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Doing the Impossible: George E. Mueller & the Management of NASA's Human Spaceflight Program
Apollo was known for its engineering triumphs, but its success also came from a disciplined management style. This excellent account of one of the most important personalities in early American human spaceflight history describes for the first time how George E. Mueller, the system manager of the human spaceflight program of the 1960s, applied the SPO methodology and other special considerations such as “all-up”testing, resulting in the success of the Apollo Program. Wernher von Braun and others did not readily accept such testing or Mueller’s approach to system management, but later acknowledged that without them NASA would not have landed astronauts on the Moon by 1969. While Apollo remained Mueller’s priority, from his earliest days at the agency, he promoted a robust post-Apollo Program which resulted in Skylab, the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. As a result of these efforts, Mueller earned the “the father of the space shuttle.” Following his success at NASA, Mueller returned to industry. Although he did not play a leading role in human spaceflight again, in 2011 the National Air and Space Museum awarded him their lifetime achievement trophy for his contributions.
Following the contributions of George E. Mueller, in this unique book Arthur L. Slotkin answers such questions exactly how did the methods developed for use in the Air Force ballistic missile programs get modified and used in the Apollo Program? How did George E. Mueller, with the help of others, manage the Apollo Program? How did NASA centers, coming from federal agencies with cultures of their own, adapt to the new structured approach imposed from Washington?
George E. Mueller is the ideal central character for this book. He was instrumental in the creation of Apollo extension systems leading to Apollo, the Shuttle, and today’s ISS and thus was a pivotal figure in early American human spaceflight history.
Following the contributions of George E. Mueller, in this unique book Arthur L. Slotkin answers such questions exactly how did the methods developed for use in the Air Force ballistic missile programs get modified and used in the Apollo Program? How did George E. Mueller, with the help of others, manage the Apollo Program? How did NASA centers, coming from federal agencies with cultures of their own, adapt to the new structured approach imposed from Washington?
George E. Mueller is the ideal central character for this book. He was instrumental in the creation of Apollo extension systems leading to Apollo, the Shuttle, and today’s ISS and thus was a pivotal figure in early American human spaceflight history.
280 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 29, 2017
Hard to imagine more detailed and comprehensive analysis of Apollo 11 preparation and management work. The book includes almost no emotions, just facts and cool headed leadershipping.
August 31, 2021
George Mueller was the organisational leader for the Apollo program. When he took the job, he did so premised on re-organising the group and applying a strong discipline of program control and general purpose systems thinking over specialisation—‘He considered most of the astronauts good engineers, though not system engineers. They did not have the depth of understanding of changes, nor did they understand the impact on the overall system‘. The same line of thinking applies to perhaps the best known outcome of the program approach, all-up testing over specialised stage and unit testing, arguing against of all people, Wernher Von Braun: ‘"you don't want to be testing piece-wise in space. You want to test the entire system because who knows which one's going to fail, and you'd better have it all together so that whatever fails, you have a reasonable chance of finding the real failure mode, not just the one you were looking for.’
A fascinating element in the book is the amount of infighting and arguing between groups and people. This is not a popular business/science book; rather it’s more written I suspect to make sure Mueller’s immense impact and contribution is part of the record. In doing so, it doesn’t have the same need to create dramatis personae, but it’s clear a lot of what Mueller was doing was dealing with people and trying to blend technical and organisational challenges to achieve the outcome, and induce constraints via program and organisational structure—’Program control and system engineering were two key elements of program management, they were different skills working together to understand the program and its implications’.
It’s worth remembering, and this book captures it, that program management at this scale was just as new ground as the technical effort, even allowing for the US Airforce’s advancement of systems engineering and the sensational logistical planning achievements of WW2. In that sense, this is a must read for anyone involved in program management, that makes it clear at sufficient scale you don’t get to easily separate concerns like technology, people, budget or even stakeholder politics—a holistic approach is needed. In that light, we perhaps have lost something since the 1960s by treating Conway’s observation on technology and people as a necessary evil, rather than a truism they are organised best in concert. Amusingly however, some things seem to remain true to this day—‘the thing that really kills programs is the changing requirements’.
Originally posted here
A fascinating element in the book is the amount of infighting and arguing between groups and people. This is not a popular business/science book; rather it’s more written I suspect to make sure Mueller’s immense impact and contribution is part of the record. In doing so, it doesn’t have the same need to create dramatis personae, but it’s clear a lot of what Mueller was doing was dealing with people and trying to blend technical and organisational challenges to achieve the outcome, and induce constraints via program and organisational structure—’Program control and system engineering were two key elements of program management, they were different skills working together to understand the program and its implications’.
It’s worth remembering, and this book captures it, that program management at this scale was just as new ground as the technical effort, even allowing for the US Airforce’s advancement of systems engineering and the sensational logistical planning achievements of WW2. In that sense, this is a must read for anyone involved in program management, that makes it clear at sufficient scale you don’t get to easily separate concerns like technology, people, budget or even stakeholder politics—a holistic approach is needed. In that light, we perhaps have lost something since the 1960s by treating Conway’s observation on technology and people as a necessary evil, rather than a truism they are organised best in concert. Amusingly however, some things seem to remain true to this day—‘the thing that really kills programs is the changing requirements’.
Originally posted here
May 24, 2022
This book is an example of the type of nonfiction I have found myself encountering increasingly, where the author who has access to the fullest range of archival material is unfortunately ill-suited to actually write the book based on the information within. In this particular case, the problem is two-fold, with the author’s relationship with Mueller (established in the first sentence he writes, in the front-end acknowledgement) clearly making him incapable of objectivity, leading to a pervasive defensiveness (especially on the rare occasions that he mentions contemporaneous critiques of his subject), matched by Mueller’s own displayed in interviews with the author; there is also the matter of the author’s amateurish prose, which I would say was edited indifferently if it appeared to have been edited at all.
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February 1, 2022I first met Dr. George E. Mueller in early 1970. I became his special assistant.
the journey to the Moon and back served as a surrogate for war with the USSR
p20 about books
system management is "a structure for visualizing all the factors involved as an integrated whole, much as system engineering visualizes all of the physical aspects of a problem
we must guard against change leading to overdesign
scientists are more interested in the search for knowledge as opposed to applying knowledge
he continued to promote the goal of reusable space systems
the launch was "anticlimactic at best"
their projections totalled upwards of $40 billion, which was twice the original program estimate
a system engineer has visualize the entire system
the journey to the Moon and back served as a surrogate for war with the USSR
p20 about books
system management is "a structure for visualizing all the factors involved as an integrated whole, much as system engineering visualizes all of the physical aspects of a problem
we must guard against change leading to overdesign
scientists are more interested in the search for knowledge as opposed to applying knowledge
he continued to promote the goal of reusable space systems
the launch was "anticlimactic at best"
their projections totalled upwards of $40 billion, which was twice the original program estimate
a system engineer has visualize the entire system
April 13, 2017
This wasn't the book I expected, but it was very good. The author assumes a lot of knowledge, both about the Apollo system and about management. If you have that background and think the question of how NASA coordinated huge contracts, many people working around the country, and the fixed budget provided by the government and managed the literal moonshot, this is worth a read. It is basically a history textbook though!
April 4, 2017
Proof positive that effective management is crucial to success in any human endeavor of non-trivial size and/or complexity.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews