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Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945
Field Marshal Viscount Slim (1891-1970) led shattered British forces from Burma to India in one of the lesser-known but more nightmarish retreats of World War II. He then restored his army's fighting capabilities and morale with virtually no support from home and counterattacked. His army's slaughter of Japanese troops ultimately liberated India and Burma.
The first edition of Defeat Into Victory , published in 1956, was an immediate sensation selling 20,000 copies within a few days. This is an updated version with a new introduction by David W. Hogan Jr.
The first edition of Defeat Into Victory , published in 1956, was an immediate sensation selling 20,000 copies within a few days. This is an updated version with a new introduction by David W. Hogan Jr.
616 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1956
About the author
William Slim
12 books12 followersField Marshal William Joseph Slim, 1st Viscount Slim, KG, GCB, GCMG, GCVO, GBE, DSO, MC, KStJ, usually known as Bill Slim, was a British military commander and the 13th Governor-General of Australia. Slim saw active service in both the First and Second World Wars and was wounded in action three times.
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November 16, 2016
This book is about the Burma/India Theatre in the Second World War where the British arguably scored their first victory against the Japanese. While this theatre did not receive as much attention as the Malayan Campaign, the fighting was not less brutal and conditions possibly harder. Resources were scarce, understandable given the secondary status this theatre was accorded (pg. 24). Food was pathetic (pg. 178) and even uniform was not enough at first (pg. 42). Add to this the difficulty of sewing together combatants from different nationalities: British, Indian, Burmese, Nepalese (Gurkhas), American (airmen) and Chinese, the challenge of stopping the Japanese advance into India was formidable. On top of that, some people could be fighting for either side (especially the Indians who served in the Indian National Army) and with a foe that exhibited systematic cruelty and brutality in any theatre (pg. 51, 238), it was no wonder that many felt demoralised and were conditioned to think that there was no way to stop the Japanese.
The central theme of this book is how the Commonwealth soldiers, with the help of the Americans airmen, eventually re-grouped, trained and through small victories scored in patrols, turned their beliefs around and came to recognise that the Japanese were not invincible. The Japanese could be defeated by a side who trained better and planned better, a side that was determined not to be forced into retreat again. The story of how they overcame the lack of resources, broken promises of higher command due to exigencies in other theatres, and maintained and improved their morale makes for a good lesson in leadership and practical intelligence.
The writing is another reason I enjoyed the book. The writer was able to give very vivid descriptions of events (pg. 28), scenes and people (pg. 31) all written in a style uncommon in military history and rare today as we push for the use of Business English. There are a few occasions when I even felt the writing poetic. For that, one should see the author's description of Northern Burma (pg. 246), the opening of Chapter 12, and about the great Irrawaddy (pg. 416), written with such respect. He also had a great sense of humour such that the book is peppered throughout with funny anecdotes (see pg. 44, 61, 141, 330). His reflections on the loss of Burma (pg. 120 onwards) also contain invaluable insights.
Some may accuse the author of being a borderline racist in his writing (pg. 281) based on today's politically correct rhetoric but I personally did not detect disrespect. If he disapproved of his Asian allies or was disappointed by them, he did not link any of this to their race, but to the lack of training or the conditions under which they had to operate. In fact he had high praises for the Indian units fighting for him and maintained the highest respect for the Gurkhas.
The one question that kept coming back to me as I read the book was why this theatre receive so little attention, especially given that it resulted in a convincing victory for the the British. Was it one that really mattered so little in the bigger scheme of things? Wouldn't it be disastrous had Burma/India ended up like Singapore? An earlier book I read had indeed speculated that the outcome of the war might be different had the British been defeated in Burma and India, and India, while geographically huge, might not be difficult to sway towards the Japanese, given the independence movement led by the Congress Party.
But like all speculations, it is hard to predict what really would happen. All we know is that the Japanese were defeated by the British and her allies for the first time and this is part of the general pattern of the war for the Japanese from then on. Interestingly, Japanese sources, both left and right-wing (Handō, 2009; Ienaga 2010; Yakuta & Watanabe, 2013), pay more attention to the defeat they tasted in Imphal, putting the blame squarely on Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi's lack of leadership, capabilities, and decisiveness.
Even if the victory here did not serve the overall cause strategically, there are reasons for one to learn about this theatre if just to know how an army, so lacking in resources could turn defeat into victory against an enemy that seemed so invicincible. And there is no one better to learn from than the one who was instrumental in the victory.
References
Handō, K. (2009), Showa Shi 1926-1945 Volume 2, Heibonsha Limited, Tokyo: Japan.
Ienaga, S. (2010), The Pacific War 1931-1945, Pantheon Asia Library, NY.
Hyakuta, N and Watanabe, S. (2013), Zerosen To Nihontou, Maple House Cultural Publishing, Taipei: Taiwan.
The central theme of this book is how the Commonwealth soldiers, with the help of the Americans airmen, eventually re-grouped, trained and through small victories scored in patrols, turned their beliefs around and came to recognise that the Japanese were not invincible. The Japanese could be defeated by a side who trained better and planned better, a side that was determined not to be forced into retreat again. The story of how they overcame the lack of resources, broken promises of higher command due to exigencies in other theatres, and maintained and improved their morale makes for a good lesson in leadership and practical intelligence.
The writing is another reason I enjoyed the book. The writer was able to give very vivid descriptions of events (pg. 28), scenes and people (pg. 31) all written in a style uncommon in military history and rare today as we push for the use of Business English. There are a few occasions when I even felt the writing poetic. For that, one should see the author's description of Northern Burma (pg. 246), the opening of Chapter 12, and about the great Irrawaddy (pg. 416), written with such respect. He also had a great sense of humour such that the book is peppered throughout with funny anecdotes (see pg. 44, 61, 141, 330). His reflections on the loss of Burma (pg. 120 onwards) also contain invaluable insights.
Some may accuse the author of being a borderline racist in his writing (pg. 281) based on today's politically correct rhetoric but I personally did not detect disrespect. If he disapproved of his Asian allies or was disappointed by them, he did not link any of this to their race, but to the lack of training or the conditions under which they had to operate. In fact he had high praises for the Indian units fighting for him and maintained the highest respect for the Gurkhas.
The one question that kept coming back to me as I read the book was why this theatre receive so little attention, especially given that it resulted in a convincing victory for the the British. Was it one that really mattered so little in the bigger scheme of things? Wouldn't it be disastrous had Burma/India ended up like Singapore? An earlier book I read had indeed speculated that the outcome of the war might be different had the British been defeated in Burma and India, and India, while geographically huge, might not be difficult to sway towards the Japanese, given the independence movement led by the Congress Party.
But like all speculations, it is hard to predict what really would happen. All we know is that the Japanese were defeated by the British and her allies for the first time and this is part of the general pattern of the war for the Japanese from then on. Interestingly, Japanese sources, both left and right-wing (Handō, 2009; Ienaga 2010; Yakuta & Watanabe, 2013), pay more attention to the defeat they tasted in Imphal, putting the blame squarely on Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi's lack of leadership, capabilities, and decisiveness.
Even if the victory here did not serve the overall cause strategically, there are reasons for one to learn about this theatre if just to know how an army, so lacking in resources could turn defeat into victory against an enemy that seemed so invicincible. And there is no one better to learn from than the one who was instrumental in the victory.
References
Handō, K. (2009), Showa Shi 1926-1945 Volume 2, Heibonsha Limited, Tokyo: Japan.
Ienaga, S. (2010), The Pacific War 1931-1945, Pantheon Asia Library, NY.
Hyakuta, N and Watanabe, S. (2013), Zerosen To Nihontou, Maple House Cultural Publishing, Taipei: Taiwan.
January 10, 2016
This book is too good to review well in the space of an essay or a paragraph. Properly appreciating and analyzing it would require a several weeks of classroom discussion. I have a great inhibition against marking or defacing books in any fashion, but with this book I have a great desire to take a highlighter and on page after page highlight the great wisdom and perspicacity displayed in this work.
It is without a doubt the finest military memoire I have ever read. I do not think that I can give enough superlatives to cover just how good this book is. I cannot think of anything one would desire to have in a military memoire that is missing from this work. You want honest critical self-appraisal, you've got it. You want detailed accounting of the movement of forces, then you have that. If you want detailed assessment of the trials and difficulties of command, as well as sound advice for overcoming them, then you've got that. If you need stirring inspiration or kick in the pants exhortation for struggling on through the greatest hardships, then you've got that.
This should be required reading for anyone desiring to obtain command rank higher than Captain, and is beneficial reading for anyone who is either professional military or a politician, or who would wish to understand the same. And it is an invaluable resource for any historian whether amateur or professional wishing to understand one of the most neglected fronts in WW2.
Five superlative stars.
It is without a doubt the finest military memoire I have ever read. I do not think that I can give enough superlatives to cover just how good this book is. I cannot think of anything one would desire to have in a military memoire that is missing from this work. You want honest critical self-appraisal, you've got it. You want detailed accounting of the movement of forces, then you have that. If you want detailed assessment of the trials and difficulties of command, as well as sound advice for overcoming them, then you've got that. If you need stirring inspiration or kick in the pants exhortation for struggling on through the greatest hardships, then you've got that.
This should be required reading for anyone desiring to obtain command rank higher than Captain, and is beneficial reading for anyone who is either professional military or a politician, or who would wish to understand the same. And it is an invaluable resource for any historian whether amateur or professional wishing to understand one of the most neglected fronts in WW2.
Five superlative stars.
July 11, 2011
Bill Slim, or – to give him his proper title – Field Marshal William Joseph Slim, 1st Viscount Slim, KG, GCB, GCMG, GCVO, GBE, DSO, MC, KStJ, has been described by some as perhaps the greatest commander of the twentieth century. Defeat into Victory is his account of the retaking of Burma by Allied forces during the Second World War first published in 1956. Slim was the commander of the British 14th Army that, in concert with American and Chinese forces, defeated the Imperial Japanese Army during the Burma Campaign.
But don’t let that put you off! Slim's most notable characteristic is his lack of ego. Unlike many (most?) other accounts of this type, Slim consistently makes reference to his mistakes, errors in planning or judgement, and his deficiencies as a military commander. For the reader’s benefit, he explores how “learning the hard lessons” as he went along, acknowledging fault and reflection on decisions helped him emerge a better man and general. It is unsurprising that his approach generated a high regard from the rank and file.
The central point of the memoir is that it is the soldiers in the field that win battles. Slim's theory is that politicians give guidelines for the campaign, and generals provide the training and backup so that the soldiers can get on with their business. The central premise is that he should – wherever possible – not get in the soldiers way.
This is a fantastic account of how – under his stewardship – the army managed to stop the Japanese advance in South-East Asia, and restore morale and discipline in the army that had been humiliatingly defeated. Defeat into Victory is more a text on good management, than a text on warfare.
The ‘trick’ to good management for Slim is in best providing for good work for those underneath you. He invested in proper training and equipment to front-line troops. He insisted that every unit was supplied according to its own special needs (crucial in a true multicultural army that encompassed English, Scots, Welsh, Irish, Indian, African, Burmese, Australian and American troops). When middle management couldn’t ensure adequate provisioning of the front line, he even put his own staff on half-rations until a solution was found: generally this hastily solved the problem! As few leaders do, he clearly understood that war is about individuals and small units. It is only in their combined and coordinated efforts that they amount to something far bigger.
The other crucial difference between this book and others of its type – Slim can write. The book is full of many amusing, depressing, enlightening and shocking anecdotes with a health dose of self-depreciation and humour. What also surprises is how – especially given the time [1956] – it is completely devoid of any racism or caricature of the enemy. Slim is incredibly respectful of his own native soldiers, as well as the Japanese enemy. This cannot be said of many text to be released in this period.
Ultimately, Defeat into Victory is a text filled with wisdom, modesty, grace, and deep understanding. Well worth a look if you are at all interested.
But don’t let that put you off! Slim's most notable characteristic is his lack of ego. Unlike many (most?) other accounts of this type, Slim consistently makes reference to his mistakes, errors in planning or judgement, and his deficiencies as a military commander. For the reader’s benefit, he explores how “learning the hard lessons” as he went along, acknowledging fault and reflection on decisions helped him emerge a better man and general. It is unsurprising that his approach generated a high regard from the rank and file.
The central point of the memoir is that it is the soldiers in the field that win battles. Slim's theory is that politicians give guidelines for the campaign, and generals provide the training and backup so that the soldiers can get on with their business. The central premise is that he should – wherever possible – not get in the soldiers way.
This is a fantastic account of how – under his stewardship – the army managed to stop the Japanese advance in South-East Asia, and restore morale and discipline in the army that had been humiliatingly defeated. Defeat into Victory is more a text on good management, than a text on warfare.
The ‘trick’ to good management for Slim is in best providing for good work for those underneath you. He invested in proper training and equipment to front-line troops. He insisted that every unit was supplied according to its own special needs (crucial in a true multicultural army that encompassed English, Scots, Welsh, Irish, Indian, African, Burmese, Australian and American troops). When middle management couldn’t ensure adequate provisioning of the front line, he even put his own staff on half-rations until a solution was found: generally this hastily solved the problem! As few leaders do, he clearly understood that war is about individuals and small units. It is only in their combined and coordinated efforts that they amount to something far bigger.
The other crucial difference between this book and others of its type – Slim can write. The book is full of many amusing, depressing, enlightening and shocking anecdotes with a health dose of self-depreciation and humour. What also surprises is how – especially given the time [1956] – it is completely devoid of any racism or caricature of the enemy. Slim is incredibly respectful of his own native soldiers, as well as the Japanese enemy. This cannot be said of many text to be released in this period.
Ultimately, Defeat into Victory is a text filled with wisdom, modesty, grace, and deep understanding. Well worth a look if you are at all interested.
October 25, 2014
Bar none--The best book on military leadership ever written.
January 7, 2022
Field Marshal Viscount Slim was driven out of Burma with his British forces when the Japanese invaded at the start of 1942. The trek from Burma to India was a constant battle and one of the lesser-known but more nightmarish retreats of World War II. In India, Slim restored his forces, bringing them back into fighting fit and attacked back into Burma.
Why I started this book: January is a great month for long audio books, and this is the first of several that I picked for a month of road trips.
Why I finished it: Delightful, charmingly British. Slim's writing is humbly understated and well thought out. This is a manual for leading diverse groups thru horrendous circumstances and Slim repeatedly gave credit to all around him and those fighting for and against him. It is also a book about learning hard lessons, realizing you were beaten, but instead of stopping, regrouping and fighting back.
Why I started this book: January is a great month for long audio books, and this is the first of several that I picked for a month of road trips.
Why I finished it: Delightful, charmingly British. Slim's writing is humbly understated and well thought out. This is a manual for leading diverse groups thru horrendous circumstances and Slim repeatedly gave credit to all around him and those fighting for and against him. It is also a book about learning hard lessons, realizing you were beaten, but instead of stopping, regrouping and fighting back.
February 28, 2012
A friend sent me a copy of Field Marshal Bill Slim’s Defeat Into Victory. It has always been on my list of books I’d like to read, but somehow I’d never quite got round to acquiring a copy. The version I have is a reading copy of the original edition, with fold out maps all through it.
The reading style is very engaging and easy to read, especially if you have the space to fold out the map at the end of the chapter so that you can follow all the places when they appear in the narrative. It was the first time I’d read about the ebb and flow of the war in Burma (even though my grandfather drove a DUKW out there). So I found it very
interesting, the nature of warfare was hugely different that both Europe and North Africa (and I suspect even the Pacific Islands). In some respects the war fought in Burma was more like recent modern wars with low troop densities, long logistics tails and a massive reliance on air power.
The other engaging bit about the book was that Slim shows you the development of the army from a road bound Western linear fighting force into an all arms, all round defence, jungle fighting machine. In the beginning the British Army is out of its depth and way beyond the ken of its commanders or troops. The Japanese have infiltration tactics that the British just can’t cope with, and are so stubborn in defence that they cannot be shifted when they gain a hold. The British just dissolve and retreat rapidly out of the way (mostly).
It isn’t just a story of the British Army, as well as colonial forces (Indians and Africans mostly) there is also the alliance warfare aspect of the war. He liaises with Vinegar Joe Stillwell and the Chinese Army too.
Later, the British manage to shorten their lines of communication, build defences and work out how to deal with the Japanese. Once they do, then the tables turn, although it takes much stubborn fighting to shift the enemy. There is a good narrative that explains the constraints the 14th Army was operating under, the logistics challenges and how these were overcome and also the details of the operations. Occasionally there are little personal vignettes of visits to the front, or reports of battles.
One of the things I noted was the commentary on how few prisoners were taken, mostly it was a grim fight to the death by both sides. A typical note on a Japanese attack was that there was one prisoner taken and 600 Japanese bodies recovered from the 14th Army positions.
However, great as all this is, the last section of the book is the best. In the last chapter Slim gives his opinions on why things turned out the way that they did and also on what he draws as lessons for the future. Given that this was written in 1957 he has a lot to say that I think was quite prescient about current operations (and it might also have been right for the post-nuclear exchange as well, but thankfully we’ve avoided that).
The thing I do wonder, is why are all our operational games about the European war? The furthest East we manage is the Russian front, when there is whole load of interesting stuff going on out in the Far East. I suspect I may well return to this when I have some time to sort out another game design.
The reading style is very engaging and easy to read, especially if you have the space to fold out the map at the end of the chapter so that you can follow all the places when they appear in the narrative. It was the first time I’d read about the ebb and flow of the war in Burma (even though my grandfather drove a DUKW out there). So I found it very
interesting, the nature of warfare was hugely different that both Europe and North Africa (and I suspect even the Pacific Islands). In some respects the war fought in Burma was more like recent modern wars with low troop densities, long logistics tails and a massive reliance on air power.
The other engaging bit about the book was that Slim shows you the development of the army from a road bound Western linear fighting force into an all arms, all round defence, jungle fighting machine. In the beginning the British Army is out of its depth and way beyond the ken of its commanders or troops. The Japanese have infiltration tactics that the British just can’t cope with, and are so stubborn in defence that they cannot be shifted when they gain a hold. The British just dissolve and retreat rapidly out of the way (mostly).
It isn’t just a story of the British Army, as well as colonial forces (Indians and Africans mostly) there is also the alliance warfare aspect of the war. He liaises with Vinegar Joe Stillwell and the Chinese Army too.
Later, the British manage to shorten their lines of communication, build defences and work out how to deal with the Japanese. Once they do, then the tables turn, although it takes much stubborn fighting to shift the enemy. There is a good narrative that explains the constraints the 14th Army was operating under, the logistics challenges and how these were overcome and also the details of the operations. Occasionally there are little personal vignettes of visits to the front, or reports of battles.
One of the things I noted was the commentary on how few prisoners were taken, mostly it was a grim fight to the death by both sides. A typical note on a Japanese attack was that there was one prisoner taken and 600 Japanese bodies recovered from the 14th Army positions.
However, great as all this is, the last section of the book is the best. In the last chapter Slim gives his opinions on why things turned out the way that they did and also on what he draws as lessons for the future. Given that this was written in 1957 he has a lot to say that I think was quite prescient about current operations (and it might also have been right for the post-nuclear exchange as well, but thankfully we’ve avoided that).
The thing I do wonder, is why are all our operational games about the European war? The furthest East we manage is the Russian front, when there is whole load of interesting stuff going on out in the Far East. I suspect I may well return to this when I have some time to sort out another game design.
September 15, 2013
Viscount Slim's memoir of his campaign in Burma deserves all the praise it has received over the years. Slim is a refreshingly blunt writer, always quick to praise superiors, subordinates, and peers while taking responsibility for his own mistakes. In fact, one of the most important lessons of Defeat into Victory is that EVERY military commander makes mistakes--lots of them. Not only does Slim own up to them, he is willing to acknowledge that some of them cost the lives of his soldiers. This is the burden of command in war, and he does not shirk it. Even when he clearly believes superiors or peers performed poorly, he is rather oblique, demonstrating his disapproval through a lack of praise.
The details of the campaigns are not so salient as Slim's observations on leadership and the behavior of senior commanders. Although his tactical advice is probably useful for any commander, it carries no brilliant insights--keep things simple, logistics are often more important than tactics, impart a positive attitude. Soldiers with high morale and an understanding of why their tasks matter will often accomplish the seemingly impossible. Tommy Franks would not suddenly become Frederick the Great simply by reading Slim. However, future generals would do well to model their behavior and build habits based on Slim's "battle rhythm" and demeanor. His explication of his own daily schedule is priceless, emphasizing the importance of reflection, sleep, exercise, unstructured discussion with trusted subordinates, and the need to reserve one's energies for the moment of crisis and not fritter them away in daily micro-management.
The book's single greatest failing is the fault of the publisher more than the author. The names and geography are likely to be unfamiliar to the vast majority of readers. Indeed, many of the place names are unpronounceable to English speakers. Although each section begins with maps, it is inconvenient to flip constantly back and forth. The maps themselves are not all that good. This book would benefit greatly from an annotated and illustrated edition that allowed the reader to see the tactical situation more clearly as Slim describes it.
Overall, a brilliant work of military history. I would strongly recommend it for any young officer with aspirations to rise to high command.
The details of the campaigns are not so salient as Slim's observations on leadership and the behavior of senior commanders. Although his tactical advice is probably useful for any commander, it carries no brilliant insights--keep things simple, logistics are often more important than tactics, impart a positive attitude. Soldiers with high morale and an understanding of why their tasks matter will often accomplish the seemingly impossible. Tommy Franks would not suddenly become Frederick the Great simply by reading Slim. However, future generals would do well to model their behavior and build habits based on Slim's "battle rhythm" and demeanor. His explication of his own daily schedule is priceless, emphasizing the importance of reflection, sleep, exercise, unstructured discussion with trusted subordinates, and the need to reserve one's energies for the moment of crisis and not fritter them away in daily micro-management.
The book's single greatest failing is the fault of the publisher more than the author. The names and geography are likely to be unfamiliar to the vast majority of readers. Indeed, many of the place names are unpronounceable to English speakers. Although each section begins with maps, it is inconvenient to flip constantly back and forth. The maps themselves are not all that good. This book would benefit greatly from an annotated and illustrated edition that allowed the reader to see the tactical situation more clearly as Slim describes it.
Overall, a brilliant work of military history. I would strongly recommend it for any young officer with aspirations to rise to high command.
November 6, 2014
I've read a fair number of general's memoirs, and Slim's is one of the most humanistic and readable. Transferred to Burma in 1942, Slim arrived to an army in administrative disarray and an overwhelming Japanese assault that turned into a near-rout. Through perseverance and energy, Slim managed to hold the line in India, rebuild his army, learn how to fight the Japanese, and then counter-attack. Few other Allied generals of the war experienced such immense swings in fortune.
The best parts of the book are how incredibly British Slim is, and a glimpse into the polyglot, colonial army of the British Empire, with Brits, Indians of hundreds of tribes and castes, and Africans all fighting alongside Americans, Chinese, and miscellaneous members of the commonwealth. Next are the observations on command, organizational spirit and morale, and the management of an army at the end of the most shoe-string logistics system an army has ever had to operate with.
Slim has few kind words for the Japanese (at one point he describes them as "the finest military insect on the planet"), but he admires the tenacity of their ordinary soldier, while critiquing the blind aggressiveness of their commanders, and the brutality inflicted on prisoners and the Burmese population. This is only fair; the Imperial Japanese Army were some of the worst war criminals this planet has ever seen, and Slim's thoughts about their command structure and penchant for atrocities are only too true. If casually genteel racism of the mid-20th century sort is a deal-breaker, this is not the book for you.
As with most books of this type, the worst part are the battles, and endless lists of divisions and corps attacking various towns. To be honest, I could never keep track of the battle, although some of the maps later in the book proved quite helpful. Part of me wished for a little bit more context on Slim's life, and his role in the Indian Army in the interwar years, but he wasn't the type to talk about himself like that.
In closing, a fascinating look at a forgotten theater of war, and a humble memoir from an able soldier.
The best parts of the book are how incredibly British Slim is, and a glimpse into the polyglot, colonial army of the British Empire, with Brits, Indians of hundreds of tribes and castes, and Africans all fighting alongside Americans, Chinese, and miscellaneous members of the commonwealth. Next are the observations on command, organizational spirit and morale, and the management of an army at the end of the most shoe-string logistics system an army has ever had to operate with.
Slim has few kind words for the Japanese (at one point he describes them as "the finest military insect on the planet"), but he admires the tenacity of their ordinary soldier, while critiquing the blind aggressiveness of their commanders, and the brutality inflicted on prisoners and the Burmese population. This is only fair; the Imperial Japanese Army were some of the worst war criminals this planet has ever seen, and Slim's thoughts about their command structure and penchant for atrocities are only too true. If casually genteel racism of the mid-20th century sort is a deal-breaker, this is not the book for you.
As with most books of this type, the worst part are the battles, and endless lists of divisions and corps attacking various towns. To be honest, I could never keep track of the battle, although some of the maps later in the book proved quite helpful. Part of me wished for a little bit more context on Slim's life, and his role in the Indian Army in the interwar years, but he wasn't the type to talk about himself like that.
In closing, a fascinating look at a forgotten theater of war, and a humble memoir from an able soldier.
January 15, 2013
An excellent book by a great leader of men. Field Marshal William Slim was one of the most understated of the Allied commanders during the Second World War. Not surprisingly he was assigned command of the 14th Army which came to be called "The Forgotten Army." This book by the general himself speaks of the arduous campaigns the Allies faced in Burma and India, facing a foe they had never come across before, the Japanese whose commitment to their goals was legendary. Slim's book also brings out his charm, his natural ability to get the best out of his men and his humility which is a trait one seldom associates with leading commanders of those times.
September 15, 2017
To many William Slim was possibly the finest British (and possibly Allied) General to serve during the Second World War. It is not readily known that the victor of Imphal was also a novelist between wars so this is one of the rarest of items, a memoir written by a general who can actually write! As memoirs go Slim lays out clearly how the war with Japan went and what it to took to turn a beaten army into a winner. Slim gives credit to all, and his portrait of Vinegar Joe Stilwell is essential. I cannot praise this book highly enough.
February 5, 2020
The best historical account of a Pacific campaign in WWII I’ve read. This book is full of leadership, tactical, and operational lessons applicable to military leaders of all ranks. My book is highlighted and tabbed for future reference; I’m confident I will revisit it. While it is not the best written book I’ve ever read, the quality of the content enabled me to get past Slim’s unique writing style.
March 16, 2020
Don’t get me wrong, there are some fantastic nuggets of leadership gold in the rather large book, but the constant log of battles and who did what where starts to wear thin.
December 30, 2021
Sir William Slim’s honest and short to the point telling of Burma Campaign during WW2.
February 26, 2022
As military memoirs go, this one ranks right up there with the memoirs of Ulysses Grant. It offers detailed accounts of battles, lessons in leadership, great respect for ordinary soldiers as well as for subordinate commanders, insights into strategy and tactics and the crucial importance of supply, and recognition of the terrible human costs of war (the latter leading to Slim's expressions of contempt for the brutality of the Japanese military, balanced by frank assessment of rank-and-file Japanese soldiers as about the best one could find for fanatical devotion to duty and capacity to endure hardship). It's also well written.
The only reason I didn't give it five stars is that there's a lot of the same rehashing of battle details that Grant indulged in: then this division moved up to that line spanning these three towns, et cetera. In Slim's case, especially given the smaller pages of the paperback edition and especially in the opening section on the 1942 retreat from Burma, the accompanying maps are not adequate.
A reader can guess why Slim was able to restore morale in what was originally a badly defeated army. His memoir points out a number of mistakes he made over the years, but every reference to his subordinates and the occasional individual soldier he met is laudatory.
Some of the lessons he drew from the campaign are also applicable outside military affairs. For example, his description of air transport and other vital supply means sounds like a description of the lean, just-in-time inventory practice that came into vogue for North American corporations decades later. Also sounding quite contemporary is his support for a system of operations that lets trained subordinates whose morale has been built up, from the division down to the platoon level, make tactical decisions for themselves in pursuit of an overall objective that has been clearly explained to them.
And there's no forgetting about the cost of all this. The book refers many times to tragic and sometimes brutal deaths.
The only reason I didn't give it five stars is that there's a lot of the same rehashing of battle details that Grant indulged in: then this division moved up to that line spanning these three towns, et cetera. In Slim's case, especially given the smaller pages of the paperback edition and especially in the opening section on the 1942 retreat from Burma, the accompanying maps are not adequate.
A reader can guess why Slim was able to restore morale in what was originally a badly defeated army. His memoir points out a number of mistakes he made over the years, but every reference to his subordinates and the occasional individual soldier he met is laudatory.
Some of the lessons he drew from the campaign are also applicable outside military affairs. For example, his description of air transport and other vital supply means sounds like a description of the lean, just-in-time inventory practice that came into vogue for North American corporations decades later. Also sounding quite contemporary is his support for a system of operations that lets trained subordinates whose morale has been built up, from the division down to the platoon level, make tactical decisions for themselves in pursuit of an overall objective that has been clearly explained to them.
And there's no forgetting about the cost of all this. The book refers many times to tragic and sometimes brutal deaths.
March 11, 2016
It is rare to read a memoir by a senior commander (or executive) and encounter the phrase "I was wrong." It appears frequently in this well written, thoughtful and remarkably modest account of WWII in Burma.
The Burma front is little known, and often dismissed as a sideshow. Yet Slim simultaneously tied up tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers who might otherwise have been deployed to the main Pacific theater and virtually invented modern all-arms warfare.
"Required reading" for all students of the art of leadership.
The Burma front is little known, and often dismissed as a sideshow. Yet Slim simultaneously tied up tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers who might otherwise have been deployed to the main Pacific theater and virtually invented modern all-arms warfare.
"Required reading" for all students of the art of leadership.
February 13, 2017
This was a very detailed and informative book about the Burma campaign, and how the British Empire, American, and Chinese forces learned to defeat the Japanese with a very slender supply line.
April 27, 2022
This is the autobiographical account of a British general, later promoted to Field Marshall for these exploits, who led British, Indian, and Burmese troops during the fight primarily for Burma during WWII. Initially defeated by the Japanese and driven out of Burma, Slim reorganized his troops and prepared for an eventually successful counterattack which slaughtered the Japanese and drove them out of Burma.
This book is at least twice as long as it should have been. I think the author's vanity led him to include a lot of nitty gritty details.
There are several comments which should be emphasized. When Slim was a young military cadet aspiring to be an office someday, he was reading the old "Principles of War" when his Sergeant Major found him. He surveyed Slim with amusement then commented, "Don't bother your head about all them things, me lad. There's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'!" That's one of the best simple summaries I've ever seen.
Another is Slim's comment on Japanese leadership (p. 521). "The Japanese were ruthless and bold as ants while their designs went well, but if those plans were disturbed or thrown out--ant-like again--they fell into confusion, were slow to readjust themselves, and invariably clung too long to their original schemes. This, to commanders, with their unquenchable military optimism, which rarely allowed inn their narrow administrative margins for any set-back or delay, was particularly dangerous. The fundamental fault of their generalship was a lack of moral, as distinct from physical, courage. They were not prepared to admit that they had made a mistake, that their plans had misfired and needed recasting. That would have meant personal failure in the service of the Emperor and loss of face. Rather than confess that, they passed on to their subordinates, unchanged, the orders they had themselves received, well knowing that with the resources available the tasks demanded were impossible. Time and again, this blind passing of responsibility ran down a chain of disaster from the Commander-in-Chief to the lowest level of leadership. It is true that in war determination by itself may achieve results, while flexibility, without determination in reserve, cannot, but it is only the blending of the two that brings final success. The hardest test of generalship is to hold this balance between flexibility and determination. In this the Japanese failed. They scored highly by determination; they paid heavily for lack if flexibility." No other comment needed here.
The last comment I want to highlight is Slim's description of Japanese prison camps (p.515). "The state of these camps and of their wretched inmates can only be realized by those who saw them as they were at this time. Except for derelict huts and bashas, the camps were little more than barbed wire enclosures in which wild beasts might have been herded together. The Japenese and Korean gaolers, almost without exception, were at the best callously indifferent to suffering, or, at the worst, bestially sadistic. The food was of a quality and a quantity barely enough to keep men alive, let alone fit them for the hard labour that most were driven to perform. It was horrifying to see them moving slowing about these sordid camps, all emaciated, many walking skeletons, numbers covered with suppurating sores, and most naked but for the ragged shorts they had worn for years or loin cloths of sacking. The most heart-moving of all were those who lay on wretched pallets, their strength ebbing faster than relief could be brought to them. There can be no excuse for a nation which as a matter of policy treats its prisoners of war in this way, and no honour for an army, however brave, which willingly makes itself the instrument of such inhumanity to the helpless." There are other WWII historians who have detailed the Japanese inhumanity to man in even more detail than Slim's account. However, to my knowledge, the Japanese military responsible for these acts has never been brought to justice, nor has the Japanese government ever been forced to apologize to the USA and other countries for their actions. The primary fault for letting them get away with their war crimes lies with General MacArthur.
This book is at least twice as long as it should have been. I think the author's vanity led him to include a lot of nitty gritty details.
There are several comments which should be emphasized. When Slim was a young military cadet aspiring to be an office someday, he was reading the old "Principles of War" when his Sergeant Major found him. He surveyed Slim with amusement then commented, "Don't bother your head about all them things, me lad. There's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'!" That's one of the best simple summaries I've ever seen.
Another is Slim's comment on Japanese leadership (p. 521). "The Japanese were ruthless and bold as ants while their designs went well, but if those plans were disturbed or thrown out--ant-like again--they fell into confusion, were slow to readjust themselves, and invariably clung too long to their original schemes. This, to commanders, with their unquenchable military optimism, which rarely allowed inn their narrow administrative margins for any set-back or delay, was particularly dangerous. The fundamental fault of their generalship was a lack of moral, as distinct from physical, courage. They were not prepared to admit that they had made a mistake, that their plans had misfired and needed recasting. That would have meant personal failure in the service of the Emperor and loss of face. Rather than confess that, they passed on to their subordinates, unchanged, the orders they had themselves received, well knowing that with the resources available the tasks demanded were impossible. Time and again, this blind passing of responsibility ran down a chain of disaster from the Commander-in-Chief to the lowest level of leadership. It is true that in war determination by itself may achieve results, while flexibility, without determination in reserve, cannot, but it is only the blending of the two that brings final success. The hardest test of generalship is to hold this balance between flexibility and determination. In this the Japanese failed. They scored highly by determination; they paid heavily for lack if flexibility." No other comment needed here.
The last comment I want to highlight is Slim's description of Japanese prison camps (p.515). "The state of these camps and of their wretched inmates can only be realized by those who saw them as they were at this time. Except for derelict huts and bashas, the camps were little more than barbed wire enclosures in which wild beasts might have been herded together. The Japenese and Korean gaolers, almost without exception, were at the best callously indifferent to suffering, or, at the worst, bestially sadistic. The food was of a quality and a quantity barely enough to keep men alive, let alone fit them for the hard labour that most were driven to perform. It was horrifying to see them moving slowing about these sordid camps, all emaciated, many walking skeletons, numbers covered with suppurating sores, and most naked but for the ragged shorts they had worn for years or loin cloths of sacking. The most heart-moving of all were those who lay on wretched pallets, their strength ebbing faster than relief could be brought to them. There can be no excuse for a nation which as a matter of policy treats its prisoners of war in this way, and no honour for an army, however brave, which willingly makes itself the instrument of such inhumanity to the helpless." There are other WWII historians who have detailed the Japanese inhumanity to man in even more detail than Slim's account. However, to my knowledge, the Japanese military responsible for these acts has never been brought to justice, nor has the Japanese government ever been forced to apologize to the USA and other countries for their actions. The primary fault for letting them get away with their war crimes lies with General MacArthur.
July 31, 2021
First, this is a great book. Second, please, please read it before or after reading Quartered Safe Out Here by George MacDonald Fraser. The latter, about the Burma Campaign, is one of the best ever first-person accounts of war by a private soldier; the former, also about the Burma Campaign, is one of the best ever first-person accounts of war by a general officer. Must be something in the Irrawadddy water.
A warning or two. You may have heard the old military history saw that amateurs talk tactics while professionals talk logistics. It is true. This book is all “lines of communications,” and “supply,” you know, “bullets and beans;” how much will we need, over what period of time, and how we are going to get it there. This is staff work, and that is what this book is mostly about. After the staff work, there are lots of troop movements and battles, and for all that, I highly recommend one or more really good maps, if you are not to have your eyes glaze over reading about places you (probably) have never heard of. The maps in my paperback edition sucked, so I needed to go elsewhere. And remember your time period, since place names, including that of “Burma“ have changed. And yes, there is ample discussion of strategy, operations and tactics (for example, the best way to clear out a Japanese-held bunker; hint, tanks are useful). But the heart of this book is staff work, logistics, and leadership.
I found the first 100 pages or so, covering the retreat, a bit of a slog, as no doubt the poor participants did, at least the ones who survived. I think Slim may not write with the same verve and elan about defeat as he does victory. Who can blame him? Please know that he also exhibits the casual racism typical of his class and era. Also that there must be over a score of races, ethnic groups, and nationalities involved here, so lots of opportunities for offense to be given. You have been warned. That said, Slim’s book is a pleasure to read. His prose is a model of engaging simplicity. Slim’s descriptions of fellow officers, including the famous American Stilwell, are entertaining, and the stories of the campaigns are, in some places, exciting and riveting. In some ways this story, like so many others of the Pacific War, is one of revenge. It is well that this terrible war is behind us, but we would do well not to forget it, since the Japanese sadly seem intent on doing just that.
Slim himself is that rarity, a self-aware and humble general officer. He is liberal with praise for his troops, and also officers who worked for, with, and above him. Slim’s wartime success is a justly deserved thumb in the eye to his unjustly more famous contemporaries, the loathsome, self-promoting prima donnas Patton, Montgomery, and MacArthur. That Slim earned Montgomery’s enmity is one of the more telling things about Monty the man.
I will leave off the incredibly disappointing, indeed horrifying, revelation about Slim in his Wikipedia entry. Instead, I will finish with the truly touching tribute to Slim from G.M. Fraser. I can’t imagine a better thing said about a superior by a subordinate: “And when it was over and [Slim] spoke of what his army had done, it was always ‘you,’ not even ‘we,’ and never ‘I.’”
A warning or two. You may have heard the old military history saw that amateurs talk tactics while professionals talk logistics. It is true. This book is all “lines of communications,” and “supply,” you know, “bullets and beans;” how much will we need, over what period of time, and how we are going to get it there. This is staff work, and that is what this book is mostly about. After the staff work, there are lots of troop movements and battles, and for all that, I highly recommend one or more really good maps, if you are not to have your eyes glaze over reading about places you (probably) have never heard of. The maps in my paperback edition sucked, so I needed to go elsewhere. And remember your time period, since place names, including that of “Burma“ have changed. And yes, there is ample discussion of strategy, operations and tactics (for example, the best way to clear out a Japanese-held bunker; hint, tanks are useful). But the heart of this book is staff work, logistics, and leadership.
I found the first 100 pages or so, covering the retreat, a bit of a slog, as no doubt the poor participants did, at least the ones who survived. I think Slim may not write with the same verve and elan about defeat as he does victory. Who can blame him? Please know that he also exhibits the casual racism typical of his class and era. Also that there must be over a score of races, ethnic groups, and nationalities involved here, so lots of opportunities for offense to be given. You have been warned. That said, Slim’s book is a pleasure to read. His prose is a model of engaging simplicity. Slim’s descriptions of fellow officers, including the famous American Stilwell, are entertaining, and the stories of the campaigns are, in some places, exciting and riveting. In some ways this story, like so many others of the Pacific War, is one of revenge. It is well that this terrible war is behind us, but we would do well not to forget it, since the Japanese sadly seem intent on doing just that.
Slim himself is that rarity, a self-aware and humble general officer. He is liberal with praise for his troops, and also officers who worked for, with, and above him. Slim’s wartime success is a justly deserved thumb in the eye to his unjustly more famous contemporaries, the loathsome, self-promoting prima donnas Patton, Montgomery, and MacArthur. That Slim earned Montgomery’s enmity is one of the more telling things about Monty the man.
I will leave off the incredibly disappointing, indeed horrifying, revelation about Slim in his Wikipedia entry. Instead, I will finish with the truly touching tribute to Slim from G.M. Fraser. I can’t imagine a better thing said about a superior by a subordinate: “And when it was over and [Slim] spoke of what his army had done, it was always ‘you,’ not even ‘we,’ and never ‘I.’”
February 8, 2023
I am shocked to have discovered this book so late: for the past 25+ years I have read books on WW2. I consider this one possibly the best general's book of the whole war.
General Slim took over as commander in Burma shortly after the British has lost Rangoon, and remained in charge until the final defeat of the Japanese forces. He was in charge while the British lost of all Burma, evacuated into India, then slowly but surely reconquered the country, with very few means compared to the luxury war in Europe. "Defeat Into Victory" describes, in great depth, both the path taken, and the decisions that had to be made with the factors at hand: a truly exceptional combination.
The book also describes Orde Wingate's expedition behind Japanese lines, with interesting information on the process. Wingate was one of the primary inspirations behind the audacious tactics of Israel's armed forces.
This book is illuminating and self-deprecating. Beyond warfare, it provides an extraordinary education into leadership in hard times. I am a CEO with a good number of startups in my past. I wish I had read this book prior to my first chance at the leadership of a startup---it would have been a big help. Among many passages, here is one I find of extraordinary value, describing his lessons learned when finding himself back in India, defeated, and needing to forge the army again and bring it back into Burma:
" Defeat is bitter. Bitter to the common soldier, but trebly bitter to his general. [...] He will go over in his mind the events of the campaign. 'Here', he will think, 'I went wrong; there I took counsel of my fears when I should have been bold; [...]' [...] In a dark hour he will turn in upon himself and question the very foundation of his leadership [...].
And then he must stop! For, if he is ever to command in battle again, he must shake off these regrets, and stamp on them, [...] and cast out the doubts born of failure. Forget them, and remember only the lessons to be learned from defeat---they are more than from victory."
General Slim took over as commander in Burma shortly after the British has lost Rangoon, and remained in charge until the final defeat of the Japanese forces. He was in charge while the British lost of all Burma, evacuated into India, then slowly but surely reconquered the country, with very few means compared to the luxury war in Europe. "Defeat Into Victory" describes, in great depth, both the path taken, and the decisions that had to be made with the factors at hand: a truly exceptional combination.
The book also describes Orde Wingate's expedition behind Japanese lines, with interesting information on the process. Wingate was one of the primary inspirations behind the audacious tactics of Israel's armed forces.
This book is illuminating and self-deprecating. Beyond warfare, it provides an extraordinary education into leadership in hard times. I am a CEO with a good number of startups in my past. I wish I had read this book prior to my first chance at the leadership of a startup---it would have been a big help. Among many passages, here is one I find of extraordinary value, describing his lessons learned when finding himself back in India, defeated, and needing to forge the army again and bring it back into Burma:
" Defeat is bitter. Bitter to the common soldier, but trebly bitter to his general. [...] He will go over in his mind the events of the campaign. 'Here', he will think, 'I went wrong; there I took counsel of my fears when I should have been bold; [...]' [...] In a dark hour he will turn in upon himself and question the very foundation of his leadership [...].
And then he must stop! For, if he is ever to command in battle again, he must shake off these regrets, and stamp on them, [...] and cast out the doubts born of failure. Forget them, and remember only the lessons to be learned from defeat---they are more than from victory."
May 16, 2023
Slim's account of the three-year British campaign in Burma is the most comprehensive account of this forgotten theater of WWII. This is probably the best-written report of any campaign in WWII by a general officer. He combines great insight, colorful detail, and a wonderful humility probably lacking from any other general, save Eisenhower, in that war. In one illuminating passage about a victory in a battle that helped turn the tide in Burma in 1944 Slim writes in typical self-effacing fashion, "I was, like other generals before me, to be saved from the consequences of my mistakes by the resourcefulness of my subordinate commanders and the stubborn valour of my troops." Slim tells of the disastrous retreat from Burma into India in 1942, when the Japanese were hailed as 'supermen' who couldn't be beaten in the jungle. He reformed his army in India, whilst keeping pressure up on the Japanese with small offensives (including the famous Chindits long range penetration group led by their eccentric commander Orde Wingate). He lobbied relentlessly for material and resources for a theater that was deemed ancillary to Europe and the Pacific. He convinced his troops they could beat the Japanese and went about rebuilding his fighting forces through the officers who remained doggedly loyal to him. It is a remarkable tale of how Slim built and led his multinational army (Sikh, Hindi, Bengali, Gurkha, East African, West African and British) on a shoestring and in the most difficult climactic conditions, while coordinating with oftentimes difficult American and Chinese allies. His dash for Rangoon in the spring of 1945 was the eastern equivalent of Germany's Blitzkrieg in France in 1940. During this last offensive the Japanese Army sustained among the largest losses in their history (remember the islands campaign conducted by the United States normally involved much smaller forces at each battle). Although the detail can be daunting at times, I urge anyone with an interest in this theater to read Slim's outstanding history.
September 6, 2022
The theatre of war is never an easy read for me but when a book is well written, filled with detail, and shows awareness and a degree of both humanity, humility, and honesty then you know you have a good read.
This is a book written in the 1950s but is probably as relevant today as it was then for anyone looking to lead men into danger. It helps to be a good and successful general but also to a first-rate writer.
I was driven to read this book, not by its plaudits but because my step-dad served in the Burma campaign although he never talked about it, I knew he won the Burma Star as did all who took part in that forgotten war. I was just interested in what it was like - and it was unlike any war I had previously read about - in fact it was a war that was both savage and more grueling than any other in WW2 - I understand now why it was no topic to remind people about. The fact that illness was far more likely than being wounded, that equipment was very limited and that the enemy died rather than surrendered tells you more about this battle in a corner of a foreign land.
That it took me more than four years to finish has nothing to do with the quality of the narrative but was simply a matter of it being left on a bookshelf 300 miles from my home and retrieved slower than the taking back of Burma!
This is a book written in the 1950s but is probably as relevant today as it was then for anyone looking to lead men into danger. It helps to be a good and successful general but also to a first-rate writer.
I was driven to read this book, not by its plaudits but because my step-dad served in the Burma campaign although he never talked about it, I knew he won the Burma Star as did all who took part in that forgotten war. I was just interested in what it was like - and it was unlike any war I had previously read about - in fact it was a war that was both savage and more grueling than any other in WW2 - I understand now why it was no topic to remind people about. The fact that illness was far more likely than being wounded, that equipment was very limited and that the enemy died rather than surrendered tells you more about this battle in a corner of a foreign land.
That it took me more than four years to finish has nothing to do with the quality of the narrative but was simply a matter of it being left on a bookshelf 300 miles from my home and retrieved slower than the taking back of Burma!
February 26, 2019
Before reviewing Defeat into Victory, it has to be borne in mind that it's written by a British militarily aristocrat in the 1940s and as such, racism and imperialism are to be expected. Having made that disclaimer, Slim doesn't come across as a racist (particularly given the information available in his day and age) but he is an unabashed imperialist.
Defeat into Victory however, is a military account and purely that. As such, it has little to do with politics. And Slim proves himself to be a capable army commander but more than that, am excellent narrator. This is a book targeted largely at military men/women, thinkers and planners and is a detailed strategic, tactical and operational account of the war in Burma. Slim writes with a remarkable candour but while he makes no attempt to hide his likes and dislikes he's always exceedingly civil and objective, and not once does he resort to nastiness (even in cases where most men would have at least made serious objections). He gives credit to more than just himself and amply to his men and takes personal responsibility for failures.
Defeat into Victory is an absolute must read for anybody interested in Indian military history, jungle warfare, warfare in general, and WWII.
Defeat into Victory however, is a military account and purely that. As such, it has little to do with politics. And Slim proves himself to be a capable army commander but more than that, am excellent narrator. This is a book targeted largely at military men/women, thinkers and planners and is a detailed strategic, tactical and operational account of the war in Burma. Slim writes with a remarkable candour but while he makes no attempt to hide his likes and dislikes he's always exceedingly civil and objective, and not once does he resort to nastiness (even in cases where most men would have at least made serious objections). He gives credit to more than just himself and amply to his men and takes personal responsibility for failures.
Defeat into Victory is an absolute must read for anybody interested in Indian military history, jungle warfare, warfare in general, and WWII.
February 4, 2020
This was a tough one for me to rate. Difficult in the realm of readability but absolutely priceless in its depths of leadership lessons and military applicability.
From being on multiple senior leaders reading lists (quoted frequently by Gen Mattis) to being part of the core curriculum for new Field Grade Officers at the Army’s Command and General Staff College, finishing this book almost felt like a right of passage.
The good:
As alluded to before, this is an absolute goldmine of leadership lessons particularly in the context of large scale combat operations. I think I highlighted something on nearly every page. While these are the raw memoirs of Field Marshal Slim nearly 80 years ago in a unique theater, the lessons are as pertinent for today.
The ugly:
The organization and ability to follow along with the narrative is challenging. The maps at the beginning of each book don’t really assist the reader in being able to track the myriad of company to division size movements Slim machine guns onto each page. This was the only aspect that kept me from giving the book 5-stars. I think a serious revision/clean up would greatly assist in this realm.
Regardless of the bad, this marked up book will retain a prominent spot on my bookshelf.
From being on multiple senior leaders reading lists (quoted frequently by Gen Mattis) to being part of the core curriculum for new Field Grade Officers at the Army’s Command and General Staff College, finishing this book almost felt like a right of passage.
The good:
As alluded to before, this is an absolute goldmine of leadership lessons particularly in the context of large scale combat operations. I think I highlighted something on nearly every page. While these are the raw memoirs of Field Marshal Slim nearly 80 years ago in a unique theater, the lessons are as pertinent for today.
The ugly:
The organization and ability to follow along with the narrative is challenging. The maps at the beginning of each book don’t really assist the reader in being able to track the myriad of company to division size movements Slim machine guns onto each page. This was the only aspect that kept me from giving the book 5-stars. I think a serious revision/clean up would greatly assist in this realm.
Regardless of the bad, this marked up book will retain a prominent spot on my bookshelf.
February 9, 2023
Excellent memoir of General Slim’s experience commanding the troops that defeated the Japanese in Burma. While the war in Burma is often regarded as a sideshow, its important contribution was the widespread destruction of Japanese ground and air forces that could have been used in other theaters.
Slim shows how the British forces in Burma went from being run out of Burma in 1942 to regrouping and forcing the Japanese out of Burma. Although under supplied and under equipped, his forces began their offensive in 1943, first rolling the Japanese back in northern Burma. The effort culminated in retaking Rangoon and southern Burma and ending organized Japanese resistance in 1945.
Some things Slim stated as essential to victory:
1. Discipline.
2. Logistics and reducing material needs as much as possible.
3. Air power and air transport.
4. Proper use of special forces.
5. Lower echelon understanding of supreme commander’s intent, since widely scattered formations in jungles would only be under loose control of the supreme commander.
One reviewer indicated that this memoir ranks alongside Ulysses Grant’s memoir. I would second that. This is a fine memoir about a campaign that too few are familiar with.
Slim shows how the British forces in Burma went from being run out of Burma in 1942 to regrouping and forcing the Japanese out of Burma. Although under supplied and under equipped, his forces began their offensive in 1943, first rolling the Japanese back in northern Burma. The effort culminated in retaking Rangoon and southern Burma and ending organized Japanese resistance in 1945.
Some things Slim stated as essential to victory:
1. Discipline.
2. Logistics and reducing material needs as much as possible.
3. Air power and air transport.
4. Proper use of special forces.
5. Lower echelon understanding of supreme commander’s intent, since widely scattered formations in jungles would only be under loose control of the supreme commander.
One reviewer indicated that this memoir ranks alongside Ulysses Grant’s memoir. I would second that. This is a fine memoir about a campaign that too few are familiar with.
January 22, 2024
This is a dense, complex, and occasionally dry history, one that has to be read with a map and a decent knowledge of military organization to begin with. But that's fine, because those are probably the sorts of people who will be reading this book anyway.
As campaign history from World War II written by the commander, it's in a class by itself--none of the self-glorying of Guderian, none of the ass-covering of Omar Bradley, Slim does no blaming of his fellow commanders, allies, superiors, or subordinates as he details what happened in Burma and what he'd tried to make happen. His illustration of how reality differed from his plans, and his honest owning of his mistakes, faulty assumptions, and errors, are incredible to read. Not only that, but it's rare to read a commander from World War II--or any war, really--who recognizes that they are not the main effort of the War and who actually understood that and accepted it.
Slim proves himself an incredible leader, an able tactician, and an incredibly gutsy commander. If you have any interest in the Pacific Theater, what it takes to make a great operational leader, or what the realities and pressures of command at that level look like, it's hard to do better than this book.
As campaign history from World War II written by the commander, it's in a class by itself--none of the self-glorying of Guderian, none of the ass-covering of Omar Bradley, Slim does no blaming of his fellow commanders, allies, superiors, or subordinates as he details what happened in Burma and what he'd tried to make happen. His illustration of how reality differed from his plans, and his honest owning of his mistakes, faulty assumptions, and errors, are incredible to read. Not only that, but it's rare to read a commander from World War II--or any war, really--who recognizes that they are not the main effort of the War and who actually understood that and accepted it.
Slim proves himself an incredible leader, an able tactician, and an incredibly gutsy commander. If you have any interest in the Pacific Theater, what it takes to make a great operational leader, or what the realities and pressures of command at that level look like, it's hard to do better than this book.
September 25, 2018
The account of Field Marshal Bill Slim's 14th army's retreat from and then defeat of the Japanese in Burma in WWII. It is an interesting story overall, but this is a General's point of view, and most of the book discusses logistics, political problems, and strategic goals. It is quite dry and relatively anecdote poor. The author has the racist views of the Japanese that were common at the time among the allied forces. He also discusses the behavioral traits of the various ethnic groups under his command including, Indians, Gorkhas, Chinese, Sikhs, British, and Burmans, especially in a vignette describing an incident where he came under fire while among enlisted men and imagined how they would each react to his being wounded. There is a sad comment that I had never heard, about how General MacArthur, in an action typical of his narcissism, refused to let the Brits move to save their prisoners of war until after he had ceremoniously accepted the Japanese surrender in Japan. The several day postponement almost certainly led to the death of some prisoners. I would recommend this to you if you have a special interest in this particular story or theatre of war, but not otherwise.
July 5, 2023
My father was in the China Burma India (CBI) theatre in World War 2 so I read books that might help me understand what he experienced. This memoir by Field Marshal Viscount Slim describes his 1942-1945 experiences from the British viewpoint. His daily, sometimes hourly, descriptions are quite detailed for the layperson. The events are primarily in Burma and India. The book was well-received upon its 1956 publication. Slim's reflections on individuals, the many countries involved from around the British Empire and within the Asia-Pacific Theatre, and the cultures of warfare are interesting and informative. But I merely perused battle details and strategies at some point as everything constantly changed, there being in his words, no focused strategy. It was hard to follow at points as he often wrote chapters based on battles, not chronologically, for instance sometimes shifting from May back to March of a year. It gave little information on the American initiatives in the CBI theatre, but lots on the diversity of cultures fighting there and how it impacted the often confusing strategies and outcomes.
April 12, 2023
About as good a leadership memoir as you could want. Frank assessments of his own performance in leading a multi-national coalition of troops in both a horrific retreat through the jungle during the monsoon, regrouping and retraining, then fighting to victory in Burma (modern day Myanmar). Invaluable comments, informed by his experiences, on:
1) Leading a diverse group.
2) Putting people first.
3) Spreading the credit.
4) Making do with what you have.
5) The value of preparation.
6) The components of morale
7) In one of the more startling passages I've read in some time, the value of accepting and learning from failure.
The non-military reader has to be tolerant of a great deal of discussion of troop movements, and a little bit of allowance must be made for the passage of time; Slim's language is unmistakably imperial. For the time, however, he is a very tolerant individual and explicitly criticizes unnamed colleagues and superiors for prejudice and insensitivity to his non-white troops, on whom he heaps lavish praise throughout the book. Just a bit odd to see Mahatma Gandhi referred to in passing as an adversary.
Highly recommended, assuming some interest in military history.
4.5/5
1) Leading a diverse group.
2) Putting people first.
3) Spreading the credit.
4) Making do with what you have.
5) The value of preparation.
6) The components of morale
7) In one of the more startling passages I've read in some time, the value of accepting and learning from failure.
The non-military reader has to be tolerant of a great deal of discussion of troop movements, and a little bit of allowance must be made for the passage of time; Slim's language is unmistakably imperial. For the time, however, he is a very tolerant individual and explicitly criticizes unnamed colleagues and superiors for prejudice and insensitivity to his non-white troops, on whom he heaps lavish praise throughout the book. Just a bit odd to see Mahatma Gandhi referred to in passing as an adversary.
Highly recommended, assuming some interest in military history.
4.5/5
December 31, 2021
A timeless classic with lessons applicable to warfare, modern and post-modern (if that’s even a thing). Slim’s account is thorough, accurate and matter of fact. His openness and frank discussion of his own mistakes is refreshing and unlike any other memoir written by highly decorated generals/admirals. The book is full of gold nuggets for small unit leaders, mid level professionals, and strategic thinkers. The time spent in detail is not as ponderous as some official histories. Rather, Slim uses it to punctuate a point he is trying to make or expand on an example made in generality.
Any reading of the chronological histories should be accompanied by memoirs to provide a detailed and nuanced understanding from a certain perspective. Slim’s stands out for his grounded honesty, clear insights and wisdom, and the ability to take lessons forward deep into the future, if only we are willing to see and learn.
Any reading of the chronological histories should be accompanied by memoirs to provide a detailed and nuanced understanding from a certain perspective. Slim’s stands out for his grounded honesty, clear insights and wisdom, and the ability to take lessons forward deep into the future, if only we are willing to see and learn.
June 8, 2019
I admit it is my first book on WW2 in Asia, but wow. What they had to endure is beyond imagination, what they improvised is amazing and how they did it all beats everything. Although this book is clearly written from a high rank perspective (everything under a full Division being 'a small force'), the author passes on his honest insights, mistakes, lessons learned and judgements at the time and afterwards. He gives everything from his day schedule to the biggest dilemma's he has wresteld with as a brigadier up to Allied Commander. Nice as well that he gives all due praise to the officers and men that helped him throughout the whole campaign. Loved it and DEFINITELY recommend it to anyone interested in what happened in Asia during WO2.
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