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Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
John Boyd may be the most remarkable unsung hero in all of American military history. Some remember him as the greatest U.S. fighter pilot ever -- the man who, in simulated air-to-air combat, defeated every challenger in less than forty seconds. Some recall him as the father of our country's most legendary fighter aircraft -- the F-15 and F-16. Still others think of Boyd as the most influential military theorist since Sun Tzu. They know only half the story.
Boyd, more than any other person, saved fighter aviation from the predations of the Strategic Air Command. His manual of fighter tactics changed the way every air force in the world flies and fights. He discovered a physical theory that forever altered the way fighter planes were designed. Later in life, he developed a theory of military strategy that has been adopted throughout the world and even applied to business models for maximizing efficiency. And in one of the most startling and unknown stories of modern military history, the Air Force fighter pilot taught the U.S. Marine Corps how to fight war on the ground. His ideas led to America's swift and decisive victory in the Gulf War and foretold the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
On a personal level, Boyd rarely met a general he couldn't offend. He was loud, abrasive, and profane. A man of daring, ferocious passion and intractable stubbornness, he was that most American of heroes -- a rebel who cared not for his reputation or fortune but for his country. He was a true patriot, a man who made a career of challenging the shortsighted and self-serving Pentagon bureaucracy. America owes Boyd and his disciples -- the six men known as the "Acolytes" -- a great debt.
Robert Coram finally brings to light the remarkable story of a man who polarized all who knew him, but who left a legacy that will influence the military -- and all of America -- for decades to come . . .
Boyd, more than any other person, saved fighter aviation from the predations of the Strategic Air Command. His manual of fighter tactics changed the way every air force in the world flies and fights. He discovered a physical theory that forever altered the way fighter planes were designed. Later in life, he developed a theory of military strategy that has been adopted throughout the world and even applied to business models for maximizing efficiency. And in one of the most startling and unknown stories of modern military history, the Air Force fighter pilot taught the U.S. Marine Corps how to fight war on the ground. His ideas led to America's swift and decisive victory in the Gulf War and foretold the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
On a personal level, Boyd rarely met a general he couldn't offend. He was loud, abrasive, and profane. A man of daring, ferocious passion and intractable stubbornness, he was that most American of heroes -- a rebel who cared not for his reputation or fortune but for his country. He was a true patriot, a man who made a career of challenging the shortsighted and self-serving Pentagon bureaucracy. America owes Boyd and his disciples -- the six men known as the "Acolytes" -- a great debt.
Robert Coram finally brings to light the remarkable story of a man who polarized all who knew him, but who left a legacy that will influence the military -- and all of America -- for decades to come . . .
504 pages, Paperback
Published May 10, 2004
About the author
Robert Coram
28 books84 followersRobert Coram is the author of three nonfiction books and seven novels. He lives in Atlanta.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 542 reviews
November 13, 2015
It's been a loooonnnngg time since I read this book (11 or 12 years ago, back when I was a single man on the prowl in Manhattan...and this is how I spent my time); I came across it in a friend's feed today and remembered, "Ah! That's a quality book!"
It was one of those, "I have no idea who this guy is and turns out he's insanely fascinating"-type books. Not for everyone, but if you have a remote inclination toward military history and tactics, worth checking out.
It was one of those, "I have no idea who this guy is and turns out he's insanely fascinating"-type books. Not for everyone, but if you have a remote inclination toward military history and tactics, worth checking out.
January 11, 2014
Wow, this is an obnoxious book. There's no question that Boyd is an influential and important figure, but Coram has written this in his usual style--find a military man who can be painted as an under-appreciated, persecuted genius (punished for his straight-shooting and truth telling to the careerist brass), write in breathless hyperbole (Boyd is the greatest strategist since Sun Tzu) and use no citations, so no once can figure out who said what about Boyd when. The Amazon and Goodreads reviews show that the formula works--people identify ferociously with Boyd, and anyone who doesn't is an enemy, an idiot or should have his tie set on fire.
July 6, 2012
Biographies of military figures are a tricky business. The core audience for the books is so passionate that they are willing to forgive lousy books in their thirst for more information. For that reason there are a lot of mediocre war books. Because of the title and the subject, it's easy to glance at this book and think of it has a Costco war biography or a decent Christmas present for a military buff. Don't.
It is instead of a truly peerless book on military strategy. Coram's chronicle is artful, so well-researched and so informative that it brought John Boyd to the forefront of military strategy well after his death and many years of neglect. Compared to his fellow writers in this field, Coram is a god among men.
This book's strength is its ability to make complex, strategic theories that fundamentally shifted the art of war understandable to the average reader. Believe me, that is not an easy task. If the book inspires you to read some of Boyd's academic papers you will quickly discover how artful Coram has translated them. In journal form, Boyd's Creative Destruction is obtuse and confusing. Coram's book is the primer to its understanding for those of us who don't have ranking military professors to explain it.
Lastly, Coram doesn't shy away from the negative sides of Boyd's genius bubble. We see how it torn at his family life and how he bore little of the consequences. If it wasn't for the endless patience of his wife who subsidized and tolerated his lifestyle with her support, the world would have been deprived of his insights.
It is instead of a truly peerless book on military strategy. Coram's chronicle is artful, so well-researched and so informative that it brought John Boyd to the forefront of military strategy well after his death and many years of neglect. Compared to his fellow writers in this field, Coram is a god among men.
This book's strength is its ability to make complex, strategic theories that fundamentally shifted the art of war understandable to the average reader. Believe me, that is not an easy task. If the book inspires you to read some of Boyd's academic papers you will quickly discover how artful Coram has translated them. In journal form, Boyd's Creative Destruction is obtuse and confusing. Coram's book is the primer to its understanding for those of us who don't have ranking military professors to explain it.
Lastly, Coram doesn't shy away from the negative sides of Boyd's genius bubble. We see how it torn at his family life and how he bore little of the consequences. If it wasn't for the endless patience of his wife who subsidized and tolerated his lifestyle with her support, the world would have been deprived of his insights.
January 14, 2022
One of the finest biographies I’ve read. Boyd did it all. The Air Force’s best fighter pilot between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, when he was forced to fly a desk, he started designing aircraft. He designed the initial “A” series of low-flying ground-pounders so beloved by Marines. He designed the F-15 AND F-16 fighters as well. Yet he didn’t stop there.
Convinced Pentagon spending was wasteful, and war fighting could be systematized, Boyd invented the O-O-D-A loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). Similar concepts were tinkered with and taught in management and business schools; the OODA loop largely displaced them due to Boyd’s keen reflection that outdoing your opponent—be it in war or business—depended on getting inside the other’s OODA loop. Put differently, the side that could turn one complete OODA before the other had an enormous advantage: it would “Observing” when its rival still was reacting.
“Thinking about operating at a quicker tempo - not just moving faster - than the adversary was a new concept in waging war. Generating a rapidly changing environment - that is, engaging in activity that is quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy - inhibits the adversary's ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact. Boyd closed the briefing by saying the message is that whoever can handle the quickest rate of change is the one who survives.”
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney won Gulf War I using OODA tactics. I know personally that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld also was an admirer. Crucially, OODA theory still is taught in management schools throughout the world. The book includes links to Boyd’s original PowerPoints.
Not that Colonel Boyd was a nice guy. A misanthrope and loner, he was anything but a team player in the Pentagon (hence never getting Generals’s stars). He was downright terrible to his wife and family. So when buried at Arlington Cemetery, only a single Air Force representiative showed—the Chaplin. Over a dozen Marines, however, attended Boyd’s funeral: grateful SOMEONE built modern planes designed for close air support.
As a result, Boyd is the sole Air Force member of the Marine Hall of Fame in Quantico. RIP.
Convinced Pentagon spending was wasteful, and war fighting could be systematized, Boyd invented the O-O-D-A loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). Similar concepts were tinkered with and taught in management and business schools; the OODA loop largely displaced them due to Boyd’s keen reflection that outdoing your opponent—be it in war or business—depended on getting inside the other’s OODA loop. Put differently, the side that could turn one complete OODA before the other had an enormous advantage: it would “Observing” when its rival still was reacting.
“Thinking about operating at a quicker tempo - not just moving faster - than the adversary was a new concept in waging war. Generating a rapidly changing environment - that is, engaging in activity that is quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy - inhibits the adversary's ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact. Boyd closed the briefing by saying the message is that whoever can handle the quickest rate of change is the one who survives.”
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney won Gulf War I using OODA tactics. I know personally that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld also was an admirer. Crucially, OODA theory still is taught in management schools throughout the world. The book includes links to Boyd’s original PowerPoints.
Not that Colonel Boyd was a nice guy. A misanthrope and loner, he was anything but a team player in the Pentagon (hence never getting Generals’s stars). He was downright terrible to his wife and family. So when buried at Arlington Cemetery, only a single Air Force representiative showed—the Chaplin. Over a dozen Marines, however, attended Boyd’s funeral: grateful SOMEONE built modern planes designed for close air support.
As a result, Boyd is the sole Air Force member of the Marine Hall of Fame in Quantico. RIP.
April 28, 2020
What did I miss? I feel like I read a different book than those with glowing reviews.
Another case of an important piece of history battered into a hyperbolic, dry and exhausting narrative.
Great man, great story, I won't dispute that. The author just comes across a little too much like an amped frat-bro hyping the bro-lord he idolizes. Much like A Woman of No Importance, this book had elements of a great story, with disappointing delivery. It felt repetitive, and probably could have been *at least* 100 pages shorter.
All that aside, it was very interesting and a solid 3 star read. To be fair, I just don't think much in the way of military biographies can come close to the excellence that was Chernow's Grant, or even Manchester's American Caesar.
Another case of an important piece of history battered into a hyperbolic, dry and exhausting narrative.
Great man, great story, I won't dispute that. The author just comes across a little too much like an amped frat-bro hyping the bro-lord he idolizes. Much like A Woman of No Importance, this book had elements of a great story, with disappointing delivery. It felt repetitive, and probably could have been *at least* 100 pages shorter.
All that aside, it was very interesting and a solid 3 star read. To be fair, I just don't think much in the way of military biographies can come close to the excellence that was Chernow's Grant, or even Manchester's American Caesar.
January 22, 2014
Awesome book covering the life and ideas of John Boyd. I profess to knowing nothing about this man prior to reading this book, and it seems I am in the majority in that respect unfortunately by planned intent. Boyd was a US Air Force fighter pilot turned engineer and scholar, who wrote the Aerial Attack Study that shaped the fighter tactics of not only the USAF but air forces all over the world, pioneered the Energy-Maneuverability Theory that impacted how fighter pilots fought and had a monumental impact on aircraft design, and also developed the OODA loop and Patterns of Conflict that among other things contributed to the executed plan of the Gulf War. This was a man of conviction that tenaciously pursued his goals and ideas whilst being ostracized by most of the military. His stated beliefs regarding "to be somebody or to do something" is a climatic decision every person must make in this world, and that is the point I have taken from this book. Recommended reading for everyone, but military officers in particular. I look forward to reading more about Boyd's theories in the future.
March 28, 2011
A very interesting book about John Boyd, who was a crack fighter pilot, and then later military strategist and reformer. Boyd flew as an instructor in the real life version of Top Gun, and beat everyone in 40 seconds or less. But later in his life he really studied military strategy, and this is where the interesting parts of this book are.
Boyd was literally the designer of the F-15, and a theory of maneuvering called Energy-Manueverability (E-M), which mathematically gave a chart for each aircraft that gave pilots an idea of the ideal speeds and altitudes they could use to pull off various turns and tactics.
One interesting thing I noted was that throughout his career, like everyone else in the military, Boyd was getting reviewed by his superiors, called ER's. It was interesting to hear, and relevant to business, how you had to "read through the lines" and how even a positive sounding ER could be a career-killer if the person wasn't recommended for promotion. Reading this has definitely made me think twice every time I've read (or written) recommendations for people.
Another Boyd tidbit I liked was when fighting bureaucratic battles in the Pentagon, he had a mantra to "use the other persons information against him". Starting with the other persons argument and data, and working backwards, you can make pretty compelling arguments.
Perhaps the biggest idea Boyd came up with is what is called the OODA loop, which stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. A key quote defining the OODA loop:
"Thinking about operating at a quicker tempo - not just moving faster - than the adversary was a new concept in waging war. Generating a rapidly changing environment - that is, engaging in activity that is quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy - inhibits the adversary's ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact. Boyd closed the briefing by saying the message is that whoever can handle the quickest rate of change is the one who survives."
Another great quote that helps explain it:
"Boyd said the strategies and bloodbaths of World War 1 were the natural consequence of both the vo Clausewitzian battle philosophy and the inability of generals to adapt new tactics to nineteenth-century technology: line abreast, mass against mass, and linear defenses against machine guns and quick-firing artillery. The bankrupt nature of that doctrine was demonstrated on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, which the British suffered sixty thousand casualties. After more than three years of the meat-grinding form of war, the Germans began engagements with a brief artillery barrage with smoke and gas obscuring their intentions, then sent in a special infantry teams. These small groups looked for gaps in the defense and advanced along many paths. They did not hit strong points but instead went around them, pressing on, always going forward and not worrying about their flanks. They were like water going downhill, bypassing obstacles, always moving, proving, and then, when they found an opening, pouring through, pressing deeper and deeper."
Getting your lieutenants to the point where they can do this kind of infiltration successfully requires great communication and men who can think fast on their feet. In other words, you had to enable every leader to be able to follow the OODA loop, and just arm them with the overal goals, and trust them to make their own decisions. Very different from previous military structures, where "the need to know" remained at the top.
Why is this empowerment valuable? Because:
"The key thing to understand about Boyd's version is the not the mechanical cycle itself, but rather the need to execute the cycle in such fashion as to get inside the mind and the decision cycle of the adversary. This means the adversary is dealing with out-dated or irrelevant information and thus becomes confused and disoriented and can't function."
And:
"Understanding the OODA loop enables a commander to compress time - that is, the time between observing a situation and taking an action. A commander can use the temporal discrepancy (a form of fast transient) to select the least-expected action rather than what is predicted to be the most effective action. The enemy can also figure out what might be the most effective. To take the least-expected action disorients the enemy. It causes him to pause, wonder, to question."
This makes sense. You can almost picture the commanders of old, who used to have to get on the phone with their boss in order make any decision. "Take the bridge, blow it up, or wait?". Hours and days could be spent waiting around for generals to make up their minds. This form of maneuver warfare is what the Germans used in WWII - they called it blitzkrieg - and it's what we used in Iraq the first time.
In business we have a word for the above - micromanagement. In a sense, it sounds like empowering business leaders and their lieutenants to have an effective OODA loop is what will let a business move faster and win marketshare. I bet somebody has written a book about that - I will have to look.
Boyd was literally the designer of the F-15, and a theory of maneuvering called Energy-Manueverability (E-M), which mathematically gave a chart for each aircraft that gave pilots an idea of the ideal speeds and altitudes they could use to pull off various turns and tactics.
One interesting thing I noted was that throughout his career, like everyone else in the military, Boyd was getting reviewed by his superiors, called ER's. It was interesting to hear, and relevant to business, how you had to "read through the lines" and how even a positive sounding ER could be a career-killer if the person wasn't recommended for promotion. Reading this has definitely made me think twice every time I've read (or written) recommendations for people.
Another Boyd tidbit I liked was when fighting bureaucratic battles in the Pentagon, he had a mantra to "use the other persons information against him". Starting with the other persons argument and data, and working backwards, you can make pretty compelling arguments.
Perhaps the biggest idea Boyd came up with is what is called the OODA loop, which stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. A key quote defining the OODA loop:
"Thinking about operating at a quicker tempo - not just moving faster - than the adversary was a new concept in waging war. Generating a rapidly changing environment - that is, engaging in activity that is quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy - inhibits the adversary's ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact. Boyd closed the briefing by saying the message is that whoever can handle the quickest rate of change is the one who survives."
Another great quote that helps explain it:
"Boyd said the strategies and bloodbaths of World War 1 were the natural consequence of both the vo Clausewitzian battle philosophy and the inability of generals to adapt new tactics to nineteenth-century technology: line abreast, mass against mass, and linear defenses against machine guns and quick-firing artillery. The bankrupt nature of that doctrine was demonstrated on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, which the British suffered sixty thousand casualties. After more than three years of the meat-grinding form of war, the Germans began engagements with a brief artillery barrage with smoke and gas obscuring their intentions, then sent in a special infantry teams. These small groups looked for gaps in the defense and advanced along many paths. They did not hit strong points but instead went around them, pressing on, always going forward and not worrying about their flanks. They were like water going downhill, bypassing obstacles, always moving, proving, and then, when they found an opening, pouring through, pressing deeper and deeper."
Getting your lieutenants to the point where they can do this kind of infiltration successfully requires great communication and men who can think fast on their feet. In other words, you had to enable every leader to be able to follow the OODA loop, and just arm them with the overal goals, and trust them to make their own decisions. Very different from previous military structures, where "the need to know" remained at the top.
Why is this empowerment valuable? Because:
"The key thing to understand about Boyd's version is the not the mechanical cycle itself, but rather the need to execute the cycle in such fashion as to get inside the mind and the decision cycle of the adversary. This means the adversary is dealing with out-dated or irrelevant information and thus becomes confused and disoriented and can't function."
And:
"Understanding the OODA loop enables a commander to compress time - that is, the time between observing a situation and taking an action. A commander can use the temporal discrepancy (a form of fast transient) to select the least-expected action rather than what is predicted to be the most effective action. The enemy can also figure out what might be the most effective. To take the least-expected action disorients the enemy. It causes him to pause, wonder, to question."
This makes sense. You can almost picture the commanders of old, who used to have to get on the phone with their boss in order make any decision. "Take the bridge, blow it up, or wait?". Hours and days could be spent waiting around for generals to make up their minds. This form of maneuver warfare is what the Germans used in WWII - they called it blitzkrieg - and it's what we used in Iraq the first time.
In business we have a word for the above - micromanagement. In a sense, it sounds like empowering business leaders and their lieutenants to have an effective OODA loop is what will let a business move faster and win marketshare. I bet somebody has written a book about that - I will have to look.
September 25, 2011
A very detailed biography of a vastly misunderstood man. Coram's description is mostly of the man himself, rather than his ideas. Boyd was an extremely flawed husband, father, and yes even officer. But despite his lumps he was a morally courageous officer and brilliant thinker.
Coram only gives you a basic overview of his theories (of which his minor theory is the oft-quoted mostly misunderstood OODA loop), but really this is only enough to pique your interest. Hammond's "The Mind of War" is more effective at describing Boyd's theories. But Osinga's "Science, Strategy and War" is most exhaustive at providing the reader with Boyd's intellectual context and foundations.
Boyd's most important and novel addition to humankind is his theories on learning in within uncertainty, adaptation, and synthesis of new novel strategies, theories, and concepts for application in the future. This goes well beyond the OODA-loop! For those readers who desire further insight in how successful learners overcome and adapt to change these texts are must-reads!
Coram only gives you a basic overview of his theories (of which his minor theory is the oft-quoted mostly misunderstood OODA loop), but really this is only enough to pique your interest. Hammond's "The Mind of War" is more effective at describing Boyd's theories. But Osinga's "Science, Strategy and War" is most exhaustive at providing the reader with Boyd's intellectual context and foundations.
Boyd's most important and novel addition to humankind is his theories on learning in within uncertainty, adaptation, and synthesis of new novel strategies, theories, and concepts for application in the future. This goes well beyond the OODA-loop! For those readers who desire further insight in how successful learners overcome and adapt to change these texts are must-reads!
July 9, 2022
"You can't have a normal career and do the good work."
Is it worth it?
Would you financially and emotionally impoverish your family, drive your career into a culvert, goad others into wreck their own careers just so you can be the guy to have some ideas that people like but don’t acknowledge that you came up with them?
John Boyd thought it was worth it. Or, based on this biography, he thought the job in front of him was worth it, very intensely worth it, until he didn’t want to deal with it anymore.
Boyd is about a fighter-jock turned underappreciated theorist on war, at least an equal to Clausewitz with Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare and the OODA Loop. Yet, on a general level, I feel Boyd should be read as an example of the limitations of brilliance. Boyd’s accolades never matched his apparent achievements. The sacrifices he made were extremely heavy for a man who retired at colonel before making his wife and 5 children live off his pension rather than consultancy fees.
"Boyd's anger at what the Air Force did to the F-16 never abated.
I like Boyd because how it balances his brilliance with his flaws. But I do have quibbles. I’m not a military strategist. Or an engineer. Or a pilot. However, Boyd’s record in the job he devoted his life to, while interesting, seems a little weak:
F-15: Boyd ‘saved’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
F-16: Boyd ‘created’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
M2-Bradley: More to his Acolyte’s credit.
US Army: Boyd unsuccessfully advised them.
US Marines: Boyd somewhat more successfully advised them, leading to a glorious victory against construction workers in Grenada.
Dick Cheney: Used Boyd’s advice (I think, the book is actually very muddy on that when you parse out the details) during the Gulf War to, I think, win somewhat more quickly?
Most of the above aren’t necessarily the fault of the book, but I would be cautious in describing the brilliance of the Marines in exploiting Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare in Grenada and the Gulf War. That is thin evidence against hilariously outclassed enemies. In support of the concept of maneuver warfare Coram writes Patton, the apparently brilliant exponent of it, would have won World War II far quicker if Eisenhower had just let him. Coram also praises the German 1918 Western Front offensives for the ways they broke the deadlock. Both those positions are, well, tenuous and suggests that Coram’s examples of Boyd’s ideas being applied might be overstated.
Nellis was Valhalla-in-the-desert
Boyd is a bit of fun, whether its being a tiger, because To be called a tiger meant you were a pure fighter pilot and that you would not hesitate to tell a bird colonel to get fucked or how Boyd got to kick a thinly disguised Kelly Johnson out of his office for attempted bribery. It is always good to learn about facts about other places, such as how Coram knows that Thai women are extraordinarily beautiful.
Boyd is also about the “value” of hard work and being called in at 10pm to listen to your boss talk shit before getting an urgent letter out at 4am, just because. Boyd worked hard, worked others hard:
Technicians in the Pentagon graphics shop hated to see Boyd come in the door. He made them stop whatever they were doing and take care of his needs
…and worked the system to his advantage on multiple occasions. I believe the book is praising Boyd’s work ethic throughout (subject to the damage he did to his family), but it’s interesting to look at all those midnight hours and wonder – did it really make things better?
Boyd throughout is the outsider crusading against the system, particularly the Pentagon’s procurement methods (the Zumwalt and F-35 suggest they haven’t improved since). Was it worth it? Boyd seems ambiguous about that, which I like, because sometimes the answer shouldn’t be clear.
Is it worth it?
Would you financially and emotionally impoverish your family, drive your career into a culvert, goad others into wreck their own careers just so you can be the guy to have some ideas that people like but don’t acknowledge that you came up with them?
John Boyd thought it was worth it. Or, based on this biography, he thought the job in front of him was worth it, very intensely worth it, until he didn’t want to deal with it anymore.
Boyd is about a fighter-jock turned underappreciated theorist on war, at least an equal to Clausewitz with Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare and the OODA Loop. Yet, on a general level, I feel Boyd should be read as an example of the limitations of brilliance. Boyd’s accolades never matched his apparent achievements. The sacrifices he made were extremely heavy for a man who retired at colonel before making his wife and 5 children live off his pension rather than consultancy fees.
"Boyd's anger at what the Air Force did to the F-16 never abated.
I like Boyd because how it balances his brilliance with his flaws. But I do have quibbles. I’m not a military strategist. Or an engineer. Or a pilot. However, Boyd’s record in the job he devoted his life to, while interesting, seems a little weak:
F-15: Boyd ‘saved’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
F-16: Boyd ‘created’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
M2-Bradley: More to his Acolyte’s credit.
US Army: Boyd unsuccessfully advised them.
US Marines: Boyd somewhat more successfully advised them, leading to a glorious victory against construction workers in Grenada.
Dick Cheney: Used Boyd’s advice (I think, the book is actually very muddy on that when you parse out the details) during the Gulf War to, I think, win somewhat more quickly?
Most of the above aren’t necessarily the fault of the book, but I would be cautious in describing the brilliance of the Marines in exploiting Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare in Grenada and the Gulf War. That is thin evidence against hilariously outclassed enemies. In support of the concept of maneuver warfare Coram writes Patton, the apparently brilliant exponent of it, would have won World War II far quicker if Eisenhower had just let him. Coram also praises the German 1918 Western Front offensives for the ways they broke the deadlock. Both those positions are, well, tenuous and suggests that Coram’s examples of Boyd’s ideas being applied might be overstated.
Nellis was Valhalla-in-the-desert
Boyd is a bit of fun, whether its being a tiger, because To be called a tiger meant you were a pure fighter pilot and that you would not hesitate to tell a bird colonel to get fucked or how Boyd got to kick a thinly disguised Kelly Johnson out of his office for attempted bribery. It is always good to learn about facts about other places, such as how Coram knows that Thai women are extraordinarily beautiful.
Boyd is also about the “value” of hard work and being called in at 10pm to listen to your boss talk shit before getting an urgent letter out at 4am, just because. Boyd worked hard, worked others hard:
Technicians in the Pentagon graphics shop hated to see Boyd come in the door. He made them stop whatever they were doing and take care of his needs
…and worked the system to his advantage on multiple occasions. I believe the book is praising Boyd’s work ethic throughout (subject to the damage he did to his family), but it’s interesting to look at all those midnight hours and wonder – did it really make things better?
Boyd throughout is the outsider crusading against the system, particularly the Pentagon’s procurement methods (the Zumwalt and F-35 suggest they haven’t improved since). Was it worth it? Boyd seems ambiguous about that, which I like, because sometimes the answer shouldn’t be clear.
June 2, 2017
Many people see themselves as reformers and idealistic and think the world will celebrate them for their reforms because they are logical and beneficial. The problem is that actual reform stops the inertia of systems that benefit the people who have a lot to lose. The better the reform the greater the attempt to buy off the reformer. If buy-offs don't work then the system itself puts its resources into ruining the reputation of the reformer. It's how idealists become realists or how innocents become cynics.
Every so often a reformer comes around that can't be defeated in a conventional way. Even when he is personally defeated his work and legacy live on. John Boyd was such a man. From the air it would look like Boyd sacrificed everything to be a reformer, his career, his family, his finances. The truth is that none of these things were a sacrifice for Boyd because his work was all that really mattered to him. In many ways that's a tragedy, but it's also a great lesson on how our lives are the sum total of the trade-offs we make to balance our values. It's easy to see the fruits of someone's success, but its not easy to see the sacrifices necessary to get there. I came away admiring the hell out of John Boyd, but I can't imagine the strain of trying to live his life.
This is an important book that explains the evolution of warfare in the 20th century, the dangers of conventional wisdom, the enemies of reform, the spirit of the warrior, and the tenacity of an air force pilot that never rose higher than colonel because he would rather do something than be someone. Most importantly, if you just focus on how Boyd prepared himself better than his adversaries you can understand why his unpopularity could not undo his ideas. The lessons here go way behind the military to any entrenched system you may encounter.
Here are some of the things that made Boyd Special:
-He was nicknamed 40 second Boyd when he was an instructor at the Elite Air Force Flying School because he said he could kill any other pilot in a dogfight in 40 seconds or he would give them $40. He never paid the $40. He killed most in under 20 seconds.
- Boyd would run the numbers on every American military plane and compare them to the equivalent Soviet plane and could show how ours were inferior and it would costs lives. This made him enemies of people who should have cared more about these deficiencies than he did.
- Boyd tried to influence building smaller lighter airplanes that could win in dogfights. He didn't succeed but he did help the F-16 and the F-17 become better planes than they would have been if the committee approach had their way.
- He synthesized the knowledge of warfare into an overarching theory where he explains that Sun Tzu's theories were superior to Clausewitz because winning at war is as much about how you get into the head of your opponent as it is what you do offensively.
- He called the common Infantry attack, "Hey Diddle Diddle, right up the Middle." It was the kind of conventional wisdom that created wars of attrition and caused unnecessary casualties. Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, sought Boyd out before our invasion of Iraq in 1991. Boyd influenced the decoy of amphibious assault on Kuwait and a sneak attack through the dessert. This brought a swift resolution of the conflict with few American casualties. It would have been even more successful except that the army slowed down to find symetry and cost itself a bigger victory. Boyd explained how Eisenhower made the same mistake with Patton in 1945 and it kept Patton out of Berlin.
- There were a lot of people who come off poorly in the book, but two politicians from the opposite sides of the aisle come off well. Gary Hart and Dick Cheney appreciated the candor of Boyd and his team when others like Cap Weinberger, Nancy Kasslebaum, and even Sam Nunn to some extend gave in to the political system in the Pentagon.
Every so often a reformer comes around that can't be defeated in a conventional way. Even when he is personally defeated his work and legacy live on. John Boyd was such a man. From the air it would look like Boyd sacrificed everything to be a reformer, his career, his family, his finances. The truth is that none of these things were a sacrifice for Boyd because his work was all that really mattered to him. In many ways that's a tragedy, but it's also a great lesson on how our lives are the sum total of the trade-offs we make to balance our values. It's easy to see the fruits of someone's success, but its not easy to see the sacrifices necessary to get there. I came away admiring the hell out of John Boyd, but I can't imagine the strain of trying to live his life.
This is an important book that explains the evolution of warfare in the 20th century, the dangers of conventional wisdom, the enemies of reform, the spirit of the warrior, and the tenacity of an air force pilot that never rose higher than colonel because he would rather do something than be someone. Most importantly, if you just focus on how Boyd prepared himself better than his adversaries you can understand why his unpopularity could not undo his ideas. The lessons here go way behind the military to any entrenched system you may encounter.
Here are some of the things that made Boyd Special:
-He was nicknamed 40 second Boyd when he was an instructor at the Elite Air Force Flying School because he said he could kill any other pilot in a dogfight in 40 seconds or he would give them $40. He never paid the $40. He killed most in under 20 seconds.
- Boyd would run the numbers on every American military plane and compare them to the equivalent Soviet plane and could show how ours were inferior and it would costs lives. This made him enemies of people who should have cared more about these deficiencies than he did.
- Boyd tried to influence building smaller lighter airplanes that could win in dogfights. He didn't succeed but he did help the F-16 and the F-17 become better planes than they would have been if the committee approach had their way.
- He synthesized the knowledge of warfare into an overarching theory where he explains that Sun Tzu's theories were superior to Clausewitz because winning at war is as much about how you get into the head of your opponent as it is what you do offensively.
- He called the common Infantry attack, "Hey Diddle Diddle, right up the Middle." It was the kind of conventional wisdom that created wars of attrition and caused unnecessary casualties. Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, sought Boyd out before our invasion of Iraq in 1991. Boyd influenced the decoy of amphibious assault on Kuwait and a sneak attack through the dessert. This brought a swift resolution of the conflict with few American casualties. It would have been even more successful except that the army slowed down to find symetry and cost itself a bigger victory. Boyd explained how Eisenhower made the same mistake with Patton in 1945 and it kept Patton out of Berlin.
- There were a lot of people who come off poorly in the book, but two politicians from the opposite sides of the aisle come off well. Gary Hart and Dick Cheney appreciated the candor of Boyd and his team when others like Cap Weinberger, Nancy Kasslebaum, and even Sam Nunn to some extend gave in to the political system in the Pentagon.
February 16, 2019
This book needs to be a required reading for military as well as elected Congressman and Senators. Much of the rot and bloating of the obscene military budget is attributable to the system John Boyd outwitted. Anyone with the slightest interest in military history and aircraft also needs to read the book for pure enjoyment.
The story of John Boyd’s life is wonderfully told by the author and is long overdue. He is an American hero who fought the toughest opponent: the Pentagon. There is a price paid by the rebels and those who fight injustice. John Boyd’s sacrifices make for compelling reading. He is a complex man whose story reveals so much about the clash of integrity with greed in the US military and government. One person can indeed change the world and John Boyd did his part.
The story of John Boyd’s life is wonderfully told by the author and is long overdue. He is an American hero who fought the toughest opponent: the Pentagon. There is a price paid by the rebels and those who fight injustice. John Boyd’s sacrifices make for compelling reading. He is a complex man whose story reveals so much about the clash of integrity with greed in the US military and government. One person can indeed change the world and John Boyd did his part.
January 31, 2007
Great bio of John Boyd, the fighter pilor who pioneered the use of Energy Maneuverability theory that dominates fighter design. He then went on to become a force for reform within the Pentagon, influencing the F-15, F-16, and A-10 programs. His final contribution was on the overall theory of learning and operations, including the now-famous OODA loop. A fascinating iconoclast-I normally don't like biographies that much, but this one was very good.
September 29, 2019
Where to begin? I’ve read the physical copy of this book probably eight times. The references and insights in the book are profound and useful in the extreme.
Further to the book, I recommend the citations - Spinney’s eulogy to Boyd offers a wonderful summary of the book, Boyd’s life and thinking.
https://americawar.wordpress.com/thin...
In summary? Fabulous and highly recommended.
Further to the book, I recommend the citations - Spinney’s eulogy to Boyd offers a wonderful summary of the book, Boyd’s life and thinking.
https://americawar.wordpress.com/thin...
In summary? Fabulous and highly recommended.
April 8, 2007
Boyd was one of the greatest thinkers and his OODA loop is referenced today by many diciplines. This book captures who he was and how he approached problems. It is behind the scenes with a person who wanted to understand the strategy of strategy.
December 11, 2023
This book does a solid job of detailing all of Boyd's contributions to the Air Force but I a lot of it remarkably hard to read (slow pacing and boring government work). Part of me wishes there was better delineation between Boyd's contributions to the USAF and his personal life-that being said I do recognize this is a biography.
I found the highlights of the book to be Boyd's energy maneuverability theory, his contributions to the F-15, F-16, and the A-10, his relationships with the 'Acolytes,' and his times in old fighter squadrons. It's a very interesting read to see how one man basically shaped the post-Vietnam era Air Force and it really makes the reader appreciate each of those jets for all the work that was put into designing them.
The lowlights I found were the extensive sections of bureaucratic red tape he experienced through the many desk jobs he had. I think the book does a solid job of describing how excruciatingly difficult those jobs were (it was just as excruciating to read).
I thought the book handled his family life exceptionally well. The author does a good job of declaring that Boyd handled his family life poorly. Boyd is a classic example of putting career before family and regretting it in the end and the author does a great job of reflecting on his mistakes and emphasizing that he should not be admired for his family relations.
I found the highlights of the book to be Boyd's energy maneuverability theory, his contributions to the F-15, F-16, and the A-10, his relationships with the 'Acolytes,' and his times in old fighter squadrons. It's a very interesting read to see how one man basically shaped the post-Vietnam era Air Force and it really makes the reader appreciate each of those jets for all the work that was put into designing them.
The lowlights I found were the extensive sections of bureaucratic red tape he experienced through the many desk jobs he had. I think the book does a solid job of describing how excruciatingly difficult those jobs were (it was just as excruciating to read).
I thought the book handled his family life exceptionally well. The author does a good job of declaring that Boyd handled his family life poorly. Boyd is a classic example of putting career before family and regretting it in the end and the author does a great job of reflecting on his mistakes and emphasizing that he should not be admired for his family relations.
February 26, 2019
Despite its somewhat campy style (the author uses foreshadowing with the reckless abandon of a third-grader), this book hit me hard - it's a winding story of the tragic, heroic, and entirely unbelievable life of John Boyd, a somewhat forgotten military strategist who, this book implies, worked with SecDef Cheney to design the famous Marine assault and Army tank push that just devastated Iraq during the first Gulf War after a career that progressed from legendary fighter ace to renegade Pentagon airframe designer and theoretician to a public voice for procurement reform and finally into a monastic life as a self-taught intellectual and military ethicist / strategist.
This is one of the most unbelievable biographies I've ever read - Boyd's professional career was marked by facing down enormous military bureaucracies, losing to them, and then finally winning years or even decades later, sometimes after he died. He was a brilliant, creative thinker, but a terribly flawed husband and father, a deeply unpleasant man and awful manager, but a charismatic mentor and engaging rhetorician - the kind of guy who calls at 2am with an idea when you just want to be asleep or who steals millions of dollars of computer time to simulate an idea that the Air Force brass wanted to squash.
Because almost all of his work was classified, and because most of it was presented orally in the form of briefings that, I kid you not, sometimes took up to 14 hours, I literally knew nothing about John Boyd before picking up this book. Boyd's life has to be described as a tragedy - the man never had a father or any other kind of mentor, and he never learned the critical lesson that it's just as important to convince others as it is to be right. He constantly found himself on the wrong side of the fight, and never seemed to find the right support structure; his "Acolytes" were something, but they didn't shield him nearly as much as he shielded all of them.
Overall, this is one of those people that stretches the imagination - a lot of biographies don't capture the feeling of the person being profiled; this book pulled me along magnetically. Almost certainly one of my top books of 2019.
Some thoughts I had while reading:
- Developing air tactics was so hard; technology changed things every couple decades, and there just wasn't a good way to converge on good approaches because of how much technology moved forward.
- The idea of decomposition and recomposition was central to Boyd's conception of creativity and critical to his general worldview.
- Boyd was a truly awful family man, just absolutely the worst.
This is one of the most unbelievable biographies I've ever read - Boyd's professional career was marked by facing down enormous military bureaucracies, losing to them, and then finally winning years or even decades later, sometimes after he died. He was a brilliant, creative thinker, but a terribly flawed husband and father, a deeply unpleasant man and awful manager, but a charismatic mentor and engaging rhetorician - the kind of guy who calls at 2am with an idea when you just want to be asleep or who steals millions of dollars of computer time to simulate an idea that the Air Force brass wanted to squash.
Because almost all of his work was classified, and because most of it was presented orally in the form of briefings that, I kid you not, sometimes took up to 14 hours, I literally knew nothing about John Boyd before picking up this book. Boyd's life has to be described as a tragedy - the man never had a father or any other kind of mentor, and he never learned the critical lesson that it's just as important to convince others as it is to be right. He constantly found himself on the wrong side of the fight, and never seemed to find the right support structure; his "Acolytes" were something, but they didn't shield him nearly as much as he shielded all of them.
Overall, this is one of those people that stretches the imagination - a lot of biographies don't capture the feeling of the person being profiled; this book pulled me along magnetically. Almost certainly one of my top books of 2019.
Some thoughts I had while reading:
- Developing air tactics was so hard; technology changed things every couple decades, and there just wasn't a good way to converge on good approaches because of how much technology moved forward.
- The idea of decomposition and recomposition was central to Boyd's conception of creativity and critical to his general worldview.
- Boyd was a truly awful family man, just absolutely the worst.
Read
November 29, 2019With my interest in time and strategy, I have long been aware of the work of John Boyd. I had also dismissed him as a Fighter Pilot whose Observe-Orient-Decide-Act-Loop (OODA) was largely about deciding and acting quickly.
I was wrong. The Boyd who shines through in Coram's excellent biography is a man who stressed the OO as much as the DA. A man with far more strategic significance than I had given. And, speaking as an Australian, a man whose rank insouciance towards authority is a pure joy to behold.
This is an extremely readable and engaging book about a chaotic, brilliant and complex man. He was a gun fighter pilot whose greatest achievements came in peacetime. A man who was not considered a leader and despised by many yet -to this day - has a rich coterie of followers. A man who knew the maths and physics of fighter planes as well as anyone, yet fundamentally stressed the importance of people and ideas before hardware.
This is foremost a biography, and a reverential one at that. Yet it is also respectful of the ideas, and provides a useful introduction to a fascinating thinker. I'm still not sure if he's right on many of his ideas about strategy and conflict. But I have come to much greater respect for the way in which he developed those ideas, and the character of the man. There's not a huge literature on Boyd, but I've ordered the Hammond and Osinga books to help take my knowledge further.
I was wrong. The Boyd who shines through in Coram's excellent biography is a man who stressed the OO as much as the DA. A man with far more strategic significance than I had given. And, speaking as an Australian, a man whose rank insouciance towards authority is a pure joy to behold.
This is an extremely readable and engaging book about a chaotic, brilliant and complex man. He was a gun fighter pilot whose greatest achievements came in peacetime. A man who was not considered a leader and despised by many yet -to this day - has a rich coterie of followers. A man who knew the maths and physics of fighter planes as well as anyone, yet fundamentally stressed the importance of people and ideas before hardware.
This is foremost a biography, and a reverential one at that. Yet it is also respectful of the ideas, and provides a useful introduction to a fascinating thinker. I'm still not sure if he's right on many of his ideas about strategy and conflict. But I have come to much greater respect for the way in which he developed those ideas, and the character of the man. There's not a huge literature on Boyd, but I've ordered the Hammond and Osinga books to help take my knowledge further.
January 28, 2019
I absolutely devoured this book. Boyd is most well known for his idea of the OODA loop and it’s military applications, but has a tremendous depth of thought behind and beyond OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act).
As a military theorist, he is tossed around in the same sentences as Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz. Some see a direct intellectual lineage running from Sun Tzu to Genghis Khan to Miyamoto Musashi to Mao Tse Tung to Boyd and such comparison do not seem unmerited.
Boyd’s work has been adopted by much of the startup world because his work most looks at how a smaller force can utilize strategy to outcompete larger opponents.
This biography by Coram is probably the best entry point to his work though Certain to Win was also excellent for seeing his theories applied to business. I listened to it on audiobook. If you’d like a briefer (albeit not brief) introduction, I did a write-up on Boyd and OODA loops here.
As a military theorist, he is tossed around in the same sentences as Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz. Some see a direct intellectual lineage running from Sun Tzu to Genghis Khan to Miyamoto Musashi to Mao Tse Tung to Boyd and such comparison do not seem unmerited.
Boyd’s work has been adopted by much of the startup world because his work most looks at how a smaller force can utilize strategy to outcompete larger opponents.
This biography by Coram is probably the best entry point to his work though Certain to Win was also excellent for seeing his theories applied to business. I listened to it on audiobook. If you’d like a briefer (albeit not brief) introduction, I did a write-up on Boyd and OODA loops here.
January 14, 2019
So Much More Than the OODA Loop
Being a Marine officer and a pilot, I had heard of John Boyd and had been “taught” about the OODA loop but I learned so much more about what he really meant.
Now that I work in the acquisitions field this book made an even bigger impact. The battles Boyd fought still need to be fought. The Pentagon is still overrun with stubborn old men who waste our money and refuse to listen to new ideas. We need to continue his work.
I’m at my heart a cynic, life in the Marine Corps will do that to you, so some of the stories the author tells caused me to roll my eyes a bit but the meat of the book, the demonstrable work Boyd and his Acolytes did is worth it.
Being a Marine officer and a pilot, I had heard of John Boyd and had been “taught” about the OODA loop but I learned so much more about what he really meant.
Now that I work in the acquisitions field this book made an even bigger impact. The battles Boyd fought still need to be fought. The Pentagon is still overrun with stubborn old men who waste our money and refuse to listen to new ideas. We need to continue his work.
I’m at my heart a cynic, life in the Marine Corps will do that to you, so some of the stories the author tells caused me to roll my eyes a bit but the meat of the book, the demonstrable work Boyd and his Acolytes did is worth it.
April 13, 2007
I loved this book, as well. There's a phrase in there that frames the type of paradigm breakthrough that occurs about once per century -- the author describes what Boyd did with analysis of fighters as moving the world from "Copernican to Newtonian."
I was stunned at how much Boyd achieved, and where he ultimately took his research, but at the cost of neglecting his family and potentially a little bit of his sanity as well.
An amazing book, for sure.
I was stunned at how much Boyd achieved, and where he ultimately took his research, but at the cost of neglecting his family and potentially a little bit of his sanity as well.
An amazing book, for sure.
September 17, 2021
Thorough and honest account of a man who changed the way the American military approaches warfighting. Though not without his personal and professional flaws—which Coram doesn’t shy away from presenting, Boyd spent his life doing the hard intellectual work to adapt and develop maneuver warfare to the modern battlefield.
December 22, 2020
This book got me very very interested in military history and biographies. John Boyd's ability of losing himself in the pursuit of excellence is truly inspirational. I feel a personal connection with this book as it paints a picture of a man I want to become in the future.
October 9, 2016
Everything makes so much more sense now. The late 80s to the early 90s were rough times for the military. The fallout of the Vietnam debacle and the military's refusal to acknowledge its failure were the sign of the times. The Russians began developing better hardware than the bloated military industrial complex which was geared to blowing gazillions of dollars. Air Force developers were so poor that a Navy aircraft, the F-4 Phantom, was forced upon them. The F-111 became a pariah due to its failures and poor performance. The B-1 was cancelled due to its exorbitant cost and failures of the F-111. What do you do? Answer: begin a clandestine weapons development program within the Air Force. The Fighter Mafia began focusing on air combat superiority solely for its new fighters. Not a flying brick that has diverse mission packages all of which it performs poorly, but a sleek fighter to answer the threat of the Russian MIGs. The Mafia was a group of low-level civil employees and Air Force officers led by Colonel Boyd. Boyd developed his own maneuverability software algorithm that allowed them to design from the ground up a fighter with immense potential. Another acolyte began development of a replacement ground support fighter. The fighter was built around the 30 mm Avenger Cannon. With a long dwell time and the ability to take massive amounts of damage, the A-10 began production. The F-15, 16, and the A-10 were developed during these years by renegade officers fighting the Air Force establishment. The results, were no less than fantastic. Israeli pilots flying the F-15s and 16s clashed with the Syrian Air Force in the early 80s. The Syrian Russian MIGs were no match for American supplied fighters. The IAF downed over 80 MIGs in a span of a few days without a single loss. The 15s and 16s led the strikes in the First Gulf War and prowled the skies during Afghanistan and Iraq over two decades later. The A-10 was known as the Black Death to Iraqi ground troops. Whatever the A-10s locked onto became an inferno. American Air Power is as visible as the Highway of Death as Iraqi troops fleeing Kuwait were annihilated by the American Air Power developed by the Fighter Mafia.
Boyd retired since the writing on the wall was clear...no General promotion for you. The establishment does not sit well with successful guerrilla leaders. Boyd's retirement was not one of fishing, endless rounds of golf, or regaling those in the bar about his active duty exploits. Boyd developed a time and movement based warfare theory. He delved into the strategy masters, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Hart, the German Blitzkrieg experts, the IDF. He developed a new doctrine for warfare. Not just air power of which he was the crown prince, but a combined arms doctrine to crush an enemies reaction capability. He got inside their decision cycle. He created the OODA loop (look this one up...its a good one). No one bought off on it...except the Marines. A few in the USMC liked what they saw. Slowly with much wrangling and gnashing of teeth, the Marines accepted the Boyd doctrine as their own and perfected it. During Grenada one Army General seethed that he had several thousand soldiers immobile while two companies of Marines wreaked havoc around the entire island. The 100 hr Desert Storm land campaign featured an advance by the Marines against the Iraqi defense while the Army did a massive end run in the desert around the flank. The Army forces stalled for three days while the Marines Divisions advanced and mauled the Iraqi positions. Marine elements bypassed strong points and drove deep into the Iraqi positions. 15 Iraqi divisions surrendered to one Marine Division. Iraq had the 4th largest Army in the world.
My personal experience with the Marines during my time in Fallujah was eye-opening. Problems are easily overcome by thinking outside the box. If it is a crazy problem, just wait till you see our solutions. Marines are expected to solve their problems at the lowest level. Who comes up with the solution is not the point. In other words, the corporal may have the solution. Their job is to create confusion within the enemy. Destroy the decision making capability. Be where they are unexpected and vanish from their expected positions. General Mattis's call sign of "Chaos" is most fitting. I had no idea where this mentality came from. Now I do.
His underdog acolytes went on to do more. Boyd mentored them like a father. None were appreciated by the military. None made it to General. But the did manage to change the entire American spectrum of warfare. It is only fitting that an Air Force renegade and his merry band created the lightning doctrine that destroyed Iraqi military capability in a matter of days.
This is a true underdog story. The underdogs are always outgunned and outnumbered. They always are disdained by those of superior strength and position. So when they win, it is nothing less than spectacular. I always root for the underdogs.
Boyd retired since the writing on the wall was clear...no General promotion for you. The establishment does not sit well with successful guerrilla leaders. Boyd's retirement was not one of fishing, endless rounds of golf, or regaling those in the bar about his active duty exploits. Boyd developed a time and movement based warfare theory. He delved into the strategy masters, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Hart, the German Blitzkrieg experts, the IDF. He developed a new doctrine for warfare. Not just air power of which he was the crown prince, but a combined arms doctrine to crush an enemies reaction capability. He got inside their decision cycle. He created the OODA loop (look this one up...its a good one). No one bought off on it...except the Marines. A few in the USMC liked what they saw. Slowly with much wrangling and gnashing of teeth, the Marines accepted the Boyd doctrine as their own and perfected it. During Grenada one Army General seethed that he had several thousand soldiers immobile while two companies of Marines wreaked havoc around the entire island. The 100 hr Desert Storm land campaign featured an advance by the Marines against the Iraqi defense while the Army did a massive end run in the desert around the flank. The Army forces stalled for three days while the Marines Divisions advanced and mauled the Iraqi positions. Marine elements bypassed strong points and drove deep into the Iraqi positions. 15 Iraqi divisions surrendered to one Marine Division. Iraq had the 4th largest Army in the world.
My personal experience with the Marines during my time in Fallujah was eye-opening. Problems are easily overcome by thinking outside the box. If it is a crazy problem, just wait till you see our solutions. Marines are expected to solve their problems at the lowest level. Who comes up with the solution is not the point. In other words, the corporal may have the solution. Their job is to create confusion within the enemy. Destroy the decision making capability. Be where they are unexpected and vanish from their expected positions. General Mattis's call sign of "Chaos" is most fitting. I had no idea where this mentality came from. Now I do.
His underdog acolytes went on to do more. Boyd mentored them like a father. None were appreciated by the military. None made it to General. But the did manage to change the entire American spectrum of warfare. It is only fitting that an Air Force renegade and his merry band created the lightning doctrine that destroyed Iraqi military capability in a matter of days.
This is a true underdog story. The underdogs are always outgunned and outnumbered. They always are disdained by those of superior strength and position. So when they win, it is nothing less than spectacular. I always root for the underdogs.
Want to read
September 27, 2019recommendation: [How Going Meta Can Level Up Your Career - LessWrong 2.0](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/2P2fu...)
> (I highly recommend you pick up this biography of him.) The one that jumped out most starkly is the pattern that Boyd exhibited throughout his career that allowed him to consistently progress.
> (I highly recommend you pick up this biography of him.) The one that jumped out most starkly is the pattern that Boyd exhibited throughout his career that allowed him to consistently progress.
May 2, 2022
A friend recommended this book, and I thought "another story of some military Paton-like hard ass" that's going to show how tough he is.
But this was a completely different story. I won't ruin the narrative around Boyd's career in the AirForce, but his basis thesis in life was:
"You will have to decide if you want to BE someone or DO something". And it appears that was 100% relevant in Boyd's time in the US military. He made huge contributions but is not even credited by the Air Force for his work because he challenged the pentagon's corrupt, bloated approach to warfare. Only the US Marines seem to have honoured what Boyd did for the US Military.
Boyd contributed four major things to the (US) military:
1. The first real manual of air combat tactics and strategy for fighter pilots.
2. The theory of energy maneuverability - the way to actually measure one fighter aircraft against another
3. He was the backbone of the "reform" movement in the US military in the 80s which fought back against the purchase of expensive, and underperforming military hardware.
4. A generalist theory of combat, which some people say is the best writing on military strategy since Sun Tzu.
Not bad, John.
A few notes on what I learned from the book about the US military:
1. Prior to Boyd, fighter pilots really didn't have much in sophisticated training.
2. The Pentagon is largely the playground of careerists. There are lots of generals and it's often worse than a corporate political environment.
3. Inside the the Pentagon, the competition is between branches of the military. The Army would rather lose to the Vietnamese than the Air Force, and vice versa.
4. The US military is enamoured with large purchases of high tech weapons versus those that can effectively accomplish focused missions.
5. The F-111 fighter was the pride of the Air Force in the 70s but was a worse aircraft than any of it's combat rivals (MIGs) despite being more expensive and technologically advanced. It was heavy and could not maneuver. It was a PIG.
6. The B-1 bomber was a similar horror. Costing over $70M (if I remember, more than 2-3X the estimated cost in the budget) it couldn't perform the most basis needs of a bomber.
7. The F-15 and A-10 were two examples of aircraft designed for mission, by Boyd or his team, and they outperform anything in their class.
8. the M-1 Abrams tank was a horribly corrupt project, with people ordered to fake test data, and even fake a test by shooting water canisters at a tank instead of rockets. The people responsible cared more about CYA than protecting the lives of their troops.
9. Too much military strategy is focused on taking ground or holding ground vs. defeating the enemy.
But this was a completely different story. I won't ruin the narrative around Boyd's career in the AirForce, but his basis thesis in life was:
"You will have to decide if you want to BE someone or DO something". And it appears that was 100% relevant in Boyd's time in the US military. He made huge contributions but is not even credited by the Air Force for his work because he challenged the pentagon's corrupt, bloated approach to warfare. Only the US Marines seem to have honoured what Boyd did for the US Military.
Boyd contributed four major things to the (US) military:
1. The first real manual of air combat tactics and strategy for fighter pilots.
2. The theory of energy maneuverability - the way to actually measure one fighter aircraft against another
3. He was the backbone of the "reform" movement in the US military in the 80s which fought back against the purchase of expensive, and underperforming military hardware.
4. A generalist theory of combat, which some people say is the best writing on military strategy since Sun Tzu.
Not bad, John.
A few notes on what I learned from the book about the US military:
1. Prior to Boyd, fighter pilots really didn't have much in sophisticated training.
2. The Pentagon is largely the playground of careerists. There are lots of generals and it's often worse than a corporate political environment.
3. Inside the the Pentagon, the competition is between branches of the military. The Army would rather lose to the Vietnamese than the Air Force, and vice versa.
4. The US military is enamoured with large purchases of high tech weapons versus those that can effectively accomplish focused missions.
5. The F-111 fighter was the pride of the Air Force in the 70s but was a worse aircraft than any of it's combat rivals (MIGs) despite being more expensive and technologically advanced. It was heavy and could not maneuver. It was a PIG.
6. The B-1 bomber was a similar horror. Costing over $70M (if I remember, more than 2-3X the estimated cost in the budget) it couldn't perform the most basis needs of a bomber.
7. The F-15 and A-10 were two examples of aircraft designed for mission, by Boyd or his team, and they outperform anything in their class.
8. the M-1 Abrams tank was a horribly corrupt project, with people ordered to fake test data, and even fake a test by shooting water canisters at a tank instead of rockets. The people responsible cared more about CYA than protecting the lives of their troops.
9. Too much military strategy is focused on taking ground or holding ground vs. defeating the enemy.
January 1, 2016
A well-researched, remarkable book about an exceptional man and warrior, a man who is still shamefully unacknowledged or disrespected by the high-ranking managers of the Pentagon who spend careers protecting their turf and trying to squelch his ground-breaking work as an original thinker. Boyd devoted his life and career to improving the U.S. military forces' tactics, strategy and equipment. He gave us the O-O-D-A Loop ("Observe, Orient, Decide, Act"); "Aerial Attack Study"; the Energy-Maneuverability Theory; "Destruction & Creation"; "Patterns of Conflict," and so much more. There is no room for doubt about his dedication to his nation and his work.
In my estimation, the depth of his character is best illustrated by what came to be known as his "To Be or To Do" speech. Here it is:
“To Be or To Do”
By Col. John Richard Boyd, USAF
(1927 - 1997)
“Tiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road. And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go [pointing] that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.
“Or, you can go that way [opposite direction] and you can do something – something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won’t have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference.
“To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do? Which way will you go?”
In my estimation, the depth of his character is best illustrated by what came to be known as his "To Be or To Do" speech. Here it is:
“To Be or To Do”
By Col. John Richard Boyd, USAF
(1927 - 1997)
“Tiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road. And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go [pointing] that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.
“Or, you can go that way [opposite direction] and you can do something – something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won’t have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference.
“To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do? Which way will you go?”
August 13, 2012
I only rated Boyd 3 out of 5 stars. The reason for this is that I think that the author has not done full due diligence on some of the material that he has been given, most likely in interviews, before writing it as fact. One particular 'fact' that really grated on me was Coram writing the F-4 Phantom off as a fighter because it did not meet Boyd's criteria for a fighter - the are numerous similar examples in the book which I believe are just the result of either inadequate research or a desire to canonise Boyd as some sort of voice in the wilderness.
One comes through very clearly to any military reader of this book is that one of the main reasons behind Boyd's isolation by the USAF was Boyd himself - if he had played a long game, it is likely that he could have both realised the fulfilment of his dream AND achieve 'stardom' in the military sense. Instead he opted for tactical engagements that did much to turn the system against him.
That notwithstanding, this should be compulsory reading for anyone who glibly prattles on about the OODA Loop and the odds are positive that they probably neither understand it or where it comes from: THAT message is what makes this book worth reading regardless of whether you are in business, aeronautical engineering or aspire to be a fighter pilot.
Apart from the flaw detailed above, Boyd is well-written and a good study of a man who probably changed the world in more ways than he realised (or probably anyone else for that matter). I read the Nook version and I think that this is lacking any of the drawing or other images that may be in a print version.
One comes through very clearly to any military reader of this book is that one of the main reasons behind Boyd's isolation by the USAF was Boyd himself - if he had played a long game, it is likely that he could have both realised the fulfilment of his dream AND achieve 'stardom' in the military sense. Instead he opted for tactical engagements that did much to turn the system against him.
That notwithstanding, this should be compulsory reading for anyone who glibly prattles on about the OODA Loop and the odds are positive that they probably neither understand it or where it comes from: THAT message is what makes this book worth reading regardless of whether you are in business, aeronautical engineering or aspire to be a fighter pilot.
Apart from the flaw detailed above, Boyd is well-written and a good study of a man who probably changed the world in more ways than he realised (or probably anyone else for that matter). I read the Nook version and I think that this is lacking any of the drawing or other images that may be in a print version.
August 6, 2013
I'm a little bit obsessed with John Boyd and his theory of the OODA loop, but I knew little about the man himself. Corman paints a picture of a brilliant iconoclast: swimmer, fighter tactics instructor, engineer, Pentagon warrior, and finally philosopher-strategist. Corman draws heavily on the memories of Boyd's Acolytes, the six people closest too him in his career, his reticent family, and the public record. As Corman will freely admit, sometimes the myth overtakes the man, but the myth is more correct.
Boyd was a character. He had three good ideas in his life, which is three more than most people have. He literally wrote the book on air-to-air combat, revolutionized aircraft design with Energy-Maneuverability theory, and his OODA loop has become the dominant strategic metaphor of the 21st century. But for all that brilliance, and his frequent tactical victories and "hosings" of those who opposed him, he lost the war. Pentagon procurement is still very expensive gold-plated systems. Get-along managers rather than principled warriors are promoted. And Boyd's personal life was a wreck, and he died practically penniless and alienated from his children. But for all that, this was a great book and a great biography.
To share one bit of Boydian wisdom: You can either be somebody or do something. Follow the rules, agree with your superiors, and you'll rise to the best of your abilities but accomplish nothing. Stick to your principles, fight for what's right, and take no shit from anybody, and you may go down in flames but you'll have fought with honor. It's your life, so what will you do with it?
Boyd was a character. He had three good ideas in his life, which is three more than most people have. He literally wrote the book on air-to-air combat, revolutionized aircraft design with Energy-Maneuverability theory, and his OODA loop has become the dominant strategic metaphor of the 21st century. But for all that brilliance, and his frequent tactical victories and "hosings" of those who opposed him, he lost the war. Pentagon procurement is still very expensive gold-plated systems. Get-along managers rather than principled warriors are promoted. And Boyd's personal life was a wreck, and he died practically penniless and alienated from his children. But for all that, this was a great book and a great biography.
To share one bit of Boydian wisdom: You can either be somebody or do something. Follow the rules, agree with your superiors, and you'll rise to the best of your abilities but accomplish nothing. Stick to your principles, fight for what's right, and take no shit from anybody, and you may go down in flames but you'll have fought with honor. It's your life, so what will you do with it?
October 8, 2012
Excellent read.
A quote from Boyd's early childhood really pulls the human side together:
"[Boyd's] family was poor and bore the stigma of having a child with polio. John's clothes were so tatty that a teacher once asked him in front of the class if he could not wear more presentable clothes. He held back his tears until he could get home and tell his mother what happened. She wrapped her arms around him and said, "Don't let it bother you. Say it to yourself over and over, 'It doesn't bother me. It doesn't bother me.' Remember you have something no one else in the class has. You have principle and integrity. That means you will be criticized and attacked. But in the end you will win. Don't let it bother you."
part of the breakthrough:
"The MiG was faster in raw acceleration and in turning ability, but the F-86 was quicker in changing maneuvers. And in combat, quicker is more important."
and a fun one:
"Boyd was in the office about a week when he called the first meeting of his department heads. ... "Everything you are doing is meaningless. ... Not a goddamn thing coming out of this office has any importance. ... But that's what the Air Force wants. So keep on doing nothing. Just don't bother me with the bullshit." He dismissed everyone but one officer, a man he judged particularly ineffective. "If I never hear from you, you will get outstanding ERs [evaluations]. ... Talk to me and your ER is downgraded. In fact, your ERs are going to be inversely proportionate to how often I hear from you."
A quote from Boyd's early childhood really pulls the human side together:
"[Boyd's] family was poor and bore the stigma of having a child with polio. John's clothes were so tatty that a teacher once asked him in front of the class if he could not wear more presentable clothes. He held back his tears until he could get home and tell his mother what happened. She wrapped her arms around him and said, "Don't let it bother you. Say it to yourself over and over, 'It doesn't bother me. It doesn't bother me.' Remember you have something no one else in the class has. You have principle and integrity. That means you will be criticized and attacked. But in the end you will win. Don't let it bother you."
part of the breakthrough:
"The MiG was faster in raw acceleration and in turning ability, but the F-86 was quicker in changing maneuvers. And in combat, quicker is more important."
and a fun one:
"Boyd was in the office about a week when he called the first meeting of his department heads. ... "Everything you are doing is meaningless. ... Not a goddamn thing coming out of this office has any importance. ... But that's what the Air Force wants. So keep on doing nothing. Just don't bother me with the bullshit." He dismissed everyone but one officer, a man he judged particularly ineffective. "If I never hear from you, you will get outstanding ERs [evaluations]. ... Talk to me and your ER is downgraded. In fact, your ERs are going to be inversely proportionate to how often I hear from you."
January 7, 2013
This book is about the life of John Boyd, a famous and talented Air Force fighter pilot. The authors purpose for writing this was to tell about how in some ways, the military can be pretty corrupt and that John Boyd was one of those who refused to conform to the corrupt system, even though it meant getting passed up for promotions once or twice. The only plot that there is in this book is the lifetime of Boyd and his great accomplishments. The very interesting part of how Robert Coram write this; is that he sides with Boyd and describes him like is a hero in a corrupt world. The author is very descriptive on certain key events that are vital to how he changed the military and people lives. The pace of this book is slow because although it is stretched over this man’s life, it focuses on the key points for a while depending on how important they are. A type of person that would enjoy this book is someone that likes history, aviation, military, and has patience. Someone that wouldn’t like this book is anyone who cannot sit still and/or open a book that they have been reading, find their place, and read as interested as they were when they picked it up.
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