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Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification
Preference falsification, according to the economist Timur Kuran, is the act of misrepresenting one's wants under perceived social pressures. It happens frequently in everyday life, such as when we tell the host of a dinner party that we are enjoying the food when we actually find it bland. In Private Truths, Public Lies Kuran argues convincingly that the phenomenon not only is ubiquitous but has huge social and political consequences. Drawing on diverse intellectual traditions, including those rooted in economics, psychology, sociology, and political science, Kuran provides a unified theory of how preference falsification shapes collective decisions, orients structural change, sustains social stability, distorts human knowledge, and conceals political possibilities.
A common effect of preference falsification is the preservation of widely disliked structures. Another is the conferment of an aura of stability on structures vulnerable to sudden collapse. When the support of a policy, tradition, or regime is largely contrived, a minor event may activate a bandwagon that generates massive yet unanticipated change.
In distorting public opinion, preference falsification also corrupts public discourse and, hence, human knowledge. So structures held in place by preference falsification may, if the condition lasts long enough, achieve increasingly genuine acceptance. The book demonstrates how human knowledge and social structures co-evolve in complex and imperfectly predictable ways, without any guarantee of social efficiency.
Private Truths, Public Lies uses its theoretical argument to illuminate an array of puzzling social phenomena. They include the unexpected fall of communism, the paucity, until recently, of open opposition to affirmative action in the United States, and the durability of the beliefs that have sustained India's caste system.
A common effect of preference falsification is the preservation of widely disliked structures. Another is the conferment of an aura of stability on structures vulnerable to sudden collapse. When the support of a policy, tradition, or regime is largely contrived, a minor event may activate a bandwagon that generates massive yet unanticipated change.
In distorting public opinion, preference falsification also corrupts public discourse and, hence, human knowledge. So structures held in place by preference falsification may, if the condition lasts long enough, achieve increasingly genuine acceptance. The book demonstrates how human knowledge and social structures co-evolve in complex and imperfectly predictable ways, without any guarantee of social efficiency.
Private Truths, Public Lies uses its theoretical argument to illuminate an array of puzzling social phenomena. They include the unexpected fall of communism, the paucity, until recently, of open opposition to affirmative action in the United States, and the durability of the beliefs that have sustained India's caste system.
448 pages, Paperback
First published September 30, 1997
About the author
Timur Kuran
22 books62 followersBorn in 1954 in New York City, where his parents lived while graduate students at Yale University, Kuran spent his early childhood in Ankara, where his father taught at the Middle East Technical University. When he was a teenager, his family moved to Istanbul. For a decade, he lived just off the campus of Boğaziçi University, where his father was president and professor of Islamic architectural history.
Kuran obtained his secondary education in Turkey, graduating from Robert College in Istanbul in 1973. He then studied economics at Princeton University, graduating magna cum laude in 1977. He went on to Stanford University to obtain a doctorate in economics. His doctoral supervisor was Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel laureate.
Kuran obtained his secondary education in Turkey, graduating from Robert College in Istanbul in 1973. He then studied economics at Princeton University, graduating magna cum laude in 1977. He went on to Stanford University to obtain a doctorate in economics. His doctoral supervisor was Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel laureate.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews
July 8, 2021
The hopeful cliché that "you can't kill an idea," is unsubstantiated by history. The more that certain ideas can be pressed out the public sphere, the more they can become unthinkable to people in private and then to a future generation become truly unthought. Preference falsification refers to a process in which people conceal their true beliefs and falsify them in public in order to comply with the social order in which they live. In doing so public policies or even entire governments that are widely unpopular in private can continue existing by force of inertia. By collectively falsifying their preferences in favor of a regime or ideology, whether to avoid punishment or win the praise of others, or both, people often become accomplices in their own oppression. In a situation where seemingly no one agrees with a set of social proposals yet they continue to exist and even grow stronger in society, it can feel to many as though some sort of conspiracy is playing out. In reality, the conspiracy is often on the part of a collective that fails to stand up and speak with courage about its true sentiments. Alternate ideas, including ones which are truer and genuinely better for human flourishing, can be marginalized to the point where they die almost entirely, surviving only as curiosities espoused by social misfits in obscure journals.
This book goes through many examples showing how preference falsification at a collective level also makes political forecasting far more difficult. Sometimes a few small triggers can lead to an avalanche of suppressed views coming to the fore. This book was written in 1997, but I hold that the Trump election was an example of this. For better or worse one man said what a lot of people privately were thinking, though their preferences had been falsified and thus the scope of such sentiments were concealed to observers. Once he started saying it, perhaps sensing these rumblings beneath the ground, it gave other Americans the "courage" to say what they believed too. Whether such an outcome is good or bad depends on ones positionality. (For the record I was against this particular case of honesty)
This book is dry and academic but makes a few good points that were memorable. It is a bit of a "red-pill" book in that it points to the existence of truths that are hidden and unexpressed in society.
This book goes through many examples showing how preference falsification at a collective level also makes political forecasting far more difficult. Sometimes a few small triggers can lead to an avalanche of suppressed views coming to the fore. This book was written in 1997, but I hold that the Trump election was an example of this. For better or worse one man said what a lot of people privately were thinking, though their preferences had been falsified and thus the scope of such sentiments were concealed to observers. Once he started saying it, perhaps sensing these rumblings beneath the ground, it gave other Americans the "courage" to say what they believed too. Whether such an outcome is good or bad depends on ones positionality. (For the record I was against this particular case of honesty)
This book is dry and academic but makes a few good points that were memorable. It is a bit of a "red-pill" book in that it points to the existence of truths that are hidden and unexpressed in society.
August 16, 2021
Reread the book.
Imagine a situation:
A long time the state of the world changes slowly if not at all - as in the case of the status quo of East European communism - then without anybody being able to predict anything - except afterward - the state suddenly starts to change very fast and status quo breaks down - e.g. in a few months the communism collapses.
One day only a few people protest against the status quo - like the handful of citizens of DDR in the Dresden churches - then a minor change - like the visit of Gorbachev in the 40 years celebration of DDR - makes the protests to first tenfold and then hundredfold. The public opinions of a huge number of people suddenly - in one week - change because they are no more afraid of expressing their private opinions publicly. The leadership of DDR is not any more motivated to shoot on the protesters.
Soon the institutions - like the police and the border control and the communist party leadership - lose their spirit and the whole system collapses. Not even real communists do anymore dare to express their belief in the system. When beforehand the noncommunists falsified their public opinions, now it is the communists who start to say "I always hated the system in my heart!".
Why does the status quo live so long? Why did a huge majority of the people support the system officially - whether communism or the race quota system in US - even if the private opinions did not support status quo. It is basically because any citizen C stays to support the status quo - and falsify his public opinion and even punish other citizens for criticising the status quo - except if a threshold ratio of other citizens f(C) has changed his public opinion first. (f(C) of course depends on the person.)
Thus even if very high percentage of the population is against the status quo, the status quo may live for a long time and public opposition staying say at 0,1% - the threshold value is more than 0.1% for 99.9% of the people. But sometimes even a modestly sized external cause may cause a huge change. First, the opposition extends to 0.5% because people are not anymore afraid. Then next 2% think "I will also protest because so many other people dared". Next day it is 6%, then 12% and soon the streets are full of protestors.
Communism collapsed but the US race quota system - affirmative action - stays even if approximately two-thirds of the US population privately disapproves it. The people are afraid of being labeled as racists. 1999 Kuran said the situation may cause an explosion in US. I think the election of Donald Trump can be seen as such an explosion.
Imagine a situation:
A long time the state of the world changes slowly if not at all - as in the case of the status quo of East European communism - then without anybody being able to predict anything - except afterward - the state suddenly starts to change very fast and status quo breaks down - e.g. in a few months the communism collapses.
One day only a few people protest against the status quo - like the handful of citizens of DDR in the Dresden churches - then a minor change - like the visit of Gorbachev in the 40 years celebration of DDR - makes the protests to first tenfold and then hundredfold. The public opinions of a huge number of people suddenly - in one week - change because they are no more afraid of expressing their private opinions publicly. The leadership of DDR is not any more motivated to shoot on the protesters.
Soon the institutions - like the police and the border control and the communist party leadership - lose their spirit and the whole system collapses. Not even real communists do anymore dare to express their belief in the system. When beforehand the noncommunists falsified their public opinions, now it is the communists who start to say "I always hated the system in my heart!".
Why does the status quo live so long? Why did a huge majority of the people support the system officially - whether communism or the race quota system in US - even if the private opinions did not support status quo. It is basically because any citizen C stays to support the status quo - and falsify his public opinion and even punish other citizens for criticising the status quo - except if a threshold ratio of other citizens f(C) has changed his public opinion first. (f(C) of course depends on the person.)
Thus even if very high percentage of the population is against the status quo, the status quo may live for a long time and public opposition staying say at 0,1% - the threshold value is more than 0.1% for 99.9% of the people. But sometimes even a modestly sized external cause may cause a huge change. First, the opposition extends to 0.5% because people are not anymore afraid. Then next 2% think "I will also protest because so many other people dared". Next day it is 6%, then 12% and soon the streets are full of protestors.
Communism collapsed but the US race quota system - affirmative action - stays even if approximately two-thirds of the US population privately disapproves it. The people are afraid of being labeled as racists. 1999 Kuran said the situation may cause an explosion in US. I think the election of Donald Trump can be seen as such an explosion.
January 5, 2021
کتاب نظریه جالبی رو ارائه کرده که چرا مردم در نظرسنجی ها یک نظر اعلام میکنند اما در انتخابات نظری برخلاف آن و چرا نتیجه این دو ممکن است متفاوت باشد. ارزش خوندن رو داره
January 19, 2021
کتاب با این دو مثال شروع میشه که در زمان انتخابات ترامپ چرا با وجود اینکه اکثر جامعه ضد ترامپ بودن ولی انتخابات نتیجه عکس داد و یا چرا در همه پرسی بریتانیا برای جدا شدن از اتحادیه اروپا اکثر جامعه مخالف بود ولی در همه پرسی نتیجه ی عکس داد و در واقع موافق جدایی بودن . با این دو مثال پدیده ای رو توضیح داد که در واقع اکثر مردم چون تمایل دارن هم رنگ جماعت باشن باعث میشه چیزی که واقعا بهش اعتقاد دارند را بیان نکنند در نتیجه درمقیاس های بزرگ مانند انتخابات جامعه شناسان دچار شوک میشوند .
نویسنده به این موضوع اشاره کرد که رفتار چنین جزئی میتونه چنین آثاری داشته باشه .
نویسنده به این موضوع اشاره کرد که رفتار چنین جزئی میتونه چنین آثاری داشته باشه .
March 3, 2019
Drier than the Sahara, but filled to the brim with insight. Absolutely essential reading for anyone who wants to understand politics, governance, public opinion, and regime change.
October 23, 2014
Timur Kuran brings out such interesting people insights, that too in large groups, where he sounds less like an economist and more like a psychoanalytic. His incisive views are arrived by identifying patterns across diverse societies and ideologies spanning centuries, demonstrates that not only does individuals shape societies, but societies shape individuals; spirals which can at times be inward looking, but turning a net positive across generations.
October 25, 2011
Incredible, path-breaking book that explains events which would not happen for 20 years. The idea of "preference falsification" is simple, powerful, and empirically demonstrable in both our every day lives, ("Yes, I enjoy spending time with my grandfather's girlfriend") and public lives ("Mubarak is great, I am so happy that he's been in charge for the past 30 years"). Mind-altering substance.
January 20, 2019
3.5 stars rounded up. The theory portions were a solid 5 stars, but the application portions varied between 2-4 stars. Essentially, if you read one chapter into the third part of the book and stopped, you'd get all the useful information you really need. The sections on affirmative action were a pain to read through. I don't know how many times I need to read that race-conscious people are the real racists, or that we have to be wary of the grievances created as a result of affirmative action (but never mind the grievances created without it...apparently one of these is much more important than the other).
"If public opinion reaches an equilibrium devoid of dissent, individuals are more likely to lose touch with alternatives to the status quo than if dissenters keep reminding them of the advantages of change. Likewise, widespread ignorance is more likely in a closed society than in one open to outside influences."
"The disappearance of public dissent can make people increasingly ignorant about flaws of the status quo, and in turn, their ignorance can make them progressively less prepared to dissent."
"Under the circumstances, civil libertarians reject the freedom to veil in order to safeguard a more precious freedom, the freedom not to veil. For their part, the fundamentalists accept the freedom not to veil, because they expect the freedom to veil to extinguish it."
"The uses of social proof are not limited to matters on which we do not experiment or think for ourselves. Even where we possess independent knowledge, the fact that our perceptions are shared assures us of their correctness."
"From a logical standpoint, mere repetition should not enhance the attractiveness of a choice. In reality, we routinely accord informational value to such repetition. We equate multiple exposures to a single belief with the consensus of a group, effectively substituting reiteration for social proof. This is why repetition is a common instrument of persuasion."
"People whose views are governed chiefly by social proof ordinarily lack a capacity for mental resistance to new social demands. It has been observed that our beliefs are strongest when they have been mildly attacked, for then we have become aware of their vulnerability and learned how to counter criticisms. Prior exposure to mild objections thus produces resistance to later persuasion, which then blocks sharp changes in private knowledge and preferences. By implication, beliefs whose counterarguments were unthought are easier to change than ones who counterarguments, while treated as unthinkable, have enjoyed at least some public exposure. When a revolution challenges many established beliefs, the ones to succumb first may thus be those that had enjoyed the greatest protection from public challenges."
"If public opinion reaches an equilibrium devoid of dissent, individuals are more likely to lose touch with alternatives to the status quo than if dissenters keep reminding them of the advantages of change. Likewise, widespread ignorance is more likely in a closed society than in one open to outside influences."
"The disappearance of public dissent can make people increasingly ignorant about flaws of the status quo, and in turn, their ignorance can make them progressively less prepared to dissent."
"Under the circumstances, civil libertarians reject the freedom to veil in order to safeguard a more precious freedom, the freedom not to veil. For their part, the fundamentalists accept the freedom not to veil, because they expect the freedom to veil to extinguish it."
"The uses of social proof are not limited to matters on which we do not experiment or think for ourselves. Even where we possess independent knowledge, the fact that our perceptions are shared assures us of their correctness."
"From a logical standpoint, mere repetition should not enhance the attractiveness of a choice. In reality, we routinely accord informational value to such repetition. We equate multiple exposures to a single belief with the consensus of a group, effectively substituting reiteration for social proof. This is why repetition is a common instrument of persuasion."
"People whose views are governed chiefly by social proof ordinarily lack a capacity for mental resistance to new social demands. It has been observed that our beliefs are strongest when they have been mildly attacked, for then we have become aware of their vulnerability and learned how to counter criticisms. Prior exposure to mild objections thus produces resistance to later persuasion, which then blocks sharp changes in private knowledge and preferences. By implication, beliefs whose counterarguments were unthought are easier to change than ones who counterarguments, while treated as unthinkable, have enjoyed at least some public exposure. When a revolution challenges many established beliefs, the ones to succumb first may thus be those that had enjoyed the greatest protection from public challenges."
January 26, 2013
One of the couple best sociology books I've ever read, even if written by an economist.
July 24, 2016
Amazing.
May 26, 2023
I have a new hammer -- lookit all these nails!
There's a genre of nonfiction I call "New Hammer". It's when the writer has a new idea that he/she thinks explains all kinds of old puzzles, and proceeds to apply that new idea to everything in sight. Some of these are great (e.g. Plagues and Peoples), some are not so good (The Innovator's Dilemma). This one, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification by Timur Kuran, is not the best of the bunch, but is nonetheless pretty good. Some of the stories Kuran has to tell surprised me, and changed the way I think about certain problems.
Kuran's central idea is deceptively simple -- people lie. What's more, they lie systematically. If you go around Russia asking Russians, "Do you support Vladimir Putin?", the answers will be close to 100% "Yes". It's the only safe answer. But in at least some proportion of cases, it is a lie. And, crucially, we don't know what that proportion is. This goes some way to explain why dictatorships sometimes collapse suddenly, seemingly without warning.
Kuran argues that systematic lies about what people really think explain a lot of otherwise puzzling observations about societies and the way they change. As is typical of the "New Hammer" genre, he pushes the applicability of the idea a bit beyond what the data can sustain. Still, I enjoyed it and found it more informative and challenging than I expected to.
Blog review.
There's a genre of nonfiction I call "New Hammer". It's when the writer has a new idea that he/she thinks explains all kinds of old puzzles, and proceeds to apply that new idea to everything in sight. Some of these are great (e.g. Plagues and Peoples), some are not so good (The Innovator's Dilemma). This one, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification by Timur Kuran, is not the best of the bunch, but is nonetheless pretty good. Some of the stories Kuran has to tell surprised me, and changed the way I think about certain problems.
Kuran's central idea is deceptively simple -- people lie. What's more, they lie systematically. If you go around Russia asking Russians, "Do you support Vladimir Putin?", the answers will be close to 100% "Yes". It's the only safe answer. But in at least some proportion of cases, it is a lie. And, crucially, we don't know what that proportion is. This goes some way to explain why dictatorships sometimes collapse suddenly, seemingly without warning.
Kuran argues that systematic lies about what people really think explain a lot of otherwise puzzling observations about societies and the way they change. As is typical of the "New Hammer" genre, he pushes the applicability of the idea a bit beyond what the data can sustain. Still, I enjoyed it and found it more informative and challenging than I expected to.
Blog review.
November 7, 2020
Succeeds as a work of intellectual history and cross-cultural analysis. The economic model, while sound, seems a bit too grounded in hypothetical utility theory (while acknowledging the advancements in behavioral economics that would contradict it) to merit 5 stars. More like 4.25 stars.
June 5, 2021
A profoundly important book to read
Timur in writing this book has (in my view) made a significant contribution to human understanding of social interaction. He has done this by articulating the connection between our public actions and those of our peer group. He does this by identifying the necessities and connection between our public actions and the social consequences of our public and private actions. These connections and feedback loops are use to show how they force us as individuals to temper our public actions and thinking due to risk of social reprisal.
Timur in writing this book has (in my view) made a significant contribution to human understanding of social interaction. He has done this by articulating the connection between our public actions and those of our peer group. He does this by identifying the necessities and connection between our public actions and the social consequences of our public and private actions. These connections and feedback loops are use to show how they force us as individuals to temper our public actions and thinking due to risk of social reprisal.
August 11, 2020
A great and timely book. The premise is simple enough, that under social pressure people often lie about what they really think and that leads to interesting social phenomenon. The model starts with the individual, who has an intrinsic utility for a preference (which often as an individual they cannot affect), some utility for reputation, and some utility for being true to themselves. Often, there will be an reputational utility for pretending to like something that the individual does not actually like, often because there are social (which is true in any society) or sometimes legal sanctions (authoritarian governments) for expressing other opinions. But counter balancing that is some cost for lying, that is self-inflicted. Different individuals have different mixes of those utilities, so some people may naturally hate lying and almost never misrepresent their preference. But most people will have some threshold where if the reputational cost is high enough that it makes sense that they just lie and eat the cost of lying. This is unintended effects, as that widespread lying could make everyone conform to a preference that almost no one believes. To convince others that they believe in the reputationally beneficial preference, these individuals who do not actually believe in it, may take actions including shaming others who express different preferences, enforcing the status quo. This can lead to the propagation of expressed preferences that the majority of the populace does not actually share. That's why often pressure groups trying to push society to believe a certain preference will argue through polls, surveys, etc. that their viewpoint is actually shared (and it is actually fairly different for the individual to figure out on their own what the widespread expressed sentiment is). Society will sometimes settle on certain equilibriums of expressed preference even though that preference is not optimal or even shared by the majority, and this inefficient preference can be persistent, even if some the settlement on the particular equilibrium was contingent on historical accident .
There's a great argument that something can turn from the unthinkable to the unthought. That the first generation suppressing their true beliefs still remember the benefits/costs of their preference, but with generational replacement those choices may be forgotten entirely. This has serious effects on knowledge generation, as "offensive ideas" are self-suppressed and over time forgotten. This especially important on knowledge that relies on others, as opposed to knowledge that an individual can experience themselves.
Sometimes a random event can "flip" a person, which can create a bandwagon effect as others realize that the expressed preference is not shared. The author argues that's why so many revolutions are not predicted, and not seen without hindsight. Many people in the populace may oppose an idea but are unaware of the opposition of others because that opposition is either self- suppressed or suppressed by social pressure. But an event may occur that makes some realize that opposition was actually widespread, and create a self-sustaining bandwagon that creates a circle where the expressed preference shifts dramatically (and causing old supporters of the prior regime to preference falsify themselves in the new regime, viva le republic). The author cites the fall of communism in Eastern Europe as an example.
I found some of the applications really interesting. For example, his argument that secret ballots cannot solve preference falsification by individuals if those individuals do not believe the ballot is really a secret or if calling for the ballot itself, will generate political opponents who have a vested interest in preserving the expressed preference as opposed to the true preferences of individuals. Or the use of "pen" studies, where surveyors showed participants that it was "safe" to be truthful by using pens with the name of opposition party etc. Of course, none of these ideas are too unknown, people are well aware of the power of social pressure, which is what certain countries bans of the wearing of veils (in countries trying to become secular) realize, as they believe that a ban prevents women from feeling pressured to wear a veil from social pressure. Some of the psychology was interesting as well, such as pluralistic ignorance (people finding it hard to figure out what the majority of people actually believe), fundamental attribution error (people underestimating the effects of social pressure on others), and the different responses by dissent to repression (cover and risk believers change of heart to conform with the mask they wear or stick to one's principles and risk extreme reputational cost, including up to persecution).
A few things keeping this book from being 5 stars despite the very good material and analysis. The first is that it's way too long, the use of the caste system, affirmative action, and communism as examples of systems maintained by preference falsification was a bit repetitive. And while the author tries to explore the nuances and possible alternative explanations, that seems to just distract from the main ideas of the book, and appears to be an attempt to just lengthen the book. In addition such digressions had the potential to distract from the theory, as I found myself unconvinced by several of his arguments about the historical examples (he rather cavalierly creates narratives about the caste system, affirmative action and communism that many people might object to) . Second, the book is a little repetitive when it comes to the argument that "everything influences everything." It's true that there's feedback mechanisms between someone's true opinion and expressed opinion as well as between people's expressed opinions and their evaluations of other's true opinions, but the book seems to repeat that argument so many times that I found myself bored when it was brought up. That caveat, that nothing in social analysis is in isolation is an admirable hedge but seems mentioned so many times that it appears to be another attempt to lengthen the book.
Despite my nits and minor complaints, still a great book that systematically thinks about social pressure to lie, and the many mechanisms/implications of people lying about what they really think. The solution the author suggests is that we have more courage and be more honest, which seems like a good aspiration to prevent the persistence of systems that no one (or maybe at most a minority) actually wants. A useful framework for anyone who thinks about expression and its implications.
There's a great argument that something can turn from the unthinkable to the unthought. That the first generation suppressing their true beliefs still remember the benefits/costs of their preference, but with generational replacement those choices may be forgotten entirely. This has serious effects on knowledge generation, as "offensive ideas" are self-suppressed and over time forgotten. This especially important on knowledge that relies on others, as opposed to knowledge that an individual can experience themselves.
Sometimes a random event can "flip" a person, which can create a bandwagon effect as others realize that the expressed preference is not shared. The author argues that's why so many revolutions are not predicted, and not seen without hindsight. Many people in the populace may oppose an idea but are unaware of the opposition of others because that opposition is either self- suppressed or suppressed by social pressure. But an event may occur that makes some realize that opposition was actually widespread, and create a self-sustaining bandwagon that creates a circle where the expressed preference shifts dramatically (and causing old supporters of the prior regime to preference falsify themselves in the new regime, viva le republic). The author cites the fall of communism in Eastern Europe as an example.
I found some of the applications really interesting. For example, his argument that secret ballots cannot solve preference falsification by individuals if those individuals do not believe the ballot is really a secret or if calling for the ballot itself, will generate political opponents who have a vested interest in preserving the expressed preference as opposed to the true preferences of individuals. Or the use of "pen" studies, where surveyors showed participants that it was "safe" to be truthful by using pens with the name of opposition party etc. Of course, none of these ideas are too unknown, people are well aware of the power of social pressure, which is what certain countries bans of the wearing of veils (in countries trying to become secular) realize, as they believe that a ban prevents women from feeling pressured to wear a veil from social pressure. Some of the psychology was interesting as well, such as pluralistic ignorance (people finding it hard to figure out what the majority of people actually believe), fundamental attribution error (people underestimating the effects of social pressure on others), and the different responses by dissent to repression (cover and risk believers change of heart to conform with the mask they wear or stick to one's principles and risk extreme reputational cost, including up to persecution).
A few things keeping this book from being 5 stars despite the very good material and analysis. The first is that it's way too long, the use of the caste system, affirmative action, and communism as examples of systems maintained by preference falsification was a bit repetitive. And while the author tries to explore the nuances and possible alternative explanations, that seems to just distract from the main ideas of the book, and appears to be an attempt to just lengthen the book. In addition such digressions had the potential to distract from the theory, as I found myself unconvinced by several of his arguments about the historical examples (he rather cavalierly creates narratives about the caste system, affirmative action and communism that many people might object to) . Second, the book is a little repetitive when it comes to the argument that "everything influences everything." It's true that there's feedback mechanisms between someone's true opinion and expressed opinion as well as between people's expressed opinions and their evaluations of other's true opinions, but the book seems to repeat that argument so many times that I found myself bored when it was brought up. That caveat, that nothing in social analysis is in isolation is an admirable hedge but seems mentioned so many times that it appears to be another attempt to lengthen the book.
Despite my nits and minor complaints, still a great book that systematically thinks about social pressure to lie, and the many mechanisms/implications of people lying about what they really think. The solution the author suggests is that we have more courage and be more honest, which seems like a good aspiration to prevent the persistence of systems that no one (or maybe at most a minority) actually wants. A useful framework for anyone who thinks about expression and its implications.
December 20, 2020
The book was a slog to get through, and should have been a third of the length. But the ideas it presented were extremely powerful.
Preference Falsification — claiming to believing something other than what you believe for reputational or social reasons — can have fairly significant consequences in both politics (Brexit and Trump happened despite polls indicating that they won’t) and business (why enterprises continue to use shitty software that no one in their company likes)
The book analyses the consequences of preference falsification, and gives readers a powerful mental model to make sense of the world
Preference Falsification — claiming to believing something other than what you believe for reputational or social reasons — can have fairly significant consequences in both politics (Brexit and Trump happened despite polls indicating that they won’t) and business (why enterprises continue to use shitty software that no one in their company likes)
The book analyses the consequences of preference falsification, and gives readers a powerful mental model to make sense of the world
August 18, 2019
Thought it would be one of those books where you only needed to read 50 pages. However, it's extremely well written and the theory continues to develop throughout the book. Very enjoyable.
July 25, 2020
Enlightening and frightening.
We find ourselves coerced to make a stand on shifting sand.
We find ourselves coerced to make a stand on shifting sand.
July 23, 2022
Have you ever shared an opinion in public that is not quite aligned with how you feel in private? Have you ever had to hide certain feelings because of social pressure to steer your politics in a certain direction? So much of what we think and feel is actually formed by interdependent, social dynamics that help to maintain or disrupt equilibriums in the societies in which we live. This book was a powerful meditation on when, why and how that happens through the social theory of "preference falsification." That's when a person, under perceived social pressure, says one thing in public but feels another way in private circles or within themselves. We do this because there's usually a cost involved in actually saying what you really think — including extremes like ostracizing, imprisonment, excommunication or violence, depending on the society's governance and tolerance levels for free expression. Hiding one's dissent or opposition to a particular policy is detrimental for two reasons: it creates the "persistence of unwanted social outcomes" and generates "widespread ignorance." The first is driven by a need for social approval (protecting one's perceived reputation) and the second is driven by our "reliance on each other for information," (we can't possibly know everything so we rely on "functionaries" to help us filter information that we then use to form personal views). Using examples from communist Eastern Europe, the caste system in India, and the United State's history of racism and affirmative action, Timur Kuran details all the ways in which individuals navigate greater social and political pressures to speak and act in ways that align with the status quo. He describes in detail the social dynamics at play that tip the social scales from status quote to revolution. He gives plenty of examples of how we tend to "underestimate the impact of social pressures on public preferences" and often confuse them for our own. People commonly misrepresent their wants and feelings, whether it's in the context of a conversation at a backyard BBQ or in the classroom. He explains the "bandwagon effect" and the layers of shift required for a society to experience a social explosion or revolution. This book was written in the 90s but is so relevant and applicable today, when perceived pressure from social media to act and think in a certain way is at an all time high. He cautions that this behavior often stifles the potential for new thoughts to emerge. "The holder of a belief at odds with public discourse is routinely reminded of the flaws" in their thinking — thus stifling the potential for new ideas to emerge within society. Using both qualitative (loved) and quantitative (harder to understand!) data, Kuran lays out all the potential consequences of hiding one's true feelings in the public sphere, both on an individual and social level. In the age of conspiracies and social influencers, reading a book like this one was a wake up call to the importance of getting familiar with one's actual feelings and thoughts on a particular issue and seeing when, where and how you can actually align the private and public self in daily life. As Kuran lays out expertly, this is much easier said than done. This was a heavy sociology textbook level read, but quite reader friendly overall and where it got challenging, I did skim but thankfully he has some excellent summative paragraphs to help you through the more mathematical models detailing where, how and when social patterns shift toward revolution or collective conservatism. This book helped me parse out some of my own thinking on socially sensitive issues of the day, like gender & identity politics, for example. Highly recommend this book if you are up for a heavy read with lots of powerful social insights. It may also help you check yourself when it comes to social media and the heavy hand it may play in forming your opinions that you then believe are solely generated by you alone. This is a fallacy - so much of what we think and feel is a social dance.
March 27, 2023
Rarely do I finish a book and want to recommend it in as unqualified of a way as I do with Timur Kuran’s “Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.” The book is chock full of fascinating information and insights on every page that span economics, philosophy, politics, religion, public administration, history, sociology, anthropology, literature, cultural studies, biology, physics, mathematics, psychology, law, and cognitive science. Everything hangs together beautifully. Nothing feels out of place. Scholars with diverse viewpoints and orientations are cited favorably yet critically. The topic is a fascinating and important one. The book is truly transhistorical and multicultural, not with the latter term being used in the sense of a buzzword but in terms of the book genuinely showing deep insights into diverse times, places, belief systems, and contexts. This book is a major achievement and an example of the kind of genuine depth and breadth that scholars should aim for when they take on broad topics of general scholarly and public interest. The arguments made are extremely tight. And perhaps most importantly, the book has something meaningful and important to say about human affairs and the human condition that has not been said a million times before.
April 4, 2022
What connects the prevalence of the caste system in India, the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and affirmative action in the modern day US ? Kuran argues that the single thread weaving through all of these disparate scenarios is widespread preference falsification: public opinion that sharply diverges from private preferences. The book uncovers an elaborate system of feedback between private preferences, private knowledge (or the lack thereof), public opinion, and political action which admit multiple equilibria. Small shifts in preferences can drive the system to a new equilibrium, and if and when this will happen in hard to predict in principle and in practice since private preferences are hidden from the public eye. This book is a profound addition to social sciences and combines insight from game theory, psychology and economics to make sense of a world with widespread preference falsification.
June 17, 2022
Timur talks about preference falsification, its reasons and consequences.
Reasons: Depending on 1)how important is a specific topic to a person, 2)how much their audience is important to them!, and 3)how important is to state their opinion (and/or benefits), they might present their opinion unlike their belief!
Some do preference falsification because they cannot handle the social pressure!
Results of preference falsification: 1)Change is prevented, 2)public knowledge is damaged/distorted, society could be surprised by outcomes of polls and drastic changes.
Definitely recommended to read!
Reasons: Depending on 1)how important is a specific topic to a person, 2)how much their audience is important to them!, and 3)how important is to state their opinion (and/or benefits), they might present their opinion unlike their belief!
Some do preference falsification because they cannot handle the social pressure!
Results of preference falsification: 1)Change is prevented, 2)public knowledge is damaged/distorted, society could be surprised by outcomes of polls and drastic changes.
Definitely recommended to read!
June 28, 2021
کتاب در خصوص عملکرد بیرونی ما برخلاف چیزی که در درون ما می گذرد صحبت و نتایج این موضوع را بیان می کند. شخصاً موضوع بیان شده در کتاب موضوع حادّی در ذهن من تاکنون نبوده اما نکته جالب برای من تاریخ نشر اول این کتاب است که سال های زیادی از آن می گذرد و نویسنده در آن توانسته بر مبنای این نظریه بسیاری موارد در حال حاضر را پیش بینی کند.
اینکه انتظار داریم نتیجه نظرسنجی یا انتخابات چیزی باشد که اکثراً به آن اعتقاد دارند اما در واقعیت و پس از اعلام نتایج اتفاق دیگری می افتد.
اینکه انتظار داریم نتیجه نظرسنجی یا انتخابات چیزی باشد که اکثراً به آن اعتقاد دارند اما در واقعیت و پس از اعلام نتایج اتفاق دیگری می افتد.
December 21, 2020
No real surprising ideas, in a way it's all something we already know, it's just the fleshing out of the consequences and getting into specifics that makes it worth reading. Sure, I learned about the iranian revolution and a few other bits of history, but the main benefit was the opportunity to mull over these processes at work in present day for a week or two.
June 26, 2021
The theoretical framework Kuran outlines is one you need to know. The examples he picks out and discusses throughout the chapters are not all equally good/well-chosen and in some situations he seems limited by the models he makes use of (implausible consequences are discussed, which are a result of implausible models), but this is a book with some very important insights. Read it.
May 28, 2021
Read this as part of a book club. The book itself is pretty dense, and there are parts where it lost be because of the excessively verbose detail used, but the overall framework introduced was thought provoking, and led to some fruitful analysis and discussions.
April 12, 2018
Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Hardcover)
by Timur Kuran
get again
ILL from 3/1 to 4/12
by Timur Kuran
get again
ILL from 3/1 to 4/12
Want to read
October 4, 2020Katherine Boyle
September 14, 2021
Intriguing premise.
October 10, 2021
Great book in particular on how public opinions influence private opinions (mass deception).
December 22, 2021
از این نظر جالب بود که نویسنده این پدیده که مردم ممکن در نظر سنجی پابلیک چیزی بگن و مثلا در انتخابات که مخفی هست نظر دیگه ای داشته باشن رو با خود سانسوری و حتی دروغ یکی نمیدونست.
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