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The Story of Russia
“This is the essential backstory, the history book that you need if you want to understand modern Russia and its wars with Ukraine, with its neighbors, with America, and with the West.”
―Anne Applebaum, author of Twilight of Democracy and Red Famine
Named a Most Anticipated Book of the Year by Publishers Weekly and Kirkus Reviews
From “the great storyteller of Russian history” ( Financial Times ), a brilliant account of the national mythologies and imperial ideologies that have shaped Russia’s past and politics―essential reading for understanding the country today
The Story of Russia is a fresh approach to the thousand years of Russia’s history, concerned as much with the ideas that have shaped how Russians think about their past as it is with the events and personalities comprising it. No other country has reimagined its own story so often, in a perpetual effort to stay in step with the shifts of ruling ideologies.
From the founding of Kievan Rus in the first millennium to Putin’s war against Ukraine, Orlando Figes explores the ideas that have guided Russia’s actions throughout its long and troubled existence. Whether he's describing the crowning of Ivan the Terrible in a candlelit cathedral or the dramatic upheaval of the peasant revolution, he reveals the impulses, often unappreciated or misunderstood by foreigners, that have driven Russian the medieval myth of Mother Russia’s holy mission to the world; the imperial tendency toward autocratic rule; the popular belief in a paternal tsar dispensing truth and justice; the cult of sacrifice rooted in the idea of the “Russian soul”; and always, the nationalist myth of Russia’s unjust treatment by the West.
How the Russians came to tell their story and to revise it so often as they went along is not only a vital aspect of their history; it is also our best means of understanding how the country thinks and acts today. Based on a lifetime of scholarship and enthrallingly written, The Story of Russia is quintessential sweeping, revelatory, and masterful.
―Anne Applebaum, author of Twilight of Democracy and Red Famine
Named a Most Anticipated Book of the Year by Publishers Weekly and Kirkus Reviews
From “the great storyteller of Russian history” ( Financial Times ), a brilliant account of the national mythologies and imperial ideologies that have shaped Russia’s past and politics―essential reading for understanding the country today
The Story of Russia is a fresh approach to the thousand years of Russia’s history, concerned as much with the ideas that have shaped how Russians think about their past as it is with the events and personalities comprising it. No other country has reimagined its own story so often, in a perpetual effort to stay in step with the shifts of ruling ideologies.
From the founding of Kievan Rus in the first millennium to Putin’s war against Ukraine, Orlando Figes explores the ideas that have guided Russia’s actions throughout its long and troubled existence. Whether he's describing the crowning of Ivan the Terrible in a candlelit cathedral or the dramatic upheaval of the peasant revolution, he reveals the impulses, often unappreciated or misunderstood by foreigners, that have driven Russian the medieval myth of Mother Russia’s holy mission to the world; the imperial tendency toward autocratic rule; the popular belief in a paternal tsar dispensing truth and justice; the cult of sacrifice rooted in the idea of the “Russian soul”; and always, the nationalist myth of Russia’s unjust treatment by the West.
How the Russians came to tell their story and to revise it so often as they went along is not only a vital aspect of their history; it is also our best means of understanding how the country thinks and acts today. Based on a lifetime of scholarship and enthrallingly written, The Story of Russia is quintessential sweeping, revelatory, and masterful.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published September 20, 2022
About the author
Orlando Figes
24 books765 followersOrlando Figes is an English historian of Russia, and a professor of history at Birkbeck, University of London.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 328 reviews
August 22, 2022
This is the book I've been wanting to read about Russia - and Figes is exactly the right person to write it. While this does sweep through the history of the country, the real focus, and what makes this so timely and fascinating, is that it doesn't just tell what happens, but how the cultural myth-making of 'Russia' runs alongside, and sometimes over, the historical material narrative.
This is about how 'Russia' thinks of itself, how it creates its ideological and mythical narratives and what those flashpoints are and have been across millennia, all the way up to the present. Given our current urgency to understand what is happening and how, Figes traces myths of 'Holy Russia' and the deep desire for a patriarchal figure to dominate and control: from the Tsars to Stalin to Putin, to the place of religious patriotism, and the almost masochistic sense of sublimation. This isn't just the story of Russia but the stories that Russia has seemingly always told itself.
Thanks to Bloomsbury for an ARC via NetGalley
This is about how 'Russia' thinks of itself, how it creates its ideological and mythical narratives and what those flashpoints are and have been across millennia, all the way up to the present. Given our current urgency to understand what is happening and how, Figes traces myths of 'Holy Russia' and the deep desire for a patriarchal figure to dominate and control: from the Tsars to Stalin to Putin, to the place of religious patriotism, and the almost masochistic sense of sublimation. This isn't just the story of Russia but the stories that Russia has seemingly always told itself.
Thanks to Bloomsbury for an ARC via NetGalley
October 5, 2022
Russia in a Nutshell.
Orlando Figes is one of the authorities of Russian history. He is also incapable of writing a bad book. So when he writes a full history on the story of Russia and the national myths that make up the nation, it can only hit the mark. This book of course is excellent, by a man passionate and knows his topic.
The Story of Russia is a short volume on Russia’s history, it’s national myths on key events in its history. Such as who is the natural successor to the medieval kingdom of the Kievan Rus and the Byzantium Empire. How living under the Mongols yoke was broken, the consolidation of a state under Ivan IV, the growth under Peter I and Catherine II, the great patriotic wars, the strong days of the USSR and belief that a strong central ruler equals a strong prosperous Russia. A nation that grew 50 square miles per day, every day from Ivan IV to the revolution in 1917.
Figes argues all of this has been building towards the rule of Vladimir Putin, a modern autocracy born in the Soviet Union. A man who has studied Russian History and these myths. A man who believes that areas of the Ukraine long belong to Russia and will stop at nothing to ‘get them back.’
This of course is a fascinating study and goes along way to explain Putin’s actions on the twenty first century. Ultimately this is the focus of the book. It’s a road that leads to the modern day. I couldn’t have thought of anyone better to write this. It is short coming in just over 300 pages, I would have loved the story to be told in a bit more depth. But Figes doesn’t need to, he is aware this has been done many times before, what is unique is he builds all this towards Putin. I really enjoyed this and couldn’t put it down. Figes is always worth reading.
Orlando Figes is one of the authorities of Russian history. He is also incapable of writing a bad book. So when he writes a full history on the story of Russia and the national myths that make up the nation, it can only hit the mark. This book of course is excellent, by a man passionate and knows his topic.
The Story of Russia is a short volume on Russia’s history, it’s national myths on key events in its history. Such as who is the natural successor to the medieval kingdom of the Kievan Rus and the Byzantium Empire. How living under the Mongols yoke was broken, the consolidation of a state under Ivan IV, the growth under Peter I and Catherine II, the great patriotic wars, the strong days of the USSR and belief that a strong central ruler equals a strong prosperous Russia. A nation that grew 50 square miles per day, every day from Ivan IV to the revolution in 1917.
Figes argues all of this has been building towards the rule of Vladimir Putin, a modern autocracy born in the Soviet Union. A man who has studied Russian History and these myths. A man who believes that areas of the Ukraine long belong to Russia and will stop at nothing to ‘get them back.’
This of course is a fascinating study and goes along way to explain Putin’s actions on the twenty first century. Ultimately this is the focus of the book. It’s a road that leads to the modern day. I couldn’t have thought of anyone better to write this. It is short coming in just over 300 pages, I would have loved the story to be told in a bit more depth. But Figes doesn’t need to, he is aware this has been done many times before, what is unique is he builds all this towards Putin. I really enjoyed this and couldn’t put it down. Figes is always worth reading.
January 9, 2023
Съвременната руска политика твърде често е анализирана без достатъчно разбиране на руската история. Два пъти през ХХ век, в 1917 и 1991, автократичната държава е разбита само за да бъде преродена в различна форма. Обществените сили се оказват твърде слаби и разделени за затвърждаване на демократично правителство.
Историята на Русия винаги е била политически обременена. Даването на примери от минали събития и до днес е ефективен начин за печелене на аргументи. В същото време историята на Русия е обвита от митове, които трябва да се познават. Дори произходът на руския народ е обект на дебат. Дали водещи при формиране на Киевска Русия през двевети век са били славяните или викингите (варяги)? Отговорът се е променял няколко пъти в исторически план според актуалната политическа конюнктура. Учудващо, но фигурата на Петър Велики създава дълбоко разделение в руското общество. Едни разглеждат неговите реформи за отваряне към Европа като спасение, а други - като поемане по грешен път. Дори преди революцията от 1917 г. руската история е внимателно цензурирана с цел да се предотврати разпространението на потенциално опасни идеи и факти, т.е. всичко, което ще представи авторитаризма в негативна светлина.
Налагането на митове явно се случва успешно, защото в анкета от 2007 г. около 70% от руснаците смятат, че Феликс Дзержински, основателят на Чека (предшественик на НКВД и КГБ), е "защитил публичния ред и обществения живот". Само 7% го смятат за "убиец и екзекутор". Още по-смущаващо е, че в същата анкета почти две трети от запитаните признават масовите репресии на Сталин върху собствения му народ, но въпреки това го определят ролята му като "позитивна" за страната. И днес има хора, които смятат, че Съветският съюз влиза във войната (Великата отечествена) през лятото на 1941 г. Периодът между пакта Молотов-Рибентроп и операция Барбароса (1939 - 1941 г.) неудобно се премълчава, а поставянето на въпроси за него дори може да бъде обект на съдебно преследване. Тъжният извод е, че пропагандата действа. Промиването на мозъци дава закономерен резултат.
Прочетете новата книга на изтъкнатия историк Орландо Файджис, за да не бъдете заблудени от многобройните митове в руската история.
Историята на Русия винаги е била политически обременена. Даването на примери от минали събития и до днес е ефективен начин за печелене на аргументи. В същото време историята на Русия е обвита от митове, които трябва да се познават. Дори произходът на руския народ е обект на дебат. Дали водещи при формиране на Киевска Русия през двевети век са били славяните или викингите (варяги)? Отговорът се е променял няколко пъти в исторически план според актуалната политическа конюнктура. Учудващо, но фигурата на Петър Велики създава дълбоко разделение в руското общество. Едни разглеждат неговите реформи за отваряне към Европа като спасение, а други - като поемане по грешен път. Дори преди революцията от 1917 г. руската история е внимателно цензурирана с цел да се предотврати разпространението на потенциално опасни идеи и факти, т.е. всичко, което ще представи авторитаризма в негативна светлина.
Налагането на митове явно се случва успешно, защото в анкета от 2007 г. около 70% от руснаците смятат, че Феликс Дзержински, основателят на Чека (предшественик на НКВД и КГБ), е "защитил публичния ред и обществения живот". Само 7% го смятат за "убиец и екзекутор". Още по-смущаващо е, че в същата анкета почти две трети от запитаните признават масовите репресии на Сталин върху собствения му народ, но въпреки това го определят ролята му като "позитивна" за страната. И днес има хора, които смятат, че Съветският съюз влиза във войната (Великата отечествена) през лятото на 1941 г. Периодът между пакта Молотов-Рибентроп и операция Барбароса (1939 - 1941 г.) неудобно се премълчава, а поставянето на въпроси за него дори може да бъде обект на съдебно преследване. Тъжният извод е, че пропагандата действа. Промиването на мозъци дава закономерен резултат.
Прочетете новата книга на изтъкнатия историк Орландо Файджис, за да не бъдете заблудени от многобройните митове в руската история.
November 19, 2023
This is great - not too long and not too short: with lots of information for the relatively uniformed. A juicy record of Russia's past rather than an academic account.
The story starts with a Vladimir (the Great) and ends with a Vladimir (the ex-KGB invader of Ukraine) and in between the long list of invaders of Russia. One does get an inkling of why Russia might just be a little mistrusting of all around them.
I enjoyed this more than I thought I might.
The story starts with a Vladimir (the Great) and ends with a Vladimir (the ex-KGB invader of Ukraine) and in between the long list of invaders of Russia. One does get an inkling of why Russia might just be a little mistrusting of all around them.
I enjoyed this more than I thought I might.
August 28, 2023
Figes does not dissapoint the reader with this account of the history of Russian's self perception. Providing the reader with a series of richly detailed overviews from different crucial periods of Russian history, links are made to how the historical development of Russia during these periods coincides with its current situation today.
With cool-headed objectivity, Figes presents a flawless historical analysis of the development of the myths that contributed to the creation of the modern Russian identity and how Russians perceive it. Among other factors, Figes gives an analysis of Russia's expansion across the Eurasian landmass which contributed to its imperial identity as well as the historical development its authoritarian political system.
"The Story of Russia" is a more then essential read for everyone who wishes to increase his/her understanding of Russia and the general mentality of its citizenry. A more then welcome development for a future relationship between a Russia which will hopefully be able to remove the shackles of its troubled past as well as its tyrannical present leadership and the rest of the world.
With cool-headed objectivity, Figes presents a flawless historical analysis of the development of the myths that contributed to the creation of the modern Russian identity and how Russians perceive it. Among other factors, Figes gives an analysis of Russia's expansion across the Eurasian landmass which contributed to its imperial identity as well as the historical development its authoritarian political system.
"The Story of Russia" is a more then essential read for everyone who wishes to increase his/her understanding of Russia and the general mentality of its citizenry. A more then welcome development for a future relationship between a Russia which will hopefully be able to remove the shackles of its troubled past as well as its tyrannical present leadership and the rest of the world.
September 5, 2022
I had second thoughts about reading this book after reading a review of it in the Guardian. But I did give him a chance, and I have to say that this book hits all the right notes; it isn't pretentious, and it has a very nice style.
One of the best texts I've read to introduce myself to Russian culture and history. The chapter on "ван асилeви" is extremely fascinating. The book ends around April 2022, so the chapters about recent history are excellent, but I doubt it will be appreciated in Russia's "imperialist milieu."
Anyone who wants to gain a better understanding of Russia and its future direction should read this book, in my opinion.
One of the best texts I've read to introduce myself to Russian culture and history. The chapter on "ван асилeви" is extremely fascinating. The book ends around April 2022, so the chapters about recent history are excellent, but I doubt it will be appreciated in Russia's "imperialist milieu."
Anyone who wants to gain a better understanding of Russia and its future direction should read this book, in my opinion.
July 25, 2023
Very good if you're looking for:
- a brief book
- that goes through the whole span of Russia's history
- 100% history - objective facts instead of commentary & sociopolitics
I admit that I find the first 70% the most valuable - the origins of Russia, the role of Kievan Rus, the impact of Mongols' rule (300 years!), pivot moments (like the battle of Poltava) & the most important rulers (Ivan IV, Katherine the 2nd, Peter the Great) - there are tons of good stuff here. It gets substantially worse (or rather - insufficient) since WWI - at least it was like that in my case: I guess I've already read too much on the October Revolution, WWII & communism era.
4.3 stars, but rounded up to 5, because of a great value to time ratio.
- a brief book
- that goes through the whole span of Russia's history
- 100% history - objective facts instead of commentary & sociopolitics
I admit that I find the first 70% the most valuable - the origins of Russia, the role of Kievan Rus, the impact of Mongols' rule (300 years!), pivot moments (like the battle of Poltava) & the most important rulers (Ivan IV, Katherine the 2nd, Peter the Great) - there are tons of good stuff here. It gets substantially worse (or rather - insufficient) since WWI - at least it was like that in my case: I guess I've already read too much on the October Revolution, WWII & communism era.
4.3 stars, but rounded up to 5, because of a great value to time ratio.
January 18, 2023
Not only is this a relatively brief (302 pages) history of Russia’s first 1,000 years, but the author wrote it intentionally to highlight those aspects of Russia’s past upon which President Putin is drawing to support his ongoing invasion of Ukraine, a task which he does extremely well.
In the process, he illustrates the foolishness behind any peoples’ claim to be of pure stock, whether that be like Hitler’s foolishness in touting the Aryan race or with Putin’s assertion that Ukrainians are part of great Russia.
Professor Figes, who has written several books about Russia, does us all the great favor of reminding us that there is much that is legitimate in Putin’s grievances against the West. While such do not justify his invasion of Ukraine, they remind us that there are, indeed, much larger issues at play than just Russia vs. Ukraine.
Indeed, Figes argues – and I think the historical facts support him – that “during his first term in office, Putin looked to further Russia’s integration with the West. In interviews he spelled out his vision of the country as ‘part of western European culture’ and said that he was open to the possibility of Russia joining NATO and the European Union. Everything depended on how Western institutions would respond, on how NATO, in particular, would act in regions where the Russians had security concerns, historic links and sensitivities which, if offended or ignored, might provoke an aggressive response from Moscow…. [This] was a recurring pattern running right through Russian history since at least the eighteenth century. Russia wanted to be part of Europe, to be treated with respect. But if it was rejected by the West’s leader, or if they humiliated it, Russia would rebuild itself and arm itself against the West.”
Unfortunately, Figes argues, and again I agree with him, NATO and the European Union essentially “blew it.” “Instead of trying to bring Russia into new security arrangements for Europe,” he writes, NATO kept it isolated. The US and its North Atlantic allies acted as if the Cold War had been ‘won’ by them, and that Russia, the ‘defeated’ power, need not be consulted on the consequences of the Soviet collapse in regions where the Russians had historic interest. The effect of Western actions was to reinforce the Russians’ own resentments of the West. On the back of years of anti-Western propaganda during the Cold War it did not take a lot to persuade them that a hostile West refused to recognize their country as an equal and took advantage of its current weakness to diminish it. This was the basis on which Putin built his anti-Western ideology.”
In making such an analysis, Figes is clearly not in any way justifying or supporting Putin’s actions in Ukraine. But he is doing something very important by reminding us that situation A of our “now” did not just pop up out of nowhere with no context or history but, rather, that all of “the present” is a product of “the past.” Moreover, if we wish to understand and resolve current issues it is essential that we understand and respect those which preceded them.
Unfortunately, the gulf between the West’s collective understanding of what is going on in Ukraine and Putin’s – and to a large extent, the Russian peoples’ – view of it is so damned wide, that it is truly hard to envision ways in which this particular nasty genie is ever “put back into its bottle.”
Putin’s View of Russia and “Russianness”
Greater Russia and the “Russian people”
There is an old Soviet joke – with renewed aptness for today – that said, in essence, “The future is fairly predictable, what is impossible to understand is the past.” And the reason for this droll observation is that Russians – especially its statist and religious rulers – have always and repeatedly interpreted the past to support their present!
But not all of, perhaps even not even most of this, was to intentionally deceive or misrepresent, for the mists of time make distinguishing exactly what happened 1,000 years ago very difficult.
Take the very origin of “the Russians” themselves. The great territorial swath that is Russia today – and which had been both Tsarist and Soviet Russia for hundreds of years – began very modestly in Kievan Rus, an entity centered around the now Ukrainian city of Kiev. Who were these people? Slavic peoples originally from central Asia, most likely, with a smattering of other Europeans. Later, as Moscow (Muscovy) came into existence and Kiev itself became less important as other cities, such as Novgorod, gained in status, it appears that a significant number of Northmen – i.e. Vikings – came to intermingle with the population.
In these early years, not only was there not “one people,” there was not even a “state.” Governance remained highly local and, unlike in Europe at the time, without many over-arching loyalties towards someone calling themselves “king” or “ruler.”
What is important to note from these times, however, was the close, ongoing, but not always friendly relationship between the peoples living in today’s central Europe – including the western lands of today’s Ukraine – and those in today’s eastern Europe – eastern Ukraine and western Russia. Like many in medieval western Europe their primary experiences and loyalties lay with their home city, and not primarily with any larger region or statist entity.
It took centuries for the tsars as we tend to think of them – autocratic rulers over large territories – to come into being. In the earliest years, the tsars of Muscovy asserted more authority and control than they actually had but, over time, they began to extend their territory north, south, east and west. And, in doing so, they encountered hostile pushbacks from other peoples – in fact, such contact was often occasioned by those other peoples crowding into “Russian” lands.
So, to the north, Russia for centuries struggled against Sweden in an effort to secure access to the Baltic Sea. In the more central lands west of Russia she frequently encountered – as did the Ukrainians (who never had their own “state” until modern times) – both Poland and Lithuania. Today’s resentments by both the Poles, Lithuanians, and Baltic republics date back centuries, as these were also the very lands over which titanic struggles were waged in the first and second world wars of the 20th century. And for the very same reasons: relatively flat lands with no natural boundaries but teeming with abundant resources, these were prizes that would give their “owners” rich access to things both desirable and necessary.
In the Middle Ages, the Russians asserted that there were three groups of “Russians”: the Great Russians of Russia proper, the White Russians of Ukraine, and the Little Russians of Lithuania.
And Russia also long longed for access to the seas in the south, too, which explains its centuries-long obsession with the Crimean Peninsula as key to the Baltic Sea and, through Constantinople (Istanbul today) to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. But to get there and remain, they had to conquer several Turkic and Mongol descendant tribes living there.
And to the east, the increasingly empty, incredibly broad stretch of land reaching to the Pacific Ocean, Russia also fought local residents in order to expand her reach.
Russia “won” most of this vast territory in the course of a few hundred years beginning in the 17th century, and these are the times when some of her most powerful and celebrated Tsars reigned, including such figures as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
Russia as the “Third Rome”
Most of the territory of Russia – at any phase of its expansion – was occupied by peasants and, like peasants everywhere seemingly, they were very pious. The land was holy, and – pagan or Christian – they tended to be quite devout.
The early tsars recognized the value that would accrue to them if they could harness this piety as but another means to tether the loyalty of the people to the throne. They checked out the religious faiths of the Turks (Muslims), the West (Rome) and the East (Constantinople), and eventually settled upon the Greek Orthodox tradition – that embraced and followed throughout the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople – as the one most compatible. They frankly regarded Western Christianity, with its headquarters in Rome, as corrupt, just as the City of Rome – the First Rome – had fallen into disrepair. Constantinople was the Second Rome but, after it fell to the Turks in 1453, the tsars and their Eastern Orthodox patriarchs happily proclaimed that now Moscow was the Third – and last – Rome. This assertion was part of the tzars’ reasoning that Moscow – indeed, Russia – was head of all true Christians, especially the various Slavic peoples who also adhered to Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
Together with how the Tzars came to frame the Russian people as those true Russians of blood wherever they lived, so also did this claim about Moscow being the Third Rome reinforce their understanding of their sacred duty towards all Eastern Orthodox adherents as being their protectors. These two ideas – the universalism of Russia and her obligations flowing from her status as the Third Rome help explain her centuries-long interest in central and eastern Europe as well as the Slavic and Balkan states to her south.
No Separation of Church and State
Unlike in the West, there was no tradition from the very beginning of different “realms” of authority for the state vis-à-vis the church. In reality, in Russia the Church has always been subordinate to the political wishes of the Tsar and, as is clear today from the Patriarch of Moscow’s endorsement of Putin’s efforts in Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church has repeatedly played a key role in reinforcing the concept of the absolute loyalty Russian people owe to their statist sovereign, whether that be a tzar, the head of the Soviet Union, or the current president of Russia.
The lack of what Figes terms “the building blocks of democracy”
One of the reasons why Putin is able to rule as he does is that – like most Russian leaders before him – he does not have to contend with the pesky realities of a free press nor, very importantly, any strong, relatively independent bodies, whether political, economic, or social. Russia never developed the tradition of strong labor unions, for example, which can wield some semblance of countervailing power to that of the state. Nor was there a legacy of strong city or regional governments that functioned independent of the central government – everything had long been centralized, although as Figes makes clear this is far from implying efficient direction or administration from the tzarist structure.
Because of this, and because the tradition of “what the tzar/commissar/president” says must be obeyed and, moreover, must be the truth, Putin – like other heads of the Soviet and Russian states before him – is quite able to weave his own interpretation of “the facts” so that the majority of the Russian people accept, if not always believe, them.
In sum, Putin’s arguments are not without a basis in history, even if he is also dipping deep into the mythology long relied upon by Russia’s rulers, and the proven ability of his people to absorb tremendous sufferings and hardships – plus the legacy of great human loss during war – means that any hopes in the West for a “short” war, or the idea that Putin will soon “give up,” are baseless.
How Might This Impasse – this Gulf of Misunderstanding – Be Resolved?
I wish to add the following: For all of these reasons, I believe only a bold effort by the United States to implement a broad discussion concerning future European security for all the countries of Europe – very much including Russia – has a chance to essentially “reset” the stage for the kind of settlement that can bring sustainable peace to the continent. Note that such an effort would not be centered on Ukraine but, rather, on attaining the kind of inclusion of Russia as an equal partner in European affairs.
Unfortunately, I don’t believe this idea has a snowflake’s chance in hell because of the rigid postures of both sides. President Biden – unlike his French and German counterparts – appears to regard all of Putin’s concern about Western encroachment and the dismissal of Russia’s “rightful place” as lacking any merit whatsoever.
Thus, not only will the suffering and tragedy of Ukraine likely continue, but so will the stand-off between Russia and “the West.”
A true – and unnecessary – tragedy!
In the process, he illustrates the foolishness behind any peoples’ claim to be of pure stock, whether that be like Hitler’s foolishness in touting the Aryan race or with Putin’s assertion that Ukrainians are part of great Russia.
Professor Figes, who has written several books about Russia, does us all the great favor of reminding us that there is much that is legitimate in Putin’s grievances against the West. While such do not justify his invasion of Ukraine, they remind us that there are, indeed, much larger issues at play than just Russia vs. Ukraine.
Indeed, Figes argues – and I think the historical facts support him – that “during his first term in office, Putin looked to further Russia’s integration with the West. In interviews he spelled out his vision of the country as ‘part of western European culture’ and said that he was open to the possibility of Russia joining NATO and the European Union. Everything depended on how Western institutions would respond, on how NATO, in particular, would act in regions where the Russians had security concerns, historic links and sensitivities which, if offended or ignored, might provoke an aggressive response from Moscow…. [This] was a recurring pattern running right through Russian history since at least the eighteenth century. Russia wanted to be part of Europe, to be treated with respect. But if it was rejected by the West’s leader, or if they humiliated it, Russia would rebuild itself and arm itself against the West.”
Unfortunately, Figes argues, and again I agree with him, NATO and the European Union essentially “blew it.” “Instead of trying to bring Russia into new security arrangements for Europe,” he writes, NATO kept it isolated. The US and its North Atlantic allies acted as if the Cold War had been ‘won’ by them, and that Russia, the ‘defeated’ power, need not be consulted on the consequences of the Soviet collapse in regions where the Russians had historic interest. The effect of Western actions was to reinforce the Russians’ own resentments of the West. On the back of years of anti-Western propaganda during the Cold War it did not take a lot to persuade them that a hostile West refused to recognize their country as an equal and took advantage of its current weakness to diminish it. This was the basis on which Putin built his anti-Western ideology.”
In making such an analysis, Figes is clearly not in any way justifying or supporting Putin’s actions in Ukraine. But he is doing something very important by reminding us that situation A of our “now” did not just pop up out of nowhere with no context or history but, rather, that all of “the present” is a product of “the past.” Moreover, if we wish to understand and resolve current issues it is essential that we understand and respect those which preceded them.
Unfortunately, the gulf between the West’s collective understanding of what is going on in Ukraine and Putin’s – and to a large extent, the Russian peoples’ – view of it is so damned wide, that it is truly hard to envision ways in which this particular nasty genie is ever “put back into its bottle.”
Putin’s View of Russia and “Russianness”
Greater Russia and the “Russian people”
There is an old Soviet joke – with renewed aptness for today – that said, in essence, “The future is fairly predictable, what is impossible to understand is the past.” And the reason for this droll observation is that Russians – especially its statist and religious rulers – have always and repeatedly interpreted the past to support their present!
But not all of, perhaps even not even most of this, was to intentionally deceive or misrepresent, for the mists of time make distinguishing exactly what happened 1,000 years ago very difficult.
Take the very origin of “the Russians” themselves. The great territorial swath that is Russia today – and which had been both Tsarist and Soviet Russia for hundreds of years – began very modestly in Kievan Rus, an entity centered around the now Ukrainian city of Kiev. Who were these people? Slavic peoples originally from central Asia, most likely, with a smattering of other Europeans. Later, as Moscow (Muscovy) came into existence and Kiev itself became less important as other cities, such as Novgorod, gained in status, it appears that a significant number of Northmen – i.e. Vikings – came to intermingle with the population.
In these early years, not only was there not “one people,” there was not even a “state.” Governance remained highly local and, unlike in Europe at the time, without many over-arching loyalties towards someone calling themselves “king” or “ruler.”
What is important to note from these times, however, was the close, ongoing, but not always friendly relationship between the peoples living in today’s central Europe – including the western lands of today’s Ukraine – and those in today’s eastern Europe – eastern Ukraine and western Russia. Like many in medieval western Europe their primary experiences and loyalties lay with their home city, and not primarily with any larger region or statist entity.
It took centuries for the tsars as we tend to think of them – autocratic rulers over large territories – to come into being. In the earliest years, the tsars of Muscovy asserted more authority and control than they actually had but, over time, they began to extend their territory north, south, east and west. And, in doing so, they encountered hostile pushbacks from other peoples – in fact, such contact was often occasioned by those other peoples crowding into “Russian” lands.
So, to the north, Russia for centuries struggled against Sweden in an effort to secure access to the Baltic Sea. In the more central lands west of Russia she frequently encountered – as did the Ukrainians (who never had their own “state” until modern times) – both Poland and Lithuania. Today’s resentments by both the Poles, Lithuanians, and Baltic republics date back centuries, as these were also the very lands over which titanic struggles were waged in the first and second world wars of the 20th century. And for the very same reasons: relatively flat lands with no natural boundaries but teeming with abundant resources, these were prizes that would give their “owners” rich access to things both desirable and necessary.
In the Middle Ages, the Russians asserted that there were three groups of “Russians”: the Great Russians of Russia proper, the White Russians of Ukraine, and the Little Russians of Lithuania.
And Russia also long longed for access to the seas in the south, too, which explains its centuries-long obsession with the Crimean Peninsula as key to the Baltic Sea and, through Constantinople (Istanbul today) to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. But to get there and remain, they had to conquer several Turkic and Mongol descendant tribes living there.
And to the east, the increasingly empty, incredibly broad stretch of land reaching to the Pacific Ocean, Russia also fought local residents in order to expand her reach.
Russia “won” most of this vast territory in the course of a few hundred years beginning in the 17th century, and these are the times when some of her most powerful and celebrated Tsars reigned, including such figures as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
Russia as the “Third Rome”
Most of the territory of Russia – at any phase of its expansion – was occupied by peasants and, like peasants everywhere seemingly, they were very pious. The land was holy, and – pagan or Christian – they tended to be quite devout.
The early tsars recognized the value that would accrue to them if they could harness this piety as but another means to tether the loyalty of the people to the throne. They checked out the religious faiths of the Turks (Muslims), the West (Rome) and the East (Constantinople), and eventually settled upon the Greek Orthodox tradition – that embraced and followed throughout the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople – as the one most compatible. They frankly regarded Western Christianity, with its headquarters in Rome, as corrupt, just as the City of Rome – the First Rome – had fallen into disrepair. Constantinople was the Second Rome but, after it fell to the Turks in 1453, the tsars and their Eastern Orthodox patriarchs happily proclaimed that now Moscow was the Third – and last – Rome. This assertion was part of the tzars’ reasoning that Moscow – indeed, Russia – was head of all true Christians, especially the various Slavic peoples who also adhered to Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
Together with how the Tzars came to frame the Russian people as those true Russians of blood wherever they lived, so also did this claim about Moscow being the Third Rome reinforce their understanding of their sacred duty towards all Eastern Orthodox adherents as being their protectors. These two ideas – the universalism of Russia and her obligations flowing from her status as the Third Rome help explain her centuries-long interest in central and eastern Europe as well as the Slavic and Balkan states to her south.
No Separation of Church and State
Unlike in the West, there was no tradition from the very beginning of different “realms” of authority for the state vis-à-vis the church. In reality, in Russia the Church has always been subordinate to the political wishes of the Tsar and, as is clear today from the Patriarch of Moscow’s endorsement of Putin’s efforts in Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church has repeatedly played a key role in reinforcing the concept of the absolute loyalty Russian people owe to their statist sovereign, whether that be a tzar, the head of the Soviet Union, or the current president of Russia.
The lack of what Figes terms “the building blocks of democracy”
One of the reasons why Putin is able to rule as he does is that – like most Russian leaders before him – he does not have to contend with the pesky realities of a free press nor, very importantly, any strong, relatively independent bodies, whether political, economic, or social. Russia never developed the tradition of strong labor unions, for example, which can wield some semblance of countervailing power to that of the state. Nor was there a legacy of strong city or regional governments that functioned independent of the central government – everything had long been centralized, although as Figes makes clear this is far from implying efficient direction or administration from the tzarist structure.
Because of this, and because the tradition of “what the tzar/commissar/president” says must be obeyed and, moreover, must be the truth, Putin – like other heads of the Soviet and Russian states before him – is quite able to weave his own interpretation of “the facts” so that the majority of the Russian people accept, if not always believe, them.
In sum, Putin’s arguments are not without a basis in history, even if he is also dipping deep into the mythology long relied upon by Russia’s rulers, and the proven ability of his people to absorb tremendous sufferings and hardships – plus the legacy of great human loss during war – means that any hopes in the West for a “short” war, or the idea that Putin will soon “give up,” are baseless.
How Might This Impasse – this Gulf of Misunderstanding – Be Resolved?
I wish to add the following: For all of these reasons, I believe only a bold effort by the United States to implement a broad discussion concerning future European security for all the countries of Europe – very much including Russia – has a chance to essentially “reset” the stage for the kind of settlement that can bring sustainable peace to the continent. Note that such an effort would not be centered on Ukraine but, rather, on attaining the kind of inclusion of Russia as an equal partner in European affairs.
Unfortunately, I don’t believe this idea has a snowflake’s chance in hell because of the rigid postures of both sides. President Biden – unlike his French and German counterparts – appears to regard all of Putin’s concern about Western encroachment and the dismissal of Russia’s “rightful place” as lacking any merit whatsoever.
Thus, not only will the suffering and tragedy of Ukraine likely continue, but so will the stand-off between Russia and “the West.”
A true – and unnecessary – tragedy!
January 27, 2023
Russlandkunde (in dt. Übersetzung gelesen).
Kurzmeinung: Angenehm zu lesen.
Während der Lektüre von Orlando Figes kam mir des Öfteren der Klassiker von Heinrich Mann „Der Untertan“ in den Sinn. Warum nur? „Patriotismus, Kollektivismus und Unterwerfung sind die traditionellen Werte Russlands“, sagt Putin 1999. Und er meint es so.
Russland ist ein Land mit einer vielfältigen und wechselhaften Geschichte. Sie ist nicht weniger gewalttätig als die vieler anderer Länder. Doch zeichnet sie sich dadurch aus, dass das große Land bis heute fast durchgängig diktatorisch- autokratisch regiert wurde. Der Kommunismus, der das Land erschütterte, hat die diktatorischen Strukturen nicht abgeschüttelt, im Gegenteil! Lenin, vor allem aber Stalin herrschten als Vorsitzende eines Einparteienstaats mit genauso harter Hand wie die einst Russlands Zaren, sogar noch gewaltsamer, noch willkürlicher, von Paranoia gesteuert.
Bis heute hat es sich gehalten, dass in Russland nicht der Staat die Bürger schützt, sondern die Bürger den Staat (In Kriegen wird auf Quantität gesetzt; rücksichtsloser Menschenverschleiß), das heißt dann: die große Opferbereitschaft Russlands und wird entsprechend hochgehängt. Patriotismus und Volkstum ist gesetzt. Antisemitismus und Xenophobie werden systematisch geschürt, ein freies Russland hat es nie gegeben. Der Glaube daran, dass ein Regent sakrosankt ist, gehört zu den traditionellen Werten, die Väterchen Putin wieder hochhält. „Kein anderes Land der Welt hat aus den eigenen Herrschern so viele Heilige fabriziert. In keinem anderen ist Macht so stark sakralisiert worden“, schreibt Figes. Ein weiteres Zitat: „Das System der Abhängigkeit vom Herrscher hat sich bis heute gehalten. Putins Oligarchen sind völlig von seinem Willen abhängig.“
Orlando Figes holt weit aus, geht zurück bis in die Anfänge der Kiewer Rus und durchläuft sämtliche nennenswerten Regenten. Um „Eine Geschichte Russlands“ zu lesen, braucht es also ein echtes Interesse für Geschichte. Wenn man dies aufbringt, bekommt man einen Schnellkursus in russischer Geschichte, deren Stoff in Deutschlands Schulen mehr als unterbelichtet ist. Von Peter dem Großen und Katharina der Großen hat man schon einmal etwas gehört, aber auch nichts Genaues und dann verließen sie ihn. Wenn, wie Wikipedia kundtut Stefan Plaggenborg (ein anderer Historiker) meint, Figes „habe sich verhoben bei dem Versuch, aus tausend Jahren russischer Geschichte heutige Verhältnisse zu erhellen“, will ich dem widersprechen.
„Eine Geschichte Russlands“ mag dem wissenschaftlichen Standard, den man für die Veröffentlichung in einer Fachzeitschrift anlegt, nicht entsprechen, doch es ist ja ein Sachbuch für Laien. Dankenswerterweise hat Figes auch auf die von der Wissenschaft so geliebten Schachtelsätze mit vor- und nachgeschobenen Einschüben vor jedem Substantiv verzichtet, so dass man Figes Sätze nicht entzippen muss wie die seiner Kollegen. Dass dabei trotzdem ein hochwertiges Werk herausgekommen ist, zeigt, dass man sehr wohl für den Laien niveauvoll schreiben kann. Mut zur Lücke ist dabei natürlich unerlässlich. Inhaltlich ist „Eine Geschichte Russlands“ gestrafft; so bleibt sie übersichtlich.
Russland sah und sieht sich als hehrer Wächter einzigartiger Ideale, „Russland als Wächter, der Europa vor den „asiatischen Horden“ beschützt, wurde seit dem 17. Jahrhundert Bestandteil des nationalen Mythos.“ „Der Kommunismus verlieh dem Land eine neue messianische Rolle“.
Figes beschreibt die Leibeigenschaft der Bauern genauso wie ihre Auslieferung unter spätere kommunistische Behörden; ein Beamter ist nicht dem Volk gegenüber verantwortlich, sondern nur seinem Vorgesetzten gegenüber verpflichtet. Deshalb gibt es keine Rücktritte von Verantwortungsträgern. Misswirtschaft und Zwangskollektivierung führten zu grauenhaften Hungersnöten.
Die Rolle der Orthodoxie wird beleuchtet, die sich unkritisch unter die Staatspolitik beugt („Im Mythos von der russischen Seele steckt ein messianisches Konzept“); das unmenschliche System der Kollektivschuld wie auch die Besiedlung Russlands Norden fast ausschließlich durch den Gulag (Zwangslager, Zwangsarbeit, Zwangsumsiedlungen), in den verschleppt wird, wer ethnisch nicht passt oder sonst wie auffällt, jetzt zum Beispiel sind es Tausende von ukrainischen Bürgern und ihre Kinder) und vieles mehr, zeigt Figes auf.
Systematische Desinformation und Geschichtsverfälschungen führen dazu, dass die Bürger eines Landes, an dessen Grenzen seit mehr als 30 Jahren keiner mehr Hand anlegte, sich in einem Verteidigungskampf zu befinden glauben. Der letzte Bogen bis in die Neuzeit ist ein bisschen kurz und besorgt. Aber wer kann schon in die Zukunft sehen? Immerhin wagt Figes einen Ausblick und gibt eine Beurteilung ab:
„Es ist ein unnötiger Krieg, geboren aus Mythen und Putins verdrehter Deutung seiner Landesgeschichte. Wenn er nicht bald beendet wird, wird er das Beste in Russland zerstören.“
Fazit: Unerlässliche Faktenkunde.
Kategorie: Sachbuch. Geschichte.
Verlag: Klett-Cotta, 2022
Kurzmeinung: Angenehm zu lesen.
Während der Lektüre von Orlando Figes kam mir des Öfteren der Klassiker von Heinrich Mann „Der Untertan“ in den Sinn. Warum nur? „Patriotismus, Kollektivismus und Unterwerfung sind die traditionellen Werte Russlands“, sagt Putin 1999. Und er meint es so.
Russland ist ein Land mit einer vielfältigen und wechselhaften Geschichte. Sie ist nicht weniger gewalttätig als die vieler anderer Länder. Doch zeichnet sie sich dadurch aus, dass das große Land bis heute fast durchgängig diktatorisch- autokratisch regiert wurde. Der Kommunismus, der das Land erschütterte, hat die diktatorischen Strukturen nicht abgeschüttelt, im Gegenteil! Lenin, vor allem aber Stalin herrschten als Vorsitzende eines Einparteienstaats mit genauso harter Hand wie die einst Russlands Zaren, sogar noch gewaltsamer, noch willkürlicher, von Paranoia gesteuert.
Bis heute hat es sich gehalten, dass in Russland nicht der Staat die Bürger schützt, sondern die Bürger den Staat (In Kriegen wird auf Quantität gesetzt; rücksichtsloser Menschenverschleiß), das heißt dann: die große Opferbereitschaft Russlands und wird entsprechend hochgehängt. Patriotismus und Volkstum ist gesetzt. Antisemitismus und Xenophobie werden systematisch geschürt, ein freies Russland hat es nie gegeben. Der Glaube daran, dass ein Regent sakrosankt ist, gehört zu den traditionellen Werten, die Väterchen Putin wieder hochhält. „Kein anderes Land der Welt hat aus den eigenen Herrschern so viele Heilige fabriziert. In keinem anderen ist Macht so stark sakralisiert worden“, schreibt Figes. Ein weiteres Zitat: „Das System der Abhängigkeit vom Herrscher hat sich bis heute gehalten. Putins Oligarchen sind völlig von seinem Willen abhängig.“
Orlando Figes holt weit aus, geht zurück bis in die Anfänge der Kiewer Rus und durchläuft sämtliche nennenswerten Regenten. Um „Eine Geschichte Russlands“ zu lesen, braucht es also ein echtes Interesse für Geschichte. Wenn man dies aufbringt, bekommt man einen Schnellkursus in russischer Geschichte, deren Stoff in Deutschlands Schulen mehr als unterbelichtet ist. Von Peter dem Großen und Katharina der Großen hat man schon einmal etwas gehört, aber auch nichts Genaues und dann verließen sie ihn. Wenn, wie Wikipedia kundtut Stefan Plaggenborg (ein anderer Historiker) meint, Figes „habe sich verhoben bei dem Versuch, aus tausend Jahren russischer Geschichte heutige Verhältnisse zu erhellen“, will ich dem widersprechen.
„Eine Geschichte Russlands“ mag dem wissenschaftlichen Standard, den man für die Veröffentlichung in einer Fachzeitschrift anlegt, nicht entsprechen, doch es ist ja ein Sachbuch für Laien. Dankenswerterweise hat Figes auch auf die von der Wissenschaft so geliebten Schachtelsätze mit vor- und nachgeschobenen Einschüben vor jedem Substantiv verzichtet, so dass man Figes Sätze nicht entzippen muss wie die seiner Kollegen. Dass dabei trotzdem ein hochwertiges Werk herausgekommen ist, zeigt, dass man sehr wohl für den Laien niveauvoll schreiben kann. Mut zur Lücke ist dabei natürlich unerlässlich. Inhaltlich ist „Eine Geschichte Russlands“ gestrafft; so bleibt sie übersichtlich.
Russland sah und sieht sich als hehrer Wächter einzigartiger Ideale, „Russland als Wächter, der Europa vor den „asiatischen Horden“ beschützt, wurde seit dem 17. Jahrhundert Bestandteil des nationalen Mythos.“ „Der Kommunismus verlieh dem Land eine neue messianische Rolle“.
Figes beschreibt die Leibeigenschaft der Bauern genauso wie ihre Auslieferung unter spätere kommunistische Behörden; ein Beamter ist nicht dem Volk gegenüber verantwortlich, sondern nur seinem Vorgesetzten gegenüber verpflichtet. Deshalb gibt es keine Rücktritte von Verantwortungsträgern. Misswirtschaft und Zwangskollektivierung führten zu grauenhaften Hungersnöten.
Die Rolle der Orthodoxie wird beleuchtet, die sich unkritisch unter die Staatspolitik beugt („Im Mythos von der russischen Seele steckt ein messianisches Konzept“); das unmenschliche System der Kollektivschuld wie auch die Besiedlung Russlands Norden fast ausschließlich durch den Gulag (Zwangslager, Zwangsarbeit, Zwangsumsiedlungen), in den verschleppt wird, wer ethnisch nicht passt oder sonst wie auffällt, jetzt zum Beispiel sind es Tausende von ukrainischen Bürgern und ihre Kinder) und vieles mehr, zeigt Figes auf.
Systematische Desinformation und Geschichtsverfälschungen führen dazu, dass die Bürger eines Landes, an dessen Grenzen seit mehr als 30 Jahren keiner mehr Hand anlegte, sich in einem Verteidigungskampf zu befinden glauben. Der letzte Bogen bis in die Neuzeit ist ein bisschen kurz und besorgt. Aber wer kann schon in die Zukunft sehen? Immerhin wagt Figes einen Ausblick und gibt eine Beurteilung ab:
„Es ist ein unnötiger Krieg, geboren aus Mythen und Putins verdrehter Deutung seiner Landesgeschichte. Wenn er nicht bald beendet wird, wird er das Beste in Russland zerstören.“
Fazit: Unerlässliche Faktenkunde.
Kategorie: Sachbuch. Geschichte.
Verlag: Klett-Cotta, 2022
December 22, 2022
After a promising start wherein the author covers the origins of the formation of the Russian state, the development of its Orthodox form of Christianity & the social & economic development of its peoples - the book descends into a thinly veiled scathing attack on the Russian leadership & their ‘misdeeds’ post the 1917 revolution.
The effect of having open land borders prone to invasion from multiple directions on the thinking of successive leaders is well brought out. The successful expansion of the Russian ‘state’ (Siberia & the Ottoman, etc lands) & its development as the largest land empire in history could have also covered the methods of assimilation (or its failure) of diverse peoples in more detail.
The amazing transformation of the Russian state from a defeated, fragmented & technologically backward condition in 1917 to one that fought the powerful Third Reich created by Hitler to a standstill a few years later (1940s) & then reversed the tide of World War 2 is not covered adequately.
Russia’s (& Putin’s) request to join the European Union & NATO & be a part of the “European” family of nations is similarly brushed aside with little comment. The continuing interference by the US led Alliance in Eastern European countries post the fall of the Berlin Wall (Serbia, etc) & expansion of NATO to the very borders of Russia, contrary to an agreement that this would not happen, also does not rate an in depth analysis.
Historically, the ‘Russian people’ have included the populations of Belorussia & the Ukraine with a large ‘Russian’ population in Eastern Ukraine. Though this is acknowledged by the author he emphasises the ‘nationalist’ (& anti Russian) movement of the Ukrainians without commenting on why such conditions did not appear in the Belorussian region.
Russia, whether under the Tsars or the later post revolution leaders is categorised as historically & culturally a threat to ‘the West’. Period.
Expected more from a Cambridge scholar. Disappointing.
The effect of having open land borders prone to invasion from multiple directions on the thinking of successive leaders is well brought out. The successful expansion of the Russian ‘state’ (Siberia & the Ottoman, etc lands) & its development as the largest land empire in history could have also covered the methods of assimilation (or its failure) of diverse peoples in more detail.
The amazing transformation of the Russian state from a defeated, fragmented & technologically backward condition in 1917 to one that fought the powerful Third Reich created by Hitler to a standstill a few years later (1940s) & then reversed the tide of World War 2 is not covered adequately.
Russia’s (& Putin’s) request to join the European Union & NATO & be a part of the “European” family of nations is similarly brushed aside with little comment. The continuing interference by the US led Alliance in Eastern European countries post the fall of the Berlin Wall (Serbia, etc) & expansion of NATO to the very borders of Russia, contrary to an agreement that this would not happen, also does not rate an in depth analysis.
Historically, the ‘Russian people’ have included the populations of Belorussia & the Ukraine with a large ‘Russian’ population in Eastern Ukraine. Though this is acknowledged by the author he emphasises the ‘nationalist’ (& anti Russian) movement of the Ukrainians without commenting on why such conditions did not appear in the Belorussian region.
Russia, whether under the Tsars or the later post revolution leaders is categorised as historically & culturally a threat to ‘the West’. Period.
Expected more from a Cambridge scholar. Disappointing.
October 10, 2023
This writer doesn’t like Russia but he chose (or was ordered) to write a book about it. It is actually fantasy book because it is miracle that Russia still exists after so many bad decissions and narratives that author follows. It ends with describing Putin as bad (Zelensky of course is good in democratic society) and stupid against NATO, explained here as just defensive organization :)
Seems that even this is not enough for true haters of Russia because someone calls it pro Russian book.
If similar book is written for USA, it would shown everything through genocide of native americans and expansion no matter what the cost is…
Seems that even this is not enough for true haters of Russia because someone calls it pro Russian book.
If similar book is written for USA, it would shown everything through genocide of native americans and expansion no matter what the cost is…
March 11, 2024
Intelligent and enlightening. As usual I tried to pronounce words written in the language of the country, it proved very difficult, but I always have fun doing that. I have never read a Russian history before and have 2 more on my tbr pile :)
April 26, 2024
Enjoyed this book overall with its look at the origins of Russia to the modern day looking at various angles and the myth building of nationhood
October 15, 2022
A good primer on the history of Russia since its broad inception (interwoven with the histories of neighbouring communities and eventually neighbouring states). Figes does a solid job of grounding competing national myths that continue to influence politics through to today though he routinely dips into wild claims about the singularness of Russian history ("no other country" etc) which are easily countered with examples. This is more the dramatic love of a historian for his work than any meaningful embellishment.
While the book is admirably short, its purview is so all-ranging that it can't possibly address key events - how they started and how they shaped history - with enough justice. So, for example, the Soviet-Afghan war which spanned a decade, and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Soviet troops and perhaps two million Afghans, gets a single-sentence aside in the book. And yet its implications for the Soviet economy, international status and internal cohesion were vast.
So what is focused on in the books serves some themes, usually the continuing nature of Tsar-like control on an almost teleological basis. 'Boyars' (think: 'Knights') are routinely surfaced as a comparison for localised control over areas. It feels like he's softly making the 'Russia requires autocratic rule as a historical inevitability' argument, tempered with interesting interpretations eg of the fall of Communism not as revolution but as a power vacuum that the Communist state.
The Chapters covering Nicholas II through to the Russian Civil War are essentially a condensed version of 'A People's Tragedy'. I thought he'd plagiarised some familiar phrases at first because I recognised them but cross-referenced them with APT and found them. For example, "It was not Marxism that made Lenin a revolutionary but Lenin who made Marxism revolutionary" is verbatim in APT but not referenced here.
His concluding chapter stretches right up to publication (covering a chunk of the Ukraine war). He handles the most recent events carefully and sensibly, covering Russia's NATO concerns as well as the aggression of its newest Tsar.
Solid read. Should be three times as long to get the depth it's crying out for.
While the book is admirably short, its purview is so all-ranging that it can't possibly address key events - how they started and how they shaped history - with enough justice. So, for example, the Soviet-Afghan war which spanned a decade, and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Soviet troops and perhaps two million Afghans, gets a single-sentence aside in the book. And yet its implications for the Soviet economy, international status and internal cohesion were vast.
So what is focused on in the books serves some themes, usually the continuing nature of Tsar-like control on an almost teleological basis. 'Boyars' (think: 'Knights') are routinely surfaced as a comparison for localised control over areas. It feels like he's softly making the 'Russia requires autocratic rule as a historical inevitability' argument, tempered with interesting interpretations eg of the fall of Communism not as revolution but as a power vacuum that the Communist state.
The Chapters covering Nicholas II through to the Russian Civil War are essentially a condensed version of 'A People's Tragedy'. I thought he'd plagiarised some familiar phrases at first because I recognised them but cross-referenced them with APT and found them. For example, "It was not Marxism that made Lenin a revolutionary but Lenin who made Marxism revolutionary" is verbatim in APT but not referenced here.
His concluding chapter stretches right up to publication (covering a chunk of the Ukraine war). He handles the most recent events carefully and sensibly, covering Russia's NATO concerns as well as the aggression of its newest Tsar.
Solid read. Should be three times as long to get the depth it's crying out for.
July 11, 2022
This whistle-stop tour through hundreds of years of Russian history has probably taken on more resonance and perked the interest of more readers than Figes probably imagined due to recent events in Ukraine (2022). Indeed, the final paragraphs of this work seem especially prescient in their forewarning of future events.
This work, being a whistle stop tour, does not do every era full justice, but this is not a criticism. The end notes provide details of other books if you wish to pursue a particular rabbit hole of Russian history. Figes spends more time in the twentieth century in this book than the previous centuries, but he draws enough parallels and shows us the connective tissue between Putin and those rulers of old whose ideology and iconography Putin has adapted to make every section here absolutely vital.
As Figes notes near the end of this work, there are now hundreds of works which deal with Putin-era Russia, and doubtless there will be thousands more to come. This book is great introduction to that era and more besides, and is an expert primer to a country with whom we are all familiar, but about whose internal life we are unfamiliar. Great stuff.
Thank you to the publishers and Netgalley for the ARC.
This work, being a whistle stop tour, does not do every era full justice, but this is not a criticism. The end notes provide details of other books if you wish to pursue a particular rabbit hole of Russian history. Figes spends more time in the twentieth century in this book than the previous centuries, but he draws enough parallels and shows us the connective tissue between Putin and those rulers of old whose ideology and iconography Putin has adapted to make every section here absolutely vital.
As Figes notes near the end of this work, there are now hundreds of works which deal with Putin-era Russia, and doubtless there will be thousands more to come. This book is great introduction to that era and more besides, and is an expert primer to a country with whom we are all familiar, but about whose internal life we are unfamiliar. Great stuff.
Thank you to the publishers and Netgalley for the ARC.
February 20, 2024
I really need to edit this review because it makes zero sense. For now I’m giving it the four stars that this review explicitly states.
Three stars is just a personal thing. I really should rate it four no question, but my interests in history and such is just not strong. So I guess I could say any of the history four stars and any of the more current information three stars. It's an informative book no question. And the narrator is excellent-clearly spoken, even pace, practically perfect enunciation. But I have to rate books on the possibility of whether I will read it again and I don't think I will reread this one hence the three stars.
Three stars is just a personal thing. I really should rate it four no question, but my interests in history and such is just not strong. So I guess I could say any of the history four stars and any of the more current information three stars. It's an informative book no question. And the narrator is excellent-clearly spoken, even pace, practically perfect enunciation. But I have to rate books on the possibility of whether I will read it again and I don't think I will reread this one hence the three stars.
March 13, 2024
Recommended by my brother. Great book on Russia. Historical narratives are such a big part of international relations but far too often ignored. Figes covers a huge amount of Russian history and does a thorough job for vetting it to the way Russia perceives its history. There are definitely episodes missing but given this covers 1000+ years, I’m willing to say that what was included was sufficient. Book ends on an analysis of how this myth fed into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with a strong narrative that’s been continued throughout the whole book. Would recommend to people, especially those trying to understand Russia and are not sure where to start.
April 1, 2023
Read for the Booktube Prize 2023.
July 19, 2023
Figes says he’ll provide a history of myths/historiographies. I’d have liked that. Sadly, his book is mainly just a narrative history of nation and state.
January 15, 2023
This is an easy-to-read history of Russia from the 800s to the date of publication in 2022. As the author notes, no other country has been so divided over its own beginnings, changed its story so often, and been unable to separate history and myth. The political disagreements and tragedies are described along with the controversial leaders often responsible. We have a better understanding of the current war in Ukraine given the historical relationship between the two countries.
November 22, 2022
I'd been looking for several months for a comprehensive book on the history of Russia. I finally found it in The Story of Russia. Excellent--well-written, easy-to-follow, and fascinating. Figes wrote the book in 2022 after the full invasion (the invasion actually started in 2014) in February. He tries to connect the events in Russia's past with the current person in the Kremlin and the war in Ukraine.
After finishing the book, I'd say that there is no hope that Russia will change. It can't undo so many centuries of history, imperial desires, and their love of autocracy. There are lots of countries that have been imperialist powers (France, Spain, England). These countries have given up on empire because they lost their empire, but I can't imagine Russia giving up on their empire--this notion of empire is part of their DNA. They've also been brainwashed for centuries.
This is a great book that will help you understand why Russia invaded Ukraine. Many people focus too much on Vladimir Putin. But from reading Russian history, Putin is not completely at fault.
After finishing the book, I'd say that there is no hope that Russia will change. It can't undo so many centuries of history, imperial desires, and their love of autocracy. There are lots of countries that have been imperialist powers (France, Spain, England). These countries have given up on empire because they lost their empire, but I can't imagine Russia giving up on their empire--this notion of empire is part of their DNA. They've also been brainwashed for centuries.
This is a great book that will help you understand why Russia invaded Ukraine. Many people focus too much on Vladimir Putin. But from reading Russian history, Putin is not completely at fault.
April 21, 2024
Of course, the key to understanding a country's present is to understand its past and Orlando Figes supplies a persuasive account going back over a 1000 years developing doing exactly that. The research and scholarship are impressive and go a long way to explaining not only why Putin became leader but also why he acts in the way he does. Russia's need for a 'strong' leader can be traced back through generations: Alexander Nevsky's victories over the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights, Ivan IV, Peter the Great and even Nicholas I. Stalin has enjoyed something of a rebirth under Putin and we are told many people hanker after the days of the Soviet Union. A few pages at the end are devoted to the current war against Ukraine, and even Putin's policy of sacrificing huge numbers of his forces to achieve marginal gains can be seen as a repeat of history.
I found this to be both illuminating and bleak reading. Illuminating for the reasons explained above, but bleak because it seems the collective west has badly misjudged Russia's world views and intentions to a considerable degree.
I found this to be both illuminating and bleak reading. Illuminating for the reasons explained above, but bleak because it seems the collective west has badly misjudged Russia's world views and intentions to a considerable degree.
April 23, 2024
Orlando Figes after calling Putin delusional, reckless and isolated from reality and getting away with it
this ate tbh. it was written in a clean, precise style and idiot-proofed by repeating the main themes/ideas multiple times but without making me feel stupid in the process, all while covering a vast period of both time and geography. i loved how Figes indicated the main areas of historiographic debate in the scholarly discussion of Russia's history but didn't get bogged down in scholar on scholar pettiness. he did such a good job in illustrating the main ideological and structural framework that modern Russia was built upon by continually linking the discussion from past to present.
my only slight complaint is that in the chapters dealing with the 1917 Revolution onwards it got a bit confusing as the main governement structure wasn't really explained so I wasn't really sure about who was in power over what, but that could likely be incompetence on my part
this ate tbh. it was written in a clean, precise style and idiot-proofed by repeating the main themes/ideas multiple times but without making me feel stupid in the process, all while covering a vast period of both time and geography. i loved how Figes indicated the main areas of historiographic debate in the scholarly discussion of Russia's history but didn't get bogged down in scholar on scholar pettiness. he did such a good job in illustrating the main ideological and structural framework that modern Russia was built upon by continually linking the discussion from past to present.
my only slight complaint is that in the chapters dealing with the 1917 Revolution onwards it got a bit confusing as the main governement structure wasn't really explained so I wasn't really sure about who was in power over what, but that could likely be incompetence on my part
July 16, 2023
Breve historia de Rusia (Sí, breve. Es la historia de un país y si no contamos las notas y la bibliografía se queda en apenas 400 páginas) y aún y con eso, es un volumen que derrocha saber estar. De forma amena a la par que sencilla nos cuenta siglos de existencia, sin caer en la manida sucesión de hechos, coronado por un último capítulo sobre la Rusia de Putin que se muestra como una consecuencia lógica de lo expuesto anteriormente y que no es sino una descripción del alma rusa, si es que eso existe.
Me hubiera gustado un mayor énfasis en las épocas más antiguas, de las que menos conozco, y es por ello que al final me ha dejado una sensación extraña, un buen libro al que le falta un punto para ser un gran libro.
Eso sí, imprescindible para los que se quieran iniciar en el tema.
Me hubiera gustado un mayor énfasis en las épocas más antiguas, de las que menos conozco, y es por ello que al final me ha dejado una sensación extraña, un buen libro al que le falta un punto para ser un gran libro.
Eso sí, imprescindible para los que se quieran iniciar en el tema.
March 20, 2023
Honestly one of the best historical overviews I’ve ever read. The audio version kept me engaged, and while occasionally I felt bogged down in names and political discussions, the overall impression was a thematic review of Russian history. Figes also gives a good overview of Putin’s regime and how it is another reincarnation of the same myths that shaped ancient Russian history. I feel much more equipped to read Russian literature and understand what I see in the news (when I decide to watch it 😂).
February 15, 2024
A broad, sweeping account of hundreds of years of history. Very readable and hugely interesting. Each chapter could lead you down a hundred rabbit holes. The central theme of the past shaping the future, and the idea that those with power in the present can reshape the past to serve their ambitions make this a fascinating book.
October 17, 2022
Zeker in de huidige tijd is achtergrond informatie over Rusland belangrijk. Hoe en waarom zijn leiders denken en handelen. Het boek van Figes verschaft een gedetailleerd historisch overzicht, waarbij vooral de gebeurtenissen sinds begin vorige eeuw tot de verbeelding spreken. Ben blij dat ik het boek heb gelezen.
May 6, 2023
This is a book that sets out to tell the history of Russia. This in and of itself is a worthwhile endeavor but it also sets out to tell the stories and myth making that Russia tells itself. This aspect is phenomenal. Both are well done and give you insights that a straight retelling of historical facts would not.
Recommended.
Recommended.
January 9, 2024
THE book to understand Russia's yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Nobody could tell this story better than Orlando Figes. A delightful read...
June 12, 2023
Figes truly tell the story of Russia. The most interesting aspects of this story for me were:
- How Russia was, throughout most of history, lacking behind the West related to the different roles of the serfs
- The big legacy of the Mongols on Russia (e.g. legal codes) that is often denied in modern-day Russia
- The incredible amount of repression against the different minorities of the Russian state
- Often forgotten crimes during the expansion to Siberia
- All the flaws of the Bolshevist and Stalinist system
- How 1990 was not a democratic revolution unlike in most of the other states of the Eastern Bloc
-How modern Russia is lending from both its past as Empire and the Soviet Union creating quite a strange mixed identity
- How Russia was, throughout most of history, lacking behind the West related to the different roles of the serfs
- The big legacy of the Mongols on Russia (e.g. legal codes) that is often denied in modern-day Russia
- The incredible amount of repression against the different minorities of the Russian state
- Often forgotten crimes during the expansion to Siberia
- All the flaws of the Bolshevist and Stalinist system
- How 1990 was not a democratic revolution unlike in most of the other states of the Eastern Bloc
-How modern Russia is lending from both its past as Empire and the Soviet Union creating quite a strange mixed identity
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