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How Much Is Enough? Money and the Good Life
A provocative and timely call for a moral approach to economics, drawing on philosophers, political theorists, writers, and economists from Aristotle to Marx to Keynes.
What constitutes the good life? What is the true value of money? Why do we work such long hours merely to acquire greater wealth? These are some of the questions that many asked themselves when the financial system crashed in 2008. This book tackles such questions head-on.
The authors begin with the great economist John Maynard Keynes. In 1930 Keynes predicted that, within a century, per capita income would steadily rise, people’s basic needs would be met, and no one would have to work more than fifteen hours a week. Clearly, he was wrong: though income has increased as he envisioned, our wants have seemingly gone unsatisfied, and we continue to work long hours.
The Skidelskys explain why Keynes was mistaken. Then, arguing from the premise that economics is a moral science, they trace the concept of the good life from Aristotle to the present and show how our lives over the last half century have strayed from that ideal. Finally, they issue a call to think anew about what really matters in our lives and how to attain it.
How Much Is Enough? is that rarity, a work of deep intelligence and ethical commitment accessible to all readers. It will be lauded, debated, cited, and criticized. It will not be ignored.
What constitutes the good life? What is the true value of money? Why do we work such long hours merely to acquire greater wealth? These are some of the questions that many asked themselves when the financial system crashed in 2008. This book tackles such questions head-on.
The authors begin with the great economist John Maynard Keynes. In 1930 Keynes predicted that, within a century, per capita income would steadily rise, people’s basic needs would be met, and no one would have to work more than fifteen hours a week. Clearly, he was wrong: though income has increased as he envisioned, our wants have seemingly gone unsatisfied, and we continue to work long hours.
The Skidelskys explain why Keynes was mistaken. Then, arguing from the premise that economics is a moral science, they trace the concept of the good life from Aristotle to the present and show how our lives over the last half century have strayed from that ideal. Finally, they issue a call to think anew about what really matters in our lives and how to attain it.
How Much Is Enough? is that rarity, a work of deep intelligence and ethical commitment accessible to all readers. It will be lauded, debated, cited, and criticized. It will not be ignored.
218 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2012
266 people are currently reading
3424 people want to read
About the author
Robert Skidelsky
67 books131 followersLord Skidelsky is Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at the University of Warwick. His three volume biography of the economist John Maynard Keynes (1983, 1992, 2000) received numerous prizes, including the Lionel Gelber Prize for International Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations Prize for International Relations. He is the author of the The World After Communism (1995) (American edition called The Road from Serfdom). He was made a life peer in 1991, and was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 1994. He is chairman of the Govenors of Brighton College
Robert Skidelsky was born on 25 April 1939 in Harbin, Manchuria. His parents were British subjects, but of Russian ancestry. His father worked for the family firm, L. S. Skidelsky, which leased the Mulin coalmine from the Chinese government. When war broke out between Britain and Japan in December 1941, he and his parents were interned first in Manchuria then Japan, but released in exchange for Japanese internees in England.
From 1953 to 1958, he was a boarder at Brighton College (of which he is now chairman of the board of governors). He went on to read history at Jesus College, Oxford, and from 1961 to 1969, he was successively research student, senior student, and research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. In 1967, he published his first book, Politicians and the Slump, Labour Government of 1929-31, based on his D.Phil dissertation. The book explores the ways in which British politicians handled the Great Depression.
During a two year research fellowship at the British Academy, he began work in his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley (published in 1975) and published English Progressive Schools (1969). In 1970, he became an Associate Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University. But the controversy surrounding the publication of his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley - in which he was felt to have let Mosley off too lightly - led John Hopkins University to refuse him tenure. Oxford University also proved unwilling to give him a permanent post.
In 1978, he was appointed Professor of International Studies at the University of Warwick, where he has since remained, though joining the Economics Department as Professor Political Economy in 1990. He is currently Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University.
The first volume of his biography of John Maynard Keynes, Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920, was published in 1983. The second volume, The Economist as Saviour, 1920-1937 (1992) won the Wolfson Prize for History. The third volume, Fighting for Britain, 1937-1946 (2000) won the Duff Cooper Prize, the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for Biography, the Lionel Gelber Prize for International Relations and the Arthur Ross Council on Foreign Relations Prize for International Relations.
Since 2003, he has been a non-executive director of the mutual fund manager, Janus Capital and Rusnano Capital; from 2008-10 he sat on the board of Sistema JSC. He is a director of the Moscow School of Political Studies and was the founder and executive secretary of the UK/Russia Round Table. Since 2002, he has been chairman of the Centre for Global Studies. In 2010, he joined the Advisory Board of the Institute of New Economic Thinking.
He writes a monthly column for Project Syndicate, "Against the Current", which is syndicated in newspapers all over the world. His account of the current economic crisis, Keynes: The Return of the Master, was published by Penguin Allen Lane in September 2009. A short history of twentieth-century Britain was published by Random House in the volume A World by Itself: A History of the British Isles edited by Jonathan Clark in January 2010. He is now in the process of writing How Much is Enough? The Economics of the Good Life jointly with his son Edward Skidelsky.
Robert Skidelsky was born on 25 April 1939 in Harbin, Manchuria. His parents were British subjects, but of Russian ancestry. His father worked for the family firm, L. S. Skidelsky, which leased the Mulin coalmine from the Chinese government. When war broke out between Britain and Japan in December 1941, he and his parents were interned first in Manchuria then Japan, but released in exchange for Japanese internees in England.
From 1953 to 1958, he was a boarder at Brighton College (of which he is now chairman of the board of governors). He went on to read history at Jesus College, Oxford, and from 1961 to 1969, he was successively research student, senior student, and research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. In 1967, he published his first book, Politicians and the Slump, Labour Government of 1929-31, based on his D.Phil dissertation. The book explores the ways in which British politicians handled the Great Depression.
During a two year research fellowship at the British Academy, he began work in his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley (published in 1975) and published English Progressive Schools (1969). In 1970, he became an Associate Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University. But the controversy surrounding the publication of his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley - in which he was felt to have let Mosley off too lightly - led John Hopkins University to refuse him tenure. Oxford University also proved unwilling to give him a permanent post.
In 1978, he was appointed Professor of International Studies at the University of Warwick, where he has since remained, though joining the Economics Department as Professor Political Economy in 1990. He is currently Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University.
The first volume of his biography of John Maynard Keynes, Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920, was published in 1983. The second volume, The Economist as Saviour, 1920-1937 (1992) won the Wolfson Prize for History. The third volume, Fighting for Britain, 1937-1946 (2000) won the Duff Cooper Prize, the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for Biography, the Lionel Gelber Prize for International Relations and the Arthur Ross Council on Foreign Relations Prize for International Relations.
Since 2003, he has been a non-executive director of the mutual fund manager, Janus Capital and Rusnano Capital; from 2008-10 he sat on the board of Sistema JSC. He is a director of the Moscow School of Political Studies and was the founder and executive secretary of the UK/Russia Round Table. Since 2002, he has been chairman of the Centre for Global Studies. In 2010, he joined the Advisory Board of the Institute of New Economic Thinking.
He writes a monthly column for Project Syndicate, "Against the Current", which is syndicated in newspapers all over the world. His account of the current economic crisis, Keynes: The Return of the Master, was published by Penguin Allen Lane in September 2009. A short history of twentieth-century Britain was published by Random House in the volume A World by Itself: A History of the British Isles edited by Jonathan Clark in January 2010. He is now in the process of writing How Much is Enough? The Economics of the Good Life jointly with his son Edward Skidelsky.
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November 30, 2016
The Skidelsky brothers have written a succinct book arguing that neoliberal economic ideology is failing the developed world. They suggest replacing the imperatives of economic growth and productive efficiency with an ethic of the ‘good life’, cobbled together from the democratic socialism of the mid-20th century, older philosophical works, and Catholic teachings. Although I’ve read other books with very similar central themes (notably Growth Fetish and I Spend Therefore I Am: How Economics Has Changed the Way We Think and Feel), this one has a distinctive voice. Unfortunately, that voice can sometimes seem a little, how can I put this, supercilious. The authors have strongly academic backgrounds, yet this book is clearly intended for a wider audience. Whilst it is certainly readable and avoids ostensible obscurantism (looking at you, Žižek), the tone does sometimes come off as patronising. This is a pity, as it’s a carefully-argued and thought-provoking work, for the most part.
The central point is one that needs constant reiteration until it becomes better understood: that the neutral neoliberal state is a myth. As the book puts it, 'A neutral state state simply hands power to the guardians of capital to manipulate public taste in their interests'. Moreover, economics is not a miraculously neutral discipline, objectively studying human behaviour. As the brothers put it:
It has not always been the case that public policy research uses econometric methods; today those are virtually the only methods used. Economics has taken over the social sciences, as well as politics. This book gives an interesting account of how this conquest occurred, as part of the wider explanation of why the rich world has so much less leisure than Keynes predicted back in 1930. To be honest, though, the arguments about moving beyond economic growth and considering wider wellbeing weren’t new to me, nor did I need to be convinced of them. They are well expressed here, with the caveat regarding tone that I mentioned earlier. The novel chapters to me were those dismissing two other popular justifications for challenging neoliberal economic ideology: on the basis of happiness and of environmental limits. The former makes some excellent points about the nature of happiness and the great difficulty of measuring it. Whilst these criticisms sometimes seemed to overstate the incompatibility of happiness measurement with the book’s good life ethic, the central points were solid.
The other chapter, on environmental limits, was considerably weaker. The Skidelsky brothers essentially dismiss climate change as a pretext for reconsidering the imperative of economic growth. I cannot agree with their stance, that the seriousness of climate change has been overstated, as it rest on misunderstandings of uncertainty and risk. They argue that the range of potential climate scenarios is wide and disputed and climate science is ‘politicised’. (How it could possibly avoid being so, given its monumental implications, they do not contemplate.) Essentially, without greater certainty about the costs of climate change, the authors don’t think action is justified. I am frankly horrified by this interpretation, which is substantially shared by the discipline of economics. Such thinking ignores, firstly, that the range of potential climate outcomes does not have a normal distribution but a ‘long tail’. This implies a much greater than zero probability of near-infinite costs (in other words, the end of human civilisation). Cost-benefit analysis and other econometrics cope poorly with such a probability distribution. Secondly, the risks of climate change aren’t linear but multiplicative. An unstable climate is a risk multiplier, increasing the likelihood of violent conflict and political instability as well as making disaster response more difficult. This is on top of the more readily understood direct consequences, such as greater likelihood of droughts, floods, and storms. Thirdly, climate change is irreversible on human timescales. Carbon dioxide pumped into the atmosphere now will stay there for around 10,000 years. Coupled with the existence of serious threshold effects, caution appears warranted. Fourthly, it is too easy to be dismissive of climate change in the developed world. It is a problem created by the rich and suffered by the poor, on a global scale. The developing world is already experiencing the effects of climate change. Low income equatorial countries will see the greatest loss of productive agricultural land; coastal cities without the funds for flood defense will suffer most from sea level rise. Fifthly and finally, pleading uncertainty about climate change costs is intellectually lazy. In what other context would risks of such scale require endless niggling over costs? Consider the amount spent annually on nuclear weaponry in the developed world. What is that a defense against, exactly? Those unwilling to sacrifice economic growth to climate change should be able to acknowledge path dependence in their thinking - emissions mitigation seems difficult because it goes against the fossil fuel dependence that has become comfortably familiar in the past few centuries. That does not mean such action isn’t justifiable, merely that it requires more imaginative effort to grasp the practical implications of climate science findings. Climate change is existentially terrifying, which is all the more reason not to disregard or trivialise it in an endless argument over the exact economic optimality of the response.
Subsequent chapters explore what the ‘good life’ requires and how its pursuit could be encouraged. This was clearly explained in terms of ‘basic goods’: health, security, respect, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure. Such terminology causes slight cognitive dissonance to those accustomed to economics, as in that world goods equal that which is bought and sold. Here, by contrast, ‘The basic goods are essentially non-marketable: they cannot properly be bought or sold. An economy geared to maximising market value will tend to crowd them out or to replace them with marketable surrogates.’ The conclusion then states firmly that promoting these basic goods should not be dismissed as paternalism (basically every new policy has to refute this tired accusation nowadays), reiterating the critical point about mythical neutrality.
I am torn when picking a rating for this book. It was for the most part thoughtful and interesting, albeit a reiteration of material I’d largely read before with a slightly new emphasis. I liked the concept of basic goods, though, and found the critique of happiness accounting valid. On the other hand, the dismissal of environmental considerations in general and climate change in particular is hard to excuse. I’d still recommend 'How Much is Enough?' but in combination with something else that gives climate change its due. The Skidelsky brothers' conclusions are certainly consistent with books on tackling climate change, such as Whole Earth Discipline: An Ecopragmatist Manifesto, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability, Heat: How to Stop the Planet From Burning, and The World We Made: Alex McKay's Story from 2050.
The central point is one that needs constant reiteration until it becomes better understood: that the neutral neoliberal state is a myth. As the book puts it, 'A neutral state state simply hands power to the guardians of capital to manipulate public taste in their interests'. Moreover, economics is not a miraculously neutral discipline, objectively studying human behaviour. As the brothers put it:
Economics is not just any academic discipline. It is the theology of our age, the language that all interests, high and low, must speak if they are to win a respectful hearing in the courts of power. Economics owes its special position in part to the failure of other disciplines to impress their stamp on political debate.
It has not always been the case that public policy research uses econometric methods; today those are virtually the only methods used. Economics has taken over the social sciences, as well as politics. This book gives an interesting account of how this conquest occurred, as part of the wider explanation of why the rich world has so much less leisure than Keynes predicted back in 1930. To be honest, though, the arguments about moving beyond economic growth and considering wider wellbeing weren’t new to me, nor did I need to be convinced of them. They are well expressed here, with the caveat regarding tone that I mentioned earlier. The novel chapters to me were those dismissing two other popular justifications for challenging neoliberal economic ideology: on the basis of happiness and of environmental limits. The former makes some excellent points about the nature of happiness and the great difficulty of measuring it. Whilst these criticisms sometimes seemed to overstate the incompatibility of happiness measurement with the book’s good life ethic, the central points were solid.
The other chapter, on environmental limits, was considerably weaker. The Skidelsky brothers essentially dismiss climate change as a pretext for reconsidering the imperative of economic growth. I cannot agree with their stance, that the seriousness of climate change has been overstated, as it rest on misunderstandings of uncertainty and risk. They argue that the range of potential climate scenarios is wide and disputed and climate science is ‘politicised’. (How it could possibly avoid being so, given its monumental implications, they do not contemplate.) Essentially, without greater certainty about the costs of climate change, the authors don’t think action is justified. I am frankly horrified by this interpretation, which is substantially shared by the discipline of economics. Such thinking ignores, firstly, that the range of potential climate outcomes does not have a normal distribution but a ‘long tail’. This implies a much greater than zero probability of near-infinite costs (in other words, the end of human civilisation). Cost-benefit analysis and other econometrics cope poorly with such a probability distribution. Secondly, the risks of climate change aren’t linear but multiplicative. An unstable climate is a risk multiplier, increasing the likelihood of violent conflict and political instability as well as making disaster response more difficult. This is on top of the more readily understood direct consequences, such as greater likelihood of droughts, floods, and storms. Thirdly, climate change is irreversible on human timescales. Carbon dioxide pumped into the atmosphere now will stay there for around 10,000 years. Coupled with the existence of serious threshold effects, caution appears warranted. Fourthly, it is too easy to be dismissive of climate change in the developed world. It is a problem created by the rich and suffered by the poor, on a global scale. The developing world is already experiencing the effects of climate change. Low income equatorial countries will see the greatest loss of productive agricultural land; coastal cities without the funds for flood defense will suffer most from sea level rise. Fifthly and finally, pleading uncertainty about climate change costs is intellectually lazy. In what other context would risks of such scale require endless niggling over costs? Consider the amount spent annually on nuclear weaponry in the developed world. What is that a defense against, exactly? Those unwilling to sacrifice economic growth to climate change should be able to acknowledge path dependence in their thinking - emissions mitigation seems difficult because it goes against the fossil fuel dependence that has become comfortably familiar in the past few centuries. That does not mean such action isn’t justifiable, merely that it requires more imaginative effort to grasp the practical implications of climate science findings. Climate change is existentially terrifying, which is all the more reason not to disregard or trivialise it in an endless argument over the exact economic optimality of the response.
Subsequent chapters explore what the ‘good life’ requires and how its pursuit could be encouraged. This was clearly explained in terms of ‘basic goods’: health, security, respect, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure. Such terminology causes slight cognitive dissonance to those accustomed to economics, as in that world goods equal that which is bought and sold. Here, by contrast, ‘The basic goods are essentially non-marketable: they cannot properly be bought or sold. An economy geared to maximising market value will tend to crowd them out or to replace them with marketable surrogates.’ The conclusion then states firmly that promoting these basic goods should not be dismissed as paternalism (basically every new policy has to refute this tired accusation nowadays), reiterating the critical point about mythical neutrality.
I am torn when picking a rating for this book. It was for the most part thoughtful and interesting, albeit a reiteration of material I’d largely read before with a slightly new emphasis. I liked the concept of basic goods, though, and found the critique of happiness accounting valid. On the other hand, the dismissal of environmental considerations in general and climate change in particular is hard to excuse. I’d still recommend 'How Much is Enough?' but in combination with something else that gives climate change its due. The Skidelsky brothers' conclusions are certainly consistent with books on tackling climate change, such as Whole Earth Discipline: An Ecopragmatist Manifesto, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability, Heat: How to Stop the Planet From Burning, and The World We Made: Alex McKay's Story from 2050.
December 29, 2013
Overall, I found Skidelsky & Skidelsky's "How Much is Enough" to be an intellectually stimulating, engaging, and well-reasoned book. I think their call for a more moral understanding of economics is sorely needed, especially in an age when liberals and progressives all too often justify their recommended redistributive policies only on technocratic grounds like "increased productivity." My main gripe with the book, however, lies with the chapter on "Limits to Growth." I agree with them on the moral case against limitless growth and agree with their prescriptions, but I think they argue against a straw man version of the environmental movement for much of the chapter. They acknowledge their complete lack of expertise in climate science but then proceed to speak very dismissively--with sweeping, unsubstantiated claims--of climate scientists and environmental activists for much of the first half of the chapter. When they lament the non-existence of a theme of "living in harmony with nature" in environmentalist literature, I began to wonder if they had even read any. Their idea of "good life environmentalism" is a quite common theme in environmentalist circles, especially those in the "new economy" circle.
June 2, 2020
I really had to put effort to complete the book. First of all there are lots of assumptions in the book. As a result I was bit frustrated about it. More so there is lot of philosophical discussions rather than hard facts or figures which should be the key component in any economic analysis. Also the way authors dealt with environmentalism debate was unfortunate. I mean there can be instances where one might not agree with the method or factor used. But to completely discard the seriousness around catastrophic effects of climate change was disheartening. ( probably authors would change their mind after 2020).
August 25, 2012
I've written a short review for CHOICE. Here I'll make some more specific comments.
I expected, from comments I've read, a very poor argument for a wishy-washy romantic argument about the end of scarcity. Robert Skidelsky is the biographer of J. Maynard Keynes, who famously thought that the prospects for his grandchildren would be a world without scarcity. (Just this morning I realized that Frank Knight made a quite similar argument in the final chapter of The Economic Organization.) While there is some of that here, the Skidelskys are focused more on the argument for why we should become less consumption focused than they are on some version of the end of scarcity.
Unfortunately, they are more concerned about mustering as many different arguments for the reduction of consumption than they are in providing a single consistent approach. In part, this results from their demand for, but lack of, a clear basis for why reducing consumption is part of human flourishing. As well, because they assume that rich nations have reached the point at which consumption could be reduced, they do not provide a lot of help for those who are increasing consumption elsewhere in the world. To their credit, they don't argue that others should not pursue what the West has gained, but they don't go too are toward any creditable arguments that would help those in the rest of the world to know what to do.
There is a nice chapter on the problems with the literature on happiness. Deirdre McCloskey's arguments are better, but the Skidelsky's have the general arguments down. For McCloskey, see Happyness in The New Republic.
After all the rhetoric, however, they get down to basics in the last several chapters. Their seven elements of a good life (basic goods) are: health, security, respect, personality (what they mean here is probably Kantian autonomy), harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure (by which they mean doing something for its own sake). The policies designed to provide these basic goods would be (surprise, surprise: not so radical as you thought, are they!): a basic income, an expenditure tax base rather than an income tax base, and constraints on advertising. As well, they expect we need to draw back from further globalization; economic integration, they argue, only contributes to human flourishing when the playing field is level.
On basic incomes, they are more inclined to support demographic capital endowments rather than a guaranteed annual income. There argument for expenditure-based taxes is straightforward Kaldor, which is hardly surprising! The one place they seem to verge into romanticizing policy is in constraints on advertising. About the most they can promote is bunching ads so people can avoid them, and disallowing advertising as a tax-deductible expense.
So on the whole, the book could be used as a good starting point for a conversation about economics and ethics. Those inclined to refer to Catholic social teaching could use the book as a conversation starter, because they make frequent reference to the social encyclicals. In general, I'm dissatisfied with the arguments which support their conclusions, but could also support basic incomes (with no additions for specific groups) and expenditure based taxes (preferably flat rate).
But one could do much better, especially by reading McCloskey's Bourgeois Virtues!
I expected, from comments I've read, a very poor argument for a wishy-washy romantic argument about the end of scarcity. Robert Skidelsky is the biographer of J. Maynard Keynes, who famously thought that the prospects for his grandchildren would be a world without scarcity. (Just this morning I realized that Frank Knight made a quite similar argument in the final chapter of The Economic Organization.) While there is some of that here, the Skidelskys are focused more on the argument for why we should become less consumption focused than they are on some version of the end of scarcity.
Unfortunately, they are more concerned about mustering as many different arguments for the reduction of consumption than they are in providing a single consistent approach. In part, this results from their demand for, but lack of, a clear basis for why reducing consumption is part of human flourishing. As well, because they assume that rich nations have reached the point at which consumption could be reduced, they do not provide a lot of help for those who are increasing consumption elsewhere in the world. To their credit, they don't argue that others should not pursue what the West has gained, but they don't go too are toward any creditable arguments that would help those in the rest of the world to know what to do.
There is a nice chapter on the problems with the literature on happiness. Deirdre McCloskey's arguments are better, but the Skidelsky's have the general arguments down. For McCloskey, see Happyness in The New Republic.
After all the rhetoric, however, they get down to basics in the last several chapters. Their seven elements of a good life (basic goods) are: health, security, respect, personality (what they mean here is probably Kantian autonomy), harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure (by which they mean doing something for its own sake). The policies designed to provide these basic goods would be (surprise, surprise: not so radical as you thought, are they!): a basic income, an expenditure tax base rather than an income tax base, and constraints on advertising. As well, they expect we need to draw back from further globalization; economic integration, they argue, only contributes to human flourishing when the playing field is level.
On basic incomes, they are more inclined to support demographic capital endowments rather than a guaranteed annual income. There argument for expenditure-based taxes is straightforward Kaldor, which is hardly surprising! The one place they seem to verge into romanticizing policy is in constraints on advertising. About the most they can promote is bunching ads so people can avoid them, and disallowing advertising as a tax-deductible expense.
So on the whole, the book could be used as a good starting point for a conversation about economics and ethics. Those inclined to refer to Catholic social teaching could use the book as a conversation starter, because they make frequent reference to the social encyclicals. In general, I'm dissatisfied with the arguments which support their conclusions, but could also support basic incomes (with no additions for specific groups) and expenditure based taxes (preferably flat rate).
But one could do much better, especially by reading McCloskey's Bourgeois Virtues!
January 23, 2015
One-Minute Review
Written by Robert and Edward Skidelsky, How Much is Enough? is my favourite book of the year, and my only five-star rating on Goodreads in 2012. The authors have crafted a philosophical discussion about our insatiable appetites for economic growth, which so far have ignored a key question: "To what end?" As students of John Maynard Keynes, the Skidelskys are all for economic growth through capitalism, but as a means not an end and certainly not at any social and environmental cost. I loved this book because it was decidedly apartisan, intellectually robust, and tackled a truly big idea – the quality of life – instead of the utilitarian so-called big ideas that dominate political discourse. It courageously proposes objective definitions to the ancient notion of the good life rather than subscribing to relativist solutions that please everyone but accomplish little. To be most admired is the way that the Skidelskys stand in the forum as public intellectuals, a role that today too often remains unfilled. Whether or not you agree with How Much is Enough?, you will relish the meaty debate the book hopes to inspire, and wish for more authors who contribute to rigorous examination of great ideas.
On Twitter: @Dr_A_Taubman
Written by Robert and Edward Skidelsky, How Much is Enough? is my favourite book of the year, and my only five-star rating on Goodreads in 2012. The authors have crafted a philosophical discussion about our insatiable appetites for economic growth, which so far have ignored a key question: "To what end?" As students of John Maynard Keynes, the Skidelskys are all for economic growth through capitalism, but as a means not an end and certainly not at any social and environmental cost. I loved this book because it was decidedly apartisan, intellectually robust, and tackled a truly big idea – the quality of life – instead of the utilitarian so-called big ideas that dominate political discourse. It courageously proposes objective definitions to the ancient notion of the good life rather than subscribing to relativist solutions that please everyone but accomplish little. To be most admired is the way that the Skidelskys stand in the forum as public intellectuals, a role that today too often remains unfilled. Whether or not you agree with How Much is Enough?, you will relish the meaty debate the book hopes to inspire, and wish for more authors who contribute to rigorous examination of great ideas.
On Twitter: @Dr_A_Taubman
December 1, 2014
Pretty uneven, and not particularly useful.
It offered an interesting history of the evolution of thought behind the accumulation of wealth, or, why we collectively decided to continue to pursue more and more money and stuff instead of choosing leisure as an alternative.
But what was missing (for me, anyway) was any semblance of explanation of how to get to the life they propose. If we decide to collectively exchange wealth for more leisure, what would the economy look like? Would it still be capable of supporting the number of people it does today? It didn't say.
Plus, sticking out like a sore thumb in the middle of the book was an awkward diatribe against Climate Change Alarmists. Not that the authors deny anthropomorphic climate change; they just think that it's obvious that we'll fix it with an (unidentified) technological solution when the problem becomes more severe. Because that's always what we've done in the past when faced with impending global catastrophe.
It offered an interesting history of the evolution of thought behind the accumulation of wealth, or, why we collectively decided to continue to pursue more and more money and stuff instead of choosing leisure as an alternative.
But what was missing (for me, anyway) was any semblance of explanation of how to get to the life they propose. If we decide to collectively exchange wealth for more leisure, what would the economy look like? Would it still be capable of supporting the number of people it does today? It didn't say.
Plus, sticking out like a sore thumb in the middle of the book was an awkward diatribe against Climate Change Alarmists. Not that the authors deny anthropomorphic climate change; they just think that it's obvious that we'll fix it with an (unidentified) technological solution when the problem becomes more severe. Because that's always what we've done in the past when faced with impending global catastrophe.
March 9, 2017
This is a quirky, uneven book, but with enough good ideas to make it worth reading. What I liked was their exploration of why Keynes and everyone else who thought that abundance would bring a decline of work, have failed. I also liked their discussion of the basic income, which they recommend. Also good was the discussion of how we can really assess economies, if GDP is bankrupt and so is “happiness economics.” Their suggestion is by looking at basic goods such as health, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure.
What I didn’t like was their chapter on limits to growth. There are no limits to growth, except moral limits, they say. Climate change is real, but we can still (according to the authors) have economic growth and deal with climate change, and they also dismiss other portents of limits to growth. They also badly misquote The Limits to Growth and repeat false statements about it: “The 1972 bestseller Limits to Growth predicted that world population would hit 7 billion by the end of the twentieth century, leading to shortages of grain, oil, gas, copper, aluminium and gold.” The footnote cites The Limits to Growth, pages 45–87. Nothing like this appears in The Limits to Growth, even as a possible projection, as you can verify for yourself. I doubt the authors actually read this book. There are other problems with this chapter, but their treatment isn’t serious enough to deserve refutation. They need to get with the program and acknowledge that limits to growth are both real and dangerous.
What I didn’t like was their chapter on limits to growth. There are no limits to growth, except moral limits, they say. Climate change is real, but we can still (according to the authors) have economic growth and deal with climate change, and they also dismiss other portents of limits to growth. They also badly misquote The Limits to Growth and repeat false statements about it: “The 1972 bestseller Limits to Growth predicted that world population would hit 7 billion by the end of the twentieth century, leading to shortages of grain, oil, gas, copper, aluminium and gold.” The footnote cites The Limits to Growth, pages 45–87. Nothing like this appears in The Limits to Growth, even as a possible projection, as you can verify for yourself. I doubt the authors actually read this book. There are other problems with this chapter, but their treatment isn’t serious enough to deserve refutation. They need to get with the program and acknowledge that limits to growth are both real and dangerous.
March 17, 2017
I didn’t find this book particularly useful. There seemed to be an awful lot of generalised truisms thrown about without much in the way of evidence or examination.
It characterised the affluent West as one homogenised wealthy mass enslaved by its constant consumption and that the path to freedom opens up if we could only stop buying rubbish. Which is presumably true of many but for the vast swathes of “JAMs” (Just About Managing) it’s a little fanciful a thesis. The focus was on consumption with barely a mention mortgages or ever increasing house prices which is surely the biggest impediment to the good life the authors talk about.
There’s also a weird polemical rant half way through against the green movement which reads like the authors have been personally offended by someone waving a Save the Planet placard at them. I did value their point about the modern concept of leisure as passive and consumptive experience, though, reframing leisure in terms of active and creative pastimes. Like writing grumpy book reviews, for example.
It characterised the affluent West as one homogenised wealthy mass enslaved by its constant consumption and that the path to freedom opens up if we could only stop buying rubbish. Which is presumably true of many but for the vast swathes of “JAMs” (Just About Managing) it’s a little fanciful a thesis. The focus was on consumption with barely a mention mortgages or ever increasing house prices which is surely the biggest impediment to the good life the authors talk about.
There’s also a weird polemical rant half way through against the green movement which reads like the authors have been personally offended by someone waving a Save the Planet placard at them. I did value their point about the modern concept of leisure as passive and consumptive experience, though, reframing leisure in terms of active and creative pastimes. Like writing grumpy book reviews, for example.
June 8, 2018
REALLY GOOD—
This is a remarkable work of economics, history, and philosophy in one, easy to understand yet offering a refreshing and complex polemic against our money-grubbing-and-hoarding nature. The book came at the opportune moment for me, actually, when I have been thinking long and hard about wealth, greed, the good life, and leisure. It's refreshing and enlightening to follow Skidelskys' attempt at reviving the ancient notion of eudaimonia (which, they argue quite convincingly, is more objective than our puny notion of happiness, which is often reduced to a subjective state of pleasure, a buzz) and along with it "sufficiency" or "enoughness," as well as their distinctions (informed by ancient wisdom) between want and need, necessities and luxuries, use value and exchange value, and tolerance and neutrality (which is a concept derived from economic liberalism). Their argument that contemporary ethical discourse is dominated by utility and therefore ethical values must be smuggled in through the back door in the guise of utility is so spot on (and, looking back at my aversion to ethics classes in college, this is one of the main reasons why I was really not into the topic, though I couldn't articulate it then).
Totally recommended.
This is a remarkable work of economics, history, and philosophy in one, easy to understand yet offering a refreshing and complex polemic against our money-grubbing-and-hoarding nature. The book came at the opportune moment for me, actually, when I have been thinking long and hard about wealth, greed, the good life, and leisure. It's refreshing and enlightening to follow Skidelskys' attempt at reviving the ancient notion of eudaimonia (which, they argue quite convincingly, is more objective than our puny notion of happiness, which is often reduced to a subjective state of pleasure, a buzz) and along with it "sufficiency" or "enoughness," as well as their distinctions (informed by ancient wisdom) between want and need, necessities and luxuries, use value and exchange value, and tolerance and neutrality (which is a concept derived from economic liberalism). Their argument that contemporary ethical discourse is dominated by utility and therefore ethical values must be smuggled in through the back door in the guise of utility is so spot on (and, looking back at my aversion to ethics classes in college, this is one of the main reasons why I was really not into the topic, though I couldn't articulate it then).
Totally recommended.
January 12, 2014
I’m sympathetic to the main argument of the Skidelskys’ book: that the pursuit of money (and economic growth) for its own sake is not only socially and environmentally destructive but also absurd. Without any social consensus on what money is for, we settle for perpetually chasing more of it, assuming this will enable us to achieve our individual (and widely varying) notions of fulfillment. The means has become the end, and there is no longer a place for the concept of “enough”. The Skidelskys combine their backgrounds in economics and philosophy to look at how this state of affairs has come about, using an obscure essay by John Maynard Keynes as a trigger for the discussion (Robert Skidelsky is a noted scholar on the work of Keynes).
The most interesting part of the book, from my perspective, is the review in the first few chapters of how pre-modern concepts of “the good life” and strictures against avarice became dissociated from developments in economic thinking and marginalized from public discussion. They propose a number of goods that comprise “the good life”, based on conceptions of it found in different religions and wisdom traditions from around the world. Eventually, they arrive at policy recommendations that many would consider radical, including a guaranteed basic income, heavy restrictions on advertising, and a large-scale consumption tax among others.
I welcome the Skidelskys’ contribution to this important discussion, especially their effort to reconnect economic growth with social objectives. I agree with much of what they argue, but I find that often their characterization of opposing or merely different views is simplistic or unrepresentative. For instance, about environmentalists, who they seem to largely equate with “climate radicals”: “If current fears about global warming turn out to be baseless, climate radicals will not abandon their opposition to long-distance flying and four-by-fours; rather, they will find new arguments to justify their austerities.” This seems quite ungenerous. Additionally, I find the Skidelskys dangerously sanguine about the environmental costs of growth. They repeat mainstream economic rationales for the time discounting of adjustment costs, for example, even though this methodology is precisely what ecological economists have made strong arguments against. It seems strange to me that they believe an abstract idea about the good life is ultimately more compelling to incite change than evidence of environmental limits. They dislike arguments made in neutral, secular terms that avoid controversy over subjective differences.
Contentious views are revealed at other points as well, as when they imply that marriages are less stable now because of “sexual freedom”, or when they suggest that legal sanctions against gay marriage in other countries would not affect the capacity to achieve the good life. For a discussion of this scope, it is probably inevitable that some of the authors’ general views will clash with readers’.
The Skidelskys exhort Western intellectuals to be more “confident” in their non-coercive paternalistic prescriptions: personally, I find their response to post-modern critiques of “objective” standards to be only partially convincing. I agree with them that society needs to take a stand on what is enough and to support an idea of the good life, but I feel much more uncomfortable imposing my ideas of those things than it seems are the Skidelskys.
In the end, as the Skidelskys report that Keynes once said, “it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong”; I think the Skidelskys are roughly right.
The most interesting part of the book, from my perspective, is the review in the first few chapters of how pre-modern concepts of “the good life” and strictures against avarice became dissociated from developments in economic thinking and marginalized from public discussion. They propose a number of goods that comprise “the good life”, based on conceptions of it found in different religions and wisdom traditions from around the world. Eventually, they arrive at policy recommendations that many would consider radical, including a guaranteed basic income, heavy restrictions on advertising, and a large-scale consumption tax among others.
I welcome the Skidelskys’ contribution to this important discussion, especially their effort to reconnect economic growth with social objectives. I agree with much of what they argue, but I find that often their characterization of opposing or merely different views is simplistic or unrepresentative. For instance, about environmentalists, who they seem to largely equate with “climate radicals”: “If current fears about global warming turn out to be baseless, climate radicals will not abandon their opposition to long-distance flying and four-by-fours; rather, they will find new arguments to justify their austerities.” This seems quite ungenerous. Additionally, I find the Skidelskys dangerously sanguine about the environmental costs of growth. They repeat mainstream economic rationales for the time discounting of adjustment costs, for example, even though this methodology is precisely what ecological economists have made strong arguments against. It seems strange to me that they believe an abstract idea about the good life is ultimately more compelling to incite change than evidence of environmental limits. They dislike arguments made in neutral, secular terms that avoid controversy over subjective differences.
Contentious views are revealed at other points as well, as when they imply that marriages are less stable now because of “sexual freedom”, or when they suggest that legal sanctions against gay marriage in other countries would not affect the capacity to achieve the good life. For a discussion of this scope, it is probably inevitable that some of the authors’ general views will clash with readers’.
The Skidelskys exhort Western intellectuals to be more “confident” in their non-coercive paternalistic prescriptions: personally, I find their response to post-modern critiques of “objective” standards to be only partially convincing. I agree with them that society needs to take a stand on what is enough and to support an idea of the good life, but I feel much more uncomfortable imposing my ideas of those things than it seems are the Skidelskys.
In the end, as the Skidelskys report that Keynes once said, “it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong”; I think the Skidelskys are roughly right.
December 25, 2019
Keynes predicted that people would increase productivity and then work much less (i.e. 15 hour work weeks). Productivity outstripped his projections but although people do work a bit less now, the gain in time spent not working is not nearly as much as Keynes predicted. Why not?
There are many attempts to explain why people who earn more money than their ancestors work more hours than Keynes expected, and I won’t summarize them all here. But I enjoyed this one from Gary Becker: people think of leisure time as lost earnings, so leisure becomes costly time, and the more a person makes, the costlier leisure becomes. Therefore, we should expect some people, maybe a lot of people, to choose to work more as they earn more because they can't bear the thought of time spent not earning.
Keynes hoped that people would work less because it would allow them to devote more time to leisure, as opposed to idleness. Are people capable of leisure? It’s probably dangerous to generalize. Some people volunteer, some people blow their inherited wealth on parties, some people hole up in an apartment gaming, and some people come home from work too burnt to do anything more than watch reality TV. And what should we think about those people that lost their jobs in 2008 and suffered a lot of stress and self-doubt as someone unemployed—until they retired? I don't know what S&S think because How Much is Enough? is mostly about abstract theories and ideals. What would an ideal society, or an ideal economic relationship between rich countries and poor countries, or an ideal study of happiness look like?
Sometimes the lack of specifics detracts from the authors' credibility, and their analysis of environmental limits and of the environmental movement was often unconvincing. They find environmentalism too romantic, but a stronger critique of romanticism within environmentalism can be found in Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline. They spend much of the chapter arguing that environmentalists focus too much on doomsday scenarios, but they don't show any understanding that identifying a concern (like being unable to support a population) helps to motivate action to prevent that scenario (see Mann's Wizard and the Prophet), nor do they look at any chart of global greenhouse gas emissions over time suggesting that we're headed for a less difficult scenario. But, abstractly, sometimes environmentalists do sound a bit romantic--even "religious" in their reverence for the planet. Unlike S&S, I don't see this reverence as disqualifying, nor do I see it as contradictory. The environmental tent is broad enough to include people who study ice cores, grid designs, and ecological collapses as well as people who hold a deep reverence for, say, trees. S&S try to find a middle ground between deep and shallow greens, but I couldn't see what difference their analysis would make in what increasingly seems to be a game of capital and political leverage.
For a book about thinking about "enough," I was surprised to find no mention of Financial Independence/ Retire Early (FI/RE). These people have worked out for the most part exactly how much it takes to retire to a range of ages and lifestyles. When I read FI/RE posts, they often distrust both economic stability and North American welfare nets, and they often dislike their job and meeting social expectations. When they retire early, they often do engage in leisure activities and devote more time to their families, though some find that they have no idea what to do with their newly discovered free time. When they announce their plans to FI/RE, they report that they are often judged or fired almost immediately by their peers and managers. In such moments, I imagine these judges as thinking either “you think you’re better than me?!” or “how dare you stop contributing to the cultural enterprise?”
But what is the cultural enterprise? S&S suggest that Smith’s early conception of economics was a reordering of resources to create a steady state of affairs in which goods were distributed ideally—a utopian vision, in other words. Today, we seem to have traded in that steady state utopia for a vision of ever evolving prosperity. Wealth will always be created, if we (or our captains of industry!) have the will and the wit to pursue it rather than leisure and idle pleasures. There are signs that the planet can no longer bear our industry as it is currently powered, but so what? There can always be more, maybe even more than enough. Right?
3.5 stars.
There are many attempts to explain why people who earn more money than their ancestors work more hours than Keynes expected, and I won’t summarize them all here. But I enjoyed this one from Gary Becker: people think of leisure time as lost earnings, so leisure becomes costly time, and the more a person makes, the costlier leisure becomes. Therefore, we should expect some people, maybe a lot of people, to choose to work more as they earn more because they can't bear the thought of time spent not earning.
Keynes hoped that people would work less because it would allow them to devote more time to leisure, as opposed to idleness. Are people capable of leisure? It’s probably dangerous to generalize. Some people volunteer, some people blow their inherited wealth on parties, some people hole up in an apartment gaming, and some people come home from work too burnt to do anything more than watch reality TV. And what should we think about those people that lost their jobs in 2008 and suffered a lot of stress and self-doubt as someone unemployed—until they retired? I don't know what S&S think because How Much is Enough? is mostly about abstract theories and ideals. What would an ideal society, or an ideal economic relationship between rich countries and poor countries, or an ideal study of happiness look like?
Sometimes the lack of specifics detracts from the authors' credibility, and their analysis of environmental limits and of the environmental movement was often unconvincing. They find environmentalism too romantic, but a stronger critique of romanticism within environmentalism can be found in Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Discipline. They spend much of the chapter arguing that environmentalists focus too much on doomsday scenarios, but they don't show any understanding that identifying a concern (like being unable to support a population) helps to motivate action to prevent that scenario (see Mann's Wizard and the Prophet), nor do they look at any chart of global greenhouse gas emissions over time suggesting that we're headed for a less difficult scenario. But, abstractly, sometimes environmentalists do sound a bit romantic--even "religious" in their reverence for the planet. Unlike S&S, I don't see this reverence as disqualifying, nor do I see it as contradictory. The environmental tent is broad enough to include people who study ice cores, grid designs, and ecological collapses as well as people who hold a deep reverence for, say, trees. S&S try to find a middle ground between deep and shallow greens, but I couldn't see what difference their analysis would make in what increasingly seems to be a game of capital and political leverage.
For a book about thinking about "enough," I was surprised to find no mention of Financial Independence/ Retire Early (FI/RE). These people have worked out for the most part exactly how much it takes to retire to a range of ages and lifestyles. When I read FI/RE posts, they often distrust both economic stability and North American welfare nets, and they often dislike their job and meeting social expectations. When they retire early, they often do engage in leisure activities and devote more time to their families, though some find that they have no idea what to do with their newly discovered free time. When they announce their plans to FI/RE, they report that they are often judged or fired almost immediately by their peers and managers. In such moments, I imagine these judges as thinking either “you think you’re better than me?!” or “how dare you stop contributing to the cultural enterprise?”
But what is the cultural enterprise? S&S suggest that Smith’s early conception of economics was a reordering of resources to create a steady state of affairs in which goods were distributed ideally—a utopian vision, in other words. Today, we seem to have traded in that steady state utopia for a vision of ever evolving prosperity. Wealth will always be created, if we (or our captains of industry!) have the will and the wit to pursue it rather than leisure and idle pleasures. There are signs that the planet can no longer bear our industry as it is currently powered, but so what? There can always be more, maybe even more than enough. Right?
3.5 stars.
June 17, 2021
Etätöissä on kyllä kiva kun voi häpeilemättä lukea pitkin työpäivää...
How much is enoughissa on kyse hyvän elämän filosofiasta, jonka avulla yhteiskuntia voisi ohjata pois ylikulutuksesta ja hyperkapitalismista. Skidelskyjen premissi on että kuuluisa ekonomisti J.M. Keynes arvioi 30-luvulla että sadan vuoden kuluttua kapitalismista siirrytään muuhun malliin kun kansalaisilla on "tarpeeksi". Tämä ei tietenkään pitänyt paikkaansa ja tässä kirjassa analysoidaan hieman nykyjärjestelmän filosofista pohjaa.
Kirjoittajat käsittelevät syvällisesti hyvän elämän filosofista historiaa ja sitä, kuinka talouskasvusta tehtiin itseisarvo jota ei voida koskaan saavuttaa. Oon Skidelskyjen kanssa samaa mieltä että nykyajan ongelmien ratkaisuun tarvitaan myös arvojen uudelleenasennoitumista.
Skidelskyjen hyvän elämän elementit ovat aika tuttuja: esimerkiksi turvallisuus, kunnioitus, ystävyys ja hyvä luontosuhde ovat ainakin mun mielestä helposti hyväksyttäviä. Filosofiset teemat eivät ole mitään maata mullistavia: kirjoittajat käyvät pitkälti läpi Aristoteleen ja Kungfutsen ajatuksia joilla he perustelevat hyvän elämän elementtien listaansa.
Vaikka pohdinnat eivät olleet vallankumouksellisia, kirjassa oli hyvää pohdintaa siitä kuinka näiden hyveiden omaksuminen voisi auttaa ihmisiä ja yhteiskuntia irtautumaan hyperkapitalismin stresseistä. Erityisesti lopussa Skidelskyt tarjosivat esimerkkejä politiikoista joilla voitaisiin mahdollistaa hyvää elämää.
Kirjasta välillä paistaa läpi kirjoittajien valkoinen mieheys ja osaltaan jenkkiläisyys. Erityisesti luontoa käsittelevä kappale jäi tosi pintapuoliseksi.
All in all syvällisesti kirjoitettu pohdinta Aristoteeliseen filosofiaan pohjautuen , jolla mun mielestä on hyvinkin käyttökohteita nykypäivänä.
Nauratti kun luin jonkun tyypin arvostelun tästä kirjasta kun antoi kaks tähteä kun ei ollut tarpeeksi graafeja ja laskutoimituksia jotka on hyvän taloudellisen analyysin perusta lmao. Meni vissiin vähän kirjan pointti ohi.
How much is enoughissa on kyse hyvän elämän filosofiasta, jonka avulla yhteiskuntia voisi ohjata pois ylikulutuksesta ja hyperkapitalismista. Skidelskyjen premissi on että kuuluisa ekonomisti J.M. Keynes arvioi 30-luvulla että sadan vuoden kuluttua kapitalismista siirrytään muuhun malliin kun kansalaisilla on "tarpeeksi". Tämä ei tietenkään pitänyt paikkaansa ja tässä kirjassa analysoidaan hieman nykyjärjestelmän filosofista pohjaa.
Kirjoittajat käsittelevät syvällisesti hyvän elämän filosofista historiaa ja sitä, kuinka talouskasvusta tehtiin itseisarvo jota ei voida koskaan saavuttaa. Oon Skidelskyjen kanssa samaa mieltä että nykyajan ongelmien ratkaisuun tarvitaan myös arvojen uudelleenasennoitumista.
Skidelskyjen hyvän elämän elementit ovat aika tuttuja: esimerkiksi turvallisuus, kunnioitus, ystävyys ja hyvä luontosuhde ovat ainakin mun mielestä helposti hyväksyttäviä. Filosofiset teemat eivät ole mitään maata mullistavia: kirjoittajat käyvät pitkälti läpi Aristoteleen ja Kungfutsen ajatuksia joilla he perustelevat hyvän elämän elementtien listaansa.
Vaikka pohdinnat eivät olleet vallankumouksellisia, kirjassa oli hyvää pohdintaa siitä kuinka näiden hyveiden omaksuminen voisi auttaa ihmisiä ja yhteiskuntia irtautumaan hyperkapitalismin stresseistä. Erityisesti lopussa Skidelskyt tarjosivat esimerkkejä politiikoista joilla voitaisiin mahdollistaa hyvää elämää.
Kirjasta välillä paistaa läpi kirjoittajien valkoinen mieheys ja osaltaan jenkkiläisyys. Erityisesti luontoa käsittelevä kappale jäi tosi pintapuoliseksi.
All in all syvällisesti kirjoitettu pohdinta Aristoteeliseen filosofiaan pohjautuen , jolla mun mielestä on hyvinkin käyttökohteita nykypäivänä.
Nauratti kun luin jonkun tyypin arvostelun tästä kirjasta kun antoi kaks tähteä kun ei ollut tarpeeksi graafeja ja laskutoimituksia jotka on hyvän taloudellisen analyysin perusta lmao. Meni vissiin vähän kirjan pointti ohi.
December 8, 2013
This book would seem right up my alley, and in most ways, it was. It is written by two philosophers, so it didn't suffer from the usual problems I find with popular-consumption econ books (though perhaps a philosopher reading it would find an analogous set of problems!).
Skidelsky pere is the author of the preeminent biography of Keynes, and the motivation for the book is a well-known essay by Keynes in which he speculated on the economic future. Based on his projections of the growth of income, he figured that by around now, people in developed countries would only need to work about 10 hours per week to meet their needs. Famously, his growth projections were remarkably accurate, but his conclusion was not. Given increasing incomes, people on the whole have chosen to work the same amount (or more) and consume more rather than work less and consume the same.
The authors' argument is an interesting one, which has much in common with Alasdair MacIntyre's argument in "After Virtue" (which the authors note). In traditional societies, including ancient Greece, there was a conception of "the good life" as a fairly objective thing to be aimed at, consisting in a finite set of reasonably well-defined things, chief among these, time for philosophical contemplation and public service. (I am not sure how much of a caricature this is. My sense is that people may have disagreed about the specific constituents of the good life, but that the existence of such a thing was not especially in question.)
One problem with this concept was that, due to the structure of these traditional societies, "the good life" was off-limits to most people. Eventually, the forces of capitalism came forth to offer what the Skidelskys very elegantly characterize as a "Faustian bargain": by unleashing self-interest and acquisitive impulses from the bounds of tradition, it spurs economic development toward the point where most people will have the resources needed for a basic "good life"; yet by unleashing these forces, the capitalist economy also erodes away the mental and spiritual basis of the enjoyment of the good life. The competitive market can produce "enough" for everyone, but as competition comes to play a dominant role, our concept of "enough" withers away.
So far, so good. The authors take some interesting digressions into conceptions of the good life in various Eastern traditions, and into the modern field of happiness research. (They are quite leery of this field, for interesting reasons.) They put forward their own subjective list of the elements of the good life: things that are hard to argue with, such as health, respect, relationships, etc. This list didn't seem very gripping to me, but also seemed fairly reasonable.
What really bugged me, though, was their concluding essays at possible government policies to encourage people to cultivate the good life. After an entire book of discussing these issues, they focus on a couple of specific policies: a universal basic income, where the state would provide an unconditional cash grant to each citizen, and a consumption tax (similar to the European VAT's, although oddly they do not discuss these). The economic basis of each of these policy proposals is clear: given a basic income, people will be more free to devote their time to fulfilling pursuits; a tax on consumption will incentivize people to substitute away from consumption (for example, to more leisure time). And yet...the very logic by which these policies are intended to work is the same market-based logic that the authors call out as the very basis of the Faustian bargain! It was astonishing to me that they did not focus their policy proposals more on direct government provision of basic goods, as with a single-payer healthcare system. The fungibility of things like UBI would seem to make them relatively easy for competitive, capitalist values to withstand.
I am in agreement with the authors on many points, but am not sure where I stand on appropriate responses beyond an individual or household level. It may be overly pessimistic to say that nothing can be done beyond this level. For example, I think that changes to policies around parental leave, or changes to structures that create "cliff effects" between full- and part-time work could be beneficial. But it seems somewhat wrong-headed to me to envision the state being able to "nudge" people toward the good life (or even being capable of maintaining any coherent conception thereof). If changes in attitudes are going to come, I think that they are much more likely to take root based on the actions of smaller units, from families to churches to online communities to individual companies. I think conceptions of the good life are much more likely to be driven by the availability of positive examples than by policy innovations.
Over this past weekend, Elise discovered a blog that I read, called "Mr. Money Mustache," and has really been enjoying it. Despite the silly name, I this blog (and the online/IRL community around it) is a strong and vibrant proponent of something like the good life described by the Skidelskys. I have always appreciated the anarchist line (not sure of the exact attribution) that a new society must be built "in the shell of the old." I think something like MMM is a modest but powerful instantiation of that idea, and gives me much more inspiration than the Skidelskys' policy ideas.
Skidelsky pere is the author of the preeminent biography of Keynes, and the motivation for the book is a well-known essay by Keynes in which he speculated on the economic future. Based on his projections of the growth of income, he figured that by around now, people in developed countries would only need to work about 10 hours per week to meet their needs. Famously, his growth projections were remarkably accurate, but his conclusion was not. Given increasing incomes, people on the whole have chosen to work the same amount (or more) and consume more rather than work less and consume the same.
The authors' argument is an interesting one, which has much in common with Alasdair MacIntyre's argument in "After Virtue" (which the authors note). In traditional societies, including ancient Greece, there was a conception of "the good life" as a fairly objective thing to be aimed at, consisting in a finite set of reasonably well-defined things, chief among these, time for philosophical contemplation and public service. (I am not sure how much of a caricature this is. My sense is that people may have disagreed about the specific constituents of the good life, but that the existence of such a thing was not especially in question.)
One problem with this concept was that, due to the structure of these traditional societies, "the good life" was off-limits to most people. Eventually, the forces of capitalism came forth to offer what the Skidelskys very elegantly characterize as a "Faustian bargain": by unleashing self-interest and acquisitive impulses from the bounds of tradition, it spurs economic development toward the point where most people will have the resources needed for a basic "good life"; yet by unleashing these forces, the capitalist economy also erodes away the mental and spiritual basis of the enjoyment of the good life. The competitive market can produce "enough" for everyone, but as competition comes to play a dominant role, our concept of "enough" withers away.
So far, so good. The authors take some interesting digressions into conceptions of the good life in various Eastern traditions, and into the modern field of happiness research. (They are quite leery of this field, for interesting reasons.) They put forward their own subjective list of the elements of the good life: things that are hard to argue with, such as health, respect, relationships, etc. This list didn't seem very gripping to me, but also seemed fairly reasonable.
What really bugged me, though, was their concluding essays at possible government policies to encourage people to cultivate the good life. After an entire book of discussing these issues, they focus on a couple of specific policies: a universal basic income, where the state would provide an unconditional cash grant to each citizen, and a consumption tax (similar to the European VAT's, although oddly they do not discuss these). The economic basis of each of these policy proposals is clear: given a basic income, people will be more free to devote their time to fulfilling pursuits; a tax on consumption will incentivize people to substitute away from consumption (for example, to more leisure time). And yet...the very logic by which these policies are intended to work is the same market-based logic that the authors call out as the very basis of the Faustian bargain! It was astonishing to me that they did not focus their policy proposals more on direct government provision of basic goods, as with a single-payer healthcare system. The fungibility of things like UBI would seem to make them relatively easy for competitive, capitalist values to withstand.
I am in agreement with the authors on many points, but am not sure where I stand on appropriate responses beyond an individual or household level. It may be overly pessimistic to say that nothing can be done beyond this level. For example, I think that changes to policies around parental leave, or changes to structures that create "cliff effects" between full- and part-time work could be beneficial. But it seems somewhat wrong-headed to me to envision the state being able to "nudge" people toward the good life (or even being capable of maintaining any coherent conception thereof). If changes in attitudes are going to come, I think that they are much more likely to take root based on the actions of smaller units, from families to churches to online communities to individual companies. I think conceptions of the good life are much more likely to be driven by the availability of positive examples than by policy innovations.
Over this past weekend, Elise discovered a blog that I read, called "Mr. Money Mustache," and has really been enjoying it. Despite the silly name, I this blog (and the online/IRL community around it) is a strong and vibrant proponent of something like the good life described by the Skidelskys. I have always appreciated the anarchist line (not sure of the exact attribution) that a new society must be built "in the shell of the old." I think something like MMM is a modest but powerful instantiation of that idea, and gives me much more inspiration than the Skidelskys' policy ideas.
Read
October 14, 2023Zaujímavé, akurát divná kapitola o udržateľnosti.
September 27, 2023
The title and cover of this book are incredibly misleading. However, don't let that deceive you because this book is an absolute gem. It delves far beyond mere advice on personal finance and personal development. Instead, it delves into the profound realms of philosophy and history, exploring the intricate aspects of money and wealth. I highly recommend it for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of these subjects.
February 5, 2018
Ekonomi üzerine yazılmış bir felsefe kitabı. Bazı bölümlerde rakamsal destekler olsa da ağırlık felsefe tarafında. Akademik alıntıları bol, bu alıntılara atıfta bulunarak yorumlamalar üzerine kurgulanmış bir kitap. Bu açıdan bakıldığında sıkıcı bölümleri fazla.
Okumaya başlamadan önce arka sayfadaki 3 yorumu dikkatlice okuyun. Ve o yorumlara 2 dakikanızı ayırın. Kitabın içinde ne bulacağınızı veya bulamayacağınızı çok güzel özetlemişler.
Okumaya başlamadan önce arka sayfadaki 3 yorumu dikkatlice okuyun. Ve o yorumlara 2 dakikanızı ayırın. Kitabın içinde ne bulacağınızı veya bulamayacağınızı çok güzel özetlemişler.
September 20, 2014
This fine, short book asks an excellent question. The father-son authors are, respectively, professors of economics and a philosophy. The book grew out of a discussion of a little known 1928 essay by economics heavyweight John Maynard Keynes, who predicted that if then current trends in technological progress and economic growth held steady, in 100 years we all would have everything we need and we would be working three hours a week. The two trends have exceeded his expectations, so what has happened? Their answer in a nutshell is that how much is enough depends on your definition of “the good life,” and that today we have truly lost any sense of what that is and we almost don’t seem to care. They discuss the insatiability of our wants conditioned by modern advertising and our fierce competition for status with our neighbors. Reviewing formulations of the good life going back as far as Aristotle, they arrive at seven basic elements of the good life: health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure. For me, the chapter that discusses these elements in detail is the best in the book. Looking back over my life at the times when I was less happy I can see that one or more of the elements was impoverished or lacking. A sampling of quotes:
“Capitalism has achieved incomparable progress in the creation of wealth, but has left us incapable of putting that wealth to civilized use.”
“The just and temperate person accumulates just those things he needs for a good life, and then stops.”
“Our proper goal, as individuals and as citizens, is not just to be happy but to have reason to be happy. To have the good things of life--health, respect, friendship, leisure--is to have reason to be happy. To be happy without these things is to be in the grip of a delusion: the delusion that life is going well when it is not.”
“Leisure is the wellspring of higher thought and culture, for it is only when emancipated from the pressure of need that we really look at the world, ponder it in its distinct character and outline.”
“Above a certain economic level, the bulk of income is spent on items that are not needed in any absolute sense but rather serve to mark out their possessors as superior, or at least not inferior to others. Such items must always be expensive relative to the average level, else they cannot serve their differentiating function; thus incomes are forced up competitively in order to acquire them.”
“Capitalism has achieved incomparable progress in the creation of wealth, but has left us incapable of putting that wealth to civilized use.”
“The just and temperate person accumulates just those things he needs for a good life, and then stops.”
“Our proper goal, as individuals and as citizens, is not just to be happy but to have reason to be happy. To have the good things of life--health, respect, friendship, leisure--is to have reason to be happy. To be happy without these things is to be in the grip of a delusion: the delusion that life is going well when it is not.”
“Leisure is the wellspring of higher thought and culture, for it is only when emancipated from the pressure of need that we really look at the world, ponder it in its distinct character and outline.”
“Above a certain economic level, the bulk of income is spent on items that are not needed in any absolute sense but rather serve to mark out their possessors as superior, or at least not inferior to others. Such items must always be expensive relative to the average level, else they cannot serve their differentiating function; thus incomes are forced up competitively in order to acquire them.”
February 9, 2019
In Keynes’ infrequently quoted prediction that the population of developed countries would work just 15 to 20 hours by 2030, the Skidelskys have found an incredible premise to explore why we continue to slave for endless hours long after our material conditions are met. And in the book’s opening chapters they eruditely lay out their idol’s idea – and convincingly extol where humanity went wrong. Hint: It's around the 1980s.
Next the brothers apply the same seriousness to examining ancient conceptions of the (hassle-free, nature-bound, inherently virtuous) “Good Life” to argue convincingly against the fleeting foolishness of insatiability, before somewhat pompously laying all the blame at the “Faustian Bargain” of modern capitalism.
Then, they veer off course to argue listlessly and needlessly against the imperfect measure of happiness indicators – used only semi-seriously by governments today but never a serious source of philosophical discourse – before patronising environmentalists by pedalling pseudoscientific claptrap loaded with really quite troublesome implications for our planet’s fate.
Sated after these two arbitrary pot shots, the Skidelskys proceed to flimsily sketch out their own conception of the “Good Life”, breezily drawing up seven “basic goods” any thinking individual would struggle to argue against – health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, leisure – with the most perfunctory semantic rigour (after all, such woolly words are nothing but wordplay).
Finally, the mask slips. After slothfully sharing their own unqualified conception of how to realise this prophetic utopia – a papier-mâché list of well-meaning if insufficient contemporary policy changes towards social progress (less advertising, a basic income) – the real, sorry agenda behind the whole project becomes clear. Apparently, such a world “would be quite probably impossible without… religion”. The Skidelskys brazenly, dangerously, declare: “Could a society entirely devoid of the religious impulse stir itself to pursuit of the common good? We doubt it.”
Such a book is an insult to the intelligence and pluralism of its readers – and a threat to the very idea that we can hope for a better existence in this world without putting our faith in the existence of another.
Next the brothers apply the same seriousness to examining ancient conceptions of the (hassle-free, nature-bound, inherently virtuous) “Good Life” to argue convincingly against the fleeting foolishness of insatiability, before somewhat pompously laying all the blame at the “Faustian Bargain” of modern capitalism.
Then, they veer off course to argue listlessly and needlessly against the imperfect measure of happiness indicators – used only semi-seriously by governments today but never a serious source of philosophical discourse – before patronising environmentalists by pedalling pseudoscientific claptrap loaded with really quite troublesome implications for our planet’s fate.
Sated after these two arbitrary pot shots, the Skidelskys proceed to flimsily sketch out their own conception of the “Good Life”, breezily drawing up seven “basic goods” any thinking individual would struggle to argue against – health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, leisure – with the most perfunctory semantic rigour (after all, such woolly words are nothing but wordplay).
Finally, the mask slips. After slothfully sharing their own unqualified conception of how to realise this prophetic utopia – a papier-mâché list of well-meaning if insufficient contemporary policy changes towards social progress (less advertising, a basic income) – the real, sorry agenda behind the whole project becomes clear. Apparently, such a world “would be quite probably impossible without… religion”. The Skidelskys brazenly, dangerously, declare: “Could a society entirely devoid of the religious impulse stir itself to pursuit of the common good? We doubt it.”
Such a book is an insult to the intelligence and pluralism of its readers – and a threat to the very idea that we can hope for a better existence in this world without putting our faith in the existence of another.
August 26, 2012
How much money do you need to lead a good life? What is the good life anyway? In their book How Much Is Enough? Robert and Edward Skidelsky try to get to the bottom of these and related questions.
In 1930 the great economist Keynes said that by 2030 most people would work only 15 hours a week, devoting the rest of their time to leisure. Obviously he was mistaken in his assumption, and the authors show why and how he went wrong with his idea.
There are many books dealing with economy and money, our desires and needs. Some grant a rather cursory glance at our needs and wants while others present an intricate picture of the mechanisms involved. This book is most definitely one of the latter, so don't expect a light and entertaining read on how we spend too much on stuff we don't really need. This one's deep, needs to sink in, get thoroughly digested!
This concise study literally has it all - from economic history to philosophy the reader can indulge in a many-layered work which ultimately makes one rethink our own perceptions of work, time and money. Might Keynes be proven right after all one day? Are the structural solutions offered feasible? Could society establish a basis for the good life we strive for? There are no ultimate answers to be found here, yet plenty of food for thought.
In short: A thought-provoking analysis showcasing the economic insatiability of our society!
In 1930 the great economist Keynes said that by 2030 most people would work only 15 hours a week, devoting the rest of their time to leisure. Obviously he was mistaken in his assumption, and the authors show why and how he went wrong with his idea.
There are many books dealing with economy and money, our desires and needs. Some grant a rather cursory glance at our needs and wants while others present an intricate picture of the mechanisms involved. This book is most definitely one of the latter, so don't expect a light and entertaining read on how we spend too much on stuff we don't really need. This one's deep, needs to sink in, get thoroughly digested!
This concise study literally has it all - from economic history to philosophy the reader can indulge in a many-layered work which ultimately makes one rethink our own perceptions of work, time and money. Might Keynes be proven right after all one day? Are the structural solutions offered feasible? Could society establish a basis for the good life we strive for? There are no ultimate answers to be found here, yet plenty of food for thought.
In short: A thought-provoking analysis showcasing the economic insatiability of our society!
October 6, 2018
The beginning was a bit dull but things turned around toward the middle of book and from then,it got real interested.
I real enjoyed chapters on the philosophy of good life and money,relationship between good life and GDP(Happy Economic),how to differentiate the search for happiness,pleasure and joy in life,basic elements of a good life and so many other things.
But I was also appalled by his biased view on climate change on The chapter "limit to growth",since this book came out on 2012 I'm sure we already had some solid evidence supporting climate change,so I don't know why the author made all these baseless claims "we still have very little evidence that human activities are contributing to climate change and global warming",sadly he was wrong throughout the chapter,but I still understood where he was coming from,he is not much of a climate change denier than person who is afraid of green movement and the sentiment relationship that some environmental people tend to have with nature
Overall it's a great read,packed with some useful germs on how to be content on age of consumerism, flashiness and accumulation
I real enjoyed chapters on the philosophy of good life and money,relationship between good life and GDP(Happy Economic),how to differentiate the search for happiness,pleasure and joy in life,basic elements of a good life and so many other things.
But I was also appalled by his biased view on climate change on The chapter "limit to growth",since this book came out on 2012 I'm sure we already had some solid evidence supporting climate change,so I don't know why the author made all these baseless claims "we still have very little evidence that human activities are contributing to climate change and global warming",sadly he was wrong throughout the chapter,but I still understood where he was coming from,he is not much of a climate change denier than person who is afraid of green movement and the sentiment relationship that some environmental people tend to have with nature
Overall it's a great read,packed with some useful germs on how to be content on age of consumerism, flashiness and accumulation
February 19, 2022
Hun poging om ethiek met economie te linken en zo een voorstel van “het goede leven” uit te denken was met momenten drammerig. Bovendien is het niet meteen duidelijk waarom sommige denkers/gebeurtenissen/... aangehaald worden en andere niet (loskoppeling van de goudstandaard om
maar iets te noemen.
De manier waarop ze Rawls liberalisme als uitgaanspunt gebruiken vond ik interessant, alhoewel ze ook hier weer heel snel té theoretisch worden. Bij mijn aanvoelen heeft een boek over hoe onze samenleving vorm moet krijgen nood aan voorbeelden uit de praktijk.
maar iets te noemen.
De manier waarop ze Rawls liberalisme als uitgaanspunt gebruiken vond ik interessant, alhoewel ze ook hier weer heel snel té theoretisch worden. Bij mijn aanvoelen heeft een boek over hoe onze samenleving vorm moet krijgen nood aan voorbeelden uit de praktijk.
April 28, 2018
Vier sterren is wellicht iets overdreven voor dit boek. Het bevat heel veel interessante insteken over hoe we alternatieve economische modellen zouden kunnen uitrollen en doet ook zijn best om de onderliggende redenen waarom economische verandering noodzakelijk is fundamenteel te onderbouwen, maar het blijft al bij al vooral op dat laatste vlak vrij onevenwichtig. Sommige delen zijn goed uitgewerkt, andere daarentegen gaan heel kort door de bocht.
Omdat het toch een heel belangrijk thema aanraakt en ook heel goede info bevat over Keynes, geef ik het toch vier sterren. Het is zeker de moeite om door te nemen en kan tot denken aanzetten daar waar het tekortschiet.
Omdat het toch een heel belangrijk thema aanraakt en ook heel goede info bevat over Keynes, geef ik het toch vier sterren. Het is zeker de moeite om door te nemen en kan tot denken aanzetten daar waar het tekortschiet.
May 7, 2017
Over the last 4 decades, we have seen a long list of books questioning or even attacking the pursuit of economic growth. From Mishan's "The Costs of Economic Growth", over the “Reports to the Club of Rome” to Tim Jackson's "Prosperity Without Growth", the list is long - and so is the list of rebuttals.
A few years ago, the celebrated biographer of Keynes, Robert Skidelsky, and his son Edward have joined forces to write " How Much is Enough? The Love of Money, and the Case for the Good Life". The central theme of the book is that pursuing economic growth has become an end in itself, and that this has led people away from what really matters, namely leading a "good life".
This book stands out from the crowd of what I would call (somewhat unfairly) the "anti-growth" crowd for several reasons.
First of all, it certainly does not deny that a lot of countries on this planet need some decades of additional growth before their citizens will be able to lead a "good life". In other words, the Skidelskies do explicitly acknowledge that there are material pre-conditions to the pursuit of non-material objectives.
Second, the authors do not align the usual suspects in their arguments.
For instance, they clearly have little patience for the argument that economic growth does not lead to measurable changes in happiness once basic needs are satisfied. Although they do spend a lot of effort in arguing that there are fundamental measurement problems linked to the concept of happiness (especially in the case of intercultural comparisons), the key of the argument is an ethical one: they think that the pursuit of happiness is just as flawed as an objective of public policy as economic growth. We'll come back to this point later in this review.
Similarly, they disagree with the environmental case against economic growth. They dismiss most of the environmentalists as fundamentalists, whose main agenda is not the improve the human condition at all. Essentially, the argument is that 'deep' environmentalism is based on a flawed ethics that is in contradiction with everything we know about ecology. For instance, how can we pretend that we should give the same weight to the sufferings of all sentient beings, while real life in the wild is actually as close to Hobbes's original state of nature as one can get? Moreover (and more controversially), they also question the anthropocentric approach to environmental policy that most economists espouse. Here as well, the argument is two-pronged: they disagree with the argument that current generations should make large sacrifices for the future state of the enviroment; this argument is embedded in the mainstream economic argument that uncertainty regarding the preferences of future generations, and the expectation that they will be richer than we are, calls for a positive discount rate. Moreover, here as well, they disagree with the economic argument because it is embedded in a consequentialist ethics that most neoclassical economics espouses.
Third, and this point is directly related to the previous, the key argument the Skidelskies use against the pursuit of economic growth is indeed an ethical one. They contrast the philosophy of for instance Aristoteles with the 'Faustian bargain' that economics has struck since the writings of Mandeville and Smith: the idea that selfishness in economic matters may be flawed from a moralist's point of view, but that it gives strong incentives to people to put their labour and capital to the most productive uses, eventually enhancing welfare of society as a whole.
The Skidelskies argue that the general adoption of the "invisible hand" argument in favour of free-market economics has gradually undermined all ethical barriers that used to mitigate the ruthless pursuit of personal wealth in the past. This has lead to a quest for "growth for growth's sake". The directly observable consequences are (especially in the US and the UK since the 1980s) growth of average incomes combined with a stagnation of median incomes and thus increasing inequality. More importantly, the Skidelskies argue that it has led to a complete neglect of the question what exactly are the components of a 'good life'. The main symptom of this neglect is that increasing incomes have not led to increasing leisure (as Keynes expected it would). This emphasis on the 'good life' as the final objective is really what distinguishes the book from most other treatises on the subject. The key to the Skidelskies's view is their disagreement with the consequentialism of modern economics, and especially of the utilitarian variant of it. They dispute forcefully the idea that 'maximising utility' (or happiness, for that matter) should be the finality of policy, and, a fortiori, of our individual lives. They propose their own alternative view of the components of a "good life" (mostly as the ancient Greeks would have understood it), and then give some suggestions for public policies that could promote the pursuit of such a good life.
Of course, it is not possible to give justice to a book of 300 pages in such a short summary, but I think this captures the essential message.
But what to think of the book and its central message?
As is the case with most books that question mainstream economics, I am afraid that it is better in raising questions than in providing implementable solutions.
For instance, I think the book makes a relatively good case against consistent applications of consequentialist ethics in concrete cases. But this misses the whole point of why economists use consequentialist ethics in the first place. Economic policy is not about devising solutions for individual citizens. It is about creating a general framework to evaluate policies that will affect different groups of people differently. A policy maker needs somehow a framework to analyse trade-offs. Consequentialism and utilitarianism, for all their faults, do provide such a framework. As the Skidelskies themselves acknowledge, policies can have a positive impact on some components of what constitutes a 'good life' for some people, and have a negative impact on the 'good life' of other people. But they do not really provide an indication of how one should proceed with such a trade-off. More importantly, although they forcefully argue that they are not paternalists, they mostly disregard the possibility that some people may actually disagree with their views on what constitutes a 'good life'. In short, the book falls short of providing an implementable alternative to the existing normative framework used in economics.
This is most salient in the last chapter, which proposes a framework for policies that would promote the "good live" rather than economic growth per se. For instance, the authors argue that a tax on consumption would be an alternative to taxes on income that would not just redistribute from the rich to the poor (as the rich obviously consume more than the poor), but would also stimulate other desirable behaviour, such as saving. However, very little attention is paid to the risk of evasion and tax competition between countries. This issue is just as real with consumption based taxes as with income taxation. I think the idea of a tax shift from labour to advertising is a quite interesting one, but its practical implications are barely discussed.
As a final point, I think the quality and depth of the argumentation is unbalanced. In some cases, the authors really go in depth to construct their argument. In other places, they are rather sloppy. This is especially the case when they discuss the changes in economic policies since the 1970s. They make rather blunt statements about the motivations behind these changes, without explaining how they reached their conclusions. Are these statements based on any party manifests or testimonies of people who were close to the decision-makers? Or are the authors mainly second-guessing the intentions of the policy makers? And why do some sections barely contain any reference to peer reviewed literature on the subject?
This being said, I think this is a very valuable book. I would even put it on the reading lists of any program in economics. Economists are too much prone to take the implicit value judgments underlying their models for granted, and this book is an excellent reminder that they shouldn't. I'd wish it would have provided a more elaborate and realistic approach for an alternative. Maybe it can be a stimulant for other people to take on this challenge.
May 5, 2020
Written a few years after the crash of 2008 this is a book for anyone that ever asked themselves why are we always chasing economic growth or, while being part of and benefitting from the global capitalist system, ever felt uneasy about it. Blending economics and philosophy, the authors explore why we use metrics, such as GDP in particular, as society's driving force and argue that this should be a byproduct of society seeking to provide a good life for all of its members, not the be-all-and-end-all. They show how this came to be and the negative impacts. They're realistic about the challenges to changing the status quo as much as they show why we should. I wouldn't necessarily agree with everything they posit, but this is clearly well-researched deftly-written and convincing.
July 29, 2012
Not exactly a breezy read—a bit of a slog, to be honest—but well worth the effort. My recent interest in combining economics and philosophy led me to this book, which is an argument for restoring a moral basis to the 'dismal science,' and rescuing it from the dark corridors of utilitarianism. The premise of the book is: What is the good life, and how can we, as a society, attain it?
I just finished it a couple minutes ago, so rather than a profound review or critique of the book, here's a quick overview of what I felt were the book's strong points:
• The authors cover pretty much all of the bases when it comes to why our system is failing us, in a cold but well-reasoned way that doesn't provoke anger (à la Michael Moore)
• Clear overview of modern Western intellectual history as it pertains to economic/political thought, and clear explanation of how morality disappeared from economics
• Appeals to classical notions of the good life (c.f. Jonathan Haidt's The Happiness Hypothesis) and not merely Western (I was quite impressed to see Keynes, Aristotle, ancient Hindu texts, and Li Bai quoted in the same chapter)
• Concise, brief overview of recent Western economic history
The book's major weakness is that it tries to end with some structural solutions, when really, the problem is one of worldview. We need to get the word out about "the good life" before we can expect people to advocate for it. In the end, the authors ultimately fail to inspire people to realize a classical good life for themselves—not that that's the goal of the book per se, but I think that is a prerequisite to establishing a society that provisions for all the possibility of the good life. By suggesting policies which have little hope of becoming reality given the current political environment, they almost encourage a hopeful passivity.
I just finished it a couple minutes ago, so rather than a profound review or critique of the book, here's a quick overview of what I felt were the book's strong points:
• The authors cover pretty much all of the bases when it comes to why our system is failing us, in a cold but well-reasoned way that doesn't provoke anger (à la Michael Moore)
• Clear overview of modern Western intellectual history as it pertains to economic/political thought, and clear explanation of how morality disappeared from economics
• Appeals to classical notions of the good life (c.f. Jonathan Haidt's The Happiness Hypothesis) and not merely Western (I was quite impressed to see Keynes, Aristotle, ancient Hindu texts, and Li Bai quoted in the same chapter)
• Concise, brief overview of recent Western economic history
The book's major weakness is that it tries to end with some structural solutions, when really, the problem is one of worldview. We need to get the word out about "the good life" before we can expect people to advocate for it. In the end, the authors ultimately fail to inspire people to realize a classical good life for themselves—not that that's the goal of the book per se, but I think that is a prerequisite to establishing a society that provisions for all the possibility of the good life. By suggesting policies which have little hope of becoming reality given the current political environment, they almost encourage a hopeful passivity.
February 12, 2013
An interesting combination of philosophy, economics and social history, this book was an interesting, but very conceptually dense read. I read fast and it took me over 2 weeks to get through this one a few morsels at a time. The central question is that of what is needed for “good life”. In exploring this, the authors examine the Keynesian conceit that technology and advances would eventually reduce the working hours needed to no more than 10 or 15 hours a week. Clearly this has not happened, but why?
The authors explore the flaws in Keynes theory, namely not giving enough thought or attention to the idea of the insatiability of desires and consumption, but how wealth and the uses of wealth has been viewed throughout history and in different schools of thought, how happiness is conceptualized and measured, and the limits (if any) to growth. Some of the more interesting food for thought comes from our very modern ideas of morality and “good life” that are now divorced from religion or any particular belief. The authors don’t argue that religious ideals were better, but they do point out some of the richness this previous belief added to how we as a society defined a “good life”. I find our modern time to be one where many can barely differentiate need from want and where consumption for the sake of status or simply because one can has eclipsed more complex ideas about the uses of wealth and what is truly valuable.
The author’s solutions or suggestions for where we go from here were the weakest part of the book for me, but still a very good read. If nothing else, it added an awareness to my everyday thinking of just how much of a modern construction our ideas of happiness, needs/wants, and what makes for a “good life” are and how they may or may not support a global movement towards more of the “good life” for all peoples.
The authors explore the flaws in Keynes theory, namely not giving enough thought or attention to the idea of the insatiability of desires and consumption, but how wealth and the uses of wealth has been viewed throughout history and in different schools of thought, how happiness is conceptualized and measured, and the limits (if any) to growth. Some of the more interesting food for thought comes from our very modern ideas of morality and “good life” that are now divorced from religion or any particular belief. The authors don’t argue that religious ideals were better, but they do point out some of the richness this previous belief added to how we as a society defined a “good life”. I find our modern time to be one where many can barely differentiate need from want and where consumption for the sake of status or simply because one can has eclipsed more complex ideas about the uses of wealth and what is truly valuable.
The author’s solutions or suggestions for where we go from here were the weakest part of the book for me, but still a very good read. If nothing else, it added an awareness to my everyday thinking of just how much of a modern construction our ideas of happiness, needs/wants, and what makes for a “good life” are and how they may or may not support a global movement towards more of the “good life” for all peoples.
November 27, 2013
Hmm. I started off liking this book and thinking it was going to propose an interesting solution to our current economic dilemma. Unfortunately, I got more and more frustrated by the fact that the writers spent most of the book stating what (to me) seemed the bleeding obvious and then failed to come up with any viable solution.
If you are one of the people who already knows that they have enough, then this book will not have much to say to you. If, on the other hand, you are one of the people who has accepted a construction of yourself as a consumer rather than a citizen, I'm not sure that you are likely to be convinced by the argument. More crucially, the writers fail to address the problem that, in a modern democracy, politicians will only propose policies that they think people will vote for and the reality is that the herd will only vote for more consumption and the acquisition of more unnecessary stuff in their lives because they are mostly sheep. How to overcome this problem? The writers of this book don't even address the question. The 'good life' as they frame it is simply not wanted by most people. And the people who actually want this concept of the 'good life' probably have it in their power to achieve it already. Live somewhere really small, don't buy a lot of stuff, work part time, pay off the mortgage, retire early - all of these goals are achievable in society as it is now - for those who really want it. Unfortunately, too few people want it. The REAL question is how to persuade people to believe that more money won't make them any happier. And I don't think the writers of this book have succeeded on that front.
If you are one of the people who already knows that they have enough, then this book will not have much to say to you. If, on the other hand, you are one of the people who has accepted a construction of yourself as a consumer rather than a citizen, I'm not sure that you are likely to be convinced by the argument. More crucially, the writers fail to address the problem that, in a modern democracy, politicians will only propose policies that they think people will vote for and the reality is that the herd will only vote for more consumption and the acquisition of more unnecessary stuff in their lives because they are mostly sheep. How to overcome this problem? The writers of this book don't even address the question. The 'good life' as they frame it is simply not wanted by most people. And the people who actually want this concept of the 'good life' probably have it in their power to achieve it already. Live somewhere really small, don't buy a lot of stuff, work part time, pay off the mortgage, retire early - all of these goals are achievable in society as it is now - for those who really want it. Unfortunately, too few people want it. The REAL question is how to persuade people to believe that more money won't make them any happier. And I don't think the writers of this book have succeeded on that front.
August 12, 2012
This book is thought-provoking and interesting, but can be fairly hard work especially the middle of the book which is mainly philosophy.
I am generally sympathetic to the argument presented - that capitalism is ultimately a senseless system. I think they are also right to focus on the concept of insatiability and the problems it causes.
The problem I have with the argument is that what they claim is needed for the good life can't really be delivered by government action. The obvious implication is that if one wanted to drive society towards the good life (as they do) an effort to change attitudes must be required, and they do not discuss this.
Their ideas to deliver Keynes's idea of living "wisely, agreeably and well) - a basic income, a consumption tax, taxing advertising, and allowing developing countries to shelter behind tariff barriers - may well go some way to encouraging less work (although this would not necessarily be the leisure they seek). But I thought it strange also they don't promote measures to help people enjoy their leisure or improve their relationships - shouldn't they be proposing more subsidies for evening classes so people can appreciate classical music, opera and contemporary dance more?! As with many books of this kind, the authors decide not to confront the obvious issues such as the political acceptability or otherwise of this proposals. So this book to me still feels like an exercise in dilettantism, if an interesting one.
I am generally sympathetic to the argument presented - that capitalism is ultimately a senseless system. I think they are also right to focus on the concept of insatiability and the problems it causes.
The problem I have with the argument is that what they claim is needed for the good life can't really be delivered by government action. The obvious implication is that if one wanted to drive society towards the good life (as they do) an effort to change attitudes must be required, and they do not discuss this.
Their ideas to deliver Keynes's idea of living "wisely, agreeably and well) - a basic income, a consumption tax, taxing advertising, and allowing developing countries to shelter behind tariff barriers - may well go some way to encouraging less work (although this would not necessarily be the leisure they seek). But I thought it strange also they don't promote measures to help people enjoy their leisure or improve their relationships - shouldn't they be proposing more subsidies for evening classes so people can appreciate classical music, opera and contemporary dance more?! As with many books of this kind, the authors decide not to confront the obvious issues such as the political acceptability or otherwise of this proposals. So this book to me still feels like an exercise in dilettantism, if an interesting one.
March 22, 2017
A lot of interesting ideas, I think though there is a slight naivety about the hostility of world politics, he imagine s we will all come together to be rational and moral about these problems when i will tell you right now that what motivates most people is not being good, not doing what is right, but getting something for themselves and holding on to it at all costs. Difficulties raised by problems such as religious differences, wars over resources, immigration are hardly discussed. But to think we can just have a neutral reasonable discussion in isolation from this volatile social and geo political context to my mind is very naive. The ideals are good for most part, cutting back advertisement, consumerism, and growth for growth sake, lessening income inequality. But to not allow for the repercussions is naive. If we in the west make our societies ever more desirable in this way it will only increase immigration and the rush of people wanting to exploit all these welfare benefits. We cannot help society and the world in general right now all we can do is, improve our own community, but without any security and stability for this community there is no motivation to do even this. We need first to take a long hard look at our errors of cosmopolitanism and neutrality in the west. The authors do touch on this area, but I think it is the main immediate practical emphasis without which all the other well meaning ideas of this book would just fall like a house of cards
March 8, 2023
My latest Lenten reading—and to be sure, it very much is Lenten reading—comes from two non-religious Britons: Robert Jacob Alexander, Baron Skidelsky, and his son Dr Edward Skidelsky: How Much Is Enough? Robert Skidelsky is an economist, and his son Edward is a philosopher, but between them Skidelsky père et fils here have given us a remarkable piece of writing that sits directly at the crux between the two disciplines.
It is also not entirely devoid of religious interest. The Lenten advice of the Holy Fathers is to ‘eat not to satiety’, but the Skidelskys point out with some degree of alarm that the very concept of satiety has been all but demolished in modern consumer culture. The wants of even the most wealthy and productive societies seem to be bottomless, creating ever newer and more ingenious ways of satisfying them—and yet our median quality of life has not improved accordingly. To the Skidelskys, this is not so much an economic problem in itself, as it is a humanities problem—one might go so far as to call it a philosophical or even religious problem...
Read the full review here.
It is also not entirely devoid of religious interest. The Lenten advice of the Holy Fathers is to ‘eat not to satiety’, but the Skidelskys point out with some degree of alarm that the very concept of satiety has been all but demolished in modern consumer culture. The wants of even the most wealthy and productive societies seem to be bottomless, creating ever newer and more ingenious ways of satisfying them—and yet our median quality of life has not improved accordingly. To the Skidelskys, this is not so much an economic problem in itself, as it is a humanities problem—one might go so far as to call it a philosophical or even religious problem...
Read the full review here.
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