monotonic relationship between modernization and political stability, Huntington argues instead for a kind of political Kuznets curve in which political stability is initially decreasing in modernization and later increasing.
It would be a disservice to this book not to acknowledge how conceptually rich and provocative it is. Huntington's conceptualization of institutionalization is fascinatingly rich as well as his discussion of political decay in what he calls "praetorian" (non-institutionalized) polities. The big problem with Huntington's argument, however, is the claim that the quality of political institutions primarily explains the a country's level political stability. Basically, while Huntington's critique of modernization theory is right, his proposed missing variable is not the one. It's worth noting that Huntington only argues that highly institutionalized organizations are /capable/ of pursuing the public good, not that they actually do. As he says, "The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests" (24). Note that this says nothing about how these institutions are /actually used/. More fundamentally, however, Huntington doesn't give an argument for why the quality of political institutions rather than the underlying /determinants/ of quality itself. For example, Tony Marx argues, one confounding variable for Huntington is racial exclusion. Racial exclusion, which leads to racial homogeneity among the included citizens in a polity, can be a pre-requisite for political institutionalization but also a direct determinant of political stability.
A different objection to Huntington is the possibility of reverse causation. It may be that political stability itself determines the level of political institutionalization in a country and not the other way around. Huntington doesn't give a real argument for treating political institutionalization as the explanatory rather than the dependent variable.
All this is to say that Huntington draws a possibly useful conceptual distinction between two classes of regimes and makes an association between the two, but he doesn't actually show that there's a causal relationship between the two. Huntington's "stylized fact" that politically stable countries tend to be either very rich or very poor, very "modern" or very "backward," may be right, just as Lipsett's famous stylized fact that all rich countries are democracies may be right. However, we want more than associations--we want explanations, and causal explanations are good explanations.
Huntington's arguing against a once widely-held view in political science called "modernization" theory that held, to simplify greatly, that countries were on a smooth escalator of development in which democratization, economic development, and the emergence of a modern society all move together. Huntington argues against modernization view that modernization misses a vital necessary condition of political institutionalization. Without political institutionalization, modernization actually leads to political decay and instability rather than political order. Political institutionalization refers to the growth in complexity, adaptability, autonomy, and coherence of political organizations like parties, the military, the bureaucracy, the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. Political institutionalization, Huntington claims, allows political organizations to mediate the social and economic forces unleashed by development and modernization and pursue the common interest rather than the interests of particular factions (again echoing Aristotle).
Huntington's basic evidence for his critique of modernization is increasing political instability in developing countries during the 1950s and 60s in the form of coups, revolutions, and protests. Rather than a smooth monotonic relationship between modernization and political stability, Huntington argues instead for a kind of political Kuznets curve in which political stability is initially decreasing in modernization and later increasing.
It would be a disservice to this book not to acknowledge how conceptually rich and provocative it is. Huntington's conceptualization of institutionalization is fascinatingly rich as well as his discussion of political decay in what he calls "praetorian" (non-institutionalized) polities. The big problem with Huntington's argument, however, is the claim that the quality of political institutions primarily explains the a country's level political stability. Basically, while Huntington's critique of modernization theory is right, his proposed missing variable is not the one. It's worth noting that Huntington only argues that highly institutionalized organizations are /capable/ of pursuing the public good, not that they actually do. As he says, "The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests" (24). Note that this says nothing about how these institutions are /actually used/. More fundamentally, however, Huntington doesn't give an argument for why the quality of political institutions rather than the underlying /determinants/ of quality itself. For example, Tony Marx argues, one confounding variable for Huntington is racial exclusion. Racial exclusion, which leads to racial homogeneity among the included citizens in a polity, can be a pre-requisite for political institutionalization but also a direct determinant of political stability.
A different objection to Huntington is the possibility of reverse causation. It may be that political stability itself determines the level of political institutionalization in a country and not the other way around. Huntington doesn't give a real argument for treating political institutionalization as the explanatory rather than the dependent variable.
All this is to say that Huntington draws a possibly useful conceptual distinction between two classes of regimes and makes an association between the two, but he doesn't actually show that there's a causal relationship between the two. Huntington's "stylized fact" that politically stable countries tend to be either very rich or very poor, very "modern" or very "backward," may be right, just as Lipsett's famous stylized fact that all rich countries are democracies may be right. However, we want more than associations--we want explanations, and causal explanations are good explanations.
November 24, 2023
So you have a book on how capitalist industrialisation generates tensions ripping apart premodern societies, pitting merchants, workers, artisans and the bourgeoisie against landlords, clergy and conservatively-inclined peasantry. Might be any number of Marx and Engels' works. Ah well, but this specifically adresses the impact of imperialism by the Western core upon colonized masses. That might be Lenin or Nkrumah, perhaps? Could be, but it also praises Leninism as the organisational paradigm allowing third-world countries to catch up with the west, leaving corrupt Western-backed dictatorships in the dust. Maybe Samir Amin?
No, no, that's all Samuel Huntington, the Class of Civilizations guy, writing at the height of the Vietnam War. Yeah, go figure. I didn't expect the man who advised president Botha not to drop apartheid too quickly to have anything worthwhile on offer, but it turns out he's had a massive, paradigm-shifting history of social change up his sleeve all along. If even half of US sociology graduates internalize a fraction of this, apparently one of the most cited books on the planet, you can almost understand why their foreign policy establishment became so jaded towards Europeans and their antiquated moral calculuses. A humbling experience for this continental.
Order is the institutionalist synthesis of marxism-leninism and modernisation theory. "Modernisation" sought to preempt communist take-overs in the Third World by stimulating economic take-off under the American aegis. But Huntington recognized that "economic growth", the "line-goes-up" view of history, misses out on a perpendicular axis equally important to statecraft: institutionalization, the machinery of society that allows policies to be implemented, contradicting interests to be mediated, political participation to be broadened and states to survive the end of a leader's reign without palace coups.
In a time of ideological pauperization, it's a testimony to how seriously opposing ideas used to be taken. In a legitimately Hegelian fashion, Huntington takes up almost every gauntlet thrown up by the ascendant marxist camp and reframes it within a complex new framework — as he sees the Russian and Chinese revolutions as the proper heirs of the Glorious, the American and the French Revolutions, so he himself forms a part of a red thread starting with the birth of Classical Political Economy. Compared to contemporaries like Acemoglu or Milanovic, probably the closest analogues of political economists today, Huntington seems so much more sophisticated — nothing acquired by previous generations went wasted.
Marx respected Malthus, in spite of the politics he actively furthered, because of his scholarship. I feel similarly now. GR isnt the place to do a deep dive on the contents themselves, I "will" carve out space for that elsewhere. But first I'll get a proper copy of this book so I can underline just about every paragraph.
No, no, that's all Samuel Huntington, the Class of Civilizations guy, writing at the height of the Vietnam War. Yeah, go figure. I didn't expect the man who advised president Botha not to drop apartheid too quickly to have anything worthwhile on offer, but it turns out he's had a massive, paradigm-shifting history of social change up his sleeve all along. If even half of US sociology graduates internalize a fraction of this, apparently one of the most cited books on the planet, you can almost understand why their foreign policy establishment became so jaded towards Europeans and their antiquated moral calculuses. A humbling experience for this continental.
Order is the institutionalist synthesis of marxism-leninism and modernisation theory. "Modernisation" sought to preempt communist take-overs in the Third World by stimulating economic take-off under the American aegis. But Huntington recognized that "economic growth", the "line-goes-up" view of history, misses out on a perpendicular axis equally important to statecraft: institutionalization, the machinery of society that allows policies to be implemented, contradicting interests to be mediated, political participation to be broadened and states to survive the end of a leader's reign without palace coups.
In a time of ideological pauperization, it's a testimony to how seriously opposing ideas used to be taken. In a legitimately Hegelian fashion, Huntington takes up almost every gauntlet thrown up by the ascendant marxist camp and reframes it within a complex new framework — as he sees the Russian and Chinese revolutions as the proper heirs of the Glorious, the American and the French Revolutions, so he himself forms a part of a red thread starting with the birth of Classical Political Economy. Compared to contemporaries like Acemoglu or Milanovic, probably the closest analogues of political economists today, Huntington seems so much more sophisticated — nothing acquired by previous generations went wasted.
Marx respected Malthus, in spite of the politics he actively furthered, because of his scholarship. I feel similarly now. GR isnt the place to do a deep dive on the contents themselves, I "will" carve out space for that elsewhere. But first I'll get a proper copy of this book so I can underline just about every paragraph.
February 25, 2020
النظام السياسي في مجتمع متغيّرة - صامويل هنتنجتون
صامويل هنتنجتون(18 أبريل 1927 - 24 ديسمبر 2008 ) هو مفكر و سياسي أميركي ، و بروفسور في جامعة هارفارد لـ 58 عاماً و مفكر محافظ. عمل في عدة مجالات فرعية منبثقة من العلوم السياسية والأعمال، تصفه جامعة هارفارد بمعلم جيل من العلماء في مجالات متباينة على نطاق واسع، وأحد أكثر علماء السياسة تأثيراً في النصف الثاني من القرن العشرين.
كتابه النظام السياسي في مجتمعات متغيرة الصادر عام 1968، و هو العمل الذي تحدى النظرة التقليدية لمنظري التحديث، بأن التقدم الاقتصادي والاجتماعي من شأنه أن ينتج الديمقراطيات المستقرة في البلدان التي تخلصت من الاستعمار في الآونة الأخيرة.
صدرت ترجمة جديدة لهذا الكتاب عام 2017، عن دار التنوير، وبـ 559 صفحة من القطع الكبير، ونقله إلى العربية الدكتور حسام نايل، بإيضاحات ساهمت في إزالة أي لبس يمكن حصوله في حالة نقل المصطلح، أو بعض السياقات الكتابية، من الإنجليزية إلى العربية. أكّد هنتنجتون أن تطوّر الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا والاتحاد السوفييتي، من الناحية السياسية، كان على "قدم المساواة" سياسيا مع التطور الاجتماعي و الاقتصادي و يقول هنتنجتون في هذا السياق: "في الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا العظمى والاتحاد السوفييتي، أنظمة حكم مختلفة، كلّها تمارس الحكم، وفي كل بلد منها، يوجد مجتمع سياسي يحقق توافقاً شاملاً فيما بين الشعب على شرعية النظام السياسي". مؤكداً أن في تلك البلاد، توجد "مؤسسات سياسية قوية ومتماسكة وقادرة على التكيّف". حيث يقوم النظام السياسي عند هنتنجتون على مبدأ "المؤسّسة" بغضّ النظر ان كانت ديمقراطية او لا ديمقراطية بل يكفي ان يكون هناك نظام سياسي قائم و يفصله بذلك على النظام الاقتصادي الذي يجعله موازيا او رابطا له و ليس هو الأساسي لبلوغ التطور السياس بل العكس .
فهنالك معايير لإضفاء الطابع السياسي بدءا من وجود اجتماع سياسي توافقي يعتمد على قوة التنظيمات والإجراءات السياسية في المجتمع ثم ان هذا النظام قادر على التكييف مع كل تغير اجتماعي فتصلّبه قد ينتج عنه تصدّع في مؤسساته و انخفاض لقدراتها في التكيف و كذلك عدم ملائمتها للتغير الاجتماعي و الاقتصادي .
يحدد هنتنجتون ثلاث مراحل لبلوغ النظام السياسي درجة عالية من التكيف و الملائمة مع التقلّبات و التغييرات الاجتماعية و الاقتصادية و هي :
-الزمن
-الأجيال
-الوظيفة
(1)الزمن: يؤكد هنتنجتون على أن بقاء اي تنظيم سياسي و تطوّره و قدرة مؤسساته صارت ارفع مرتبطا بمدّة قدمه ، فالتطور السياسي عنده هو تطوّر بطيء مقارنة بالتطور الاقتصادي الذي يكون متسارعا فلا يمكن تشكيل حزب رئيسي قوي و له تأثير دائم في يوم ، يقول "لا يتمّ إنشاء المؤسسات السياسية إذا بين عشية و ضحاها".
(1)عمر الأجيال : و يعني بذلك وجود القيادات من أجيال جديدة في الحكم باعتبار أن "إحلال مجموعة من القادة محل مجموعة أخرى، مثلا للتغلب على أزمة انتقال السلطة" ستكون أمراً "هاماً من حيث قابلية التكيف المؤسسي، لكنه ليس كأهمية تغيير أجيال القيادة، أي إزاحة مجموعة من القادة بمجموعة أخرى ذات تجارب جدّ مختلفة" فالانتقال من جيل لآخر في حكم تنظيم او حزب معين هو تحفيز على تطوير التنظيم و إضفاء طابع عصري على المؤسسة و يعتبر ذلك "حالة صحّية" لبلوغ الحزب ذروته التنظيمية.
(3) الوظيفة : يعتبر هنتنجتون أن "التنظيم المتكيف مع التغييرات الطارئة على بيئته ، ينجح في إدخال تغيير أو أكثر ضمن وظائفه الرئيسية" وبذلك يكون "طابعه المؤسسي أعلى" ، حيث ينشأ كل تنظيم لإداء وظيفة معينة و عندما تنتهي تلك الوظيفة تنهي مهمّته او بقائه على قيد الحياة فيرتهن للموت البطيء . فتنظيم اكثر ديمومة و ملائمة هو التنظيم الذي كيّف وظائفه للتغير و مسايرة كل تغيير و ليس تحديد الوظائف هو المهم بل التكيّف الذي يجعل قادة هذا التنظيم يقيّمونه من أجل ذاته و بذلك سيطوّر وجوده الذاتي على خلاف تحديد وظائفه فيكون تنظيم اكثر تكيّفا و تطوّرا .
يعدّ الكتاب نموذجا في الدراسات السياسية و حقلا من المعلومات للدارسين و الراغبين في معرفة طبيعة الأنظمة السياسية و ظروف تغيّرها من الإستقرار إلى التقلقل و الفوضى ، و نختم مقالنا هذا بمقولة هنتنجتون "إنّ المجتمع العاجز فعلا ليس المجتمع الذي تهدّده الثورة ، بل المجتمع الغير مؤهّل لها" .
صامويل هنتنجتون(18 أبريل 1927 - 24 ديسمبر 2008 ) هو مفكر و سياسي أميركي ، و بروفسور في جامعة هارفارد لـ 58 عاماً و مفكر محافظ. عمل في عدة مجالات فرعية منبثقة من العلوم السياسية والأعمال، تصفه جامعة هارفارد بمعلم جيل من العلماء في مجالات متباينة على نطاق واسع، وأحد أكثر علماء السياسة تأثيراً في النصف الثاني من القرن العشرين.
كتابه النظام السياسي في مجتمعات متغيرة الصادر عام 1968، و هو العمل الذي تحدى النظرة التقليدية لمنظري التحديث، بأن التقدم الاقتصادي والاجتماعي من شأنه أن ينتج الديمقراطيات المستقرة في البلدان التي تخلصت من الاستعمار في الآونة الأخيرة.
صدرت ترجمة جديدة لهذا الكتاب عام 2017، عن دار التنوير، وبـ 559 صفحة من القطع الكبير، ونقله إلى العربية الدكتور حسام نايل، بإيضاحات ساهمت في إزالة أي لبس يمكن حصوله في حالة نقل المصطلح، أو بعض السياقات الكتابية، من الإنجليزية إلى العربية. أكّد هنتنجتون أن تطوّر الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا والاتحاد السوفييتي، من الناحية السياسية، كان على "قدم المساواة" سياسيا مع التطور الاجتماعي و الاقتصادي و يقول هنتنجتون في هذا السياق: "في الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا العظمى والاتحاد السوفييتي، أنظمة حكم مختلفة، كلّها تمارس الحكم، وفي كل بلد منها، يوجد مجتمع سياسي يحقق توافقاً شاملاً فيما بين الشعب على شرعية النظام السياسي". مؤكداً أن في تلك البلاد، توجد "مؤسسات سياسية قوية ومتماسكة وقادرة على التكيّف". حيث يقوم النظام السياسي عند هنتنجتون على مبدأ "المؤسّسة" بغضّ النظر ان كانت ديمقراطية او لا ديمقراطية بل يكفي ان يكون هناك نظام سياسي قائم و يفصله بذلك على النظام الاقتصادي الذي يجعله موازيا او رابطا له و ليس هو الأساسي لبلوغ التطور السياس بل العكس .
فهنالك معايير لإضفاء الطابع السياسي بدءا من وجود اجتماع سياسي توافقي يعتمد على قوة التنظيمات والإجراءات السياسية في المجتمع ثم ان هذا النظام قادر على التكييف مع كل تغير اجتماعي فتصلّبه قد ينتج عنه تصدّع في مؤسساته و انخفاض لقدراتها في التكيف و كذلك عدم ملائمتها للتغير الاجتماعي و الاقتصادي .
يحدد هنتنجتون ثلاث مراحل لبلوغ النظام السياسي درجة عالية من التكيف و الملائمة مع التقلّبات و التغييرات الاجتماعية و الاقتصادية و هي :
-الزمن
-الأجيال
-الوظيفة
(1)الزمن: يؤكد هنتنجتون على أن بقاء اي تنظيم سياسي و تطوّره و قدرة مؤسساته صارت ارفع مرتبطا بمدّة قدمه ، فالتطور السياسي عنده هو تطوّر بطيء مقارنة بالتطور الاقتصادي الذي يكون متسارعا فلا يمكن تشكيل حزب رئيسي قوي و له تأثير دائم في يوم ، يقول "لا يتمّ إنشاء المؤسسات السياسية إذا بين عشية و ضحاها".
(1)عمر الأجيال : و يعني بذلك وجود القيادات من أجيال جديدة في الحكم باعتبار أن "إحلال مجموعة من القادة محل مجموعة أخرى، مثلا للتغلب على أزمة انتقال السلطة" ستكون أمراً "هاماً من حيث قابلية التكيف المؤسسي، لكنه ليس كأهمية تغيير أجيال القيادة، أي إزاحة مجموعة من القادة بمجموعة أخرى ذات تجارب جدّ مختلفة" فالانتقال من جيل لآخر في حكم تنظيم او حزب معين هو تحفيز على تطوير التنظيم و إضفاء طابع عصري على المؤسسة و يعتبر ذلك "حالة صحّية" لبلوغ الحزب ذروته التنظيمية.
(3) الوظيفة : يعتبر هنتنجتون أن "التنظيم المتكيف مع التغييرات الطارئة على بيئته ، ينجح في إدخال تغيير أو أكثر ضمن وظائفه الرئيسية" وبذلك يكون "طابعه المؤسسي أعلى" ، حيث ينشأ كل تنظيم لإداء وظيفة معينة و عندما تنتهي تلك الوظيفة تنهي مهمّته او بقائه على قيد الحياة فيرتهن للموت البطيء . فتنظيم اكثر ديمومة و ملائمة هو التنظيم الذي كيّف وظائفه للتغير و مسايرة كل تغيير و ليس تحديد الوظائف هو المهم بل التكيّف الذي يجعل قادة هذا التنظيم يقيّمونه من أجل ذاته و بذلك سيطوّر وجوده الذاتي على خلاف تحديد وظائفه فيكون تنظيم اكثر تكيّفا و تطوّرا .
يعدّ الكتاب نموذجا في الدراسات السياسية و حقلا من المعلومات للدارسين و الراغبين في معرفة طبيعة الأنظمة السياسية و ظروف تغيّرها من الإستقرار إلى التقلقل و الفوضى ، و نختم مقالنا هذا بمقولة هنتنجتون "إنّ المجتمع العاجز فعلا ليس المجتمع الذي تهدّده الثورة ، بل المجتمع الغير مؤهّل لها" .
July 31, 2011
It is perhaps regretful that, post- September 11 2001, most people are familiar only with the late Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" but not his earlier seminal works. Of these works, "Political Order in Changing Societies" is perhaps a classic which all students of political science should read.
This is considering that although the book was originally written in the 1960s, it is almost brim full of thought-provoking, illuminating and, at times, counter-intuitive insights about politics that are perhaps still relevant and valid in today's world. One will just have to look at the recent happenings in Tunisia to recognise this truth.
This is considering that although the book was originally written in the 1960s, it is almost brim full of thought-provoking, illuminating and, at times, counter-intuitive insights about politics that are perhaps still relevant and valid in today's world. One will just have to look at the recent happenings in Tunisia to recognise this truth.
Read
October 3, 2018The main takeaways from this book (for me, personally) are below. Just to clarify, I fundamentally disagree with many of Huntington's conclusions, but I found it useful to write some of them down.
- Underdeveloped countries tend to be stable; developed countries tend to be stable; countries undergoing modernization (attempting to move from the former to the latter, in other words) are likely to experience significant turmoil, however, if they do not have strong political institutions and/or a strong government. "Modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability." (p41)
- The idea that economic success will breed political stability is misguided: "For in fact, economic development and political stability are two independent goals and progress towards one has no necessary connection to progress towards another." (p6)
- Rapid but uneven economic development, the type of which we see in many countries across the globe, is likely to create tensions in society. "Economic development increases economic inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality." (p58)
- Holding 'free and fair elections' in a society that lacks proper political institutions is meaningless at best and dangerous at worst as it will increase awareness of social differences between groups in that society
- Group consciousness and all its early consequences, including extremism, are a by-product of modernization
- The Gap Hypothesis: modernization leads to exposure, which leads to the creation of expectations among the population that a transitional society won't be able to fulfill. "Consequently, a gap develops between aspirations and expectations, want formation and want satisfaction, or the satisfaction function and the level-of-living function. This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of this gap provides a reasonable index to political instability." (p54)
- In developing societies dominated economically by foreign investors and/or very small groups/families, people will turn to politics in order to further their personal ambitions. In a different type of society these people could have been entrepreneurs, for example
- On anti-corruption reactions in developing socities: "The initial adherence to modern values by a group in a transitional country often takes extreme form. The ideals of honesty, probity, universalism, and merit often become so overriding that individuals and groups come to condemn as corrupt in their own society practices which are accepted as normal and even legitimate in more modern societies." (p62)
- Corruption has, according to Huntington, some positive aspects: corruption means individuals buy in the system and do not seek its destruction; corruption might help stimulate economic growth by bypassing a country's overly rigid bureaucratic apparatus etc. (pp66-67)
- He more or less advocates for authoritarian rule in societies undergoing transition, with democratic elements to be added after: "Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order." (pp7-8)
Interesting side notes
- As a Romanian I feel this unfortunately applies to the 'family mentality' of many people in Eastern Europe today: "The amoral familism (...) is typical not of a traditional society, but of a backward society in which the traditional institution of the extended family has disintegrated under the impact of the first waves of modernization. The new values undermine the old bases of association and of authority, before new skills, motivations and resources can be broughtinto existence to create new groupings."
- I found it hilarious that historians are apparently saying the American Revolution was not the result of the colonies being more politically advanced than England, as popular belief would dictate, but rather the other way around. This quote by C. H. McIlwain, cited by Hungtington, is everything: "The colonists retained to a marked and unusual degree the traditions of Tudor England. In all our study of American institutions, colonial and contemporary, institutions of both public law and private law, this fact must be reckoned with. The breach between colonies and mother country was largely a mutual misunderstanding based, in great part, on the fact of this retention of older ideas in the colonies after parliamentary sovereignty had driven them out in the mother country." (p97)
- Underdeveloped countries tend to be stable; developed countries tend to be stable; countries undergoing modernization (attempting to move from the former to the latter, in other words) are likely to experience significant turmoil, however, if they do not have strong political institutions and/or a strong government. "Modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability." (p41)
- The idea that economic success will breed political stability is misguided: "For in fact, economic development and political stability are two independent goals and progress towards one has no necessary connection to progress towards another." (p6)
- Rapid but uneven economic development, the type of which we see in many countries across the globe, is likely to create tensions in society. "Economic development increases economic inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality." (p58)
- Holding 'free and fair elections' in a society that lacks proper political institutions is meaningless at best and dangerous at worst as it will increase awareness of social differences between groups in that society
- Group consciousness and all its early consequences, including extremism, are a by-product of modernization
- The Gap Hypothesis: modernization leads to exposure, which leads to the creation of expectations among the population that a transitional society won't be able to fulfill. "Consequently, a gap develops between aspirations and expectations, want formation and want satisfaction, or the satisfaction function and the level-of-living function. This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of this gap provides a reasonable index to political instability." (p54)
- In developing societies dominated economically by foreign investors and/or very small groups/families, people will turn to politics in order to further their personal ambitions. In a different type of society these people could have been entrepreneurs, for example
- On anti-corruption reactions in developing socities: "The initial adherence to modern values by a group in a transitional country often takes extreme form. The ideals of honesty, probity, universalism, and merit often become so overriding that individuals and groups come to condemn as corrupt in their own society practices which are accepted as normal and even legitimate in more modern societies." (p62)
- Corruption has, according to Huntington, some positive aspects: corruption means individuals buy in the system and do not seek its destruction; corruption might help stimulate economic growth by bypassing a country's overly rigid bureaucratic apparatus etc. (pp66-67)
- He more or less advocates for authoritarian rule in societies undergoing transition, with democratic elements to be added after: "Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order." (pp7-8)
Interesting side notes
- As a Romanian I feel this unfortunately applies to the 'family mentality' of many people in Eastern Europe today: "The amoral familism (...) is typical not of a traditional society, but of a backward society in which the traditional institution of the extended family has disintegrated under the impact of the first waves of modernization. The new values undermine the old bases of association and of authority, before new skills, motivations and resources can be broughtinto existence to create new groupings."
- I found it hilarious that historians are apparently saying the American Revolution was not the result of the colonies being more politically advanced than England, as popular belief would dictate, but rather the other way around. This quote by C. H. McIlwain, cited by Hungtington, is everything: "The colonists retained to a marked and unusual degree the traditions of Tudor England. In all our study of American institutions, colonial and contemporary, institutions of both public law and private law, this fact must be reckoned with. The breach between colonies and mother country was largely a mutual misunderstanding based, in great part, on the fact of this retention of older ideas in the colonies after parliamentary sovereignty had driven them out in the mother country." (p97)
December 23, 2022
The book has aged surprisingly well. The "change" Huntington describes is modernity, and I'm quite impressed by how well some of the trends that he describes hold up today. So the main points are still highly valid.
What Huntington understands uniquely well is power. He sees that power is not something that exists out there to be restricted, but something to be created through political organisation. And without the creation of power, no political order can be established.
These thoughts really work as useful contrast to the dominating story of useful institutions as ones that limit the power of government; Huntington turns us on our heads and asks to think of how this power is to come at all.
This focus really elevates what political science can do, but the book is highly recommended to all.
What Huntington understands uniquely well is power. He sees that power is not something that exists out there to be restricted, but something to be created through political organisation. And without the creation of power, no political order can be established.
These thoughts really work as useful contrast to the dominating story of useful institutions as ones that limit the power of government; Huntington turns us on our heads and asks to think of how this power is to come at all.
This focus really elevates what political science can do, but the book is highly recommended to all.
January 19, 2020
One of the most important books ever written. It's a shame the author is a racist.
July 11, 2011
While published in 1968, it is surprising how relevant and useful some of the insights in this book remain. Many do display the dust of the intervening decades, less the dust of scholarship than of global events. Yet Huntington's masterful narrative style and clear argument ensures this provocative work's continuing place in the canon of IR classics...
April 6, 2011
I read the original version in graduate school. I found the thesis vaguely disquieting at that time (and now). I recall clearly, though, the animated discussion in class over the validity of his argument. And I thought then--and now--that a book that could generate such debate has value.
Currently reading
September 8, 2009A must read book for all poltiicians
April 8, 2023
As is agreed, this book is a classic and has laid the groundwork for considerable scholarship since it’s publication.
There is much in this book.
Three important takeaways for me in this second reading years later:
Professor Huntington’s argument that premature political liberalization can lead to instability in the context of institutionally weak states spawned the developmental strategy of the authoritarian transition. In the case of selected countries, Asian Tigers such as Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, this has proven successful (for non-chewing gum lovers), but not for much of the emerging and developing world.
The phenomenon of political decay warrants careful study.
Whilst political and economic development follow separate tracks, the latter is highly dependent on the former being a supportive and not destructive catalyst.
There is much in this book.
Three important takeaways for me in this second reading years later:
Professor Huntington’s argument that premature political liberalization can lead to instability in the context of institutionally weak states spawned the developmental strategy of the authoritarian transition. In the case of selected countries, Asian Tigers such as Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, this has proven successful (for non-chewing gum lovers), but not for much of the emerging and developing world.
The phenomenon of political decay warrants careful study.
Whilst political and economic development follow separate tracks, the latter is highly dependent on the former being a supportive and not destructive catalyst.
Want to read
July 27, 2017裴敏欣說：
我到哈佛大學時，他正好是65歲、66歲的時候，正值學術成就的頂峰時期，我對他最大的印象是，從個性來講，他生性非常低調，不太說話，是一個很靦腆的人。
我選他的第一門課，就是「比較政治學」，當時我所讀的第一本他著作的書是《變遷中社會的政治秩序》 （Political Order In Changing Society, 1968），我一看，覺得這不得了，這是天才的書！那本書，可以說是改變我的學術軌跡，原本我應該是要學國際關係，但他的書中有許多比較政治分析、解釋、理論，特別是現代化國家的政治穩定、政治變革，他的見解是天才性的，讓我十分佩服，使我感到學比較政治更有意思。
但他是說一個國家最主要的是「政治秩序」，政治秩序的來源是一個「強而有力的政府」，但怎麼形成強而有力政府？許多人解讀成，發展中國家實行威權主義，能夠提供一個強而有力的政府。但他其實並沒有給一個清楚的答案。
杭廷頓教授做學問的方式最大的影響是兩點：第一點，是找到重要的問題。學術可研究的問題很多，但大部份問題都是不重要的。像杭廷頓教授，他選的題都是最重要的，而且他有前瞻性，許多十年之後成為很重要的問題，十年之前他都看到了，這個特質是沒人可比的，他是天才。
第二點，是他根據事實說話，你如果要研究某個問題，你必須要有足夠的證據，這是他對許多學生的影響，他為學生樹了很好的學風。
我到哈佛大學時，他正好是65歲、66歲的時候，正值學術成就的頂峰時期，我對他最大的印象是，從個性來講，他生性非常低調，不太說話，是一個很靦腆的人。
我選他的第一門課，就是「比較政治學」，當時我所讀的第一本他著作的書是《變遷中社會的政治秩序》 （Political Order In Changing Society, 1968），我一看，覺得這不得了，這是天才的書！那本書，可以說是改變我的學術軌跡，原本我應該是要學國際關係，但他的書中有許多比較政治分析、解釋、理論，特別是現代化國家的政治穩定、政治變革，他的見解是天才性的，讓我十分佩服，使我感到學比較政治更有意思。
但他是說一個國家最主要的是「政治秩序」，政治秩序的來源是一個「強而有力的政府」，但怎麼形成強而有力政府？許多人解讀成，發展中國家實行威權主義，能夠提供一個強而有力的政府。但他其實並沒有給一個清楚的答案。
杭廷頓教授做學問的方式最大的影響是兩點：第一點，是找到重要的問題。學術可研究的問題很多，但大部份問題都是不重要的。像杭廷頓教授，他選的題都是最重要的，而且他有前瞻性，許多十年之後成為很重要的問題，十年之前他都看到了，這個特質是沒人可比的，他是天才。
第二點，是他根據事實說話，你如果要研究某個問題，你必須要有足夠的證據，這是他對許多學生的影響，他為學生樹了很好的學風。
April 22, 2019
Entstanden in den späten 1960ern beschreibt das Buch unter welchen Voraussetzungen es zu stabilen oder instabilen Gesellschaften kommt. Huntington geht dabei auf geschichtliche Ausgangssituationen und die Aktionsmöglichkeiten der verschiedenen Gesellschaftsgruppen und -schichten. Gut gelungen finde ich die häufigen Einschübe zu politischen Systemen.
December 14, 2019
از این کتاب چیزهای زیادی یاد میگیرید. البته نباید فراموش کرد که نگاهی در تحلیل مسایل دیپلماتیک داریم بنام نگاه هانتینگتونی! که در ایران هم رواج داره. یعنی آنچه در این کتاب میخوانید برگرفته از رویکرد خاص شخص هانتینگتون و روش تحلیل این فرد است که قدرت تاثیرگذاری زیادی بر مخاطب داره.
May 6, 2017
كتاب مهم جدا للمهتمين بالانظمة السياسية في المجتمات غير المتطورة مثل الدول العربية سواء الانظمة العسكرية او الملكية
December 10, 2021
من الكتب الشيقة والمفيدة التي لايمل الشخص من قراءتها في كل مرة.
كتاب فيه شرح للتحولات التي تحدث داخل الانظمة السياسية وعمليات التحديث والعصرنة التي تتم فيها.
كتاب فيه شرح للتحولات التي تحدث داخل الانظمة السياسية وعمليات التحديث والعصرنة التي تتم فيها.
June 23, 2023
Magnum Opus.. Without a doubt..
On the aspect of how to modernize a state
On the aspect of how to modernize a state
March 26, 2023
"Political Order in Changing Societies" is a book written by Samuel Huntington, an influential political scientist and professor at Harvard University. The book was first published in 1968 and focuses on the challenges of creating and maintaining stable political institutions in societies undergoing rapid social and economic change.
Huntington argues that in societies undergoing rapid change, there is often a breakdown of traditional forms of political authority, as well as a loss of trust in existing institutions. This can lead to social unrest, political instability, and even violence. Huntington proposes that the key to establishing and maintaining political order in these contexts is the development of effective political institutions that can manage competing interests and mediate conflicts.
The book offers a comparative analysis of political development in a range of different countries and regions, including Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Huntington argues that while each society faces its own unique set of challenges, there are certain universal principles and strategies that can be applied to promote political order and stability.
"Political Order in Changing Societies" has had a significant impact on the fields of political science and international relations. Its focus on the importance of effective political institutions and the challenges of political development in rapidly changing societies has influenced the work of many scholars and policymakers.
GPT
Huntington argues that in societies undergoing rapid change, there is often a breakdown of traditional forms of political authority, as well as a loss of trust in existing institutions. This can lead to social unrest, political instability, and even violence. Huntington proposes that the key to establishing and maintaining political order in these contexts is the development of effective political institutions that can manage competing interests and mediate conflicts.
The book offers a comparative analysis of political development in a range of different countries and regions, including Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Huntington argues that while each society faces its own unique set of challenges, there are certain universal principles and strategies that can be applied to promote political order and stability.
"Political Order in Changing Societies" has had a significant impact on the fields of political science and international relations. Its focus on the importance of effective political institutions and the challenges of political development in rapidly changing societies has influenced the work of many scholars and policymakers.
GPT
May 29, 2021
Huntington is most likely the best in his field and this book is a proof of that: through a clear and specific (but still not too difficult) analysis of the role of institutions and men in the society, he manages to make a perfect synthesis of what has happened and a convincing forecast of what will happen. A wonderful book in my honest opinion (and Fukyama's preface is another point in favor) .
July 11, 2013
I'll have to re-read this at some point, but Huntington makes an excellent case regarding the need for political consolidation and stability through a balance of social forces, a balance of modernization across multiple areas (education, industry, technology, political participation), balance between urban and rural areas, and a balanced perspective regarding democracy itself (nominal democracy is not of necessity either stable or true democracy). He also points to the peculiarities of the US form of democracy in a striking way, particularly the unique context within which the US democratic system formed.
January 27, 2016
Huntington looks at the major divisions in the world, and instead of seeing the main divide as being between capitalist and communist states, he sees states able to maintain stability and order and those that cannot. He concludes that this is to to a lack of political order and institutions, and asserts that modernization and development must be separated as concepts. Rather than modernization leading to development as many assert, he instead sees modernization as an inherently conflictual process.
June 20, 2014
A great book. Probably one of the best regarding developmental economics and politics. It is dense to read, but provides a great understanding of how institutions form in a developing country.
Seems like 5 books all wrapped up into one. It is not often that a book written in the 60's is still so relevant in today's world.
Seems like 5 books all wrapped up into one. It is not often that a book written in the 60's is still so relevant in today's world.
October 27, 2015
Genius. I haven't decided yet whether it's force-for-good genius or evil genius (probably it could be -- and has been -- either or both, depending on whose hands it falls into), but what an elegant and eye-opening read this was. Chapter 2, about "Tudor America", is alone worth buying the book, and could almost be a separate book unto itself.
December 26, 2011
This book had inspired many dictators like Suharto in building a militaristic state and was the beginning of Indonesians long-lasting suffer. Judging from the historical influence it made, this book should be read by everyone concerns toward the future of our world.
July 7, 2015
Well written and while not the easiest to understand it brought forth many interesting ideas and perspectives. Politics aren't my thing and I definitely would not have read if not for class but I would still recommend it to any Poli sci student.
September 12, 2007
Controversial and a bit dated (no, the USSR is not an example of a stable communist state), but provocative and worth a read.
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