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The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won
A definitive account of World War II by America's preeminent military historian
World War II was the most lethal conflict in human history. Never before had a war been fought on so many diverse landscapes and in so many different ways, from rocket attacks in London to jungle fighting in Burma to armor strikes in Libya.
The Second World Wars examines how combat unfolded in the air, at sea, and on land to show how distinct conflicts among disparate combatants coalesced into one interconnected global war. Drawing on 3,000 years of military history, Victor Davis Hanson argues that despite its novel industrial barbarity, neither the war's origins nor its geography were unusual. Nor was its ultimate outcome surprising. The Axis powers were well prepared to win limited border conflicts, but once they blundered into global war, they had no hope of victory.
An authoritative new history of astonishing breadth, The Second World Wars offers a stunning reinterpretation of history's deadliest conflict.
World War II was the most lethal conflict in human history. Never before had a war been fought on so many diverse landscapes and in so many different ways, from rocket attacks in London to jungle fighting in Burma to armor strikes in Libya.
The Second World Wars examines how combat unfolded in the air, at sea, and on land to show how distinct conflicts among disparate combatants coalesced into one interconnected global war. Drawing on 3,000 years of military history, Victor Davis Hanson argues that despite its novel industrial barbarity, neither the war's origins nor its geography were unusual. Nor was its ultimate outcome surprising. The Axis powers were well prepared to win limited border conflicts, but once they blundered into global war, they had no hope of victory.
An authoritative new history of astonishing breadth, The Second World Wars offers a stunning reinterpretation of history's deadliest conflict.
652 pages, Hardcover
First published October 17, 2017
1236 people are currently reading
3212 people want to read
About the author
Victor Davis Hanson
80 books1,118 followersHanson was educated at the University of California, Santa Cruz (BA, Classics, 1975), the American School of Classical Studies (1978-79) and received his Ph.D. in Classics from Stanford University in 1980. He lives and works with his family on their forty-acre tree and vine farm near Selma, California, where he was born in 1953.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 245 reviews
October 16, 2020
Victor Davis Hanson's "The Second World Wars" is a must-read for history buffs. It is a thorough, comprehensive review from a strategic perspective of the armed forces of the major powers that fought the war, the turning points, and the results. It is an enormous book and reading it may be a daunting task for the casual reader.
Ultimately, Hanson concludes that the resources and industrialization of the Big Three, the USA, The Soviet Union, and Great Britain was so vast that, when their full resources were brought to bear, the outcome had to be only victory for the allies. Hanson further laments that the world war that cost in excess of sixty million lives was preventable and that the West's years of appeasement to the Third Reich and the Japanese Imperium and their failure to demonstrate strength in will or in military buildup convinced both the Nazis and the Japanese that the Western powers would not act or could easily be intimidated.
Soviet perfidy in the form of Stalin's secret non-aggression pacts played a huge role in giving the Axis powers free reign to invade -- at least until Hitler turned on the Soviets, beginning the largest and deadliest land campaign in all of history. Without an Eastern front in early 1940, the Germans were free to blitzkreig or surprise attack a bevy of smaller neighboring states. Also, the French collapse in a matter of weeks was so stunning that it gave the Germans a false sense of confidence that allowed them to take on the Soviets even though Britain still stood free in the West. The focus on Operation Barbarossa is fascinating because of how large the distances involved, the millions of troops involved, and the Soviet decision to retreat 1,000 miles and stretch the German supply lines to breaking.
And, as Hanson relates, the ultimate turning point and strategic mistake of the Axis powers wS to awaken the sleeping giant, America, by an unnecessary sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the USA. Stunningly, the US almost overnight turned from a tiny military to millions of troops, aircraft carriers, tanks, and planes. With its industrial heartland safe from invasion across vast oceans, the output of a now wide awake USA knew no equals. Thus, the US could simultaneously fight two fronts half a world apart.
Every page is fascinating for those who are interested in military capabilities and strategy. A long book to read, but worth it.
Ultimately, Hanson concludes that the resources and industrialization of the Big Three, the USA, The Soviet Union, and Great Britain was so vast that, when their full resources were brought to bear, the outcome had to be only victory for the allies. Hanson further laments that the world war that cost in excess of sixty million lives was preventable and that the West's years of appeasement to the Third Reich and the Japanese Imperium and their failure to demonstrate strength in will or in military buildup convinced both the Nazis and the Japanese that the Western powers would not act or could easily be intimidated.
Soviet perfidy in the form of Stalin's secret non-aggression pacts played a huge role in giving the Axis powers free reign to invade -- at least until Hitler turned on the Soviets, beginning the largest and deadliest land campaign in all of history. Without an Eastern front in early 1940, the Germans were free to blitzkreig or surprise attack a bevy of smaller neighboring states. Also, the French collapse in a matter of weeks was so stunning that it gave the Germans a false sense of confidence that allowed them to take on the Soviets even though Britain still stood free in the West. The focus on Operation Barbarossa is fascinating because of how large the distances involved, the millions of troops involved, and the Soviet decision to retreat 1,000 miles and stretch the German supply lines to breaking.
And, as Hanson relates, the ultimate turning point and strategic mistake of the Axis powers wS to awaken the sleeping giant, America, by an unnecessary sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the USA. Stunningly, the US almost overnight turned from a tiny military to millions of troops, aircraft carriers, tanks, and planes. With its industrial heartland safe from invasion across vast oceans, the output of a now wide awake USA knew no equals. Thus, the US could simultaneously fight two fronts half a world apart.
Every page is fascinating for those who are interested in military capabilities and strategy. A long book to read, but worth it.
Read
November 13, 2023Dnf
I read more than half of the book, but I'm throwing in the towel!
Too technical for my liking. Granted the book is very comprehensive, but it would appeal to a small group of history buffs who like numbers, strategies and technicalities and repetitions.
I read more than half of the book, but I'm throwing in the towel!
Too technical for my liking. Granted the book is very comprehensive, but it would appeal to a small group of history buffs who like numbers, strategies and technicalities and repetitions.
March 2, 2018
Two factors made this book an instant “Must Have” and “Must Read” work. The first factor was that Victor Davis Hanson wrote it. Hanson is both a classicist and a military historian. He is equally at home teaching, speaking, or writing about the ancient Greeks and Romans. His skills include being adept at discussing the literature of the Greeks and Romans. Want to know about Homer, Herodotus, or Livy? Read Hanson. Particularly, see Who Killed Homer?, Warfare and Agriculture in Ancient Greece, Bonfire of the Humanities, or A War Like No Other.
But he is also one of the premier military historians of our time. Rank him right up there with John Keegan. See Carnage and Culture, Ripples of Battle, The Soul of Battle, or The Savior Generals. (We can add this point also: Hanson is a first rate political commentator as well. See his contributions as found on his web-site or on the National Review web-site.)
The second reason was the title: The Second World Wars. As I have stated before, my love of history began with studying World War II and other events in 20th Century history. That love has never diminished. (My love for other parts of history has increased, however). Oddly enough, I never took a college class that covered WWII nor have I taught it much in recent years. But I continue to read about it.
If one wants to know the story of the Second World War, don’t read this book. If one wants to know the causes, don’t read this book. If one wants to read extensively about the incredible cast of leaders (political and military), don’t read this book. If one enjoys the narratives of the battles, the clash of arms, the suffering and the glory of what the soldiers, sailors, and airmen faced…need I repeat myself?
Who then should read this book? Those who already have read extensively on the war. This is a BIG PICTURE ANALYSIS of the war. It is an accounting of multitudes of numbers, details, weapon capabilities, geographical factors, industrial outputs, and casualties. As such, I loved it.
Who besides Victor Davis Hanson could fill a book with a million statistics, facts, and figures, and then make ample use of references to ancient wars, and still produce an incredibly mind-numbing and brilliant work? I found myself constantly asking, “How could a war of this magnitude have actually taken place?” and “How could Hanson have assembled and made sense of all these details?”
Most nights (for I read this book at night), I was only able to absorb and cover 10 to 20 pages of this book. That is a testimony in its favor. (I always had the “page-turner” close by to read after the Hanson book.) But each night, I looked forward to reading this book.
The Axis powers simply took on more than it was possible for them to achieve. Of course, one can examine ways they could have won the war or achieved some degree of survival. Some of the decisions of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese defy reason.
On the part of Hitler: Why attack Russia when Britain was still a formidable force that was hurling bombs on Berlin itself? Why declare war on the United States after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor? Why waste so much manpower holding places like Norway? Why leave Malta and Gibraltar in Allied hands? Why waste money and resources on some major weapons that were never produced in ample numbers? And, of course, why brutalize people you needed on your side?
To Mussolini: Why declare war on France? That little venture, along with the attack on Greece, helped doom Italy. Why enter into a war when Italy did not have an adequate army or industry to wage war? Why join in with the efforts to conquer Russia?
To Japan: Why leave the American forces in Pearl Harbor wounded, but not destroyed? Why provoke America and Britain into a war when war with China was already consuming so much manpower?
Along with those issues, the Allied powers made plenty of mistakes on their own. The fall of France in 1940 continues to defy imagination. Britain made enough blunders to lose the war a dozen times over. The United States would have committed blunders of almost irreparable harm had it not been for the British restraints. Russia’s conduct–meaning Stalin’s–was horrendous and stupid at times.
Yet Britain, America, and Russia produced weapons, planes, tanks, artillery guns, trucks, and bombs in such numbers that the sheer weight of it all should have crushed the Axis powers. Add to that, the manpower (which was not made up solely of males).
Hanson’s account calls on the reader to reconsider the impact of the Allied bombing campaign over Germany and Japan. The types and amount of planes that Britain and America produced and employed was staggering. The air war was the second front that Stalin often complained about the lack of. The British really made a substantial contribution to winning the war both through being at war with Germany longer than any other allied country and in terms of quality production of weaponry. And no one can successfully dismiss Churchill’s roles and rhetoric.
If your love of history spurs you to want to make the comparisons between opposing forces, this is the book for you. If you have read and enjoyed Rick Atkinson’s Liberation Trilogy, but feel like you are ready for some behind the scenes details, this book will amaze you. If you enjoy comparisons of the recent past (World War II) to the distant past (the Peloponnesian War), you will find those comparisons here.
In short, this book is a great contribution by one of our finest historians. And this book is absolutely vital to add to your library and reading list for understanding the Second World War.
But he is also one of the premier military historians of our time. Rank him right up there with John Keegan. See Carnage and Culture, Ripples of Battle, The Soul of Battle, or The Savior Generals. (We can add this point also: Hanson is a first rate political commentator as well. See his contributions as found on his web-site or on the National Review web-site.)
The second reason was the title: The Second World Wars. As I have stated before, my love of history began with studying World War II and other events in 20th Century history. That love has never diminished. (My love for other parts of history has increased, however). Oddly enough, I never took a college class that covered WWII nor have I taught it much in recent years. But I continue to read about it.
If one wants to know the story of the Second World War, don’t read this book. If one wants to know the causes, don’t read this book. If one wants to read extensively about the incredible cast of leaders (political and military), don’t read this book. If one enjoys the narratives of the battles, the clash of arms, the suffering and the glory of what the soldiers, sailors, and airmen faced…need I repeat myself?
Who then should read this book? Those who already have read extensively on the war. This is a BIG PICTURE ANALYSIS of the war. It is an accounting of multitudes of numbers, details, weapon capabilities, geographical factors, industrial outputs, and casualties. As such, I loved it.
Who besides Victor Davis Hanson could fill a book with a million statistics, facts, and figures, and then make ample use of references to ancient wars, and still produce an incredibly mind-numbing and brilliant work? I found myself constantly asking, “How could a war of this magnitude have actually taken place?” and “How could Hanson have assembled and made sense of all these details?”
Most nights (for I read this book at night), I was only able to absorb and cover 10 to 20 pages of this book. That is a testimony in its favor. (I always had the “page-turner” close by to read after the Hanson book.) But each night, I looked forward to reading this book.
The Axis powers simply took on more than it was possible for them to achieve. Of course, one can examine ways they could have won the war or achieved some degree of survival. Some of the decisions of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese defy reason.
On the part of Hitler: Why attack Russia when Britain was still a formidable force that was hurling bombs on Berlin itself? Why declare war on the United States after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor? Why waste so much manpower holding places like Norway? Why leave Malta and Gibraltar in Allied hands? Why waste money and resources on some major weapons that were never produced in ample numbers? And, of course, why brutalize people you needed on your side?
To Mussolini: Why declare war on France? That little venture, along with the attack on Greece, helped doom Italy. Why enter into a war when Italy did not have an adequate army or industry to wage war? Why join in with the efforts to conquer Russia?
To Japan: Why leave the American forces in Pearl Harbor wounded, but not destroyed? Why provoke America and Britain into a war when war with China was already consuming so much manpower?
Along with those issues, the Allied powers made plenty of mistakes on their own. The fall of France in 1940 continues to defy imagination. Britain made enough blunders to lose the war a dozen times over. The United States would have committed blunders of almost irreparable harm had it not been for the British restraints. Russia’s conduct–meaning Stalin’s–was horrendous and stupid at times.
Yet Britain, America, and Russia produced weapons, planes, tanks, artillery guns, trucks, and bombs in such numbers that the sheer weight of it all should have crushed the Axis powers. Add to that, the manpower (which was not made up solely of males).
Hanson’s account calls on the reader to reconsider the impact of the Allied bombing campaign over Germany and Japan. The types and amount of planes that Britain and America produced and employed was staggering. The air war was the second front that Stalin often complained about the lack of. The British really made a substantial contribution to winning the war both through being at war with Germany longer than any other allied country and in terms of quality production of weaponry. And no one can successfully dismiss Churchill’s roles and rhetoric.
If your love of history spurs you to want to make the comparisons between opposing forces, this is the book for you. If you have read and enjoyed Rick Atkinson’s Liberation Trilogy, but feel like you are ready for some behind the scenes details, this book will amaze you. If you enjoy comparisons of the recent past (World War II) to the distant past (the Peloponnesian War), you will find those comparisons here.
In short, this book is a great contribution by one of our finest historians. And this book is absolutely vital to add to your library and reading list for understanding the Second World War.
July 20, 2019
Magnificent overview of the global policies, tactics and economics that shaped the conduct of the war, for both the Axis and Allies. Unique in the sense that it does not craft a chronological narrative, but rather describes the various 'fronts' that inevitable led to different policies in which - at the end - the Allies were better than the Axis. For the World War 2 buff, this book might offer some new perspectives.
March 11, 2019
I really like Victor Davis Hanson a lot. I enjoy his columns and think that he is a very savvy scholar and political observer. This book, however, was a bit of a disappointment to me. It's not a badly written book by any means, but it just failed to really capture my imagination. Given Mr. Hanson's reputation, I was expecting, or at least hoping for, some small tidbit of new information. I suppose some seventy plus years after the war's end that is not really to be expected so I can't really fault him for that.
Hanson's style is very much like that of his columns, and it took me quite some time to get used to it. It works better for short columns than it does for a 600 page book. He certainly knows his history; I found very few errors in the book.
The subject of the book is really why the Allies won and the Axis lost. Anyone who has read a lot about the war already knows this. He goes into some detail about various weapons systems, but the book really is a large scale view of various aspects of the war including air, sea, land, leadership and the cost of the war in lives and treasure. It did become repetitive at times.
This is a good book and I am not sorry that I read it even though I have read better.
Hanson's style is very much like that of his columns, and it took me quite some time to get used to it. It works better for short columns than it does for a 600 page book. He certainly knows his history; I found very few errors in the book.
The subject of the book is really why the Allies won and the Axis lost. Anyone who has read a lot about the war already knows this. He goes into some detail about various weapons systems, but the book really is a large scale view of various aspects of the war including air, sea, land, leadership and the cost of the war in lives and treasure. It did become repetitive at times.
This is a good book and I am not sorry that I read it even though I have read better.
November 21, 2017
Disappointing, especially compared to Hanson's work on the classical world. (This book has too many classical references, betraying a certain amount of authorial anxiety) It's not really a history but rather a congratulatory, triumphal retrospective on the Allies' victory that we know occurred. It's organized by topic (air, sea, infantry, armor etc) and each chapter follows the same pattern of a slow allied start and eventual application of overwhelming industrial expansion to weapon production and increased skill in applying force. There is a lot of repetition since the chronology is continually re-run. there's a tendency toward weapons geekery as technology evolves: the genealogy of tank evolution is very fine grained for instance. Hanson's bloodless narrative congratulating the allies for their conduct of the war actually drains the allied victory of its stupendous achievement. The Axis may have failed but they had a hell of a violent run before the tide turned and even when they were getting battered. Hanson disparages their leadership because they lost and doesn't seem to understand Hitler at all: he had to go east. His ideology demanded it even if he would lose the war.
Also a minor point but Hanson several times makes the error that Churchill was voted out of office in 1945 as a ungrateful nation turned on him. As a parliamentary democracy, his party was voted out. Not least because the war changed everything including what the people who fought it demanded from their leaders.
Also a minor point but Hanson several times makes the error that Churchill was voted out of office in 1945 as a ungrateful nation turned on him. As a parliamentary democracy, his party was voted out. Not least because the war changed everything including what the people who fought it demanded from their leaders.
February 8, 2019
I held this heavy book in my hands and in my spirit the last three months. The numbers are numbing. 65,000,000 died because of this mammoth calamity. The Russian dead at Leningrad alone were four times greater than the death toll of all Americans during the entire war.
While I've read dozens of narratives of WWII describing what happened, this is the most comprehensive examination of causes I've encountered. Hanson's analysis comes from his study of post-war material from the six major belligerents (Axis: Germany, Japan, Italy; Allies: Britain, Soviet Union, America).
Organized into seven sections — IDEAS, AIR, WATER, EARTH, FIRE, PEOPLE, and ENDS — it is written with the assumption of reader familiarity with the battles and combatants. In that sense it is advanced reading, not something I would recommend to a typical high school student.
In the preface, Hanson writes: World War II exhausted superlatives. I have only one superlative for this masterpiece: the best book I've read on WWII.
While I've read dozens of narratives of WWII describing what happened, this is the most comprehensive examination of causes I've encountered. Hanson's analysis comes from his study of post-war material from the six major belligerents (Axis: Germany, Japan, Italy; Allies: Britain, Soviet Union, America).
Organized into seven sections — IDEAS, AIR, WATER, EARTH, FIRE, PEOPLE, and ENDS — it is written with the assumption of reader familiarity with the battles and combatants. In that sense it is advanced reading, not something I would recommend to a typical high school student.
In the preface, Hanson writes: World War II exhausted superlatives. I have only one superlative for this masterpiece: the best book I've read on WWII.
September 14, 2021
Victor Davis Hanson is the greatest living military historian and this book is further evidence of that. The book is not a history of World War II. In fact, the book assumes the reader is extremely knowledgeable about the war. Rather, it is an analysis of the war, the why and the how of it, the strategy, the decisions by both sides, both those that were wise and those that were folly. In my opinion it is a brilliant analysis and sets forth a clear military and political understanding of the war and the more than 75 years of its aftermath.
August 26, 2019
DNF @ 22%
4 stars and a DNF, you say? Yes!
This is a fascinating book! There's simply so much information to digest in this book that listening to it doesn't do it any justice.
Victor Davis Hanson is an exceptional historian and writer, and he has the added ability to see long-term consequences of decisions, both good and bad, all the way to modern times. I'm going to pick this up again soon, but as a written book instead.
4 stars and a DNF, you say? Yes!
This is a fascinating book! There's simply so much information to digest in this book that listening to it doesn't do it any justice.
Victor Davis Hanson is an exceptional historian and writer, and he has the added ability to see long-term consequences of decisions, both good and bad, all the way to modern times. I'm going to pick this up again soon, but as a written book instead.
November 19, 2017
The best non-fiction book I have read about W.W. II.
January 24, 2021
Victor Davis Hanson has written many books of military history. The Second World Wars may be his most ambitious. He writes a deep, thorough analysis of WWII without describing the military operations themselves. It's not a narrative but is, instead, an honest, open-eyed appraisal of how military operations during the war were conducted. It analyzes what men and machines, plans and objectives achieved as opposed to what was expected. As the title promises, Hanson brings his many years of study, especially that rooted in organized warfare's ancient beginnings, to bear on a weighty examination of how the war was fought and why what happened happened.
He considers all the components of the war, the men and machines and how they were used and with what effectiveness. The war saw the 1st extensive use of airpower, expanded beyond its role in supporting ground operations to include destroying enemy materiel and his ability to produce more. The war was marked by the huge navies involved and by many amphibious invasions. They were both critical strengths in the Allied victory. The infantries of every major participant is appraised along with their weaponry. Finally he looks at the leadership of the major belligerents, political and military. This may be the book's most interesting section. The last part, "Ends," tries to sum up exactly what resulted longterm from the war and why. Because it lacks real, fresh insight, I think this may be the weakest part of the book. The Allies won by being superior in all aspects of modern warfare, by being able to produce vast numbers of ships and planes with men more superiorly-trained to man them. They won by vastly outnumbering the Axis ground forces and by supporting the Allied units with the equipment needed to overwhelm them. Mobility was a key element, the ability to move substantial military forces and the necessary logistical support where they were needed. A major reason for the success of all this, of course, was America's production capacity which met most Allied equipment needs: weapons, ships, planes, aviation fuel, and all the goods to support the men using them.
Hanson uses analogy and example to bring perspective to the war's events. Most are from the time of classical Greece, as when he discusses the qualities of leadership and statesmanship during the period 1939-45 compared to the Greeks of the Peloponnesian War, 431-404 BC, or when he points out the German hubristic tragedy at Stalingrad resembles the Athenian campaign in Sicily in 415-413. Hanson's knowledge and scope of research, as always, is impressive. I've enjoyed reading several of his books but found this to be a bit tedious, too often giving way to the litanies of numbers available to him: types of planes, production statistics, the immense tallies of the dead, the steady repetition of the fact the Russian T-34 was the war's most dependable tank.
He considers all the components of the war, the men and machines and how they were used and with what effectiveness. The war saw the 1st extensive use of airpower, expanded beyond its role in supporting ground operations to include destroying enemy materiel and his ability to produce more. The war was marked by the huge navies involved and by many amphibious invasions. They were both critical strengths in the Allied victory. The infantries of every major participant is appraised along with their weaponry. Finally he looks at the leadership of the major belligerents, political and military. This may be the book's most interesting section. The last part, "Ends," tries to sum up exactly what resulted longterm from the war and why. Because it lacks real, fresh insight, I think this may be the weakest part of the book. The Allies won by being superior in all aspects of modern warfare, by being able to produce vast numbers of ships and planes with men more superiorly-trained to man them. They won by vastly outnumbering the Axis ground forces and by supporting the Allied units with the equipment needed to overwhelm them. Mobility was a key element, the ability to move substantial military forces and the necessary logistical support where they were needed. A major reason for the success of all this, of course, was America's production capacity which met most Allied equipment needs: weapons, ships, planes, aviation fuel, and all the goods to support the men using them.
Hanson uses analogy and example to bring perspective to the war's events. Most are from the time of classical Greece, as when he discusses the qualities of leadership and statesmanship during the period 1939-45 compared to the Greeks of the Peloponnesian War, 431-404 BC, or when he points out the German hubristic tragedy at Stalingrad resembles the Athenian campaign in Sicily in 415-413. Hanson's knowledge and scope of research, as always, is impressive. I've enjoyed reading several of his books but found this to be a bit tedious, too often giving way to the litanies of numbers available to him: types of planes, production statistics, the immense tallies of the dead, the steady repetition of the fact the Russian T-34 was the war's most dependable tank.
August 7, 2018
Astonishingly detailed analysis of World War II -- goes far beyond the basic facts into fascinating cause and effect discussions of weapons, industry, and political decision making. The connections the author makes with ancient, medieval, and Napoleonic warfare are as completely engrossing as they are illuminating. There's just no one else who can write history like Victor Davis Hanson!
April 7, 2018
A profoundly sobering work of military history. Unlike the other works of military
history I read this year Hanson is not concerned with the details of battles but with an overarching strategic analysis that deals with why the Allies won and the Axis lost. There’s some shocking statistics - 27,000 people died every minute from September 1939 to August 1945. There is also a fascinating unravelling of the mistakes the Axis made. For example, Hitler conquered all those European countries and then had to post troops to keep them thus depriving the army of troops needed for the Eastern Front. (2017)
history I read this year Hanson is not concerned with the details of battles but with an overarching strategic analysis that deals with why the Allies won and the Axis lost. There’s some shocking statistics - 27,000 people died every minute from September 1939 to August 1945. There is also a fascinating unravelling of the mistakes the Axis made. For example, Hitler conquered all those European countries and then had to post troops to keep them thus depriving the army of troops needed for the Eastern Front. (2017)
May 9, 2018
the best book about WW2 I've read (from quite a lot such)
January 12, 2024
“The Second World Wars” is an excellent if unsentimental overview of what the author calls the “first global conflict.” Hanson views the conflict through the lens of the logistics and strategic operations of the war which determined the outcome. This is not a book about the individual heroics of Allied soldiers or tragic human rights atrocities of the Axis Powers. Of course, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this approach; however, the book can come across as cold when it reduces the horrors of World War II such as the atomic bombings or Holocaust to statistics to support the author’s thesis.
Judging the book on what it does set out to do, however, shows that it is a meticulously researched analysis of how the means and methods of war determines the outcome. Instead of opting for a traditional chronological approach to depicting the war, Hanson divides the book into seven parts, each covering a different aspect of the war such as air power, sea power, etc. This is a refreshing take on what can only be described as the well-trodden ground of WW2 history books.
What I appreciate most about this book is how thoroughly it dispels the myth of early war Axis military supremacy. Through careful examination, Hanson reveals that fearsome forces such as the German tank corps or Japanese navy were in fact paper tigers consisting of outdated equipment that succeeded primarily on the basis of unprovoked attacks on disorganized neighbors. Once war was declared on resource rich, industrialized nations like the United States, Great Britain, and USSR, the war was already lost for Germany and Japan purely from a logistical perspective.
Overall, I would recommend this book to military history buffs but not to a general audience who isn’t already acquainted with the history of World War II. The non-chronological approach of the book will make it difficult if not inaccessible to a newcomer. However, If you’re looking to acquire a deeper understanding of the logistics and operations of the war, it does not get much better than this.
P.S. I read this book through a combination of a physical copy and the unabridged audiobook version. The audiobook narrator had a distracting habit of taking sharp breaths at the end of passages which was unpleasant to the listening experience. While normally I enjoy audio versions just as much as physical copies, in this case I would recommend a written version over the audio.
Judging the book on what it does set out to do, however, shows that it is a meticulously researched analysis of how the means and methods of war determines the outcome. Instead of opting for a traditional chronological approach to depicting the war, Hanson divides the book into seven parts, each covering a different aspect of the war such as air power, sea power, etc. This is a refreshing take on what can only be described as the well-trodden ground of WW2 history books.
What I appreciate most about this book is how thoroughly it dispels the myth of early war Axis military supremacy. Through careful examination, Hanson reveals that fearsome forces such as the German tank corps or Japanese navy were in fact paper tigers consisting of outdated equipment that succeeded primarily on the basis of unprovoked attacks on disorganized neighbors. Once war was declared on resource rich, industrialized nations like the United States, Great Britain, and USSR, the war was already lost for Germany and Japan purely from a logistical perspective.
Overall, I would recommend this book to military history buffs but not to a general audience who isn’t already acquainted with the history of World War II. The non-chronological approach of the book will make it difficult if not inaccessible to a newcomer. However, If you’re looking to acquire a deeper understanding of the logistics and operations of the war, it does not get much better than this.
P.S. I read this book through a combination of a physical copy and the unabridged audiobook version. The audiobook narrator had a distracting habit of taking sharp breaths at the end of passages which was unpleasant to the listening experience. While normally I enjoy audio versions just as much as physical copies, in this case I would recommend a written version over the audio.
September 7, 2024
A helpful, insightful, and comprehensive examination of the history of the Second World War that provides, in many ways, a more honest and realistic assessment of the leaders and end results and consequences of the war than many other volumes I’ve read previously. Highly recommended to all WWII history buffs, as well as those that desire a better understanding of the contours of our world as it exists today.
August 27, 2024
A gold standard in WW2 history. In contrast to other WW2 books which provide a narrative of the conflict, this work goes deep into the specifics of the war. Hanson investigates and describes just about all important factors which are neatly broken down into categories such as air, water, land, industrial production, generals, admirals, air marshals and the interrelationships of the axis and allies.
Hanson also emphasises on the lesser known components of the war such as the role of the commonwealth nations, which only adds to the already well balanced description of the war provided. The details provided include numbers of ships of nations at the start and end of the war, airplane production, logistics and more. The comparison between the technologies of the conflicting nations and how this changed throughout the war, is helpful in dispelling generalisations of all conflicting parties. This precise and numerical technique really paints a concrete a picture of the conflict. The only thing missing was a deep dive on the intelligence agencies of the nations but I suppose that is a story for another time!
Hanson also emphasises on the lesser known components of the war such as the role of the commonwealth nations, which only adds to the already well balanced description of the war provided. The details provided include numbers of ships of nations at the start and end of the war, airplane production, logistics and more. The comparison between the technologies of the conflicting nations and how this changed throughout the war, is helpful in dispelling generalisations of all conflicting parties. This precise and numerical technique really paints a concrete a picture of the conflict. The only thing missing was a deep dive on the intelligence agencies of the nations but I suppose that is a story for another time!
April 5, 2018
After reading several histories on the breadth of World War II and many, many more on specific aspects of the conflict, I have to agree with author Hanson’s observation that it exhausts superlatives. The sheer statistics become mind-numbing, if not incomprehensible. The viciousness, especially in its final months, shock. That is become the combatants knew what current leaders and military personnel seem not to know, “in any existential war, only the side that has the ability to destroy the homeland of the other wins.”
WWII is one of the few major wars where the losing side killed more soldiers than the winners, and where far more civilians perished than soldiers. It sparked a powder keg of warped values where society, politics and militarism became conveniently and confusingly mixed, “National Socialism was to be a force multiplier of Prussian militarism.” Fascism was to return Italy to the glory of the Roman Empire and Japan’s Bushido was to prove superiority over other nations and races in every sense of the word.
These ideologies marked a stark change from the old boys’ school of deliberate diplomacy. The psychology and motivations of new leaders along with modes of action and industrial might signaled this would not be a static or contained war. It was less about pride and flag and more about resource starved and seemingly threatened Axis powers lashing out. This was a sea-change to the status quo. Consider what the English ambassador to France confessed in 1930, “We English, after the war (First World War), made two mistakes: we believed the French, because they had been victorious, had become Germans, and we believed the Germans, through some mysterious transmutation, had become the Englishmen.”
This was a war of manufacturing, supply, communication and logistics. Men and materiel could be moved like never before. Technology gave man new ways to fight and to arm ever larger militaries, “A Jeep or tank in 1945 looked more like its counterpart in 2016 than in 1918.” Hitler was said to remark that he would never have invaded the Soviet Union had he known of Stalin’s tank production capabilities.
The Nazis created ever more models or tank and airplane while the Allied powers accepted deficiencies in design and, instead, opted for massive standardized output. The Sherman and the T34 flooded battlefields. Hanson writes a beautiful and insightful line, “We often forget that the Third Reich was postmodern in creative genius but premodern in actual implementation and operations.” In other words, the Axis powers should have won in theory.
In reality, the Allied nations economic output created larger, better equipped militaries. It was dramatically lopsided. I remember reading elsewhere that for every Japanese soldier there was one man behind supporting him. For every American soldier in the Pacific theater, there were 12-14 men. Those men being in logistics, motor pool, communications, mess tent, etc.
Hanson makes this point time again. That is, how numbers of men and materiel overwhelmed. The book gets granular, right down to rate of fire of various machine guns. This is where his style of research, analysis, and writing differ from a Ryan or Beevor who lean more to narrative and individualized stories. Hanson’s work is more academic but not dry. It substantiates by offering more substance. That makes it a more involved read.
One cool bit comes in the form of an alternative history musing. Could the Axis have hunkered down mid-war, held the won territory and mobilize conquered assets to wage a different war? I will not share the conclusion as this is a fascinating sub-topic.
Hanson succinctly summarizes, “The Allies learned to fight like the Axis; the Axis never learned to produce like the Allies.” This devastatingly cruel conflict could have been avoided, claims the author, if not for “British appeasement, American isolationism, and Russian collaboration.” I enthusiastically recommend this work.
WWII is one of the few major wars where the losing side killed more soldiers than the winners, and where far more civilians perished than soldiers. It sparked a powder keg of warped values where society, politics and militarism became conveniently and confusingly mixed, “National Socialism was to be a force multiplier of Prussian militarism.” Fascism was to return Italy to the glory of the Roman Empire and Japan’s Bushido was to prove superiority over other nations and races in every sense of the word.
These ideologies marked a stark change from the old boys’ school of deliberate diplomacy. The psychology and motivations of new leaders along with modes of action and industrial might signaled this would not be a static or contained war. It was less about pride and flag and more about resource starved and seemingly threatened Axis powers lashing out. This was a sea-change to the status quo. Consider what the English ambassador to France confessed in 1930, “We English, after the war (First World War), made two mistakes: we believed the French, because they had been victorious, had become Germans, and we believed the Germans, through some mysterious transmutation, had become the Englishmen.”
This was a war of manufacturing, supply, communication and logistics. Men and materiel could be moved like never before. Technology gave man new ways to fight and to arm ever larger militaries, “A Jeep or tank in 1945 looked more like its counterpart in 2016 than in 1918.” Hitler was said to remark that he would never have invaded the Soviet Union had he known of Stalin’s tank production capabilities.
The Nazis created ever more models or tank and airplane while the Allied powers accepted deficiencies in design and, instead, opted for massive standardized output. The Sherman and the T34 flooded battlefields. Hanson writes a beautiful and insightful line, “We often forget that the Third Reich was postmodern in creative genius but premodern in actual implementation and operations.” In other words, the Axis powers should have won in theory.
In reality, the Allied nations economic output created larger, better equipped militaries. It was dramatically lopsided. I remember reading elsewhere that for every Japanese soldier there was one man behind supporting him. For every American soldier in the Pacific theater, there were 12-14 men. Those men being in logistics, motor pool, communications, mess tent, etc.
Hanson makes this point time again. That is, how numbers of men and materiel overwhelmed. The book gets granular, right down to rate of fire of various machine guns. This is where his style of research, analysis, and writing differ from a Ryan or Beevor who lean more to narrative and individualized stories. Hanson’s work is more academic but not dry. It substantiates by offering more substance. That makes it a more involved read.
One cool bit comes in the form of an alternative history musing. Could the Axis have hunkered down mid-war, held the won territory and mobilize conquered assets to wage a different war? I will not share the conclusion as this is a fascinating sub-topic.
Hanson succinctly summarizes, “The Allies learned to fight like the Axis; the Axis never learned to produce like the Allies.” This devastatingly cruel conflict could have been avoided, claims the author, if not for “British appeasement, American isolationism, and Russian collaboration.” I enthusiastically recommend this work.
February 5, 2018
This is a truly fine book. I’ve even written to the author to congratulate him.
Anyone who tries to write a book summarizing a subject as vast as WWII faces a problem of organization. Pure chronology won’t work, but dividing it up into subtopics, such as by region, by military service, or any other way, creates problems. Hanson has addressed the problem by combining subject matters with a partly chronological account. The result is more analysis then one usually sees in dry military history, but there is still a narrative element that at times is quite gripping.
Conclusions:
(1) The axis powers were crazy to do some of the things they did, such as a tech in the United States should I could not possibly be afraid, Hitler declare war on the US when he had no need to do so, the invasion of Russia with the resources for a long war.
(2) The greatest sacrifices and the greatest contribution to the Allied victory was by the Soviet union, although it was vastly helped, most by American industrial production, and by the opening of France in north Africa, Italy, strategic bombing, and ultimately Normandy.
(3) The central factors in the Allied victory were industrial production and logistics. The German soldier was probably superior to the Western or not by much, but Germany was completely out of produced by the US, Britain, and Russia. This point back to the point about the folly of the axis initiation and conduct of the war. A company in economic analysis would have showed that a general war between the axis in the west and Russia could only end in defeat.
Not to be completed the effusive in my prayers, I might add that the weakest part of the book was the discussion of the military leadership of the various combatants. This will reduce mostly to lists of command is that Hanson filter either exceptionally good or exceptionally bad. For reasons of space, he can’t explain why. I think concentrating on a couple of examples from each combatant, with much more detail, might have improved this section.
All in all, however, a fine book, which I highly recommend.
Anyone who tries to write a book summarizing a subject as vast as WWII faces a problem of organization. Pure chronology won’t work, but dividing it up into subtopics, such as by region, by military service, or any other way, creates problems. Hanson has addressed the problem by combining subject matters with a partly chronological account. The result is more analysis then one usually sees in dry military history, but there is still a narrative element that at times is quite gripping.
Conclusions:
(1) The axis powers were crazy to do some of the things they did, such as a tech in the United States should I could not possibly be afraid, Hitler declare war on the US when he had no need to do so, the invasion of Russia with the resources for a long war.
(2) The greatest sacrifices and the greatest contribution to the Allied victory was by the Soviet union, although it was vastly helped, most by American industrial production, and by the opening of France in north Africa, Italy, strategic bombing, and ultimately Normandy.
(3) The central factors in the Allied victory were industrial production and logistics. The German soldier was probably superior to the Western or not by much, but Germany was completely out of produced by the US, Britain, and Russia. This point back to the point about the folly of the axis initiation and conduct of the war. A company in economic analysis would have showed that a general war between the axis in the west and Russia could only end in defeat.
Not to be completed the effusive in my prayers, I might add that the weakest part of the book was the discussion of the military leadership of the various combatants. This will reduce mostly to lists of command is that Hanson filter either exceptionally good or exceptionally bad. For reasons of space, he can’t explain why. I think concentrating on a couple of examples from each combatant, with much more detail, might have improved this section.
All in all, however, a fine book, which I highly recommend.
April 13, 2021
Historical determinism wrapped in a thematic structure inside too many classical references.
Hanson's 2017 "The Second World Wars" eschews a chronological narrative and instead covers WWII in a thematic manner, focusing on air, land, seapower, soldier caliber, generalship, and leadership styles. It's an interesting approach that mostly works especially if you wanted an overview of a particular topic rather than having to search for X or Y battle.
The major problems are twofold however. First, Hanson takes a very deterministic view towards the whole endeavor. Despite early Axis victories in both Europe and the Pacific, Hanson is very much of the "the Allies were always going to win" -- and while each section supports this premise, the real main piece of evidence is that the Allies *did* win. Hanson takes this as a given whereas a more skeptical reader might think "maybe not?"
This approach to history is very much in line with treating every decision by Lincoln during the Civil War as "good" or at least not fatal but it begs the question, did the Allies (or Lincoln) win because of these various decisions/ actions or *in spite* of them? Hanson can always point to the fact the Allies won/Axis lost but it rings a little hollow and generally fails to persuade over the course of the book.
Hanson also has an annoying habit of peppering in far too many largely irrelevant classical references in the book. While I get that he is primarily a Greek military historian, I'm not sure references to Platea or Salamis are the MOST RELEVANT citations to make in discussing air power or mechanized infantry. Granted, he does include other, slightly more contemporary references, but it's about an 80/20 split. I saw another review describe this as "authorial anxiety" and the term fits. Hanson knows what he knows (classical Greek warfare) and that's used to bolster his WWII theories (just a bit too much though).
All that said, this is a well researched and generally well argued history of WWII that takes a novel approach in how it presents information.
Hanson's 2017 "The Second World Wars" eschews a chronological narrative and instead covers WWII in a thematic manner, focusing on air, land, seapower, soldier caliber, generalship, and leadership styles. It's an interesting approach that mostly works especially if you wanted an overview of a particular topic rather than having to search for X or Y battle.
The major problems are twofold however. First, Hanson takes a very deterministic view towards the whole endeavor. Despite early Axis victories in both Europe and the Pacific, Hanson is very much of the "the Allies were always going to win" -- and while each section supports this premise, the real main piece of evidence is that the Allies *did* win. Hanson takes this as a given whereas a more skeptical reader might think "maybe not?"
This approach to history is very much in line with treating every decision by Lincoln during the Civil War as "good" or at least not fatal but it begs the question, did the Allies (or Lincoln) win because of these various decisions/ actions or *in spite* of them? Hanson can always point to the fact the Allies won/Axis lost but it rings a little hollow and generally fails to persuade over the course of the book.
Hanson also has an annoying habit of peppering in far too many largely irrelevant classical references in the book. While I get that he is primarily a Greek military historian, I'm not sure references to Platea or Salamis are the MOST RELEVANT citations to make in discussing air power or mechanized infantry. Granted, he does include other, slightly more contemporary references, but it's about an 80/20 split. I saw another review describe this as "authorial anxiety" and the term fits. Hanson knows what he knows (classical Greek warfare) and that's used to bolster his WWII theories (just a bit too much though).
All that said, this is a well researched and generally well argued history of WWII that takes a novel approach in how it presents information.
May 3, 2022
Excellent. Hanson analyzes WW2 from more of a strategic perspective (industrial capacity, population, ideology, technology, whether the particular belligerent had learned the lessons of modern warfare, logistical capability, the officer corp, training, etc.) than tactical, although he examines the tactical results of those perspectives as well. It's a very long book, but it held my attention throughout.
February 11, 2022
Good overview by topics instead of time period about WW2. The weak points is that is use the brute force argument that the Axis was doomed to lose and ignore the mistakes of the Allies and give too much praise to the incomptetent soviet leadership who lost up to 40 millions of its citizen against the nazis.
December 25, 2020
Provides some interesting insights (very few) but otherwise poorly written and lacks focus or flow. Most analyses are superficial and shallow and do not take all complicated factors into consideration.
June 16, 2018
The Second World Wars — How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won
©2017 Victor Davis Hanson
a Book Report by Ron Housley
How did we learn about World War II in my generation, we who grew up in the 1950s? We sat through “Victory At Sea” on 1950s black-&-white TV, the war set to snappy Richard Rodgers melodies. We had Samuel Eliot Morrison’s tedious historical accounting of the war at sea, battle by battle. We had dinner-table conversations at home about the War and we had a large assortment of Hollywood offerings. And there was little more until the History Channel burst upon the scene decades later with a unending litany of World War II reporting, from every imaginable perspective --- well, so it seemed.
Not until Victor Davis Hanson did it occur to me that perspective was precisely what had been missing from all those other accounts. What we had before VDH amounted to dubious narratives along with never-ending examinations of isolated elements of the War.
There was little attempt to draw larger lessons in all these WW2 “histories;” there was little attempt to see the broad, centuries-long continuity wherein the puzzle-piece of World War II was to fit. And on top of that there had developed some accepted narratives about the War — like WW2 got us out of the Great Depression; like Hitler or Japan could actually have won; like it was in American self-interest to cooperate with Stalin; like Hitler’s holocaust being the worst mass-murder in history; like FDR provoked Japan into Pearl Harbor with his oil embargo — narratives riddled with misconception.
I’m not sure that I could have followed VDH’s contribution to WW2 history without a previously acquired corpus of the war’s essential parts. But for me, this current volume is the perfect summary and epilog to a lifetime immersion in WW2 facts.
THE INSIGHTS
After all these decades of documentaries and Hollywood depictions, I came away with five important new insights as the result of opening my eyes to Hanson’s new book.
[1]: INSIGHT ABOUT WHY THE AXIS LOST THE WAR
Why is it so preposterous to contend that Hitler and Tojo could have won, “if only…?” It turns out that there were no “if onlys” about it:
The Axis powers were unable to win (a)because of their own misguided strategic decisions, but mostly (b)because their chosen enemy was bigger and more powerful by nearly every metric: more people, more draftable citizens, more productive capacity, more technological inventiveness, all energized by a sense of righteous indignation that they had been surprise attacked.
a) no Axis power had a four-engine, long-range bomber to attack Detroit, or to cross the Urals to attack Soviet factories, or to even reach Manchester or Liverpool. Only the Allies had these bombers
b) no Axis power had a blue water Navy capable of challenging the Royal Navy at sea
c) no Axis power had aircraft carries that could support an attack on America’s west coast, or even support an attack on Suez
d) Hitler lorded over 170-million people and proposed to wage a war on an Allied total exceeding 400-million.
e) I was brought up to understand that the Germans and Japanese were “military machines,” much to be feared. But these countries were never able to invade or conquer America, to destroy its industrial strength (unlike today’s enemies with nuclear ICBMs).
Hitler’s entire plan was based on two arrogant presumptions: (1) that if he could successfully surprise-attack poorly defended border states, that he could therefore dominate over well-fortified, well-supplied and well-armed major powers further away from home base; and (2)that Britain would continue its appeasement and that the US would continue its isolationism.
But pre-emptive war against militarily weak neighbors ought not to have led a sane dictator to conclude that much stronger and larger nations could be similarly dispatched.
British appeasement and US isolationism had the effect of destroying the deterrence that the two powers should have projected, if they had wanted to stop Hitler in the first place. Let that be a lesson for the ages; let that be a lesson for today: when a country “makes nice” with an aggressive enemy (think: Nazi Germany; Iran; North Korea), the aggressive enemy is encouraged to wage war. The next Pearl Harbor could very well be an EMP attack destroying an entire national power grid.
The Axis powers, in short, declared war on the U.S. without any plan to actually win. They waged war totally unprepared; they had no idea of how to destroy their enemy’s ability to make war.
[2]: INSIGHT ABOUT ATOMIC BOMB CONTROVERSY
Even a casual reading of VDH puts to rest once and for all the decades-long contention that America’s use of the atomic bomb may have been a mistake, or even “immoral.”
When a country is forced to fight for its life in a struggle launched and sustained by ruthless barbarians, it is unseemly to condemn the victims for waging too vigorous a defense. All moral blame for civilian deaths, even if any were remotely innocent, lies entirely with the aggressor who initiated military force in the first place.
VDH reminds us that the firebombing of Tokyo was far more destructive of life and property than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
It has always struck me odd that an argument would ever be framed that moral judgments vary according to which method of killing is employed. Stop it!
[3]: INSIGHT ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF DEATH
Here are seven factual points, all knowable to me, but which I did NOT know until VDH’s quietly pointed them out.
(a): This is the first time anyone had done the arithmetic for me to divide the total war deaths by the number of war days and then report that WW2 killed over 27,000 people per day, every day, for over 6 years(!).
Somehow, 60-million deaths was just a number; but 27,000 deaths per day seemed more real. Contrast that to the 3-day long Battle of Gettysburg which left a total dead of only 3,155.
(b): I didn’t know that the losing side (the Axis) killed, or starved to death, 80% of the dead in WW2
(c): Hitler is notoriously blamed for the death of 6-million Jews in the holocaust; but contrast that with the 30-million Eastern Europeans killed on the Russian front.
(d): Of the 60-million WW2 deaths, nearly 80% were civilians
(e): The March 9, 1945 napalm attack on Tokyo was the single most destructive 24 hour period in military history; yet, the atomic bomb attacks of August 1945 receive all the “moral” condemnations.
(f): There were 3 Great Holocausts in the 20th century: 1- Hitler killed 6-million Jews; 2- Stalin killed 10-million (prior to 1938); 3- Mao killed 40-70-million (1946-1970s)
These 3 great leaders exterminated most of these off the battlefield; note that their totals are more than the 60-million killed in WW2 itself.
(g): 50% of Allied bomber crews were killed (6,000 bombers and 40,000 airmen lost)
[4]: INSIGHT ABOUT WHY THE ALLIES WON
Throughout my years, I have been told that the Allies beat the Axis because the Allies were morally superior.
VDH tells us that the real reasons the Allies won include (a)the Allies had larger industrial capacity; (b)America produced more implements of war than all other combatants combined; (c)the Allies had “righteous indignation” over having been surprise attacked; (d)the Allies developed cryptological excellence and trusted one another; (e)the Axis were duplicitous with one another.
It turns out that the Allies erred on the side of serviceability and practicality and durability of its war implements, whereas the axis erred on the side of “gigantism:” building huge rail guns with limited use; building huge battleships with limited use; building huge tanks with limited use.
Sealing the explanation for the Allied victories are factors such as (a)Hitler never grasped that he had neither the airpower nor the navy to overwhelm the UK; (b)Hitler had no idea of Soviet industrial capacity; (c)Hitler and Mussolini knew combat, but had little capacity to administer a Master war effort.
[5]: INTERESTING FACTOIDS THAT I HADN’T KNOWN
___I did not know that the developing and building the B-29 was bigger than the entire Manhattan Project.
___I did not know that the Japanese were killing 20,000 per day when the decision was made to fire-bomb Tokyo. It probably would not have been more humane to allow the killing spree to continue.
___I did not know that Curtis LeMay was prepared to firebomb all of Japan. It’s not that the atomic bomb saved American lives, it’s that the atomic bomb saved all of Japan from being firebombed into oblivion.
___And much more!
So now that I’ve digested Victor Davis Hanson’s perspective on the War, I have a better sense about the moral propriety of the Dresden fire bombing, of the Tokyo fire bombing, of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing. These bombings were the free nations of the world responding to a new phenomenon: an industrial statist regime willing to systematically butcher tens of millions of people.
I have a better grasp of how strong nations lose the power of deterrence when they disengage, or when they appease a weaker enemy, or embrace Just War Theory’s call for proportionality.
I see with greater clarity how the goal of “a lasting peace” absolutely requires a democratic victor to occupy a statist enemy’s homeland. (Once Germany and Japan were occupied, only then was the ground prepared for a lasting peace and cooperation with the former enemy — unlike what happened at the end of World War I.)
What I do not understand is why none of these lessons or insights are taught today in the government schools, nor even in the military academies. And so it worries me that the stage is being set to repeat the whole thing over again.
WW2 was the biggest war ever in history; it was the most costly war ever in history. The History Channel, and even the success of Hanson’s new book, confirms that WW2 still has a hold on the American imagination. Yet we are not prepared to learn its lessons as we go forth into the future.
Unknown in the ranks of today’s generation is that the only way to end a war and to have lasting peace afterward is to utterly crush the enemy’s will to fight, and that necessitates taking the war to the homeland of the enemy to destroy his means of waging war. Today’s generation appears to favor making accommodations, deals, and appeasements.
In the final analysis, America was good in what it did in WW2, heroic. Elsewise, there would have been a world-wide holocaust.
My hope is that some of today’s generation might prepare for our security armed with just some of the lessons readily available from even a cursory study of Hanson’s “The Second World Wars.” — RWH
©2017 Victor Davis Hanson
a Book Report by Ron Housley
How did we learn about World War II in my generation, we who grew up in the 1950s? We sat through “Victory At Sea” on 1950s black-&-white TV, the war set to snappy Richard Rodgers melodies. We had Samuel Eliot Morrison’s tedious historical accounting of the war at sea, battle by battle. We had dinner-table conversations at home about the War and we had a large assortment of Hollywood offerings. And there was little more until the History Channel burst upon the scene decades later with a unending litany of World War II reporting, from every imaginable perspective --- well, so it seemed.
Not until Victor Davis Hanson did it occur to me that perspective was precisely what had been missing from all those other accounts. What we had before VDH amounted to dubious narratives along with never-ending examinations of isolated elements of the War.
There was little attempt to draw larger lessons in all these WW2 “histories;” there was little attempt to see the broad, centuries-long continuity wherein the puzzle-piece of World War II was to fit. And on top of that there had developed some accepted narratives about the War — like WW2 got us out of the Great Depression; like Hitler or Japan could actually have won; like it was in American self-interest to cooperate with Stalin; like Hitler’s holocaust being the worst mass-murder in history; like FDR provoked Japan into Pearl Harbor with his oil embargo — narratives riddled with misconception.
I’m not sure that I could have followed VDH’s contribution to WW2 history without a previously acquired corpus of the war’s essential parts. But for me, this current volume is the perfect summary and epilog to a lifetime immersion in WW2 facts.
THE INSIGHTS
After all these decades of documentaries and Hollywood depictions, I came away with five important new insights as the result of opening my eyes to Hanson’s new book.
[1]: INSIGHT ABOUT WHY THE AXIS LOST THE WAR
Why is it so preposterous to contend that Hitler and Tojo could have won, “if only…?” It turns out that there were no “if onlys” about it:
The Axis powers were unable to win (a)because of their own misguided strategic decisions, but mostly (b)because their chosen enemy was bigger and more powerful by nearly every metric: more people, more draftable citizens, more productive capacity, more technological inventiveness, all energized by a sense of righteous indignation that they had been surprise attacked.
a) no Axis power had a four-engine, long-range bomber to attack Detroit, or to cross the Urals to attack Soviet factories, or to even reach Manchester or Liverpool. Only the Allies had these bombers
b) no Axis power had a blue water Navy capable of challenging the Royal Navy at sea
c) no Axis power had aircraft carries that could support an attack on America’s west coast, or even support an attack on Suez
d) Hitler lorded over 170-million people and proposed to wage a war on an Allied total exceeding 400-million.
e) I was brought up to understand that the Germans and Japanese were “military machines,” much to be feared. But these countries were never able to invade or conquer America, to destroy its industrial strength (unlike today’s enemies with nuclear ICBMs).
Hitler’s entire plan was based on two arrogant presumptions: (1) that if he could successfully surprise-attack poorly defended border states, that he could therefore dominate over well-fortified, well-supplied and well-armed major powers further away from home base; and (2)that Britain would continue its appeasement and that the US would continue its isolationism.
But pre-emptive war against militarily weak neighbors ought not to have led a sane dictator to conclude that much stronger and larger nations could be similarly dispatched.
British appeasement and US isolationism had the effect of destroying the deterrence that the two powers should have projected, if they had wanted to stop Hitler in the first place. Let that be a lesson for the ages; let that be a lesson for today: when a country “makes nice” with an aggressive enemy (think: Nazi Germany; Iran; North Korea), the aggressive enemy is encouraged to wage war. The next Pearl Harbor could very well be an EMP attack destroying an entire national power grid.
The Axis powers, in short, declared war on the U.S. without any plan to actually win. They waged war totally unprepared; they had no idea of how to destroy their enemy’s ability to make war.
[2]: INSIGHT ABOUT ATOMIC BOMB CONTROVERSY
Even a casual reading of VDH puts to rest once and for all the decades-long contention that America’s use of the atomic bomb may have been a mistake, or even “immoral.”
When a country is forced to fight for its life in a struggle launched and sustained by ruthless barbarians, it is unseemly to condemn the victims for waging too vigorous a defense. All moral blame for civilian deaths, even if any were remotely innocent, lies entirely with the aggressor who initiated military force in the first place.
VDH reminds us that the firebombing of Tokyo was far more destructive of life and property than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
It has always struck me odd that an argument would ever be framed that moral judgments vary according to which method of killing is employed. Stop it!
[3]: INSIGHT ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF DEATH
Here are seven factual points, all knowable to me, but which I did NOT know until VDH’s quietly pointed them out.
(a): This is the first time anyone had done the arithmetic for me to divide the total war deaths by the number of war days and then report that WW2 killed over 27,000 people per day, every day, for over 6 years(!).
Somehow, 60-million deaths was just a number; but 27,000 deaths per day seemed more real. Contrast that to the 3-day long Battle of Gettysburg which left a total dead of only 3,155.
(b): I didn’t know that the losing side (the Axis) killed, or starved to death, 80% of the dead in WW2
(c): Hitler is notoriously blamed for the death of 6-million Jews in the holocaust; but contrast that with the 30-million Eastern Europeans killed on the Russian front.
(d): Of the 60-million WW2 deaths, nearly 80% were civilians
(e): The March 9, 1945 napalm attack on Tokyo was the single most destructive 24 hour period in military history; yet, the atomic bomb attacks of August 1945 receive all the “moral” condemnations.
(f): There were 3 Great Holocausts in the 20th century: 1- Hitler killed 6-million Jews; 2- Stalin killed 10-million (prior to 1938); 3- Mao killed 40-70-million (1946-1970s)
These 3 great leaders exterminated most of these off the battlefield; note that their totals are more than the 60-million killed in WW2 itself.
(g): 50% of Allied bomber crews were killed (6,000 bombers and 40,000 airmen lost)
[4]: INSIGHT ABOUT WHY THE ALLIES WON
Throughout my years, I have been told that the Allies beat the Axis because the Allies were morally superior.
VDH tells us that the real reasons the Allies won include (a)the Allies had larger industrial capacity; (b)America produced more implements of war than all other combatants combined; (c)the Allies had “righteous indignation” over having been surprise attacked; (d)the Allies developed cryptological excellence and trusted one another; (e)the Axis were duplicitous with one another.
It turns out that the Allies erred on the side of serviceability and practicality and durability of its war implements, whereas the axis erred on the side of “gigantism:” building huge rail guns with limited use; building huge battleships with limited use; building huge tanks with limited use.
Sealing the explanation for the Allied victories are factors such as (a)Hitler never grasped that he had neither the airpower nor the navy to overwhelm the UK; (b)Hitler had no idea of Soviet industrial capacity; (c)Hitler and Mussolini knew combat, but had little capacity to administer a Master war effort.
[5]: INTERESTING FACTOIDS THAT I HADN’T KNOWN
___I did not know that the developing and building the B-29 was bigger than the entire Manhattan Project.
___I did not know that the Japanese were killing 20,000 per day when the decision was made to fire-bomb Tokyo. It probably would not have been more humane to allow the killing spree to continue.
___I did not know that Curtis LeMay was prepared to firebomb all of Japan. It’s not that the atomic bomb saved American lives, it’s that the atomic bomb saved all of Japan from being firebombed into oblivion.
___And much more!
So now that I’ve digested Victor Davis Hanson’s perspective on the War, I have a better sense about the moral propriety of the Dresden fire bombing, of the Tokyo fire bombing, of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing. These bombings were the free nations of the world responding to a new phenomenon: an industrial statist regime willing to systematically butcher tens of millions of people.
I have a better grasp of how strong nations lose the power of deterrence when they disengage, or when they appease a weaker enemy, or embrace Just War Theory’s call for proportionality.
I see with greater clarity how the goal of “a lasting peace” absolutely requires a democratic victor to occupy a statist enemy’s homeland. (Once Germany and Japan were occupied, only then was the ground prepared for a lasting peace and cooperation with the former enemy — unlike what happened at the end of World War I.)
What I do not understand is why none of these lessons or insights are taught today in the government schools, nor even in the military academies. And so it worries me that the stage is being set to repeat the whole thing over again.
WW2 was the biggest war ever in history; it was the most costly war ever in history. The History Channel, and even the success of Hanson’s new book, confirms that WW2 still has a hold on the American imagination. Yet we are not prepared to learn its lessons as we go forth into the future.
Unknown in the ranks of today’s generation is that the only way to end a war and to have lasting peace afterward is to utterly crush the enemy’s will to fight, and that necessitates taking the war to the homeland of the enemy to destroy his means of waging war. Today’s generation appears to favor making accommodations, deals, and appeasements.
In the final analysis, America was good in what it did in WW2, heroic. Elsewise, there would have been a world-wide holocaust.
My hope is that some of today’s generation might prepare for our security armed with just some of the lessons readily available from even a cursory study of Hanson’s “The Second World Wars.” — RWH
July 19, 2019
This was a very readable, good all-around account of pretty much every aspect of World War II, including many elements not touched upon at least in the books I have read. It is not a historical chronology of the war from start to finish, nor does is it a series of biographies, and though it sometimes does delve into the history of different types of weapons it is not that either (with entire sections or series of chapters devoted to topics having nothing to do with weapons technology and development, such as examinations of international politics, economics, or civilian causalities). What it is is a thematic examination of various aspects of the war, the author introducing a topic and examining the causes, courses, consequences, and other aspects of that topic, spending several pages to the better part of a chapter each from the point of view of Italy, Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom (on rarer occasions from the point of view of analyzing this particular aspect or that element of the war from say the Chinese, Yugoslav, Polish, or French points of view, still more rarely analyzing this element or aspect from say a Spanish or Filipino point of view). Sometimes this could get a little repetitive in terms of format and sometimes in material covered but not often (among other things the author stated eloquently and with frequent examples a number of times is that the Axis countries often worked at cross purposes with each other and for their own goals so say discussing Italy would really have extremely little overlap if any with Japan and while the Allies instead often worked together towards the same goal and in the same theater had often vastly different specialties and interests, such a say the Russians specializing in infantry and armor while the Americans might focus more on naval and air elements).
One of the main themes of the book, stated in the preface, is that World War II is unique in the history of warfare in that no other war saw so many countries fighting such different enemies, “alongside disparate allies, in greatly different ways across the globe” on “premises that often seem unrelated,” or how all of this “coalesced into one war,” “to the extent that a rocket attack on London or jungle fighting in Burma or armor strikes in Libya seemed to belong to entirely different wars.”
As discussed in the first chapter, the war was also unique in the sheer number of deaths, military and civilian, something hard to really comprehend as “World War II exhausted superlatives.” Just on the first page alone the author opened up with the sentence “Some sixty million people died in World War II,” following this up with other facts, such as on “average, twenty-seven thousand people perished on each day between the invasion of Poland (September 1, 1939) and the formal surrender of Japan (September 2, 1945) – bombed, shot, stabbed, blown apart, incinerated, gassed, starved, or infected.” After that is a grim litany of other facts, as World War II had the deadliest armor battle (Kursk, 2,000 tanks lost), the greatest loss life of life from a single ship sinking (the German troop transport _Wilhelm Gustloff_, sank with 9,400 fatalities in the Baltic Sea in January 1945), and the deadliest single day in military history (March 10, 1945, the firebombing of Tokyo, more than a hundred thousand casualties). I really respected how the author never put aside the civilian element of suffering from the war, noting again and again civilian casualties on both sides not just from direct enemy fire but from the Holocaust, from starvation, from infection, even indirectly caused by say so many people being mobilized to fight that fragile agricultural systems teetered into ruin, unable to function with so many in basic production and transportation away fighting, while not always condemning these causalities where there are understandable reasons for these causalities (though such deaths definitely get condemned in many cases, noting for instance that 80% of those who died in the war were at the hands of the Axis, particularly just mind-numbingly staggering numbers of Chinese, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and others, and the layers upon layers of ugliness, evil, and tragic, miserable waste of the Holocaust, the author also condemns latter day revisionist views, such as noting in the final pages “self-critical, affluent and leisured citizens of the democracies….that had not survived a torpedoed Liberty ship in the icy Atlantic, parachuted out from a flaming B-17 over Schweinfurt, seen the ovens at Buchenwald, or fought at Sugar Loaf Hill on Okinawa” and “[s]tranger still…few [of those criticizing Allied bombing caused deaths of Axis citizens] note that the losing Axis powers inflicted 80 percent of the fatalities of World War II – the vast majority of them unarmed civilians”).
The book was divided into seven parts, with the various parts as few as one chapter or as many as five. Following that was an extremely extensive section of footnotes noting sources. There were some sections of plates of photographs and there were also maps in the book as well.
Part one was on labeled “Ideas.” A lot is covered, from a discussion of how physical geography and the obstacles and opportunities they presented (the same that plagued say Julius Caesar or Napoleon) still affected the combatants (the lessons of the past often ignored at considerable peril) to noting “the central tragic irony of World War II: the weaker Axis powers proved incapable of defeating their Allied enemies on the field of battle, but nevertheless were more adept at killing far more of them and their civilian populations” to another paradox, that “Hitler’s Germany in the late 1930s was seen by the democracies either as not much of an existential threat or as so great an existential threat that it would require another senseless war to stop it,” to well, a lot else besides such as analyzing American isolationism, the mythology of the German Blitzkrieg, and so much more.
Part two was on the air war. I had no idea that the Axis and Allied nations produced 800,000 plus military, transport, and training planes, nor that 300,000 were lost to combat (or damaged too badly to be salvaged), that over 350,000 pilots and aircrew perished, and nearly 2 million civilians died in air raids. Though the Axis powers produced some excellent planes, they never came close to the sheer volume of Allied planes (as the Allies produced three times as many aircraft). As impressive as this staggering loss of life is, “perhaps only 3 percent of military causalities during World War II were related to the use of aircraft” (again putting into perspective complaints about Allied bombing campaigns). However aircraft were expensive (“over 40 percent of America’s wartime budget”). Lots is covered in the chapter, particularly the importance to victory of long-range four-engine bombers and the technology wonder that the B-29 represented as well as how important it was in defeating Japan.
Part three was on the war at sea. Among the things covered are that proportionally the various nation’s navies had the fewest fatalities, that even the worst battles at sea didn’t approach the worst battles on land in terms of fatalities (Leyte Gulf, 15,300 fatalities, while Stalingrad, upwards of 2 million dead), how timidity often doomed or prevented Axis victories (not following up on the success of Pearl Harbor for instance by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo or Admiral Takeo Takagi’s unwillingness to send aircraft to finish off the _Yorktown_ at the Battle of the Coral Sea), the Italian Navy’s utter uselessness (“[r]arely in military history had such a large powerful fleet played almost no helpful role in a war and disappeared so quickly”), and the absolutely vital role of the destroyer (“490 destroyers were sunk during the war, more than all other classes of surface ships combined…[f]rom the first to the last year of the war, it was the destroyer that proved the most economical investment in terms of cost to build and man versus the benefits accrued”).
Part four, with the greatest number of chapters, was on the land war, covering infantry and sieges among other topics. So much, all the things, are covered, including how important infantry were to the war, how one of the greatest revolutions in warfare was in infantry rifles (more than armor or artillery), how trucks and not tanks were in large part why the Allies won the ground war (the U.S. produced 2.4 million transport vehicles, more than the entire combined production of the British, Russians, and Axis), some great comparisons of the typical soldier for each of the major powers, that large numbers of Italians fought in Russia (with 85,000 soldiers dying there), the tremendous disparity in losses of soldiers between the Russians and the Anglo-American forces (the British and Americans traveled from Normandy to the German interior, 75 % of the distance from Moscow to Berlin, in 11 months instead of the 4 years it took the Russians, all at “5 percent of the Soviet cost in infantry fatalities”), and some great coverage of the siege of Leningrad (with a good map), noting among other things it was the longest and most lethal siege in history (an 872 siege that cost 4 million Russian soldiers as causalities, a full 14 percent of all of its causalities in World War II), with “Russian dead in and around Leningrad…four times greater than the death toll of all Americans lost in World War II.” Again, the author really drove home just how many people died in this war.
Part five was labeled “Fire” and dealt with tanks and artillery. There is far more about tank design and theory than any other weapon system in the book. Maybe a bit much but it was mostly interesting. I had no idea that “no one knew what defined a tank” when the war started and just how many factors in tank design and operation had to be juggled, from speed to armor to armament to profile to weight to how many could be fielded and how easy they were to learn to use and to maintain.
Part six, “People,” dealt with those in “Supreme Command” as well having chapters titled “The Warlords,” “The Workers,” and “The Dead.” Topics covered included comparing and contrasting the virtues and faults of democratic versus absolutist leadership (among other things absolutists “felt no need to offer detail or to explain ambiguity within their policies”), a fundamental reason why the Axis failed was that Hitler and the Axis powers could never achieved their grandiose global ambitions because “he lacked the shrewdness to coax or successfully coerce others, both allies and millions of Europeans under occupation, in helping him,” how Hitler had “no direct knowledge of much of anything more than a few hundred miles from his birthplace,” never having visited America, Britain, or Russia (in very sharp contrast to Churchill and Roosevelt, who had all visited Germany and each other’s countries), and the Axis leadership never really understood that the Allied ability to produce manpower and material well beyond what the Axis could was going to doom them, especially as the Axis lacked “any appreciation of the resources of their enemies, or of how they might impair” these same abilities and that given “Axis material inferiority on land, at sea, and in the air, Allied leaders needed only to be to competent rather than inspired.”
Part seven was on Ends, what basically was won, noting among other things another paradox of the war, that though the Allied war effort defeated the Nazis it saved communism, that “the war against fascism was won only with the help of the greatest totalitarian power of all,” with the Soviet Union’s very role in the war another paradox itself:
“Stalin had once been both Hitler’s greatest asset and his worst enemy, the salvation of the West during war and its existential enemy in peace. No other country lost so many of its own to Germany or killed so many Germans. No nation’s army fought so ineptly and so brilliantly, and sacrificed millions of its own to kill millions of Germans.”
The book sometimes seemed to touch way more lightly on a topic than I would like (such as naval history) or maybe a bit too much on one topic than I cared for (lots and lots of pages devoted to tank history, technology, and usage, though it was all pretty much new to me), but every time I thought a chapter was gong on too long or my eyes were glazing over a bit on some aspect Hanson got my intention by many pithy, eloquent, very well written summarizations of particular aspects of the war, be they overall lessons learned or basic fundamental aspects of Axis leader psychology or the staggering differences in say American and Axis industrial capacity, the author skillfully in a few paragraphs that were very quotable succinctly and wittily (but not irreverently) summarizing key things to understand about the causes, course, and consequences of the war.
Lots of references to previous battles, wars, and military leaders, mainly classical, are made throughout the book. They seemed more prevalent earlier on in the book and I think became less frequent as I progressed through the book, though it is possible I got more used to them.
The writing isn’t too dense, dry, or academic. It does make for grim reading at times but it never was so dark I stopped reading. I think the author had more comfort discussing ground combat than naval combat, with air combat comfort somewhere in between.
One of the main themes of the book, stated in the preface, is that World War II is unique in the history of warfare in that no other war saw so many countries fighting such different enemies, “alongside disparate allies, in greatly different ways across the globe” on “premises that often seem unrelated,” or how all of this “coalesced into one war,” “to the extent that a rocket attack on London or jungle fighting in Burma or armor strikes in Libya seemed to belong to entirely different wars.”
As discussed in the first chapter, the war was also unique in the sheer number of deaths, military and civilian, something hard to really comprehend as “World War II exhausted superlatives.” Just on the first page alone the author opened up with the sentence “Some sixty million people died in World War II,” following this up with other facts, such as on “average, twenty-seven thousand people perished on each day between the invasion of Poland (September 1, 1939) and the formal surrender of Japan (September 2, 1945) – bombed, shot, stabbed, blown apart, incinerated, gassed, starved, or infected.” After that is a grim litany of other facts, as World War II had the deadliest armor battle (Kursk, 2,000 tanks lost), the greatest loss life of life from a single ship sinking (the German troop transport _Wilhelm Gustloff_, sank with 9,400 fatalities in the Baltic Sea in January 1945), and the deadliest single day in military history (March 10, 1945, the firebombing of Tokyo, more than a hundred thousand casualties). I really respected how the author never put aside the civilian element of suffering from the war, noting again and again civilian casualties on both sides not just from direct enemy fire but from the Holocaust, from starvation, from infection, even indirectly caused by say so many people being mobilized to fight that fragile agricultural systems teetered into ruin, unable to function with so many in basic production and transportation away fighting, while not always condemning these causalities where there are understandable reasons for these causalities (though such deaths definitely get condemned in many cases, noting for instance that 80% of those who died in the war were at the hands of the Axis, particularly just mind-numbingly staggering numbers of Chinese, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and others, and the layers upon layers of ugliness, evil, and tragic, miserable waste of the Holocaust, the author also condemns latter day revisionist views, such as noting in the final pages “self-critical, affluent and leisured citizens of the democracies….that had not survived a torpedoed Liberty ship in the icy Atlantic, parachuted out from a flaming B-17 over Schweinfurt, seen the ovens at Buchenwald, or fought at Sugar Loaf Hill on Okinawa” and “[s]tranger still…few [of those criticizing Allied bombing caused deaths of Axis citizens] note that the losing Axis powers inflicted 80 percent of the fatalities of World War II – the vast majority of them unarmed civilians”).
The book was divided into seven parts, with the various parts as few as one chapter or as many as five. Following that was an extremely extensive section of footnotes noting sources. There were some sections of plates of photographs and there were also maps in the book as well.
Part one was on labeled “Ideas.” A lot is covered, from a discussion of how physical geography and the obstacles and opportunities they presented (the same that plagued say Julius Caesar or Napoleon) still affected the combatants (the lessons of the past often ignored at considerable peril) to noting “the central tragic irony of World War II: the weaker Axis powers proved incapable of defeating their Allied enemies on the field of battle, but nevertheless were more adept at killing far more of them and their civilian populations” to another paradox, that “Hitler’s Germany in the late 1930s was seen by the democracies either as not much of an existential threat or as so great an existential threat that it would require another senseless war to stop it,” to well, a lot else besides such as analyzing American isolationism, the mythology of the German Blitzkrieg, and so much more.
Part two was on the air war. I had no idea that the Axis and Allied nations produced 800,000 plus military, transport, and training planes, nor that 300,000 were lost to combat (or damaged too badly to be salvaged), that over 350,000 pilots and aircrew perished, and nearly 2 million civilians died in air raids. Though the Axis powers produced some excellent planes, they never came close to the sheer volume of Allied planes (as the Allies produced three times as many aircraft). As impressive as this staggering loss of life is, “perhaps only 3 percent of military causalities during World War II were related to the use of aircraft” (again putting into perspective complaints about Allied bombing campaigns). However aircraft were expensive (“over 40 percent of America’s wartime budget”). Lots is covered in the chapter, particularly the importance to victory of long-range four-engine bombers and the technology wonder that the B-29 represented as well as how important it was in defeating Japan.
Part three was on the war at sea. Among the things covered are that proportionally the various nation’s navies had the fewest fatalities, that even the worst battles at sea didn’t approach the worst battles on land in terms of fatalities (Leyte Gulf, 15,300 fatalities, while Stalingrad, upwards of 2 million dead), how timidity often doomed or prevented Axis victories (not following up on the success of Pearl Harbor for instance by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo or Admiral Takeo Takagi’s unwillingness to send aircraft to finish off the _Yorktown_ at the Battle of the Coral Sea), the Italian Navy’s utter uselessness (“[r]arely in military history had such a large powerful fleet played almost no helpful role in a war and disappeared so quickly”), and the absolutely vital role of the destroyer (“490 destroyers were sunk during the war, more than all other classes of surface ships combined…[f]rom the first to the last year of the war, it was the destroyer that proved the most economical investment in terms of cost to build and man versus the benefits accrued”).
Part four, with the greatest number of chapters, was on the land war, covering infantry and sieges among other topics. So much, all the things, are covered, including how important infantry were to the war, how one of the greatest revolutions in warfare was in infantry rifles (more than armor or artillery), how trucks and not tanks were in large part why the Allies won the ground war (the U.S. produced 2.4 million transport vehicles, more than the entire combined production of the British, Russians, and Axis), some great comparisons of the typical soldier for each of the major powers, that large numbers of Italians fought in Russia (with 85,000 soldiers dying there), the tremendous disparity in losses of soldiers between the Russians and the Anglo-American forces (the British and Americans traveled from Normandy to the German interior, 75 % of the distance from Moscow to Berlin, in 11 months instead of the 4 years it took the Russians, all at “5 percent of the Soviet cost in infantry fatalities”), and some great coverage of the siege of Leningrad (with a good map), noting among other things it was the longest and most lethal siege in history (an 872 siege that cost 4 million Russian soldiers as causalities, a full 14 percent of all of its causalities in World War II), with “Russian dead in and around Leningrad…four times greater than the death toll of all Americans lost in World War II.” Again, the author really drove home just how many people died in this war.
Part five was labeled “Fire” and dealt with tanks and artillery. There is far more about tank design and theory than any other weapon system in the book. Maybe a bit much but it was mostly interesting. I had no idea that “no one knew what defined a tank” when the war started and just how many factors in tank design and operation had to be juggled, from speed to armor to armament to profile to weight to how many could be fielded and how easy they were to learn to use and to maintain.
Part six, “People,” dealt with those in “Supreme Command” as well having chapters titled “The Warlords,” “The Workers,” and “The Dead.” Topics covered included comparing and contrasting the virtues and faults of democratic versus absolutist leadership (among other things absolutists “felt no need to offer detail or to explain ambiguity within their policies”), a fundamental reason why the Axis failed was that Hitler and the Axis powers could never achieved their grandiose global ambitions because “he lacked the shrewdness to coax or successfully coerce others, both allies and millions of Europeans under occupation, in helping him,” how Hitler had “no direct knowledge of much of anything more than a few hundred miles from his birthplace,” never having visited America, Britain, or Russia (in very sharp contrast to Churchill and Roosevelt, who had all visited Germany and each other’s countries), and the Axis leadership never really understood that the Allied ability to produce manpower and material well beyond what the Axis could was going to doom them, especially as the Axis lacked “any appreciation of the resources of their enemies, or of how they might impair” these same abilities and that given “Axis material inferiority on land, at sea, and in the air, Allied leaders needed only to be to competent rather than inspired.”
Part seven was on Ends, what basically was won, noting among other things another paradox of the war, that though the Allied war effort defeated the Nazis it saved communism, that “the war against fascism was won only with the help of the greatest totalitarian power of all,” with the Soviet Union’s very role in the war another paradox itself:
“Stalin had once been both Hitler’s greatest asset and his worst enemy, the salvation of the West during war and its existential enemy in peace. No other country lost so many of its own to Germany or killed so many Germans. No nation’s army fought so ineptly and so brilliantly, and sacrificed millions of its own to kill millions of Germans.”
The book sometimes seemed to touch way more lightly on a topic than I would like (such as naval history) or maybe a bit too much on one topic than I cared for (lots and lots of pages devoted to tank history, technology, and usage, though it was all pretty much new to me), but every time I thought a chapter was gong on too long or my eyes were glazing over a bit on some aspect Hanson got my intention by many pithy, eloquent, very well written summarizations of particular aspects of the war, be they overall lessons learned or basic fundamental aspects of Axis leader psychology or the staggering differences in say American and Axis industrial capacity, the author skillfully in a few paragraphs that were very quotable succinctly and wittily (but not irreverently) summarizing key things to understand about the causes, course, and consequences of the war.
Lots of references to previous battles, wars, and military leaders, mainly classical, are made throughout the book. They seemed more prevalent earlier on in the book and I think became less frequent as I progressed through the book, though it is possible I got more used to them.
The writing isn’t too dense, dry, or academic. It does make for grim reading at times but it never was so dark I stopped reading. I think the author had more comfort discussing ground combat than naval combat, with air combat comfort somewhere in between.
November 22, 2020
A good book, giving a topical history of the many conflicts which made up The World War(s) II. The author, Victor Davis Hanson, pulls deeply from his classical studies to put WWII in the broader context of human conflict. Comparisons to the many great struggles of the Western Ancient World and Renaissance are constant throughout the work. Rather than presenting a chronological history Hanson divides the story up into subject areas, from the great strategic questions through to very detailed conversations about the interplay between tactics and culture. Throughout he keeps a theme which ties this book to his earlier work: the interplay between material and moral strengths. His broad conclusion: that even if the Axis had possessed a human skills superiority, which he fully proves they didn’t, they would have been steamrolled by the productive output of the allies. An understanding of Hanson’s previous work is very helpful, as is familiarity with key moments and people from the Classical World. Like his other book, Hanson doesn’t have much reference to mankind’s lessons from the Ancient East. It would have been interesting if he had thrown in some Sun Tzu alongside Thucydides. One interesting element are the “what-if” statements which pepper the work. These are less about strategic of tactical decisions not taken, but instead alternate production priorities (how many Panzers could have been made from BISMARCK’s hull, etc.). These emphasize again and again Hanson’s view of material dominance. This is a good book for anyone interested in WWII. Highly recommended for those who want to better analyze how WWII was fought and why it turned out as it did.
August 19, 2022
Brilliant, circumspect, and worthwhile. For those who have an interest in the actual “how” and “why” of the events of WWII this is a good one. Actually, it’s even better if you’ve read quite a bit on this time period - biographies and such. The reason is that this book gives all the background for why the Allies won that war - lots of tactical and economic explanations that just help put everything into a perspective that makes sense.
For instance, in a traditional linear history of the war or the time period you would read of the events and then the reaction of the events by great men and women. Then the resulting political upheaval or the next event that happened. You might get some of the “why this was so important” when you’re reading. But maybe not. Or, if you’re reading a biography you’d bet the thinking of FDR or Churchill or whatever. Their letters, their diary etc. the events would unfold before you as part of their world and life.
But in this book you have the war divided up into topics. Each topic is explored thoroughly. If it’s tanks or leaders or planes or whatever. Then he explains the tech or the personality and how each major nation used it/them. Then gives examples in battle and you can see the how being played out from the why. So he will explain that the Allies had the P51 mustang and that it was superior and why. Then give examples of battles it dominated. There are digressions on how a country’s political leadership and ideology shaped each topic. The whole thing is first class. Really really good.
For instance, in a traditional linear history of the war or the time period you would read of the events and then the reaction of the events by great men and women. Then the resulting political upheaval or the next event that happened. You might get some of the “why this was so important” when you’re reading. But maybe not. Or, if you’re reading a biography you’d bet the thinking of FDR or Churchill or whatever. Their letters, their diary etc. the events would unfold before you as part of their world and life.
But in this book you have the war divided up into topics. Each topic is explored thoroughly. If it’s tanks or leaders or planes or whatever. Then he explains the tech or the personality and how each major nation used it/them. Then gives examples in battle and you can see the how being played out from the why. So he will explain that the Allies had the P51 mustang and that it was superior and why. Then give examples of battles it dominated. There are digressions on how a country’s political leadership and ideology shaped each topic. The whole thing is first class. Really really good.
April 25, 2019
I must have over 100 bookmarks, this was fantastic. Hanson skips over most of the tactics and individual battles (except the dozen or so that decided the war) to focus on how WW2 was a battle of resources and supply chains. The book is mostly divided between air, sea, and ground, explaining the strengths and weaknesses of each of the players.
There’s some incredible statistics that just change one’s whole perspective of the war, like how 75-80% of Nazi casualties happened in Russia, or the dramatic discrepancy in sea power between the US and Japan once the war geared up. In fact, Hanson paints the outcome as probably inevitable once Hitler invaded Russia and Japan attacked the US.
There was not much on the atomic bomb programs, which was fine by me as I’ve read a half dozen books on that anyway.
Really thoroughly enjoyed this.
There’s some incredible statistics that just change one’s whole perspective of the war, like how 75-80% of Nazi casualties happened in Russia, or the dramatic discrepancy in sea power between the US and Japan once the war geared up. In fact, Hanson paints the outcome as probably inevitable once Hitler invaded Russia and Japan attacked the US.
There was not much on the atomic bomb programs, which was fine by me as I’ve read a half dozen books on that anyway.
Really thoroughly enjoyed this.
September 17, 2024
I try to rate nonfiction in terms of how well it does what it sets out to do, rather than how much I “liked” it. In this case, I may be under-rating it a bit by that standard – I think Hanson is rightly proud of what he accomplished, but I can’t help feeling that the title is misleading. In the introduction, he develops the idea a bit that there were, in fact, multiple wars raging simultaneously during the late 30s and early 40s, which we misperceive as a single global war. But he seems to lose track of it early on, and gives himself over to mountains of technical facts about the war. It also seems a bit lame to me that he sticks to the established chronology of the war’s “official” beginning in September 1939 with the invasion of Poland, rather than expanding to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Spanish Civil War, or the various “peaceful” takeovers of European territory that preceded the UK’s and France’s declaration of war.
Anyway, what Hanson seems to be interested in is fact, not analysis, and this seems to make readers of military history giddy, so have at it. He does throw in some rather interesting comparisons to ancient Greek examples, but without any theory to guide them, these juxtapositions end up just being more facts. A fine book to fall asleep with. I read it over a VERY long period as an ebook on my phone, in tiny increments.
Anyway, what Hanson seems to be interested in is fact, not analysis, and this seems to make readers of military history giddy, so have at it. He does throw in some rather interesting comparisons to ancient Greek examples, but without any theory to guide them, these juxtapositions end up just being more facts. A fine book to fall asleep with. I read it over a VERY long period as an ebook on my phone, in tiny increments.
January 27, 2018
Victor Davis Hanson has written a remarkable, and remarkably innovative and perceptive, history of World War II that overlays a holistically oriented comparative analysis on the overall tapestry of the war and its times and events. This is not a chronological, event-driven history. Rather, Dr. Hanson looks at broad themes – causes, sea power, air power, land power, leadership, general-ship, home countries and their demographics, economics, industrial bases and cultures. In each of these broad themes he breaks out specialized topics such as strategic bombers, armor, surface warfare ships (to cite but a few representative examples) and thin those topics he analyzes and explains why the war happened as it did and ultimately why the Axis was fighting a losing cause from the start despite having started it all. There is some repetition, as there must be when one is illustrating how hopeless the Axis war effort was relative to tank design and production, fighter planes, manpower reserves, innovative technologies, command and control… in all areas of the war, the Axis was not just beaten but never had much chance of prevailing ever, in the long term. It is a compelling case exhaustively constructed by Dr. Hanson that he peppers throughout with revealing anecdotes, insights and human interest asides. He also makes copious use of military allegories and historical parallels, dating upon his extensive background in military and classical history.
The Axis powers committed three irrevocable and irremediable errors… Hitler invaded his ally the Soviet Union; Japan attacked Pearl Harbor; Hitler declared war on the United States. These errors foreshadowed the ultimate outcome of the war, as Dr. Hanson illustrates and explains thoroughly. In so doing, he does not ignore the savage and self-serving nature of Stalinist Russia – the perfidy of Joseph Stalin who supported Hitler in his war against the West and gained territory from it that he never relinquished – whose policies and practices significantly exceeded Hitler’s death totals – and who engineered a post-war world that refuted so many of the war goals of the Allies. Stalin’s evils have been obscured by history and by the Soviet Union’s admittedly heroic epic war against Nazi Germany. Dr. Hanson redresses the historical record. It needs to be widely remembered – Stalin deserves the same historical opprobrium, as has been Hitler’s legacy.
It was a war unique in so many aspects – the first (and hopefully only) in which civilian casualties exceeded combatant causalities, in which the casualties suffered by the victors exceeded those of the losers. It was several wars in one – the Soviet war against Nazi Germany; the US and British war against Germany, Japan and Italy; the British stand throughout the duration of the war (the only Western power to do so). Japan’s war against the US and Britain but not the Soviet Union, with whom they had a non-aggression pact. Italy’s short war, Germany’s longer one, Japan’s even longer one still. The book is a revelation of fresh insights, evaluations and analyses that will give the reader extensive understanding and renewed appreciation for the event in all its historical progression.
The Axis powers committed three irrevocable and irremediable errors… Hitler invaded his ally the Soviet Union; Japan attacked Pearl Harbor; Hitler declared war on the United States. These errors foreshadowed the ultimate outcome of the war, as Dr. Hanson illustrates and explains thoroughly. In so doing, he does not ignore the savage and self-serving nature of Stalinist Russia – the perfidy of Joseph Stalin who supported Hitler in his war against the West and gained territory from it that he never relinquished – whose policies and practices significantly exceeded Hitler’s death totals – and who engineered a post-war world that refuted so many of the war goals of the Allies. Stalin’s evils have been obscured by history and by the Soviet Union’s admittedly heroic epic war against Nazi Germany. Dr. Hanson redresses the historical record. It needs to be widely remembered – Stalin deserves the same historical opprobrium, as has been Hitler’s legacy.
It was a war unique in so many aspects – the first (and hopefully only) in which civilian casualties exceeded combatant causalities, in which the casualties suffered by the victors exceeded those of the losers. It was several wars in one – the Soviet war against Nazi Germany; the US and British war against Germany, Japan and Italy; the British stand throughout the duration of the war (the only Western power to do so). Japan’s war against the US and Britain but not the Soviet Union, with whom they had a non-aggression pact. Italy’s short war, Germany’s longer one, Japan’s even longer one still. The book is a revelation of fresh insights, evaluations and analyses that will give the reader extensive understanding and renewed appreciation for the event in all its historical progression.
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