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Boom and Bust: A Global History of Financial Bubbles
Why do stock and housing markets sometimes experience amazing booms followed by massive busts and why is this happening more and more frequently. In order to answer these questions, William Quinn and John D. Turner take us on a riveting ride through the history of financial bubbles, visiting, among other places, Paris and London in 1720, Latin America in the 1820s, Melbourne in the 1880s, New York in the 1920s, Tokyo in the 1980s, Silicon Valley in the 1990s and Shanghai in the 2000s. As they do so, they help us understand why bubbles happen. why some have catastrophic economic, social and political consequences whilst others have actually benefited society. They reveal that bubbles start when investors and speculators react to new technology or political initiatives, showing that our ability to predict future bubbles will ultimately come down to being able to predict these sparks.
296 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2020
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August 11, 2021
An interesting, albeit a rather narrow, discussion of financial booms and busts. In a way, this was refreshing as it skipped over the debate among many economists about whether or not 'investors'/speculators are rational or not. Instead, they promote a novel, if simplistic, model called the 'bubble triangle' to explain why financial bubbles occur. The triangle contains three sides: money/credit, speculation and marketability. Basically, for a bubble to emerge, there has to be: A. easy money and/or credit; speculators; and finally, access to the market (e.g., marketability).
What the authors do is examine about 12 different bubbles, ranging from the 18th century through the subprime crash of 2007/8 and conclude with some speculations regarding now. Of course, there have been many more bubbles than just these 12, but the authors restrict themselves to ones where there is data/primary sources and ones that had a significant impact.
So, what 'causes' bubbles? The authors speculate that there most be some sort of innovation-- this could be technological (e.g., the railway and bicycle bubbles), it could be financial innovation (most recently, CDOs and such associated with the subprime meltdown) or it could be a political change-- for example, deregulation, which allows more players to enter the market, or attempts to mitigate outstanding government debt (South Sea and Mississippi bubbles). With this a background, they explore specific cases or bubbles as to their specific causes and consequences.
What I found most informative regards the basic set up and understanding of financial markets in general. When interest rates are low and credit is easily available, investors/speculators try to 'go for yield'. This is where leverage comes in and also the search for something that will get them better than a few percent annual yield. Like, now for example! In a way, this touches some key Austrian economic themes, such as the perils of easy credit, but rather than then Austrian assertion that this will cause inflation, the authors here link it to asset price inflation (e.g., bubbles).
Regarding 'now', think of how well the stock market has been doing, or fast home prices have been rising-- easy credit has facilitated leverage and served to boost asset prices far more then warranted under just about any historical rubric you wish to employ.
What was also kinda neat was how they linked bubbles (at times) to good outcomes, not just negative ones. The Dot.com bubble, for example, did lay a lot of fiber-optic cables and the Englich Railway mania did lay lots of track/infrastructure. Bubbles have at times also helped various firms get established via easy credit and some survived to become players in the future. Nonetheless, they also highlight the destructive nature of bubbles on bystanders-- e.g., the economic impact that hits people not involved in speculation and such.
A quick, short read that may be of interest to those who are interesting in financial markets.
What the authors do is examine about 12 different bubbles, ranging from the 18th century through the subprime crash of 2007/8 and conclude with some speculations regarding now. Of course, there have been many more bubbles than just these 12, but the authors restrict themselves to ones where there is data/primary sources and ones that had a significant impact.
So, what 'causes' bubbles? The authors speculate that there most be some sort of innovation-- this could be technological (e.g., the railway and bicycle bubbles), it could be financial innovation (most recently, CDOs and such associated with the subprime meltdown) or it could be a political change-- for example, deregulation, which allows more players to enter the market, or attempts to mitigate outstanding government debt (South Sea and Mississippi bubbles). With this a background, they explore specific cases or bubbles as to their specific causes and consequences.
What I found most informative regards the basic set up and understanding of financial markets in general. When interest rates are low and credit is easily available, investors/speculators try to 'go for yield'. This is where leverage comes in and also the search for something that will get them better than a few percent annual yield. Like, now for example! In a way, this touches some key Austrian economic themes, such as the perils of easy credit, but rather than then Austrian assertion that this will cause inflation, the authors here link it to asset price inflation (e.g., bubbles).
Regarding 'now', think of how well the stock market has been doing, or fast home prices have been rising-- easy credit has facilitated leverage and served to boost asset prices far more then warranted under just about any historical rubric you wish to employ.
What was also kinda neat was how they linked bubbles (at times) to good outcomes, not just negative ones. The Dot.com bubble, for example, did lay a lot of fiber-optic cables and the Englich Railway mania did lay lots of track/infrastructure. Bubbles have at times also helped various firms get established via easy credit and some survived to become players in the future. Nonetheless, they also highlight the destructive nature of bubbles on bystanders-- e.g., the economic impact that hits people not involved in speculation and such.
A quick, short read that may be of interest to those who are interesting in financial markets.
December 27, 2020
The 3 Elements you need for a Bubble
Quinn and Turner prefer to use the analogy of a FIRE to describe speculative bubbles. A fire is "destructive, self-perpetuating and difficult to control once it begins." And just as a fire needs oxygen, fuel, and heat, a speculative bubble needs assets that are easy to trade (i.e., oxygen), plenty of money and credit (fuel), and speculation (heat). It also needs a spark, which usually comes from government action or new technology.
The authors describe how these key elements played out in 11 speculative booms since the 1700s:
• French Mississippi Bubble (1719 to 1720)
• British South Sea Bubble (1719 to 1720)
• British Emerging Market Mines Bubble (1824 to 1826)
• U.K. Railway Mania (1844 to1846)
• Australian Land Boom (1886 to 1893)
• The U.K. Bicycle Mania (1895 to 1898)
• U.S. Roaring Twenties (1920 to 1931)
• Japanese stock and real estate bubble (1985 to 1992)
• U.S. Dot-Com Bubble (1995 to 2001)
• U.S. and European Subprime Bubble (2003 to 2010)
• the 2007 and 2015 Chinese stock bubbles.
Some of the many interesting facts they uncover include:
• The word "bubble" originated from Shakespeare in the 'All the world's a stage' speech from his comedy As You Like It. He uses 'bubble' to mean "fragile, empty or worthless, just like a soap bubble." Beginning in 1719, with the South Sea Bubble, writers like Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift used bubble to describe new companies that were worthless.
• Charles Mackay's 1841 book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds gives a vivid account of the foolish speculation during the South Sea Bubble, but it is mostly fiction: almost none of the anecdotes can be substantiated.
• In 2008 The Economist described the British Railway Mania as "arguably the greatest bubble in history."
• During the British Railway Mania of 1848, railway shares rose from constituting 23 percent of total stock market value to 71 percent. So many new speculators began buying railway stocks that 15 new stock exchanges opened in England during the mania to meet the demand. (Half of them shut down when the mania ended.)
• Fueling the railway bubble was the Bank of England's low discount rate. At 2.5 percent in 1844, it was the lowest it had ever been in the 150 years of the bank's history. Investors bought railway stocks to earn a higher yield.
• The Japanese government deliberately sparked the land and stock bubbles during the late 1980s to create a boom. Japan lowered interest rates, gave tax breaks to real estate developers, and allowed banks to accept land as collateral, which increased the amount of lending they could do, which was usually plowed back into more land or stocks.
• The authors believe that the Dot-com bubble during the late 1990s had many good economic benefits, despite the 8-month recession that followed it. The bubble directed a lot of money into innovative companies and motivated smart entrepreneurs to create new companies. It also supplied the capital needed to build internet communications, which have been so critical for our lives today.
• Between 2000 and 2008 in both Ireland and Spain, more than one new home was built for every new inhabitant in the country.
• In the U.K., the bank Northern Rock marketed "Together mortgages," which allowed individuals to borrow up 125 percent of their home value, targeting borrowers who could not afford to buy a home or even furnish it.
• The Chinese stock market bubbles resembled the South Sea and Mississippi bubbles of 1720, where the bubbles were created deliberately to offload government debt into stockholders.
The main lesson from the book is that while bubbles can be blurry during the heat and smoke of a speculative fire, we should look for three key elements: asset marketability, speculation, and leverage.
Quinn and Turner prefer to use the analogy of a FIRE to describe speculative bubbles. A fire is "destructive, self-perpetuating and difficult to control once it begins." And just as a fire needs oxygen, fuel, and heat, a speculative bubble needs assets that are easy to trade (i.e., oxygen), plenty of money and credit (fuel), and speculation (heat). It also needs a spark, which usually comes from government action or new technology.
The authors describe how these key elements played out in 11 speculative booms since the 1700s:
• French Mississippi Bubble (1719 to 1720)
• British South Sea Bubble (1719 to 1720)
• British Emerging Market Mines Bubble (1824 to 1826)
• U.K. Railway Mania (1844 to1846)
• Australian Land Boom (1886 to 1893)
• The U.K. Bicycle Mania (1895 to 1898)
• U.S. Roaring Twenties (1920 to 1931)
• Japanese stock and real estate bubble (1985 to 1992)
• U.S. Dot-Com Bubble (1995 to 2001)
• U.S. and European Subprime Bubble (2003 to 2010)
• the 2007 and 2015 Chinese stock bubbles.
Some of the many interesting facts they uncover include:
• The word "bubble" originated from Shakespeare in the 'All the world's a stage' speech from his comedy As You Like It. He uses 'bubble' to mean "fragile, empty or worthless, just like a soap bubble." Beginning in 1719, with the South Sea Bubble, writers like Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift used bubble to describe new companies that were worthless.
• Charles Mackay's 1841 book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds gives a vivid account of the foolish speculation during the South Sea Bubble, but it is mostly fiction: almost none of the anecdotes can be substantiated.
• In 2008 The Economist described the British Railway Mania as "arguably the greatest bubble in history."
• During the British Railway Mania of 1848, railway shares rose from constituting 23 percent of total stock market value to 71 percent. So many new speculators began buying railway stocks that 15 new stock exchanges opened in England during the mania to meet the demand. (Half of them shut down when the mania ended.)
• Fueling the railway bubble was the Bank of England's low discount rate. At 2.5 percent in 1844, it was the lowest it had ever been in the 150 years of the bank's history. Investors bought railway stocks to earn a higher yield.
• The Japanese government deliberately sparked the land and stock bubbles during the late 1980s to create a boom. Japan lowered interest rates, gave tax breaks to real estate developers, and allowed banks to accept land as collateral, which increased the amount of lending they could do, which was usually plowed back into more land or stocks.
• The authors believe that the Dot-com bubble during the late 1990s had many good economic benefits, despite the 8-month recession that followed it. The bubble directed a lot of money into innovative companies and motivated smart entrepreneurs to create new companies. It also supplied the capital needed to build internet communications, which have been so critical for our lives today.
• Between 2000 and 2008 in both Ireland and Spain, more than one new home was built for every new inhabitant in the country.
• In the U.K., the bank Northern Rock marketed "Together mortgages," which allowed individuals to borrow up 125 percent of their home value, targeting borrowers who could not afford to buy a home or even furnish it.
• The Chinese stock market bubbles resembled the South Sea and Mississippi bubbles of 1720, where the bubbles were created deliberately to offload government debt into stockholders.
The main lesson from the book is that while bubbles can be blurry during the heat and smoke of a speculative fire, we should look for three key elements: asset marketability, speculation, and leverage.
May 4, 2020
This book’s full title is Boom and Bust: A global History of Financial Bubbles by William Quinn and John D. Turner. Since there are no reviews that I can find, I will proceed differently on this review than on others that I have made. I was given an advance copy of this book in PDF form to read.
You can find information on William Quinn here. Information on John D. Turner is here. Neither seems to have any presence online in the form of videos. Both are on Twitter. William Quinn is found here and
John Turner is on found here.
Reading about the problems that Britain had in 1825, you have to wonder if governments and their agencies have learned anything from past crisis. It would appear not. Britain’s handling of the banking crisis and the damage to Latin America was awful in the instability it caused for a long time. Yes, the crisis changed some things, but similar things are still happening.
This book has been written at a good time. The basic cause of the severe 1930 Depression was that people stopped spending. You got to wonder if this will happen once Covid 19 restrictions are lifted. A lot of people have suffered with job losses and lack of money. Who knows what this flu will do in the future and what he government reaction will be? We might have a severe depression if people are reluctant to spend money and to go out when the restrictions are lifted.
I am interested in investing. I do it for a living now, but I have been investing for some time and love reading books on economics and history. This book about economic history is the sort that does appeal to me. That is why I accepted a copy in return for a review. I agreed to read this book and if I like it, I would put a review on my blog and on Good Reads.
One of the things they talk about is market speculation. It would seem that a number of times people have treated the stock market as a casino. I invest for the long term, but I belong to some investment clubs and some do talk about speculation and others talk about investing. Some in the investment clubs, especially the one via meetup are doing day trading. This must be the ultimate in stock market speculation.
We probably all remember the real estate bubble in the US. The real estate bubble also affected Spain and England. You can read about this bubble in this book as it will make most of it understandable to people who are not interested in economics. We can still see the aftermath of that bubble. There is a news item on YouTube that talks about abandoned houses in USA. Here is another video on abandoned houses on YouTube in USA. There is an article about abandoned places in Spain on Quartz.
Most of the bubble situations talked about in the book I had heard of before, including the UK Railway Mania. But I have always been fascinated by UK Railway Mania bubble. Whenever I have read about the building of railways, it seems that shareholder did not make any money from investing in them. I live in Canada, and when it was decided we could not afford to build one railway from coast to coast, we decided to build two. Yes, I know how this sounds, but this is Canada and Canadian history. Our main railways of today, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific, are currently doing just fine for their shareholders. Some things do change.
I believe the first Railways were built in England. I know that problems can arise when you are the first to use new technology. But according to the author, a bubble is started by politics and/or technology. Also, the authors say to have a bubble you need Speculation, Marketability and Money Credit. Then you have a bubble triangle. The authors also talked about why some bubbles caused economic problems and why others did not.
There certainly was speculation going on with the Railway Mania in England. There was lot of excitement because of the building of railways. Lots of petitions to parliament to authorize the building of different railway lines. As the share prices rose, it attracted lots of money, not only from the upper classes, but from the middle and lower classes. The media also had their hand in building excitement for railway shares. Speculators hoped to flip their shares before more capital was called up by the railways.
Marketability has to do, in the case of the Railway Mania case, the granting of corporate charters and the trading of shares. Parliament became more liberal in granting corporate charters to railway companies. The MPs had an electoral incentive to promote the interest of their local constituency. During the mania 15 new stock exchanges opened. So, it was very easy for people to buy and sell shares in the companies.
The last of the bubble triangle is Money Credit. There did not seemed to be much in the way of investors borrowing to buy shares. They really did not need to as investor were issued share certificates. They put some money down and were expected to answer future calls for capital. The down payment on the shares was at first 10% and then it was lowered to 5%. So really, leverage was built into the buying of shares.
So, there you have it. The Railway Mania in England provided all the ingredients for a bubble to form. Now you can get the book and see why this particular bubble caused economic problems for Britain.
You can find information on William Quinn here. Information on John D. Turner is here. Neither seems to have any presence online in the form of videos. Both are on Twitter. William Quinn is found here and
John Turner is on found here.
Reading about the problems that Britain had in 1825, you have to wonder if governments and their agencies have learned anything from past crisis. It would appear not. Britain’s handling of the banking crisis and the damage to Latin America was awful in the instability it caused for a long time. Yes, the crisis changed some things, but similar things are still happening.
This book has been written at a good time. The basic cause of the severe 1930 Depression was that people stopped spending. You got to wonder if this will happen once Covid 19 restrictions are lifted. A lot of people have suffered with job losses and lack of money. Who knows what this flu will do in the future and what he government reaction will be? We might have a severe depression if people are reluctant to spend money and to go out when the restrictions are lifted.
I am interested in investing. I do it for a living now, but I have been investing for some time and love reading books on economics and history. This book about economic history is the sort that does appeal to me. That is why I accepted a copy in return for a review. I agreed to read this book and if I like it, I would put a review on my blog and on Good Reads.
One of the things they talk about is market speculation. It would seem that a number of times people have treated the stock market as a casino. I invest for the long term, but I belong to some investment clubs and some do talk about speculation and others talk about investing. Some in the investment clubs, especially the one via meetup are doing day trading. This must be the ultimate in stock market speculation.
We probably all remember the real estate bubble in the US. The real estate bubble also affected Spain and England. You can read about this bubble in this book as it will make most of it understandable to people who are not interested in economics. We can still see the aftermath of that bubble. There is a news item on YouTube that talks about abandoned houses in USA. Here is another video on abandoned houses on YouTube in USA. There is an article about abandoned places in Spain on Quartz.
Most of the bubble situations talked about in the book I had heard of before, including the UK Railway Mania. But I have always been fascinated by UK Railway Mania bubble. Whenever I have read about the building of railways, it seems that shareholder did not make any money from investing in them. I live in Canada, and when it was decided we could not afford to build one railway from coast to coast, we decided to build two. Yes, I know how this sounds, but this is Canada and Canadian history. Our main railways of today, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific, are currently doing just fine for their shareholders. Some things do change.
I believe the first Railways were built in England. I know that problems can arise when you are the first to use new technology. But according to the author, a bubble is started by politics and/or technology. Also, the authors say to have a bubble you need Speculation, Marketability and Money Credit. Then you have a bubble triangle. The authors also talked about why some bubbles caused economic problems and why others did not.
There certainly was speculation going on with the Railway Mania in England. There was lot of excitement because of the building of railways. Lots of petitions to parliament to authorize the building of different railway lines. As the share prices rose, it attracted lots of money, not only from the upper classes, but from the middle and lower classes. The media also had their hand in building excitement for railway shares. Speculators hoped to flip their shares before more capital was called up by the railways.
Marketability has to do, in the case of the Railway Mania case, the granting of corporate charters and the trading of shares. Parliament became more liberal in granting corporate charters to railway companies. The MPs had an electoral incentive to promote the interest of their local constituency. During the mania 15 new stock exchanges opened. So, it was very easy for people to buy and sell shares in the companies.
The last of the bubble triangle is Money Credit. There did not seemed to be much in the way of investors borrowing to buy shares. They really did not need to as investor were issued share certificates. They put some money down and were expected to answer future calls for capital. The down payment on the shares was at first 10% and then it was lowered to 5%. So really, leverage was built into the buying of shares.
So, there you have it. The Railway Mania in England provided all the ingredients for a bubble to form. Now you can get the book and see why this particular bubble caused economic problems for Britain.
February 1, 2023
In essence, this book consists of a simple, yet good mental model (the bubble triangle) and a detailed chronicle of the most impactful historical bubbles.
I did enjoy reading through it, because of the level of detail - it's great to have such information cumulated in a single place. But there are some elements I missed:
- summarizing practical observations common to all bubbles, e.g., on how to detect them, how to counter them, etc.
- deeper dive on triggering factors (in most cases, except the govt-invented ones): how intentional was the bubble, who was behind it, what were the techniques used to trigger it, etc.
Nevertheless, recommended. Good, interesting stuff.
I did enjoy reading through it, because of the level of detail - it's great to have such information cumulated in a single place. But there are some elements I missed:
- summarizing practical observations common to all bubbles, e.g., on how to detect them, how to counter them, etc.
- deeper dive on triggering factors (in most cases, except the govt-invented ones): how intentional was the bubble, who was behind it, what were the techniques used to trigger it, etc.
Nevertheless, recommended. Good, interesting stuff.
April 18, 2020
The book is very good from historical perspective. There are detailed and interesting observations on bubbles and how they happened. The analysis is detailed and comprehensive. Loved the thoughts on the consequences of bubbles. They seem to be important for the fever of sociey, technology advancement and overall economic progress.
January 1, 2021
A concise and quite informative survey of financial "bubbles". The book uses Kindleberger's definition: "upward price movement over an extended range that then implodes". The authors employ the concept of a "Bubble Triangle" to evaluate the real life cases studied, over the period 1720 to the present. The Bubble Triangle is built of three sides: (i) "marketability" - the "oxygen": the instrument, transactional platform, agents, and practice; (ii) "money & credit" - the "fuel": quantity, price and ease of access; and (iii) "speculation" - the "heat": the pyschology and other facilitating drivers producing strong buying demand within the market beyond fundamentals-justification. The "spark" to the conflagration comes from political and/or technological developments. Whilst the conformity to the model is not perfect in all cases, the authors' approach does provide great insight into common characteristics in the build up and bursting of financial bubbles throughout history.
The book reads easily and is a noteworthy contribution to the literature.
January 14, 2023
Another informative read. I'm not sure I caught all of what he was trying to say (the narrator was also Irish, and that took a little getting used to, because I feel these are complicated topics).
My takeaways: bubbles are impossible to predict. They are comprised of changes in marketability (ppl joining the market, or the ease with which the commodity is traded?), change in technology or policy, and some third thing. Perhaps the last indicator of a bubble is that people who purchase the commodity don't want the commodity itself, but the value it "promises" to produce when sold at a later date.
And, sometimes events that are deemed "a bubble" produce viable economic changes. Indeed, the bicycle bubble of the early 20th century produced conglomerates like RCA, which would later develop radios and televisions.
I was also impressed at the range of bubbles discussed. I had no idea that there was an Australian housing bubble in the 1880s, and I was unaware of the bubbles in Japan in the 1980s/90s, or even the Chinese bubble of the 2010s.
My takeaways: bubbles are impossible to predict. They are comprised of changes in marketability (ppl joining the market, or the ease with which the commodity is traded?), change in technology or policy, and some third thing. Perhaps the last indicator of a bubble is that people who purchase the commodity don't want the commodity itself, but the value it "promises" to produce when sold at a later date.
And, sometimes events that are deemed "a bubble" produce viable economic changes. Indeed, the bicycle bubble of the early 20th century produced conglomerates like RCA, which would later develop radios and televisions.
I was also impressed at the range of bubbles discussed. I had no idea that there was an Australian housing bubble in the 1880s, and I was unaware of the bubbles in Japan in the 1980s/90s, or even the Chinese bubble of the 2010s.
April 29, 2021
Liked the history lesson, but was a bit simplistic, repetitive, and predictable. Read very much like a school paper.
December 31, 2020
This book had much promise. The opening chapter does an excellent job of describing the factors that lead to boom and bust speculation. the discussion of the dot.com bubble and the housing bubble are worth the price of the book. But most of the remaining chapters are disappointing--long discussions of events with not much insight. After a while their structure for each chapter (description of the events, discussion of the causes of the bubble and the consequences of the bubble) become a bit tiresome and it is unclear what lessons we should be learning.
March 20, 2022
버블을 정량적이고 객관적인 조건으로 바라볼 수 있게 역사 속의 버블들을 분석해 놓았다. 시장성 증대, 유동성과 신용의 확대, 투기 심리 이 세 변이 갖춰진 상태에서 정치적인 이니셔티브나 기술 혁신 등의 불꽃이 발생하면서 거대한 버블이 발생한다고 한다. 과거에 보았던 버블 관련 책보다도 훨씬 실질적인 도움을 줄 것 같다. 번역이 너무 엉망인 것이 조금 아쉽지만 정말 좋은 책이다.
March 8, 2022
This was quite an insightful read on the notable financial events since 1720 to the ‘crypto boom’. It was quite interesting to understand the three triangles that create a bubble and how this can be inorganically manufactured either for the benefit or detriment of an economy. Would definitely recommend for anyone working in financial services and the wider public sector!
May 8, 2020
A book that delivers on the promise of the title.
William and John have a hypothesis: three common themes to financial investment bubbles. They set on proving that theory based on a dozen or so boom and bust cycles over the course of three centuries.
It is an interesting journey and provides illuminating insights, but it reads at times a little too repetitive. This is good to bring home a point, hammering it almost into your brain, but makes the book itself a little less enjoyable to read.
Not a perfect score, but still a great book if you like books about investing in general.
William and John have a hypothesis: three common themes to financial investment bubbles. They set on proving that theory based on a dozen or so boom and bust cycles over the course of three centuries.
It is an interesting journey and provides illuminating insights, but it reads at times a little too repetitive. This is good to bring home a point, hammering it almost into your brain, but makes the book itself a little less enjoyable to read.
Not a perfect score, but still a great book if you like books about investing in general.
August 16, 2022
After introducing a (very concise) framework to describe the economic bubbles of the last 300 years, including marketability, money/credit, and speculation (like the fire triangle of Oxygen, Fuel, and Heat), the book profiles a number of historical bubbles. In conclusion, bubbles are difficult to spot if just looking through the lenses of finance and economics. Our current globalized economic system is a “tinderbox” and governments and the media are not particularly trustworthy on putting the brakes on bubbles. It is down to the individual to examine each opportunity “like a fire inspector” in order not to get burned.
March 21, 2021
This brief books argues, via a history of bubbles since the 16th century until today, that the necessary conditions for a bubble are:
1) Marketability--an asset can be bought and sold easily
2) Money and credit--there's money and credit sloshing around
3) Speculation
and either: (i) a technological breakthrough that makes folks believe a prosperous future is inevitable; and (ii) government policy aiming at pumping up an asset (like how the US supports housing).
1) Marketability--an asset can be bought and sold easily
2) Money and credit--there's money and credit sloshing around
3) Speculation
and either: (i) a technological breakthrough that makes folks believe a prosperous future is inevitable; and (ii) government policy aiming at pumping up an asset (like how the US supports housing).
March 25, 2024
Overall this was interesting in that it pulled together disparate histories of bubbles but execution let it down. As others have noted, it was repetitive both within and across chapters. I’m not entirely sure how it won’t FT book of the year, respectfully.
I think it was a missed opportunity to exclude property unless it was associated with stock bubbles or new financial securities - would have laid an interesting lens over a repeated bubble we go through often. Could have been a different or amended framework.
The triangle felt simple but imperfect in that you need marketability or money/credit for speculation but don’t necessarily need speculation for the other two. Political economy and influence was within the triangle but I felt thst outside pressure in might have worked better.
The need for a promotional boom to accompany a price reversal criterion felt reductive to me.
Some of the writing felt jagged: “the boom in share prices and promotion boom were accompanied by a boom in railway periodicals.”
Felt like a hole to laud the Times for its role acting as a watchdog for investors in rail companies, noting its significance and influence as a newspaper, but then at the same time quote a study that the Times had a negligible effect on the market.
Appeared to quote a “commentator” and referenced the authors as source. Felt weird.
Inconsistent in level of pitch - routinely gloss over or discuss complicated topics but then give an ie for mbanks suspending payments’.
Did appreciate inclusion of bicycle bubble as one that had benefits like technological change and social transformation but it took half the book to recognise a benefit for any.
Generally despite referencing much research and the book being on the drivers of bubbles, the writing gave the impression that the authors attribute no irrationality or being possible in efficient markets. Also had some references that even institutional investors were open about their speculative intentions in Dotcom- well no sh*t Sherlock - do people invest in companies to lose money? And if someone is willing to pay and exchange (maybe margin investing as an exception) for a share, is that not efficient?
There was no source for the claim (in reality dribble opinion) that Gordon Brown thought (let alone the impression they give that he explicitly owned and pushed the fact) that bubbles have no major negative economic or social consequences. It’s a ridiculous non-sequitur tying Brown’s oft used no more boom and bust phrase to an assertion that he thinks that bubbles are all rosy, especially given some of the context of the phrase WAS in the context of the Tories past (even if it wasn’t in their complete control) and the inevitable political embellishment in parliament. He could have thought the net benefit was higher in most cases or have been talking about their comparatively stable economic management of the British economy vs the Tories, but no that doesn’t make for as good a click bait writing and tripe that is shitting on Gordon Brown in what was an unfortunately timed tenure as Chancellor.
Perhaps most annoying was that there was very little in broader social and economic consequences for each country and government post bubble. What there was felt tacked on and I think missed a key So what? element.
I think it was a missed opportunity to exclude property unless it was associated with stock bubbles or new financial securities - would have laid an interesting lens over a repeated bubble we go through often. Could have been a different or amended framework.
The triangle felt simple but imperfect in that you need marketability or money/credit for speculation but don’t necessarily need speculation for the other two. Political economy and influence was within the triangle but I felt thst outside pressure in might have worked better.
The need for a promotional boom to accompany a price reversal criterion felt reductive to me.
Some of the writing felt jagged: “the boom in share prices and promotion boom were accompanied by a boom in railway periodicals.”
Felt like a hole to laud the Times for its role acting as a watchdog for investors in rail companies, noting its significance and influence as a newspaper, but then at the same time quote a study that the Times had a negligible effect on the market.
Appeared to quote a “commentator” and referenced the authors as source. Felt weird.
Inconsistent in level of pitch - routinely gloss over or discuss complicated topics but then give an ie for mbanks suspending payments’.
Did appreciate inclusion of bicycle bubble as one that had benefits like technological change and social transformation but it took half the book to recognise a benefit for any.
Generally despite referencing much research and the book being on the drivers of bubbles, the writing gave the impression that the authors attribute no irrationality or being possible in efficient markets. Also had some references that even institutional investors were open about their speculative intentions in Dotcom- well no sh*t Sherlock - do people invest in companies to lose money? And if someone is willing to pay and exchange (maybe margin investing as an exception) for a share, is that not efficient?
There was no source for the claim (in reality dribble opinion) that Gordon Brown thought (let alone the impression they give that he explicitly owned and pushed the fact) that bubbles have no major negative economic or social consequences. It’s a ridiculous non-sequitur tying Brown’s oft used no more boom and bust phrase to an assertion that he thinks that bubbles are all rosy, especially given some of the context of the phrase WAS in the context of the Tories past (even if it wasn’t in their complete control) and the inevitable political embellishment in parliament. He could have thought the net benefit was higher in most cases or have been talking about their comparatively stable economic management of the British economy vs the Tories, but no that doesn’t make for as good a click bait writing and tripe that is shitting on Gordon Brown in what was an unfortunately timed tenure as Chancellor.
Perhaps most annoying was that there was very little in broader social and economic consequences for each country and government post bubble. What there was felt tacked on and I think missed a key So what? element.
March 12, 2024
This book was extremely enjoyable to me, especially as someone who has never read anything like this before. For enjoyment, I've always stuck to fiction, and very very rarely I've picked up like an autobiography or something. I graduated with a Finance degree and I've always been a lover of history, so this was a great intersection for me. I thought that this book was extremely informative and very well researched. The only bubble in this book that I really knew anything about was the '08 subprime bubble, so the vast majority of this was new to me. My favorite bubble talked about in the book was Bicyclemania, which was very cool from a historical and financial perspective. I thought it was impressive how the narrative of cause and effect was explained so thoroughly. There is a lot packed into this short read just over 200 pages.
My only complaints are minor gripes. I think that the dense language made this a slower read for me. I also thought that they could've done a better job explaining certain finance topics, to make it more accessible to the average person. Since this is clearly meant to be a book for academics, it is what it is. They did a good job keeping it interesting for the most part, I did fall off my reading at the great depression. For the most famous bubble ever, you'd think it'd be more interesting, but I could've skipped that part. Lastly, I think that the ladder half of the book got a little repetitive, in the sense that there were "Causes" sections that were pretty much copy paste from bubble to bubble. It also contained a lot of the information that was already in the first part of the chapter. But again, it's supposed to prove their assertion about bubbles correct, so it's still important.
Overall, I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and I would definitely recommend it to anyone interested in the topic.
My only complaints are minor gripes. I think that the dense language made this a slower read for me. I also thought that they could've done a better job explaining certain finance topics, to make it more accessible to the average person. Since this is clearly meant to be a book for academics, it is what it is. They did a good job keeping it interesting for the most part, I did fall off my reading at the great depression. For the most famous bubble ever, you'd think it'd be more interesting, but I could've skipped that part. Lastly, I think that the ladder half of the book got a little repetitive, in the sense that there were "Causes" sections that were pretty much copy paste from bubble to bubble. It also contained a lot of the information that was already in the first part of the chapter. But again, it's supposed to prove their assertion about bubbles correct, so it's still important.
Overall, I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and I would definitely recommend it to anyone interested in the topic.
July 18, 2021
An accessible book, which details what constitutes a bubble, examples of bubbles (including background, causes and consequences) and how to predict bubbles, in a clear voice for a broad audience. Its interesting that there are so many similarities across the bubble examples, to some extent the book can be repetitive here. More generally I think there should be a bit more of a dissection of who exactly is responsible for credit supply, this changes from country to country and overtime, these days central banks are largely independent, so the arguments around political intervention in monetary policy would hold less weight today.
I have two further comments; the book concludes at the bursting of the crypto/bitcoin bubble in 2018. I wonder what the authors make of its resurgence and stubborn price as of July 2021?
There also tends to be a focus on the destruction that is caused by bubbles due to marketability, speculation and the easy credit, but these elements are a critical input to advancing society. The ease in which assets can be traded, the role of speculators in funding innovation (although this is touched on) and central banks role in giving stability and confidence to markets are a necessary component of progress; although perhaps one step back, two steps forward! Although contributors to bubbles, important in their own right.
I have two further comments; the book concludes at the bursting of the crypto/bitcoin bubble in 2018. I wonder what the authors make of its resurgence and stubborn price as of July 2021?
There also tends to be a focus on the destruction that is caused by bubbles due to marketability, speculation and the easy credit, but these elements are a critical input to advancing society. The ease in which assets can be traded, the role of speculators in funding innovation (although this is touched on) and central banks role in giving stability and confidence to markets are a necessary component of progress; although perhaps one step back, two steps forward! Although contributors to bubbles, important in their own right.
January 5, 2021
Great book
Love the overall structure, the buildup per chapter and the way i’portant points are introduced, expanded and then weaved together.
The fire metafor (oxygen/fuel/heat for credit/marketability/speculation) is strong and helps understand the past bubbles better.
The spark, as a catalyst for bubbles, by either tech of gov allows for a usefull dichotomy from a policy perspective, to figure out if bubbles are good or bad for society.
From a practical point of view my takeaways for investing are:
- bubbles happen more often, likely because of higher marketability
- gov AND media have little inventive to burst bubbles
- some old tricks (margin, ban on shortselling, ....) never really get old
Love the overall structure, the buildup per chapter and the way i’portant points are introduced, expanded and then weaved together.
The fire metafor (oxygen/fuel/heat for credit/marketability/speculation) is strong and helps understand the past bubbles better.
The spark, as a catalyst for bubbles, by either tech of gov allows for a usefull dichotomy from a policy perspective, to figure out if bubbles are good or bad for society.
From a practical point of view my takeaways for investing are:
- bubbles happen more often, likely because of higher marketability
- gov AND media have little inventive to burst bubbles
- some old tricks (margin, ban on shortselling, ....) never really get old
March 18, 2021
While I was struggling sometimes to grasp the cause and effect of each bubble on the stock market from 1720 till the 21st century, the central idea was clear: most of them were man-made and fired by the necessity of the main players and the psychology of the crowd. A bright and vidid description of every major crisis on the stock market in this book made it easy to read. I did expect more "revelations", perhaps, a "miracle of an advice" how to recognise a bubble. There is no recipe, alas, rather than think, analyse and be on good terms with the reason.
February 3, 2022
Įdomus skaitinys apie finansinius burbulus per paskutinius 300 metų. Trumpa, aiški ir tiksli teorinė dalis leidžia gerai atpažinti ir aprašyti finansinius burbulus. Jeigu paskutinio šimtmečio daugmaž žinomi, tai Jungtinės Karalystės dviračių ar geležinkelių, Melburno žemės ir nekilnojamojo turto, Lotynų Amerikos kasyklų burbulai visai nepažinti ir įdomūs. Pasirodo bene kiekviena kažkiek revoliucinga technologinė naujovė, kurios tikslią įtaką gyvenimui ateityje sunku nuspėti, dažniausiai sukelia perdėtus lūkesčius, kurie po kurio laiko bliūkšta ir kažkas praranda nemažai pinigų. Puiki knyga.
June 8, 2022
Solid and fast read. Shines a light on market bubbles formed over the previous 300 years. Utilizes a triangle/fire metaphor to highlight the attributing factors that are common across speculative bubbles. (My home town of Adelaide, Australia got a shout out!). Amazing how the human condition continues to manifest in exactly the same way, over many centuries, given the advancements made in academia and technologies.. feels as if we have come so far to remain the same..
January 5, 2021
High quality review of some of the most important financial bubbles in history. I think this book provides a good balance of good data points along with still being accessible to the reader. This book would likely be of much higher interest to those in the financial community than outside of it. I am not sure how well it would appeal to someone that isn't interested in markets.
January 25, 2021
Thorough, lucid, albeit with (admittedly) limited predictive power, William Quinn and John Turner’s ‘Boom and Bust’ is an important contribution to our understanding of financial bubbles. Read my full review here: https://buckysbookreviews.com/2021/01...
November 10, 2021
Clear, easy to follow and well argued overview of a set of financial bubbles over the world's financial history which was largely comprehensible for a layperson like myself to understand (with the caveat that I did have a financial terminology dictionary open in another window). Can't vouch for the veracity of every reading but the cases made are convincing.
April 23, 2022
Money/credit, marketability, and speculation make Johnny into a big financial bubble waiting to pop. Bubbles and the elemental sparks which generate them are illustrated through historical examples, accessibly enough for someone like me to follow (i.e. someone lacking any meaningful depth of knowledge of finance and financial markets), though it gets a tad repetitious in style, at times.
July 27, 2022
An enlivening case book on a number financial bubbles going back 300 years. Readable and illuminating, the book invites further reading, and being well referenced, articles and books are at hand in the end notes and bibliography. I liked the authors’ framework which fostered understanding for a non-economist.
April 2, 2023
Very nice book summarising major crashes of the last 300 years. Each chapter a bubble is examined in detail, with history, causes and then consequences. Each is analysed in framework of “bubble triangle” like the fire triangle where three key elements are needed for the fire/bubble to occur. Nicely written and simple to understand.
March 7, 2021
Interesting framework based on a bubble triangle that consists of marketability, speculation and money/credit; as well as the account of many historical bubbles from the South Sea bubble to the subprime crisis.
June 21, 2021
The simple breakdown of the ingredients that form a bubble, coupled with the detailed explanations of countless cycles of the past 300 years and a dose of hindsight bias makes you wonder... Why do we always find ourselves back in a bubble?
April 13, 2022
This book presents the idea that financial crisis, boom and then busts, require three conditions; marketability (easy access to the public), cheap credit (it's easy to fund activity), and increase speculation. After that, the book has many examples of financial crisis.
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