What do you think?
Rate this book
10% Less Democracy: Why You Should Trust Elites a Little More and the Masses a Little Less
During the 2016 presidential election, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders argued that elites were hurting the economy. But, drawing together evidence and theory from across economics, political science, and even finance, Garett Jones says otherwise. In 10% Less Democracy , he makes the case that the richest, most democratic nations would be better off if they slightly reduced accountability to the voting public, turning up the dial on elite influence. To do this, Jones builds on three foundational lines of evidence in areas where he has personal experience. First, as a former staffer in the U.S. Senate, he saw how senators voted differently as elections grew closer. Second, as a macroeconomist, Jones knows the merits of "independent" central banks, which sit apart from the political process and are controlled by powerful insiders. The consensus of the field is that this detached, technocratic approach has worked far better than more political and democratic banking systems. Third, his previous research on the effects of cognitive skills on political, social, and economic systems revealed many ways in which well-informed voters improve government. Discerning repeated patterns, Jones draws out practical suggestions for fine-tuning, focusing on the length of political terms, the independence of government agencies, the weight that voting systems give to the more-educated, and the value of listening more closely to a group of farsighted stakeholders with real skin in the game―a nation's sovereign bondholders. Accessible to political news junkies while firmly rooted and rigorous, 10% Less Democracy will fuel the national conversation about what optimal government looks like.
248 pages, Hardcover
Published February 4, 2020
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 36 reviews
July 24, 2020
Before I even opened this book I agreed with the title's premise. Especially because it is calling for marginal tweaks rather than radical social revolution. In the introduction Jones mentions that he's been talking and thinking about the subject for five years. Honestly, this was so bad that I ended up questioning my own belief and wondering whether I should change my mind. If the end result of five years of thinking on the subject is this weak, then maybe the theory is much worse than I ever imagined?
Jones actually has many good points. Low level elections for posts like City Treasurer seem pointless. Forcing politicians (as in the House of Representatives) to run for reelection every 2 years seems misguided. People have no problem with the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve being unelected -- most people actually see the inability of the masses to affect those institutions as a very good thing. Of course, there's an obligatory chapter on how great the dictatorship in Singapore under Lee Kwan Yew was. But the entire feeling of the book is very scattershot and poorly structured. It feels less like a structured book and more like when one of your friends at the pub who has opinions on everything suddenly says, "And that's another thing! What about the European Union, hey?"
But what tips the scales from 2-star to 1-star is that Jones never even tries to engage with a counterargument. He is almost a caricature of the economist's mind; except he's apparently completely oblivious about it. In the first chapter he looks at the benefits of democracy and seems to think the only possible outcome worth measuring is money. Something similar arises in his story about elections for the City Treasurer where money appears to be the only factor he can conceive of anyone caring about.
Even in his argument about the Supreme Court he oversells the case and doesn't raise the possibility of alternative opinions. Yet people are frequently upset about judges who have lifetime appointments and have grown out of touch with current social mores. See the judge in the Brock Turner rape case, for instance.
One of the more telling blows against his theory is his long build up about independent central banks. After giving us lots of early research about how amazing it is to have independent central banks he finally mentions that more recent research has actually found that central bank independence is pretty meaningless once you control for things like political stability, openness, and other national characteristics.
Jones tries to salvage his position:
But fails to admit the obvious. If you ask a central banker whether they should be independent, of course they are going to "take it as pretty obvious". That is entirely self-serving! Everyone wants to be independent and everyone feels they work better that way.
So what do we have? A field where experts should have a clear victory on their side. A very narrow subject -- controlling inflation -- as opposed to vague and broad scope. Tons of academic research with mathematical models showing "the right answer", as opposed to the wicked problems everywhere else. Near universal consensus in the mainstream economics profession about the right things to do. And still all we have is "muddled empirical evidence".
That's...a bit deflating, to be honest. The best case scenario for trusting elites is "muddled empirical evidence". Honestly, it is enough to have me rethinking my initial support for the idea.
Later on Jones runs into the same problem in his discussion about elected versus appointed regulators.
So...there's a large literature on this and the results are mixed but...Jones is still stumping for it?
He talks about elected vs appointed electricity regulators and says
Notice how he has gone back to calling the evidence for central bank independence "conclusive" even though previously he called it "muddled"? And this is worse than the muddled evidence for central bank independence.
I was extremely disappointed with this book. I went into it supporting the idea and hoping that someone who had thought it for years and marshalled his thoughts into the structure of a book would give me good arguments to support my initial gut feeling. Instead I came away feeling that if the arguments are this bad then maybe I should trust elites a little less and the masses a little more.
Jones actually has many good points. Low level elections for posts like City Treasurer seem pointless. Forcing politicians (as in the House of Representatives) to run for reelection every 2 years seems misguided. People have no problem with the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve being unelected -- most people actually see the inability of the masses to affect those institutions as a very good thing. Of course, there's an obligatory chapter on how great the dictatorship in Singapore under Lee Kwan Yew was. But the entire feeling of the book is very scattershot and poorly structured. It feels less like a structured book and more like when one of your friends at the pub who has opinions on everything suddenly says, "And that's another thing! What about the European Union, hey?"
But what tips the scales from 2-star to 1-star is that Jones never even tries to engage with a counterargument. He is almost a caricature of the economist's mind; except he's apparently completely oblivious about it. In the first chapter he looks at the benefits of democracy and seems to think the only possible outcome worth measuring is money. Something similar arises in his story about elections for the City Treasurer where money appears to be the only factor he can conceive of anyone caring about.
Even in his argument about the Supreme Court he oversells the case and doesn't raise the possibility of alternative opinions. Yet people are frequently upset about judges who have lifetime appointments and have grown out of touch with current social mores. See the judge in the Brock Turner rape case, for instance.
One of the more telling blows against his theory is his long build up about independent central banks. After giving us lots of early research about how amazing it is to have independent central banks he finally mentions that more recent research has actually found that central bank independence is pretty meaningless once you control for things like political stability, openness, and other national characteristics.
So although Cukierman had found that CBI still helped predict lower inflation when you knew about some additional national characteristics, other researchers found that if you included other national characteristics—and I’d draw attention to the political stability measure myself—CBI became essentially useless as a predictor of lower average inflation
Jones tries to salvage his position:
Despite the muddled empirical evidence, Blinder, who has been a central banker himself and has met many more central bankers the world over, still takes it as pretty obvious that central banks should be insulated, at least to some degree, from the political process
But fails to admit the obvious. If you ask a central banker whether they should be independent, of course they are going to "take it as pretty obvious". That is entirely self-serving! Everyone wants to be independent and everyone feels they work better that way.
So what do we have? A field where experts should have a clear victory on their side. A very narrow subject -- controlling inflation -- as opposed to vague and broad scope. Tons of academic research with mathematical models showing "the right answer", as opposed to the wicked problems everywhere else. Near universal consensus in the mainstream economics profession about the right things to do. And still all we have is "muddled empirical evidence".
That's...a bit deflating, to be honest. The best case scenario for trusting elites is "muddled empirical evidence". Honestly, it is enough to have me rethinking my initial support for the idea.
Later on Jones runs into the same problem in his discussion about elected versus appointed regulators.
Whalley himself says in a footnote: “There is large literature on the effects of appointed and elected regulators that has generally found mixed results.”
So...there's a large literature on this and the results are mixed but...Jones is still stumping for it?
He talks about elected vs appointed electricity regulators and says
The evidence on the effects of elected electricity regulators isn’t as conclusive as the evidence for the costs of voter-dependent central banks.
Notice how he has gone back to calling the evidence for central bank independence "conclusive" even though previously he called it "muddled"? And this is worse than the muddled evidence for central bank independence.
I was extremely disappointed with this book. I went into it supporting the idea and hoping that someone who had thought it for years and marshalled his thoughts into the structure of a book would give me good arguments to support my initial gut feeling. Instead I came away feeling that if the arguments are this bad then maybe I should trust elites a little less and the masses a little more.
March 1, 2020
> After all, the insiders don’t have to be perfect for 10% less democracy to be an improvement; they just have to be better than the voters.
The argument might be persuasive, the same way Hitler was. Yet, how do you measure Democracy so you can shave off 10% for the good of the collective? Jones does not care, all he cares is getting his gang into power.
But how does one identify the individuals "better than the voters"? Well, you have to be a chosen one, like Jones, of course. And what does "better that the voters" imply? Smoking abstinence, washing the hands twice after going number two? Again, Jones has no answers beyond his mendacious argument.
How does Jones know he is the chosen one? His email is "polluted by hate", proof the Devil is at work here.
The argument might be persuasive, the same way Hitler was. Yet, how do you measure Democracy so you can shave off 10% for the good of the collective? Jones does not care, all he cares is getting his gang into power.
But how does one identify the individuals "better than the voters"? Well, you have to be a chosen one, like Jones, of course. And what does "better that the voters" imply? Smoking abstinence, washing the hands twice after going number two? Again, Jones has no answers beyond his mendacious argument.
How does Jones know he is the chosen one? His email is "polluted by hate", proof the Devil is at work here.
February 12, 2020
Rich, short book - you get a lot of ideas per hour of reading. The chapters are quite different and the book doesn't form a very unified whole, for better or worse. Recommended.
I wrote a longer review here:
https://www.facebook.com/stefan.schub...
I wrote a longer review here:
https://www.facebook.com/stefan.schub...
October 25, 2020
I suppose that the reason Garett Jones doesn't quote Winston Churchill at all in this book may be that he knows that Churchill probably didn't say:
To get misunderstandings out of the way first: This isn't a book that argues against democracy per se. It does argue that there may be such a thing as too much democracy, and that many rich democracies may actually find themselves in such a situation.
One of Jones' similes is that of the Laffer curve, which describes the relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. If the tax rate is zero, the tax revenue is also zero. If the tax rate is a hundred percent, the tax revenue is also zero, because no-one would work if they had to pay their entire income in taxes. The sweet spot is somewhere between these two extremes.
Jones argues that there's also a sweet spot for democracy, and that most modern democracies currently lie to the right of it. Thus, if we could pull back democracy a little, we might actually be better off.
He spends the first hundred pages going over institutions that already work like that, like independent central banks and judiciary branches. Since I have a master's degree in economics myself, I found those pages hard going, being mostly repetition of what I already knew.
The language didn't help, either. Sentences are often awkwardly phrased, and there's little punctuation to help you parse them. It's not that I couldn't understand what was being said, but I often had to read a sentence multiple times before I understood them. Not because of the content, but because of the grammar.
After a hundred pages, the book becomes more readable, but on the other hand, I found the chapter on EU jarring. Particularly the sections on Brexit and Frontex didn't at all align with my European vantage point.
Most of the book is US-centric, and Jones is an American, so I'm reminded of the observation by Michael Crichton (but attributed to Murray Gell-Mann) that when you read about something you know about, you see all the errors, but then again forget them once you turn the page. Well, I don't intend to forget them.
I still found the book thought-provoking, but because of the EU chapter (and some other reservations), I'm less inclined to believe that it's on as solid ground as it wants to pretend.
"The best argument against Democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter."It does, however, nicely summarise the essence of the book.
To get misunderstandings out of the way first: This isn't a book that argues against democracy per se. It does argue that there may be such a thing as too much democracy, and that many rich democracies may actually find themselves in such a situation.
One of Jones' similes is that of the Laffer curve, which describes the relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. If the tax rate is zero, the tax revenue is also zero. If the tax rate is a hundred percent, the tax revenue is also zero, because no-one would work if they had to pay their entire income in taxes. The sweet spot is somewhere between these two extremes.
Jones argues that there's also a sweet spot for democracy, and that most modern democracies currently lie to the right of it. Thus, if we could pull back democracy a little, we might actually be better off.
He spends the first hundred pages going over institutions that already work like that, like independent central banks and judiciary branches. Since I have a master's degree in economics myself, I found those pages hard going, being mostly repetition of what I already knew.
The language didn't help, either. Sentences are often awkwardly phrased, and there's little punctuation to help you parse them. It's not that I couldn't understand what was being said, but I often had to read a sentence multiple times before I understood them. Not because of the content, but because of the grammar.
After a hundred pages, the book becomes more readable, but on the other hand, I found the chapter on EU jarring. Particularly the sections on Brexit and Frontex didn't at all align with my European vantage point.
Most of the book is US-centric, and Jones is an American, so I'm reminded of the observation by Michael Crichton (but attributed to Murray Gell-Mann) that when you read about something you know about, you see all the errors, but then again forget them once you turn the page. Well, I don't intend to forget them.
I still found the book thought-provoking, but because of the EU chapter (and some other reservations), I'm less inclined to believe that it's on as solid ground as it wants to pretend.
November 24, 2020
In new countries, democracy has worked and produced results only when there is an honest and effective government, which means a people smart enough to elect such a government. Remember, elected governments are only as good as the people who choose them......the best television performers and rally entertainers are not necessarily the best leaders who can deliver good government.Lee Kuan Yew
In the strict sense of the term, a genuine Democracy never has existed, and never will exist.JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
In the strict sense of the term, a genuine Democracy never has existed, and never will exist.JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
September 12, 2020
This is a frustrating book. I agree with some of what he says and he inspired me to come up with some additional ideas. But I find the presentation ill-thought out, and I find his perspective limited, and rather traditional.
Jones is an economist. Moreover, he's on the supply-side of the great divide, which is a problem for me because supply-side ain't what it used to be. Moreover, he's a believer in Public Choice. This is a big problem for me because it's a little like saying you're a Jungian psychologist and you've just not bothered to read any cognitive psychology yet. I get that we are all taught what we're taught but, surely, learning about behavioural economics would be a good thing to do before writing a book about reforming liberal democracy? I mean, the reason why democracy doesn't function as well as we think it should just might be revealed through understanding how and why people make decisions, right? (Rather than relying on a more traditionalist model that makes giant, incorrect assumptions about decision making.) Jones acknowledges his professions' flaws by telling a good joke. But he doesn't seem to be aware that other economists have tried to correct them!
The way it is written is also kind of bizarre. Jones takes his title and runs with it. Instead of trying to build his case through the book, he starts off with the assumption that the title is the goal, that we should just take his word for it. Yes, he assembles evidence to support, but he's constantly saying how we need to work towards this number without every really justifying it. I get it, it's just an arbitrary choice low enough not to scare most people, but it seems to have caused him to put the cart before the horse. Have a better title, and then argue the reforms.
He's very concerned with macro outcomes, like most economists. This is frustrating because his readers are not, right? The problem with focusing on macro outcomes in a country as large as the United States, for example, is that just because something is a net positive for the country as a whole doesn't mean there aren't a whole heaping pile of net negative outcomes for individuals or communities. Saying "but the economy will be a little bit better" is not very convincing.
He's too focused on the US, which should come as no surprise given where he teaches.
Also, another shocker: he once worked for a Republican. I assume Jones meant well but, for those of us who do not live in the US, copping that you tried to help the Republicans with their policies is not a vote of confidence. (Did he walk in there to try to convince them not to lower taxes while spending more?) Ahem...
Jones clearly intends this book for lay people, and particularly lay people who lean "conservative" (in the US sense). There are little appeals to pop culture and there is way too much about Alexander Hamilton. Moreover, the conclusion is basically just an intro to democratic theory that anyone who has ever taken a university level class on political philosophy already knows. It's very, very basic, to the point of making me wonder why it exists. The conclusion I come to is that he has tried to write this for people who do not have a background in political philosophy. Fair enough, but these ideas (in the conclusion) are not new, and are among the most discussed in political philosophy. The presentation, a brief summary, could be a lot better.
Oh, one other thing: like so many Americans on the Right, Jones assumes there are not barriers to entry to the elites beyond merit. This is demonstrably false in many ways. And one of the great debates in society right now is how to fix that, or at least make it less bad. But Jones doesn't seem to believe they exist and rather believes in the myth of a meritocracy. (I mean, he's a professor of economics, right? The system must work!)
But, despite all of that, I tend to agree with a lot of what he says, with the notable exceptions of deciding Singapore is the best country in the world and deciding bondholders should have actual votes in government. (On the latter: like most economists of his ilk, Jones doesn't seem to understand that the point of government is not to run a balanced budget but rather to be effective.) I think he could have done a much better job of presenting the material, arguing the points, and convincing me, but I do think that there is a strong case to limit the power of the masses. Now, I've believed this for a long time, so he's preaching to the converted with me. But that doesn't mean I wasn't intrigued. He even inspired me to wonder about giving tax policy to economists. Imagine if our elections didn't concern taxes because taxes were set by an appointee serving a 10 year term! What would our elections be about then? (It's intriguing, isn't it?)
So this is a big shrug for me. A lot of it made me frustrated. Some of it made me laugh. Some of it made me think. I wish someone a little more broadly read had written it, that's for sure.
Jones is an economist. Moreover, he's on the supply-side of the great divide, which is a problem for me because supply-side ain't what it used to be. Moreover, he's a believer in Public Choice. This is a big problem for me because it's a little like saying you're a Jungian psychologist and you've just not bothered to read any cognitive psychology yet. I get that we are all taught what we're taught but, surely, learning about behavioural economics would be a good thing to do before writing a book about reforming liberal democracy? I mean, the reason why democracy doesn't function as well as we think it should just might be revealed through understanding how and why people make decisions, right? (Rather than relying on a more traditionalist model that makes giant, incorrect assumptions about decision making.) Jones acknowledges his professions' flaws by telling a good joke. But he doesn't seem to be aware that other economists have tried to correct them!
The way it is written is also kind of bizarre. Jones takes his title and runs with it. Instead of trying to build his case through the book, he starts off with the assumption that the title is the goal, that we should just take his word for it. Yes, he assembles evidence to support, but he's constantly saying how we need to work towards this number without every really justifying it. I get it, it's just an arbitrary choice low enough not to scare most people, but it seems to have caused him to put the cart before the horse. Have a better title, and then argue the reforms.
He's very concerned with macro outcomes, like most economists. This is frustrating because his readers are not, right? The problem with focusing on macro outcomes in a country as large as the United States, for example, is that just because something is a net positive for the country as a whole doesn't mean there aren't a whole heaping pile of net negative outcomes for individuals or communities. Saying "but the economy will be a little bit better" is not very convincing.
He's too focused on the US, which should come as no surprise given where he teaches.
Also, another shocker: he once worked for a Republican. I assume Jones meant well but, for those of us who do not live in the US, copping that you tried to help the Republicans with their policies is not a vote of confidence. (Did he walk in there to try to convince them not to lower taxes while spending more?) Ahem...
Jones clearly intends this book for lay people, and particularly lay people who lean "conservative" (in the US sense). There are little appeals to pop culture and there is way too much about Alexander Hamilton. Moreover, the conclusion is basically just an intro to democratic theory that anyone who has ever taken a university level class on political philosophy already knows. It's very, very basic, to the point of making me wonder why it exists. The conclusion I come to is that he has tried to write this for people who do not have a background in political philosophy. Fair enough, but these ideas (in the conclusion) are not new, and are among the most discussed in political philosophy. The presentation, a brief summary, could be a lot better.
Oh, one other thing: like so many Americans on the Right, Jones assumes there are not barriers to entry to the elites beyond merit. This is demonstrably false in many ways. And one of the great debates in society right now is how to fix that, or at least make it less bad. But Jones doesn't seem to believe they exist and rather believes in the myth of a meritocracy. (I mean, he's a professor of economics, right? The system must work!)
But, despite all of that, I tend to agree with a lot of what he says, with the notable exceptions of deciding Singapore is the best country in the world and deciding bondholders should have actual votes in government. (On the latter: like most economists of his ilk, Jones doesn't seem to understand that the point of government is not to run a balanced budget but rather to be effective.) I think he could have done a much better job of presenting the material, arguing the points, and convincing me, but I do think that there is a strong case to limit the power of the masses. Now, I've believed this for a long time, so he's preaching to the converted with me. But that doesn't mean I wasn't intrigued. He even inspired me to wonder about giving tax policy to economists. Imagine if our elections didn't concern taxes because taxes were set by an appointee serving a 10 year term! What would our elections be about then? (It's intriguing, isn't it?)
So this is a big shrug for me. A lot of it made me frustrated. Some of it made me laugh. Some of it made me think. I wish someone a little more broadly read had written it, that's for sure.
November 5, 2023
Garrett Jones provides convincing evidence to his claim that 10% less democracy and giving the elites more weight in society would make a given country better off. He advocates for ideas such as lengthening term limits, restricting voting based on age, education, and/or other factors, and making independent the central bank. While not completely in agreement, I do think some points should be considered.
However, Jones fails to determine how this democracy reduction would come about, and also does not give guidelines as to whom encompasses the elite and why they are qualified to have a greater influence in politics and economics. Additionally, the book eschews any mention of government support for those that are not qualified “elites” to become educated enough to have that additional power. Finally, his theory largely seems to operate on the idea that such elites would naturally make decisions that are better for the country as a whole. But what happens if that proves untrue? What if these elites choose to only further their own agendas at the cost of the people? He fails to provide sufficient evidence that shows he has thought through his ideas sufficiently.
That is his ultimate weakness; his ideas are undefined, and he seems largely unconcerned with the potential of a “10% less democratic country” to spiral into something tyrannical.
However, Jones fails to determine how this democracy reduction would come about, and also does not give guidelines as to whom encompasses the elite and why they are qualified to have a greater influence in politics and economics. Additionally, the book eschews any mention of government support for those that are not qualified “elites” to become educated enough to have that additional power. Finally, his theory largely seems to operate on the idea that such elites would naturally make decisions that are better for the country as a whole. But what happens if that proves untrue? What if these elites choose to only further their own agendas at the cost of the people? He fails to provide sufficient evidence that shows he has thought through his ideas sufficiently.
That is his ultimate weakness; his ideas are undefined, and he seems largely unconcerned with the potential of a “10% less democratic country” to spiral into something tyrannical.
March 3, 2021
We should support: longer terms for politicians, independent (not elected) central banks, independent (not elected) judiciaries, giving more weight to informed voters, and giving government bondholders a role in the legislature.
I'm really surprised at all the low ratings this book has received. I had never considered these ideas much in the past, and if I did I just assumed they were bad because they diminished the role of democracy. If other readers are like me they should be reveling in the chance to chew on new ideas and see if there is any truth to them. A book like this will always get 5 stars from me, even if I don't completely agree with all the ideas.
I'm really surprised at all the low ratings this book has received. I had never considered these ideas much in the past, and if I did I just assumed they were bad because they diminished the role of democracy. If other readers are like me they should be reveling in the chance to chew on new ideas and see if there is any truth to them. A book like this will always get 5 stars from me, even if I don't completely agree with all the ideas.
May 16, 2021
[Imported automatically from my blog. Some formatting there may not have translated here.]
I got this book via UNH Interlibrary Loan, up from Southern New Hampshire University's Shapiro Library. It's by Garett Jones, econ prof at George Mason and the Mercatus Center. He undertakes a brave task, taking on the sacred cow of "democracy"—is it really the best way to run things?
Well, of course it is. Except when it's not. Jones says: let's back off and really examine real-world results of democratic procedures. And comes to the reasonable conclusion that we'd be better off with slightly less of them. As the title says, about 10% less.
Some of the data is telling. Independent central banks, insulated from "democratic" political pressures, seem to deliver better economic results for their countries. Independent judicial branches reach better decisions than more politicized ones. Bondholders—nobody elected them—can act as important sanity checks on governments' fiscal policies. Plenty of other examples and sensible observations.
This could be all dry and abstract, but Jones isn't afraid to drop some wit into his discussion. For example, in his discussion of "unanimity rule" (as opposed to "majority rule"): "If 90% of the people at the party want to order so-called pineapple pizza badly enough, and if the party can only order one kind of pizza, then even under unanimity rule, those 90% will probably be able to buy off the wise minority who are rightly skeptical of this pineapple-bread monstrosity." Heh.
A late chapter is particularly relevant to the current "democratic socialist" argument that we should be more like Denmark. Jones compares Denmark with (roughly equal in population) Singapore. Singapore's per capita income is about 80% higher than Denmark's. Singapore's life expectancy is 2.5 years longer than Denmark's. And: "Since 1960, Denmark has grown about four times richer per person, but over the same period, Singapore has grown about twenty-three times richer per person."
And Singapore is not particularly "democratic": Jones estimates that it has "50% less democracy". Yet, it flourishes. We don't need to, and probably shouldn't, go "Full Singapore". But it would be a good thing if we were at least wondering if it wouldn't be a decent idea to move in that direction.
September 19, 2023
The intro tees up thesis: more of something good does not necessarily produce better outcomes. Jones recommends 10% less democracy for already-rich, developed countries (not for countries at real risk of starvation or dictatorship). Jones first discusses many of democracy’s positive outcomes. He discusses Amartya Sen’s famous thesis—no two democracies have ever gone to war—which has so far held up. He discusses democracy’s tendency to avoid famines. He asks whether democracy causes economic prosperity, or maybe it’s the other way around? The Laffer curve—the inverted U-curve describing the relationship between the government’s tax rate and tax revenue—is introduced as possibly applying to the amount of democracy. However, as Jones later reports, more sophisticated economic papers find an unclear, muddled relationship between democracy and economic growth, at least past the point of famine-avoiding levels of democracy. The jury is still out on this complicated relationship.
Rather than rely on cross-national comparisons, Jones prefers to centre his analysis on “microfoundations”: precise, well-described, individual channels, i.e., economic agents’ behaviours and interactions…
Chapter 2 looks at how short terms for politicians means worse economic outcomes: towards the end of term, politicians tend to vote for more economic policies that majorities of economists think are wrongheaded. Many popular policies among the general public tend to shrink the economic pie, and politicians are more likely to vote for these policies towards the end of term. Ergo, shorter terms are worse for everyone. Likewise, Jones cites evidence that EU parliament finds it more difficult to agree on policies when any of its members have an election looming. Thus, Jones advocates for longer political terms—as part of his 10% less democracy proposal—to ensure better economic policies.
Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and inflation rate, showing statistical evidence from a seminal paper (Alesina and Summers, 1993) of a strong negative correlation. Is this causal? Jones thinks so, supporting his case by showing how changes in government that have changed CBI produce the expected change inflation rate. However, he caveats this by later citing evidence that when other variables are considered and controlled for—e.g., economic fundamentals like openness, political stability, optimal tax considerations—then the strength of the negative correlation between CBI and inflation rate is mostly attenuated. Yet, Jones still advocates for more politically detached central banks (high CBI) because he thinks the evidence still supports a fiercely independent group of experts committed to their goal in a way that cannot be corrupted by political interests. That was a bit odd.
Chapter 4 is about the benefits of independently-selected judges vs. democratically-selected judges. At this point, the reader can sense a theme. As Jones summarizes the evidence he surveys, “Since merit commissions are the most common method of judicial appointment across the rich countries, it’s fair to say that in practice, appointed judges are better than democratically selected judges” (p. 60).
Chapter 5 looks generally at competence vs public policy—specifically, how does educational level correlate with endorsement of policies that experts support? As Jones summarizes, “Raising the average information level of voters by truncating the lower tail of the education distribution is a practical way to raise the probability of getting good policy” (p. 85). Jones favourably cites Bryan Caplan’s excellent book The Myth of the Rational Voter (2007), which looks extensively at the tendency for less educated voters to support bad economic policies. In a similar vein, Jones cites Jason Brennan’s contentious and also excellent book Against Democracy (2016), which argues for “epistocracy”—rule of the informed—which more aggressively argues for restricting voting right based on education. One of the objections I had about Brennan’s book was how one could expect to implement in, given that this would require disenfranchising voters. Jones has a good suggestion: grandfathering. Allow everyone who can currently vote to continue voting, and make the new rules apply only to newcomers.
I found chapters 6 and 7 much less interesting and integral to the book’s thesis—chapter 6 being on considerations regarding government bonds (which Jones only loosely links to the thesis at the very end), and chapter 7 discussing staggered elections to have “a continuing body” (i.e., to avoid 100% turnovers in government representatives).
As Jones summarizes in the concluding chapter, “pure democracy is not an ideal to strive for; it’s a mistake to be avoided.” Democracy clearly impedes the ability of experts to deliver the goods in many domains, so when tuning the dial on democracy, we need to carefully assess the trade-offs. 10% Less Democracy offers an interesting look into these considerations. Moderately recommended.
Rather than rely on cross-national comparisons, Jones prefers to centre his analysis on “microfoundations”: precise, well-described, individual channels, i.e., economic agents’ behaviours and interactions…
Chapter 2 looks at how short terms for politicians means worse economic outcomes: towards the end of term, politicians tend to vote for more economic policies that majorities of economists think are wrongheaded. Many popular policies among the general public tend to shrink the economic pie, and politicians are more likely to vote for these policies towards the end of term. Ergo, shorter terms are worse for everyone. Likewise, Jones cites evidence that EU parliament finds it more difficult to agree on policies when any of its members have an election looming. Thus, Jones advocates for longer political terms—as part of his 10% less democracy proposal—to ensure better economic policies.
Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and inflation rate, showing statistical evidence from a seminal paper (Alesina and Summers, 1993) of a strong negative correlation. Is this causal? Jones thinks so, supporting his case by showing how changes in government that have changed CBI produce the expected change inflation rate. However, he caveats this by later citing evidence that when other variables are considered and controlled for—e.g., economic fundamentals like openness, political stability, optimal tax considerations—then the strength of the negative correlation between CBI and inflation rate is mostly attenuated. Yet, Jones still advocates for more politically detached central banks (high CBI) because he thinks the evidence still supports a fiercely independent group of experts committed to their goal in a way that cannot be corrupted by political interests. That was a bit odd.
Chapter 4 is about the benefits of independently-selected judges vs. democratically-selected judges. At this point, the reader can sense a theme. As Jones summarizes the evidence he surveys, “Since merit commissions are the most common method of judicial appointment across the rich countries, it’s fair to say that in practice, appointed judges are better than democratically selected judges” (p. 60).
Chapter 5 looks generally at competence vs public policy—specifically, how does educational level correlate with endorsement of policies that experts support? As Jones summarizes, “Raising the average information level of voters by truncating the lower tail of the education distribution is a practical way to raise the probability of getting good policy” (p. 85). Jones favourably cites Bryan Caplan’s excellent book The Myth of the Rational Voter (2007), which looks extensively at the tendency for less educated voters to support bad economic policies. In a similar vein, Jones cites Jason Brennan’s contentious and also excellent book Against Democracy (2016), which argues for “epistocracy”—rule of the informed—which more aggressively argues for restricting voting right based on education. One of the objections I had about Brennan’s book was how one could expect to implement in, given that this would require disenfranchising voters. Jones has a good suggestion: grandfathering. Allow everyone who can currently vote to continue voting, and make the new rules apply only to newcomers.
I found chapters 6 and 7 much less interesting and integral to the book’s thesis—chapter 6 being on considerations regarding government bonds (which Jones only loosely links to the thesis at the very end), and chapter 7 discussing staggered elections to have “a continuing body” (i.e., to avoid 100% turnovers in government representatives).
As Jones summarizes in the concluding chapter, “pure democracy is not an ideal to strive for; it’s a mistake to be avoided.” Democracy clearly impedes the ability of experts to deliver the goods in many domains, so when tuning the dial on democracy, we need to carefully assess the trade-offs. 10% Less Democracy offers an interesting look into these considerations. Moderately recommended.
March 22, 2021
Whether you agree with all of Jones’s conclusions or not (and I do not), this is an important book.
I’ve been saying for many years that democracy, for all its many virtues, is flawed. Alas, as the author says, “people are not equally capable of adding value to political discourse.” Jones dares to question things most people don’t even realize are up for debate. He starts by acknowledging the many benefits of democracy, why we certainly need it, and how its benefits in rich, strong democracies wouldn’t even remotely be affected by a 10% reduction in the political influence of the masses.
Athens was the only major democracy in history that was actually a pure democracy, where every voter was invited to voice his (yes, his—obviously women didn’t get to vote) opinion on every single issue. The United States is obviously not that. We are a representative democracy. So Jones points out that we obviously believe in certain limits on the concept of pure democracy. Then he illustrates, with ample support, how government bodies that are largely independent from politics (democracy), like the Federal Reserve and much of the judiciary, make better policy decisions (which Jones supports with evidence). He’s now proposing more limits that would result in better policy decisions. Then he walks us through lots and lots of research to support his many proposals, which include:
-longer terms for politicians (because studies show they vote differently—worst—when running for re-election)
-eliminating elected judges
-allowing elected politicians to make values-driven policy, but appointed panels of experts make substantive policies, such as economic or tax policies
-raising the voting age
-only allowing graduates of the top 140 universities vote for Senators
-requiring a high school diploma in order to vote
-educational gerrymandering to increase the number of reps from highly educated areas
Jones doesn’t prescribe all of these reforms for every nation. He invites us to search for the right “dose” of democracy, and like most politica philosophers throughout time (including our Founders), he advocates for “polyarchy”: a blend of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
In a perfect world, we would all set aside our devotion to the “sacred right to vote” and consider prioritizing good government instead.
I’ve been saying for many years that democracy, for all its many virtues, is flawed. Alas, as the author says, “people are not equally capable of adding value to political discourse.” Jones dares to question things most people don’t even realize are up for debate. He starts by acknowledging the many benefits of democracy, why we certainly need it, and how its benefits in rich, strong democracies wouldn’t even remotely be affected by a 10% reduction in the political influence of the masses.
Athens was the only major democracy in history that was actually a pure democracy, where every voter was invited to voice his (yes, his—obviously women didn’t get to vote) opinion on every single issue. The United States is obviously not that. We are a representative democracy. So Jones points out that we obviously believe in certain limits on the concept of pure democracy. Then he illustrates, with ample support, how government bodies that are largely independent from politics (democracy), like the Federal Reserve and much of the judiciary, make better policy decisions (which Jones supports with evidence). He’s now proposing more limits that would result in better policy decisions. Then he walks us through lots and lots of research to support his many proposals, which include:
-longer terms for politicians (because studies show they vote differently—worst—when running for re-election)
-eliminating elected judges
-allowing elected politicians to make values-driven policy, but appointed panels of experts make substantive policies, such as economic or tax policies
-raising the voting age
-only allowing graduates of the top 140 universities vote for Senators
-requiring a high school diploma in order to vote
-educational gerrymandering to increase the number of reps from highly educated areas
Jones doesn’t prescribe all of these reforms for every nation. He invites us to search for the right “dose” of democracy, and like most politica philosophers throughout time (including our Founders), he advocates for “polyarchy”: a blend of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
In a perfect world, we would all set aside our devotion to the “sacred right to vote” and consider prioritizing good government instead.
June 28, 2021
Solid Premise with Some Strange Turns
I heard the author speak on the “Innovation Hub” podcast, after which I decided to read the book.
The premise is simple: we have too much direct democracy, and some outcomes could be improved by eliminating the people’s direct involvement. The book offers empirical evidence that demonstrates elected judges don’t perform as well as appointed judges; independent central bankers are more effective than ones dependent on “accountable politicians”; longer terms make politicians braver and help them make the right long term choices.
As a Californian, I’m highly sympathetic to these arguments. Our initiative process puts a book length set of initiatives in front of voters at least twice a year, asking us to make uninformed choices about everything from healthcare professional licensing policies to taxation. We are also asked to vote for the fire district, harbor master, state auditor, state attorney general and dozens of other positions. Most of us don’t understand these roles, are not qualified to assess the quality of the candidates to these highly specialized roles, and frankly most of us don’t care - leading to low voter participation and the ability of special interests to capture these often high impact offices.
So, generally speaking I agree with the premise. But then the author takes a strange turn and starts advocating for some truly bizarre propositions: let only graduates of top universities vote for some seats in the upper house; universal sufferage leads to poorer outcomes, because voters are uninformed, therefore making it harder to vote is a good thing. Insert eye roll.
The book is concise, well written and worth reading. Some chapters (notably chapter 5) best taken with a heavy dose of salt or with a Republican Party registration card. Enjoy.
I heard the author speak on the “Innovation Hub” podcast, after which I decided to read the book.
The premise is simple: we have too much direct democracy, and some outcomes could be improved by eliminating the people’s direct involvement. The book offers empirical evidence that demonstrates elected judges don’t perform as well as appointed judges; independent central bankers are more effective than ones dependent on “accountable politicians”; longer terms make politicians braver and help them make the right long term choices.
As a Californian, I’m highly sympathetic to these arguments. Our initiative process puts a book length set of initiatives in front of voters at least twice a year, asking us to make uninformed choices about everything from healthcare professional licensing policies to taxation. We are also asked to vote for the fire district, harbor master, state auditor, state attorney general and dozens of other positions. Most of us don’t understand these roles, are not qualified to assess the quality of the candidates to these highly specialized roles, and frankly most of us don’t care - leading to low voter participation and the ability of special interests to capture these often high impact offices.
So, generally speaking I agree with the premise. But then the author takes a strange turn and starts advocating for some truly bizarre propositions: let only graduates of top universities vote for some seats in the upper house; universal sufferage leads to poorer outcomes, because voters are uninformed, therefore making it harder to vote is a good thing. Insert eye roll.
The book is concise, well written and worth reading. Some chapters (notably chapter 5) best taken with a heavy dose of salt or with a Republican Party registration card. Enjoy.
October 2, 2020
A quick (and I mean quick) read and very briefly proposes and discusses changes to rich, Western democracies that might improve their functioning (read, outcomes; read, financial... stability, wealth, etc.... mostly.)
I'm receptive to these kinds of ideas and arguments ("more democracy" sounds good, always... but is it? By what criteria? And why not test that?) and this book sketches some proposals and evidence for, or at at least around, those proposals. I also have a bit of a soft spot for the "undemocratic" (or, to use the apparently preferred term, "realist") question: why does a 22-year-old high-school drop-out get the same say as a 50-year-old with a master's degree? I think I have an aswer that isn't the "cynical" version Jones claims it is, but I nonetheless can't quite shake the feeling that the question makes an awful lot of sense.
Overall, the author's best argument might be the one he never really comes out and states. We're experimenting with our government now (we started with direct elections of Senators in the 1920's and we continue with, among other things, the use of -or even the mere existence of- social media now) so why balk at fiddling around the edges to increase the role of expertise, education, long-range thinking, 'cooler passions', etc. and to decrease the (corrupting) pressures of re-election, etc.?
I'm receptive to these kinds of ideas and arguments ("more democracy" sounds good, always... but is it? By what criteria? And why not test that?) and this book sketches some proposals and evidence for, or at at least around, those proposals. I also have a bit of a soft spot for the "undemocratic" (or, to use the apparently preferred term, "realist") question: why does a 22-year-old high-school drop-out get the same say as a 50-year-old with a master's degree? I think I have an aswer that isn't the "cynical" version Jones claims it is, but I nonetheless can't quite shake the feeling that the question makes an awful lot of sense.
Overall, the author's best argument might be the one he never really comes out and states. We're experimenting with our government now (we started with direct elections of Senators in the 1920's and we continue with, among other things, the use of -or even the mere existence of- social media now) so why balk at fiddling around the edges to increase the role of expertise, education, long-range thinking, 'cooler passions', etc. and to decrease the (corrupting) pressures of re-election, etc.?
February 3, 2024
Great book! Highly recommended for those interested in how economists think about democracy in non-ideal and tradeoff terms. The book is a wonderful invitation to think about democracy strategically and in non-ideal terms. Our modern culture is almost data-free and obsessed with the benefits of democracy without looking at the empirical evidence of its costs and benefits. This book does exactly that: it gives the reader a cost/benefit analysis of expanding or reducing the level of democracy in our decision-making collective choices.
The main thesis of the book is that democracy has the properties of a Laffer Curve (an inverted U), which means that from lower levels of democracy, expanding democracy is a good thing (like taxes), but then, after a certain threshold (the optimal point), expanding democracy starts to bring lower marginal returns. It might even, at some point, bring more costs than benefits, meaning that more democracy (beyond a certain point) might be harmful to welfare, economic growth, price stability, public debt, etc. You might disagree with the authors' proposals, but his way of thinking is a very clear, non-romantic way of thinking about the tradeoffs of democracy. I highly recommend reading this book, especially if you are a social scientist.
The main thesis of the book is that democracy has the properties of a Laffer Curve (an inverted U), which means that from lower levels of democracy, expanding democracy is a good thing (like taxes), but then, after a certain threshold (the optimal point), expanding democracy starts to bring lower marginal returns. It might even, at some point, bring more costs than benefits, meaning that more democracy (beyond a certain point) might be harmful to welfare, economic growth, price stability, public debt, etc. You might disagree with the authors' proposals, but his way of thinking is a very clear, non-romantic way of thinking about the tradeoffs of democracy. I highly recommend reading this book, especially if you are a social scientist.
December 25, 2023
During this whole book I found myself wondering:
A) What the author would make of Switzerland’s system, which is very different from what he is espousing, yet I think by any measure is a pretty successful one.
B) What Nassim Taleb would make of this book. I’m not 100% sure why, but I was very curious.
The first part of the book was reminiscent of what Fareed Zakaria wrote about in an older book (I think “Future of Freedom”), wherein he shows how government bodies that are somewhat less democratic (the Fed, The court system, etc.) are more respected than, say, congress. The second part touched more on what the author calls an “epistocracy”. This sounds like one of those things that sound great in theory but are almost impossible to fulfill in reality. In fact, he seems short of details as to how to achieve this epistocracy.
I found the chapter on Singapore quite interesting, as well as the fact that “The Italian law of June 30, 1912, granted the vote to illiterate people, but only on the condition that they had reached their thirtieth year or had fulfilled their military obligations.” (p. 107).
A) What the author would make of Switzerland’s system, which is very different from what he is espousing, yet I think by any measure is a pretty successful one.
B) What Nassim Taleb would make of this book. I’m not 100% sure why, but I was very curious.
The first part of the book was reminiscent of what Fareed Zakaria wrote about in an older book (I think “Future of Freedom”), wherein he shows how government bodies that are somewhat less democratic (the Fed, The court system, etc.) are more respected than, say, congress. The second part touched more on what the author calls an “epistocracy”. This sounds like one of those things that sound great in theory but are almost impossible to fulfill in reality. In fact, he seems short of details as to how to achieve this epistocracy.
I found the chapter on Singapore quite interesting, as well as the fact that “The Italian law of June 30, 1912, granted the vote to illiterate people, but only on the condition that they had reached their thirtieth year or had fulfilled their military obligations.” (p. 107).
August 28, 2020
Interesting and somewhat controversial ideas challenging the preconceived notion that a pure democracy is in the best interests of the governed. Key takeaways: (1) the United States, perhaps one of the most successful democracies, is an indirect democracy (republic) that has several undemocratic and beneficial institutions such as SCOTUS, the Federal Reserve, and various agencies of the Executive Branch; (2) the electorate’s poor long-term memory incentivizes politicians to focus too much on being reelected, thus longer terms in office may help obviate this dilemma; (3) the Federal Reserve should be given even more autonomy so that monetary policy is not made in hasty response to voters and politicians who don’t understand economics; and (4) voter competence matters to the wealth of a nation and so greater weight should be given to the “more informed” (e.g., older, better educated, etc.) voter and perhaps also to bondholders who have a vested interest in the economic health of the country.
February 1, 2021
I selected this book thinking that it would be about political theory, and was surprised to find that it is mostly about economics. Jones makes a compelling case for less democratic institutions, and he brings large amounts of interesting data and examples to support his points. The failings of this book are mainly to do with the authors lack of holistic consideration. Jones barely considers anything beyond economic prosperity, ignoring the fact that democracy is about more than economic governance. Jones also only quotes right wing economists such as Friedman and Hayek. Jones’ economic points would be more credible if he backed them up with theories by some centre-left economists as well. This book was useful for me as an introduction to certain concepts in macroeconomics, particularly the role of central banks. This book is an interesting read, and a treasure trove of fun facts and fascinating data. It is unfortunate that it has failings which detract from the authors broad argument.
June 1, 2020
This book is the better version of Caplan's "Myth of the rational voter". It is funny in that it cites the economics literature to make the case against democracy, funnily enough, a lot of the literature he cites like the Acemoglu is purposefully created by pro-democracy advocates, but Jone's framing makes you realize how willfully they misrepresent their own work. It's a great read, I chuckled quite a bit in the European Chapter.
Anyway, as usual with these economics books, they are very entertaining but ultimately they are idiotic in that they don't understand what people really want. People are only interested in increasing their material conditions up to a certain point, this maximizes GDP stuff just gets everybody in cities and doesn't allow cultures to thrive. Of course, the economist will be stupefied by this suggestion: "What? There are important things I can't measure? You are anti-intellectual", and this is why we ultimately need separation of intellectuals from power.
Anyway, as usual with these economics books, they are very entertaining but ultimately they are idiotic in that they don't understand what people really want. People are only interested in increasing their material conditions up to a certain point, this maximizes GDP stuff just gets everybody in cities and doesn't allow cultures to thrive. Of course, the economist will be stupefied by this suggestion: "What? There are important things I can't measure? You are anti-intellectual", and this is why we ultimately need separation of intellectuals from power.
October 15, 2020
I enjoyed Garett's arguments against voters weighing in on the minutiae of local government. I was nodding along with his arguments for appointed positions in central banks and judges. But I was very uncomfortable with his arguments for limiting who could vote. He never engaged with the obvious counter argument that giving power to a segment of society will cause them to compound that advantage over time at the expense of those that don't have power.
As someone who has argued against California's penchant to put every little decision to a proposition vote, I thought I would open to the arguments of this book. But it seems to have made me much more uncomfortable with the idea of less democracy. I should probably amend my own position to "elected officials should handle more details of governing through appointments and legislating, but the ability to vote them out should be continually expanded to all".
As someone who has argued against California's penchant to put every little decision to a proposition vote, I thought I would open to the arguments of this book. But it seems to have made me much more uncomfortable with the idea of less democracy. I should probably amend my own position to "elected officials should handle more details of governing through appointments and legislating, but the ability to vote them out should be continually expanded to all".
May 16, 2020
This book is a really short, quick read, and I wanted to pick it up because so much of the conversation around the coronavirus has also turned into a conversation about democracy / liberty / 'rights' / whatever. Also because "the elites" largely BUNGLED the United States' response to COVID-19: the WHO, the CDC, the NIAID...Jones would probably say its because of democratically-driven constaints put on these institutions, no doubt. Unfortunately groking most of it depends on having a similar ideological starting point as Jones; without that foundation you'll mostly feel incredulous. This is the case for lots of 'rational' or 'data-driven' books, I think--they still depend on the author and the reader agreeing to certain basic principles to make the entire enterprise (the book) make sense.
September 6, 2020
A short, well-argued case that voter involvement has real world trade offs, and that we may be beyond the optimal equilibrium.
Jones is best when citing empirical studies of this, such as the bad performance of elected city treasurers compared to appointed ones, or the policy options of officials in the year before elections. He is at his worst when he superficially speaks of EU governance issues or the Singaporean electoral system, which while may be correct, are of little value.
The tone of the book is also strange, with constant pop culture references, jokes, and anecdotes. The book is clearly aimed towards a general audience which has never pondered about political science or economics, which can be alienating towards the audience which I believe would most enjoy this book.
Jones is best when citing empirical studies of this, such as the bad performance of elected city treasurers compared to appointed ones, or the policy options of officials in the year before elections. He is at his worst when he superficially speaks of EU governance issues or the Singaporean electoral system, which while may be correct, are of little value.
The tone of the book is also strange, with constant pop culture references, jokes, and anecdotes. The book is clearly aimed towards a general audience which has never pondered about political science or economics, which can be alienating towards the audience which I believe would most enjoy this book.
August 23, 2023
Severely circumscribed by the authors decision to only look at top line GDP growth numbers, neglecting equity, differing agendas of interest groups which mean there would be trade-offs of policy decisions, externalities, and human dignities. Also pretty cruel tbh.
Author is also happy to make sloppy constructions (10%? 2%? 50%? Good enough?), rely on shaky data, and encourage readers to simply consider whether to "take a long walk" down paths he has not well argued, on the basis that it has to be better (how does he arrive at it? Convinction).
Does have some cool points like the how there are folks we never really notice, who affect a lot of gov policy, like bondholders.
Author is also happy to make sloppy constructions (10%? 2%? 50%? Good enough?), rely on shaky data, and encourage readers to simply consider whether to "take a long walk" down paths he has not well argued, on the basis that it has to be better (how does he arrive at it? Convinction).
Does have some cool points like the how there are folks we never really notice, who affect a lot of gov policy, like bondholders.
March 2, 2020
A workmanlike literature review that makes a good case for slightly less democracy. There's not much that is novel or exciting in here. Jones's suggestions span the gamut from unlikely to far-fetched and he doesn't offer any practical advice on how to actually get 10% less democracy. Really, we're stuck with what we've got so this is mostly a theoretical exercise.
July 17, 2020
The book's first few chapters were interesting about variety of potential institutional arrangements in the United States and their impact. The last few anecdotal chapters were light on substance and tried to intertwine current political structures with philosophy, logic , personal experience and modern day social science in what appeared to be slapdash fashion.
November 1, 2020
More careful and academic than you probably think
Despite a few bold proposals, this is fundamentally an academic book- careful and full of discussions of previous statistical works. The book adds some depth and some interesting facts but most people are likely better off sticking with a summary (say a podcast interview about it).
Despite a few bold proposals, this is fundamentally an academic book- careful and full of discussions of previous statistical works. The book adds some depth and some interesting facts but most people are likely better off sticking with a summary (say a podcast interview about it).
February 28, 2020
Great read.
research is solid. suggestions are moderate.
smooth reading experience
research is solid. suggestions are moderate.
smooth reading experience
June 23, 2020
Meh. Arguments are pretty flimsy. The first few chapters are good but then it goes a bit off the rails.
October 7, 2020
8% less feels about right.
Lovely read.
Lovely read.
October 27, 2020
paging dr pangloss...
Displaying 1 - 30 of 36 reviews