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On Guerrilla Warfare
One of the most influential documents of our time, Mao Tse-tung's pamphlet on guerrilla warfare has become the basic textbook for waging revolution in underdeveloped and emergent areas throughout the world.
Recognizing the fundamental disparity between agrarian and urban societies, Mao advocated unorthodox strategies that converted deficits into using intelligence provided by the sympathetic peasant population; substituting deception, mobility, and surprise for superior firepower; using retreat as an offensive move; and educating the inhabitants on the ideological basis of the struggle. This radical new approach to warfare, waged in jungles and mountains by mobile guerrilla bands closely supported by local inhabitants, has been adopted by other revolutionary leaders from Ho Chi Minh to Che Guevara.
Mao wrote On Guerrilla Warfare in 1937 while in retreat after ten years of battling the Nationalist army of Chiang Kai-shek. Twelve years later, the Nationalist Chinese were rousted from the mainland, and Mao consolidated his control of a new nation, having put his theories of revolutionary guerrilla warfare to the test.
Established governments have slowly come to recognize the need to understand and devise means to counter this new method of warfare. Samuel B. Griffith's classic translation makes Mao's treatise widely available and includes a comprehensive introduction that profiles Mao, analyzes the nature and conduct of guerrilla warfare, and considers its implications for American policy.
Recognizing the fundamental disparity between agrarian and urban societies, Mao advocated unorthodox strategies that converted deficits into using intelligence provided by the sympathetic peasant population; substituting deception, mobility, and surprise for superior firepower; using retreat as an offensive move; and educating the inhabitants on the ideological basis of the struggle. This radical new approach to warfare, waged in jungles and mountains by mobile guerrilla bands closely supported by local inhabitants, has been adopted by other revolutionary leaders from Ho Chi Minh to Che Guevara.
Mao wrote On Guerrilla Warfare in 1937 while in retreat after ten years of battling the Nationalist army of Chiang Kai-shek. Twelve years later, the Nationalist Chinese were rousted from the mainland, and Mao consolidated his control of a new nation, having put his theories of revolutionary guerrilla warfare to the test.
Established governments have slowly come to recognize the need to understand and devise means to counter this new method of warfare. Samuel B. Griffith's classic translation makes Mao's treatise widely available and includes a comprehensive introduction that profiles Mao, analyzes the nature and conduct of guerrilla warfare, and considers its implications for American policy.
128 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1935
About the author
Mao Zedong
444 books429 followersMao Zedong, also transliterated as Mao Tse-tung, and commonly referred to as Chairman Mao, was a Chinese Communist revolutionary, guerrilla warfare strategist, Marxist political philosopher, and leader of the Chinese Revolution. He was the architect and founding father of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from its establishment in 1949, and held control over the nation until his death in 1976. His theoretical contribution to Marxism–Leninism, along with his military strategies and brand of policies, are collectively known as Maoism.
Mao rose to power by commanding the Long March, forming a Second United Front with Kuomintang (KMT) during the Second Sino-Japanese War to repel a Japanese invasion, and later led the Communist Party of China (CPC) to victory against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's KMT in the Chinese Civil War. Mao established political and military control over most of the territory formerly contained within the Chinese Empire and launched a campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries. He sent the Communist People's Liberation Army into Xinjiang and Tibet but was unable to oust the remnants of the Nationalist Party from Taiwan. He enacted sweeping land reform by using violence and terror to overthrow landlords before seizing their large estates and dividing the land into people's communes. The Communist Party's final victory came after decades of turmoil in China, which included the Great Depression, a brutal invasion by Japan and a protracted civil war. Mao's Communist Party ultimately achieved a measure of stability in China, though Mao's efforts to close China to trade and market commerce, and eradicate traditional Chinese culture, have been largely rejected by his successors.
Mao styled himself "The Great Helmsman" and supporters continue to contend that he was responsible for some positive changes which came to China during his three decade rule. These included doubling the school population, providing universal housing, abolishing unemployment and inflation, increasing health care access, and dramatically raising life expectancy. A cult of personality grew up around Mao, and community dissent was not permitted. His Communist Party still rules in mainland China, retains control of media and education there and officially celebrates his legacy. As a result, Mao is still officially held in high regard by many Chinese as a great political strategist, military mastermind, and savior of the nation. Maoists promote his role as a theorist, statesman, poet, and visionary, and anti-revisionists continue to defend most of his policies.
Mao rose to power by commanding the Long March, forming a Second United Front with Kuomintang (KMT) during the Second Sino-Japanese War to repel a Japanese invasion, and later led the Communist Party of China (CPC) to victory against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's KMT in the Chinese Civil War. Mao established political and military control over most of the territory formerly contained within the Chinese Empire and launched a campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries. He sent the Communist People's Liberation Army into Xinjiang and Tibet but was unable to oust the remnants of the Nationalist Party from Taiwan. He enacted sweeping land reform by using violence and terror to overthrow landlords before seizing their large estates and dividing the land into people's communes. The Communist Party's final victory came after decades of turmoil in China, which included the Great Depression, a brutal invasion by Japan and a protracted civil war. Mao's Communist Party ultimately achieved a measure of stability in China, though Mao's efforts to close China to trade and market commerce, and eradicate traditional Chinese culture, have been largely rejected by his successors.
Mao styled himself "The Great Helmsman" and supporters continue to contend that he was responsible for some positive changes which came to China during his three decade rule. These included doubling the school population, providing universal housing, abolishing unemployment and inflation, increasing health care access, and dramatically raising life expectancy. A cult of personality grew up around Mao, and community dissent was not permitted. His Communist Party still rules in mainland China, retains control of media and education there and officially celebrates his legacy. As a result, Mao is still officially held in high regard by many Chinese as a great political strategist, military mastermind, and savior of the nation. Maoists promote his role as a theorist, statesman, poet, and visionary, and anti-revisionists continue to defend most of his policies.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 132 reviews
June 30, 2023
Essential to understanding how Mao came to power..."The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea." This book has been used by insurgent movements all over the world; it really addresses the 'whys and wherefores' of revolutionary uprisings. Amazing insight into what motivates small groups to revolt against the status quo.
May 24, 2017
A quick read for a day you are wondering why the world is fighting guerilla-style now. As Mao Tse-Tung predicted in this seminal text, the style of combat borne in China to repel foreign invaders would soon become the world's violent modus operandi. Thus, it was essential to understand its proper utilization, as well as its limitations.
Samuel B. Griffith, USMC and translator of the text, puts it in a nutshell: "In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerillas do exactly the opposite."
A note that I found particularly impressive was Mao's insistence that, "We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy." (p.93)
Samuel B. Griffith, USMC and translator of the text, puts it in a nutshell: "In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerillas do exactly the opposite."
A note that I found particularly impressive was Mao's insistence that, "We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy." (p.93)
June 4, 2023
'When the enemy attacks us in the foulest, vilest most mendacious way that is a good sign, for it means we have scored an enormous victory".---Mao Ze Deng
This is the other "Little Red Book" by Mao and the one that is worth reading and re-reading. My own copy is covered in bright red plastic. Mao is not limiting himself to military affairs. These are lessons for life. No wonder Robert Greene cites this gem so often in THE 48 LAWS OF POWER! Composed of talks and articles written during the war against the Japanese, 1935-1945, Mao philosophize on how a seemingly inferior force, his Red Army, could tackle, wrestle and defeat the mighty force of the Japanese occupation army. "Hide, fight, run" is Mao's motto for the guerrilla---the guerrilla in all of us. Direct confrontation is a strategy bound to lead to defeat, on the battlefield, in the office, or in your relationships. When striking at an opponent one swift blow is worth ten small ones; never underestimate the power of memory. Do not be fooled or frightened by your enemy's apparent strength. He has weaknesses too, even if they lie below the surface. Japan seemed tough, but its whole economy depended on imports and it had no real allies in Asia, only puppet friends. The Chinese, seemingly divided (Mao versus Jiang) could count on patriotism to help lead them to victory in a long war. If you want the up on bosses, politicians, and other big-shots who make you jump, this is the place to begin your instruction.
This is the other "Little Red Book" by Mao and the one that is worth reading and re-reading. My own copy is covered in bright red plastic. Mao is not limiting himself to military affairs. These are lessons for life. No wonder Robert Greene cites this gem so often in THE 48 LAWS OF POWER! Composed of talks and articles written during the war against the Japanese, 1935-1945, Mao philosophize on how a seemingly inferior force, his Red Army, could tackle, wrestle and defeat the mighty force of the Japanese occupation army. "Hide, fight, run" is Mao's motto for the guerrilla---the guerrilla in all of us. Direct confrontation is a strategy bound to lead to defeat, on the battlefield, in the office, or in your relationships. When striking at an opponent one swift blow is worth ten small ones; never underestimate the power of memory. Do not be fooled or frightened by your enemy's apparent strength. He has weaknesses too, even if they lie below the surface. Japan seemed tough, but its whole economy depended on imports and it had no real allies in Asia, only puppet friends. The Chinese, seemingly divided (Mao versus Jiang) could count on patriotism to help lead them to victory in a long war. If you want the up on bosses, politicians, and other big-shots who make you jump, this is the place to begin your instruction.
August 30, 2017
I suppose my background in studying strategy and tactics, and my enjoyment in such a subject, has determined a lot of what I gained from reading this. For example, my multiple readings of Art of War, which Mao mentions multiple times in direct quote or allusion to, has enabled me to visualize a lot of what he says here. I also like the way his writing was translated, the way it functions as a basic manual. This book was short and educating, and my own writing on the subject of strategy and organization has evolved well because of reading this.
While I want to find a book which details specific strategy, such as placement of troops, interaction with specific territory and people, the actions of close-combat tactic, this book, like Art of War with general military movement, instead gives mostly abstract notions of what to do in successfuly carrying out guerrilla operations. For example, he doesn't go into detail about what a guerrilla with a sword or lance is supposed to do in combat with heavily-armed imperialists. But perhaps such vagueries are exemplary of an adaptable combat mindset. Nonetheless, I often did get the feeling like more could have been said. I also have an ideological problem with the rigid hierachies he suggests work best, when to me such hierarchal positions appear unnecessary. Nonetheless, his ideas and the way he suggests to carry them out, were interesting for historical and educational purposes.
Perhaps the most important thing Mao Tse-tung says in this book is something related to how guerrilla warfare cannot succeed without the voluntary will of the people. He repeatedly rules out any thievery (except of enemy supply) for guerrilla purposes, and I highly respect such sentiment. This, historically, has answered my questions as to why certain guerrilla movements fail or appear to fail. For example, think of Che Guevara's involvement in the guerrilla activity in Cuba. This activity spread rapidly because the will of the people erupted when just a few dozen guerrilla soldiers made it to shore and began their movement of revolutionary activity. Whereas later, Che's involvement in revolutionary guerrilla activity in his homeland of Bolivia did not succeed (and ended in his murder), because (for whatever reason I still don't know) the Bolivian people did not have the voluntary will to fight.
Since my early life growing up, Mao Tse-tung has been an anomaly. He essentially was my familial generation's Great Evil. If my grandfather's Great Evil was Josef Stalin, and my parents' Great Evil was Gorbachev, then my generation subsequently has Mao. Chronologically it doesn't make sense, and yet nothing about mccarthyism makes sense. Anyway, it was never explained rationally to me the what and why and how, simply that he's evil and there's nothing else to say (and asking questions or disagreeing is considered sedition in authoritarian societies, ironically placed adamantly here). All this did was heighten my interest. Now, reading this, I feel even more inclined and interested in reading more of his works.
While I want to find a book which details specific strategy, such as placement of troops, interaction with specific territory and people, the actions of close-combat tactic, this book, like Art of War with general military movement, instead gives mostly abstract notions of what to do in successfuly carrying out guerrilla operations. For example, he doesn't go into detail about what a guerrilla with a sword or lance is supposed to do in combat with heavily-armed imperialists. But perhaps such vagueries are exemplary of an adaptable combat mindset. Nonetheless, I often did get the feeling like more could have been said. I also have an ideological problem with the rigid hierachies he suggests work best, when to me such hierarchal positions appear unnecessary. Nonetheless, his ideas and the way he suggests to carry them out, were interesting for historical and educational purposes.
Perhaps the most important thing Mao Tse-tung says in this book is something related to how guerrilla warfare cannot succeed without the voluntary will of the people. He repeatedly rules out any thievery (except of enemy supply) for guerrilla purposes, and I highly respect such sentiment. This, historically, has answered my questions as to why certain guerrilla movements fail or appear to fail. For example, think of Che Guevara's involvement in the guerrilla activity in Cuba. This activity spread rapidly because the will of the people erupted when just a few dozen guerrilla soldiers made it to shore and began their movement of revolutionary activity. Whereas later, Che's involvement in revolutionary guerrilla activity in his homeland of Bolivia did not succeed (and ended in his murder), because (for whatever reason I still don't know) the Bolivian people did not have the voluntary will to fight.
Since my early life growing up, Mao Tse-tung has been an anomaly. He essentially was my familial generation's Great Evil. If my grandfather's Great Evil was Josef Stalin, and my parents' Great Evil was Gorbachev, then my generation subsequently has Mao. Chronologically it doesn't make sense, and yet nothing about mccarthyism makes sense. Anyway, it was never explained rationally to me the what and why and how, simply that he's evil and there's nothing else to say (and asking questions or disagreeing is considered sedition in authoritarian societies, ironically placed adamantly here). All this did was heighten my interest. Now, reading this, I feel even more inclined and interested in reading more of his works.
December 1, 2015
I can't believe I discovered this treasure in a Maryland antique store last week while visiting the Eastern Shore from Tennessee with my wife. As a long time student of the Vietnam conflicts and Ho Chi Mihn, and to a lesser degree, Mao Tse-Tung, I had heard of this classic guerrilla primer for some time, but I've never been able to find it. Until now. In hardback. And it was pricey. But worth it.
Mao wrote this small book in 1937 while leading the Chinese Red Army guerrillas against the Japanese invaders. The book was later translated and published by the US military in 1940. My edition was re-translated and published in 1961 by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, who wrote a most excellent introduction to the book. In fact, while short, it's so excellent, that when combined with Mao's text, I couldn't help but wonder what would have happened if the French and US governments and military had read the original first, and for the US later, this edition. They could have learned some lessons, taken some advice, maybe taken some pointers, and perhaps saved countless lives in futile efforts to take over a people. It's beyond idiotic. It's actually something I've long thought, dating back to Edward Lansdale's CIA efforts in 1950s Indochina and the conclusions he drew about probable guerrilla warfare the US would be facing if we were drawn into conflict there. Simply stunning how no one in charge ever listened to the experts, the "real" experts.
Mao wrote this primer while allegedly on the "Long March," I believe it's called if I remember correctly, which would have put him under serious stress while doing so. It's quite comprehensive for such a small volume. It covers things such as what guerrilla warfare is, the history of guerrilla warfare, the relationship of guerrilla operations to regular army operations, the actual organization of guerrilla units and armies, political issues for guerrillas, and more. He writes quite convincingly of his firm belief that while the enemy may be technologically superior, they can't fight on all fronts at all times of day or night and eventually a long term war will wear them down and defeat them. Griffith, the translator, makes a point that both Ho Chi Mihn and Castro used this primer and this strategy successfully and it's hard to argue against its success.
Mao writes of political goals for guerrillas. These include:
1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.
He also lists the essential requirements for all successful guerrilla operations:
1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted; tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducted strategically on interior lines.
2. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.
3. The establishment of bases.
4. A clear understanding of the relationship that exists between the attack and the defense.
5. The development of mobile operations.
6. Correct command.
One thing Mao makes clear is guerrilla warfare is to be an offensive-only operation. Strike and strike quickly, move fast, run away if you have to, run away a lot, hit from behind, from the flanks, at night, strike supply lines, get arms and supplies from your enemies. His original guerrillas had perhaps three rifles and a few pistols per unit. The rest had swords and spears. They had to wait until they had successfully attacked and defeated Japanese units and taken their equipment before they could arm themselves.
Of course it's always important for guerrillas to win the hearts of the people, especially in China's case (and Vietnam's later), the peasants. Everyone -- even children -- can help out. Anyone can be militia, spy, courier, cook, medic, soldier, etc. It's imperative to politically educate the population so everyone will know why you're fighting and why it's important to fight. And why it's important to find and eradicate traitors.
Griffith's introduction, as I mentioned, is short but excellent. He gives a brief overview of Mao himself, on the nature of revolutionary guerrilla war, on strategy, tactics, and logistics of such a war, and some conclusions. Among his conclusions are the notion that fighting such guerrillas is definitely a losing proposition for a conventional army and even counter-guerrilla tactics won't work! He even goes on to say that if any country or government were to try to aid a country or government fighting against a guerrilla army, it would be wise to ONLY offer advisers and equipment. Remember, he wrote this in 1961, about the time when America was starting to openly send advisers to South Vietnam. I guess he could foretell things. Pity no one in the US government read this or listened to him or took him or this book seriously. Cause he was right. We had no chance. And if you believe Mao -- and Griffith -- virtually any government or army fighting a conventional or counter-guerrilla protracted war against a "revolutionary" guerrilla army is pretty much destined to lose. Fact. Tragedy. Too much loss of life.
This book was everything I'd hoped it would be. It was superb. It was a history, a strategy, a tactic, a warning -- it was fascinating. And to read it with the benefit of history's hindsight made it especially amazing. Mao wasn't right about everything. He couldn't be. But it seems to me that Ho picked Mao's brains and used what he could and improved upon everything to totally destroy the US effort in the war we lost against North Vietnam, a war that could have been avoided if we had only looked at history. This is a book I'm keeping in my library and will undoubtedly be reading again. It's quite short and easy to read. And it's most highly recommended.
Mao wrote this small book in 1937 while leading the Chinese Red Army guerrillas against the Japanese invaders. The book was later translated and published by the US military in 1940. My edition was re-translated and published in 1961 by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, who wrote a most excellent introduction to the book. In fact, while short, it's so excellent, that when combined with Mao's text, I couldn't help but wonder what would have happened if the French and US governments and military had read the original first, and for the US later, this edition. They could have learned some lessons, taken some advice, maybe taken some pointers, and perhaps saved countless lives in futile efforts to take over a people. It's beyond idiotic. It's actually something I've long thought, dating back to Edward Lansdale's CIA efforts in 1950s Indochina and the conclusions he drew about probable guerrilla warfare the US would be facing if we were drawn into conflict there. Simply stunning how no one in charge ever listened to the experts, the "real" experts.
Mao wrote this primer while allegedly on the "Long March," I believe it's called if I remember correctly, which would have put him under serious stress while doing so. It's quite comprehensive for such a small volume. It covers things such as what guerrilla warfare is, the history of guerrilla warfare, the relationship of guerrilla operations to regular army operations, the actual organization of guerrilla units and armies, political issues for guerrillas, and more. He writes quite convincingly of his firm belief that while the enemy may be technologically superior, they can't fight on all fronts at all times of day or night and eventually a long term war will wear them down and defeat them. Griffith, the translator, makes a point that both Ho Chi Mihn and Castro used this primer and this strategy successfully and it's hard to argue against its success.
Mao writes of political goals for guerrillas. These include:
1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.
He also lists the essential requirements for all successful guerrilla operations:
1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted; tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducted strategically on interior lines.
2. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.
3. The establishment of bases.
4. A clear understanding of the relationship that exists between the attack and the defense.
5. The development of mobile operations.
6. Correct command.
One thing Mao makes clear is guerrilla warfare is to be an offensive-only operation. Strike and strike quickly, move fast, run away if you have to, run away a lot, hit from behind, from the flanks, at night, strike supply lines, get arms and supplies from your enemies. His original guerrillas had perhaps three rifles and a few pistols per unit. The rest had swords and spears. They had to wait until they had successfully attacked and defeated Japanese units and taken their equipment before they could arm themselves.
Of course it's always important for guerrillas to win the hearts of the people, especially in China's case (and Vietnam's later), the peasants. Everyone -- even children -- can help out. Anyone can be militia, spy, courier, cook, medic, soldier, etc. It's imperative to politically educate the population so everyone will know why you're fighting and why it's important to fight. And why it's important to find and eradicate traitors.
Griffith's introduction, as I mentioned, is short but excellent. He gives a brief overview of Mao himself, on the nature of revolutionary guerrilla war, on strategy, tactics, and logistics of such a war, and some conclusions. Among his conclusions are the notion that fighting such guerrillas is definitely a losing proposition for a conventional army and even counter-guerrilla tactics won't work! He even goes on to say that if any country or government were to try to aid a country or government fighting against a guerrilla army, it would be wise to ONLY offer advisers and equipment. Remember, he wrote this in 1961, about the time when America was starting to openly send advisers to South Vietnam. I guess he could foretell things. Pity no one in the US government read this or listened to him or took him or this book seriously. Cause he was right. We had no chance. And if you believe Mao -- and Griffith -- virtually any government or army fighting a conventional or counter-guerrilla protracted war against a "revolutionary" guerrilla army is pretty much destined to lose. Fact. Tragedy. Too much loss of life.
This book was everything I'd hoped it would be. It was superb. It was a history, a strategy, a tactic, a warning -- it was fascinating. And to read it with the benefit of history's hindsight made it especially amazing. Mao wasn't right about everything. He couldn't be. But it seems to me that Ho picked Mao's brains and used what he could and improved upon everything to totally destroy the US effort in the war we lost against North Vietnam, a war that could have been avoided if we had only looked at history. This is a book I'm keeping in my library and will undoubtedly be reading again. It's quite short and easy to read. And it's most highly recommended.
August 26, 2018
Wow I am shocked at myself. I can't believe I am actually reading this and enjoying it. I can't believe a simple minded basic girl like me who studied computers in uni and can be found reading trashy NA will end up reading On Guerrilla Warfare by Chairman Mao. All thanks to For Love of a Book. This kick ass book group has many many challenges that would help u shatter ur reading goals expectations and also open up a new reading horizon for you
On Guerrilla Warfare is a pamphlet written for citizens during Sino Japanese War. Its short and very straight to the point. Chairman Mao detailed all aspect of guerrilla warfare and strategy. You gotta be amazed by his insights and explanation. As a newbie like me, you will never see war as simple as strategize, charge and attack. You will never think of war as only something to be left to the soldiers. Because in a revolutionary war , everyone including the old, the woman and the children can play a part in the war.
Mao also put heavy emphasis on morales during wartime. We all know how ruthless the Japanese Imperial Army treated chinese during the war. So it was only natural the chinese wanted an eye for an eye. But Chairman Mao insisted that they have to treat the captured enemy with respect to further shaken the faith in the Japanese Army and gain international sympathy to China's cause.
:P I don't want to give too much detail about it. Its better to jump right in and be amazed. Say what you want about Chairman Mao being a Communist and killer, but I can't deny that this book is amazing
On Guerrilla Warfare is a pamphlet written for citizens during Sino Japanese War. Its short and very straight to the point. Chairman Mao detailed all aspect of guerrilla warfare and strategy. You gotta be amazed by his insights and explanation. As a newbie like me, you will never see war as simple as strategize, charge and attack. You will never think of war as only something to be left to the soldiers. Because in a revolutionary war , everyone including the old, the woman and the children can play a part in the war.
Mao also put heavy emphasis on morales during wartime. We all know how ruthless the Japanese Imperial Army treated chinese during the war. So it was only natural the chinese wanted an eye for an eye. But Chairman Mao insisted that they have to treat the captured enemy with respect to further shaken the faith in the Japanese Army and gain international sympathy to China's cause.
:P I don't want to give too much detail about it. Its better to jump right in and be amazed. Say what you want about Chairman Mao being a Communist and killer, but I can't deny that this book is amazing
March 25, 2021
Mao Zedong sets forth his theories and strategies on the use of guerrilla warfare. Examples are provided.
January 2, 2008
I believe armed struggles of the 21st century will be known more for asymmetric warfare dictated by insurgencies rather than the total war characterized by 20th century where the entire economic and military might of a nation was mobilized to win. These grassroots rebellions generally arise from the masses of unfortunate, uneducated, and forgotten poor seeking to improve their position in life and react with violent revolutionary action. Mao knew and trusted the peasants and correctly gauged their revolutionary potential. The peasants provided him with superior information, which allowed his forces to engage the enemy at their choosing. Which ever side wins the support of the general population will be the ultimate victors.
Given the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian leaders, military leaders, and even average citizens of western powers should read this short book written by the greatest leader of modern guerrilla warfare to better understand the logic and reasons behind insurgent movements. It compiles all of the lessons Mao learned fighting the Japanese during WWII, drawing on combat experience and his own deep thought about winning a protracted war while fighting from the position of weakness. Guerrilla warfare is primitive only in the technological sense. The author states, "Its basic element is man, ans man is more complex than any of his machines."
A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action. This is a major thesis of Mao's and he stresses the need for an ideological alternative to current government and once that is solidified it must be logically and convincingly written, explained, repeated, and disseminated among the population in order to gain their support. Once the support is gained the guerrillas must be organized and continuously reminded the reason for the struggle. While looking at the guerrilla organizational charts it was interesting to see a propaganda officer at the top of the hierarchy.
Mao's principle of "unity of opposites" is interesting since it is an adaptation of the ancient Chinese philosophical concept of Yin-Yang. Summarized into a military viewpoint, the theory equates to "concealed within strength there is weakness, and within weakness, strength. The small, under armed peasants were no match for the Japanese, but quickness, surprise, and better information allowed for rapid, effective military strikes, eventually wearing down the invaders.
I found it interesting that Mao viewed guerrilla tactics as simply one phase of the revolutionary war and it was a means to sap the enemy strength until more confrontational conventional war could be waged. He stressed a protracted war so that invading forces would face international pressure, domestic pressure, continual guerrilla attacks and it would eventually be defeated. It appears many western armies do not think of conflicts in longer terms and seem to seek quick rapid military action to reach a political goal.
This book is a classic of military literature and the essential manual for understanding revolutionary warfare is not only of armed conflict but political in nature.
Given the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian leaders, military leaders, and even average citizens of western powers should read this short book written by the greatest leader of modern guerrilla warfare to better understand the logic and reasons behind insurgent movements. It compiles all of the lessons Mao learned fighting the Japanese during WWII, drawing on combat experience and his own deep thought about winning a protracted war while fighting from the position of weakness. Guerrilla warfare is primitive only in the technological sense. The author states, "Its basic element is man, ans man is more complex than any of his machines."
A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action. This is a major thesis of Mao's and he stresses the need for an ideological alternative to current government and once that is solidified it must be logically and convincingly written, explained, repeated, and disseminated among the population in order to gain their support. Once the support is gained the guerrillas must be organized and continuously reminded the reason for the struggle. While looking at the guerrilla organizational charts it was interesting to see a propaganda officer at the top of the hierarchy.
Mao's principle of "unity of opposites" is interesting since it is an adaptation of the ancient Chinese philosophical concept of Yin-Yang. Summarized into a military viewpoint, the theory equates to "concealed within strength there is weakness, and within weakness, strength. The small, under armed peasants were no match for the Japanese, but quickness, surprise, and better information allowed for rapid, effective military strikes, eventually wearing down the invaders.
I found it interesting that Mao viewed guerrilla tactics as simply one phase of the revolutionary war and it was a means to sap the enemy strength until more confrontational conventional war could be waged. He stressed a protracted war so that invading forces would face international pressure, domestic pressure, continual guerrilla attacks and it would eventually be defeated. It appears many western armies do not think of conflicts in longer terms and seem to seek quick rapid military action to reach a political goal.
This book is a classic of military literature and the essential manual for understanding revolutionary warfare is not only of armed conflict but political in nature.
June 14, 2017
In 1937, Mao Tse-tung wrote this manual on revolutionary guerrilla warfare during the Japanese invasion of China. Chairman Mao would later become the founding father of the People's Republic of China.
Mao writes, "Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation."
... He believed in the rights for the peasant people of China.
Mao was born in the late 1800's. Fathered by a strict disciplinarian, he was known to be in constant conflict with his father. In his youth he enjoyed reading Chinese philosophy, poetry, history, and political science. After finishing school he associated himself with a Marxist study group where he discovered Lenin and Trotsky, and where he would later become a convinced Communist.
In this manual Mao speaks on the basic strategy of guerrilla warfare, which is based on alertness, mobility, attack and deception.
"The enemy's rear is the guerrillas' front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical problems are solved in a direct and elementary fashion. The enemy is the principal source of weapons, equipment and ammunition."
While Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam) and Che Guevara (Cuba) have associated revolutionary guerrilla warfare with Communism, it is important to remember guerrilla warfare existed long before Communism.
And while many books have been written on the strategy of warfare (Sun Tzu, Miyamoto Musashi etc), I believe it is important to read a 'modern' version to understand revolutions in recent history.
Mao writes, "Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation."
... He believed in the rights for the peasant people of China.
Mao was born in the late 1800's. Fathered by a strict disciplinarian, he was known to be in constant conflict with his father. In his youth he enjoyed reading Chinese philosophy, poetry, history, and political science. After finishing school he associated himself with a Marxist study group where he discovered Lenin and Trotsky, and where he would later become a convinced Communist.
In this manual Mao speaks on the basic strategy of guerrilla warfare, which is based on alertness, mobility, attack and deception.
"The enemy's rear is the guerrillas' front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical problems are solved in a direct and elementary fashion. The enemy is the principal source of weapons, equipment and ammunition."
While Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam) and Che Guevara (Cuba) have associated revolutionary guerrilla warfare with Communism, it is important to remember guerrilla warfare existed long before Communism.
And while many books have been written on the strategy of warfare (Sun Tzu, Miyamoto Musashi etc), I believe it is important to read a 'modern' version to understand revolutions in recent history.
November 13, 2023
I tend to shirk military history. It's not my favorite kind of history. There was one point where I was so happy to learn that history was not just accounts of wars and Great Men. History could also be domestic, social, cultural, fashionable, culinary, feminist, queer, scientific. I sometimes call military history, warfare, and statecraft "boy history" on account of the many boys I knew growing up who loved to tell me facts about tanks against my will. That said, it is time for some self-criticism, because military history is not just boy history, as current events are showing us. To think about it this way is to move through this world with a girl boss mindset, ignorant of the stakes and the great sacrifices of ordinary people.
Last Friday I completed a workplace anti-racism training. During this training we looked at that well-known list about white supremacy culture, which was made famous during the George Floyd uprisings of 2020. I have long been skeptical of this list. It feels correct, it's easy to digest, it's infographic-friendly, but where does it come from? How do you create a list with such authority? How do you measure these characteristics? How do you definitively assign them to one culture?
In an interview with the Intercept, Tema Okun, the author of the original paper, talks about the origins of this list and how it took on a life of its own during the George Floyd protests. Okun is a white woman who worked with community organizations on anti-racism throughout the 90s and early 2000s. Her mentor Kenneth Jones passed away in 2004, but she credits him along with a few others in the paper for influencing her.
In Okun's own words about how the paper was written:
I went to some kind of meeting and I don’t remember any details of the meeting, but I went to a meeting and it was a very frustrating and horrible meeting. And I came home and I sat in front of the computer. And the article literally came through me onto the computer. It was not researched. I didn’t sit down and deliberate. It just came through me. And I’ve never had that experience with my writing, before or since.
I'm not here to argue the validity of the paper. For all I know this list of characteristics of white supremacy culture could be definitively true. But while we in institutions are teaching ourselves to self-flagellate, seek purification, and be ashamed of behaviors (because now these behaviors are not only wrong, they're also now "white supremacist"), other people around the world are learning about liberation. Anti-racist education as it exists in most western institutions and non-profits is part of an ever-growing syllabus of liberal theory, which keeps people occupied, self-managing, thought exercising. But most importantly, it keeps us away from liberatory texts.
Palestinian fighters, guerrilla Adivasi fighters in India, liberation army soldiers in the Philippines—they are reading Mao. You don’t have to like it for it to be true. Palestinian resistance in Gaza is waging guerrilla warfare, which is a well-studied and complex strategy that has a historical precedent of successful Indigenous resistance against occupying governments. I’m not saying we in the belly of the beast should be waging guerrilla warfare. I’m just saying, they’re reading Mao and we’re studying infographics made because somebody went into a frustrating meeting. Could we be any more unserious?
Liberal education is always teaching us about the atrocities of those in power and the resulting suffering. It might even make a small attempt at talking about its structural and systemic components (while never putting one’s own institution in the crosshairs of criticism). But it almost never talks about the riots or the insurrections. I had always been confused about the reported cooperation and docility of the Japanese people as they were put in concentration camps. I couldn’t understand how people would just lie down and let themselves be stepped on. I never learned about uprisings in the Manzanar internment camp until just a few years ago. As a result of this truncated education, people in this country are forever on their moral high ground about how any death is a tragedy that cannot be condoned. People here rarely understand power or oppression, let alone what it takes to actually become liberated. From a western curriculum one can only learn either how to oppress others, or suffer oppression with dignity.
But the story of human rights is always told this way, as if the display of suffering put the ruling class in a difficult position, or a famous speech or treatise provoked unparalleled empathy and enlightenment—rather than what we know is true when we look at the facts: Human rights are won through revolution and riot. This is not boy history. In times of extreme crisis and wartime, warfare and fighting includes children, the elderly, and women, and care work includes men. People do whatever must be done. Resistance fighters in Palestine have women’s infantries. Palestinian doctors and journalists, men and women, are seen on video comforting children, providing medical care, food, and tenderness.
The struggle we wage is global and our enemy is organized. Resistance is survival (which is what makes it necessary), but it also invites repression (which is what makes it inevitable). If boy history was presented to me in the form of WWII tank facts, then girl history has been presented to me in the form of cozy instagram diagrams, airing grievances in breakout rooms, and talking endlessly about microaggressions. But I am not going to thought-exercise myself to death because my heart is done aching. We must read liberation texts—the real ones, not ones on the NYT bestsellers list. We must no longer qualify our support for armed struggle. We should not have to think more about suffering than we think about winning.
Last Friday I completed a workplace anti-racism training. During this training we looked at that well-known list about white supremacy culture, which was made famous during the George Floyd uprisings of 2020. I have long been skeptical of this list. It feels correct, it's easy to digest, it's infographic-friendly, but where does it come from? How do you create a list with such authority? How do you measure these characteristics? How do you definitively assign them to one culture?
In an interview with the Intercept, Tema Okun, the author of the original paper, talks about the origins of this list and how it took on a life of its own during the George Floyd protests. Okun is a white woman who worked with community organizations on anti-racism throughout the 90s and early 2000s. Her mentor Kenneth Jones passed away in 2004, but she credits him along with a few others in the paper for influencing her.
In Okun's own words about how the paper was written:
I went to some kind of meeting and I don’t remember any details of the meeting, but I went to a meeting and it was a very frustrating and horrible meeting. And I came home and I sat in front of the computer. And the article literally came through me onto the computer. It was not researched. I didn’t sit down and deliberate. It just came through me. And I’ve never had that experience with my writing, before or since.
I'm not here to argue the validity of the paper. For all I know this list of characteristics of white supremacy culture could be definitively true. But while we in institutions are teaching ourselves to self-flagellate, seek purification, and be ashamed of behaviors (because now these behaviors are not only wrong, they're also now "white supremacist"), other people around the world are learning about liberation. Anti-racist education as it exists in most western institutions and non-profits is part of an ever-growing syllabus of liberal theory, which keeps people occupied, self-managing, thought exercising. But most importantly, it keeps us away from liberatory texts.
Palestinian fighters, guerrilla Adivasi fighters in India, liberation army soldiers in the Philippines—they are reading Mao. You don’t have to like it for it to be true. Palestinian resistance in Gaza is waging guerrilla warfare, which is a well-studied and complex strategy that has a historical precedent of successful Indigenous resistance against occupying governments. I’m not saying we in the belly of the beast should be waging guerrilla warfare. I’m just saying, they’re reading Mao and we’re studying infographics made because somebody went into a frustrating meeting. Could we be any more unserious?
Liberal education is always teaching us about the atrocities of those in power and the resulting suffering. It might even make a small attempt at talking about its structural and systemic components (while never putting one’s own institution in the crosshairs of criticism). But it almost never talks about the riots or the insurrections. I had always been confused about the reported cooperation and docility of the Japanese people as they were put in concentration camps. I couldn’t understand how people would just lie down and let themselves be stepped on. I never learned about uprisings in the Manzanar internment camp until just a few years ago. As a result of this truncated education, people in this country are forever on their moral high ground about how any death is a tragedy that cannot be condoned. People here rarely understand power or oppression, let alone what it takes to actually become liberated. From a western curriculum one can only learn either how to oppress others, or suffer oppression with dignity.
But the story of human rights is always told this way, as if the display of suffering put the ruling class in a difficult position, or a famous speech or treatise provoked unparalleled empathy and enlightenment—rather than what we know is true when we look at the facts: Human rights are won through revolution and riot. This is not boy history. In times of extreme crisis and wartime, warfare and fighting includes children, the elderly, and women, and care work includes men. People do whatever must be done. Resistance fighters in Palestine have women’s infantries. Palestinian doctors and journalists, men and women, are seen on video comforting children, providing medical care, food, and tenderness.
The struggle we wage is global and our enemy is organized. Resistance is survival (which is what makes it necessary), but it also invites repression (which is what makes it inevitable). If boy history was presented to me in the form of WWII tank facts, then girl history has been presented to me in the form of cozy instagram diagrams, airing grievances in breakout rooms, and talking endlessly about microaggressions. But I am not going to thought-exercise myself to death because my heart is done aching. We must read liberation texts—the real ones, not ones on the NYT bestsellers list. We must no longer qualify our support for armed struggle. We should not have to think more about suffering than we think about winning.
January 23, 2024
US Marine General Samuel B. Griffith's translation and interpretation of Mao's slim little booklet on the strategy and use of guerrilla warfare is a true classic -- one that I would recommend anyone who is either interested in Chinese military history or -- ready for this one? -- doing business in China or finds themselves competing with Chinese businesses elsewhere in the world. I am still working through the use and implementation of Mao's strategies for business purposes but the deeper you get into the book, the more you see many of these strategies and tactics are being used to advance Chinese business interests. Brilliant.
August 31, 2007
Like the art of war, this is a fascinating book into the mind of Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare was written in the 1950's and describes most of the tactics used by the Viet Kong to defeat the US during the Vietnam conflict.
It has a lot of applicability in the business world and actually in any group dynamic.
It is also a study in strategy to exectuion.
It has a lot of applicability in the business world and actually in any group dynamic.
It is also a study in strategy to exectuion.
February 17, 2020
二十世纪zergling rush太牛了
毛主席万岁
毛主席万岁
September 10, 2020
I read this for a class, but I would honestly read it outside of class. Such an interesting read
October 26, 2022
A genuinely fascinating read with huge insights into the difficulties of China during this period. It's rather fascinating to see how decentralised this movement was at this time, and it's also interesting to see how much Mao really cared about democratic process and voluntary action the whole way through. This sadly was not something that completely carried over into his leadership, however it's important to recognise some of the brilliant things he did and his truly noble intentions at the beginning.
Much of this book is deeply scientific, and I was completely blown away by how empathetic Mao is to his enemies. As a tactical person that recognises the importance of compassion, he strives to ultimately build a strong resistance movement by teaching everyone the benefits they will see by working together for a common good. There is no coercion, there is no forceful hand - this is a movement designed to help people.
I think if you also have a deep interest in Chinese history, this is an excellent book as it shows the general attitudes towards Japanese imperialism at this time.
Much of this book is deeply scientific, and I was completely blown away by how empathetic Mao is to his enemies. As a tactical person that recognises the importance of compassion, he strives to ultimately build a strong resistance movement by teaching everyone the benefits they will see by working together for a common good. There is no coercion, there is no forceful hand - this is a movement designed to help people.
I think if you also have a deep interest in Chinese history, this is an excellent book as it shows the general attitudes towards Japanese imperialism at this time.
May 22, 2024
Rated 4.5 stars. Good but not my favorite. Very direct and strategic.
January 7, 2014
I think I enjoyed the commentary on Chairman Mao's writing more than his own. Overall a very potent little book that has helped inspire Guerrilla Warfare across the globe as the only viable option when faced with a larger, stronger and better equipped opponent. The scary part is how effective it can be even against superior forces.
My Favorite quotes:
"IN the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware of the the issues at stake. A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and a home-made bomb. His indoctrination begins even beofre he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man" - Samuel B Griffith
"Basically the conflict split the Chinese Communist Party wide open and alienated the traditionalists in Moscow revolved about this question: Was the Chinese revolution to be based on the industrial proletariat -as Marxist dogma prescribed- or was it to be based on the peasant? Mao, who knew and trusted the peasants, and had correctly gauged their revolutionary potential, was convinced that the Chinese urban proletariat were too few in number and too apathetic to make a revolution"
"Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning Guerrilla operations"
"In a guerrilla area, every person without exception must be considered an agent-old men, women, boys driving ox carts, girls tending goats, farm laborers, storekeepers, schoolteachers, priests, boatmen, scavengers"
"Guerrillas deny all information of themselves to their enemy, who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog"
"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops"
"Guerrillas must be expert at running always since they do it so often. The avoid static dispositions; their effort is always to keep the situation as fluid as possible, to strike where and when the enemy least expects them"
"Decentralization has many advantages, particularly if local leaders are ingenious and bold. The enemy's rear is the guerrillas' front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical problems are solved in a direct and elementary fashion: The enemy is the principal source of weapons, equipment, and ammunition"
Mao once said "We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy's own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke" -Mao Zedong
"An important postulate of the Yin-Yang theory is that concealed within strength there is weakness, and withing weakness, strength"
Guerrilla tactical doctrine may be summarized in four Chinese characters pronounced "Sheng Tung, Chi HSi" which mean "uproar (in the) Eas; Striek (in the) West." Here we find expressed the all-important principles of distraction aon the one hand and concentration on the other; to fix the enemy's attention and to strike where an when he least anticipates the blow"
"A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized, a revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins"
"The tactics of Guerrillas must be used against Guerrillas themselves"
"Imaginative, intelligent, and bold leadership is absolutely essential. Commanders, and leaders at every echelon must be selected with these specific qualities in mind. Officers and NCO's who are more than competent under normal conditions will frequently be hopelessly ineffective when confronted with the dynamic and totally different situations characteristic of guerrilla warfare"
My Favorite quotes:
"IN the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware of the the issues at stake. A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and a home-made bomb. His indoctrination begins even beofre he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man" - Samuel B Griffith
"Basically the conflict split the Chinese Communist Party wide open and alienated the traditionalists in Moscow revolved about this question: Was the Chinese revolution to be based on the industrial proletariat -as Marxist dogma prescribed- or was it to be based on the peasant? Mao, who knew and trusted the peasants, and had correctly gauged their revolutionary potential, was convinced that the Chinese urban proletariat were too few in number and too apathetic to make a revolution"
"Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning Guerrilla operations"
"In a guerrilla area, every person without exception must be considered an agent-old men, women, boys driving ox carts, girls tending goats, farm laborers, storekeepers, schoolteachers, priests, boatmen, scavengers"
"Guerrillas deny all information of themselves to their enemy, who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog"
"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops"
"Guerrillas must be expert at running always since they do it so often. The avoid static dispositions; their effort is always to keep the situation as fluid as possible, to strike where and when the enemy least expects them"
"Decentralization has many advantages, particularly if local leaders are ingenious and bold. The enemy's rear is the guerrillas' front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical problems are solved in a direct and elementary fashion: The enemy is the principal source of weapons, equipment, and ammunition"
Mao once said "We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy's own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke" -Mao Zedong
"An important postulate of the Yin-Yang theory is that concealed within strength there is weakness, and withing weakness, strength"
Guerrilla tactical doctrine may be summarized in four Chinese characters pronounced "Sheng Tung, Chi HSi" which mean "uproar (in the) Eas; Striek (in the) West." Here we find expressed the all-important principles of distraction aon the one hand and concentration on the other; to fix the enemy's attention and to strike where an when he least anticipates the blow"
"A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized, a revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins"
"The tactics of Guerrillas must be used against Guerrillas themselves"
"Imaginative, intelligent, and bold leadership is absolutely essential. Commanders, and leaders at every echelon must be selected with these specific qualities in mind. Officers and NCO's who are more than competent under normal conditions will frequently be hopelessly ineffective when confronted with the dynamic and totally different situations characteristic of guerrilla warfare"
January 9, 2014
Mao wrote this in 1937, when he was just a leader of the Chinese Communist Party, allied with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in a desperate war against the Japanese invaders. Mao had not yet become the ideological mass-murdering tyrant we know. The book originally appeared as a pamphlet for the instruction of troops. It is famous for its clear presentation of guerrilla methods, but I think its application is limited. Mao is concerned specifically with partisan warfare, i.e. guerrilla warfare by irregular units in support of a regular army. He provides suggested tables of organization and equipment that are completely conventional for light infantry, from squad to regiment. He lays out traditional guerrilla tactics: avoiding battle except when delaying, harassing, or attacking isolated units; keeping close relationships with the people among whom the guerrillas operate; centralized strategy but decentralized tactical operations; political indoctrination of the troops and of the people (printing presses are among the necessary equipment he identifies). He emphasizes that China is in a protracted war of attrition in which the enemy must be worn out before he can be ejected from the country. He discusses the importance of secure bases where guerrillas can rest, refit, and train, and the difficulty of defending them when guerrilla units are unsuited for tactical defense. Permanent guerrilla bases are easiest to establish in remote mountain areas; lowlands may only have temporary bases used only when the enemy is occupied elsewhere. I wonder what he would say about today's guerrillas, who usually operate on their own, without any regular armies, and some of whom rely on urban bases hidden under the nose of the regular government.
June 1, 2016
Mao's writing on guerilla warfare has become a guide on waging revolution in underdeveloped areas around the world. Mao recognizes the difference between rural and urban societies to create strategies that create advantages for the lower class.
In his writing, Mao highlights the signifigance of guerilla war as it creates areas for production, agriculture, and exploits the strengths and weaknesses of large armies and help guide the lower class in fighting them. I agree with Mao Tse Tung on his views of why it's important because it not only helps the lower class and increase production, but it also unites the people and helps them become more aware so that hey may help each other to meet needs.
Overall, I thought that this book was really interesting and teaches the signifiance of unity and how to use that unity to benefit the people. I would definitely recommend this book and other books in his series.
In his writing, Mao highlights the signifigance of guerilla war as it creates areas for production, agriculture, and exploits the strengths and weaknesses of large armies and help guide the lower class in fighting them. I agree with Mao Tse Tung on his views of why it's important because it not only helps the lower class and increase production, but it also unites the people and helps them become more aware so that hey may help each other to meet needs.
Overall, I thought that this book was really interesting and teaches the signifiance of unity and how to use that unity to benefit the people. I would definitely recommend this book and other books in his series.
August 15, 2009
This is the short text based on Mao's experiences fighting the Chinese Nationalists as well as preparing to fight the Imperial Japanese Army as it invaded the Chinese mainland. Most people do think of Mao more in line as Chairman Mao. Take away what you think of him personally, he was a gifted military leaders with a keen mind. This is valuable to read, especially his treatment of protracted war, very different than most traditional Western military theory. It is also timely, as the United States fights protracted wars of its own, in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the global war on terror.
November 3, 2013
Mao's book is a classic on guerrilla warfare, ably translated and contextualized by General Samuel B Griffith. This book mainly covers the theoretical and strategic aspects of guerrilla warfare, the need for complete political clarity at all levels, strict ethical codes and internal discipline for the men, and the proposed use of guerrillas against a qualitatively superior but numerically inferior force tasked with occupation and pacification. This book won't teach you about how to set an ambush and not starving to death in the woods, but it will cover the basic steps between an isolated an ineffective movement and the fall of a government.
September 6, 2007
It's not great writing, and it's not even particularly gripping stuff. The translation is perhaps not the greatest, or perhaps Mao was not a literary genius.
That said, it's an important read. I found it recommended in Petraeus' bibliography to his Counterinsurgency Field Manual as one of the classic texts on the subject. It's short and easy to get through in one brief sitting, and it positively informs one's understanding of all recent insurgency-fueled conflicts, including Algeria, Vietnam, and now Iraq.
That said, it's an important read. I found it recommended in Petraeus' bibliography to his Counterinsurgency Field Manual as one of the classic texts on the subject. It's short and easy to get through in one brief sitting, and it positively informs one's understanding of all recent insurgency-fueled conflicts, including Algeria, Vietnam, and now Iraq.
April 11, 2016
Taking Place during the second Sino-Japanese War or more commonly know as WW2, Mao Tse-tung a brilliant general and future leader of China talks about the war efforts and what needs to be done concerning guerrilla warfare. This book is base on Sun Tzu's war manual "Art of War" and the author expands it by talking about guerrilla operations and why they are necessary. Over all this book is a great read in the right hands. Mao Tse-tung "On Guerrilla Warfare" is read almost like a manual, and takes a little studying to understand what the author is truly saying.
February 22, 2018
I think Mao Tse Tung basically played psychological side of human in the war.
Lesson learned I can take to be considered:
It should, feudal system be vanished and be not used anymore. But, we still see that in many modern organizations use that system, ironically the organizations are within educational institution. All students and teachers need to read this book, so they can take some values then implement it.
Lesson learned I can take to be considered:
It should, feudal system be vanished and be not used anymore. But, we still see that in many modern organizations use that system, ironically the organizations are within educational institution. All students and teachers need to read this book, so they can take some values then implement it.
June 17, 2013
iT SEEMS TO ME THAT HO CHI MING TOOK ALL HE DID IN FIGHTING A GUERRILLA WAR FROM THE WORDS OF MAO TSE=TUNG. I HAD READ THE FIRST LAST YEAR AND IT SO JUST LIKE THIS BOOK. I WONDER IF PRESIDENT Johnson HAD READ EITHER BOOK. IF HE OR OUR MILITARY LEADERS HAD READ BOTH BOOKS, THE VIET NAM WAR COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, I THINK
August 28, 2017
Mr. Mao writes in a clear, straightforward style. I think he has a future in writing. Perhaps of a little red book or something.
Really though, this is a straightforward and surprisingly practical book about waging guerrilla warfare against a traditional army. Mao sets the context for a guerrilla army within that of a larger fighting force. I enjoyed his insights.
Really though, this is a straightforward and surprisingly practical book about waging guerrilla warfare against a traditional army. Mao sets the context for a guerrilla army within that of a larger fighting force. I enjoyed his insights.
May 20, 2012
This is another book that I have returned to often over the years. It taught me the basic construct that rebels, partisans, guerrillas, terrorists, etc. use. I think that it is no coincidence that Al Qaida translates to "the base," a Mao concept.
March 2, 2017
Must read for anyone interested in unconventional warfare. Mao set out his 3 phases - establish a regional base, start direct action, then gain decision and victory. Believed that in every disadvantage there is an advantage, and the converse.
March 17, 2017
With this and "The Art of War", I am now adequately prepared to teach high school.
May 3, 2022
Short, dense, monumental treatise on guerilla warfare written by Mao Zedong, one of the most important leaders of the 20th century. Mao is known as the father of modern China and more ignominiously as the world’s greatest proponent of communism (well, second only to his superior Joseph Stalin). Mao has left an indelible legacy on geopolitics that has persisted despite the CCP shifting toward more of a free-market modus operandi. This volume was written during the Second Sino-Japanese War, in which Mao’s joined forces with his arch nemesis Chiang Kai-shek to stave off the relentless Japanese Imperial Army. Just for some temporal context, this was published in 1937 before the infamous Rape of Nanking which saw Japan massacre upwards of 200,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians (in just six weeks).
As the title suggests, this volume gives a rundown of guerilla military operations, which Mao profiles through the context of the then-ongoing war against a militarily superior Japan. Mao covers everything necessary to execute a successful guerilla operation: the necessity of an ideological impetus, recruiting the right personnel (by regional segmentation and volunteer-only), building support among the local population, deploying offensive/mobile units, building bases in strategic zones, etc. Mao is concise, conveying all critical points and adequate detail on how to stage a successful revolutionary guerilla movement down to weapons, munitions, explosives, clothing, medicine, etc. Mao does not pretend to be an innovator here, rather crediting both recent and distant episodes of Chinese military history (he cites Sun Tzu) as well as global conflicts ranging from Ethiopia to Latin America. Expectedly, he gives credit to the great Vladimir Lenin (citing his pamphlet titled “On Guerilla Warfare” or, alternatively, “Partisan Warfare”).
Let’s walk through how Mao says you should effectuate a successful guerilla operation to neutralize and ideally obliterate a militarily superior adversary.
First, start with ideology. This is central. Mao unequivocally states that without extreme conviction, a guerilla war cannot be carried out. Good guerilla armies start small and rapidly expand in terms of geography and personnel. This happens with the aid propaganda and proselytization, through which a guerilla operation obtains the support of local communities from which it can recruit military personnel as well as win the logistical support needed to sustain the army’s operations. Because of their dispersed, mobile, decentralized nature, guerilla armies are dependent upon local populaces for everything from intelligence to sustenance to weapons and beyond. You win the populace over by appealing to some sort of a common struggle; in the case of China at this time, that was resistance against Japanese imperialism. It is also critical because guerilla personnel need a higher degree of conviction and resolve to commit to the hardships and tribulations of guerilla fighting, which lacks the supply constancy that orthodox military operations more often enjoy. Mao emphasizes that politics goes hand in glove with the military operations and it is therefore essential to devote energies toward spreading political propaganda.
The next point is that guerilla units must operate in tandem with orthodox military operations. Guerilla armies and regular armies each have unique, essential mandates. In the case of guerilla armies, it is to execute speedy, stealthy offensive attacks against the enemy’s rear with small, agile bodies of men to harry and wear them down (or destroy their supply, transport, communication lines, etc.) Contrarily, regular armies are centralized, capable of defensive operations, more often attack from the front, field larger bodies of men, employ artillery/heavy weapons, etc. Mao notes that at times regular armies can adopt more mobile tactics just as guerilla armies can at times assume greater concentration. However, they are typically and fundamentally different and work in tandem with one another, e.g. the guerilla army harasses the communication lines of the enemy to give their regular army a better tactical advantage in engagement.
On a somewhat related note on the false notion of independent guerillas: a common misconception of guerilla armies of which Mao seeks to disabuse the reader is that they are ragtag bands of brigands and vagabonds, raiding, pillaging, and terrorizing civilians. Mao says that while there are instances of armies deemed guerilla carrying out such acts, this is neither typical nor effective for guerilla soldiers. Not only must guerillas be the most zealous of soldiers, they must also be of high quality (he cites certain proscriptions, like drug addiction). It is important that guerillas have disciplined conduct amid the heat and brutality of war. This is for propagandistic purposes, as it enables them to win the support of the local population and this extends to the enemy as well as third parties (e.g., like with regard to treatment of captives), as you are likelier to win outside support and undermine the enemy if your conduct is not perceived as cruel and wanton.
Lastly, guerilla armies must be extremely resourceful. Mao says the supply of the guerilla army is dictated by neither want nor need: it is determined by what’s available. In addition to the support of civilian allies, guerilla armies must rely on the enemy. The enemy is the main source of weapons and munitions, this being an essential part of the growth in strength of the guerilla army. Through its bases, a guerilla army can and should have facilities for the repair and production of weapons, however given the nature of guerilla armies this cannot be the primary source. It is against the conventions of war to take the enemy’s clothing, however the clothing of traitors can be taken. Explosives can and should be taken and used liberally to blow up railroads, bridges, and other infrastructure the enemy depends on. Telephone and radio equipment should also be taken, as should medicine, etc…most things are fair game. Field glasses, compasses, and military maps are also essential.
Interestingly, Mao says the most important thing each guerilla unit should have is a printing press! (And necessary printing and writing materials). This is for the purpose of training and propagandizing, both of which must continually be carried out over the entire life of a guerilla unit.
What struck me most is the depth of Mao’s military philosophy. Again, some of this harks to ancient Chinese tradition. Mao’s philosophy is that no matter how small you are and no matter how big your enemy is, you both have profound strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it behooves the ant to study and assiduously…truly, exhaustively…examine the elephant’s weaknesses. It is often the strengths of the elephant that are in fact its greatest weaknesses and the ant’s weaknesses that are its greatest strengths. This is extremely critical. It underlies the entire spirit of resistance of guerilla war, which generally assumes martial inferiority on the part of the guerilla band—at least in the conventional sense. The odds may be small...they are not as small as they seem. This is something to ruminate upon, perhaps obsessively.
This is a military classic and is illuminating for anyone who wants to move beyond Hollywood and pop culture stereotypes to really understand guerilla warfare. How well Mao’s tactics served China in the 1930s and ’40s is debatable, as it wasn’t until the US nuked Japan that the Sino-Japanese War really ended. Vietnam surely did its part to vindicate Mao’s theories. However, given the numerous examples of guerilla militants the world has since seen everywhere from the Congo to the Middle East to Latin America and their at-best mixed record of military effectiveness, it would seem despite Mao’s overweening confidence in the viability of his theory that there is a lot to question here.
This translated version was published in 1961 and has a useful introduction from a Marine general expounding on the book with relevant geopolitical context. Speaking to the point in the third-to-last paragraph here, the general emphasizes the folly of the circulating idea among military brass that the latest, most advanced weapons will be enough to defeat the Vietnamese. He says point blank that advanced weapons and military power will not be sufficient to defeat the Vietnamese. Remember, this is in 1961. How did Vietnam turn out for France and America, the militarily, culturally, and racially superior countries?
As the title suggests, this volume gives a rundown of guerilla military operations, which Mao profiles through the context of the then-ongoing war against a militarily superior Japan. Mao covers everything necessary to execute a successful guerilla operation: the necessity of an ideological impetus, recruiting the right personnel (by regional segmentation and volunteer-only), building support among the local population, deploying offensive/mobile units, building bases in strategic zones, etc. Mao is concise, conveying all critical points and adequate detail on how to stage a successful revolutionary guerilla movement down to weapons, munitions, explosives, clothing, medicine, etc. Mao does not pretend to be an innovator here, rather crediting both recent and distant episodes of Chinese military history (he cites Sun Tzu) as well as global conflicts ranging from Ethiopia to Latin America. Expectedly, he gives credit to the great Vladimir Lenin (citing his pamphlet titled “On Guerilla Warfare” or, alternatively, “Partisan Warfare”).
Let’s walk through how Mao says you should effectuate a successful guerilla operation to neutralize and ideally obliterate a militarily superior adversary.
First, start with ideology. This is central. Mao unequivocally states that without extreme conviction, a guerilla war cannot be carried out. Good guerilla armies start small and rapidly expand in terms of geography and personnel. This happens with the aid propaganda and proselytization, through which a guerilla operation obtains the support of local communities from which it can recruit military personnel as well as win the logistical support needed to sustain the army’s operations. Because of their dispersed, mobile, decentralized nature, guerilla armies are dependent upon local populaces for everything from intelligence to sustenance to weapons and beyond. You win the populace over by appealing to some sort of a common struggle; in the case of China at this time, that was resistance against Japanese imperialism. It is also critical because guerilla personnel need a higher degree of conviction and resolve to commit to the hardships and tribulations of guerilla fighting, which lacks the supply constancy that orthodox military operations more often enjoy. Mao emphasizes that politics goes hand in glove with the military operations and it is therefore essential to devote energies toward spreading political propaganda.
The next point is that guerilla units must operate in tandem with orthodox military operations. Guerilla armies and regular armies each have unique, essential mandates. In the case of guerilla armies, it is to execute speedy, stealthy offensive attacks against the enemy’s rear with small, agile bodies of men to harry and wear them down (or destroy their supply, transport, communication lines, etc.) Contrarily, regular armies are centralized, capable of defensive operations, more often attack from the front, field larger bodies of men, employ artillery/heavy weapons, etc. Mao notes that at times regular armies can adopt more mobile tactics just as guerilla armies can at times assume greater concentration. However, they are typically and fundamentally different and work in tandem with one another, e.g. the guerilla army harasses the communication lines of the enemy to give their regular army a better tactical advantage in engagement.
On a somewhat related note on the false notion of independent guerillas: a common misconception of guerilla armies of which Mao seeks to disabuse the reader is that they are ragtag bands of brigands and vagabonds, raiding, pillaging, and terrorizing civilians. Mao says that while there are instances of armies deemed guerilla carrying out such acts, this is neither typical nor effective for guerilla soldiers. Not only must guerillas be the most zealous of soldiers, they must also be of high quality (he cites certain proscriptions, like drug addiction). It is important that guerillas have disciplined conduct amid the heat and brutality of war. This is for propagandistic purposes, as it enables them to win the support of the local population and this extends to the enemy as well as third parties (e.g., like with regard to treatment of captives), as you are likelier to win outside support and undermine the enemy if your conduct is not perceived as cruel and wanton.
Lastly, guerilla armies must be extremely resourceful. Mao says the supply of the guerilla army is dictated by neither want nor need: it is determined by what’s available. In addition to the support of civilian allies, guerilla armies must rely on the enemy. The enemy is the main source of weapons and munitions, this being an essential part of the growth in strength of the guerilla army. Through its bases, a guerilla army can and should have facilities for the repair and production of weapons, however given the nature of guerilla armies this cannot be the primary source. It is against the conventions of war to take the enemy’s clothing, however the clothing of traitors can be taken. Explosives can and should be taken and used liberally to blow up railroads, bridges, and other infrastructure the enemy depends on. Telephone and radio equipment should also be taken, as should medicine, etc…most things are fair game. Field glasses, compasses, and military maps are also essential.
Interestingly, Mao says the most important thing each guerilla unit should have is a printing press! (And necessary printing and writing materials). This is for the purpose of training and propagandizing, both of which must continually be carried out over the entire life of a guerilla unit.
What struck me most is the depth of Mao’s military philosophy. Again, some of this harks to ancient Chinese tradition. Mao’s philosophy is that no matter how small you are and no matter how big your enemy is, you both have profound strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it behooves the ant to study and assiduously…truly, exhaustively…examine the elephant’s weaknesses. It is often the strengths of the elephant that are in fact its greatest weaknesses and the ant’s weaknesses that are its greatest strengths. This is extremely critical. It underlies the entire spirit of resistance of guerilla war, which generally assumes martial inferiority on the part of the guerilla band—at least in the conventional sense. The odds may be small...they are not as small as they seem. This is something to ruminate upon, perhaps obsessively.
This is a military classic and is illuminating for anyone who wants to move beyond Hollywood and pop culture stereotypes to really understand guerilla warfare. How well Mao’s tactics served China in the 1930s and ’40s is debatable, as it wasn’t until the US nuked Japan that the Sino-Japanese War really ended. Vietnam surely did its part to vindicate Mao’s theories. However, given the numerous examples of guerilla militants the world has since seen everywhere from the Congo to the Middle East to Latin America and their at-best mixed record of military effectiveness, it would seem despite Mao’s overweening confidence in the viability of his theory that there is a lot to question here.
This translated version was published in 1961 and has a useful introduction from a Marine general expounding on the book with relevant geopolitical context. Speaking to the point in the third-to-last paragraph here, the general emphasizes the folly of the circulating idea among military brass that the latest, most advanced weapons will be enough to defeat the Vietnamese. He says point blank that advanced weapons and military power will not be sufficient to defeat the Vietnamese. Remember, this is in 1961. How did Vietnam turn out for France and America, the militarily, culturally, and racially superior countries?
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