What do you think?
Rate this book
Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today’s world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis.
Serhii Plokhy’s Nuclear Folly offers an international perspective on the crisis, tracing the tortuous decision-making that produced and then resolved it, which involved John Kennedy and his advisers, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and their commanders on the ground. In breathtaking detail, Plokhy vividly recounts the young JFK being played by the canny Khrushchev; the hotheaded Castro willing to defy the USSR and threatening to align himself with China; the Soviet troops on the ground clearing jungle foliage in the tropical heat, and desperately trying to conceal nuclear installations on Cuba, which were nonetheless easily spotted by U-2 spy planes; and the hair-raising near misses at sea that nearly caused a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine to fire its weapons.
More often than not, the Americans and Soviets misread each other, operated under false information, and came perilously close to nuclear catastrophe. Despite these errors, nuclear war was ultimately avoided for one central reason: fear, and the realization that any escalation on either the Soviets’ or the Americans’ part would lead to mutual destruction.
Drawing on a range of Soviet archival sources, including previously classified KGB documents, as well as White House tapes, Plokhy masterfully illustrates the drama and anxiety of those tense days, and provides a way for us to grapple with the problems posed in our present day.
Serhii Plokhy’s Nuclear Folly offers an international perspective on the crisis, tracing the tortuous decision-making that produced and then resolved it, which involved John Kennedy and his advisers, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and their commanders on the ground. In breathtaking detail, Plokhy vividly recounts the young JFK being played by the canny Khrushchev; the hotheaded Castro willing to defy the USSR and threatening to align himself with China; the Soviet troops on the ground clearing jungle foliage in the tropical heat, and desperately trying to conceal nuclear installations on Cuba, which were nonetheless easily spotted by U-2 spy planes; and the hair-raising near misses at sea that nearly caused a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine to fire its weapons.
More often than not, the Americans and Soviets misread each other, operated under false information, and came perilously close to nuclear catastrophe. Despite these errors, nuclear war was ultimately avoided for one central reason: fear, and the realization that any escalation on either the Soviets’ or the Americans’ part would lead to mutual destruction.
Drawing on a range of Soviet archival sources, including previously classified KGB documents, as well as White House tapes, Plokhy masterfully illustrates the drama and anxiety of those tense days, and provides a way for us to grapple with the problems posed in our present day.
444 pages, Hardcover
First published April 13, 2021
About the author
Serhii Plokhy
41 books748 followersSerhii Plokhy is a Ukrainian and American historian. Plokhy is currently the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, where he was also named Walter Channing Cabot Fellow in 2013. A leading authority on Eastern Europe, he has lived and taught in Ukraine, Canada, and the United States. He has published extensively in English, Ukrainian, and Russian. For three successive years (2002-2005) his books won first prize of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies.
For his Ukrainian-language profile, please see: Сергій Плохій
For his Ukrainian-language profile, please see: Сергій Плохій
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 144 reviews
April 6, 2021
Author Serhii Plokhy won the Baillie Gifford Prize (my favourite book award) with, “Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy,” so I had high hopes of this. Thankfully, this new history of the Cuban Missile Crisis lived up to all my expectations.
Perhaps the most important thing about this book is that it gives far more than the usual viewpoint – very often from the American point of view; probably as the authors of previous work had most access to information from that country. Plokhy tries to give a more balanced view, with a greater proportion of the work given over to the Russian point of view and also to the Cuban. Not only is there much about Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, as well as John F. Kennedy, but also from those in close proximity to the three leaders, as well as many involved at the time, in various different ways.
It is clear that both Kennedy and Khrushchev feared nuclear war. Both men recalled the use of nuclear in weapons in WWII all too well. Now the men were in danger of beginning an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and descending into nuclear war.
This book begins with the Bay of Pigs and the Berlin Wall, before showing how Khrushchev committed the Soviet Union to helping Cuba. What is also clear is how Khrushchev initially viewed Kennedy as young, inexperienced, and weak. Cuba, meanwhile, wanted assurances from Russia that, if the US attacked them, they would go to war. Instead, they were offered missiles. As the crisis unfolds, Plokhy takes the reader into meetings, unfolding the decision-making processes, as the world stood on the brink of calamity. A fascinating history of the time, with a genuine message for the politicians of today. I received a copy of this book from the publishers, via NetGalley, for review.
Perhaps the most important thing about this book is that it gives far more than the usual viewpoint – very often from the American point of view; probably as the authors of previous work had most access to information from that country. Plokhy tries to give a more balanced view, with a greater proportion of the work given over to the Russian point of view and also to the Cuban. Not only is there much about Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, as well as John F. Kennedy, but also from those in close proximity to the three leaders, as well as many involved at the time, in various different ways.
It is clear that both Kennedy and Khrushchev feared nuclear war. Both men recalled the use of nuclear in weapons in WWII all too well. Now the men were in danger of beginning an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and descending into nuclear war.
This book begins with the Bay of Pigs and the Berlin Wall, before showing how Khrushchev committed the Soviet Union to helping Cuba. What is also clear is how Khrushchev initially viewed Kennedy as young, inexperienced, and weak. Cuba, meanwhile, wanted assurances from Russia that, if the US attacked them, they would go to war. Instead, they were offered missiles. As the crisis unfolds, Plokhy takes the reader into meetings, unfolding the decision-making processes, as the world stood on the brink of calamity. A fascinating history of the time, with a genuine message for the politicians of today. I received a copy of this book from the publishers, via NetGalley, for review.
January 30, 2021
If you haven't read Plokhy's book on Chernobyl, start there. It's a great work and it's what brought me to this book. However, this book is closely behind it. The Cuban Missile Crisis gets a reputation as political jockeying in order to avoid nuclear war, but the book makes it much more than that. It is a book about power politics, exploring the motivations of the Soviet Union and putting it squarely in context of the larger Cold War, specifically with the developments in central Europe.
The greatest benefit this book brings is a narrative that combines both US and USSR points of view. So many books focus on only the American view, that it removes all of the drama and discussion that went on in Russia. (Granted, those sources are probably only becoming now available). However, this provides a really full, detailed account of the before, during, and after, of the events.
It's much more objective than a lot of other works. Let's be honest: don't judge the Cuban Missile Crisis on Thirteen Days; it's a good read, but its bias should be clear. Plokhy's bias as a historian of European history serves him well here. There is not much American foreign policy history that only requires the American viewpoint, and he does a nice job trying to simultaneously look at both sides and how they reacted.
A word on readability, as well: Plokhy is a great writer. This not dry analytical writing, it reads as narration to a gripping documentary. It will keep your attention until you hit the endnotes (and if you're very interested, maybe even past that point)
The greatest benefit this book brings is a narrative that combines both US and USSR points of view. So many books focus on only the American view, that it removes all of the drama and discussion that went on in Russia. (Granted, those sources are probably only becoming now available). However, this provides a really full, detailed account of the before, during, and after, of the events.
It's much more objective than a lot of other works. Let's be honest: don't judge the Cuban Missile Crisis on Thirteen Days; it's a good read, but its bias should be clear. Plokhy's bias as a historian of European history serves him well here. There is not much American foreign policy history that only requires the American viewpoint, and he does a nice job trying to simultaneously look at both sides and how they reacted.
A word on readability, as well: Plokhy is a great writer. This not dry analytical writing, it reads as narration to a gripping documentary. It will keep your attention until you hit the endnotes (and if you're very interested, maybe even past that point)
June 25, 2021
More like a 3.5. No complaints, it is a good book but for some reason didn't quite pull me in to the extent I expected.
April 20, 2021
I watched the Ken Burns "Hemingway" documentary last weekend, and even He of the Fabulously Lengthy Film Maker Guild dispensed with the Cuban missile crisis in about one minute flat! I needed more.
I have to admit that I knew almost nothing about the Cuban missile crisis (or the Bay of Pigs, for that matter). Mr. Plokhy's book certainly filled me in completely. And, for me, the first-hand sources on the Soviet side were a real plus. Most often, you hear from only the home team. The author almost seems to have more source material for the Soviet and Cuban sides of the conflict rather than the American side. I appreciated that, in the same way that long ago I appreciated the film, Das Boot, for widening the lens with which we generally view world events involving the United States.
The big takeaway for me is that neither Khrushchev nor Kennedy wanted nuclear war, realizing that it would mean total annihilation. In the popular imagination, the Soviets are usually painted as warmongers. As well, in the introduction and epilogue, the author makes the frightening statement that today we are as close to nuclear war as we've been since this 1962 political standoff. In 2019, he points out, both the Russians and Americans withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty negotiated at the end of the Cold War in 1987.
"Today we are back to a period resembling the one that preceded the Cuban missile crisis, when there is no generally recognized 'balance of terror,' to use Churchill's phrase of the 1950s, and various countries are competing in a race to improve and extend their nuclear arsenals," he writes. "This is one of the most dangerous moments in the history of nuclear arms."
Whether you know nothing about the Cuban missile crisis or you're a seasoned student of it, you'll appreciate Serhii Plokhy's book. In his approach, you get both a wide bird's-eye view and a granular close-up of the individuals involved as decision-makers, order followers and pawns.
I have to admit that I knew almost nothing about the Cuban missile crisis (or the Bay of Pigs, for that matter). Mr. Plokhy's book certainly filled me in completely. And, for me, the first-hand sources on the Soviet side were a real plus. Most often, you hear from only the home team. The author almost seems to have more source material for the Soviet and Cuban sides of the conflict rather than the American side. I appreciated that, in the same way that long ago I appreciated the film, Das Boot, for widening the lens with which we generally view world events involving the United States.
The big takeaway for me is that neither Khrushchev nor Kennedy wanted nuclear war, realizing that it would mean total annihilation. In the popular imagination, the Soviets are usually painted as warmongers. As well, in the introduction and epilogue, the author makes the frightening statement that today we are as close to nuclear war as we've been since this 1962 political standoff. In 2019, he points out, both the Russians and Americans withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty negotiated at the end of the Cold War in 1987.
"Today we are back to a period resembling the one that preceded the Cuban missile crisis, when there is no generally recognized 'balance of terror,' to use Churchill's phrase of the 1950s, and various countries are competing in a race to improve and extend their nuclear arsenals," he writes. "This is one of the most dangerous moments in the history of nuclear arms."
Whether you know nothing about the Cuban missile crisis or you're a seasoned student of it, you'll appreciate Serhii Plokhy's book. In his approach, you get both a wide bird's-eye view and a granular close-up of the individuals involved as decision-makers, order followers and pawns.
March 26, 2023
A comprehensive study of the much-covered cold war crisis. Much of the US - Kennedy side of the story is well known. It was a key moment in Kennedy's presidency and legacy and here he does once again come across as a heroic figure, negotiating his way through troubled times with stoic skill and some luck, and resisting the advice of many advisors to rush into military action. The Soviet-Krushchev side of the story is less well known, and Krushchev and the Soviet leaders come across as incompetent at best, riddled by mis-assumptions, poor planning and countless errors and miscommunications. Most concerning, as Plokhy notes in his epilogue, is the parallel to the current situation and Putin's dangerous actions. While reading, Putin announced his plan to base nuclear weapons in Belarus. The lessons from history have been long forgotten it seems, but the pathetic bravado and posturing goes on.
July 27, 2023
This a truly scary book. Neither the Americans nor the Soviets had any accurate idea of what was actually going on – and then there was wild card Fidel to make things even more dangerous. It is a damned miracle we didn’t all get blown to Kingdom Come. And here we are, 61 years later, and the risk of nuclear war is probably as great as has ever been.
July 25, 2021
"Nuclear Folly" is interesting but dry, considering the topic.
The only previous book I've read on the Cuban Missile Crisis was Robert Kennedy's "Thirteen Days," and that was so long ago that I remember only little bits of it. But I do recall that I found it spellbinding.
Kennedy had the advantage of having been there, in a key role. He also was only telling the story from the American perspective, which made for a compact story line.
According to Serhii Plokhy, Kennedy also employed selective memory when telling his version of events.
Plokhy had the advantage of voluminous documents now made public and the surprisingly frank recollections of former Soviet officials who were involved at the time. This means we get the perspective of Nikita Khrushchev and his team as well as John F. Kennedy and his team. The two leaders come across as poised over a chessboard containing very dangerous pieces, each trying to guess the thoughts of the other.
These were pieces with minds of their own. Plokhy reveals how very close the world came to the nuclear abyss at one point, as a Soviet submarine commander was poised to launch a nuclear-tipped missile in response to harassment from U.S. air and naval forces. Had it not been for a last-second apology signaled from a U.S. commander, and the Soviet commander noticing the apology, the history of the ensuing decades would have been very different, if there had been any history to record.
For all of that drama, even that episode seems to lack punch in the telling of it. I'm glad that Plokhy doesn't oversell his story or engage in hyperbole. But the narrative overall seems lackluster. This may be due in part to the wealth of material Plokhy had to work with. The events are told chronologically, but Plokhy has to back up at times -- OK, this is what the Soviets were thinking about that. OK, this is what Kennedy's advisers had suggested before this happened.
Plokhy's account confirms a couple of things that we probably already knew. One is that the Cuban missile crisis ended without becoming a catastrophe primarily because both Khrushchev and Kennedy were horrified by the thought of a nuclear war and didn't want to be connected with setting one off. This is sobering in view of the number of leaders today who have access to nuclear weapons. It seems increasingly possible that a rogue leader might not share that horror.
The other is that Vice President Lyndon Johnson was mostly excluded from the proceedings. It's well known that Robert Kennedy despised Johnson, so it's not surprising if Johnson was given no credit in "Thirteen Days." But even in this book, Johnson only appears three times. In one, though, Plokhy says that Johnson's view prevailed. In another, he, like Kennedy, develops a convenient "cold" in order to be rushed back to Washington from domestic travels. So he wasn't entirely out of the loop.
Bottom line: If you have an interest in Cold War history, this book is well worth reading, even if it's not told in a heart-stopping manner.
The only previous book I've read on the Cuban Missile Crisis was Robert Kennedy's "Thirteen Days," and that was so long ago that I remember only little bits of it. But I do recall that I found it spellbinding.
Kennedy had the advantage of having been there, in a key role. He also was only telling the story from the American perspective, which made for a compact story line.
According to Serhii Plokhy, Kennedy also employed selective memory when telling his version of events.
Plokhy had the advantage of voluminous documents now made public and the surprisingly frank recollections of former Soviet officials who were involved at the time. This means we get the perspective of Nikita Khrushchev and his team as well as John F. Kennedy and his team. The two leaders come across as poised over a chessboard containing very dangerous pieces, each trying to guess the thoughts of the other.
These were pieces with minds of their own. Plokhy reveals how very close the world came to the nuclear abyss at one point, as a Soviet submarine commander was poised to launch a nuclear-tipped missile in response to harassment from U.S. air and naval forces. Had it not been for a last-second apology signaled from a U.S. commander, and the Soviet commander noticing the apology, the history of the ensuing decades would have been very different, if there had been any history to record.
For all of that drama, even that episode seems to lack punch in the telling of it. I'm glad that Plokhy doesn't oversell his story or engage in hyperbole. But the narrative overall seems lackluster. This may be due in part to the wealth of material Plokhy had to work with. The events are told chronologically, but Plokhy has to back up at times -- OK, this is what the Soviets were thinking about that. OK, this is what Kennedy's advisers had suggested before this happened.
Plokhy's account confirms a couple of things that we probably already knew. One is that the Cuban missile crisis ended without becoming a catastrophe primarily because both Khrushchev and Kennedy were horrified by the thought of a nuclear war and didn't want to be connected with setting one off. This is sobering in view of the number of leaders today who have access to nuclear weapons. It seems increasingly possible that a rogue leader might not share that horror.
The other is that Vice President Lyndon Johnson was mostly excluded from the proceedings. It's well known that Robert Kennedy despised Johnson, so it's not surprising if Johnson was given no credit in "Thirteen Days." But even in this book, Johnson only appears three times. In one, though, Plokhy says that Johnson's view prevailed. In another, he, like Kennedy, develops a convenient "cold" in order to be rushed back to Washington from domestic travels. So he wasn't entirely out of the loop.
Bottom line: If you have an interest in Cold War history, this book is well worth reading, even if it's not told in a heart-stopping manner.
December 30, 2021
Serhii Plokhy's Nuclear Folly, a history of the lead-up to, events of, and fallout from the Cuban Missile Crisis is a compellingly written portrait of US-USSR relations in the early 1960s. For readers unfamiliar with the event, this book provides a thorough overview of both what happened and, more interestingly, why it happened. And for history buffs who have read older material, Plokhy brings in a hefty amount of newly available/recently declassified Soviet accounts to the story.
If you're looking for either a general history of the crisis or are curious to read an English-language work that deals as much with the Russian/Soviet and Cuban framing as it does the US-American one, this is a top notch choice.
Note: I read an eARC from NetGalley, so some edits to the final version may not have been present.
If you're looking for either a general history of the crisis or are curious to read an English-language work that deals as much with the Russian/Soviet and Cuban framing as it does the US-American one, this is a top notch choice.
Note: I read an eARC from NetGalley, so some edits to the final version may not have been present.
May 24, 2021
Good book overall on the subject. I am not sure how much new information is in the book. It's a good overall treatment of the crisis, from the origins in the Bay of Pigs, to the ending. The author does tie in Khrushchev's disposal two years later as a result of the crisis. And I totally didn't know anything about the critical importance of Robert Kennedy's back channel diplomacy.
Philip Kuhn
Philip Kuhn
July 10, 2021
In 1981 I briefly studied the Cuban Missiles Crisis as part of my degree and it was horrifying enough then and of course well within the recollection of my tutor. What this book does so well is add to the confusion and constant missteps through new material from the Soviet side and from Cuba, to what had been a largely American perspective.
This is an extremely well written book with a great sense of space and in every chapter a new trap seems to have been sprung by the complete lack of understanding between the Soviet and America sides. A couple of things struck me in particular. What a hawk Robert Kennedy had been in ExCom and we would certainly had a nuclear war if his view had prevailed. The weakness of Kruschev’s position ( which led to him being deposed two years later) including in poor information about Cuba and that Soviet weaponry was less effective than they claimed. US information was woefully inaccurate for instance the Soviets had over four times as many troops as they calculated when planning an invasion of Cuba. And that Castro became a wild card with, understandably, his own agenda, at that time not really a Communist one, and unwilling to play a junior role to Kruschev.
There were multiple occasions where the smallest changes would have led to at least a limited nuclear exchange. Highly sobering.
This is an extremely well written book with a great sense of space and in every chapter a new trap seems to have been sprung by the complete lack of understanding between the Soviet and America sides. A couple of things struck me in particular. What a hawk Robert Kennedy had been in ExCom and we would certainly had a nuclear war if his view had prevailed. The weakness of Kruschev’s position ( which led to him being deposed two years later) including in poor information about Cuba and that Soviet weaponry was less effective than they claimed. US information was woefully inaccurate for instance the Soviets had over four times as many troops as they calculated when planning an invasion of Cuba. And that Castro became a wild card with, understandably, his own agenda, at that time not really a Communist one, and unwilling to play a junior role to Kruschev.
There were multiple occasions where the smallest changes would have led to at least a limited nuclear exchange. Highly sobering.
December 15, 2023
Глибокий і ґрунтовний виклад подій та їх аналіз роблять з цієї книги не просто хроніку страшних подій 1962 року, все це виглядає, ніби захоплива історія з художньої книги. Насправді, дуже актуальна праця в наш час..
September 2, 2023
真是個極佳的討價還價戰略教本…雖說山姆大叔幾乎是輾壓性大勝啦，一邊在北約佈核武，一邊各種哭夭古巴，看到蘇聯退讓後又是狂哭夭加碼，極致GY🤣🤣🤣赫魯雪夫到最後有種被沈默成本心態綁架的感覺，把盟友搞得那麼難看，被罷免也真是不奇怪。冷戰後出於善意跟恐懼的核子縮減，現在來看真是諷刺，好像這些年來做的事情沒什麼意義這樣……
May 16, 2022
3.5*
February 12, 2023
Reading Plokhy’s book exactly 59 years after the events is like shower water running progressively colder until it is icy. His narration begins with JFK’s election. His youth, which was considered attractive by many, was not an asset in the international stage. There, it was seen as inexperience. The Soviet premier Khrushchev (NSK) chose this time to break free from the Stalinist legacy and impose his footprint on the world. The key fact was the ill-conceived invasion of Cuba promoted by the CIA in 1961. Although it was an operation inherited from his predecessor Eisenhower, Kennedy felt pressured to carry it out by the military and the CIA. It was a shambles and it gave Khrushchev an idea to kill two birds with one stone: to protect the emerging Castrist revolution and to overcome a technical limitation. The “missile gap” was an issue on which JFK had campaigned against Nixon in 1960; supposedly the USSR was superior to the US in missile technology (this crazy notion was promoted by the Soviets’ coup with the Sputnik satellite) and the US had to catch up. This was rubbish, there was no missile gap, the US had both many more missiles than its rival and also much better technology. The US had ICBM, misiles that could traverse the oceans to strike at its enemy. The USSR lacked these missiles and thus couldn’t hit the US unless it placed missiles on US borders or nearby. Here Cuba came in handy, it was barely 90 miles from the Florida coast and thus ideally located to place missiles to threaten the US. Khrushchev convinced Castro that this would save the Revolution, now clearly portrayed as Communist. Khrushchev did not think this was an aggressive act. The US had missiles in Turkey, which bordered on the URSS, so why should it mind it the Soviets had missiles on Cuba? Plus, Kennedy was clearly a weakling, who could be bullied, or so Khrushchev thought. Although not unlikable compared to Stalin, Khrushchev was a bully and a verbose loose cannon. He wanted to appear tough before the Chinese, who were then on the verge of the Cultural Revolution and much more militant than the Soviets, and also to attract third world leaders, since this was the high point of decolonization in Asia and Africa. So he started to move much weaponry, both defensive and offensive into Cuba, including not only nuclear weapons, both strategic (missiles) and tactical, but also fighter jets. The Soviets had to do much work to get these weapons in their right places, in a country with few roads and decent bridges. Also without trees to cover the missiles from spy planes (U2s). Here they were helped by the wedding of CIA chief John McCone (I always thought this was a great name), which took him out of circulation for an extensive honeymoon trip to Europe, thus cutting the flow of intelligence to the US. Eventually the US found out about the missiles and the launching pads and all hell broke loose. The extreme bloody mindedness of top military leaders and some civilians (like RFK, who nonetheless evolved significantly during the few weeks the crisis lasted) is not surprising but is astonishing. What where these people thinking? ¿Did they think they could take over Cuba without inflicting and suffering millions of casualties? Anyway, JFK and NSK found ways to negotiate and to come to an agreement. Although all humanity won when an agreement was reached, NSK ended with egg on his face. Castro was furious when the missiles and fighter jets where removed without consulting him. The Soviet military was humiliated by having to withdraw from Cuba like it had been beaten and by having its ships searched by the Americans under UN auspices. Key politburo player Anastas Mikoyan became an enemy to NSK due to his flat footed management of the crisis. Eventually the leadership would come together against NSK under Leonid Brezhnev, a total mediocrity. Less than two years after the crisis both leaders would be gone. JFK murdered by a lone gunman or by a mind-boggling conspiracy, NSK done away by a palace coup. Fidel Castro would remain for nearly 60 more years in power, producing a huge diaspora of right wingers, who would move mostly into Florida, thus changing politics there and in the US for ever. This book is an excellent study in how decisions are made and how negotiations take place at the highest levels and in great matters. Although the world was unlucky that NSK decided to trust his gut instinct that JFK was a gutless rich boy, it was lucky that he wasn’t and the NSK, although a bully and a blowhard, was no fool. One wonders how that episode would play out today. Let’s hope we don’t have to find out.
August 6, 2023
A gripping analysis of the showdown between the US and USSR over the installation of soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. Particularly noteworthy is the insight offered into the strategy and decision-making of Soviet leadership. The reader comes away with appreciation, and gratitude, that both Kennedy and Khrushchev were willing to go to great lengths and bear substantial political risks to avoid leading their nations and the world into nuclear war. In the end leadership really mattered. Thought provoking in today’s geo-political climate. In sum, a very well constructed and written history. Highly recommend.
May 23, 2021
This is a very timely book considering the recent end of the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, and it is most interesting because it shows the rationale behind decisions the leaders (Kennedy and Kruschev) of the U.S and Soviet Union made at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and serves as a good reminder of just how close we were to Nuclear War.
The book focuses at the highest levels of the respective governments and militaries (to include that of Cuba’s) and due to the fact the nuclear age arrived prior to the Information Age, so many of these chess moves each side made were often done in the dark, and uninformed because of it. The author’s thesis is that we avoided nuclear war out of fear on both sides, and he proves his point while ultimately declaring the U.S the winner in the grand scheme as Russia’s retreat with their offensive weapons from Cuba so soon after they secretly deployed them had to be viewed as humiliation.
The decision making processes the U.S leadership and Soviet leadership went through are illuminated well in this book, and the shift in power dynamics between the countries makes for fun reading for anyone interested in diplomatic power. The only slight critique is the author could’ve probably touched a little more on how the respective populaces viewed all of this unfolding. That said, it does a great job with what the author set out to do, and for anyone interested in this fascinating event in world history or the way ahead for nuclear deterrence it’s a great read.
The book focuses at the highest levels of the respective governments and militaries (to include that of Cuba’s) and due to the fact the nuclear age arrived prior to the Information Age, so many of these chess moves each side made were often done in the dark, and uninformed because of it. The author’s thesis is that we avoided nuclear war out of fear on both sides, and he proves his point while ultimately declaring the U.S the winner in the grand scheme as Russia’s retreat with their offensive weapons from Cuba so soon after they secretly deployed them had to be viewed as humiliation.
The decision making processes the U.S leadership and Soviet leadership went through are illuminated well in this book, and the shift in power dynamics between the countries makes for fun reading for anyone interested in diplomatic power. The only slight critique is the author could’ve probably touched a little more on how the respective populaces viewed all of this unfolding. That said, it does a great job with what the author set out to do, and for anyone interested in this fascinating event in world history or the way ahead for nuclear deterrence it’s a great read.
April 30, 2021
This was terrific. Even if you think you know about the Cuban Missile Crisis, you should read this one, because you will find out something you didn't know before.
The fraught relationship between the Soviets and the Cubans really comes into focus here. Also new is the experience of the Soviet troops who were deployed with the missiles.
Perhaps the most myth-busting thing for American readers is the role of Robert Kennedy. He was key as a behind-the-scenes go-between, but in the early stages of the crisis, he was very hawkish. No "Now I know how Tojo felt when planning Pearl Harbor" note came from his pen.
Also, Plokhy makes it clear how close war came when airplanes confronted airplanes over the Arctic Circle or ships confronted submarines in the Atlantic. These are encounters that most international relations classes simply don't mention.
I came away very impressed by this book and enjoyed it more than I expected to.
The fraught relationship between the Soviets and the Cubans really comes into focus here. Also new is the experience of the Soviet troops who were deployed with the missiles.
Perhaps the most myth-busting thing for American readers is the role of Robert Kennedy. He was key as a behind-the-scenes go-between, but in the early stages of the crisis, he was very hawkish. No "Now I know how Tojo felt when planning Pearl Harbor" note came from his pen.
Also, Plokhy makes it clear how close war came when airplanes confronted airplanes over the Arctic Circle or ships confronted submarines in the Atlantic. These are encounters that most international relations classes simply don't mention.
I came away very impressed by this book and enjoyed it more than I expected to.
October 13, 2021
Serhii Plokhy is a political history professor at Harvard University specializing in diplomatic history; he also serves as Director of Harvard’s Ukrainian Research Institute. His credentials and credibility are a solid foundation for his Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (2021). On top of this, he is a clear writer who knows the record and keeps your attention.
Early on, Plokhy announces that the book's perspective on political history is unusual. Rather than focusing on the things done right—the normal emphasis of books by the politicians involved in the affair (he cites Robert Kennedy specifically)—he focuses on what was done wrong and what prevented those errors from becoming cataclysmic. This makes eminent sense to me: how else can you learn from an event without acknowledging what was done wrong? And learning from the diplomatic foibles of an event involving nuclear weapons should be a high priority.
But the vast bulk of his book is a moment-by-moment account of the development and progress of the crisis. This is excellent stuff and exceedingly well constructed. But there are no diplomatic lessons to be drawn from the event other than: (1) the world was lucky that both Kennedy and Khrushchev were virulently opposed to nuclear war; and (2) the Cuban missile crisis was a clusterf**k involving several parties: John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, and—behind the scenes—Mao Zedong representing China, which was in a contest with Russia over power in Cuba; (3)Castro was a nut.
Only in the epilogue are lessons drawn, and these seem to be easily summarized—the world is backtracking on the nuclear question: long-standing agreements on proliferation are lapsing, nuclear proliferation among smaller nations is increasing, and in nuclear standoffs, we don't have the advantage of just a few large nations with a lot to lose calling the shots. Today Castro might control a nuclear arsenal.
The Beginning
The early 1960s were a time of almost simultaneous change in national leadership: Castro in Cuba (1959) and Kennedy in the U. S. (1960), with the veteran Krushchev in the USSR: Khrushchev had been a Lieutenant General during WWII and had spent decades running Russian government agencies. He had survived Stalin’s reign and he was shrewd enough to replace Georgy Malenkov as First Secretary of the Communist Party in 1953 and to become Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in 1958.
Khrushchev was both intelligent and shrewd, a known risk-taker who believed that he could manage the risks by thinking his way through any problems. During his tenure at the top, he navigated the Suez Crisis of 1957, launched Sputnik, handled the 1957 Syrian Crisis, and turned the 1960 U-2 incident into a win for Russia. The end of his string of successes was still in front of him.
Lower down the experience scale was Fidel Castro, who became Cuba’s Prime Minister after his 1956 ousting of Fulgencio Batista, became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Cuba in 1965, and in 1976 became the President of the Council of State of Cuba, a position he maintained even after he became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Cuba in 1965. Regardless of the title, Castro was fully in charge of Cuba after 1956.
Last, and perhaps least, was John Kennedy, elected a Massachusetts Senator in 1946 and U.S. President in 1961. His fifteen years as senator were unremarkable and he'd had no real leadership experience when he became President and was immediately sucked into the CIA's plot to invade Cuba in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle. The failure of that ill-planned and under-resourced invasion led Khrushchev to conclude that Kennedy was unqualified and encouraged him to press hard on the U.S. An early action was the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 just as the Cuban crisis was beginning. Khrushchev also floated the idea of a formal treaty with East Germany that would protect it from western incursions and, perhaps, close Berlin to western air, land, and rail traffic.
Khrushchev's interest in Cuba was multi-faceted. He saw Cuba as the bulwark of socialism in the western hemisphere as well as a launching pad for socialist advances in the U. S. backyard. It was a thorn in the side of the U. S. and, after the Bay of Pigs, the Cubans and Khrushchev expected a real invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces. Khrushchev wanted to protect Cuba from the U. S. clutches. At the same time, he was provoked by the U. S. placement of medium-range nuclear weapons in Turkey in 1959. Oddly, Kennedy could not see the parallel between our sites in Turkey and Soviet missile sites in Cuba.
The USSR had no such advantage—it had only short- and medium-range nuclear missiles, and the ones at hand used liquid fuel that took hours to fill a missile's tank. The U.S. was far out of range and Paris seemed to be the extent of a USSR missile threat. Yes, there was a real missile gap, as the U.S. press and conservative politicians claimed. But it was the Soviets who lagged far behind in numbers, range, fueling time, and quality of nuclear missiles.
The Middle
Khrushchev had an epiphany: what's good for the goose is good for the gander! If the U. S. can put missiles in Turkey, within range of Moscow, the USSR can put them in in Cuba, within range of Washington. This would stalemate the U. S. in both Europe and the Caribbean, preserve Cuba for the coming socialist revolution in the western hemisphere, forestall meaningful U. S. nuclear threats in Asia and Europe, and add to the USSR’s power in the Berlin impasse.
So began Operation Anadyr, the Soviet plan to install sixty missiles and 40 launching pads on Cuban soil, along with several thousand troops to manage, maintain, and protect the missile sites; ultimately Soviet personnel on Cuba would reach 40,000. But it would be very risky and secrecy was essential. Khrushchev was assured that the 67 foot-long missiles and their launchers would be adequately screened by Cuba's palm trees, that their delivery to Cuba by ship could be effectively masked as commercial cargo, and that the influx to Cuba of Soviet personnel would go unnoticed. Of course, none of these were true: Palm trees were short, U. S. air surveillance would reveal the men and machines, and eyes on the ground would confirm the Soviet presence.
Reconnaissance flights soon revealed ships arriving in Cuba and the construction of missile facilities. Congress gave Kennedy a free hand to do anything to counter the threat. Kennedy called for a response from the Joint Chiefs about action to be taken. Khrushchev threatened war and, if necessary the use of the USSR’s vast undersupply of nuclear weapons. At the same time—following his “carrot and stick” practice, Khrushchev dangled a nuclear test-ban treaty in front of the President.
On August 29, 1961 a U-2 overflight of Cuba revealed the presence of surface-to-air (SAM) missiles on Cuban soil. These were the vanguard of the nuclear missiles soon to arrive by sea.
The information galvanized Kennedy, who, still unaware of what was on its way to Cuba in ships, reported to the public that the SAMS were offensive weapons. Bad weather and Dean Rusk’s resistance stalled U-2 overflights for five weeks, giving the USSR the perfect window to mount ballistic missiles—if they would just arrive. The first medium-range ballistic missiles arrived in Cuba on September 9. Intermediate-range missiles that could reach Washinton were expected in November.
In mid-October a U-2 flight over Cuba revealed that these missiles had been mounted. This was a major shock to Kennedy and demanded a response. Kennedy met with his advisors. His brother, Robert, was a strong supporter of a surgical strike on the missile sites, but his other advisors were split down the middle. Their primary concern was that if the missiles were armed and ready, and if some missiles survived the strike, the Cuban response could be catastrophic even if not disabling. So the final decision was a wait-and-see period with a blockade of all maritime trade with Cuba to stop the new missile deliveries.
Khrushchev was in a panic. He was not even near wanting a nuclear exchange, especially with the USSR's clear disadvantage even with missiles already in Cuba. He was a risk-taker and a blusterer, but he was also a canny thinker. This was not adding up to a victory for the USSR. His attention turned to negotiation—he had Berlin and the missiles in Turkey to work with, and ultimately he turned the ships bound for Cuba around short of the U. S. quarantine zone. The first emergency of the crisis was over, but tensions remained.
[Note: I was on a naval troopship at Guantanamo Bay when the Soviet ships turned around. I and many of my fellow Marines naively thought that it was the end of the crisis; it was just the beginning of the end.]
The End
The solution to the impasse was the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. They had prompted the crisis and the U. S. was not committed to them—they were placed in Turkey by the Eisenhower administration and the Pentagon saw them as technologically obsolete and politically unnecessary. Kennedy fixed upon a face-saving way out of the crisis: an agreement with Khrushchev that if the Soviets removed the Cuban nuclear missiles, subject to UN ground and naval inspection, the U. S. would withdraw its missiles from Turkey. The exchange of missiles also appealed to Khrushchev, who had placed missiles in Cuba as a counter to the Turkish missiles.
But an agreement would not be immediate, and events on the ground were threatening to overtake careful negotiation. The Soviet military was riddled with confusion about the conditions under which it could use either conventional or nuclear weapons without special permission from Moscow. The result was a reasonable fear on the part of both the Soviets and the U. S. that low-level commanders would take steps that spilled over into nuclear war.
In late October frequent low-level reconnaissance flights were drawing fire from the SAM missiles and antiaircraft batterie. And on October 27 a U-2 was downed by an unauthorized SAM. This placed increased pressure on Kennedy to approve an airstrike on the Soviet missiles in Cuba, followed by a general invasion. But that downing also softened Khrushchev’s bluster: no longer was he dangling Berlin in front of Kennedy. No longer was he talking about establishing a Soviet naval base on Cuba. No longer was he advocating sending submarines with nuclear-tipped torpedoes to the Caribbean, though they were already on their way.
A fly in the ointment of amity was Fidel Castro. Upon learning of a potential U. S.-Soviet missile swap he vociferously objected. This would compromise Cuba's honor, the condition of ground inspections by international authorities like the UN violated Cuba's sovereignty, and he saw the USSR as throwing the Cuban people under the bus. He expected that one condition of the agreement—that the U. S. would not invade Cuba—was a false flag. Castro continued to urge a Soviet attack on the U. S.
To calm Castro, Khrushchev sent Anastas Mikoyan to talk to Castro. Mikoyan was the consummate negotiator, calm under all conditions, who had the best chance of communicating with Castro. Mikoyan went to Cuba even though his wife was on the verge of death from cancer—she died while he was there. In their discussion, Castro said
In the agreement to withdraw nuclear weapons from Cuba, Kennedy had specified "ballistic missiles." This was convenient to the USSR because there were also non-ballistic offensive weapons: the Soviets had sent IL-28s, a short-range light bomber capable of carrying nuclear payloads, as well as nuclear-tipped Luna tactical missiles. the U. S. knew about the light bombers but they were not on the list to be removed from Cuba because of oversight; it did not know about the Lunas.
On November 18 Castro without Soviet approval—ordered his anti-aircraft SAM batteries to resume shooting at low-level overflights by the U. S. The tension peaked again: the U. S. would not follow the Soviet-American agreement if its reconnaissance abilities ended. It had not yet ended the naval blockade and would not do so until the overflight threat ended. Castro conceded—he would not threaten overflying aircraft if the U. S. ended its naval blockade.
The Americans still did not know about the nuclear-armed Luna missiles, nor did they know that while the light bombers had been removed their nuclear payloads remained in Cuba. Once again Castro, presumably still expecting an American invasion, fouled his nest by telling the U. S. that he still had tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear payloads. The Americans dutifully added them to the removal list. To forestall additional tension, Khrushchev ordered them removed from Cuba.
The clear political winners in this event were America and President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy would be assassinated two years later by, some suspect, the Castro government operating through the Mafia and a lone crazy named Oswald. Krushchev would be retired in 1964 and would die in 1971. Castro hung onto power until conceding leadership to his brother Raul in 2008 and dying in 2016. Cuba remains isolated and in economic difficulty.
Early on, Plokhy announces that the book's perspective on political history is unusual. Rather than focusing on the things done right—the normal emphasis of books by the politicians involved in the affair (he cites Robert Kennedy specifically)—he focuses on what was done wrong and what prevented those errors from becoming cataclysmic. This makes eminent sense to me: how else can you learn from an event without acknowledging what was done wrong? And learning from the diplomatic foibles of an event involving nuclear weapons should be a high priority.
But the vast bulk of his book is a moment-by-moment account of the development and progress of the crisis. This is excellent stuff and exceedingly well constructed. But there are no diplomatic lessons to be drawn from the event other than: (1) the world was lucky that both Kennedy and Khrushchev were virulently opposed to nuclear war; and (2) the Cuban missile crisis was a clusterf**k involving several parties: John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, and—behind the scenes—Mao Zedong representing China, which was in a contest with Russia over power in Cuba; (3)Castro was a nut.
Only in the epilogue are lessons drawn, and these seem to be easily summarized—the world is backtracking on the nuclear question: long-standing agreements on proliferation are lapsing, nuclear proliferation among smaller nations is increasing, and in nuclear standoffs, we don't have the advantage of just a few large nations with a lot to lose calling the shots. Today Castro might control a nuclear arsenal.
The Beginning
The early 1960s were a time of almost simultaneous change in national leadership: Castro in Cuba (1959) and Kennedy in the U. S. (1960), with the veteran Krushchev in the USSR: Khrushchev had been a Lieutenant General during WWII and had spent decades running Russian government agencies. He had survived Stalin’s reign and he was shrewd enough to replace Georgy Malenkov as First Secretary of the Communist Party in 1953 and to become Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in 1958.
Khrushchev was both intelligent and shrewd, a known risk-taker who believed that he could manage the risks by thinking his way through any problems. During his tenure at the top, he navigated the Suez Crisis of 1957, launched Sputnik, handled the 1957 Syrian Crisis, and turned the 1960 U-2 incident into a win for Russia. The end of his string of successes was still in front of him.
Lower down the experience scale was Fidel Castro, who became Cuba’s Prime Minister after his 1956 ousting of Fulgencio Batista, became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Cuba in 1965, and in 1976 became the President of the Council of State of Cuba, a position he maintained even after he became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Cuba in 1965. Regardless of the title, Castro was fully in charge of Cuba after 1956.
Last, and perhaps least, was John Kennedy, elected a Massachusetts Senator in 1946 and U.S. President in 1961. His fifteen years as senator were unremarkable and he'd had no real leadership experience when he became President and was immediately sucked into the CIA's plot to invade Cuba in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle. The failure of that ill-planned and under-resourced invasion led Khrushchev to conclude that Kennedy was unqualified and encouraged him to press hard on the U.S. An early action was the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 just as the Cuban crisis was beginning. Khrushchev also floated the idea of a formal treaty with East Germany that would protect it from western incursions and, perhaps, close Berlin to western air, land, and rail traffic.
Khrushchev's interest in Cuba was multi-faceted. He saw Cuba as the bulwark of socialism in the western hemisphere as well as a launching pad for socialist advances in the U. S. backyard. It was a thorn in the side of the U. S. and, after the Bay of Pigs, the Cubans and Khrushchev expected a real invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces. Khrushchev wanted to protect Cuba from the U. S. clutches. At the same time, he was provoked by the U. S. placement of medium-range nuclear weapons in Turkey in 1959. Oddly, Kennedy could not see the parallel between our sites in Turkey and Soviet missile sites in Cuba.
The USSR had no such advantage—it had only short- and medium-range nuclear missiles, and the ones at hand used liquid fuel that took hours to fill a missile's tank. The U.S. was far out of range and Paris seemed to be the extent of a USSR missile threat. Yes, there was a real missile gap, as the U.S. press and conservative politicians claimed. But it was the Soviets who lagged far behind in numbers, range, fueling time, and quality of nuclear missiles.
The Middle
Khrushchev had an epiphany: what's good for the goose is good for the gander! If the U. S. can put missiles in Turkey, within range of Moscow, the USSR can put them in in Cuba, within range of Washington. This would stalemate the U. S. in both Europe and the Caribbean, preserve Cuba for the coming socialist revolution in the western hemisphere, forestall meaningful U. S. nuclear threats in Asia and Europe, and add to the USSR’s power in the Berlin impasse.
So began Operation Anadyr, the Soviet plan to install sixty missiles and 40 launching pads on Cuban soil, along with several thousand troops to manage, maintain, and protect the missile sites; ultimately Soviet personnel on Cuba would reach 40,000. But it would be very risky and secrecy was essential. Khrushchev was assured that the 67 foot-long missiles and their launchers would be adequately screened by Cuba's palm trees, that their delivery to Cuba by ship could be effectively masked as commercial cargo, and that the influx to Cuba of Soviet personnel would go unnoticed. Of course, none of these were true: Palm trees were short, U. S. air surveillance would reveal the men and machines, and eyes on the ground would confirm the Soviet presence.
Reconnaissance flights soon revealed ships arriving in Cuba and the construction of missile facilities. Congress gave Kennedy a free hand to do anything to counter the threat. Kennedy called for a response from the Joint Chiefs about action to be taken. Khrushchev threatened war and, if necessary the use of the USSR’s vast undersupply of nuclear weapons. At the same time—following his “carrot and stick” practice, Khrushchev dangled a nuclear test-ban treaty in front of the President.
On August 29, 1961 a U-2 overflight of Cuba revealed the presence of surface-to-air (SAM) missiles on Cuban soil. These were the vanguard of the nuclear missiles soon to arrive by sea.
The information galvanized Kennedy, who, still unaware of what was on its way to Cuba in ships, reported to the public that the SAMS were offensive weapons. Bad weather and Dean Rusk’s resistance stalled U-2 overflights for five weeks, giving the USSR the perfect window to mount ballistic missiles—if they would just arrive. The first medium-range ballistic missiles arrived in Cuba on September 9. Intermediate-range missiles that could reach Washinton were expected in November.
In mid-October a U-2 flight over Cuba revealed that these missiles had been mounted. This was a major shock to Kennedy and demanded a response. Kennedy met with his advisors. His brother, Robert, was a strong supporter of a surgical strike on the missile sites, but his other advisors were split down the middle. Their primary concern was that if the missiles were armed and ready, and if some missiles survived the strike, the Cuban response could be catastrophic even if not disabling. So the final decision was a wait-and-see period with a blockade of all maritime trade with Cuba to stop the new missile deliveries.
Khrushchev was in a panic. He was not even near wanting a nuclear exchange, especially with the USSR's clear disadvantage even with missiles already in Cuba. He was a risk-taker and a blusterer, but he was also a canny thinker. This was not adding up to a victory for the USSR. His attention turned to negotiation—he had Berlin and the missiles in Turkey to work with, and ultimately he turned the ships bound for Cuba around short of the U. S. quarantine zone. The first emergency of the crisis was over, but tensions remained.
[Note: I was on a naval troopship at Guantanamo Bay when the Soviet ships turned around. I and many of my fellow Marines naively thought that it was the end of the crisis; it was just the beginning of the end.]
The End
The solution to the impasse was the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. They had prompted the crisis and the U. S. was not committed to them—they were placed in Turkey by the Eisenhower administration and the Pentagon saw them as technologically obsolete and politically unnecessary. Kennedy fixed upon a face-saving way out of the crisis: an agreement with Khrushchev that if the Soviets removed the Cuban nuclear missiles, subject to UN ground and naval inspection, the U. S. would withdraw its missiles from Turkey. The exchange of missiles also appealed to Khrushchev, who had placed missiles in Cuba as a counter to the Turkish missiles.
But an agreement would not be immediate, and events on the ground were threatening to overtake careful negotiation. The Soviet military was riddled with confusion about the conditions under which it could use either conventional or nuclear weapons without special permission from Moscow. The result was a reasonable fear on the part of both the Soviets and the U. S. that low-level commanders would take steps that spilled over into nuclear war.
In late October frequent low-level reconnaissance flights were drawing fire from the SAM missiles and antiaircraft batterie. And on October 27 a U-2 was downed by an unauthorized SAM. This placed increased pressure on Kennedy to approve an airstrike on the Soviet missiles in Cuba, followed by a general invasion. But that downing also softened Khrushchev’s bluster: no longer was he dangling Berlin in front of Kennedy. No longer was he talking about establishing a Soviet naval base on Cuba. No longer was he advocating sending submarines with nuclear-tipped torpedoes to the Caribbean, though they were already on their way.
A fly in the ointment of amity was Fidel Castro. Upon learning of a potential U. S.-Soviet missile swap he vociferously objected. This would compromise Cuba's honor, the condition of ground inspections by international authorities like the UN violated Cuba's sovereignty, and he saw the USSR as throwing the Cuban people under the bus. He expected that one condition of the agreement—that the U. S. would not invade Cuba—was a false flag. Castro continued to urge a Soviet attack on the U. S.
To calm Castro, Khrushchev sent Anastas Mikoyan to talk to Castro. Mikoyan was the consummate negotiator, calm under all conditions, who had the best chance of communicating with Castro. Mikoyan went to Cuba even though his wife was on the verge of death from cancer—she died while he was there. In their discussion, Castro said
If our position puts peace throughout the world at risk, then we would think it more correct to consider the Soviet side free from its obligations, and we will resist. Come what may. We have the right to defend our dignity ourselvesIn his report Mikoyan says that this was like dropping an exploding bomb in the room, but he urged Khrushchev not to draw any conclusions from the statement. Mikoyan calmed Castro and received his reluctant acceptance to the agreement's terms. Eventually, Castro accepted even the ground inspections. Plohky doesn't tell us what inducements were offered but we know that after the Missile Crisis Cuba received significant benefits from the USSR in the form of sugar purchases, provision of oil and other commodities, and infrastructure construction. These ended with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union that sent Cuba into a prolonged economic malaise.
In the agreement to withdraw nuclear weapons from Cuba, Kennedy had specified "ballistic missiles." This was convenient to the USSR because there were also non-ballistic offensive weapons: the Soviets had sent IL-28s, a short-range light bomber capable of carrying nuclear payloads, as well as nuclear-tipped Luna tactical missiles. the U. S. knew about the light bombers but they were not on the list to be removed from Cuba because of oversight; it did not know about the Lunas.
On November 18 Castro without Soviet approval—ordered his anti-aircraft SAM batteries to resume shooting at low-level overflights by the U. S. The tension peaked again: the U. S. would not follow the Soviet-American agreement if its reconnaissance abilities ended. It had not yet ended the naval blockade and would not do so until the overflight threat ended. Castro conceded—he would not threaten overflying aircraft if the U. S. ended its naval blockade.
The Americans still did not know about the nuclear-armed Luna missiles, nor did they know that while the light bombers had been removed their nuclear payloads remained in Cuba. Once again Castro, presumably still expecting an American invasion, fouled his nest by telling the U. S. that he still had tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear payloads. The Americans dutifully added them to the removal list. To forestall additional tension, Khrushchev ordered them removed from Cuba.
The clear political winners in this event were America and President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy would be assassinated two years later by, some suspect, the Castro government operating through the Mafia and a lone crazy named Oswald. Krushchev would be retired in 1964 and would die in 1971. Castro hung onto power until conceding leadership to his brother Raul in 2008 and dying in 2016. Cuba remains isolated and in economic difficulty.
May 13, 2022
A detailed, fast-moving account of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, describing many ways in which the situation could have slid into a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy looked persistently for ways to end the crisis peacefully, Kennedy pulling back from an initial temptation to attack Cuba. One lesson of the account is that overall leaders sometimes have to restrain other senior officials and advisors, and that fairly junior military officers in the field can impulsively, or through fear or accident, take actions that could lead to war.
The senior U.S. military commanders and, initially, Robert Kennedy counselled attacking Cuban missile installations by air and even invading the island. Robert Kennedy went so far as to suggest a false-flag attack that would give the U.S. an excuse for such action. On the other side, Fidel Castro became a constant thorn in Khrushchev's side. At one point, thinking a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent, he strongly urged a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. The willingness of a prickly minor player to start a horrendous conflict suggests why it's extremely worrisome that smaller countries with unpredictable leaders and opaque decision making now are acquiring nuclear capability.
A few matters could have been explained in more depth. Why did U.S. aircraft engage in serious harassment of Soviet ships to the point where Soviet commanders nearly retaliated? Who on earth thought it would be a good idea to have U.S. ships signal Soviet submarines near the Caribbean to surface by dropping practice depth charges toward them? The Soviet submarine commanders were warned this could happen but of course had little way of distinguishing between practice depth charges and the real items. The brief epilogue could have explained how Kennedy eventually arranged a promised withdrawal of missiles from Turkey. There were also incidents that would be unimaginable today — ABC News correspondent John Scali, a well-known reporter with strong access to the State Department and other official sources, served at least twice as an unofficial conduit for messages to and from the KGB chief in Washington.
Overall, the book leaves a strong impression that individuals matter in resolving crises, but are often left struggling with imperfect information and difficult communication.
The senior U.S. military commanders and, initially, Robert Kennedy counselled attacking Cuban missile installations by air and even invading the island. Robert Kennedy went so far as to suggest a false-flag attack that would give the U.S. an excuse for such action. On the other side, Fidel Castro became a constant thorn in Khrushchev's side. At one point, thinking a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent, he strongly urged a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. The willingness of a prickly minor player to start a horrendous conflict suggests why it's extremely worrisome that smaller countries with unpredictable leaders and opaque decision making now are acquiring nuclear capability.
A few matters could have been explained in more depth. Why did U.S. aircraft engage in serious harassment of Soviet ships to the point where Soviet commanders nearly retaliated? Who on earth thought it would be a good idea to have U.S. ships signal Soviet submarines near the Caribbean to surface by dropping practice depth charges toward them? The Soviet submarine commanders were warned this could happen but of course had little way of distinguishing between practice depth charges and the real items. The brief epilogue could have explained how Kennedy eventually arranged a promised withdrawal of missiles from Turkey. There were also incidents that would be unimaginable today — ABC News correspondent John Scali, a well-known reporter with strong access to the State Department and other official sources, served at least twice as an unofficial conduit for messages to and from the KGB chief in Washington.
Overall, the book leaves a strong impression that individuals matter in resolving crises, but are often left struggling with imperfect information and difficult communication.
June 4, 2022
I’m debating myself on this one a whole lot. I feel like there might be an uncomfortable chasm between my response to this book and the merits of this book.
I found Plokhy’s handling of the subject herein to be incredibly dry and unappetizing. I’m not sure there’s any way he could have gotten around the former. In all honesty, I think this book taught me something about my own reading tastes—this is not my kind of nonfiction. It’s too granular, too policy-centric, too remote from an emotional core. Because I can read a book on policy, I think. I liked Obama’s A PROMISED LAND well enough. Granted, maybe it was more appealing because I was alive for the Obama administration. :P But I think it has more to do with the fact that the Obama book is a memoir, and therefore has more heart. Maybe I’d connect more to Robert Kennedy’s book, though Plokhy lead me to understand that his account might be a little lacking.
My parents were alive during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and I’d challenge them to get through this book. :P But if someone were to present me with a book on how the Cuban Missile Crisis impacted grade school students and their families, then that would be a different story. And a different form of interest from me.
At the same time, well, there’s BookTubers I admire, and who read much more nonfiction than I do, who admire this book, including Steve Donoghue, professionally, in the Boston Globe! :P https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/04/2... And I suppose I can concede that Plokhy laid down a considerable amount of information in a non-stuffy narrative. (If I were to quibble, I wish he would’ve gotten rid of his “If xxx, then yyy” statements, which he utilized too liberally for my tastes.) Many chapters ended with the melodramatic “world crisis looming” vibe, though to be fair, that both kept the prose engaging and was probably true to the moment. I’ve no doubt that those few months in 1962 were hella stressful for the big leaders in the U.S., USSR, and Cuba, too.
I’m not well-versed enough in Cold War scholarship to ascertain whether Plokhy brought anything new to the table, besides for my understanding that he looked through recently unearthed KGB files. It was difficult to keep all the names and facts straight in this as-before-mentioned granular account. What it seems like to me is that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a mixture of showmanship and posturing, bad or slow radio connections, and an unforgiving tropical climate. Khruschev comes off as a blowhard, and Kennedy not so much as bumbling, but as actually beholden to the opinions of his administration. Fidel Castro, and the Cuban position, was perhaps the most compelling to me (for all of his annoying dramatics), as it was stuck between dangerous superpowers.
I thought, too, about communism, and how the idealism of it must’ve calcified in the USSR by this time, despite the fact that de-colonized nations like Cuba were turning to it for radical revolution. I thought about my country’s (incomplete) foundation on democracy and freedom, yet how power led to its own brand of imperialism. And I thought about how different 60 years ago was in America, when the only woman with dialogue in a book about a huge political undertaking was Kennedy’s 19-year-old university student and mistress, Mimi Alford, who was flown in to keep him company. Times have changed.
Plokhy’s overarching message, though, is that things have not changed. Or maybe they’ve changed for the worst, since 2019 and both Russia and the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This puts us back in Cuban Missile Crisis territory, the author argues, with mutual destruction imminent, and this time, fewer leaders who are afraid of said outcome (notably, this book was written during the Trump Administration. But Putin, if anything, seems even more unhinged in 2022, considering Ukraine. And now, of course, there’s Kim Jong-un.) Plokhy’s words were bombastic, but I bought them.
We are all in danger…but does this granular study of the past lead to change in the future? This level of detail proves that we live in a different time, technologically and socio-politically, so it’s not a one for one comparison here. This argument feels more like a theatrical excuse to pick up the book. But even I, who didn’t like the book, can appreciate the merits therein. History may or may not provide a magic 8 ball, but it’s worth studying to understand people and events within their own context. The past was real, too.
I found Plokhy’s handling of the subject herein to be incredibly dry and unappetizing. I’m not sure there’s any way he could have gotten around the former. In all honesty, I think this book taught me something about my own reading tastes—this is not my kind of nonfiction. It’s too granular, too policy-centric, too remote from an emotional core. Because I can read a book on policy, I think. I liked Obama’s A PROMISED LAND well enough. Granted, maybe it was more appealing because I was alive for the Obama administration. :P But I think it has more to do with the fact that the Obama book is a memoir, and therefore has more heart. Maybe I’d connect more to Robert Kennedy’s book, though Plokhy lead me to understand that his account might be a little lacking.
My parents were alive during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and I’d challenge them to get through this book. :P But if someone were to present me with a book on how the Cuban Missile Crisis impacted grade school students and their families, then that would be a different story. And a different form of interest from me.
At the same time, well, there’s BookTubers I admire, and who read much more nonfiction than I do, who admire this book, including Steve Donoghue, professionally, in the Boston Globe! :P https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/04/2... And I suppose I can concede that Plokhy laid down a considerable amount of information in a non-stuffy narrative. (If I were to quibble, I wish he would’ve gotten rid of his “If xxx, then yyy” statements, which he utilized too liberally for my tastes.) Many chapters ended with the melodramatic “world crisis looming” vibe, though to be fair, that both kept the prose engaging and was probably true to the moment. I’ve no doubt that those few months in 1962 were hella stressful for the big leaders in the U.S., USSR, and Cuba, too.
I’m not well-versed enough in Cold War scholarship to ascertain whether Plokhy brought anything new to the table, besides for my understanding that he looked through recently unearthed KGB files. It was difficult to keep all the names and facts straight in this as-before-mentioned granular account. What it seems like to me is that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a mixture of showmanship and posturing, bad or slow radio connections, and an unforgiving tropical climate. Khruschev comes off as a blowhard, and Kennedy not so much as bumbling, but as actually beholden to the opinions of his administration. Fidel Castro, and the Cuban position, was perhaps the most compelling to me (for all of his annoying dramatics), as it was stuck between dangerous superpowers.
I thought, too, about communism, and how the idealism of it must’ve calcified in the USSR by this time, despite the fact that de-colonized nations like Cuba were turning to it for radical revolution. I thought about my country’s (incomplete) foundation on democracy and freedom, yet how power led to its own brand of imperialism. And I thought about how different 60 years ago was in America, when the only woman with dialogue in a book about a huge political undertaking was Kennedy’s 19-year-old university student and mistress, Mimi Alford, who was flown in to keep him company. Times have changed.
Plokhy’s overarching message, though, is that things have not changed. Or maybe they’ve changed for the worst, since 2019 and both Russia and the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This puts us back in Cuban Missile Crisis territory, the author argues, with mutual destruction imminent, and this time, fewer leaders who are afraid of said outcome (notably, this book was written during the Trump Administration. But Putin, if anything, seems even more unhinged in 2022, considering Ukraine. And now, of course, there’s Kim Jong-un.) Plokhy’s words were bombastic, but I bought them.
We are all in danger…but does this granular study of the past lead to change in the future? This level of detail proves that we live in a different time, technologically and socio-politically, so it’s not a one for one comparison here. This argument feels more like a theatrical excuse to pick up the book. But even I, who didn’t like the book, can appreciate the merits therein. History may or may not provide a magic 8 ball, but it’s worth studying to understand people and events within their own context. The past was real, too.
October 15, 2021
Meisterlik ülevaade Kuuba kriisist – autor on kasutanud nii USA kui ka Nõukogude poliitika kõige olulisemate otsustajate kohta käivaid allikaid. Samas ei ole teos kuiv, isegi kohustuslikus korras lugedes oli elamus meeldiv (mõningad vürtsikamad vahepalad: John Kennedy took the news rather stoically, if not philosophically: "There is always some sonofabitch who doesn't get the word." või The Soviet ambassador was, as always, the last person to learn what was going on in Moscow.).
Teos on sisu poolest pikk narratiiv sellest, kuidas maailm oli juuksekarva katkemise kaugusel tuumasõjast ning kuidas pärast kriisi lahenemist sõlmiti mitmeid lepinguid, mis vähendasid tuumarelvade testimist ning tootmist. Seda enam jääb kummitama teose epiloog, kus on välja toodud, millistest lubadustest on taganetud kasvõi viimase paari aasta jooksul, tuues ohu taaskord lähemale. What can be done? Hoping that populist and nationalist politicians will stop being irresponsible in their statements and actions, that revisionist autocrats will mutate into defenders of the status quo, that leaders of all political stripes will start following the advice of their experts, or that those experts will free themselves completely of their political and cultural biases is a hopeless proposition. Tegemist ei ole just eriti positiivse sõnavõtuga. Autor lugejat päris pimedusse kompima aga ei jäta: At the height of the Cold War, public debate put arms control on the political agenda: governments alone would not have done so. Thus, as citizens, we must reeducate ourselves about the history of nuclear weapons and the dangers they present so that a new arms-control regime can be negotiated. Elected politicians eventually listen to their electorates.
Ning lõpetuseks – miks on ajalugu oluline: Looking back is an essential prerequisite for moving forward.
Teos on sisu poolest pikk narratiiv sellest, kuidas maailm oli juuksekarva katkemise kaugusel tuumasõjast ning kuidas pärast kriisi lahenemist sõlmiti mitmeid lepinguid, mis vähendasid tuumarelvade testimist ning tootmist. Seda enam jääb kummitama teose epiloog, kus on välja toodud, millistest lubadustest on taganetud kasvõi viimase paari aasta jooksul, tuues ohu taaskord lähemale. What can be done? Hoping that populist and nationalist politicians will stop being irresponsible in their statements and actions, that revisionist autocrats will mutate into defenders of the status quo, that leaders of all political stripes will start following the advice of their experts, or that those experts will free themselves completely of their political and cultural biases is a hopeless proposition. Tegemist ei ole just eriti positiivse sõnavõtuga. Autor lugejat päris pimedusse kompima aga ei jäta: At the height of the Cold War, public debate put arms control on the political agenda: governments alone would not have done so. Thus, as citizens, we must reeducate ourselves about the history of nuclear weapons and the dangers they present so that a new arms-control regime can be negotiated. Elected politicians eventually listen to their electorates.
Ning lõpetuseks – miks on ajalugu oluline: Looking back is an essential prerequisite for moving forward.
May 21, 2023
Few periods in history are as thoroughly burned up, paved over, rehashed, and re-examined as the perilous days of the Cuban Missile Crisis — but Serhii Plokhy’s account marks a valuable contribution to a crowded corpus.
Working with an extensive collection of primary sources and ex post facto senior-leader recollections, Plokhy argues authoritatively that the Soviet Union actually possessed an offensive nuclear capability that could reach the United States from its installations in Cuba for several days until Khrushchev agreed to dismantle them — an alarming fact, and a reminder that the two powers came closer to nuclear conflict than anyone would like to remember.
“Nuclear Folly,” examined from a distance of many decades, captures the risks that emerge when (1) some senior leaders believe that major conflict is imminent or inevitable; (2) when a great power views the security of a partner in much closer proximity to a major-power competitor as a vital national security interest; and (3) when that same great power seeks to deter its competitor in ways that prove fundamentally unacceptable to the major power in closer proximity to the partner.
Published in 2021, “Nuclear Folly,” however, misses an opportunity to consider the implications of the Cuban Missile Crisis for the increasingly competitive relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Instead, Plokhy muses in the epilogue about implications for the modern U.S.-Russia relationship and for the tenuous state of global nuclear stability (and in the case of the latter, he does not even mention the PRC’s widely reported nuclear acceleration). For this reason, “Nuclear Folly” may achieve far more than the average work on the Cuban Missile Crisis — but it may not achieve all that it could for the sake of policymakers considering today’s security environment.
Working with an extensive collection of primary sources and ex post facto senior-leader recollections, Plokhy argues authoritatively that the Soviet Union actually possessed an offensive nuclear capability that could reach the United States from its installations in Cuba for several days until Khrushchev agreed to dismantle them — an alarming fact, and a reminder that the two powers came closer to nuclear conflict than anyone would like to remember.
“Nuclear Folly,” examined from a distance of many decades, captures the risks that emerge when (1) some senior leaders believe that major conflict is imminent or inevitable; (2) when a great power views the security of a partner in much closer proximity to a major-power competitor as a vital national security interest; and (3) when that same great power seeks to deter its competitor in ways that prove fundamentally unacceptable to the major power in closer proximity to the partner.
Published in 2021, “Nuclear Folly,” however, misses an opportunity to consider the implications of the Cuban Missile Crisis for the increasingly competitive relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Instead, Plokhy muses in the epilogue about implications for the modern U.S.-Russia relationship and for the tenuous state of global nuclear stability (and in the case of the latter, he does not even mention the PRC’s widely reported nuclear acceleration). For this reason, “Nuclear Folly” may achieve far more than the average work on the Cuban Missile Crisis — but it may not achieve all that it could for the sake of policymakers considering today’s security environment.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 28, 2021
Excellent history book of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which draws upon previously classified Ukrainian and Russian archives. What is new here is the evidence of what we knew already, that is how close we got to nuclear disaster. The same day when a Soviet missile shot down a US spy plane over Cuba (known fact), another US spy plane mistakenly wandered into Soviet airspace in Siberia. Two US fighter jets armed with nuclear missiles were sent from Alaska to locate it. They only narrowly missed running into two Soviet MIG jets sent to intercept the spy plane. There was also a close call in the Bermuda Triangle when a Soviet submarine surfaced and found itself surrounded by US destroyers. When the US Navy dropped flares that detonated loudly, the Soviet captain thought he was under attack and gave orders to dive and fire a nuclear torpedo. Luckily, the USS Cony's commander apologized via a signal light and the Soviet submarine's commander was smart enough to block the order just before diving. The book is rich of details on the decision making process of those famous 13 days, both on the US and Soviet sides, and a great case study on negotiation (I use it in my negotiation courses). In certain parts, it makes for a dry read, but overall it is a fascinating history of making decisions out of imperfect communication and wrong assumptions (CIA grossly underestimated the number of Soviet troops in Cuba from 4,000 to actual 40,000. If Kennedy ordered an invasion, it would have been another disaster). It is a cautionary tale on how important nuclear disarmament is, especially when countries do not have open lines of communication.
February 9, 2022
It is truly the mark of an outstanding work of history that one feels completely entrenched in the timeline of the narrative. I did not know much about the Cuban Missile Crisis aside from its outcome before going into this book, and now I have a much better idea of the specific points where one wrong move would have devolved into nuclear war between the US and the USSR.
This book was definitely an info dump (I mean this is a good way, given how much I didn't know about the situation to begin with). Plokhy describes how the US got involved with Cuba, how the Soviets involved themselves in Cuba, the intricate communication game between JFK, Khrushchev, and their advisors, the engagements that nearly led to war, and how this crisis marked the end of Khrushchev's political career.
Plokhy ends the book with a call for the public to educate themselves on our nuclear history, as we find the world in much a similar state as it was before the Cuban Missile Crisis. He draws the uncomfortable conclusion that without the appropriate apprehension to nuclear proliferation, the next nuclear crisis could very well be the last.
This book was definitely an info dump (I mean this is a good way, given how much I didn't know about the situation to begin with). Plokhy describes how the US got involved with Cuba, how the Soviets involved themselves in Cuba, the intricate communication game between JFK, Khrushchev, and their advisors, the engagements that nearly led to war, and how this crisis marked the end of Khrushchev's political career.
Plokhy ends the book with a call for the public to educate themselves on our nuclear history, as we find the world in much a similar state as it was before the Cuban Missile Crisis. He draws the uncomfortable conclusion that without the appropriate apprehension to nuclear proliferation, the next nuclear crisis could very well be the last.
January 2, 2023
Nonfiction book about the Cuban missile crisis, specifically looking at what was done wrong and the mistakes that were made by Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro.
At times a pageturner, this book brings you through all the events of those "thirteen days" with an eye towards what went wrong, which distinguishes it from other histories of this event which tend to focus on the positive (and rightfully so... we were not annihilated and are still here to examine it).
The strategic back-and-forth between Kennedy and Khrushchev were fascinating, and the author takes care to point out every which way these two leaders tried to stay one step ahead of the other at all times. It truly shows you what a delicate tap-dance diplomacy can be. Especially in this era, where they had to wait for cables and telegraphs to be sent, and in some cases only found out information through watching press conferences or listening to the same radio addresses that the general public were privy to.
The Epilogue was particularly good (and frightening)--pointing out how we are now not as afraid of nuclear weapons as we should be, since we have been spared from this type of close call for many decades now. That, and the leaders who have obtained these weapons now (i.e. North Korea) are not as level-headed as were Kennedy and Khrushchev.
At times a pageturner, this book brings you through all the events of those "thirteen days" with an eye towards what went wrong, which distinguishes it from other histories of this event which tend to focus on the positive (and rightfully so... we were not annihilated and are still here to examine it).
The strategic back-and-forth between Kennedy and Khrushchev were fascinating, and the author takes care to point out every which way these two leaders tried to stay one step ahead of the other at all times. It truly shows you what a delicate tap-dance diplomacy can be. Especially in this era, where they had to wait for cables and telegraphs to be sent, and in some cases only found out information through watching press conferences or listening to the same radio addresses that the general public were privy to.
The Epilogue was particularly good (and frightening)--pointing out how we are now not as afraid of nuclear weapons as we should be, since we have been spared from this type of close call for many decades now. That, and the leaders who have obtained these weapons now (i.e. North Korea) are not as level-headed as were Kennedy and Khrushchev.
April 10, 2024
Plokhy skillfully presents factual accounts from both sides, offering a refreshing perspective for those raised on Americanized notions of good and evil. As a first-time reader on the Cuban Missile Crisis, I was astonished by the numerous close calls, each with grave implications. It appears Kennedy took heed of Eisenhower's warnings about the military-industrial complex. If only subsequent presidents, including LBJ and those of the 21st century, could have upheld Kennedy's commitment to peace over the advocates of war.
April 28, 2022
Great book that genuinely could have been that much greater with the simple inclusion of a graphical timeline. Meticulously researched and compellingly presented, but I really can only keep track in so many hour by hour, day by day developments. Still great read though!
December 20, 2022
Well done though I did still get a little lost in the timeline. Amazing how many mistakes were made and how many decisions were based on wrong intel. The prospect of nuclear war is so scary and we came so close.
March 29, 2023
A great read. Very interesting to see how delayed communication and various accidents had so much potential to start a larger conflict, potentially a nuclear war.
August 30, 2023
Patiko - apie Kubos konfliktą tarp JAV ir Sovietų Sąjungos. Mūsų galvose turbūt visas šitas reikalas žinomas labiau elgesio psichologoijos valkiojamu pavyzdžiu, kuomet CCCP specialistas priėmė sprendimą nešauti raketų atgal, kada pamatė jas atlekiančias prietaisuose. Spoiler Alert: tai net neminima šitoje knygoje. Nes knyga grynai apie politinį konfliktą ir daugiausia Kennedy ir Chruščiovo bei jų komandų elgesį - fokusas į politinius veiksmus, o ne tie į karinius veiksmus. Man labai įdomu ir daug dalykų nežinota. 5* neduodu, nes galutinė dalis kiek atrodo ištęsta, o mažiau puslapių visada geriau nei daugiau.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 144 reviews