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The Russian Revolution: A New History
In The Russian Revolution, historian Sean McMeekin traces the origins and events of the Russian Revolution, which ended Romanov rule, ushered the Bolsheviks into power, and changed the course of world history. Between 1900 and 1920, Russia underwent a complete and irreversible transformation: by the end of these two decades, a new regime was in place, the economy had collapsed, and over 20 million Russians had died during the revolution and what followed. Still, Bolshevik power remained intact due to a remarkable combination of military prowess, violent terror tactics, and the failures of their opposition. And as McMeekin shows, Russia's revolutionaries were aided at nearly every step by countries like Germany and Sweden who sought to benefit—politically and economically—from the chaotic changes overtaking the country.
The first comprehensive history of these momentous events in a decade, The Russian Revolution combines cutting-edge scholarship and a fast-paced narrative to shed new light on a great turning point of the twentieth century.
496 pages, Hardcover
First published May 30, 2017
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May 16, 2024
“Russia in the last days of the tsars was a land of contradictions, of great wealth and extreme poverty and the myriad social and ethnic tensions of a vast multiethnic empire; but there was nothing inevitable about the collapse of the regime in 1917. Nearly torn asunder by the revolution of 1905…the Russian Empire made a remarkable recovery over the following decade… The tragedy of Russian liberalism is that it was the country’s most dedicated reformers and constitutionalists who, by embracing the fashionable ideas of pan-Slavism, convinced Nicholas II that he needed to mobilize in July 1914 to appease public opinion – and then spent the war plotting against him anyway, in spite of his foolish decision to follow their advice. It was the tsar’s fateful decision to go to war…which brought an end to an era of great economic and social progress in Russia, and ultimately cost him his throne. In this way an empire founded on the autocratic principle foundered on the feeble will to power of its last autocrat, who lacked the courage of his own convictions. Once he had the upper hand, Lenin would not make the same mistake…”
- Sean McMeekin, The Russian Revolution: A New History
Because I suffer from a profound big-book bias, the first thing that struck me about Sean McMeekin’s The Russian Revolution is its relative brevity. At 352 pages of text, it’s not exactly a Denny’s menu. But when compared to other similarly-themed entries – such as Richard Pipe’s The Russian Revolution, at 842 pages, or Orlando Figes’ A People’s Tragedy, at 824 pages – it feels practically brief.
The reason – as we learn upfront – is that McMeekin has something very particular to say, and he goes about saying it without any hemming. In short, he wants to demolish any claim that the Bolsheviks had “to democratic, popular, or moral legitimacy.” Though he acknowledges other books have taken this tact before – and it has been the prevailing view for some time – McMeekin feels the moment is right to deal another blow to the lingering ghosts of Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and the rest.
Why? It’s a good question, one that McMeekin explains rather weakly. To him, events such as the popularity of Thomas Picketty and Bernie Sanders hint at a Marxist resurgence, rather than a critique of the failures of late-stage capitalism. While this works as a grumpy old guy opinion, I remain unconvinced that the greatest danger facing the world today is a second Communist takeover.
Despite the hyperbole, though, I’m not one to pass up a new volume on one of the epochal events in human history. Besides, I have enjoyed McMeekin’s work in the past, and was willing to give this a try, despite a shaky mission statement, and only 352 pages with which to work.
***
McMeekin’s view of the Russian Revolution is that it was not a revolution at all, but a coup. As a result, he spends the early chapters reframing the last years of the Old Regime. Rather than a country brought low by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, McMeekin argues that Russia had, in many respects, made a full recovery. His argument is a bit more nuanced, but can be summed up by this motto: Autocracy: It’s Not as Bad as it Sounds!
The pivotal moment is the Great War, a subject that McMeekin has covered before in July 1914 and The Russian Origins of the First World War. Contra received wisdom, McMeekin has always placed much of the blame for the conflagration’s outbreak in Russia’s hands. Here, he sticks to that position in blunt terms, suggesting that despite Rasputin’s general weirdness – and predatory instincts – Nicholas would have been better served listening to him, instead of mobilizing in support of Serbia. McMeekin contends that if Nicholas II had followed the mystic, “he might have died peacefully on his throne instead of being butchered by the Bolsheviks in July 1918.”
***
Once the war began, McMeekin is pretty sanguine about Russia’s performance. He argues that – all things considered – the Russian Armies did pretty well, given the relativity of success in the Great War. Russia’s liberals, however, believed the military effort to be floundering, and staged their revolution to improve the military situation. Once the Provisional Government took over, McMeekin cites Alexander Kerensky – who served as minister of war, minister of justice, and as minister-chairman – for numerous blunders with regard to his handling of the insurgent Bolsheviks. Kerensky had a chance to end the Bolsheviks for good and all after the so-called “July Days” mini-revolution; instead, he lost sight of the prize, picked a fight with a popular general, and allowed them to rise again. When the Bolsheviks did come to power, they did so as a minority party, without a popular mandate. As they demonstrated, however, a clear goal, an iron will, and utter ruthlessness more than makes up for majority support.
***
Of course, Kerensky did not act in a vacuum. There were other players involved, including Germany. McMeekin spends a lot of time detailing its role in smuggling Lenin into Russia as a kind of poison pill. Accusations of Lenin being a German agent began contemporaneously with the events of the Russian Revolution. To McMeekin, the money trail shows this to be literally true. According to him, the Germans contributed some 50 million gold marks ($1 billion today) to Lenin’s party. If true, this was money well spent, for the Bolshevik influence on Russia’s armies – not a decisive battle – ultimately caused it to collapse.
***
I haven’t read a ton of books on the Russian Revolution, so part of The Russian Revolution’s value to me is that it easy to follow. McMeekin is judicious in deciding what details to put in, and what to leave out. By way of comparison, Figes’ A People’s Tragedy is a better book, but there were times when I got lost within its dense mass of tiny print.
That didn't happen here. McMeekin keeps things moving along at a solid pace. Furthermore, by presenting his narrative as an argument, McMeekin provides a good framework for understanding a complex historical topic. I’m no Russian expert, though I do drink the occasional vodka drink, and I have a Soviet artilleryman’s uniform my dad purchased when the USSR collapsed. This means I can’t unqualifiedly endorse or discard McMeekin’s interpretations. Nevertheless, by being direct, pithy, and opinionated, he delivers a book of refreshing clarity.
***
Lest you think I have embraced concision, I should add that it has its consequences. Due to the streamlining, there are no rich biographical portraits of the revolution’s numerous fascinating figures. There are no in-depth set pieces that put you into the heart of the action, whether it’s a rally on the streets of Petrograd, a futile assault on an Austro-Hungarian trench, or in the basement of the Ipatiev House as the Tsar's executioners gather.
Typically, I prefer more detail to less, and something that’s immersive, rather than an outline. But I also recognize that when it comes to the Russian Revolution, what I want in my reading life and what I need are separate things. For readers like me, The Russian Revolution is valuable as a fresh, up-to-date, and readable account of a hugely complicated and important world-historical turning point. And for readers like future-me – the me that drinks less vodka and reads more Russian history books – it has interpretations and opinions worth pondering.
***
Whatever else you might think about the Romanovs, the Bolsheviks, or Communism, the Russian Revolution was terrifying on an individual level. This isn’t a surprise. Throughout history, popular revolts have sought to change the world, only to replace an unfair and unjust system with one that is equally flawed. In the interim – no matter the original intent – countless people end up crushed by the grinding gears of societal reordering, so that hundreds, thousands, even millions are not around to see the glorious future once promised. In Russia, what began as a democratic movement simply ended up exchanging one autocratic for another, with consequences severe enough to fill untold mass graves.
- Sean McMeekin, The Russian Revolution: A New History
Because I suffer from a profound big-book bias, the first thing that struck me about Sean McMeekin’s The Russian Revolution is its relative brevity. At 352 pages of text, it’s not exactly a Denny’s menu. But when compared to other similarly-themed entries – such as Richard Pipe’s The Russian Revolution, at 842 pages, or Orlando Figes’ A People’s Tragedy, at 824 pages – it feels practically brief.
The reason – as we learn upfront – is that McMeekin has something very particular to say, and he goes about saying it without any hemming. In short, he wants to demolish any claim that the Bolsheviks had “to democratic, popular, or moral legitimacy.” Though he acknowledges other books have taken this tact before – and it has been the prevailing view for some time – McMeekin feels the moment is right to deal another blow to the lingering ghosts of Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and the rest.
Why? It’s a good question, one that McMeekin explains rather weakly. To him, events such as the popularity of Thomas Picketty and Bernie Sanders hint at a Marxist resurgence, rather than a critique of the failures of late-stage capitalism. While this works as a grumpy old guy opinion, I remain unconvinced that the greatest danger facing the world today is a second Communist takeover.
Despite the hyperbole, though, I’m not one to pass up a new volume on one of the epochal events in human history. Besides, I have enjoyed McMeekin’s work in the past, and was willing to give this a try, despite a shaky mission statement, and only 352 pages with which to work.
***
McMeekin’s view of the Russian Revolution is that it was not a revolution at all, but a coup. As a result, he spends the early chapters reframing the last years of the Old Regime. Rather than a country brought low by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, McMeekin argues that Russia had, in many respects, made a full recovery. His argument is a bit more nuanced, but can be summed up by this motto: Autocracy: It’s Not as Bad as it Sounds!
The pivotal moment is the Great War, a subject that McMeekin has covered before in July 1914 and The Russian Origins of the First World War. Contra received wisdom, McMeekin has always placed much of the blame for the conflagration’s outbreak in Russia’s hands. Here, he sticks to that position in blunt terms, suggesting that despite Rasputin’s general weirdness – and predatory instincts – Nicholas would have been better served listening to him, instead of mobilizing in support of Serbia. McMeekin contends that if Nicholas II had followed the mystic, “he might have died peacefully on his throne instead of being butchered by the Bolsheviks in July 1918.”
***
Once the war began, McMeekin is pretty sanguine about Russia’s performance. He argues that – all things considered – the Russian Armies did pretty well, given the relativity of success in the Great War. Russia’s liberals, however, believed the military effort to be floundering, and staged their revolution to improve the military situation. Once the Provisional Government took over, McMeekin cites Alexander Kerensky – who served as minister of war, minister of justice, and as minister-chairman – for numerous blunders with regard to his handling of the insurgent Bolsheviks. Kerensky had a chance to end the Bolsheviks for good and all after the so-called “July Days” mini-revolution; instead, he lost sight of the prize, picked a fight with a popular general, and allowed them to rise again. When the Bolsheviks did come to power, they did so as a minority party, without a popular mandate. As they demonstrated, however, a clear goal, an iron will, and utter ruthlessness more than makes up for majority support.
***
Of course, Kerensky did not act in a vacuum. There were other players involved, including Germany. McMeekin spends a lot of time detailing its role in smuggling Lenin into Russia as a kind of poison pill. Accusations of Lenin being a German agent began contemporaneously with the events of the Russian Revolution. To McMeekin, the money trail shows this to be literally true. According to him, the Germans contributed some 50 million gold marks ($1 billion today) to Lenin’s party. If true, this was money well spent, for the Bolshevik influence on Russia’s armies – not a decisive battle – ultimately caused it to collapse.
***
I haven’t read a ton of books on the Russian Revolution, so part of The Russian Revolution’s value to me is that it easy to follow. McMeekin is judicious in deciding what details to put in, and what to leave out. By way of comparison, Figes’ A People’s Tragedy is a better book, but there were times when I got lost within its dense mass of tiny print.
That didn't happen here. McMeekin keeps things moving along at a solid pace. Furthermore, by presenting his narrative as an argument, McMeekin provides a good framework for understanding a complex historical topic. I’m no Russian expert, though I do drink the occasional vodka drink, and I have a Soviet artilleryman’s uniform my dad purchased when the USSR collapsed. This means I can’t unqualifiedly endorse or discard McMeekin’s interpretations. Nevertheless, by being direct, pithy, and opinionated, he delivers a book of refreshing clarity.
***
Lest you think I have embraced concision, I should add that it has its consequences. Due to the streamlining, there are no rich biographical portraits of the revolution’s numerous fascinating figures. There are no in-depth set pieces that put you into the heart of the action, whether it’s a rally on the streets of Petrograd, a futile assault on an Austro-Hungarian trench, or in the basement of the Ipatiev House as the Tsar's executioners gather.
Typically, I prefer more detail to less, and something that’s immersive, rather than an outline. But I also recognize that when it comes to the Russian Revolution, what I want in my reading life and what I need are separate things. For readers like me, The Russian Revolution is valuable as a fresh, up-to-date, and readable account of a hugely complicated and important world-historical turning point. And for readers like future-me – the me that drinks less vodka and reads more Russian history books – it has interpretations and opinions worth pondering.
***
Whatever else you might think about the Romanovs, the Bolsheviks, or Communism, the Russian Revolution was terrifying on an individual level. This isn’t a surprise. Throughout history, popular revolts have sought to change the world, only to replace an unfair and unjust system with one that is equally flawed. In the interim – no matter the original intent – countless people end up crushed by the grinding gears of societal reordering, so that hundreds, thousands, even millions are not around to see the glorious future once promised. In Russia, what began as a democratic movement simply ended up exchanging one autocratic for another, with consequences severe enough to fill untold mass graves.
September 11, 2022
Every Time it Hits Hard.
Reading about Russian’s tragic Revolution never fails to invoke feelings of sadness and shock at the loss of a nation and it’s people. The horrors are unimaginable and the suffering cannot be contemplated. So many died for so little. The Russian Revolution: A New History by Sean McMeekin does the same. Although smaller than other benchmark works such as A People’s Tragedy by Orlando Figes, this book still has a lot to offer and is still great in understanding the events that took place from 1914-1924. I have read a lot on the subject and the book was still able to teach, for example if forgotten the importance of the Kornilov Affair which effectively sealed the fate of Kerensky or Order Number 1 which completely undermined and ruined the Tsarist Regime.
What I always love about McMeekin is that he is an analyst, able to give his opinions on events and how they situations hung on a knife edge and could be swayed either way, Tsar Nicholas II’s reign could have survived, the Bolsheviks could have easily been overturned once they got into power, anything could have happened if it were not for the chances of history. McMeekin is brilliant at showing these crossroads. He is a student of Russia and WWI, but at the same time is not an advocate for the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks or Social Revolutionaries which is nice to see. He also shows how the liberals politicians who urged the Tsar to go to war in 1914 (the conservatives and Rasputin actually advised against it) and the Provisional Government after his abdication actually performed worse than the Tsarist Regime. Following this he opens up the hypocrisy, fanaticism and incompetence of the Bolsheviks as they murdered, stole and lied their way through to the 1920s, somehow with all the cards falling in their favour.
The smashing of the ancient churches, monasteries and shrines in Moscow was particularly poignant, alongside opening of the coffins of the past Tsars in St Petersburg, again to steal precious jewels. All of this to pay for a huge deficit in funds they had. All of this of course, is an important lesson, one we should think about going forward and should be careful not to repeat. Those who are promising social equality or utopia should be held at arms length as it can only end in death and catastrophe. Following this book I am hungry for more McMeekin and more on Russia. It’s a great read!
Reading about Russian’s tragic Revolution never fails to invoke feelings of sadness and shock at the loss of a nation and it’s people. The horrors are unimaginable and the suffering cannot be contemplated. So many died for so little. The Russian Revolution: A New History by Sean McMeekin does the same. Although smaller than other benchmark works such as A People’s Tragedy by Orlando Figes, this book still has a lot to offer and is still great in understanding the events that took place from 1914-1924. I have read a lot on the subject and the book was still able to teach, for example if forgotten the importance of the Kornilov Affair which effectively sealed the fate of Kerensky or Order Number 1 which completely undermined and ruined the Tsarist Regime.
What I always love about McMeekin is that he is an analyst, able to give his opinions on events and how they situations hung on a knife edge and could be swayed either way, Tsar Nicholas II’s reign could have survived, the Bolsheviks could have easily been overturned once they got into power, anything could have happened if it were not for the chances of history. McMeekin is brilliant at showing these crossroads. He is a student of Russia and WWI, but at the same time is not an advocate for the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks or Social Revolutionaries which is nice to see. He also shows how the liberals politicians who urged the Tsar to go to war in 1914 (the conservatives and Rasputin actually advised against it) and the Provisional Government after his abdication actually performed worse than the Tsarist Regime. Following this he opens up the hypocrisy, fanaticism and incompetence of the Bolsheviks as they murdered, stole and lied their way through to the 1920s, somehow with all the cards falling in their favour.
The smashing of the ancient churches, monasteries and shrines in Moscow was particularly poignant, alongside opening of the coffins of the past Tsars in St Petersburg, again to steal precious jewels. All of this to pay for a huge deficit in funds they had. All of this of course, is an important lesson, one we should think about going forward and should be careful not to repeat. Those who are promising social equality or utopia should be held at arms length as it can only end in death and catastrophe. Following this book I am hungry for more McMeekin and more on Russia. It’s a great read!
July 14, 2017
What I learned from McMeekin: Lenin and the Bolsheviks worked for the Germans. The tsar wasn't too bad (but he did get bad advice at critical junctures). Kornilov and Denikin were good, patriotic Russians who would've probably done a fine job running the country. The Bolshevik "coup" was easily avoidable.
If you're interested in a moderate, dispassionate presentation of a fairly reactionary, monarchist view of the Russian Revolution, McMeekin is the place to go. It's not so much a "new" history, but it does ignore most of the recent scholarship. Unless you're a graduate student reading for exams or just a glutton for pain, I suggest finding another, better book on the revolution. Shelia Fitzpatrick's "The Russian Revolution," one of the many books he swipes at in the introduction, is a good place to start.
If you're interested in a moderate, dispassionate presentation of a fairly reactionary, monarchist view of the Russian Revolution, McMeekin is the place to go. It's not so much a "new" history, but it does ignore most of the recent scholarship. Unless you're a graduate student reading for exams or just a glutton for pain, I suggest finding another, better book on the revolution. Shelia Fitzpatrick's "The Russian Revolution," one of the many books he swipes at in the introduction, is a good place to start.
June 15, 2017
shorter than I expected (there are 150 pages of notes, references etc) but captivating like a page turner novel; the main thrust (argued well) is how preparing for 1917, Russia was actually very well positioned to defeat the Central powers who were the ones on the verge of meltdown, but a weak Tsar with no inner circle worth mentioning and reeling from Rasputin's assassination in December 1916, talkative but ineffective politicians, able to stir trouble but ultimately not to control it, and generals who thought that staying out of "politics" is part of their job, led to the February Revolution and the provisional government and then the Germans made their move sending Lenin (and others) with a ton of money to disrupt it; with a clear eye on power at all costs and with a clear idea - transforming the "imperialist war" in civil war to destroy society and remake it in his vision, Lenin was unrelenting in the pursuit of power and despite missteps and internal opposition from most other Bolshevik leaders who actually living in Russia, thought Lenin's ideas crazy, the combination of self-destruction from various politicians that led the provisional government, Lenin's ability to pay agitators with German money to destabilize the front and the general war wariness of the peasant soldiers (obviously not knowing that Lenin would first send them back to fight an even more gruesome war against all opposition and then to destroy the villages and take the land and the food until he was forced to temporary retreat from maximalist socialism with the NEP) allowed him to eventually take power fairly easily in October 1917 and then by surrendering to the Germans at Brest Litovsk in early 1918 to insure the survival of his regime
Later in 1918, the Germans were getting fed up with the Bolsheviks - and preparing to march on Moscow and depose them but their defeat in the west and the British giving up on the blockade of the Soviet state allowed the regime to buy (with looted gold, precious stones and works of art) all the armament needed through Sweden and crush its opponents in late 1919, early 1920, only for that to be followed by the brutal war against the peasants, the workers who saw the realities of Bolshevism and rebelled (most notably at Kronstadt in 1921, the original bolshevik power center of 1917, turned into a mass grave by Trotsky) and basically anyone saying anything, so inaugurating a regime 100 times more oppressive and brutal than the tsarist one it replaced
Excellent overview of the beginning of the destruction of Russia by the most brutal regime of the 20th century who inaugurated mass murder on industrial scale (though sadly it won't be the last one)
Later in 1918, the Germans were getting fed up with the Bolsheviks - and preparing to march on Moscow and depose them but their defeat in the west and the British giving up on the blockade of the Soviet state allowed the regime to buy (with looted gold, precious stones and works of art) all the armament needed through Sweden and crush its opponents in late 1919, early 1920, only for that to be followed by the brutal war against the peasants, the workers who saw the realities of Bolshevism and rebelled (most notably at Kronstadt in 1921, the original bolshevik power center of 1917, turned into a mass grave by Trotsky) and basically anyone saying anything, so inaugurating a regime 100 times more oppressive and brutal than the tsarist one it replaced
Excellent overview of the beginning of the destruction of Russia by the most brutal regime of the 20th century who inaugurated mass murder on industrial scale (though sadly it won't be the last one)
February 25, 2018
Although at times a little dry and challenging given the sheer cast of players and military units this is a well-structured and informative overview of the revolution.
It is perhaps a shorter book than one might expect for such a period of change and impact, but with substantial sources and references the author is able to wave his view of events and how these took a country from a regime of monarchical superiority to one of non-monarchical self-elected superiority.
Of interest to me was not only the wider story of how the revolution came about but also how the author almost demotes the Tsar to a key but not overwhelming participant. To my mind this serves the book well as the struggles between people, groups and indeed countries plays out without - as some books do - constantly placing the royal family at the story's centre; yes they were central but only to a point and it is this aspect that rewards the reader to my mind.
Also well described is the Russian army and navy and its battles, morale and indeed conduct fighting the war. It continued to do so from early to mid-revolution and into Brest-Litovsk and all the while showing a differing pace, intent and tactics to the war depending on the commander, location and immediate situation (militarily), ethnicity of its units, and the enemy being faced (for example Turkish or say German).
Post-war how the French, German, British, Japanese, Chinese and Americans all engaged, treated, communicated, funded, fought and supported the new soviet regime is also covered. Here I was intrigued not just by the Reds/Whites, Polish and Czech wars and operations, including various landings, seizing of territory and diplomatic contacts with Russian armed forces and political units, but of the sheer number of weapons and aid shipped into Russia (this last especially so by the US who helped alleviate starvation in many areas).
It is this last point (starvation) that brings me to the penultimate chapter, and for me the book's best writing. This chapter deals with the regime's challenge of starvation and in tandem its war on the church. Outside of the USA's assistance to feed the Russian peoples the regime and notably Lenin in the author's view deliberately let millions starve; in part because they had no grain but also because all monies and booty - tons and tons of gold, silver, diamonds etc., taken from citizens and banks - was used to buy armaments, and in some cases good and high living rich foodstuffs such as chocolate for the new red bourgeoisie. The church was ravaged and robbed of tons and tons of treasure and historical worth. True it [church] should have given its valuables to help feed the poor but the gold, silver, jewels never turned to red wine and bread as Lenin's GPU and other agencies appropriated these back to the government to buy more machine-guns, rifles, bullets and so on: not to kill external enemies but, alongside famine, to be used as weapons of war on the population within Russian borders.
With Lenin's death in 1924 the stage is then set, as the book ends, for Joseph Stalin to continue purging and murdering in ever greater numbers the Russian peoples, who had in reality influenced and knew little of the revolution as it happened and endured famine and treatment far worse and deaths in greater numbers than ever under the monarchy.
My copy (hardback first edition) benefited from many good quality black and white maps and photographs.
All in all a solid three star informative book from an author who I have read before.
It is perhaps a shorter book than one might expect for such a period of change and impact, but with substantial sources and references the author is able to wave his view of events and how these took a country from a regime of monarchical superiority to one of non-monarchical self-elected superiority.
Of interest to me was not only the wider story of how the revolution came about but also how the author almost demotes the Tsar to a key but not overwhelming participant. To my mind this serves the book well as the struggles between people, groups and indeed countries plays out without - as some books do - constantly placing the royal family at the story's centre; yes they were central but only to a point and it is this aspect that rewards the reader to my mind.
Also well described is the Russian army and navy and its battles, morale and indeed conduct fighting the war. It continued to do so from early to mid-revolution and into Brest-Litovsk and all the while showing a differing pace, intent and tactics to the war depending on the commander, location and immediate situation (militarily), ethnicity of its units, and the enemy being faced (for example Turkish or say German).
Post-war how the French, German, British, Japanese, Chinese and Americans all engaged, treated, communicated, funded, fought and supported the new soviet regime is also covered. Here I was intrigued not just by the Reds/Whites, Polish and Czech wars and operations, including various landings, seizing of territory and diplomatic contacts with Russian armed forces and political units, but of the sheer number of weapons and aid shipped into Russia (this last especially so by the US who helped alleviate starvation in many areas).
It is this last point (starvation) that brings me to the penultimate chapter, and for me the book's best writing. This chapter deals with the regime's challenge of starvation and in tandem its war on the church. Outside of the USA's assistance to feed the Russian peoples the regime and notably Lenin in the author's view deliberately let millions starve; in part because they had no grain but also because all monies and booty - tons and tons of gold, silver, diamonds etc., taken from citizens and banks - was used to buy armaments, and in some cases good and high living rich foodstuffs such as chocolate for the new red bourgeoisie. The church was ravaged and robbed of tons and tons of treasure and historical worth. True it [church] should have given its valuables to help feed the poor but the gold, silver, jewels never turned to red wine and bread as Lenin's GPU and other agencies appropriated these back to the government to buy more machine-guns, rifles, bullets and so on: not to kill external enemies but, alongside famine, to be used as weapons of war on the population within Russian borders.
With Lenin's death in 1924 the stage is then set, as the book ends, for Joseph Stalin to continue purging and murdering in ever greater numbers the Russian peoples, who had in reality influenced and knew little of the revolution as it happened and endured famine and treatment far worse and deaths in greater numbers than ever under the monarchy.
My copy (hardback first edition) benefited from many good quality black and white maps and photographs.
All in all a solid three star informative book from an author who I have read before.
September 23, 2018
I am currently very focused on the ascent to power of Communism in Russia, not because it had anything to recommend it, but for the lessons it can teach us. Some of those lessons are ones the author of this book, Sean McMeekin, wants to impart—the dangers of left-wing ideology, primarily. Those are valuable lessons, certainly, but if we haven’t learned them after many decades of left-wing horror shows, we’re not going to learn them from this book. The lessons I am seeking, therefore, are more dynamic: how power can be grasped and used in fluid, chaotic situations, and by what kind of people. And those lessons are also on full display in this book, even if I did not learn any new ones.
By “A New History,” McMeekin really means a somewhat revisionist history. Two main grounds of revision are relevant in twentieth-century Russian history. One is the flood of information that has poured out of Communist archives in the past few decades. The other, related but distinct, is the holes that have been punched in the wall of silence erected around the crimes of Communism by the Left for the past century. These slashes in the fabric of the academic popular front were first made by brave scholars such as Robert Conquest and by men such as Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn. The latter revisionism began before the fall of the Soviet Union, and the predictable response at the time was the excoriation of and attacks on the brave men who dared to question the fruits of Communism, and frenzied denial of the truths they revealed, by the global Left which for a century has traveled in lockstep with Communism, complicit in its crimes up to the present day. (True, Solzhenitsyn in the late 1970s did have some impact in getting leftists to think that Soviet Communism wasn’t all it was cracked up to be, not that that reduced their faith in Communism itself.) The latter revisionism gained strength from the former revisionism after 1990, so now they work in tandem, producing works such as McMeekin’s. Of course, he has been attacked for the same reasons as Conquest. Famously, when asked to submit a new title for his 1968 book "The Great Terror," in 1991, Conquest is said to have suggested (though it was actually Kingsley Amis) "I Told You So, You F—-ing Fools." Funny, in a bitter way, but illustrative.
McMeekin offers restrained revisionism. He doesn’t have to convince anyone that Communism was bad; those who still believe it wasn’t aren’t going to be convinced; they are ideologues in the James Burnham definition. It is in other matters that McMeekin pulls back the curtain. He sets the stage by showing to be false the idea we all have latently in our heads, that fin de siècle Imperial Russia was a backward and stagnant land, to which the Bolsheviks, whatever their faults, brought the modern age. Part of dispelling this illusion is statistics on industrialization and the like, but more powerful still is one simple fact: “Russia in the early twentieth century was a substantial net importer of both people and capital: a telling fact that, since the revolution, has never been true again.” In many ways, the economic Russia of 1900 was like the China of 2010, and it was Communism, made possible by the war, that threw it into the abyss. Viewing Russia in this way resets our vision—we see that thinking of Tsarist Russia as a semi-barbarous land of black bread and serfs is the result of a century of deliberate philo-Communist propaganda in the West, meant to make us view Communism as at least bringing Russia up to date, when in fact it almost certainly would have done that all by itself, leading to a very different twentieth century (and, perhaps, a different vision of politics than that in which the West has enmired itself).
Along the same lines, McMeekin shows that the Tsarist regime was hardly one of terror. McMeekin points out that between 1825 and 1917, fewer than seventy people per year were executed in the entire country—not for political offenses, but for all offenses, including murder. This, when thousands of government officials were assassinated by the Left every year—3,600 in 1905, for example. The Bolsheviks executed hundreds of thousands, if not millions, within the early years of their power. Thus, not only did the Bolsheviks not cause the modernization of Russia, they did not relieve the country of terror, because in Imperial Russia there was no terror, or even substantial oppression (autocracy is not oppression), nor, for that matter, did they even ever provide “land and bread,” in the words of the slogan they stole from the Social Revolutionaries. The Communists, that is, had absolutely nothing at all to recommend them, despite what we were instructed by their allies in the West through the entire past century (including, for example, my high school history teacher, who was an open fan of the Soviet Union, and formally stole eight weeks of our American history course to indoctrinate us with a fictionalized Soviet history consisting mostly of Communist apologetics.)
McMeekin begins with the murder of Rasputin, at the end of 1916. This may seem like too melodramatic a way to begin, but McMeekin does a good job of tying Rasputin into all the threads of his book, not least the irony that Rasputin strongly opposed Russia entering the war, and that if his advice has been followed, the Tsar would doubtless have reigned for longer. The real meat of the book starts in 1905, though, with Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, resulting in unrest across Russia, including, crucially for later, among the armed forces. The Tsar, Nicholas II, conceded the convention of the Duma, an “Imperial Assembly” that would offer a form of parliament for the first time. Nicholas had been warned by Sergei Witte, a key advisor and architect of much of Russia’s economic growth, that he must either have some form of genuine constitutionalism, a backing away from autocracy, or crush the unrest with by military dictatorship. He picked the former, although perhaps he should have picked the latter—but then, Nicholas was never able to choose that path. He was no Napoleon; he was a gentle man, tossed about by history and imprisoned by his own mind. A saint, perhaps, but not a man up to the job. In the short run, however, creating the Duma while shooting a few active rebels quelled the unrest.
Witte was succeeded as the Tsar’s premier advisor by Peter Stolypin, who crushed further unrest by using martial law in areas of revolt and executing hundreds of leftist rebels, while at the same time enacting reforms such as expanded rights against arbitrary arrest. He was no fan of socialist parliamentarians; McMeekin quotes him as saying “You want a great upheaval. We want a great Russia!” MRGA! He led and oversaw an even greater economic boom, not through free markets or globalism, but through state capitalism, the same way every great nation, including Britain and the United States, built their economies. Stolypin, and therefore the Tsar, gave everyone rising wages and a greater stake in society, including industrial workers through good jobs and peasants through land reform of converting communal holdings to private holdings, turning Russia into a massive exporter of grain. A large part of Stolypin’s efforts went to preserving peace, since he could see very well that war would throw his plans off track—he said, “Give the state twenty years of peace, and you will not recognize present-day Russia.” Sounds like a foreshadowing of Trump, or what Trump could have been were he disciplined—but Stolypin didn’t get twenty years, he got five, assassinated in 1911.
Things went downhill from there. A significant percentage of the Russian upper classes were eager for war with Germany, which, of course, they got. McMeekin’s focus is, unsurprisingly, not the war in Flanders, but on the other side of the continent, which, while it was up and down, generally featured Russian success. And by January 1917, Russian military morale was extremely high, weapons stocks were also high, and the capture of Constantinople was eagerly awaited in the summer. Nor were civilians suffering unduly, contrary to myth—there were not actually bread shortages in Petrograd, and strikes were fewer than they had been (in large part because the Germans had stopped subsidizing strikers). There was nonetheless a great deal of political unrest, both among leftists opposed to the government’s mere existence, and among government factions opposed to each other, with some also opposing the Tsar and the conduct of the war—not that it should be ended, but objecting that the Tsar was unduly influenced by pro-German elements, starting with his wife. In part due to unseasonably warm weather, Socialist Revolutionary-led protests spiraled upwards, leading to a general strike and military mutinies among bored and propagandized rear echelon troops stationed in Petrograd (helped along, as McMeekin notes, “by the presence of pretty young women.”). The Tsar was out of town, and either unwilling or unable to react decisively, so various unscrupulous and grasping politicians stepped into the gap (especially one Mikhail Rodzianko, forgotten today but on whom McMeekin focuses closely), further confusing the situation. Given dubious and conflicting advice, and faced with inadequate loyal military resources, the Tsar abdicated. The Socialist Revolutionary lawyer Alexander Kerensky quickly rose to the top of this flotsam, and he promptly, and fatally for later, engineered a reversal of military morale, releasing soldiers from many disciplinary obligations and subjecting them to the local soviets (the order, “Order No. 1,” technically applied only to the Petrograd garrison, but was treated as applicable to all soldiers).
Into this chaos stepped the Bolsheviks, in the person of Lenin, back from multi-year exile and funded with the equivalent of, today, more than a billion dollars in German gold. While the Bolsheviks had been relevant, though far from dominant, players on the leftist revolutionary scene, what made them was German funding. For example, when Lenin arrived in April, he immediately bought a giant printing press for the equivalent, today, of tens of millions of dollars, and promptly deluged the city with Bolshevik propaganda. Money was also used to fund demonstrators—a common daily payment per person was ten gold rubles in cash, roughly $500 today. In fact, money was used for every purpose that money can be used for, and we would never have heard of the Bolsheviks if not for German money. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, this German funding was denied by the Communists, and by their fifth columns in the West, but today is heavily documented, though the records are still incomplete, as McMeekin notes. Still, shrill leftist denials are often heard of these basic facts, always without any counter-evidence, naturally.
Lenin, as always, had a plan, and it did not involve the continuation of Kerensky’s Socialist Revolutionary-led Provisional Government. Kerensky was incompetent, in any case, and surrounded by a variety of other incompetents, even if McMeekin prefers the more delicate criticisms of “amateurism” and “little stomach for the exercise of power.” While Kerensky toured front-line troops to rebuild morale he had undermined, hoping to bring the war to a successful end, the Bolsheviks spent hundreds of millions to turn the war into a civil war, a matter of deliberate Communist policy. This was done through propaganda, through paying agitators among troops, and by buying politicians, all with great success.
Kerensky’s biggest failure in these months was not executing Lenin after a failed putsch by the Bolsheviks in July, 2017. In fact, a running theme of the book is that the Tsars, and later the liberals of the February Revolution, failed to be adequately harsh with their opponents, and paid the price. (By the same token, as has often been pointed out, Lenin was fortunate in his enemies.) McMeekin goes over in great detail Kerensky’s disastrous decision to release, after their failed putsch, and instead to effectively ally himself with, the Bolsheviks, against a non-existent right-wing threat. (It was here that Kerensky announced his infamous dogma of “no enemies to the Left,” which has ever since characterized all leftist thought.) And, as we all know, in October the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government, ensconcing themselves permanently in power (whereupon Kerensky fled, ultimately dying in New York in 1970, where he was denied Orthodox burial for the sins he had unleashed on Russia).
The rest of the book covers the Bolsheviks in power, which they began by executing more than fifteen thousand people in the first two months alone (as McMeekin points out, more than twice the number executed in the entire last century of tsarist rule). It covers the civil war (detailing what seems like the besetting sin of insurgency movements, the inability to cooperate adequately), the implosion of the Russian economy, and the Bolsheviks running out of weapons, and how the Swedes kept the Bolsheviks afloat with guns and railroad engines, so they could get their hands on the Tsar’s gold (the German gold all having been long spent). It covers the Kronstadt rebellion and the resulting final dropping of the Bolshevik mask of being a “worker’s party.” It covers the 1921 famine (caused accidentally by Communism, not deliberately like later famines), alleviated not by the Bolsheviks, who spent what money they had left to foment revolution in Europe, but by Herbert Hoover and American Christian organizations. Naturally Lenin, with his “ice-cold grasp of power relationships,” used the famine as an excuse to steal everything owned by the Orthodox Church, which was a lot less than he expected and none of which was spent on famine relief.
Lenin came through all this, lucky as usual and greatly helped by sympathizers in the West, as well as by opportunistic politicians like Lloyd George, and at the end of 1922 the Bolsheviks were firmly in power and able to continue their reign of terror without fear of overthrow. Here McMeekin concludes his book, noting that the lesson we should learn is that we should “stiffen our defenses and resist armed prophets promising social perfection.” By this he explicitly means left-wing prophets, noting with distaste the rising Western “popularity of Marxist-style maximalist socialism,” and its lack of appeal anywhere it was actually in power. Unfortunately, none of the young people today crying out for “democratic socialism” are going to read this book, since few of those people read books at all, other than, perhaps, some Howard Zinn.
McMeekin characterizes Lenin’s seizure of power as a “hostile takeover.” By this he means that it succeeded without popular support, but rather by machination, which is certainly true. Lenin did not have a magic formula; other than simple luck, what made him successful was a combination of an iron will, unblinking focus, and the Kaiser’s money. Lenin grasped that history is a kaleidoscope, and when it turns, entirely new and unexpected combinations arise. And they arise not in some logical progression, but, as McMeekin notes of events in 1917, “at a bewildering pace.” For some reason, most people have difficulty dealing with the reality that great changes are phase changes; step functions, not linear slopes. They imagine that the future will be much like the past, because that’s their daily experience. Seeing beyond that, or more precisely, acting beyond that with consistency over time, is a rare talent.
I suppose I did not learn any new lessons from this book, despite that being my reason for reading it. I have elsewhere offered detailed thoughts on what we can learn from Lenin’s career, which I will not repeat here, and this book merely reinforced those. Still, this is an excellent book, and for someone looking to learn more about 1917 in Russia, this is certainly the modern book to read.
By “A New History,” McMeekin really means a somewhat revisionist history. Two main grounds of revision are relevant in twentieth-century Russian history. One is the flood of information that has poured out of Communist archives in the past few decades. The other, related but distinct, is the holes that have been punched in the wall of silence erected around the crimes of Communism by the Left for the past century. These slashes in the fabric of the academic popular front were first made by brave scholars such as Robert Conquest and by men such as Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn. The latter revisionism began before the fall of the Soviet Union, and the predictable response at the time was the excoriation of and attacks on the brave men who dared to question the fruits of Communism, and frenzied denial of the truths they revealed, by the global Left which for a century has traveled in lockstep with Communism, complicit in its crimes up to the present day. (True, Solzhenitsyn in the late 1970s did have some impact in getting leftists to think that Soviet Communism wasn’t all it was cracked up to be, not that that reduced their faith in Communism itself.) The latter revisionism gained strength from the former revisionism after 1990, so now they work in tandem, producing works such as McMeekin’s. Of course, he has been attacked for the same reasons as Conquest. Famously, when asked to submit a new title for his 1968 book "The Great Terror," in 1991, Conquest is said to have suggested (though it was actually Kingsley Amis) "I Told You So, You F—-ing Fools." Funny, in a bitter way, but illustrative.
McMeekin offers restrained revisionism. He doesn’t have to convince anyone that Communism was bad; those who still believe it wasn’t aren’t going to be convinced; they are ideologues in the James Burnham definition. It is in other matters that McMeekin pulls back the curtain. He sets the stage by showing to be false the idea we all have latently in our heads, that fin de siècle Imperial Russia was a backward and stagnant land, to which the Bolsheviks, whatever their faults, brought the modern age. Part of dispelling this illusion is statistics on industrialization and the like, but more powerful still is one simple fact: “Russia in the early twentieth century was a substantial net importer of both people and capital: a telling fact that, since the revolution, has never been true again.” In many ways, the economic Russia of 1900 was like the China of 2010, and it was Communism, made possible by the war, that threw it into the abyss. Viewing Russia in this way resets our vision—we see that thinking of Tsarist Russia as a semi-barbarous land of black bread and serfs is the result of a century of deliberate philo-Communist propaganda in the West, meant to make us view Communism as at least bringing Russia up to date, when in fact it almost certainly would have done that all by itself, leading to a very different twentieth century (and, perhaps, a different vision of politics than that in which the West has enmired itself).
Along the same lines, McMeekin shows that the Tsarist regime was hardly one of terror. McMeekin points out that between 1825 and 1917, fewer than seventy people per year were executed in the entire country—not for political offenses, but for all offenses, including murder. This, when thousands of government officials were assassinated by the Left every year—3,600 in 1905, for example. The Bolsheviks executed hundreds of thousands, if not millions, within the early years of their power. Thus, not only did the Bolsheviks not cause the modernization of Russia, they did not relieve the country of terror, because in Imperial Russia there was no terror, or even substantial oppression (autocracy is not oppression), nor, for that matter, did they even ever provide “land and bread,” in the words of the slogan they stole from the Social Revolutionaries. The Communists, that is, had absolutely nothing at all to recommend them, despite what we were instructed by their allies in the West through the entire past century (including, for example, my high school history teacher, who was an open fan of the Soviet Union, and formally stole eight weeks of our American history course to indoctrinate us with a fictionalized Soviet history consisting mostly of Communist apologetics.)
McMeekin begins with the murder of Rasputin, at the end of 1916. This may seem like too melodramatic a way to begin, but McMeekin does a good job of tying Rasputin into all the threads of his book, not least the irony that Rasputin strongly opposed Russia entering the war, and that if his advice has been followed, the Tsar would doubtless have reigned for longer. The real meat of the book starts in 1905, though, with Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, resulting in unrest across Russia, including, crucially for later, among the armed forces. The Tsar, Nicholas II, conceded the convention of the Duma, an “Imperial Assembly” that would offer a form of parliament for the first time. Nicholas had been warned by Sergei Witte, a key advisor and architect of much of Russia’s economic growth, that he must either have some form of genuine constitutionalism, a backing away from autocracy, or crush the unrest with by military dictatorship. He picked the former, although perhaps he should have picked the latter—but then, Nicholas was never able to choose that path. He was no Napoleon; he was a gentle man, tossed about by history and imprisoned by his own mind. A saint, perhaps, but not a man up to the job. In the short run, however, creating the Duma while shooting a few active rebels quelled the unrest.
Witte was succeeded as the Tsar’s premier advisor by Peter Stolypin, who crushed further unrest by using martial law in areas of revolt and executing hundreds of leftist rebels, while at the same time enacting reforms such as expanded rights against arbitrary arrest. He was no fan of socialist parliamentarians; McMeekin quotes him as saying “You want a great upheaval. We want a great Russia!” MRGA! He led and oversaw an even greater economic boom, not through free markets or globalism, but through state capitalism, the same way every great nation, including Britain and the United States, built their economies. Stolypin, and therefore the Tsar, gave everyone rising wages and a greater stake in society, including industrial workers through good jobs and peasants through land reform of converting communal holdings to private holdings, turning Russia into a massive exporter of grain. A large part of Stolypin’s efforts went to preserving peace, since he could see very well that war would throw his plans off track—he said, “Give the state twenty years of peace, and you will not recognize present-day Russia.” Sounds like a foreshadowing of Trump, or what Trump could have been were he disciplined—but Stolypin didn’t get twenty years, he got five, assassinated in 1911.
Things went downhill from there. A significant percentage of the Russian upper classes were eager for war with Germany, which, of course, they got. McMeekin’s focus is, unsurprisingly, not the war in Flanders, but on the other side of the continent, which, while it was up and down, generally featured Russian success. And by January 1917, Russian military morale was extremely high, weapons stocks were also high, and the capture of Constantinople was eagerly awaited in the summer. Nor were civilians suffering unduly, contrary to myth—there were not actually bread shortages in Petrograd, and strikes were fewer than they had been (in large part because the Germans had stopped subsidizing strikers). There was nonetheless a great deal of political unrest, both among leftists opposed to the government’s mere existence, and among government factions opposed to each other, with some also opposing the Tsar and the conduct of the war—not that it should be ended, but objecting that the Tsar was unduly influenced by pro-German elements, starting with his wife. In part due to unseasonably warm weather, Socialist Revolutionary-led protests spiraled upwards, leading to a general strike and military mutinies among bored and propagandized rear echelon troops stationed in Petrograd (helped along, as McMeekin notes, “by the presence of pretty young women.”). The Tsar was out of town, and either unwilling or unable to react decisively, so various unscrupulous and grasping politicians stepped into the gap (especially one Mikhail Rodzianko, forgotten today but on whom McMeekin focuses closely), further confusing the situation. Given dubious and conflicting advice, and faced with inadequate loyal military resources, the Tsar abdicated. The Socialist Revolutionary lawyer Alexander Kerensky quickly rose to the top of this flotsam, and he promptly, and fatally for later, engineered a reversal of military morale, releasing soldiers from many disciplinary obligations and subjecting them to the local soviets (the order, “Order No. 1,” technically applied only to the Petrograd garrison, but was treated as applicable to all soldiers).
Into this chaos stepped the Bolsheviks, in the person of Lenin, back from multi-year exile and funded with the equivalent of, today, more than a billion dollars in German gold. While the Bolsheviks had been relevant, though far from dominant, players on the leftist revolutionary scene, what made them was German funding. For example, when Lenin arrived in April, he immediately bought a giant printing press for the equivalent, today, of tens of millions of dollars, and promptly deluged the city with Bolshevik propaganda. Money was also used to fund demonstrators—a common daily payment per person was ten gold rubles in cash, roughly $500 today. In fact, money was used for every purpose that money can be used for, and we would never have heard of the Bolsheviks if not for German money. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, this German funding was denied by the Communists, and by their fifth columns in the West, but today is heavily documented, though the records are still incomplete, as McMeekin notes. Still, shrill leftist denials are often heard of these basic facts, always without any counter-evidence, naturally.
Lenin, as always, had a plan, and it did not involve the continuation of Kerensky’s Socialist Revolutionary-led Provisional Government. Kerensky was incompetent, in any case, and surrounded by a variety of other incompetents, even if McMeekin prefers the more delicate criticisms of “amateurism” and “little stomach for the exercise of power.” While Kerensky toured front-line troops to rebuild morale he had undermined, hoping to bring the war to a successful end, the Bolsheviks spent hundreds of millions to turn the war into a civil war, a matter of deliberate Communist policy. This was done through propaganda, through paying agitators among troops, and by buying politicians, all with great success.
Kerensky’s biggest failure in these months was not executing Lenin after a failed putsch by the Bolsheviks in July, 2017. In fact, a running theme of the book is that the Tsars, and later the liberals of the February Revolution, failed to be adequately harsh with their opponents, and paid the price. (By the same token, as has often been pointed out, Lenin was fortunate in his enemies.) McMeekin goes over in great detail Kerensky’s disastrous decision to release, after their failed putsch, and instead to effectively ally himself with, the Bolsheviks, against a non-existent right-wing threat. (It was here that Kerensky announced his infamous dogma of “no enemies to the Left,” which has ever since characterized all leftist thought.) And, as we all know, in October the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government, ensconcing themselves permanently in power (whereupon Kerensky fled, ultimately dying in New York in 1970, where he was denied Orthodox burial for the sins he had unleashed on Russia).
The rest of the book covers the Bolsheviks in power, which they began by executing more than fifteen thousand people in the first two months alone (as McMeekin points out, more than twice the number executed in the entire last century of tsarist rule). It covers the civil war (detailing what seems like the besetting sin of insurgency movements, the inability to cooperate adequately), the implosion of the Russian economy, and the Bolsheviks running out of weapons, and how the Swedes kept the Bolsheviks afloat with guns and railroad engines, so they could get their hands on the Tsar’s gold (the German gold all having been long spent). It covers the Kronstadt rebellion and the resulting final dropping of the Bolshevik mask of being a “worker’s party.” It covers the 1921 famine (caused accidentally by Communism, not deliberately like later famines), alleviated not by the Bolsheviks, who spent what money they had left to foment revolution in Europe, but by Herbert Hoover and American Christian organizations. Naturally Lenin, with his “ice-cold grasp of power relationships,” used the famine as an excuse to steal everything owned by the Orthodox Church, which was a lot less than he expected and none of which was spent on famine relief.
Lenin came through all this, lucky as usual and greatly helped by sympathizers in the West, as well as by opportunistic politicians like Lloyd George, and at the end of 1922 the Bolsheviks were firmly in power and able to continue their reign of terror without fear of overthrow. Here McMeekin concludes his book, noting that the lesson we should learn is that we should “stiffen our defenses and resist armed prophets promising social perfection.” By this he explicitly means left-wing prophets, noting with distaste the rising Western “popularity of Marxist-style maximalist socialism,” and its lack of appeal anywhere it was actually in power. Unfortunately, none of the young people today crying out for “democratic socialism” are going to read this book, since few of those people read books at all, other than, perhaps, some Howard Zinn.
McMeekin characterizes Lenin’s seizure of power as a “hostile takeover.” By this he means that it succeeded without popular support, but rather by machination, which is certainly true. Lenin did not have a magic formula; other than simple luck, what made him successful was a combination of an iron will, unblinking focus, and the Kaiser’s money. Lenin grasped that history is a kaleidoscope, and when it turns, entirely new and unexpected combinations arise. And they arise not in some logical progression, but, as McMeekin notes of events in 1917, “at a bewildering pace.” For some reason, most people have difficulty dealing with the reality that great changes are phase changes; step functions, not linear slopes. They imagine that the future will be much like the past, because that’s their daily experience. Seeing beyond that, or more precisely, acting beyond that with consistency over time, is a rare talent.
I suppose I did not learn any new lessons from this book, despite that being my reason for reading it. I have elsewhere offered detailed thoughts on what we can learn from Lenin’s career, which I will not repeat here, and this book merely reinforced those. Still, this is an excellent book, and for someone looking to learn more about 1917 in Russia, this is certainly the modern book to read.
January 14, 2019
This is a revisionist history of the political convulsions wracking Russia from, roughly, 1905 until the twenties. It's conservative, politically speaking, reminiscent of Schama's 'Citizens' and its handling of the French revolution. Both go to great lengths to underscore how good the prospects were for the ancient regimes of Russia and France, if only they'd been allowed time to reform themselves gradually. The big mistake, in imperial Russia's case, was to become involved in WWI. The biggest bogeyman of the tale is Lenin, though the liberal elites come in for their share of criticism as well. The unexpected hero, surprisingly enough, is Rasputin, a consistent opponent of the war.
My own background has included a lot of reading about Russian history, beginning with Trotsky's writings while I was back in high school. My prejudices therefore run in directions opposite to McMeekin's. Still, it's good to read all sides of such contentious matters and to keep current. Here the author serves, his book having the benefit of such Soviet archival materials as have become available since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, for instance, one learns much more about how dependent Lenin and the Bolsheviks were on German financial support during the critical days of 1917.
My own background has included a lot of reading about Russian history, beginning with Trotsky's writings while I was back in high school. My prejudices therefore run in directions opposite to McMeekin's. Still, it's good to read all sides of such contentious matters and to keep current. Here the author serves, his book having the benefit of such Soviet archival materials as have become available since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, for instance, one learns much more about how dependent Lenin and the Bolsheviks were on German financial support during the critical days of 1917.
February 3, 2020
The Russian Revolution : A New History, by Sean McMeekin, is an interesting book chronicling the Russian Revolution from onset to about the 1920's, or the end of the Civil War. This book utilizes documents recovered from Soviet era archives to give a more accurate political account of the revolution, looking at the growth of anti-Tsarist rhetoric in Russia, the liberal-nationalist initiated revolution that put an end to the Russian Empire, and the growth of the Bolshevik branch of left radicals that eventually took power.
The book goes over events pre-revolution, starting with the growth of discontent within Russian society. At the turn of the 20th century, the Russian empire was a behemoth. It controlled not just current era Russia, but most of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Northern Iran, and large swathes of Poland, Ukraine, and Romania. The entirety of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Finland were part of the Russian Empire. Russia was part of the conservative alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, all states interested in a stable, conservative-autocratic Europe. Its armies were massive, with the ability to call up millions of men to arms if a war ground on. Although still less developed than much of central and western Europe, Russia was beginning programs of massive economic development. New factories, mines and farming communities were springing up across the continent sized Empire. Railways were still not super common, but thousands of kilometers of track had been laid. On the diplomatic front, Russia enjoyed a close alliance with France, and was able to exert itself in crisis in the Ottoman Empire and in the Balkans. It gained rail concessions in Manchuria, and a new port at Port Arthur, exerting its dominance over the Qing Empire. Germany quaked at the growing prevalence of Russia's armies, and sought to undermine its stability. However, issues in Russia existed below the surface, even if they were not visible to outsiders or those who lived day to day in the Empire.
At the turn of the century, Russia's political landscape was bleak. Growing discontent among the intelligentsia over lack of freedoms under the Tsarist regime were real. Poverty could be grinding in some cases. Russia's far flung territories were difficult to govern. The rise of radical ideologies, such as nationalism, communism and anarchism had taken root in Russia, and its political systems were struggling to constrain these ideas. Assassinations of politicians and bureaucrats was common, Russian political exiles were found all over Europe, and Russia's external enemies - Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, housed and supported these exiles to try and undermine the behemoth empire. At the turn of the 20th century, Russia was riding high after excellent external military performance, with an army flushed with victory after its victories over the Ottomans in the late 19th century. This changed however, in 1905, with Russia's embarrassing loss to rising Japan. The Russ0-Japanese War was a victory for Japan, who expelled Russian influence from Korea, took over Russian concessions in Manchuria, and annexed Port Arthur. In one fell swoop, Russia's Asian influence was severely curtailed. The biggest blow, however, was Russia's loss of prestige. This conflict ...
TBC
The book goes over events pre-revolution, starting with the growth of discontent within Russian society. At the turn of the 20th century, the Russian empire was a behemoth. It controlled not just current era Russia, but most of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Northern Iran, and large swathes of Poland, Ukraine, and Romania. The entirety of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Finland were part of the Russian Empire. Russia was part of the conservative alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, all states interested in a stable, conservative-autocratic Europe. Its armies were massive, with the ability to call up millions of men to arms if a war ground on. Although still less developed than much of central and western Europe, Russia was beginning programs of massive economic development. New factories, mines and farming communities were springing up across the continent sized Empire. Railways were still not super common, but thousands of kilometers of track had been laid. On the diplomatic front, Russia enjoyed a close alliance with France, and was able to exert itself in crisis in the Ottoman Empire and in the Balkans. It gained rail concessions in Manchuria, and a new port at Port Arthur, exerting its dominance over the Qing Empire. Germany quaked at the growing prevalence of Russia's armies, and sought to undermine its stability. However, issues in Russia existed below the surface, even if they were not visible to outsiders or those who lived day to day in the Empire.
At the turn of the century, Russia's political landscape was bleak. Growing discontent among the intelligentsia over lack of freedoms under the Tsarist regime were real. Poverty could be grinding in some cases. Russia's far flung territories were difficult to govern. The rise of radical ideologies, such as nationalism, communism and anarchism had taken root in Russia, and its political systems were struggling to constrain these ideas. Assassinations of politicians and bureaucrats was common, Russian political exiles were found all over Europe, and Russia's external enemies - Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, housed and supported these exiles to try and undermine the behemoth empire. At the turn of the 20th century, Russia was riding high after excellent external military performance, with an army flushed with victory after its victories over the Ottomans in the late 19th century. This changed however, in 1905, with Russia's embarrassing loss to rising Japan. The Russ0-Japanese War was a victory for Japan, who expelled Russian influence from Korea, took over Russian concessions in Manchuria, and annexed Port Arthur. In one fell swoop, Russia's Asian influence was severely curtailed. The biggest blow, however, was Russia's loss of prestige. This conflict ...
TBC
July 22, 2017
I can not recommend this book to the general reader. I seems that McMeekin has decided to go against the prevailing views about the Russian Revolution and conjure up his own interpretation of the events and their significance. His major theme is that the Bolsheviks won the revolution because they received the financial support of the Germans. The theory of "German Gold" goes back to the Right Wing Newspapers during the time of the revolution. He seems to have concentrated his study on the movement of large sums of money and gold during the course of 1917-1920. This is an interesting approach, but it fails to account for the actual meaning of the events that occurred. He describes the Lenin's theories of Proletarian Revolution as some kind of ploy to undermine the Russian Army and pave the way for a German victory. Toward this end, he concocts stories of the Bolsheviks being flush with cash to pay off peasants to do their bidding. Lenin concocted a hostile takeover of the Russian Army and Navy. This theory has no basis in fact and this book should be exposed for the fraud that it is. It is nothing but Trump "alternative facts" being applied to scholarship. McMeekin is a professor at Bard College and this author does not speak well for this school's level of scholarship. Nor does it speak well for its publisher, Basic Books. Everyone connected to this book should feel ashamed!
October 3, 2017
The author, Bard College professor Sean McMeekin, is certainly an authority on the Russian Revolution surrounding World War I. I was not able to fully absorb the abundance of facts and material, which I found overwhelming and a bit dry at times, but I did comprehend an overview. The revolution had several factions and it appears that the one best at propaganda, as well as plundering gold and treasures, achieved control and authority. I’m most thankful that my reading was for pleasure and not a mid-term exam!
August 22, 2017
Sean McMeekin is a wonderful historian. His recent books on the run up to WW1 and the end of the Ottoman Empire are really well done. In his most recent book, he presents a "new history" of the Russian Revolution to take advantage of the opening up of state archives following 1990. His intent is to relay what happened and try to avoid the meshing of history and ideology that has happened in either Soviet accounts of the events or in extraordinarily critical Western accounts (Pipes and others). The result is a revealing book that shows just how contingent the events of 1917-1918 were, raising issues of how the world might have developed differently has the reign of Nicholas taken different turns (with Rasputin among others) or had the socialists of the February revolution, especially Kerensky, made different choices when it was their turn to move. Most interesting of all is the light that McMeekin shines on the Bolsheviks based on contemporary documentary evidence rather than the rewriting of history that became the hallmark of the Soviet state that Stalin built up.
I suspect that most people who have read anything about it have strong opinions about the revolution. That is unavoidable, especially for those who remember the Cold War. It is not clear that McMeekin will change many preconceptions about the revolution, although he may well do so. He does provide an account that makes the participants seem to be real people, some of whom thought very hard about what they were doing. The book also highlights the chaos of the Civil War and presses the reader to look at decisions from the viewpoint of participants who were under quite a bit of pressure at the time.
The highlights of the book for me were in the arguments about why and how the Bolsheviks were able to succeed in the revolution and civil war that followed, given their relatively small size and the large number of opponents they faced. McMeekin argues that the ability of the Bolshekiks to radicalize the northern armies was crucial to success in the revolution and provided the basis for the construction of the Red Army on the ruins of the Tsarist armies. This was possible in part due to the greater resources that the Bolsheviks enjoyed for communicating with the masses and for propagandizing their efforts. This involved the significant funding they received from Germany, who sent Lenin to Russia after the first revolution and provided with funding to by printing facilities and other materials. The support of Germany for Lenin was not lost on his opponents and the development of this story around the Brest-Litovsk treaty until the end of the war was a strong point of McMeekin's account.
I was fortunate to be able to read this book at the same time as I visited the incredible exhibition of the Russian Revolution at the British Library. The book was complementary to the wonderful exhibition and I strongly recommend the exhibition to anyone who is able to see it. I also recommend McMeekin's new book strongly.
I suspect that most people who have read anything about it have strong opinions about the revolution. That is unavoidable, especially for those who remember the Cold War. It is not clear that McMeekin will change many preconceptions about the revolution, although he may well do so. He does provide an account that makes the participants seem to be real people, some of whom thought very hard about what they were doing. The book also highlights the chaos of the Civil War and presses the reader to look at decisions from the viewpoint of participants who were under quite a bit of pressure at the time.
The highlights of the book for me were in the arguments about why and how the Bolsheviks were able to succeed in the revolution and civil war that followed, given their relatively small size and the large number of opponents they faced. McMeekin argues that the ability of the Bolshekiks to radicalize the northern armies was crucial to success in the revolution and provided the basis for the construction of the Red Army on the ruins of the Tsarist armies. This was possible in part due to the greater resources that the Bolsheviks enjoyed for communicating with the masses and for propagandizing their efforts. This involved the significant funding they received from Germany, who sent Lenin to Russia after the first revolution and provided with funding to by printing facilities and other materials. The support of Germany for Lenin was not lost on his opponents and the development of this story around the Brest-Litovsk treaty until the end of the war was a strong point of McMeekin's account.
I was fortunate to be able to read this book at the same time as I visited the incredible exhibition of the Russian Revolution at the British Library. The book was complementary to the wonderful exhibition and I strongly recommend the exhibition to anyone who is able to see it. I also recommend McMeekin's new book strongly.
July 31, 2020
If you want to read a new interpretation or concise overview of the Russian revolutions of 1917, then do not read this book. I should have known when I saw reactionary historian Richard Pipes being deified in the introduction.
McMeekin claims to write a new history of the Russian revolution, grounded in three decades of research in the now opened Soviet archives. He only lives up to his claim when this concerns the Imperial and Red Army archives as well as those, Russian and Entente diplomatuc archives and the finances of the bolshevists. It is a history which focuses solely on high-ranking, male actors within the military and political scene and virtually exclusively narrates a traditional event driven history of military and political events, littered with what-ifs and anecdotes (apparently Tsar Nicholas' motives for the war against Japan were driven by an attack by a Japanese officer when he visited the country in 1891...) that fails to explain why the revolution occured in the first place. Moreover, McMeekin's narrative is squarely anti-Marxixst and pro-tsarist. It consists of many errors and flawed interpretations: the disastrous defeat of Tannenberg was a stalemate, all Bolshevist political thought and its appeal to soldiers are told.off as mere propaganda, the social history of the Revolution and the experiences of ordinary people completely ignored. The setting is also telling: Petrograd, Moscow and the frontlines. The provinces and the various national uprisings throughout the Empire are all but ignored.
According to McMeekin, had it not been for the war, the Russian Empire would have gradually modernized and democratized. The Russian army was apparently in great conditions until the first 1917 revolution. The Bolshevist coup's success is explained by German funding. It must be said, McMeekin does shed new light on the foreign (German and Swedish( backing of the Bolshevists and their economic issues. But why did the February Revolution (explained as a palace coup by inadequate liberals) or the October Revolution occur or find widespread support?
Perhaps the biggest flaw is that McMeekin simply ignores much of recent scholarship on the Revolution that does not fit his narrative. Most obvious is the omission of any works that deal with social history and the experiences and perspectives of women, farmers, rank and file Bolshevists or civil servants, farmers, and so on. More recent research on political culture, the role of the Church or continuity of state institutions, international contexts of Bolshevism: all ignored. The same applies to the two Revolutions' impact beyond the military and capital, especially the imperial dimension. Nothing is said about the Central Asian revolutions, Ukraine and Finland are mentioned in footnotes.
McMeekin says he will show that the October Revolution was not a "real" revolution, but a putsch: something that has been known for a while now. He portrays Lenin as a German funded puppet and explains the Red Army's success because of its foreign backing. As elsewhere, leading politicians and generals determine McMeekin's course of history Rightfully so, McMeekin zooms in on the Red terror and manifold violence of the bolshevists, the bloody peasant wars and faminea. However, in doing so, he defends the track record of the 'enlightened' tsarist regime.
This is glaringly obvious in the conclusion: McMeeking exclaims the moral bankruptcy of marxism with Fukuyamaesque glee and literally prays it will not return (no wonder McMeekin portrays the orthodox church as a literally benevolent social force). Why and how Marxism changed Russian and word history, remains a mystery, but also why the February Revolution occured and tsarism lost support during the wat. I would only recommend this book for its limited new inisghts in the diplomacy (especially involving Germany) and international economic dealings of the bolshevists and the military history of the revolution, or if you are a biased conservative like McMeekin.
McMeekin claims to write a new history of the Russian revolution, grounded in three decades of research in the now opened Soviet archives. He only lives up to his claim when this concerns the Imperial and Red Army archives as well as those, Russian and Entente diplomatuc archives and the finances of the bolshevists. It is a history which focuses solely on high-ranking, male actors within the military and political scene and virtually exclusively narrates a traditional event driven history of military and political events, littered with what-ifs and anecdotes (apparently Tsar Nicholas' motives for the war against Japan were driven by an attack by a Japanese officer when he visited the country in 1891...) that fails to explain why the revolution occured in the first place. Moreover, McMeekin's narrative is squarely anti-Marxixst and pro-tsarist. It consists of many errors and flawed interpretations: the disastrous defeat of Tannenberg was a stalemate, all Bolshevist political thought and its appeal to soldiers are told.off as mere propaganda, the social history of the Revolution and the experiences of ordinary people completely ignored. The setting is also telling: Petrograd, Moscow and the frontlines. The provinces and the various national uprisings throughout the Empire are all but ignored.
According to McMeekin, had it not been for the war, the Russian Empire would have gradually modernized and democratized. The Russian army was apparently in great conditions until the first 1917 revolution. The Bolshevist coup's success is explained by German funding. It must be said, McMeekin does shed new light on the foreign (German and Swedish( backing of the Bolshevists and their economic issues. But why did the February Revolution (explained as a palace coup by inadequate liberals) or the October Revolution occur or find widespread support?
Perhaps the biggest flaw is that McMeekin simply ignores much of recent scholarship on the Revolution that does not fit his narrative. Most obvious is the omission of any works that deal with social history and the experiences and perspectives of women, farmers, rank and file Bolshevists or civil servants, farmers, and so on. More recent research on political culture, the role of the Church or continuity of state institutions, international contexts of Bolshevism: all ignored. The same applies to the two Revolutions' impact beyond the military and capital, especially the imperial dimension. Nothing is said about the Central Asian revolutions, Ukraine and Finland are mentioned in footnotes.
McMeekin says he will show that the October Revolution was not a "real" revolution, but a putsch: something that has been known for a while now. He portrays Lenin as a German funded puppet and explains the Red Army's success because of its foreign backing. As elsewhere, leading politicians and generals determine McMeekin's course of history Rightfully so, McMeekin zooms in on the Red terror and manifold violence of the bolshevists, the bloody peasant wars and faminea. However, in doing so, he defends the track record of the 'enlightened' tsarist regime.
This is glaringly obvious in the conclusion: McMeeking exclaims the moral bankruptcy of marxism with Fukuyamaesque glee and literally prays it will not return (no wonder McMeekin portrays the orthodox church as a literally benevolent social force). Why and how Marxism changed Russian and word history, remains a mystery, but also why the February Revolution occured and tsarism lost support during the wat. I would only recommend this book for its limited new inisghts in the diplomacy (especially involving Germany) and international economic dealings of the bolshevists and the military history of the revolution, or if you are a biased conservative like McMeekin.
December 20, 2017
Sean McMeekin's book is interesting and readable - sometimes grippingly so. His fresh perspective on the Revolution stabs at the myths and legends of a seminal moment in modern history, and his take on the military situation for Russia in 1917 is extremely well-written. For the most part, his chronological narrative drives the reader very surely through the utter turmoil of the Tsarist-to-Leninist years, depositing them around Lenin's death in 1924.
So yes: it is worth a read. But this is despite McMeekin's determination to make it, at times, an unnecessarily agonising piece of work.
This is due to his fresh perspective, which comes from a place of deep hostility towards left-of-centre politics. His introduction and conclusion even carries a warning about Bernie Sanders and the left-wing renaissance in the West, which is not only absurd and insulting but actively depreciates the objective value of the narrative in between. This feeling is only heightened by the choices McMeekin makes in telling the story - such as his insinuations of Lenin's cowardice (his "mysterious illness" which rendered him unable to speak at a revolutionary meeting), or his emphasis on a single witness' deposition that the Bolsheviks handed out roubles to crowds. Despite initially explaining that there is conflicting testimony over whether Trotsky called for Kerensky's murder before October 1917, he later presents it as an accepted fact. Had McMeekin cooled his ideological urge to rebuke socialism, the book would be less susceptible to accusations of right-wing bias.
McMeekin's increasingly irritating narrative would be easier to escape from were we structurally chained to it; there is actually very little depth to his depiction of Russia after the excellent pre-war chapters. After 1917 there is civil war, war on the peasantry, famine, war on the church, and the ever-present threat of bankruptcy. Yet the psychological, cultural and social effect this must have had on the people of Russia (quite apart from the political leap from absolutism to communism in 9 months) must have been enormous: McMeekin never explores it. The lives of White Russians after their explusion from their homeland: never explored. For all that it is hailed as a 'geopolitical' history, the electrifying effect Bolshevism had on socialists world-wide: never explored.
Finally, McMeekin does a thorough job of describing the villainry of figures like Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin (his early career, at any rate). That is to be expected, even if it is not particularly original. But the critique feels distinctly lacking in intellectual substance. It is unreasonable to expect an Arendtian-style exposition of Russian totalitarianism, perhaps, but at no point does McMeekin really come to terms with political theory outside of a brief quote from Lenin or Marx. Kerensky's core beliefs, and the manner in which he felt he was achieving them, was one of my main reasons for picking up the book.
To conclude: enjoy the book, but revolt against it.
So yes: it is worth a read. But this is despite McMeekin's determination to make it, at times, an unnecessarily agonising piece of work.
This is due to his fresh perspective, which comes from a place of deep hostility towards left-of-centre politics. His introduction and conclusion even carries a warning about Bernie Sanders and the left-wing renaissance in the West, which is not only absurd and insulting but actively depreciates the objective value of the narrative in between. This feeling is only heightened by the choices McMeekin makes in telling the story - such as his insinuations of Lenin's cowardice (his "mysterious illness" which rendered him unable to speak at a revolutionary meeting), or his emphasis on a single witness' deposition that the Bolsheviks handed out roubles to crowds. Despite initially explaining that there is conflicting testimony over whether Trotsky called for Kerensky's murder before October 1917, he later presents it as an accepted fact. Had McMeekin cooled his ideological urge to rebuke socialism, the book would be less susceptible to accusations of right-wing bias.
McMeekin's increasingly irritating narrative would be easier to escape from were we structurally chained to it; there is actually very little depth to his depiction of Russia after the excellent pre-war chapters. After 1917 there is civil war, war on the peasantry, famine, war on the church, and the ever-present threat of bankruptcy. Yet the psychological, cultural and social effect this must have had on the people of Russia (quite apart from the political leap from absolutism to communism in 9 months) must have been enormous: McMeekin never explores it. The lives of White Russians after their explusion from their homeland: never explored. For all that it is hailed as a 'geopolitical' history, the electrifying effect Bolshevism had on socialists world-wide: never explored.
Finally, McMeekin does a thorough job of describing the villainry of figures like Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin (his early career, at any rate). That is to be expected, even if it is not particularly original. But the critique feels distinctly lacking in intellectual substance. It is unreasonable to expect an Arendtian-style exposition of Russian totalitarianism, perhaps, but at no point does McMeekin really come to terms with political theory outside of a brief quote from Lenin or Marx. Kerensky's core beliefs, and the manner in which he felt he was achieving them, was one of my main reasons for picking up the book.
To conclude: enjoy the book, but revolt against it.
July 28, 2017
DNF. Stopped reading during the 8th chapter. Most of what I read was regurgitation of information I had read in the Romanovs book by Simon Sebag Montefiore. Then it just got tedious. But the fanboy squealing was just plain annoying. I get it that the author loves and adores the Russian monarchy but it was too much.
May 16, 2024
An incredibly fresh, exciting, and saddening history. My knowledge of the Russian revolution was limited to what I learned in a decent history course in high school, but I had forgotten (or perhaps never learned in the first place) the sad details of the whole unwinding.
After losing to Japan in the Russo-Japan war of 1905, Czar Nicholas was forced to make a series of liberalizing reforms towards a republican form of government to appease the proud Russian opinion makers who thought that the reason for their defeat by those British lackeys (the Japanese) was a lack of sound government based on representation. But at the same time, these Russian “liberals” were not unhappy with imperialist expansion. Far from it. They wanted to push Russia’s borders and influence as far as possible, and thought that giving more people a say was a good way to achieve this. Some political reform and a few good years of solid economic growth, though, did nothing to dampen the Russian imperialists thirst for expansionist war.
Sound familiar?
It was these “liberal” Russians who swore revenge against the Germans in 1912 when the German’s reneged on some compromise in the Balkans and got more influence there, while Russia got nothing. So when Czar Nicholas had decided not to mobilize the Russian Army in 1914 in response to a telegram from his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm pleading with Nicholas not to, those same Russian “liberals” talked the Czar back into mobilizing, which forced Germany to do the same.
(Step up and claim your prize if you had Russia as the main cause of World War I.)
And the rest, as they say, is history…
But, in fact, history continues to produce pertinent facts, and this terrific book brings a fresh view to, for example, the background for the February 1917 revolution, which was not, as the common view has it, because of lack of bread in St. Petersburg. Not by any means. There was plenty of food, in general, at that time, and the Russian army was not necessarily losing. No. It was the provocation of guards shooting into a peaceful demonstration, combined with Communist rabble-rousing in the army barracks that set off the riots and civil disorder that ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Duma and the voluntary resignation of the Czar.
Initially, in the resulting Menshevik-“liberal” rump parliament, the imperialist view still held, with the majority wanting to continue the war against Germany. Enter Lenin, literally courtesy of Germany, with his German cash and working printing presses, and the slowly jelling consensus to continue the war began to dissolve in the acid of Bolshevik propaganda.
Although Lenin was soon exposed as a German agent, and had to flee the country, Russian incompetence at the top … (Sound familiar?) … resulted in a paranoid dictator (I kid you not) taking power. How was this possible?
Well, after the Czar voluntarily resigned, at the request of the “liberal” opinion makers, there was no single person clearly in charge, and that mantel fell to whomever was willing to step up. So in the confusion, the few Russian opinion makers still around chose a guy who decided he had to rule with an iron fist. (And, although this sounds eerily similar to what happened with Yeltsin choosing Putin, I am not making this up).
But the guy they chose was so paranoid that when some churchman go-between carried a bungled message from the new dictator to the head of the Russian Army, a disagreement between these two erupted. And THAT was the tear in the fabric of civil order that gave the Bolsheviks their opportunity, which they exploited by bringing their dangerous Latvian riflemen and red sailors from Kalingrad first to St. Petersburg and its environs, and then to Moscow.
From February through October of 1917, the non-communist authorities continually used a soft-touch, arresting some people, but not everyone, and trying to minimize casualties. And the dictator guy (because he was paranoid about the wrong people!) even thought he could bring the Bolsheviks over to his side. But this civility was not reciprocated by Lenin.
No. Lenin was ruthless. When the Bolsheviks got to Moscow in October, they surrounded the Kremlin and blasted the hell out of it with artillery (those Ruskies love that arty—since the Overture of 1812) and then, starting in 1919, at Lenin’s instructions, the Bolsheviks cracked down on internal dissent even harder with mass executions of civilians. (Sounding vaguely familiar?)
But, ultimately, the Commies were able to rally the simple people of Russia around them because, with non-Russian armies pressing on all sides, the Bolsheviks could portray themselves as the “victims” of Western imperialism, FFS.
In the history of governments, the transition from autocracy to democratic republic is hard. It took the English and the French and the Japanese hundreds of years to achieve. (It should be noted that in all those countries, there was a pre-existing habit of discussion/debate and group decision making.) It is saddening to see the Russians being presented with the opportunity to achieve the same transition twice in the past 100 years, and then falling back into despotism both times. It is also a tragedy for the world. Perhaps we will see a third opportunity soon.
(Since Lenin, Russia’s number one weapon has been what they can get people to believe.)
After losing to Japan in the Russo-Japan war of 1905, Czar Nicholas was forced to make a series of liberalizing reforms towards a republican form of government to appease the proud Russian opinion makers who thought that the reason for their defeat by those British lackeys (the Japanese) was a lack of sound government based on representation. But at the same time, these Russian “liberals” were not unhappy with imperialist expansion. Far from it. They wanted to push Russia’s borders and influence as far as possible, and thought that giving more people a say was a good way to achieve this. Some political reform and a few good years of solid economic growth, though, did nothing to dampen the Russian imperialists thirst for expansionist war.
Sound familiar?
It was these “liberal” Russians who swore revenge against the Germans in 1912 when the German’s reneged on some compromise in the Balkans and got more influence there, while Russia got nothing. So when Czar Nicholas had decided not to mobilize the Russian Army in 1914 in response to a telegram from his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm pleading with Nicholas not to, those same Russian “liberals” talked the Czar back into mobilizing, which forced Germany to do the same.
(Step up and claim your prize if you had Russia as the main cause of World War I.)
And the rest, as they say, is history…
But, in fact, history continues to produce pertinent facts, and this terrific book brings a fresh view to, for example, the background for the February 1917 revolution, which was not, as the common view has it, because of lack of bread in St. Petersburg. Not by any means. There was plenty of food, in general, at that time, and the Russian army was not necessarily losing. No. It was the provocation of guards shooting into a peaceful demonstration, combined with Communist rabble-rousing in the army barracks that set off the riots and civil disorder that ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Duma and the voluntary resignation of the Czar.
Initially, in the resulting Menshevik-“liberal” rump parliament, the imperialist view still held, with the majority wanting to continue the war against Germany. Enter Lenin, literally courtesy of Germany, with his German cash and working printing presses, and the slowly jelling consensus to continue the war began to dissolve in the acid of Bolshevik propaganda.
Although Lenin was soon exposed as a German agent, and had to flee the country, Russian incompetence at the top … (Sound familiar?) … resulted in a paranoid dictator (I kid you not) taking power. How was this possible?
Well, after the Czar voluntarily resigned, at the request of the “liberal” opinion makers, there was no single person clearly in charge, and that mantel fell to whomever was willing to step up. So in the confusion, the few Russian opinion makers still around chose a guy who decided he had to rule with an iron fist. (And, although this sounds eerily similar to what happened with Yeltsin choosing Putin, I am not making this up).
But the guy they chose was so paranoid that when some churchman go-between carried a bungled message from the new dictator to the head of the Russian Army, a disagreement between these two erupted. And THAT was the tear in the fabric of civil order that gave the Bolsheviks their opportunity, which they exploited by bringing their dangerous Latvian riflemen and red sailors from Kalingrad first to St. Petersburg and its environs, and then to Moscow.
From February through October of 1917, the non-communist authorities continually used a soft-touch, arresting some people, but not everyone, and trying to minimize casualties. And the dictator guy (because he was paranoid about the wrong people!) even thought he could bring the Bolsheviks over to his side. But this civility was not reciprocated by Lenin.
No. Lenin was ruthless. When the Bolsheviks got to Moscow in October, they surrounded the Kremlin and blasted the hell out of it with artillery (those Ruskies love that arty—since the Overture of 1812) and then, starting in 1919, at Lenin’s instructions, the Bolsheviks cracked down on internal dissent even harder with mass executions of civilians. (Sounding vaguely familiar?)
But, ultimately, the Commies were able to rally the simple people of Russia around them because, with non-Russian armies pressing on all sides, the Bolsheviks could portray themselves as the “victims” of Western imperialism, FFS.
In the history of governments, the transition from autocracy to democratic republic is hard. It took the English and the French and the Japanese hundreds of years to achieve. (It should be noted that in all those countries, there was a pre-existing habit of discussion/debate and group decision making.) It is saddening to see the Russians being presented with the opportunity to achieve the same transition twice in the past 100 years, and then falling back into despotism both times. It is also a tragedy for the world. Perhaps we will see a third opportunity soon.
(Since Lenin, Russia’s number one weapon has been what they can get people to believe.)
March 13, 2024
A fantastic history of a known subject, but with new information and a new perspective on the events. Mr. McMeekin paints the revolution as bad timing, bad situations, and bad leadership for the liberals and the Tsar and the opposite for the Bolsheviks. Mr. McMeekin also gives a more accurate portrayal of Russia up until the revolution and the abdication of the Tsar. Not as a backwater serfdom, but as a developing country that stopped because of WWI.
Overall, a gripping account of the Revolution with all the details spilled out. A fast read too, a history that is worth the time to read.
Overall, a gripping account of the Revolution with all the details spilled out. A fast read too, a history that is worth the time to read.
July 31, 2018
History as conservative agitprop. McMeekin is out to demonstrate that the Bolsheviks came to power because of a small, organized coup d'etat that had little to no popular support. They were helped by Imperial Germany's support (d'uh, although McMeekin assigns a far greater role to the Kaiser in World War I than Wilhelm's generals and governments did; McMeekin keeps having the emperor making decisions that impact policy. Surely not by 1916?), the general ineptness of Kerensky and Rodzianko, and the lack of commitment by the Allies to overthrowing the regime during 1919-1920. All of this makes sense, and he tells the story briskly. Where he lost me was the description of Russia in February, 1917. The military was confident that the army was going to overwhelm the Central Powers on every front, the soldiers were not disaffected after three years of horrendous losses, military supplies were plentiful, there were no real food shortages in Petrograd, all, in fact, was going well when the Tsar was toppled by Rodzianko. McMeekin begins the story with Rasputin's murder and the semi-hysteria about the staretz that gripped the Russian aristocracy, who blamed him and the Tsarina for the "inevitable" collapse of the autocracy. Once Rasputin is safely tucked under the ice in the Neva, events cascade, and before you know it, Nicholas II is forced to abdicate. McMeekin finds this ironic, as Rasputin had famously advised Nicholas not to take the empire into World War I.
A lot of this flies in the face of what we know about Nicholas and Alexandra. They were wilfully stupid people, and that is putting it mildly. Nicholas wound up undercutting every competent minister he ever had, zestfully aided in this by his wife and her faith healer. During the war he went to Stavka and assumed "command" of the army. In practice, this meant he was blamed for every defeat the Russians suffered. Meanwhile, Alexandra wrote reams everyday to him demanding appointments for hacks because Rasputin recommended them. No autocracy could survive this level of executive incompetence. I had the impression that because what followed Nicholas II was so much worse than the imperial system for the vast majority of Russians that McMeekin turns Romanov rule into a false positive. The fact is that imperial autocracy collapsed extremely quickly. And while it is interesting speculation about the capabilities of Russia's armies in 1917, they did not, in fact, want to continue fighting. The moment a central government in Petrograd loosened its hold on the General Staff, the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary virtually ended.
McMeekin is entitled to be bitter about the Allied response to Nicholas' overthrow. The Russian Empire had bought the West precious time against the Central Powers by sacrificing millions of soldiers. And yet the Entente was always embarrassed by the alliance with an absolute autocracy, and prematurely rejoiced after the February Revolution.
McMeekin cherry picks his facts in support of his thesis, which is simplistic (he draws a straight line from Bolshevism to Bernie Sanders) and fails to account for the undeniable support communism picked up from Russians after the October overthrow (which really was a small coup, he is dead right) and subsequent chaos. There were a number of interesting nuggets of information in the book: the Okhrana, or Tsarist secret police, was infinitely smaller than the Bolshevik equivalent, theCHEKA. Lenin had a taste for luxury, negotiating an extreme sum with Rolls Royce for parts for the limousine he used, commandeered from Grand Duke Michael. The level of invective directed at the government by the Duma was unbelievably open during late 1916/early 1917. No one, not even Lenin, was in complete control of anything. Indeed, it was left to Stalin to consolidate the Revolution for what it was --- a naked power grab. But much like the French Revolution, the Russian spiraled out of control until it ended once again . . . in autocracy.
A lot of this flies in the face of what we know about Nicholas and Alexandra. They were wilfully stupid people, and that is putting it mildly. Nicholas wound up undercutting every competent minister he ever had, zestfully aided in this by his wife and her faith healer. During the war he went to Stavka and assumed "command" of the army. In practice, this meant he was blamed for every defeat the Russians suffered. Meanwhile, Alexandra wrote reams everyday to him demanding appointments for hacks because Rasputin recommended them. No autocracy could survive this level of executive incompetence. I had the impression that because what followed Nicholas II was so much worse than the imperial system for the vast majority of Russians that McMeekin turns Romanov rule into a false positive. The fact is that imperial autocracy collapsed extremely quickly. And while it is interesting speculation about the capabilities of Russia's armies in 1917, they did not, in fact, want to continue fighting. The moment a central government in Petrograd loosened its hold on the General Staff, the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary virtually ended.
McMeekin is entitled to be bitter about the Allied response to Nicholas' overthrow. The Russian Empire had bought the West precious time against the Central Powers by sacrificing millions of soldiers. And yet the Entente was always embarrassed by the alliance with an absolute autocracy, and prematurely rejoiced after the February Revolution.
McMeekin cherry picks his facts in support of his thesis, which is simplistic (he draws a straight line from Bolshevism to Bernie Sanders) and fails to account for the undeniable support communism picked up from Russians after the October overthrow (which really was a small coup, he is dead right) and subsequent chaos. There were a number of interesting nuggets of information in the book: the Okhrana, or Tsarist secret police, was infinitely smaller than the Bolshevik equivalent, theCHEKA. Lenin had a taste for luxury, negotiating an extreme sum with Rolls Royce for parts for the limousine he used, commandeered from Grand Duke Michael. The level of invective directed at the government by the Duma was unbelievably open during late 1916/early 1917. No one, not even Lenin, was in complete control of anything. Indeed, it was left to Stalin to consolidate the Revolution for what it was --- a naked power grab. But much like the French Revolution, the Russian spiraled out of control until it ended once again . . . in autocracy.
October 19, 2019
Can't agree with this revisionism, which merely returns to discredited myths under the rubric of a "fresh examination." The author delivers up the old anti-Bolshevik canards in circulation since July, 1917, echoing his mentor Richard Pipes that it was just a "Bolshevik coup," a national security matter that could have been taken care of with manly military fortitude on Kerensky's part. This is, of course, Pipe's simplistic Reaganism, echoed here. The bread shortages in 1917 Petrograd were not mythical, the Russian Army was in disarray, war profiteers' ill-gotten gains do not count as economic GDP per capita, and how Kerensky could have "restored order" with no counter-revolutionary force is one of those mysteries unaccounted for in this NSC trope. The Russian Revolution was more than the Bolsheviks, more than Lenin - even if the latter were its ultimate beneficiaries - and the documentary record of the time more than substantiates this. Whatever Lenin's ultra-Zimmerwald call for turning the imperialist war into a civil war, it took the Russian state and military command's myopic fumbling and fears to cause its own army's collapse. Lenin merely had to cash in the check handed him by others.
McMeekin is right in stating that the Russian liberals hoped to maximize their own political capital by joining Europe's war chorus, and Nicholas' and Rasputin's misgivings were more than justified - as events proved. The liberals' own opportunism - and class biases - undermined their political project, ensuring that the eruption (which did come from below, and was most definitely not orchestrated by the Bolsheviks) would leave them behind.
The author does his research, and tries to argue his case, and I'll credit his effort; but it's the same cold war "Commie conspiracy" stuff reheated and served up fresh. Those who buy into this revisionism probably also believe that Reagan "won" the cold war. The passions, traditions, and actions of ordinary people on the ground have, as usual, nothing to do with the ivory tower judgments of armchair historians.
McMeekin is right in stating that the Russian liberals hoped to maximize their own political capital by joining Europe's war chorus, and Nicholas' and Rasputin's misgivings were more than justified - as events proved. The liberals' own opportunism - and class biases - undermined their political project, ensuring that the eruption (which did come from below, and was most definitely not orchestrated by the Bolsheviks) would leave them behind.
The author does his research, and tries to argue his case, and I'll credit his effort; but it's the same cold war "Commie conspiracy" stuff reheated and served up fresh. Those who buy into this revisionism probably also believe that Reagan "won" the cold war. The passions, traditions, and actions of ordinary people on the ground have, as usual, nothing to do with the ivory tower judgments of armchair historians.
July 5, 2017
Entertains an interesting thesis that Russia was not in as bad a shape in 1916-17 as most accounts imply and that the collapse of the Romanov Dynasty and ascent of the radicals was not a foregone conclusion. The author quite properly shows sufficient evidence to make the case that the bulk of the Russian military was still intact when events spiraled out of control in Petrograd in February, 1917. Ultimately Czar Nicholas could have averted his abdication but for a series of blunders by himself and supporters, and unfortunate delays in Nicholas returning from the front to assert control.
There is extensive coverage of the political scheming including the successful plot to oust and kill Rasputin, who in fact, was not pro-German as was often asserted. Unfortunately it is within the political labyrinth that the narrative slumps badly. There are so many actors, committees, and factions that it becomes burdensome to follow the main themes of the story line. Readers would be much served if much of this material was shed from the narrative and assigned to an appendix. A provocative book that certainly has its strengths and rates a high 2, probably a 2.8, but is compromised as the forest often gets lost for the trees.
There is extensive coverage of the political scheming including the successful plot to oust and kill Rasputin, who in fact, was not pro-German as was often asserted. Unfortunately it is within the political labyrinth that the narrative slumps badly. There are so many actors, committees, and factions that it becomes burdensome to follow the main themes of the story line. Readers would be much served if much of this material was shed from the narrative and assigned to an appendix. A provocative book that certainly has its strengths and rates a high 2, probably a 2.8, but is compromised as the forest often gets lost for the trees.
August 25, 2017
Although I am not an expert on the subject, I don't think the book portrays Lenin's role objectively. It does provide a good summary of events that led to and followed the October revolution but seems to have been written with an agenda in mind. Does not seem to be a reliable source of information on the subject.
January 23, 2021
Este libro nos situa en los últimos estertores del Imperio Ruso, con la asunción del Zar Nicolás II. El último Romanov, que no daba la talla para sostener tremendo imperio, perdió batallas cruciales como la guerra contra los japoneses y embarcó al Imperio Ruso en la guerra contra Alemania que terminaría siendo, en última instancia, la Primera Guerra Mundial.
Estos factores sumados a la desigualdad, la hambruna, la escasez y las enfermedades, llevaron a una situación social de descontento y descreimiento que propiciaron la caída del Zar, luego la caída del Gobierno Provisional de corte liberal y la llegada al poder de Lenin y los bolcheviques.
Obviamente este es un resumen muy por encima de lo que la Revolución Rusa implicó y todos los sucesos que tuvieron lugar. Este libro narra de una manera muy amena muchos por menores y sucesos necesarios para comprender el panorama general de la época, tanto dentro como fuera de las fronteras rusas.
El objetivo didáctico de comprender el tiempo pasado lo cumple de manera muy satisfactoria, pero hay que tener en cuenta que el autor tiene una postura muy particular en cuanto todo lo que narra, teniendo una visión pro zarista y marcadamente Anti izquierda.
No es el mejor libro para comenzar a aprender ya que el sesgo ideológico es muy intenso, pero si para añadir información si ya se tiene una base previa. Es este sesgo lo que me lleva a darle 3 estrellas.
Estos factores sumados a la desigualdad, la hambruna, la escasez y las enfermedades, llevaron a una situación social de descontento y descreimiento que propiciaron la caída del Zar, luego la caída del Gobierno Provisional de corte liberal y la llegada al poder de Lenin y los bolcheviques.
Obviamente este es un resumen muy por encima de lo que la Revolución Rusa implicó y todos los sucesos que tuvieron lugar. Este libro narra de una manera muy amena muchos por menores y sucesos necesarios para comprender el panorama general de la época, tanto dentro como fuera de las fronteras rusas.
El objetivo didáctico de comprender el tiempo pasado lo cumple de manera muy satisfactoria, pero hay que tener en cuenta que el autor tiene una postura muy particular en cuanto todo lo que narra, teniendo una visión pro zarista y marcadamente Anti izquierda.
No es el mejor libro para comenzar a aprender ya que el sesgo ideológico es muy intenso, pero si para añadir información si ya se tiene una base previa. Es este sesgo lo que me lleva a darle 3 estrellas.
April 27, 2022
One star for the conservative "Lenin was a German agent and therefore revolution is invalid" argument, except meticulous sources give it one star back.
December 18, 2022
Harva on kellelgi oma vaenlastega niivõrd vedanud nagu Leninil.
Väga köitev ja esmaklassiline monograafia, mis on igati omal kohal iga poliitilisi ja/või ajaloolisi mõtteid lennutavad kodaniku lugemisvaras. Tarbetu oleks hakata loetlema, kui paljud olulised faktid on köite teema kohta käivatest aruteludest, mis on ka 21. sajandil igati asjakohased (lisaks ideoloogilise aspektile võis lugedes korduvalt tõdeda, et näiliselt uus (näiteks sakslaste diilitamislembus idaga on ikka ja jälle taasavastatud vana) ignorantsuse või pahatahtlikkuse tõttu välja jäänud, aga on rõõm, et siit saab nad kätte.
March 15, 2018
An enlightening account of the Russian revolution, written succinctly but with enough detail to provide clear understanding of the events. Starting in the late 19th century, McMeekin lays out the seeds of discord already having been sowed. Moving into the early 20th century, we see a war-weary Russia and frustration among soldiers. With ww1, this was prime opportunity to capitalize on this discord for the orchestration of the coup against the Duma. Even though the Bolsheviks did not have the majority to rule, nor did they have peasantry support, from 1917-1920 they exercised the type of control, force, coercion, and terrorism for which they rebelled against the Tsar for using to finally gain control. The book ends recounting the multiple failures of the Lenin regime - massive starvation, hyper-inflation, establishment of totalitarianism, war against the church, etc. A good read for those who want something less doctrinaire than those works who either praise the revolution or which don't give adequate understanding for how and why it happened.
January 13, 2018
* * * * - I really liked this account of the Russian Revolution.
This book by Sean McMeekin is the first one on the topic of the Russian Revolution which I have read. I have previously read more than the average non-Russian person about Russian history, but I am in no way an expert on the subject.
"The Russian Revolution: A New History" portrays the Bolsheviks as ruthless semi-gangsters, who are mainly driven by a will to power. They disguise this power-hunger with a veneer of political jargon and Marxist phraseology. It was very enlightening to read about the very beginning of the Revolution, how favourable circumstances and luck can play such a large role in historical events.
I cannot vouch for this book's accuracy. But it struck me as reasonably accurate. At least it has spurred my interest and I plan to read more on the topic!
This book by Sean McMeekin is the first one on the topic of the Russian Revolution which I have read. I have previously read more than the average non-Russian person about Russian history, but I am in no way an expert on the subject.
"The Russian Revolution: A New History" portrays the Bolsheviks as ruthless semi-gangsters, who are mainly driven by a will to power. They disguise this power-hunger with a veneer of political jargon and Marxist phraseology. It was very enlightening to read about the very beginning of the Revolution, how favourable circumstances and luck can play such a large role in historical events.
I cannot vouch for this book's accuracy. But it struck me as reasonably accurate. At least it has spurred my interest and I plan to read more on the topic!
August 23, 2017
A little dry, but very informative. The author does not try to minimize or justify the atrocities committed during this bloody revolution.
From the epilogue: "If the last hundred years teaches us anything, it is that we should stiffen our defenses and resist armed prophets promising social perfection. The Russians who followed Lenin in 1917 had good grounds for resenting the tsarist government that had plunged them into a terrible war for which they were unprepared, and they had little reason to expect that the regime they were creating would unleash far greater terrors. They could not have known, then, what Communism truly meant. A century of well-catalogued disasters later, no one should have the excuse of ignorance."
From the epilogue: "If the last hundred years teaches us anything, it is that we should stiffen our defenses and resist armed prophets promising social perfection. The Russians who followed Lenin in 1917 had good grounds for resenting the tsarist government that had plunged them into a terrible war for which they were unprepared, and they had little reason to expect that the regime they were creating would unleash far greater terrors. They could not have known, then, what Communism truly meant. A century of well-catalogued disasters later, no one should have the excuse of ignorance."
January 10, 2018
Sean McMeekin is quickly becoming one of my must-read authors. Much like The Ottoman Endgame, The Russian Revolution: A New History explores one of the great seams of history in the modern age as the Russian Empire fell and was replaced by fanatical communist state. His careful writing beats back the powerful founding mythology and propaganda of the Soviet Union to reveal a more complex, uncertain, and traumatically unpredictable sequence of improbable and unimaginable events from prior to World War I, until after the Russian peasant wars. As he did with the Ottoman Empire, McMeekin artfully describes how a proud empire can collapse and how the creation of its succeeding state began when that empire appeared strong and poised to continue. A well written and fascinating read.
April 21, 2019
I read a lot of history books and few authors can make history read like an action move, Sean McMeekin is one of those who really can do so. The book does a wonderful job of explaining the history of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 - debunking many of the myths about the causes and consequences of the Revolution. For anyone interested in the history of Russia this is a great volume on a critical moment in the countries development.
June 20, 2018
Good insight and analysis of the events, plenty of historical references and overall great research. Gets dry occasionally, but overall covers a quite captivating storyline of the world's bloodiest regime.
January 4, 2020
Sean McMeekin is one of the most interesting historians writing today; his previous work on the diplomatic crisis of July 1914 cast new and fascinating light on a subject that had been hitherto laboriously explored, the diplomatic crisis leading up to the outbreak of World War 1, whilst his work on the Berlin to Baghdad railway revealed groundbreaking insights into the strategic thinking behind the German-Ottoman alliance that could have altered the course of World War 1 had those plans come to fruition. His tome on the Russian Revolution, released for the Centenary of that World-shanking event, is yet another example of his revisionist approach, written in his characteristic robust and muscular style.
McMeekin’s work casts new light on several tried and accepted facts surrounding the Russian Revolution. The inevitable rise of Communism as a result of class struggle as propagated by Marxist theory is challenged. Rather than being seen as an inevitability of history where the overthrow of the Bourgeoisie by the proletariat as society evolves from feudalism to industrialization with capitalism collapsing under its own weight as it fails to reform, the rise of the Bolsheviks is instead presented as a combination of their right-time right-place good luck combined with the might-have-been’s and missed chances of 1917, in particular Kerensky’s blunder in not finishing them off when he had the chance to consolidate his own power through army loyalists.
Another myth debunked by McMeekin is that of poor progress in the War ushering in the Revolution. On the contrary, he shows that army morale was high heading into 1917 in the wake of significant successes such as the Brusilov offensive of 1916, with mounting success continuing, especially against the hapless Austrians. Indeed, in the aftermath of the seizure of power by the Provisional Government in February/ March 1917, there was a ‘risk’ of revival of fighting morale under the new leadership. The army only gave up the fight after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks at the end of the year, and once their campaign of sowing dissent among the ranks through propaganda had taken effect. McMeekin also reminds that the fall of the Czar was greeted with enthusiasm also by the Entente powers but especially in Washington, where the fall of the the autocratic regime and its replacement by ‘liberal democracy’ gave President Wilson the final pretext, following the Zimmerman telegram and resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, to justify entry into the War.
Above all is the damming indictment of Lenin as an agent of German mischief, a man quite literally on the German payroll dispatched back into Russia from exile in Switzerland to be a catalyst of chaos, an investment which paid off handsomely and which quite literally could have won the War for Germany had events on the Western front not taken the turns they did in 1918. This investment then completed full circle as Germany became financial provider of last resort to the struggling Bolshevik regime in 1922, throwing it a vital lifeline. Although this German sponsorship of Lenin is well accepted and known, McMeekin introduces a new and intriguing money trail involving Swedish financial intermediaries and German bankers to prove it beyond doubt.
This is an account more about the great events rather than the figures of the Revolution. Scant attention is paid to the personalities and origins of figures like Kernesky, Kamenev, Derzhinsky, Trotsky, Stalin, Savinkov or even Lenin himself. The focus is rather on the seismic events themselves - the twilight years of Imperial Czarist Russia through the revolution of 1905 & subsequent reforms; Russia’s experiences in WW1; the tumultuous year of 1917; the Civil War & Red Terror; the foundation of the Soviet Communist State and the Comintern; the great famines and the persecution of Church and State. It is a monumental recounting under new light of the great events in Russia that shook the World and would have a profound impact on Global history for the remainder of the 20th Century.
McMeekin’s work casts new light on several tried and accepted facts surrounding the Russian Revolution. The inevitable rise of Communism as a result of class struggle as propagated by Marxist theory is challenged. Rather than being seen as an inevitability of history where the overthrow of the Bourgeoisie by the proletariat as society evolves from feudalism to industrialization with capitalism collapsing under its own weight as it fails to reform, the rise of the Bolsheviks is instead presented as a combination of their right-time right-place good luck combined with the might-have-been’s and missed chances of 1917, in particular Kerensky’s blunder in not finishing them off when he had the chance to consolidate his own power through army loyalists.
Another myth debunked by McMeekin is that of poor progress in the War ushering in the Revolution. On the contrary, he shows that army morale was high heading into 1917 in the wake of significant successes such as the Brusilov offensive of 1916, with mounting success continuing, especially against the hapless Austrians. Indeed, in the aftermath of the seizure of power by the Provisional Government in February/ March 1917, there was a ‘risk’ of revival of fighting morale under the new leadership. The army only gave up the fight after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks at the end of the year, and once their campaign of sowing dissent among the ranks through propaganda had taken effect. McMeekin also reminds that the fall of the Czar was greeted with enthusiasm also by the Entente powers but especially in Washington, where the fall of the the autocratic regime and its replacement by ‘liberal democracy’ gave President Wilson the final pretext, following the Zimmerman telegram and resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, to justify entry into the War.
Above all is the damming indictment of Lenin as an agent of German mischief, a man quite literally on the German payroll dispatched back into Russia from exile in Switzerland to be a catalyst of chaos, an investment which paid off handsomely and which quite literally could have won the War for Germany had events on the Western front not taken the turns they did in 1918. This investment then completed full circle as Germany became financial provider of last resort to the struggling Bolshevik regime in 1922, throwing it a vital lifeline. Although this German sponsorship of Lenin is well accepted and known, McMeekin introduces a new and intriguing money trail involving Swedish financial intermediaries and German bankers to prove it beyond doubt.
This is an account more about the great events rather than the figures of the Revolution. Scant attention is paid to the personalities and origins of figures like Kernesky, Kamenev, Derzhinsky, Trotsky, Stalin, Savinkov or even Lenin himself. The focus is rather on the seismic events themselves - the twilight years of Imperial Czarist Russia through the revolution of 1905 & subsequent reforms; Russia’s experiences in WW1; the tumultuous year of 1917; the Civil War & Red Terror; the foundation of the Soviet Communist State and the Comintern; the great famines and the persecution of Church and State. It is a monumental recounting under new light of the great events in Russia that shook the World and would have a profound impact on Global history for the remainder of the 20th Century.
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