Buy new:
-25% $33.88$33.88
Ships from: Amazon.com Sold by: Amazon.com
Save with Used - Very Good
$11.79$11.79
$3.99 delivery July 1 - 8
Ships from: midtownscholarbookstore Sold by: midtownscholarbookstore

Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Follow the author
OK
Democratic Devices and Desires (Theories of Institutional Design)
Purchase options and add-ons
- ISBN-100521639778
- ISBN-13978-0521639774
- PublisherCambridge University Press
- Publication dateApril 13, 2000
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions6 x 0.63 x 9 inches
- Print length278 pages
Discover the latest buzz-worthy books, from mysteries and romance to humor and nonfiction. Explore more
Frequently purchased items with fast delivery
Editorial Reviews
Book Description
Product details
- Publisher : Cambridge University Press
- Publication date : April 13, 2000
- Language : English
- Print length : 278 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0521639778
- ISBN-13 : 978-0521639774
- Item Weight : 7.6 ounces
- Dimensions : 6 x 0.63 x 9 inches
- Lexile measure : 1520L
- Best Sellers Rank: #10,403,106 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #2,636 in Economic Theory (Books)
- #4,073 in Political Ideologies
- #5,789 in Political History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read book recommendations and more.
Customer reviews
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star5 star100%0%0%0%0%100%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star4 star100%0%0%0%0%0%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star3 star100%0%0%0%0%0%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star2 star100%0%0%0%0%0%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star1 star100%0%0%0%0%0%
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on AmazonTop reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews. Please reload the page.
- Reviewed in the United States on August 15, 2001Format: PaperbackExcerpted from The Independent Review (Summer 2001) by Roger D. Congleton.
My main complaint about Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin's new book is its title, which supplies a nice alliteration but seems a bit misleading. The title might lead the reader to expect a book about democratic intrigue at the turn of the twentieth century, when the high tide of democratic ideology gave rise to widespread suffrage movements and electoral reforms. Instead, what the reader finds is a very interesting rational-choice analysis of how constitutions should be designed if individuals can and do choose to follow normative rules-none of which seem, strictly speaking, to be intrinsically democratic. A helpful subtitle might have been "Implications of Norm-Following Behavior for Constitutional Design," which would indicate an issue on which the book does make a good deal of progress.
I have only very minor quarrels with the authors' basic argument, which on the whole seems to be very reasonable-and indeed many of their points have been mentioned, as they point out, in classic works on constitutional design.
Overall, the evidence suggests that ethical behavior in politics occurs, but it may be of more limited significance to voters than the Brennan-Hamlin analysis seems to imply. However, to their credit, Brennan and Hamlin expressly claim only that norm-following behavior does occur and may be relied on in some circumstances. This much all but the most diehard skeptics would surely acknowledge.
Even those who doubt this more modest but still significant claim, however, will benefit from considering the path-breaking analysis Brennan and Hamlin develop in this book.