What do you think?
Rate this book
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
The update of this classic treatise on the behavior of great powers takes a penetrating look at the question likely to dominate international relations in the twenty-first century: Can China rise peacefully? To John J. Mearsheimer, great power politics are tragic because the anarchy of the international system requires states to seek dominance at one another s expense, dooming even peaceful nations to a relentless power struggle. The best survival strategy in this dangerous world is to become a regional hegemon like the United States in the Western Hemisphere and to make sure that no other hegemon emerges elsewhere. In a new concluding chapter, Mearsheimer examines the course of Sino-American relations should China continue its ascent to greater economic and military power. He predicts that China will attempt to dominate Asia while the United States, determined to remain the world s sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to contain China. The tragedy of great power politics is inescapable."
592 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
About the author
John J. Mearsheimer
26 books711 followersJohn Joseph Mearsheimer (1947) is an American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation.
Mearsheimer is best known for developing the theory of offensive realism, which describes the interaction between great powers as being primarily driven by the rational desire to achieve regional hegemony in an anarchic international system. In accordance with his theory, Mearsheimer believes that China's growing power will likely bring it into conflict with the United States.
Mearsheimer's works are widely read and debated by 21st-century students of international relations. A 2017 survey of US international relations faculty ranks him third among "scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years.
Mearsheimer is best known for developing the theory of offensive realism, which describes the interaction between great powers as being primarily driven by the rational desire to achieve regional hegemony in an anarchic international system. In accordance with his theory, Mearsheimer believes that China's growing power will likely bring it into conflict with the United States.
Mearsheimer's works are widely read and debated by 21st-century students of international relations. A 2017 survey of US international relations faculty ranks him third among "scholars whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 193 reviews
April 17, 2009
Dear John (Mearsheimer):
Of all the realists, you suck the least.
Of all the realists, you suck the least.
May 1, 2016
Well, Eloquent as the narrative is , a large proportion of Mr John. Mearsheimer's aggressive realism theory cannot be applied to the 21st century.
Personally I am not inclined to subject to his theory which reminds me of the Dark Forests laws involved in a si-fi book Three Body Problems in which a rather bleak prospect will be presented for everyone. Just cannot imagine such things shall occur. Will detail the reasons and analysis about the book soon.
Mr Mearsheimer wants to validate his theory by prophesying that China can not rise peacefully.It come to my admission that I would not accept this prediction nor I will defend for China. Maybe I don't have some original ideas to think about this grand question. Even I have some, I shall be vigilant that "the intimate revelations of a young girl or at least the terms in which she express them are usually plagiaristic and marred by obvious suppressions "
But some parts of his theory could possibly wrong.
His theory was based on the hypothesis of the three characters of the current international system that could contribute to the antagonism between nations and that I find quite suspicious.
first, the current system lacks a central authority that could transcend all the nations and prevent the violation against each other. second, nations are always in possession of the military capabilities to attack each other. third, a nation can never clearly know the intentions of other nations. The utmost priority of a nation is to survive all the odds: in order to survive, to be a hegemony can secure a nation's survival.
Well, these points seem to bear some resemblance with the Dark forest law that goes like the following:
“The universe is a dark forest. Every civilization is an armed hunter stalking through the trees like a ghost, gently pushing aside branches that block the path and trying to tread without sound. Even breathing is done with care. The hunter has to be careful, because everywhere in the forest are stealthy hunters like him. If he finds other life—another hunter, an angel or a demon, a delicate infant or a tottering old man, a fairy or a demigod—there’s only one thing he can do: open fire and eliminate them. In this forest, hell is other people. An eternal threat that any life that exposes its own existence will be swiftly wiped out. This is the picture of cosmic civilization. It’s the explanation for the Fermi Paradox.”
But the international relations could not be like this in the 21st century. suffice to say, it could not be a zero-sum game. Why? here we go.
1. International studies will be in a dynamic process of evolving. Any theory about the social development can explain the past well in some sense but we all know it is easy to define what is past than to predict the future. History can provide food for thoughts for the people today, but even history itself has bewildering regressions that we cannot explain.
2.
International studies cannot be qualified very easily like maths or physics though the quantitative analysis of IR is on the way but still far from mature. IR is heavily influenced by the judgments and calculations of the leaders of different nations and it is not easy to predict human being's thoughts. So it seems reasonable to presume that IR would deteriorate if you think human nature is malicious. But here is the question. Is human nature bound to be malicious?? If you think it is and have quite pessimistic stance about it, IR would be a dark one. But if you are an optimist in the new century, IR seems not that bad as we imagine. WE need to have some confidence.
3.
in Chinese, the military power is"武". This Chinese character consists of another two characters"止 戈" . 止 means to prevent, to stop, to cease. And 戈 means weapon. So "武" means to "stop using weapons" . This is quite interesting, the utmost function of military power is to stop using military power. I think this implies some ancient wisdom.
Just as what art of war goes:Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, But in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.
4. I think It is no use to talk about if China or any other country can rise or not. What we should focus on is whether we can and how we can build a community represent human being's interests in this century.
(To BE Continued, Will analyse a bit about the difference between
Aggressive Realism and Moral Realism )
Personally I am not inclined to subject to his theory which reminds me of the Dark Forests laws involved in a si-fi book Three Body Problems in which a rather bleak prospect will be presented for everyone. Just cannot imagine such things shall occur. Will detail the reasons and analysis about the book soon.
Mr Mearsheimer wants to validate his theory by prophesying that China can not rise peacefully.It come to my admission that I would not accept this prediction nor I will defend for China. Maybe I don't have some original ideas to think about this grand question. Even I have some, I shall be vigilant that "the intimate revelations of a young girl or at least the terms in which she express them are usually plagiaristic and marred by obvious suppressions "
But some parts of his theory could possibly wrong.
His theory was based on the hypothesis of the three characters of the current international system that could contribute to the antagonism between nations and that I find quite suspicious.
first, the current system lacks a central authority that could transcend all the nations and prevent the violation against each other. second, nations are always in possession of the military capabilities to attack each other. third, a nation can never clearly know the intentions of other nations. The utmost priority of a nation is to survive all the odds: in order to survive, to be a hegemony can secure a nation's survival.
Well, these points seem to bear some resemblance with the Dark forest law that goes like the following:
“The universe is a dark forest. Every civilization is an armed hunter stalking through the trees like a ghost, gently pushing aside branches that block the path and trying to tread without sound. Even breathing is done with care. The hunter has to be careful, because everywhere in the forest are stealthy hunters like him. If he finds other life—another hunter, an angel or a demon, a delicate infant or a tottering old man, a fairy or a demigod—there’s only one thing he can do: open fire and eliminate them. In this forest, hell is other people. An eternal threat that any life that exposes its own existence will be swiftly wiped out. This is the picture of cosmic civilization. It’s the explanation for the Fermi Paradox.”
But the international relations could not be like this in the 21st century. suffice to say, it could not be a zero-sum game. Why? here we go.
1. International studies will be in a dynamic process of evolving. Any theory about the social development can explain the past well in some sense but we all know it is easy to define what is past than to predict the future. History can provide food for thoughts for the people today, but even history itself has bewildering regressions that we cannot explain.
2.
International studies cannot be qualified very easily like maths or physics though the quantitative analysis of IR is on the way but still far from mature. IR is heavily influenced by the judgments and calculations of the leaders of different nations and it is not easy to predict human being's thoughts. So it seems reasonable to presume that IR would deteriorate if you think human nature is malicious. But here is the question. Is human nature bound to be malicious?? If you think it is and have quite pessimistic stance about it, IR would be a dark one. But if you are an optimist in the new century, IR seems not that bad as we imagine. WE need to have some confidence.
3.
in Chinese, the military power is"武". This Chinese character consists of another two characters"止 戈" . 止 means to prevent, to stop, to cease. And 戈 means weapon. So "武" means to "stop using weapons" . This is quite interesting, the utmost function of military power is to stop using military power. I think this implies some ancient wisdom.
Just as what art of war goes:Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, But in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.
4. I think It is no use to talk about if China or any other country can rise or not. What we should focus on is whether we can and how we can build a community represent human being's interests in this century.
(To BE Continued, Will analyse a bit about the difference between
Aggressive Realism and Moral Realism )
February 5, 2016
A long, heavily theoretical (social science) modelling of powers and great powers. Mearsheimer, who is quite brilliant, is a Realist, and argues for offensive realism as opposed to defensive realism. In offensive realism, nations of necessity seek to maximize their power at any cost, and must seek hegemony -- and thus war is always inevitable. In defensive realism, country simply seek to survive, and will seek a balance. Though I admire Mearsheimer's intelligence, I find a theoretical-modelling approached a dubious method for solving the problems of human history. One needs to approach history, I think, inductively (not hypothetically), and with a touch of poetry in one's fingers.
January 27, 2018
A very interesting book about great power politics and how governments either cooperate or confront each other to keep the balance of power. The book discusses different strategies of confrontation, containment or cooperation. Many good historical examples of buck-passing, bloodletting, and containment are given with concentration on WWI and WWII. The theory of the balance of power from an offensive realist point of view is discussed and many examples are given starting from the 17th century starting with the peace of Westphalia, to the French revolution, to the French hegemony with Napoleon, to the Crimean war, WWI and then WWII. The author also discusses the cold war and how America was able to contain the Soviet Union through accepting its role in Europe after WWII as a superpower and then using bloodletting at many instances to weaken the Soviet system.
August 5, 2016
I was old enough to remember the apocalyptic prognostications of WWIII with Mad Max and Terminator movies. After fall of the Berlin Wall fell and collapse of the Soviet Union, I bought into the "End of History" euphoria. I thought that democracies have triumphed and authoritarians' days were numbered. Realism seemed too cynical and pessimistic at the time. My main of objection to realism was that it didn't give enough weight to the internal traits of a state in determining its behavior. Democratic states have institutions and processes that make their governments accountable and rational (and conversely, authoritarian regimes are illegitimate, that's why they stay in power only through violence, therefore, their international relations reflect ulterior motives and irrational calculations.) Realism has a certain moral relativism that I'm uncomfortable with, but where I am in agreement is that the world is one "bad neighborhood" and all states do what they can for security. I included the outline of the notes that I took.
Hat tip to Robert D. Kaplan for recommending this book.
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John J. Mearsheimer (2001)
Chapter 1. Introduction
Democratic liberalism vs. Realism
Democratic Liberalism
States as main actors
Internal traits determine behavior
“Good” states are key to world power
Democratic peace theory
Realism
States as main actors too
The international environment determines behavior
Power calculations dominate strategic thinking
Americans dislike realism. Post-Cold War hopes, “End of History.”
Chapter 2. Anarchy and the struggle for power
Why states pursue power:
a. The international system is anarchic
b. Great powers have inherint offensive military potential
c. States can never be sure of each other's intentions
d. Survival is the primary goal of great powers
e. Great powers are rational actors
Maximize relative power with rivals
States calculate costs and risks as well as outside response before acting
Power and fear
a. Mutual assured destruction makes great powers feel safe
b. “The stopping power of water” Bodies of water greatly reduce great power offense capability
c. Balance of power between great powers determines level of fear. A multi-polar world is the most dangerous.
Heirarchial state goals
Non-security goals: Ideology or humanitarian intervention
World peace is a gamble. States are wary of collective security schemes. Modern history of international relations is full of treaties and alliances that collapsed.
Chapter 3. Wealth and power
Factors that determine a state's “latent power”
a. Population - Percentage of military age, percentage that can be mobilized or conscripted, how the state motivates to the public.
b. Material - Access to natural resources and the ability to transform into military systems and infrastructure
c. Wealth - Level of industrilization, development and trade
d. Technology - Ability to develop, adapt and apply new technology
e. Efficiency - Ability to manage all of the above
Chapter 4. The primacy of land power
Continental vs. Insular great powers
Nuclear superiority
Chapter 5. Strategies for survival
a. War - Direct attack as rationally calculated gamble
b. Blackmail -
c. Bait and bleed -
d. Bloodletting -
e. Balancing -
f. Buck-passing - Triple Entente tried to contain Wilhemine Germany. League of Nations tried to contain Nazi Germany.
g. Appeasement -
h. Bandwagoning - Minor or weak powers wait to see which side is ascendent before joining.
Operational state goals:
a. Regional hegemony
b. Maximum wealth
c. Pre-eminent land power
d. Nuclear superiority
Chapter 6. Great Powers in action
Do great powers act as offensive realism predicts?
a. Great power politics involves clashing revisionist states
b. Status quo power are regional hegemons that constantly seek opportunities to gain power
Defensive realists explain why some aggressors suceed while others fail by comparing “expanders” and “over-expanders.”
Smart aggressors vs. irrational aggressors
Don't blame wacky home-front politics - Nations make calculated risks based on surroundings
We cannot predict the long-term asymetric diffusion of military technology, i.e. cyberwar, social media, etc.
Chapter 7. The offshore balancers: The United States and United Kingdom
US did not fight WWI and WWII to make peace but to prevent foe from becoming regional hegemon.
Water stopped the US and UK because of Great Power balance.
Chapter 8. Balancing vs. Buck-passing
Great powers try to balance in a bipolar world because there is no one to pass the buck to. In a multi-polar world, it is much easier to pass the buck.
States buck-pass because the cost of containing a hegemon is great.
Chapter 9. The causes of Great Power war
Bipolarity vs. Multi-polarity
Balanced vs. unbalanced polarity
Neighbors of a potential hegemon naturally ally to balance, the “classic security dilemma”
“Power driad” diagram: More unbalanced driads result in more rivalries and greather potential for conflict.
Miscalculation - Aggressors underestimate the response.
European history
1) Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 balanced multipolarity
2) Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815, unbalance multipolarity
3) 19th century, 1815-1902, balanced multipolarity
4) Kaiserreich era, 1903-1918, unbalanced multipolarity
5) Interwar years, 1919-1938, balanced multipolarity
6) Nazi era, 1939-1945, unbalanced multi-polarity
7) Cold War, 1945-1990, bipolarity
10. Great power politics of the 21st Century
Democracies do not necessarily make natural allies because democracies can fail just like other systems.
China as potential regional hegemon
Hat tip to Robert D. Kaplan for recommending this book.
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John J. Mearsheimer (2001)
Chapter 1. Introduction
Democratic liberalism vs. Realism
Democratic Liberalism
States as main actors
Internal traits determine behavior
“Good” states are key to world power
Democratic peace theory
Realism
States as main actors too
The international environment determines behavior
Power calculations dominate strategic thinking
Americans dislike realism. Post-Cold War hopes, “End of History.”
Chapter 2. Anarchy and the struggle for power
Why states pursue power:
a. The international system is anarchic
b. Great powers have inherint offensive military potential
c. States can never be sure of each other's intentions
d. Survival is the primary goal of great powers
e. Great powers are rational actors
Maximize relative power with rivals
States calculate costs and risks as well as outside response before acting
Power and fear
a. Mutual assured destruction makes great powers feel safe
b. “The stopping power of water” Bodies of water greatly reduce great power offense capability
c. Balance of power between great powers determines level of fear. A multi-polar world is the most dangerous.
Heirarchial state goals
Non-security goals: Ideology or humanitarian intervention
World peace is a gamble. States are wary of collective security schemes. Modern history of international relations is full of treaties and alliances that collapsed.
Chapter 3. Wealth and power
Factors that determine a state's “latent power”
a. Population - Percentage of military age, percentage that can be mobilized or conscripted, how the state motivates to the public.
b. Material - Access to natural resources and the ability to transform into military systems and infrastructure
c. Wealth - Level of industrilization, development and trade
d. Technology - Ability to develop, adapt and apply new technology
e. Efficiency - Ability to manage all of the above
Chapter 4. The primacy of land power
Continental vs. Insular great powers
Nuclear superiority
Chapter 5. Strategies for survival
a. War - Direct attack as rationally calculated gamble
b. Blackmail -
c. Bait and bleed -
d. Bloodletting -
e. Balancing -
f. Buck-passing - Triple Entente tried to contain Wilhemine Germany. League of Nations tried to contain Nazi Germany.
g. Appeasement -
h. Bandwagoning - Minor or weak powers wait to see which side is ascendent before joining.
Operational state goals:
a. Regional hegemony
b. Maximum wealth
c. Pre-eminent land power
d. Nuclear superiority
Chapter 6. Great Powers in action
Do great powers act as offensive realism predicts?
a. Great power politics involves clashing revisionist states
b. Status quo power are regional hegemons that constantly seek opportunities to gain power
Defensive realists explain why some aggressors suceed while others fail by comparing “expanders” and “over-expanders.”
Smart aggressors vs. irrational aggressors
Don't blame wacky home-front politics - Nations make calculated risks based on surroundings
We cannot predict the long-term asymetric diffusion of military technology, i.e. cyberwar, social media, etc.
Chapter 7. The offshore balancers: The United States and United Kingdom
US did not fight WWI and WWII to make peace but to prevent foe from becoming regional hegemon.
Water stopped the US and UK because of Great Power balance.
Chapter 8. Balancing vs. Buck-passing
Great powers try to balance in a bipolar world because there is no one to pass the buck to. In a multi-polar world, it is much easier to pass the buck.
States buck-pass because the cost of containing a hegemon is great.
Chapter 9. The causes of Great Power war
Bipolarity vs. Multi-polarity
Balanced vs. unbalanced polarity
Neighbors of a potential hegemon naturally ally to balance, the “classic security dilemma”
“Power driad” diagram: More unbalanced driads result in more rivalries and greather potential for conflict.
Miscalculation - Aggressors underestimate the response.
European history
1) Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 balanced multipolarity
2) Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815, unbalance multipolarity
3) 19th century, 1815-1902, balanced multipolarity
4) Kaiserreich era, 1903-1918, unbalanced multipolarity
5) Interwar years, 1919-1938, balanced multipolarity
6) Nazi era, 1939-1945, unbalanced multi-polarity
7) Cold War, 1945-1990, bipolarity
10. Great power politics of the 21st Century
Democracies do not necessarily make natural allies because democracies can fail just like other systems.
China as potential regional hegemon
November 6, 2017
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John J Mearsheimer is a book of extremes. It is the logical conclusion of five presumptions on how to view international relations:
1. International system is anarchic, no one to govern governments.
2. States have inherent offensive capability.
3. States cannot know another states intentions.
4. Survival is the primary goal of nations.
5. Great powers are rational actors.
This in turn creates a pattern of behavior that nations undertake in order to best position themselves in the international system:
1. Nations fear each other, or at the very least are suspicious of them.
2. God helps those who help themselves, therefore it pays to be selfish.
3. States care how power is distributed, and will work to maximize their share.
The world of Dr. Mearsheimer, who I almost studied under when I applied to the Harris School in the University of Chicago, is bleak and pessimistic. This is not my characterization, it is one he readily acknowledges himself. He uses history in order to inform his views on the present, and on a number of things he has been rather spot on. Mearsheimer may be wrong about many things, but he has been right enough to make him one of the most credible proponents of offensive realism in the entire discipline of international relations.
Flaws emerge with his presumptions, as well as his operating assumption. This is a theory that examines the past to inform the present and future, as well as a proscriptive appeal to what nations should be doing as rational actors. The primary issue stems with his notion of anarchy, and his firm anchor to the historical examples he uses to inform his opinion on relations. He, himself, notes that there are flaws in his analytical framework. Sometimes nations do not act the way they should, and sometimes domestic factors instill irrationality within the state.
He says it best in the first chapter when he suggests that Offensive Realism is sometimes not the best way to view the world, and that it is sometimes misleading in its implications, but it is a powerful flashlight in a dark room. While it is not perfect, it maintains and retains a massive degree of utility in the discipline. My only concern is that the historical framework may have limited usefulness as our world enters into a phase of unpredictable and unprecedented action and interaction.
Thomas Christensen spent a great deal of his book counteracting the claims of pessimists. They may be potentially right, but Christensen felt no need to indulge them, and argued fairly persuasively that a number of their arguments do not measure up to intense scrutiny. Dr. Mearsheimer was one of those pessimists. The Liberal Order is an effective mechanism against the worst impulses of the anarchic order, and their paradigm is built on the economic and political integration of nations and how this inhibits zero-sum logic systems. While others may fearmonger about a Rising China, those with capital and will suggest that a rising China has the potential for the greatest amount of wealth and prosperity generation in human history, and will say the same about India and Africa as they follow behind.
Mearsheimer is someone I do not agree with, but he is someone I respect. Had the University of Chicago proven a more welcoming environment, then I would have been fortunate to have audited some of his classes as I continued my own studies. Odds are that should I ever become a published academic, my work will act in counter to his.
Even so, it is hard to imagine him and his work as anything other than a monolithic contribution to my field. He deserves respect, and this book should be read by any who pretends to competence in IR studies.
90/100 (A-)
1. International system is anarchic, no one to govern governments.
2. States have inherent offensive capability.
3. States cannot know another states intentions.
4. Survival is the primary goal of nations.
5. Great powers are rational actors.
This in turn creates a pattern of behavior that nations undertake in order to best position themselves in the international system:
1. Nations fear each other, or at the very least are suspicious of them.
2. God helps those who help themselves, therefore it pays to be selfish.
3. States care how power is distributed, and will work to maximize their share.
The world of Dr. Mearsheimer, who I almost studied under when I applied to the Harris School in the University of Chicago, is bleak and pessimistic. This is not my characterization, it is one he readily acknowledges himself. He uses history in order to inform his views on the present, and on a number of things he has been rather spot on. Mearsheimer may be wrong about many things, but he has been right enough to make him one of the most credible proponents of offensive realism in the entire discipline of international relations.
Flaws emerge with his presumptions, as well as his operating assumption. This is a theory that examines the past to inform the present and future, as well as a proscriptive appeal to what nations should be doing as rational actors. The primary issue stems with his notion of anarchy, and his firm anchor to the historical examples he uses to inform his opinion on relations. He, himself, notes that there are flaws in his analytical framework. Sometimes nations do not act the way they should, and sometimes domestic factors instill irrationality within the state.
He says it best in the first chapter when he suggests that Offensive Realism is sometimes not the best way to view the world, and that it is sometimes misleading in its implications, but it is a powerful flashlight in a dark room. While it is not perfect, it maintains and retains a massive degree of utility in the discipline. My only concern is that the historical framework may have limited usefulness as our world enters into a phase of unpredictable and unprecedented action and interaction.
Thomas Christensen spent a great deal of his book counteracting the claims of pessimists. They may be potentially right, but Christensen felt no need to indulge them, and argued fairly persuasively that a number of their arguments do not measure up to intense scrutiny. Dr. Mearsheimer was one of those pessimists. The Liberal Order is an effective mechanism against the worst impulses of the anarchic order, and their paradigm is built on the economic and political integration of nations and how this inhibits zero-sum logic systems. While others may fearmonger about a Rising China, those with capital and will suggest that a rising China has the potential for the greatest amount of wealth and prosperity generation in human history, and will say the same about India and Africa as they follow behind.
Mearsheimer is someone I do not agree with, but he is someone I respect. Had the University of Chicago proven a more welcoming environment, then I would have been fortunate to have audited some of his classes as I continued my own studies. Odds are that should I ever become a published academic, my work will act in counter to his.
Even so, it is hard to imagine him and his work as anything other than a monolithic contribution to my field. He deserves respect, and this book should be read by any who pretends to competence in IR studies.
90/100 (A-)
February 7, 2017
WHY IS THE GLASS so half-empty? Because, Mearsheimer tells us, structure of the world makes it so. There is no hierarchy (no world sheriff), states can hurt each-other, and cannot be certain of one another's intentions, current or future. So to survive, for a rational actor, is to become more powerful; powerful enough that no other state can challenge them. But here is the thing: by acquiring relative power, states unbalance the international system. Unbalanced system is not stable; someone needs to balance it. So states go to war. Hence the tragedy.
Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz that a bipolar system makes for the most stable world (apart from global hegemony, which he thinks of as unlikely because of the stopping power of water), but his analysis goes deeper. Great powers want to become regional hegemons, and to stop other great powers from doing the same in their own regions. To do so they prefer to pass the buck to a regional power, a buck-catcher, often with a border with the potential hegemon. If the buck-catcher fails to balance the aggressor, the great powers have to deploy armies overseas and act as an offshore balancer. States are never status-quo, because survival is never sure. Trade will not save us, because security will always trump economy.
The book is filled with historical anecdotes and exhibits, from the rise of Napoleon till the presidency of W., to show for the theory of offensive realism. The writing is eloquent and bold, the read entertaining. Does his ideas apply to the 21st century? Despite my idealist proclivities, I cannot tell why not.
At the end of the day, offensive realism is a social science theory; as always a double edged sword. We cannot predict the future. All we can do is to raise our half-empty glasses to peace, and hope for the best.
Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz that a bipolar system makes for the most stable world (apart from global hegemony, which he thinks of as unlikely because of the stopping power of water), but his analysis goes deeper. Great powers want to become regional hegemons, and to stop other great powers from doing the same in their own regions. To do so they prefer to pass the buck to a regional power, a buck-catcher, often with a border with the potential hegemon. If the buck-catcher fails to balance the aggressor, the great powers have to deploy armies overseas and act as an offshore balancer. States are never status-quo, because survival is never sure. Trade will not save us, because security will always trump economy.
The book is filled with historical anecdotes and exhibits, from the rise of Napoleon till the presidency of W., to show for the theory of offensive realism. The writing is eloquent and bold, the read entertaining. Does his ideas apply to the 21st century? Despite my idealist proclivities, I cannot tell why not.
At the end of the day, offensive realism is a social science theory; as always a double edged sword. We cannot predict the future. All we can do is to raise our half-empty glasses to peace, and hope for the best.
March 25, 2020
Dr. Mearsheimer is one of the leading figures in the school of international relations that is realism. This book again provides realism's arguments on the anarchic nature of international relations and the primacy of the interests of states.
May 21, 2017
I read this book side by side with Buzan and Waever's Regions and Powers. The books is a good one and stands on its own, but comes up short in comparison to Buzan and Waever's work.
The oddest feature of Mearsheimer’s book is that he speaks about geopolitics as if it was the 1930s, the nineteenth, or even the eighteenth century. In essence what Mearsheimer calls offensive realism is nothing more than continental realism or the realism born in 18th century Europe. Just like Buzan and Waever's work, Mearsheimer seeks to reterritorialize politics; however, unlike Buzan and Waever where territories and states are places with histories, and social structures of amity and enmity rule, geography has a generic effect on world politics—large bodies of water keep regions and powers apart, shared land makes states vulnerable. In addition, Mearsheimer’s continental realism must forget or ignore the crucial technological effects of nuclear weapons, precision munitions, and a great deal of the complex interdependence that underpins the world economy to come to his conclusions—the world is still about the insecurity of states, and shockingly, still about armies and the ability to occupy territory. Mearsheimer doesn’t relegate continental realism to geographical areas outside of the North America and Europe as others would, but instead posits this as a generic feature of all politics everywhere. Realism is generic everywhere--Africa where states barely exist and in some places loyalty is strongest at the tribal level, Europe where supranational structures are now eliding stateness, and other places where national and ethnic groups are often the strongest threats to the state. If Buzan and Waever’s RSCT is Einsteinian physics, then Mearsheimer’s offensive realism would have to be something even simpler than Newtonian physics. Social structures are completely absent from his theory and material power is the only variable that matters. The reactions of states and state leaders are not quite mechanical but almost, and one is left to wonder what is stopping the US from using its armies to conquer Mexico, Canada, and Central America to create efficiencies that would allow it to vie for global hegemony.
Mearsheimer’s claim that armies are the most important branch is laughable—what he means is that projectable armies are important; and his analysis fails to demonstrate that most armies today are most often used not for security against external threats of states, but from internal chaos and to secure borders against immigration. In addition, to these short-comings, Mearsheimer frequently neglects to make distinctions between superpowers and great powers, regional hegemons and global hegemons (the later he says cannot exist), and offshore balancing and the alternatives of penetration and overlay. Perhaps his biggest oversight is in his inability to distinguish great powers from states. Much of his prescription seems to be directed not as states per se, but great powers—worse his constant confusion of the term creates an ontological space where the existence of states outside of great powers is questionable. Thus, when he says that it is dangerous to bandwagon or appease, he neglects to inform the reader that small states may have no choice if they wish to survive. In addition, in his discussion of how someone should measure capabilities, he fails completely to examine how the level of stateness (defined by Buzan and Waever as the affinity between the government and the people) should figure into this equation.
The book still fails to offset the gravest criticisms of realism—that it neglects cooperation as a reasonable strategic alternative to the security dilemma and that the prime motivator of state behavior need not be fear. Indeed, it is on this last point that Mearsheimer seems to overreach many conventional realists—fear as a motivator of state actions is so acute that states are not satisfied with security based on defensive or retaliatory military capabilities, but must conquer others in order to feel secure. This is in stark contrast to postclassical realists who suggest that states are sensitive to the costs of security, and that a minimal defensive security is often preferred. The issue of excessive state fear is an ontological assumption—the linchpin of his analysis—on which his whole house of cards is based.
One of the most poignant parts of Mearsheimer's book is his discussion of the problems of the global commons and how these issues will not necessarily create cooperation. This is a great point, but one that Buzan and Waever address better. Nuclear proliferation, weapons proliferation, environmental problems, and public health issues are likely to be handled in ways that address the particular needs of regional complexes. As Mearsheimer points out, this could easily be in forms of competition over scarcer resources rather than cooperation; but as Buzan and Waever convincingly argue, these issues will most likely work within social structures of amity and enmity. Another good point that Mearsheimer brings up is that one should not discount the possibility of backsliding on the part of democracies and supranational structures like the EU. For this reason, the maintenance of the EU, NATO, and other organizations is always a potential security issue.
The oddest feature of Mearsheimer’s book is that he speaks about geopolitics as if it was the 1930s, the nineteenth, or even the eighteenth century. In essence what Mearsheimer calls offensive realism is nothing more than continental realism or the realism born in 18th century Europe. Just like Buzan and Waever's work, Mearsheimer seeks to reterritorialize politics; however, unlike Buzan and Waever where territories and states are places with histories, and social structures of amity and enmity rule, geography has a generic effect on world politics—large bodies of water keep regions and powers apart, shared land makes states vulnerable. In addition, Mearsheimer’s continental realism must forget or ignore the crucial technological effects of nuclear weapons, precision munitions, and a great deal of the complex interdependence that underpins the world economy to come to his conclusions—the world is still about the insecurity of states, and shockingly, still about armies and the ability to occupy territory. Mearsheimer doesn’t relegate continental realism to geographical areas outside of the North America and Europe as others would, but instead posits this as a generic feature of all politics everywhere. Realism is generic everywhere--Africa where states barely exist and in some places loyalty is strongest at the tribal level, Europe where supranational structures are now eliding stateness, and other places where national and ethnic groups are often the strongest threats to the state. If Buzan and Waever’s RSCT is Einsteinian physics, then Mearsheimer’s offensive realism would have to be something even simpler than Newtonian physics. Social structures are completely absent from his theory and material power is the only variable that matters. The reactions of states and state leaders are not quite mechanical but almost, and one is left to wonder what is stopping the US from using its armies to conquer Mexico, Canada, and Central America to create efficiencies that would allow it to vie for global hegemony.
Mearsheimer’s claim that armies are the most important branch is laughable—what he means is that projectable armies are important; and his analysis fails to demonstrate that most armies today are most often used not for security against external threats of states, but from internal chaos and to secure borders against immigration. In addition, to these short-comings, Mearsheimer frequently neglects to make distinctions between superpowers and great powers, regional hegemons and global hegemons (the later he says cannot exist), and offshore balancing and the alternatives of penetration and overlay. Perhaps his biggest oversight is in his inability to distinguish great powers from states. Much of his prescription seems to be directed not as states per se, but great powers—worse his constant confusion of the term creates an ontological space where the existence of states outside of great powers is questionable. Thus, when he says that it is dangerous to bandwagon or appease, he neglects to inform the reader that small states may have no choice if they wish to survive. In addition, in his discussion of how someone should measure capabilities, he fails completely to examine how the level of stateness (defined by Buzan and Waever as the affinity between the government and the people) should figure into this equation.
The book still fails to offset the gravest criticisms of realism—that it neglects cooperation as a reasonable strategic alternative to the security dilemma and that the prime motivator of state behavior need not be fear. Indeed, it is on this last point that Mearsheimer seems to overreach many conventional realists—fear as a motivator of state actions is so acute that states are not satisfied with security based on defensive or retaliatory military capabilities, but must conquer others in order to feel secure. This is in stark contrast to postclassical realists who suggest that states are sensitive to the costs of security, and that a minimal defensive security is often preferred. The issue of excessive state fear is an ontological assumption—the linchpin of his analysis—on which his whole house of cards is based.
One of the most poignant parts of Mearsheimer's book is his discussion of the problems of the global commons and how these issues will not necessarily create cooperation. This is a great point, but one that Buzan and Waever address better. Nuclear proliferation, weapons proliferation, environmental problems, and public health issues are likely to be handled in ways that address the particular needs of regional complexes. As Mearsheimer points out, this could easily be in forms of competition over scarcer resources rather than cooperation; but as Buzan and Waever convincingly argue, these issues will most likely work within social structures of amity and enmity. Another good point that Mearsheimer brings up is that one should not discount the possibility of backsliding on the part of democracies and supranational structures like the EU. For this reason, the maintenance of the EU, NATO, and other organizations is always a potential security issue.
November 9, 2007
This is a restatement and working out of the Realist school of international relations, which dictates that military power and security competition dictates all relations between states, and that power logic determines everything. It's a good explanation of both the theory itself and the consequences thereof, though the historical examples are a little tiresome in places. It is not however a good defense of the basic assumptions of realism; they're taken as given, and rely on the last 200 years of Western history for proof, but that's a really small sample size from which to dictate *all* international relations and laws thereof.
The end of the book also contains a warning about the US policy towards China encouraging economic growth is a bad idea, and we should try to retard economic growth in China to avoid a multipolar world. It's odd, because few things would be more likely to produce the sort of power competition he says is inevitable, and the assumption is that the poverty of their millions is worth our power. Of course I violently disagree and question that, but this book didn't provide me enough backing besides historical example to begin a debate with the author in my head.
So as an explanation of realism and a manual for thinking like a realist, it works, but as a defense of the same, not so much.
The end of the book also contains a warning about the US policy towards China encouraging economic growth is a bad idea, and we should try to retard economic growth in China to avoid a multipolar world. It's odd, because few things would be more likely to produce the sort of power competition he says is inevitable, and the assumption is that the poverty of their millions is worth our power. Of course I violently disagree and question that, but this book didn't provide me enough backing besides historical example to begin a debate with the author in my head.
So as an explanation of realism and a manual for thinking like a realist, it works, but as a defense of the same, not so much.
February 2, 2012
Brilliant. It's a pity so much specious vitriol has been directed at Mearsheimer in the wake of the Israel Lobby book, as it's doubtless swayed some away from this -- as clearheaded an assessment of our present position as I've recently read. Highly recommended.
February 28, 2022
Mearsheimer är svår.
Hans argument är nästan alltid taktiskt rimliga, och han backar alltid upp dem med i alla fall några slags exempel, men jag förblir likväl defensiv i mina realistiska preferenser; Mearsheimers strategisyn övertygar inte. Han blir för svepande, och för kortsiktig. Politiskt entreprenörskap/ statsmannaskap är något han hänvisar till, men på sätt som inte gör det möjligt att ta på allvar.
Problemet är att han aldrig verkar tittar på styreskonsekvenserna i sina argument om potentiella kostnader, och i termer av långsiktig exploatering av ett erövrat territorium spelar det roll - annars hade inte Belgarna misslyckats så katastrofalt som de gjorde. Det gör att äregirigheten och trygghetsbegäret hos politiker förväntas övertrumfa deras förmåga att utvärdera administrationsmöjligheterna, på ett sätt som Mearsheimer menar är verklighetsnärmare än den defensiva realismens mer begränsade girighet; men som i själva verket utgör själva exempelbilden statligt förtagande, såsom föregick nästan alla imperiers undergång. Motargumentet är naturligtvis att taktik och strategi är flytande begrepp när ett land ständigt är i taktiska situationer, och att perfekt information aldrig kan förutsättas ens bland statsledare. I så fall skulle argumentet mot honom som teoretiker kunna ses som ett argument för honom som praktiker. Det skulle i sin tur omöjliggöra statsmannaskap och statlig vision, vilket talar för ersättande av politiker med militärtribunaler. Jag ser mig som pessimist om mänskligt omdöme, men tycker att ett sådant hopp är djärvt, och jag ser det inte heller framskrivet i texten.
Bortom detta svepande, ser jag en dubbelhet i Mearsheimers tolkning av det som driver osäkerheten i det politiska systemet. Det jag ser är ett konstaterande av mänsklig ambition som en konstant, likväl som stressorerna i systemet självt. Utifrån det analyserar han beteenden och analyser, med ett fokus på det kortsiktigt genomförbara i olika situationer. Mearsheimer både tillskriver den mänskliga faktorn enorm makt, och väljer att bortse ifrån den; Portugal, har exempelvis lyckats balansera mot sina grannar genom förutsägbarhet, snarare än mer kostsamma strategier, något som Mearsheimer menar inte borde fungera. Man gjorde detta genom rituella garantier, vilka liknar de propagandakrig som idag förs mellan krigförande parter i östeuropa, om vem som begår flest övergrepp mot mänskliga rättigheter (denna tids kvasireligiösa enhetsbegrepp och värderiktare).
Dessa klagomål noterade, är Mearsheimers text imponerande. Han sätter fingret på viktiga förhållanden, såsom stresskonstanterna i utrikespolitik, och kategoriserar flera användbara taktiska beteenden som hjälper en analytiker (eller hobbyist) titta på en internationell situation och förstå den bättre. Jag rekommenderar honom för alla statsvetarnördar; det är bara det att jag tror att man bör läsa honom som handbok snarare än som profet.
Hans argument är nästan alltid taktiskt rimliga, och han backar alltid upp dem med i alla fall några slags exempel, men jag förblir likväl defensiv i mina realistiska preferenser; Mearsheimers strategisyn övertygar inte. Han blir för svepande, och för kortsiktig. Politiskt entreprenörskap/ statsmannaskap är något han hänvisar till, men på sätt som inte gör det möjligt att ta på allvar.
Problemet är att han aldrig verkar tittar på styreskonsekvenserna i sina argument om potentiella kostnader, och i termer av långsiktig exploatering av ett erövrat territorium spelar det roll - annars hade inte Belgarna misslyckats så katastrofalt som de gjorde. Det gör att äregirigheten och trygghetsbegäret hos politiker förväntas övertrumfa deras förmåga att utvärdera administrationsmöjligheterna, på ett sätt som Mearsheimer menar är verklighetsnärmare än den defensiva realismens mer begränsade girighet; men som i själva verket utgör själva exempelbilden statligt förtagande, såsom föregick nästan alla imperiers undergång. Motargumentet är naturligtvis att taktik och strategi är flytande begrepp när ett land ständigt är i taktiska situationer, och att perfekt information aldrig kan förutsättas ens bland statsledare. I så fall skulle argumentet mot honom som teoretiker kunna ses som ett argument för honom som praktiker. Det skulle i sin tur omöjliggöra statsmannaskap och statlig vision, vilket talar för ersättande av politiker med militärtribunaler. Jag ser mig som pessimist om mänskligt omdöme, men tycker att ett sådant hopp är djärvt, och jag ser det inte heller framskrivet i texten.
Bortom detta svepande, ser jag en dubbelhet i Mearsheimers tolkning av det som driver osäkerheten i det politiska systemet. Det jag ser är ett konstaterande av mänsklig ambition som en konstant, likväl som stressorerna i systemet självt. Utifrån det analyserar han beteenden och analyser, med ett fokus på det kortsiktigt genomförbara i olika situationer. Mearsheimer både tillskriver den mänskliga faktorn enorm makt, och väljer att bortse ifrån den; Portugal, har exempelvis lyckats balansera mot sina grannar genom förutsägbarhet, snarare än mer kostsamma strategier, något som Mearsheimer menar inte borde fungera. Man gjorde detta genom rituella garantier, vilka liknar de propagandakrig som idag förs mellan krigförande parter i östeuropa, om vem som begår flest övergrepp mot mänskliga rättigheter (denna tids kvasireligiösa enhetsbegrepp och värderiktare).
Dessa klagomål noterade, är Mearsheimers text imponerande. Han sätter fingret på viktiga förhållanden, såsom stresskonstanterna i utrikespolitik, och kategoriserar flera användbara taktiska beteenden som hjälper en analytiker (eller hobbyist) titta på en internationell situation och förstå den bättre. Jag rekommenderar honom för alla statsvetarnördar; det är bara det att jag tror att man bör läsa honom som handbok snarare än som profet.
April 6, 2022
This is probably the best book on international relations yet written. Mearsheimer became more famous recently from his "Why Ukraine is the West's Fault" lecture from 2015, and is one of the leading "realist" thinkers in international relations. In this book he develops a framework for why countries engage in warfare (essentially active defense), analyzes the past 500 years of great power interactions, and makes predictions for Europe and Asia with respect to the US, Russia, and China. Ultimately it's a fairly depressing book -- conflict being inevitable, and actions the US has taken with respect to Russia and China being exactly what we shouldn't have done, leading to predictable consequences.
March 20, 2017
The theory itself may still have many flaws, but overall it's a good overview of international relationship over the last three century. Quite easy to read and those who love history would definitely find this book interesting.
May 8, 2021
Good theory but needs to be better supported by data, by using more statistics. In addition, there should be more focus on error bounds, expected size of deviations from predictions, and the role of randomness. Without these things, offensive realism remains just a good theory.
June 14, 2020
The book, better referred to as a treatise, is a scholarly work on Professor Mearsheimer's offensive realism theory. The author does well in explaining this highly pessimistic and machiavellian construct structurally and clearly. Professor does not mince words in the slightest. There is no equivocation or obfuscation, which is so commonplace in most social science books. Historic anecdotes are exciting and appropriately used in conjunction with a variety of propositions and sub-propositions within the overall framework.
In other words, the author should get perfect marks for explaining his highly original ideas lucidly. He provides a great example of how a scholar should conduct his or her work in designing a comprehensive theory, explaining its components, using supportive evidences, and contrasting and criticizing rival theories. The author excels in converting highly academic work into something informative and entertaining for non-experts. All this makes going through the work a delightful experience.
And yet, this is not sufficient to make the theory either good enough for practical armchair analysis or good enough as an efficient, let alone moral or ethical guide in current times for most political or policy leaders.
As hinted before, the theory is extraordinarily pessimistic as it takes a dim view of humanity's collective objectives when grouped and divided as nation-states. On flimsy grounds, the author insists that when divided along such lines and without an over-arching disciplining, supra-national, global force, nation-states cannot but view each other with suspicions and doomed to fight merely to survive.
In the author's mind, any liberal or other ideals are mere chimeras behind which leaders of the "greatest" nation-states plot their expansionist agendas. Implicitly, the author seems to imply that if there are any political or military leaders with genuinely non-expansionist or altruistic visions, they will never have a sufficient impact on the global geopolitics. If any nation is unfortunate enough to have some ideologues taking over, such a society will at least temporarily cease to be a "great" nation as per this theory. There will be other ideology-free entities around which will suppress such weak countries who opt out of any expansionist ventures.
There are three significant issues with this theory:
Historically, the theory appears more valid than it is because of the ability to explain geopolitics of the colonializing (and earliest industrial revolution beneficiary) powers in the pre-tech era.
The theory is remarkably static. Its obsessive focus on land-based power grab - reflected in its definition of relative strength, recommended strategies, forecasts - ignore the new power vehicles of the post-industrial era. These new realities not only necessitate new methods within the theory but destroy the fundamental non-liberal, military-expansion driven construct from its roots.
The author fails to realize the vicious circularities that would be created, leading to possibly an eventual extinction of the whole humanity, if everyone explicitly believes in offensive realism as the only way to survive and feels no need to have any other values or ideals.
Let's explain these three in more detail, although not necessarily sequentially.
The author never entertains the thought about the context where offensive realism might not be applicable. If he had started with a simple thought experiment, he would have recognized its universal invalidity until the onset of the industrial revolution. More importantly, it would have led to the conjecture that the same could be less applicable in international geopolitics forever from roughly the publication date of the book (published just before 9/11).
Post-agrarian, pre-tech period of our race is only a phase of our existence. The industrial revolution caused a material change in the way the societies interact within themselves and with each other. Over time, they obliterated kingdoms, fiefdoms, and old power structures as the urbanizing world became a conglomeration of nation-states.
The book is about international interactions, rivalry, and feuds in a particular era, facilitated by industrial revolution innovations, not yet upended by recognition of universal human values, information era derivers/drivers, and marked by the forces of colonization. Starting with the assumptions that go into the makeup of the theory to nearly every example used to bolster the case, the author refuses to look towards a possible world that may not be about its baddest and biggest powers feuding in a land grab.
Despite the various religion-based reformations in societies across the world for the previous two thousand years, there was no concept of equality or human rights until the end of the eighteenth century. There was massive progress on these fronts from the 1770s until the end of the twentieth century. Still, almost all the major actors on the world stage were racists, sexists, chauvinists, feudalists, power-obsessed or religious fanatics because of the value systems of those eras.
With the industrial revolution, the early innovators felt the need to use the new powers to extend their domination that was just not possible in previous times. What expansionists like Alexander or Ghenghis Khan could not do, i.e., hold on to - and not just conquer - vast stretches of faraway land as a prized possession, suddenly became possible. More importantly, with larger dominion, colonizing powers got bigger markets and could build a more significant resource base for even more territory and innovation.
The author's definition of "the great powers" of the past three centuries is tautological. It excludes large nations like China that were insular, India that was colonized, or civilizations like Islam that had opted out. Effectively, the author's great powers were early industrial innovators seeking to protect their innovations from other industrial innovators and competed with them for more resources and markets.
These nations fought bitterly and nearly endlessly for two centuries from the 1790s. Offensive realism is right when it states that the way the nations feuded in international space did not correlate with their domestic political ideologies in this pre-information era. However, the author is not only overly pessimistic and static but also willfully blind to the rise of material new forces over the last fifty years.
9/11 showed how new enemies do not need to be nation-states. Information fluidity shows how innovations cannot be suppressed for as long as before. People on the ground are more aware and less acceptable to blatantly evil state acts on alien societies. Most importantly, in the world of viruses, nuclear bombs, robots, and AIs, infantry/military are becoming less and less critical in the power games.
The biggest problem with offensive realism is that it is one of those theories that, if true, should be roundedly and comprehensively eradicated rather than accepted, as the author suggests. No thinking human should nod a philosophy that demands stronger nations to go out there and dominate with the weaker merely accepting their fate. Any world where ideologies are acceptable ruses for the strongmen of the era to justify killing millions - because that's what international geopolitics is as per offensive realism - would be a sad place. Offensive realism would oppose any attempts at reforming such a system, as the author strongly believes that the best in international geopolitics would be those who follow its guidelines. Believer of offensive realism, like believers of many heinous theories like euthenics, need to be resisted. Otherwise, their arguments will lead to every nation or group justifying its own Hitler equivalent. The author is not just wrong, but he cannot be accepted as right.
In other words, the author should get perfect marks for explaining his highly original ideas lucidly. He provides a great example of how a scholar should conduct his or her work in designing a comprehensive theory, explaining its components, using supportive evidences, and contrasting and criticizing rival theories. The author excels in converting highly academic work into something informative and entertaining for non-experts. All this makes going through the work a delightful experience.
And yet, this is not sufficient to make the theory either good enough for practical armchair analysis or good enough as an efficient, let alone moral or ethical guide in current times for most political or policy leaders.
As hinted before, the theory is extraordinarily pessimistic as it takes a dim view of humanity's collective objectives when grouped and divided as nation-states. On flimsy grounds, the author insists that when divided along such lines and without an over-arching disciplining, supra-national, global force, nation-states cannot but view each other with suspicions and doomed to fight merely to survive.
In the author's mind, any liberal or other ideals are mere chimeras behind which leaders of the "greatest" nation-states plot their expansionist agendas. Implicitly, the author seems to imply that if there are any political or military leaders with genuinely non-expansionist or altruistic visions, they will never have a sufficient impact on the global geopolitics. If any nation is unfortunate enough to have some ideologues taking over, such a society will at least temporarily cease to be a "great" nation as per this theory. There will be other ideology-free entities around which will suppress such weak countries who opt out of any expansionist ventures.
There are three significant issues with this theory:
Historically, the theory appears more valid than it is because of the ability to explain geopolitics of the colonializing (and earliest industrial revolution beneficiary) powers in the pre-tech era.
The theory is remarkably static. Its obsessive focus on land-based power grab - reflected in its definition of relative strength, recommended strategies, forecasts - ignore the new power vehicles of the post-industrial era. These new realities not only necessitate new methods within the theory but destroy the fundamental non-liberal, military-expansion driven construct from its roots.
The author fails to realize the vicious circularities that would be created, leading to possibly an eventual extinction of the whole humanity, if everyone explicitly believes in offensive realism as the only way to survive and feels no need to have any other values or ideals.
Let's explain these three in more detail, although not necessarily sequentially.
The author never entertains the thought about the context where offensive realism might not be applicable. If he had started with a simple thought experiment, he would have recognized its universal invalidity until the onset of the industrial revolution. More importantly, it would have led to the conjecture that the same could be less applicable in international geopolitics forever from roughly the publication date of the book (published just before 9/11).
Post-agrarian, pre-tech period of our race is only a phase of our existence. The industrial revolution caused a material change in the way the societies interact within themselves and with each other. Over time, they obliterated kingdoms, fiefdoms, and old power structures as the urbanizing world became a conglomeration of nation-states.
The book is about international interactions, rivalry, and feuds in a particular era, facilitated by industrial revolution innovations, not yet upended by recognition of universal human values, information era derivers/drivers, and marked by the forces of colonization. Starting with the assumptions that go into the makeup of the theory to nearly every example used to bolster the case, the author refuses to look towards a possible world that may not be about its baddest and biggest powers feuding in a land grab.
Despite the various religion-based reformations in societies across the world for the previous two thousand years, there was no concept of equality or human rights until the end of the eighteenth century. There was massive progress on these fronts from the 1770s until the end of the twentieth century. Still, almost all the major actors on the world stage were racists, sexists, chauvinists, feudalists, power-obsessed or religious fanatics because of the value systems of those eras.
With the industrial revolution, the early innovators felt the need to use the new powers to extend their domination that was just not possible in previous times. What expansionists like Alexander or Ghenghis Khan could not do, i.e., hold on to - and not just conquer - vast stretches of faraway land as a prized possession, suddenly became possible. More importantly, with larger dominion, colonizing powers got bigger markets and could build a more significant resource base for even more territory and innovation.
The author's definition of "the great powers" of the past three centuries is tautological. It excludes large nations like China that were insular, India that was colonized, or civilizations like Islam that had opted out. Effectively, the author's great powers were early industrial innovators seeking to protect their innovations from other industrial innovators and competed with them for more resources and markets.
These nations fought bitterly and nearly endlessly for two centuries from the 1790s. Offensive realism is right when it states that the way the nations feuded in international space did not correlate with their domestic political ideologies in this pre-information era. However, the author is not only overly pessimistic and static but also willfully blind to the rise of material new forces over the last fifty years.
9/11 showed how new enemies do not need to be nation-states. Information fluidity shows how innovations cannot be suppressed for as long as before. People on the ground are more aware and less acceptable to blatantly evil state acts on alien societies. Most importantly, in the world of viruses, nuclear bombs, robots, and AIs, infantry/military are becoming less and less critical in the power games.
The biggest problem with offensive realism is that it is one of those theories that, if true, should be roundedly and comprehensively eradicated rather than accepted, as the author suggests. No thinking human should nod a philosophy that demands stronger nations to go out there and dominate with the weaker merely accepting their fate. Any world where ideologies are acceptable ruses for the strongmen of the era to justify killing millions - because that's what international geopolitics is as per offensive realism - would be a sad place. Offensive realism would oppose any attempts at reforming such a system, as the author strongly believes that the best in international geopolitics would be those who follow its guidelines. Believer of offensive realism, like believers of many heinous theories like euthenics, need to be resisted. Otherwise, their arguments will lead to every nation or group justifying its own Hitler equivalent. The author is not just wrong, but he cannot be accepted as right.
April 21, 2022
Sì, lo so a cosa state pensando. A quel nome in copertina, Alessandro Orsini, il famigerato Alessandro Orsini, che in questo caso ha scritto l'introduzione a questa edizione - la prima in italiano, grazie alla lungimiranza di LUISS University Press- de La Tragedia delle Grandi Potenze di John Mearsheimer, uno maggiori esperti di relazioni internazionali, argomento che di questi tempi è per forza di cose sulla bocca di tutti. Questa edizione è del 2019, ma in origine il libro è uscito nel 2001: la differenza più sostanziale tra le due versioni è che in quest'ultima è presente un capitolo sulla Cina, in quanto potenza emergente che nel giro di poco potrebbe dare del filo da torcere allo stato egemone per eccellenza da un bel po' di tempo a questa parte, che ovviamente sono gli Stati Uniti d'America. E, secondo Mearsheimer, il conflitto tra le due potenze sarà difficilmente evitabile. Sì, perchè il politologo statunitense è uno strenuo sostenitore della teoria del realismo offensivo: visto che gli Stati esistono in una condizione di anarchia (non c'è nessun organo superiore che li governi) questi sono costretti ad assumere un atteggiamento aggressivo nei confronti degli altri - che spesso andrà a sfociare in guerre - per ridurre il rischio di essere attaccati e aumentare la loro sicurezza. Da questo ne deriva che la situazione di maggior sicurezza si avrebbe con un unico Stato egemone mondiale, cosa che ovviamente a livello pratico è molto difficile che succeda. Per dimostrare tale teoria, Mearhseimer prende in esame la storia degli ultimi 200 anni, dalle guerre napoleoniche fino ai giorni nostri, e analizza minuziosamente i rapporti e i conflitti tra le varie potenze, con conseguenti variazioni nell'equilibrio di potere tra di esse. E nel voler dimostrare le sue teorie Mearsheimer non si risparmia di certo, diventando a volte anche un po' ripetitivo, dal momento che alcuni concetti vengono ripetuti ben più di una volta, in tutte le salse. Comunque, al di là di un po' di ridondanza ho trovato questa analisi piuttosto convincente - e deprimente, certo - anche perché la situazione politica internazionale di questi ultimi tempi sembra proprio la naturale prosecuzione di quello che viene raccontato ne La Tragedia delle Potenze. E visto che questo testo è stato scritto prima che succedesse quello che è successo, io a questo punto di quello che dice Mearsheimer un po' mi fido.
February 10, 2018
As much as I liked this book, it was a flashback to my master’s studies. It was a challenging read (audiobook in my case) because you had to stop and think, process, and analyze everything every step of the way.
October 28, 2023
Being the first full book on international relations that I have read, I had high expectations for Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. As such, it it is difficult based on just this book to determine whether I find realism, let alone offensive realism, a compelling theory of international affairs as opposed to idealistic or liberal theories.
Nonetheless, I found the book to be incredibly thorough and certainly convincing in areas. Its description of the foundation of the balance of power and what constitutes power is logically very sound. When discussing the historical record, Mearsheimer is careful to account for the various anomalies and counterarguments that you would expect from applying one theory to the entirety of international history. His theory is not simplistic - whilst the key message of offensive realism is that states engage in security competition as a means to maximise power, owing to the need for security and fear of other states combined with the system of international anarchy, Mearsheimer understands that more in depth analysis is needed to understand why states act the way they do, and have in the past. For example, he explains well the reasons for the different actions of the United Kingdom and the United States as great powers being largely explained through the stopping power of water.
As others point out however, his theory's lack of focus on domestic politics and the ideological beliefs of individual politicians (as one would expect from a realist theory) makes offensive realism hard to apply to the reality of international affairs. Whilst Mearsheimer does acknowledge the importance of ideology, for example nationalism in China's rise to great power status and the role of communism versus capitalism in the Cold War's security competition, for the most part he dismisses ideological considerations as subordinate to balance of power considerations. Mearsheimer is right and is convincing in its assertions about how ideological motives are used to mask balance of power motives. He compares Confucianism in China with liberalism in the United States both as forces that can be used in this regard. For example, it did not matter during the Cold War what ideology the USSR ascribed to, as whilst their employment of communism helped mask it, their true consideration was ensuring the Soviets did not achieve regional hegemony in Europe as a key tenet of offensive realism is the desire of regional hegemons (like the U.S.) from preventing other potential hegemons in other regions from achieving that status.
Regardless, it is evident that his theory lacks domestic considerations which are of utmost important when considering state action. Ultimately, states exist in a everchanging world, and states themselves are everchanging with an influx of new politicians, new ways of thinking and new domestic activity. As such, it is difficult to argue that balance of power considerations are the only ones that matter when state action is directly informed by domestic politics that is so complex and unstable.
Certainly, I have a lot to read on international relations to gain a greater appreciation of this book. Moreover, its claims on the rise of China as a potential hegemon in East Asia and a security competition with the United States will be interesting to watch, as particularly in the South China Sea this appears to be developing quickly. Perhaps in the future, as my own knowledge of international affairs grow and as the international scene changes, I will consider its arguments more or less convincing.
Nonetheless, I found the book to be incredibly thorough and certainly convincing in areas. Its description of the foundation of the balance of power and what constitutes power is logically very sound. When discussing the historical record, Mearsheimer is careful to account for the various anomalies and counterarguments that you would expect from applying one theory to the entirety of international history. His theory is not simplistic - whilst the key message of offensive realism is that states engage in security competition as a means to maximise power, owing to the need for security and fear of other states combined with the system of international anarchy, Mearsheimer understands that more in depth analysis is needed to understand why states act the way they do, and have in the past. For example, he explains well the reasons for the different actions of the United Kingdom and the United States as great powers being largely explained through the stopping power of water.
As others point out however, his theory's lack of focus on domestic politics and the ideological beliefs of individual politicians (as one would expect from a realist theory) makes offensive realism hard to apply to the reality of international affairs. Whilst Mearsheimer does acknowledge the importance of ideology, for example nationalism in China's rise to great power status and the role of communism versus capitalism in the Cold War's security competition, for the most part he dismisses ideological considerations as subordinate to balance of power considerations. Mearsheimer is right and is convincing in its assertions about how ideological motives are used to mask balance of power motives. He compares Confucianism in China with liberalism in the United States both as forces that can be used in this regard. For example, it did not matter during the Cold War what ideology the USSR ascribed to, as whilst their employment of communism helped mask it, their true consideration was ensuring the Soviets did not achieve regional hegemony in Europe as a key tenet of offensive realism is the desire of regional hegemons (like the U.S.) from preventing other potential hegemons in other regions from achieving that status.
Regardless, it is evident that his theory lacks domestic considerations which are of utmost important when considering state action. Ultimately, states exist in a everchanging world, and states themselves are everchanging with an influx of new politicians, new ways of thinking and new domestic activity. As such, it is difficult to argue that balance of power considerations are the only ones that matter when state action is directly informed by domestic politics that is so complex and unstable.
Certainly, I have a lot to read on international relations to gain a greater appreciation of this book. Moreover, its claims on the rise of China as a potential hegemon in East Asia and a security competition with the United States will be interesting to watch, as particularly in the South China Sea this appears to be developing quickly. Perhaps in the future, as my own knowledge of international affairs grow and as the international scene changes, I will consider its arguments more or less convincing.
May 22, 2015
We tend to be enthusiastic about books which offer ideas you already hold, books which reinforce your way of thinking. So it's no surprise that I liked John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. He articulates what I have for years thought is the true nature of international relations.
The book is a long argument for Mearsheimer's theory about what drives the relations between nations. He calls it offensive realism, his theory that the collection of the world's great powers is an anarchic system in which they're not committed so much to maintaining peace but instead work toward maximizing their share of world power. Hegemony is the foundation on which the architecture of his theory is built. Nations strive toward hegemony in their region while neighbors work to balance the situation with power and threats and with alliances while at the same time maneuvering their own power toward their own hegemony. Those times in history when there have been potential hegemons have been the most volatile, whether the primary actor was Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or Japan. He supports the detailed points of his theory with examples from the modern era beginning in 1792 and running through the end of the Cold War in 1990. His focus is on Europe because most of the world's great powers are there and most of the great power conflict in recent history has arisen from their intense competition. The long last chapter, however, deals with the rise of China and his view that given the tendency of nations to behave according to the motivations of offensive realism, given China's natural impulse to work toward regional hegemony while its neighbors try to limit it with balancing coalitions and alliances, China and the U. S. can probably not avoid confrontation in the western Pacific. His outlook for a peaceful rise of China is pessimistic. The tragedy is the reality of history and the future.
The book is a long argument for Mearsheimer's theory about what drives the relations between nations. He calls it offensive realism, his theory that the collection of the world's great powers is an anarchic system in which they're not committed so much to maintaining peace but instead work toward maximizing their share of world power. Hegemony is the foundation on which the architecture of his theory is built. Nations strive toward hegemony in their region while neighbors work to balance the situation with power and threats and with alliances while at the same time maneuvering their own power toward their own hegemony. Those times in history when there have been potential hegemons have been the most volatile, whether the primary actor was Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or Japan. He supports the detailed points of his theory with examples from the modern era beginning in 1792 and running through the end of the Cold War in 1990. His focus is on Europe because most of the world's great powers are there and most of the great power conflict in recent history has arisen from their intense competition. The long last chapter, however, deals with the rise of China and his view that given the tendency of nations to behave according to the motivations of offensive realism, given China's natural impulse to work toward regional hegemony while its neighbors try to limit it with balancing coalitions and alliances, China and the U. S. can probably not avoid confrontation in the western Pacific. His outlook for a peaceful rise of China is pessimistic. The tragedy is the reality of history and the future.
October 3, 2022
"International Politics is a dangerous business and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition and the quest for hegemony."
Being realist sucks! But in the end, no matter how much people resist it, realism prevails. The book provides the perfect guide to Offensive Realism in International Relations. Mr Mearsheimer had predicted the rise of china a long time ago and most of his predictions are proving themselves to be true. The study and literature reading the author have done are quite commendable. A must-read for all the students of International Politics and Global Diplomacy. Although the perspective has western, especially eurocentric biases, it is very easy to draw the corollary.
The Book analyses how Balance of Power considerations and States' drive for hegemony shape the international order, and eventually that international order provokes states to gain as much relative power as they can compare to their adversary. It also highlights the importance of Geography in International Relations. A comprehensive analysis and an exciting read.
Being realist sucks! But in the end, no matter how much people resist it, realism prevails. The book provides the perfect guide to Offensive Realism in International Relations. Mr Mearsheimer had predicted the rise of china a long time ago and most of his predictions are proving themselves to be true. The study and literature reading the author have done are quite commendable. A must-read for all the students of International Politics and Global Diplomacy. Although the perspective has western, especially eurocentric biases, it is very easy to draw the corollary.
The Book analyses how Balance of Power considerations and States' drive for hegemony shape the international order, and eventually that international order provokes states to gain as much relative power as they can compare to their adversary. It also highlights the importance of Geography in International Relations. A comprehensive analysis and an exciting read.
June 26, 2019
He makes some very good points, but for the most part he does not really make a good theory that revolves around world politics as he basically disregards three continents and only really focuses on about four countries. He tends to conveniently forget a lot of facts and a lot of history, and oversimplifies events so that it fits his theory.
October 11, 2022
(book 4, september) solid. Meansheimer writes with an acute clarity and generally enough self-reflexivity for you to keenly grasp the limitations of his method and theory. his theory is one he calls offensive realism; paraphrased it is the idea that nations are inherently paranoic about other nations and will seek to gain more power or thwart other nations' way to power so as to ultimately survive. for Meansheimer it is survival that is the ultimate imperative: the economy and ideology are secondary, because without survival neither of those things can exist. (a last idea Meansheimer focuses on is hegemony, specifically its regional variant. nations seek hegemony, he claims, because it is the surest path to survival. other conclusions about the "stopping power of water" qualify and support this claim)
my only reservation about this book is that Meansheimer tends to repeat himself a lot and re-expound his theory many many times. I guess this helps his theory stick in the mind for a distracted reader like me but the serious reader could deal with a once-off exposition and more detailed critiques of case studies that seek to mine greater insights instead of merely proving points the reader has accepted as agreed common sense.
but that's a small issue and one that, again, does have some advantages. in the end Meansheimer's pessimistic view of international relations seems to be bearing itself out in the Sino-American relations of today and the Russia-Ukraine war. one wonders if, in the end, theory must be left to unhappy descriptions of inevitable war and conflict; or if, as dreamed the philosophers eons ago and even some believed after the Holocaust - theory can be used to build better societies where peace enjoys a concrete existence. Meansheimer is convincing that the latter scenario is a pipe dream. but reading about civilian bombings in Kiev today and which will continue months after this, a devastated part of me hopes he must be wrong.
my only reservation about this book is that Meansheimer tends to repeat himself a lot and re-expound his theory many many times. I guess this helps his theory stick in the mind for a distracted reader like me but the serious reader could deal with a once-off exposition and more detailed critiques of case studies that seek to mine greater insights instead of merely proving points the reader has accepted as agreed common sense.
but that's a small issue and one that, again, does have some advantages. in the end Meansheimer's pessimistic view of international relations seems to be bearing itself out in the Sino-American relations of today and the Russia-Ukraine war. one wonders if, in the end, theory must be left to unhappy descriptions of inevitable war and conflict; or if, as dreamed the philosophers eons ago and even some believed after the Holocaust - theory can be used to build better societies where peace enjoys a concrete existence. Meansheimer is convincing that the latter scenario is a pipe dream. but reading about civilian bombings in Kiev today and which will continue months after this, a devastated part of me hopes he must be wrong.
May 4, 2022
This book seeks to set out the framework of "offensive realism" - which argues that (in contrast to defensive realism) that for states to seek security, they have to expand and cannot be acceptive of their status quo unless they become a regional hegemon, and even then: they have to ward off rising great powers nonetheless, to preserve their own position. This is an useful update of Waltz's view which is more static - but it has its own limits: its analysis is very reliant on military power, economy is only useful insofar it relates to expansion of military power. However, I think economy is key here in the sense capitalist world-system is structured in a hierarchy of world-states, which affect its international power. Ukraine has a powerful army (as can be seen now), but by no means is it a great power - while Germany can be considered one, for instance.
Furthermore, he does not look enough at how ideology shapes the worldview of states; which I think would be useful - however, this is mostly an addition to his analysis, not in contradiction to it.
Lastly, he has no real theory of why war happens - he gives some arguments as to what increases it, but why do states engage in destructive behaviour? It's just (implicitly) seen as a way of achieving the state goals of maximizing hegemony etc., but this is too simplistic as it cannot explain any unit-level accounts beyond post-factum rationalizations. Copeland's account here is far superior, as it is a dynamic account able to integrate far more cases.
Nonetheless, it is an useful account and has useful ways of categorising state-strategies in improving their power internationally & why some are preferred to others.
Furthermore, he does not look enough at how ideology shapes the worldview of states; which I think would be useful - however, this is mostly an addition to his analysis, not in contradiction to it.
Lastly, he has no real theory of why war happens - he gives some arguments as to what increases it, but why do states engage in destructive behaviour? It's just (implicitly) seen as a way of achieving the state goals of maximizing hegemony etc., but this is too simplistic as it cannot explain any unit-level accounts beyond post-factum rationalizations. Copeland's account here is far superior, as it is a dynamic account able to integrate far more cases.
Nonetheless, it is an useful account and has useful ways of categorising state-strategies in improving their power internationally & why some are preferred to others.
February 10, 2019
possibly one of the worst books i've ever read, written by a white man who probably had way too much fun concocting military strategy and imagining mass destruction. here is the premise encapsulated in a single sentence: "states should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world" (11). basically he's saying that it's perfectly rational and reasonable for states to seek hegemony. and that china and the US will soon be embroiled in a massive war.
April 1, 2022
Didn't read the whole thing because it just isn't necessary. I don't agree with Mearsheimer's theory, even in today's grim world, but the book gives a clear, valuable description of offensive realism that is important for anyone to understand. Mearsheimer also gives adequate time to counterarguments which I appreciate.
June 5, 2022
Okay, his theorem of offensive realism thoroughly explained, which I mostly agree as how the world should be modeled, but this book is written in a pretty annoying way. Is this standard for political theorists? Is it really necessary to spell out the dates of wars every time they are mentioned, which is like, on every page? This makes it feel like high school history essays.
December 25, 2021
An original and well written argument in favour of Offensive Realism. Especially the warning about Chinas immanent rise to the status of regional hegemon was well spotted in the year 2000. Unfortunately not enough people payed the necessary attention…
December 18, 2022
Kánon ofenziního realismu. V mnohém podnětné, paradoxně zvlášť ve vztahu k Rusku, protože Kreml žije v podobném myšlenkovém světě. Ale ve své podstatě nepřesvědčivé, příliš zjednodušující ve snaze najít pár jednoduchých pravidel, dle kterých se řídí interakce velmocí. Podobně jako neoklasická ekonomie, ze které neorealismus ne náhodou vychází, padá na předpokladu racionálních aktérů, stejně tak jako na nemožnosti zjištění motivací ostatních velmocí - mezi liberálními demokraciemi toto možné minimálně střednědobě je.
Read
January 18, 2020[Used this as a textbook for university. I'm not going to rate it since I didn't read it for fun but I wanted to count it because I had to read all of it.]
Displaying 1 - 30 of 193 reviews