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Sophist
A fluent and accurate new translation of the dialogue that, of all Plato's works, has seemed to speak most directly to the interests of contemporary and analytical philosophers. White's extensive introduction explores the dialogue's central themes, its connection with related discussions in other dialogues, and its implicaiton for the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics.
112 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 361
About the author
Plato
5,145 books7,378 followers427 BC-347 BC
The Republic , the best known of these many dialogues with Socrates, mentor, as the central character, expounds idealism of noted Greek philosopher Plato and describes a hypothetical utopian state that thinkers rule; he taught and wrote for much his life at the Academy, which he founded near Athens around 386 BC. Platonism, the philosophy of Plato, especially asserts the phenomena of the world as an imperfect and transitory reflection of ideal forms, an absolute and eternal reality.
Plato said that Atlantis, a legendary island, west of Gibraltar, in the Atlantic Ocean sank beneath the sea during an earthquake.
Aristotle began as a pupil of Plato.
Plotinus and his successors at Alexandria in the 3rd century developed Neoplatonism, a philosophical system, based on Platonism with elements of mysticism and some Judaic and Christian concepts.
Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinascombined Neoplatonism with the doctrines of Aristotle within a context of Christian thought.
This classical mathematician and student started the first institution of higher learning in the western world. Alongside his student, Aristotle, Plato helped to lay the western science.
Plato of the most important western exerted influence on virtually every figure and authored the first comprehensive work on politics. Plato also contributed to ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. Aristotle, his extremely influential student, also tutored Alexander the Great of Macedonia.
The Republic , the best known of these many dialogues with Socrates, mentor, as the central character, expounds idealism of noted Greek philosopher Plato and describes a hypothetical utopian state that thinkers rule; he taught and wrote for much his life at the Academy, which he founded near Athens around 386 BC. Platonism, the philosophy of Plato, especially asserts the phenomena of the world as an imperfect and transitory reflection of ideal forms, an absolute and eternal reality.
Plato said that Atlantis, a legendary island, west of Gibraltar, in the Atlantic Ocean sank beneath the sea during an earthquake.
Aristotle began as a pupil of Plato.
Plotinus and his successors at Alexandria in the 3rd century developed Neoplatonism, a philosophical system, based on Platonism with elements of mysticism and some Judaic and Christian concepts.
Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinascombined Neoplatonism with the doctrines of Aristotle within a context of Christian thought.
This classical mathematician and student started the first institution of higher learning in the western world. Alongside his student, Aristotle, Plato helped to lay the western science.
Plato of the most important western exerted influence on virtually every figure and authored the first comprehensive work on politics. Plato also contributed to ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. Aristotle, his extremely influential student, also tutored Alexander the Great of Macedonia.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 147 reviews
July 25, 2023
What is rhetoric? Yes, the dialogue will turn around this issue, but not only. I loved it. The reflections are vivid, the text is dramatic, and one took in the story. One imagines being in the place of Callicles and debate or being in the area of Socrates. We speak here of the beautiful and the ugly, just and the unjust, injustice, power in many forms, and even the soul. Contrary to what one might think, the choice of subjects is very varied.
In terms of injustice, I did not agree with Socrates. Indeed, he had persuaded that committing a crime is worse than suffering. Of course, this fact is a point of view, but I find it slightly reductive and should have been more thorough. Moreover, the dialogue lacks repetition since Plato would have transcribed in writing from the oral to the base. Indeed, during Socrates's recapitulations, he repeated what he had already said several times, and it was embarrassing to follow the reasoning. It was as if one had been arrested in a full circle to resume it after this recapitulation.
In conclusion, Plato's dialogue is not perfect, but it is dragging with suspense, very well written, and could be read in one afternoon. Despite its defects, it is incredible; to read urgently to have a good time!
In terms of injustice, I did not agree with Socrates. Indeed, he had persuaded that committing a crime is worse than suffering. Of course, this fact is a point of view, but I find it slightly reductive and should have been more thorough. Moreover, the dialogue lacks repetition since Plato would have transcribed in writing from the oral to the base. Indeed, during Socrates's recapitulations, he repeated what he had already said several times, and it was embarrassing to follow the reasoning. It was as if one had been arrested in a full circle to resume it after this recapitulation.
In conclusion, Plato's dialogue is not perfect, but it is dragging with suspense, very well written, and could be read in one afternoon. Despite its defects, it is incredible; to read urgently to have a good time!
October 1, 2012
By the middle of the book here's what I really wanted to see happen:
---
STRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and
some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?
THEAETETUS: There can be no greater.
STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the
imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely
know you and your figure?
THEAETETUS: Naturally.
STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of
virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge
of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this
opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they
can, in word and deed?
*PUNCH*
STRANGER: OW!
STRANGER: ...
STRANGER: Did you just punch me in the face?
THEAETETUS: Yes, in the nose.
STRANGER: That REALLY hurt!
THEAETETUS: Sorry, but I had a justified true belief that punching you in the face would finally make this interesting. I've been saying "yes", and "very true" for over an hour now and you haven't communicated anything of testable value. You've assumed a definition of knowledge and seem to be under the impression that through deduction you can arrive at an absolute truth that would somehow settle all further inquiry. You've provided not a single conjecture that I, or anyone listening, could ever evaluate, test, or even attempt to falsify.
STRANGER: AGH, my nose is bleeding...
THEAETETUS: You're right, that was uncalled for. Please, go on using sophistry to tell me why sophistry is bad.
---
But that never happened.
Here's something fun, filter out everything Theaetetus says, it goes like this,
...
THEAETETUS: Yes.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
THEAETETUS: Yes, it is often called so.
THEAETETUS: By all means.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Most true.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Granted.
THEAETETUS: Very true
THEAETETUS: There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.
THEAETETUS: Very good.
THEAETETUS: By all means.
THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.
...
And so on for the entire dialogue.
Perhaps out of boredom, or perhaps trying to distract myself from hoping the stranger gets punched in the face, I wondered if every "True" and "Very true" could be deciphered as some kind of code or riddle-- maybe there is a hidden message encoded in repetitive affirmations. Or maybe I'm just desperately looking for something of value in this text...
Anyway, this is not a dialogue (as we use the word), but instead a diatribe against sophists; ironically characterizing "sophists" for doing exactly what Plato, as the "stranger", was doing via this dialectic approach.
At one point I had to stop because I thought maybe I was reading a farcical comedy. I kept an open mind, but every page became harder and harder to get through. Hours of dialectic-glop and semantic entanglements. I'll assume some of that was a problem of translation, but still, a punch in the face would have made the whole thing much more interesting.
---
STRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and
some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?
THEAETETUS: There can be no greater.
STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the
imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely
know you and your figure?
THEAETETUS: Naturally.
STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of
virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge
of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this
opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they
can, in word and deed?
*PUNCH*
STRANGER: OW!
STRANGER: ...
STRANGER: Did you just punch me in the face?
THEAETETUS: Yes, in the nose.
STRANGER: That REALLY hurt!
THEAETETUS: Sorry, but I had a justified true belief that punching you in the face would finally make this interesting. I've been saying "yes", and "very true" for over an hour now and you haven't communicated anything of testable value. You've assumed a definition of knowledge and seem to be under the impression that through deduction you can arrive at an absolute truth that would somehow settle all further inquiry. You've provided not a single conjecture that I, or anyone listening, could ever evaluate, test, or even attempt to falsify.
STRANGER: AGH, my nose is bleeding...
THEAETETUS: You're right, that was uncalled for. Please, go on using sophistry to tell me why sophistry is bad.
---
But that never happened.
Here's something fun, filter out everything Theaetetus says, it goes like this,
...
THEAETETUS: Yes.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
THEAETETUS: Yes, it is often called so.
THEAETETUS: By all means.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Most true.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Granted.
THEAETETUS: Very true
THEAETETUS: There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.
THEAETETUS: Very good.
THEAETETUS: By all means.
THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.
...
And so on for the entire dialogue.
Perhaps out of boredom, or perhaps trying to distract myself from hoping the stranger gets punched in the face, I wondered if every "True" and "Very true" could be deciphered as some kind of code or riddle-- maybe there is a hidden message encoded in repetitive affirmations. Or maybe I'm just desperately looking for something of value in this text...
Anyway, this is not a dialogue (as we use the word), but instead a diatribe against sophists; ironically characterizing "sophists" for doing exactly what Plato, as the "stranger", was doing via this dialectic approach.
At one point I had to stop because I thought maybe I was reading a farcical comedy. I kept an open mind, but every page became harder and harder to get through. Hours of dialectic-glop and semantic entanglements. I'll assume some of that was a problem of translation, but still, a punch in the face would have made the whole thing much more interesting.
April 25, 2017
مكالمه ى سوفيست، به شناخت ماهيت سوفيست مى پردازد. سقراط در اين گفتگو ساكت است و بيگانه اى الئايى صحبت مى كند.
خلاصه ى مباحث
از كتاب
سوفيست به ظلمات "نيستى" پناه مى برد و همه ى زواياى تاريكى را مى شناسد؛ از اين رو شناختن او در آن تاريكى بسيار دشوار است.
ولى فيلسوف سرگرم تحقيق در باره ى "هستى" است، و روشنايى خيره كننده اى كه او را احاطه كرده مردمان را از شناختن او باز مى دارد؛ زيرا چشم درونى بيشتر مردمان نمى تواند زمانى دراز در روشنايى خدايى نظر كند.
خلاصه ى مباحث
از كتاب
سوفيست به ظلمات "نيستى" پناه مى برد و همه ى زواياى تاريكى را مى شناسد؛ از اين رو شناختن او در آن تاريكى بسيار دشوار است.
ولى فيلسوف سرگرم تحقيق در باره ى "هستى" است، و روشنايى خيره كننده اى كه او را احاطه كرده مردمان را از شناختن او باز مى دارد؛ زيرا چشم درونى بيشتر مردمان نمى تواند زمانى دراز در روشنايى خدايى نظر كند.
July 28, 2018
Clearly I’ll have to read this again. I suspect God kills a kitten every time Theaetetus says “clearly” “definitely,” “of course.” BECAUSE NONE OF THAT IS CLEAR AT ALL.
I became interested in Sophist through Heidegger. I’ve read a bunch of Plato’s dialogues before, I can’t remember which, I read them without any guide — they impressed me as mildly amusing, beyond that it’s completely mysterious to me how anyone can walk away with any sort of certainty, or conclusion. Plato always leaves me feeling “trolled.”
The “nice” (?) thing about reading backwards from modern “signposts” is that I get to appreciate other people’s interpretive efforts. I don’t think I could have taken this dialogue very seirously if I didn’t know it inspired so many generations of philosophers, and now I’m burning with desire to read Heidegger’s lecture on Sophist, and his investigation of “beings, even though I’ll have to learn to read Greek first.
And I suspect that’s the whole point — not to indoctrinate readers with any kind of solidified “knowledge,” but to inspire more dialogues, investigations, contemplations.
I don’t usually rate books I don’t understand, but I think, for the psychological effect it created — bafflement commingled with desires to dig deeper — it’s justifiable to give it ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ .
I became interested in Sophist through Heidegger. I’ve read a bunch of Plato’s dialogues before, I can’t remember which, I read them without any guide — they impressed me as mildly amusing, beyond that it’s completely mysterious to me how anyone can walk away with any sort of certainty, or conclusion. Plato always leaves me feeling “trolled.”
The “nice” (?) thing about reading backwards from modern “signposts” is that I get to appreciate other people’s interpretive efforts. I don’t think I could have taken this dialogue very seirously if I didn’t know it inspired so many generations of philosophers, and now I’m burning with desire to read Heidegger’s lecture on Sophist, and his investigation of “beings, even though I’ll have to learn to read Greek first.
And I suspect that’s the whole point — not to indoctrinate readers with any kind of solidified “knowledge,” but to inspire more dialogues, investigations, contemplations.
I don’t usually rate books I don’t understand, but I think, for the psychological effect it created — bafflement commingled with desires to dig deeper — it’s justifiable to give it ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ .
July 9, 2011
Sophist is one of the few Platonic dialogues which don’t have Socrates as the main character (all are from the late period). This seems to offer Plato some advantages, especially for this book’s purposes. Using the Eleatic Visitor as the main speaker allows Plato to make sustained arguments consisting of series of positive statements as opposed to the Socratic character’s standard approach, claiming to know nothing and play the midwife of others’ thoughts – asking questions, testing answers, usually showing their inadequacy, and typically ending inconclusively. Arguably Plato could have used Socrates the same way he used the Visitor, but that would have been odd as Socrates is the main speaker in the Theaetetus, Sophist’s predecessor in a trilogy, in which Socrates is true to his old form. Sophist is an attack on Plato’s adversaries, the sophists, and on some of their most important (and to Plato, very dangerous) word or logic puzzles. His animus towards sophists, and towards poets, might seem excessive, but we should remember that he saw both as educators offering falsehoods, in some cases in the guise of truth and in others with a relativistic view of truth. And this was at a time when disinterested, rational investigation into truth was new and insecure. For some it was seen as impious, probably for others a potential threat to society and the state. Another danger that seems to have been quite real was the conflating of philosophy and sophistry (as we see in Aristophanes’ Clouds, and as Plato’s Apology seems to suggest, though in reality they were perhaps less distinct than Plato might have us believe). Regarding at least some sophists, the main issue was the reality and importance of truth and the importance of pursuing truth regardless of outcome as opposed to developing and teaching skill in persuasion regardless of truth. The sophists’ puzzles posed serious problems for Plato, causing fundamental aspects of existence (being and non-being, rest and motion, one and many, etc.) to appear hopelessly mired in contradictions and confusions, leading among other things to relativism about truth and morality.
Primary among these problems was confusion about being (i.e. the word “is”) and manipulation of the confusion of “is” as denoting existence with its denoting a thing’s having particular qualities. With this difference long clear to us, it’s hard to understand how the brightest minds in ancient Greece were stumped by it, but it was a major problem that Plato seems to have effectively clarified in Sophist. Another main problem in sophistical arguments was the equation of “not being x” with “being the opposite of x.” Plato pretty effectively clarifies that “not” indicates difference but not necessarily contrariety. He also, very importantly, believes he establishes that we can talk about things that don’t exist without necessarily contradicting ourselves. I’m not sure he established this in a way that would decisively undermine the sophists, but this issue was central to Plato’s problem with them. Some sophists claimed there couldn’t be false belief or speech because no one could think or say “that which is not” since “that which is not” has no share in “being” (this picks up an issue from the Theaetetus, while Sophist in general is largely directed against Parmenides, with some mostly indirect connection to the dialogue named after him). We might say that Plato demonstrated, or believed he demonstrated, that at least some things which don’t exist (e.g. things that are false) are nevertheless available to thought and speech.
Another main issue Plato tackles, also without the greatest clarity, is that qualities (possibly the Forms or Ideas from his earlier works) can blend with each other (this revisits a central problem from the Parmenides, at least if we take it as dealing with the Forms). He doesn’t provide much of an account of how this works, but in a proto-Aristotelian manner he doesn’t seem to need to so he doesn’t bother; he gives some examples which appear to adequately demonstrate that this “blending” happens in at least some situations and then forgoes further proof as he’s achieved his primary objectives: demonstrating that things can either “be” in the sense that they exist or they can “be” possessors of qualities; they can “not be” in possession of quality x but this doesn’t mean they have (or are) its opposite; they can “not be” something without meaning they don’t exist; we can discuss things that “are not” without contradicting ourselves or saying nothing; and things can possess a multiplicity of differing qualities, “blending with each other,” without this being inherently contradictory or problematic. At least this is my understanding of what I take to be the main points of the dialogue. (The first third of the book is an entertaining search for a definition of “sophist,” in which we also meet the Eleatic Visitor and are introduced to his “method of division.”)
The Visitor seems to speak for Plato much more clearly than the character Socrates elsewhere, and it’s hard to imagine Plato taking on the tasks of this dialogue with the usual Socratic limitations and dialectical method. Decisively refuting the sophists on the points addressed was critical to Plato’s project (there is truth, it’s absolute and unchanging, and it very possibly can be discovered and understood by man; there also must be falsehood – both deceit and misunderstanding or ignorance; similarly, justice and knowledge are real, and attempting to pursue and understand them is not necessarily destined to be fruitless). But we also find the Visitor as the main speaker in Statesman, while Parmenides had been the main speaker in that dialogue (with a young Socrates largely on the defensive), and Socrates doesn’t even appear in The Laws. Timaeus and Critias are essentially monologues by those characters, and even in Philebus, with Socrates as the main speaker, he asserts positive doctrine rather than questioning others and demolishing their definitions and arguments. It seems Plato in his late period needed something his earlier Socratic character and method could no longer provide him (with the exception of the Theaetetus, perhaps acting as a coda for the old Socrates and an introduction to the trilogy which apparently was to include Sophist, Statesman, and the unwritten Philosopher).
I mentioned a proto-Aristotelian aspect in this dialogue; it seems there are several of these in the Parmenides and Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman trilogy: The logic puzzles in Parmenides almost demand an analysis and categorization of logical fallacies, for which a formal logic would be a prerequisite. The Eleatic Visitor’s method of division (used in Sophist and Statesman) is a step away from Socratic dialectic and a step towards Aristotelian logic. The Visitor also insists on differentiation between general and specific, and seems to be moving towards something like Aristotle’s genus and species. The unmoved mover makes a very brief appearance in Statesman’s cosmological myth, which also includes something like an initial abstract of Aristotle’s Politics (i.e. a survey and critique of existing political systems). And there’s also something similar to Aristotle’s beloved doctrine of the mean in Statesman. To be fair to Aristotle, no one else in the Academy took these hints or produced the remarkable body of work he did, and there are plenty of things in Aristotle, e.g. his causality, which don’t seem to have any obvious precedents in Plato. Certainly Aristotle’s formal logic was one of history’s great intellectual achievements, regardless of the extent of the foundation Plato provided. And of course the mindsets of the two men were very different, not least in the place (or lack thereof) of empiricism in their respective worlds of thought.
Perhaps it should be noted that our view of the sophists may be excessively negative and otherwise unbalanced largely due to Plato’s well-preserved and brilliant dialogues which so often savage the group. It’s unlikely we’ll ever have adequate knowledge of them to be able to independently assess Plato’s characterizations. But perhaps it’s worth keeping in mind Plato’s harsh view of the poets, who we do know, when considering his even harsher view of the sophists.
Primary among these problems was confusion about being (i.e. the word “is”) and manipulation of the confusion of “is” as denoting existence with its denoting a thing’s having particular qualities. With this difference long clear to us, it’s hard to understand how the brightest minds in ancient Greece were stumped by it, but it was a major problem that Plato seems to have effectively clarified in Sophist. Another main problem in sophistical arguments was the equation of “not being x” with “being the opposite of x.” Plato pretty effectively clarifies that “not” indicates difference but not necessarily contrariety. He also, very importantly, believes he establishes that we can talk about things that don’t exist without necessarily contradicting ourselves. I’m not sure he established this in a way that would decisively undermine the sophists, but this issue was central to Plato’s problem with them. Some sophists claimed there couldn’t be false belief or speech because no one could think or say “that which is not” since “that which is not” has no share in “being” (this picks up an issue from the Theaetetus, while Sophist in general is largely directed against Parmenides, with some mostly indirect connection to the dialogue named after him). We might say that Plato demonstrated, or believed he demonstrated, that at least some things which don’t exist (e.g. things that are false) are nevertheless available to thought and speech.
Another main issue Plato tackles, also without the greatest clarity, is that qualities (possibly the Forms or Ideas from his earlier works) can blend with each other (this revisits a central problem from the Parmenides, at least if we take it as dealing with the Forms). He doesn’t provide much of an account of how this works, but in a proto-Aristotelian manner he doesn’t seem to need to so he doesn’t bother; he gives some examples which appear to adequately demonstrate that this “blending” happens in at least some situations and then forgoes further proof as he’s achieved his primary objectives: demonstrating that things can either “be” in the sense that they exist or they can “be” possessors of qualities; they can “not be” in possession of quality x but this doesn’t mean they have (or are) its opposite; they can “not be” something without meaning they don’t exist; we can discuss things that “are not” without contradicting ourselves or saying nothing; and things can possess a multiplicity of differing qualities, “blending with each other,” without this being inherently contradictory or problematic. At least this is my understanding of what I take to be the main points of the dialogue. (The first third of the book is an entertaining search for a definition of “sophist,” in which we also meet the Eleatic Visitor and are introduced to his “method of division.”)
The Visitor seems to speak for Plato much more clearly than the character Socrates elsewhere, and it’s hard to imagine Plato taking on the tasks of this dialogue with the usual Socratic limitations and dialectical method. Decisively refuting the sophists on the points addressed was critical to Plato’s project (there is truth, it’s absolute and unchanging, and it very possibly can be discovered and understood by man; there also must be falsehood – both deceit and misunderstanding or ignorance; similarly, justice and knowledge are real, and attempting to pursue and understand them is not necessarily destined to be fruitless). But we also find the Visitor as the main speaker in Statesman, while Parmenides had been the main speaker in that dialogue (with a young Socrates largely on the defensive), and Socrates doesn’t even appear in The Laws. Timaeus and Critias are essentially monologues by those characters, and even in Philebus, with Socrates as the main speaker, he asserts positive doctrine rather than questioning others and demolishing their definitions and arguments. It seems Plato in his late period needed something his earlier Socratic character and method could no longer provide him (with the exception of the Theaetetus, perhaps acting as a coda for the old Socrates and an introduction to the trilogy which apparently was to include Sophist, Statesman, and the unwritten Philosopher).
I mentioned a proto-Aristotelian aspect in this dialogue; it seems there are several of these in the Parmenides and Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman trilogy: The logic puzzles in Parmenides almost demand an analysis and categorization of logical fallacies, for which a formal logic would be a prerequisite. The Eleatic Visitor’s method of division (used in Sophist and Statesman) is a step away from Socratic dialectic and a step towards Aristotelian logic. The Visitor also insists on differentiation between general and specific, and seems to be moving towards something like Aristotle’s genus and species. The unmoved mover makes a very brief appearance in Statesman’s cosmological myth, which also includes something like an initial abstract of Aristotle’s Politics (i.e. a survey and critique of existing political systems). And there’s also something similar to Aristotle’s beloved doctrine of the mean in Statesman. To be fair to Aristotle, no one else in the Academy took these hints or produced the remarkable body of work he did, and there are plenty of things in Aristotle, e.g. his causality, which don’t seem to have any obvious precedents in Plato. Certainly Aristotle’s formal logic was one of history’s great intellectual achievements, regardless of the extent of the foundation Plato provided. And of course the mindsets of the two men were very different, not least in the place (or lack thereof) of empiricism in their respective worlds of thought.
Perhaps it should be noted that our view of the sophists may be excessively negative and otherwise unbalanced largely due to Plato’s well-preserved and brilliant dialogues which so often savage the group. It’s unlikely we’ll ever have adequate knowledge of them to be able to independently assess Plato’s characterizations. But perhaps it’s worth keeping in mind Plato’s harsh view of the poets, who we do know, when considering his even harsher view of the sophists.
February 26, 2023
8/10.
Plato is an excellent writer, and the dialogue format teaches one how to properly dispute. Socratic debate tests one's ideas in the furnace of argument, where only the best comes out unscathed. I wanted to test out ChatGPT's powers of Socratic dialogue, so I asked it to write a dialogue in Socratic format discussing discipline. Check out what it created:
The scene opens in a grand hall, where Socrates is engaged in a lively debate with the sophist Protagoras. The room is filled with various members of the community, each with their own opinions on the topic at hand.
Socrates: "My dear Protagoras, I must say that your arguments for a life of pleasure and leisure do not hold up to scrutiny. Surely, there is more to life than simply indulging our every whim and desire."
Protagoras: "Ah, Socrates, always the philosopher. But what could be more important than seeking pleasure and avoiding pain? That is the essence of the good life."
Socrates: "Ah, but pleasure is fleeting, my friend. It is a fickle mistress, and one that will abandon you in times of struggle and hardship. No, I believe there is something more important than mere pleasure. Something that gives life meaning and purpose."
At that moment, one of the members of the community speaks up.
Member: "Speaking of struggle and hardship, have you not heard of the heroism of the Spartans in the Battle of Thermopylae? They faced insurmountable odds, but still stood their ground and fought for what they believed in. Surely, they are a model for all of us in our own struggles."
Socrates: "Indeed, my friend. The Spartans showed us the importance of discipline and strength in the face of adversity. But they were not the only ones to exhibit such courage. What of Charles Martel, who defended Europe against the Muslim invaders? Or the Germans, who fought to the bitter end against the encroaching Soviet army?"
Protagoras: "But what good did it do them? They died in the end, did they not? What is the point of all that struggle and sacrifice?"
Socrates: "The point, my dear Protagoras, is that they lived with honor and virtue. They did not cower in fear, but instead faced their challenges head-on. And in doing so, they achieved a greatness that will be remembered for centuries to come."
Another member of the community speaks up.
Member: "And let us not forget the explorers who ventured into the unknown, facing all manner of dangers and hardships in the pursuit of knowledge and discovery. They too exhibited great courage and strength."
Socrates: "Yes, the explorers showed us that even the fear of the unknown can be overcome with discipline and determination. They were willing to risk everything in order to expand the boundaries of human knowledge."
Protagoras: "But what does all of this have to do with me, or with anyone living in the modern world?"
Socrates: "Everything, my friend. The struggles of our ancestors are a reminder that we too must face our own challenges with courage and determination. We must submit ourselves to a higher standard, and in doing so, we will find meaning and purpose in our lives."
At that moment, the doors to the hall swing open, and in strides Alexander the Great, his armor gleaming in the light.
Alexander: "My friends, forgive me for interrupting your discussion. But I could not help but overhear what you were saying. And I must say, I agree with Socrates. I myself was once a weak and fickle boy, who did not accept the obligations my father placed upon me. But I learned better. I learned to do my duty, and in doing so, I gained in strength and willpower. And with that strength, I conquered all of the known world."
Socrates nodded in agreement. "Indeed, the life of Alexander is a testament to the power of duty and discipline," he said. "He was not born a great man, but he chose to become one through his actions and his commitment to his obligations."
Protagoras scoffed. "But what if one does not have great obligations, or what if one's duties go against their own desires and beliefs? Should they still submit to them?"
Socrates raised an eyebrow. "Are you suggesting that one should only do what they want to do, regardless of any external obligations or responsibilities they may have?"
Protagoras shrugged. "Why not? What is the point of living a life that is not enjoyable or fulfilling?"
Socrates shook his head. "But true fulfillment comes not from indulging in pleasure or following one's whims, but from living a life of purpose and virtue. And sometimes, that requires sacrifice and discipline."
Protagoras frowned. "But what if one's obligations go against their own moral code? What if they are asked to do something they believe is wrong?"
Socrates considered this for a moment. "It is true that there may be times when our obligations conflict with our beliefs. In those cases, we must use reason and wisdom to determine the best course of action. But even then, we cannot simply disregard our duties altogether. We must find a way to fulfill them while still staying true to our principles."
Alexander, who had been listening silently to the conversation, spoke up. "I have faced such conflicts many times in my life," he said. "But I have learned that it is possible to balance duty and morality. One must simply have the courage to do what is right, even in the face of opposition or adversity."
Socrates nodded approvingly. "Indeed, it is the mark of a truly virtuous person to uphold their obligations while still staying true to their own moral code. This is the path to true excellence and greatness."
Protagoras looked contemplative, as if he were considering Socrates' words. "Perhaps there is some merit to what you say," he said at last. "But I still believe that one should prioritize their own happiness and fulfillment above all else."
Socrates smiled. "And I believe that true happiness and fulfillment come not from pleasure-seeking and self-indulgence, but from living a life of purpose and virtue. It is only by submitting ourselves to a higher standard that we can truly reach our full potential."
Alexander nodded in agreement. "Indeed, it is through our obligations and responsibilities that we find our true strength and greatness. And it is through our virtues and discipline that we make the most of the time we have been given."
Protagoras looked somewhat defeated, as if he were realizing that his beliefs were perhaps not as sound as he had thought. "I suppose there may be some truth to what you say," he said at last. "Perhaps I have been too focused on my own desires and pleasures, and not enough on my duties and obligations."
Socrates smiled warmly. "It is never too late to start living a life of purpose and virtue," he said. "And I believe that if you do, you will find that the rewards are far greater than any fleeting pleasures or indulgences."
Plato is an excellent writer, and the dialogue format teaches one how to properly dispute. Socratic debate tests one's ideas in the furnace of argument, where only the best comes out unscathed. I wanted to test out ChatGPT's powers of Socratic dialogue, so I asked it to write a dialogue in Socratic format discussing discipline. Check out what it created:
The scene opens in a grand hall, where Socrates is engaged in a lively debate with the sophist Protagoras. The room is filled with various members of the community, each with their own opinions on the topic at hand.
Socrates: "My dear Protagoras, I must say that your arguments for a life of pleasure and leisure do not hold up to scrutiny. Surely, there is more to life than simply indulging our every whim and desire."
Protagoras: "Ah, Socrates, always the philosopher. But what could be more important than seeking pleasure and avoiding pain? That is the essence of the good life."
Socrates: "Ah, but pleasure is fleeting, my friend. It is a fickle mistress, and one that will abandon you in times of struggle and hardship. No, I believe there is something more important than mere pleasure. Something that gives life meaning and purpose."
At that moment, one of the members of the community speaks up.
Member: "Speaking of struggle and hardship, have you not heard of the heroism of the Spartans in the Battle of Thermopylae? They faced insurmountable odds, but still stood their ground and fought for what they believed in. Surely, they are a model for all of us in our own struggles."
Socrates: "Indeed, my friend. The Spartans showed us the importance of discipline and strength in the face of adversity. But they were not the only ones to exhibit such courage. What of Charles Martel, who defended Europe against the Muslim invaders? Or the Germans, who fought to the bitter end against the encroaching Soviet army?"
Protagoras: "But what good did it do them? They died in the end, did they not? What is the point of all that struggle and sacrifice?"
Socrates: "The point, my dear Protagoras, is that they lived with honor and virtue. They did not cower in fear, but instead faced their challenges head-on. And in doing so, they achieved a greatness that will be remembered for centuries to come."
Another member of the community speaks up.
Member: "And let us not forget the explorers who ventured into the unknown, facing all manner of dangers and hardships in the pursuit of knowledge and discovery. They too exhibited great courage and strength."
Socrates: "Yes, the explorers showed us that even the fear of the unknown can be overcome with discipline and determination. They were willing to risk everything in order to expand the boundaries of human knowledge."
Protagoras: "But what does all of this have to do with me, or with anyone living in the modern world?"
Socrates: "Everything, my friend. The struggles of our ancestors are a reminder that we too must face our own challenges with courage and determination. We must submit ourselves to a higher standard, and in doing so, we will find meaning and purpose in our lives."
At that moment, the doors to the hall swing open, and in strides Alexander the Great, his armor gleaming in the light.
Alexander: "My friends, forgive me for interrupting your discussion. But I could not help but overhear what you were saying. And I must say, I agree with Socrates. I myself was once a weak and fickle boy, who did not accept the obligations my father placed upon me. But I learned better. I learned to do my duty, and in doing so, I gained in strength and willpower. And with that strength, I conquered all of the known world."
Socrates nodded in agreement. "Indeed, the life of Alexander is a testament to the power of duty and discipline," he said. "He was not born a great man, but he chose to become one through his actions and his commitment to his obligations."
Protagoras scoffed. "But what if one does not have great obligations, or what if one's duties go against their own desires and beliefs? Should they still submit to them?"
Socrates raised an eyebrow. "Are you suggesting that one should only do what they want to do, regardless of any external obligations or responsibilities they may have?"
Protagoras shrugged. "Why not? What is the point of living a life that is not enjoyable or fulfilling?"
Socrates shook his head. "But true fulfillment comes not from indulging in pleasure or following one's whims, but from living a life of purpose and virtue. And sometimes, that requires sacrifice and discipline."
Protagoras frowned. "But what if one's obligations go against their own moral code? What if they are asked to do something they believe is wrong?"
Socrates considered this for a moment. "It is true that there may be times when our obligations conflict with our beliefs. In those cases, we must use reason and wisdom to determine the best course of action. But even then, we cannot simply disregard our duties altogether. We must find a way to fulfill them while still staying true to our principles."
Alexander, who had been listening silently to the conversation, spoke up. "I have faced such conflicts many times in my life," he said. "But I have learned that it is possible to balance duty and morality. One must simply have the courage to do what is right, even in the face of opposition or adversity."
Socrates nodded approvingly. "Indeed, it is the mark of a truly virtuous person to uphold their obligations while still staying true to their own moral code. This is the path to true excellence and greatness."
Protagoras looked contemplative, as if he were considering Socrates' words. "Perhaps there is some merit to what you say," he said at last. "But I still believe that one should prioritize their own happiness and fulfillment above all else."
Socrates smiled. "And I believe that true happiness and fulfillment come not from pleasure-seeking and self-indulgence, but from living a life of purpose and virtue. It is only by submitting ourselves to a higher standard that we can truly reach our full potential."
Alexander nodded in agreement. "Indeed, it is through our obligations and responsibilities that we find our true strength and greatness. And it is through our virtues and discipline that we make the most of the time we have been given."
Protagoras looked somewhat defeated, as if he were realizing that his beliefs were perhaps not as sound as he had thought. "I suppose there may be some truth to what you say," he said at last. "Perhaps I have been too focused on my own desires and pleasures, and not enough on my duties and obligations."
Socrates smiled warmly. "It is never too late to start living a life of purpose and virtue," he said. "And I believe that if you do, you will find that the rewards are far greater than any fleeting pleasures or indulgences."
March 22, 2021
En este dialogo, del cual Platón toma de la mano al Extranjero, da sentido decisivo a lo que toca a lo esencial de su proyecto filosófico desde su enfoque metodológico hasta su dimensión ontológica. Un dialogo que corresponde al periodo tardío del autor y que tiene como eje central las características del sofista, que en algún momento, tiene la connotación de sabio y que tiene como logro persuadir a sus contrincantes. Los sofistas eran maestros e intelectuales profesionales itinerantes que frecuentaban Atenas y otras ciudades griegas en la segunda mitad del siglo V a.C. A cambio de dinero ofrecían una educación a los jóvenes ricos.
Un texto que se mueve entre cuatro personajes: Teodoro, Teeteto, Extranjero de Elea y Sócrates que son los encargados de plantear el problema filosófico de la naturaleza de la sofisma, que hoy en día ha llegado a nosotros a significar el uso deliberado del razonamiento falaz, el charlatanismo intelectual y la falta de escrupulosidad moral. Platón lo describe como sugiriendo que los sofistas son la ruina de todos aquellos que entran en contacto con ellos y como abogando por su expulsión de la cuidad. Acordaron en un lugar Teeteto y Teodoro reunirse, le expresa Teeteto que al encuentro venia un Extranjero, proveniente de Elea, de quien se asegura ser discípulo o compañero de Parménides y Zenón. Fue tan bien acogida de la visita que Sócrates lo vio como un Dios el cual podría dar respuestas a todos los asuntos que ellos venían tratando. Las ideas a discutir: El sofista, el político y el filosofo.
Si bien es cierto que un texto que en su esencia se ampara en la diairesis, es decir, el método de ir dividiendo un concepto que a su vez tiene otras divisiones hasta llegar a la definición deseada, como a especie de un diversión, a veces se hace algo cansón, pues muchos de los diálogos son cortos, y es tanta las interrupciones entre los anfitriones que puede hacerte dejar texto. Pero obviemos eso, es un texto impresionante donde Platón refuta la filosofía de Parménides sobre el ser es ser sino también que el es no-ser
Un texto que se mueve entre cuatro personajes: Teodoro, Teeteto, Extranjero de Elea y Sócrates que son los encargados de plantear el problema filosófico de la naturaleza de la sofisma, que hoy en día ha llegado a nosotros a significar el uso deliberado del razonamiento falaz, el charlatanismo intelectual y la falta de escrupulosidad moral. Platón lo describe como sugiriendo que los sofistas son la ruina de todos aquellos que entran en contacto con ellos y como abogando por su expulsión de la cuidad. Acordaron en un lugar Teeteto y Teodoro reunirse, le expresa Teeteto que al encuentro venia un Extranjero, proveniente de Elea, de quien se asegura ser discípulo o compañero de Parménides y Zenón. Fue tan bien acogida de la visita que Sócrates lo vio como un Dios el cual podría dar respuestas a todos los asuntos que ellos venían tratando. Las ideas a discutir: El sofista, el político y el filosofo.
Si bien es cierto que un texto que en su esencia se ampara en la diairesis, es decir, el método de ir dividiendo un concepto que a su vez tiene otras divisiones hasta llegar a la definición deseada, como a especie de un diversión, a veces se hace algo cansón, pues muchos de los diálogos son cortos, y es tanta las interrupciones entre los anfitriones que puede hacerte dejar texto. Pero obviemos eso, es un texto impresionante donde Platón refuta la filosofía de Parménides sobre el ser es ser sino también que el es no-ser
November 23, 2019
Okay I know I know I know, I have said countless time that I don't like Plato and that I don't like dialogues... Apparently, I do like the Sophist...
I'm not going to try to go into too much details about why I did like this book in contrast to my general opinion on Plato's dialogue, but I think it has something to do with the fact that this dialogue was so clearly rooted in issues of language, semantics and linguistics which is something that plays out best in the act of it. I'm still not completely sold on the idea of dialogue as a feasible philosophical method, but I do think it worked in this case.
And the fact that it was about Parmenides' being and not-being and how both being and negation work - subjects I already found very interesting - probably helped with me liking this one.
Definitely recommend this to anyone interested in a dialogue about the meaning and expression of being and not-being!
I'm not going to try to go into too much details about why I did like this book in contrast to my general opinion on Plato's dialogue, but I think it has something to do with the fact that this dialogue was so clearly rooted in issues of language, semantics and linguistics which is something that plays out best in the act of it. I'm still not completely sold on the idea of dialogue as a feasible philosophical method, but I do think it worked in this case.
And the fact that it was about Parmenides' being and not-being and how both being and negation work - subjects I already found very interesting - probably helped with me liking this one.
Definitely recommend this to anyone interested in a dialogue about the meaning and expression of being and not-being!
January 20, 2018
O.k. Since now, whenever somebody asks me what's the point of reading Plato after nearly 2500 years, I can laught earnestly.
This was a truly extraordinary experience. Plato is quite regardful writer, he makes sure everybody's got the point before he moves on. Trying to define (and succeding in it which is a nice change from Hippias Major) the concept of Sophist, he manage to designate a neat classification of all human activity, prove that Non-Being exists, define the concepts of Being, Not-Being, Sameness, Difference, Motion and Rest; and just along the way find the definition of Philosophist. Time good spend.
This was a truly extraordinary experience. Plato is quite regardful writer, he makes sure everybody's got the point before he moves on. Trying to define (and succeding in it which is a nice change from Hippias Major) the concept of Sophist, he manage to designate a neat classification of all human activity, prove that Non-Being exists, define the concepts of Being, Not-Being, Sameness, Difference, Motion and Rest; and just along the way find the definition of Philosophist. Time good spend.
March 14, 2019
Opposites time all the time in this dialogue. Trying to break down in the most tedious line of questions of what is being and what is non being. This dialogue was dragging for a while near the end and then it wraps up without much of a conclusion in a matter of phrases. Certainly didn’t feel conclusive to me. Nothing particularly reflective for me with this dialogue and it neither impressed me nor offended.
May 16, 2023
Аристотел е най-харизматичният античен философ разказвач за мен, но пък може би точно този диалог на Платон е от по-обраните му. Така или иначе бързо се чете, но това не се отнася за пояснителната литература върху него :))
January 15, 2021
This is a review for the Prometheus Trust edition of the Sophist, which is part of their Students' Edition books. It contains several essays in the back that are useful for understanding the dialogue, along with fairly extensive explanatory notes and excerpts from Platonists that are relevant to the passages. The text itself is translated by Thomas Taylor, and it's worth getting this version for the added material.
May 3, 2020
Plato argues some things don't exist and some propositions are false. Surprising as it might sound, those arguments still need to be made.
March 3, 2024
In the Theaetetus, Socrates had tried to educate a new philosopher and failed in so doing -- it appeared that Theaetetus was not possessed of the proper disposition, but it also appeared that Socrates himself was incapable of generating the proper type of riddles, which all pointed to contradictions within the Socratic metaphysics and the ultimate supremacy of the everyman's political opinions against which Socrates had always defined himself. Now arrived is the Eleatic Stranger. Who is he? Nobody really knows. Away from his own project of philosophic irony within Elea, the Stranger is apparently capable of delivering the explicit, off-the-cuff explication of philosophy at the highest order that Socrates refused to (although seemed to do, away from his own city, in the Phaedrus). Unlike Socrates, in political trouble at this time, the Stranger is entirely at the leisure Socrates had always demanded for philosophy, as though freed to complete the ultimate metaphysic: he begins, almost peripatetically, with orderly divisions of genus, as though this casual demonstration of logical division were sufficient, but eventually must provide a full account of Being, Seeming and Nothing in order to explain the nature of the Sophist, whose practice of deceit is defined by his lies about himself (and perhaps to himself). The interlocutor is the naive mathematician Theatetus, whom the Stranger does not resemble and with whom he is not in love; being polite and speaking as he likes: he is free to say of what is, that it is.
As such, the metaphysics that follow are something of a hidden core to the Platonic corpus, as it would seem -- Parmenides, in his dialogue, had provided a convincing account of a world made of self-generating forms and souls, but his student the Stranger casually decides to slay his antecedent's metaphysics in a radical act called 'parricide', at risk of seeming insane -- such are the things one can do, when away from those with whom one lives. The world is not a single egg, instantiated out to souls; the world is the infinitely many and shifting river of the Herakleiteans all the way to its most metaphysical level, where tout-le-monde is in motion save for the mind (but not the soul), for whom logos is a contradistnictly static image made tangible by passing differentiations; as such, the Sophist is a making and self-made image acting in ignorance, and the philosopher who does the same is an ironist.
Is this the secret behind Plato's works? Theaetetus is not astute enough an observer to question the stranger's declaration in speech that all speech is an image, or this proof through chaotic and constantly shifting paradigms that all speech is totally static. It is not clear the meaning of this metaphysic, which intrudes upon the political question of sophistry and ends with an ultimate appeal to God, somehow the divine intelligence behind the waking world -- what is clear that Socrates, who sat silently listening through this entire speech, willfully committed suicide not long after.
What, then, of this mystery about the praxis of the philosopher and the sophist? The stranger does not present a complete metaphysics, and indeed Plato never did throughout his life -- indeed, in Athens, Plato had, perhaps from political pressure, provided a mathematical metaphysics in a speech entitled "On The Good", had written a letter in similarly political circumstances to the Sicilians advocating a peripatetic metaphysics, and provided a competing image in the Parmenides. Contemporaries who received any of these explications had called him insane, and all of his students, who had been given this same information and more, continued on to espouse contradictory, wildly diverging and radically simplified theories -- which the dialogues themselevs often very clearly refute ... it is not even clear that he had ever really wanted to really educate anyone in these matters.
I'm not going to read this book again for at least five years, for my health on all levels.
As such, the metaphysics that follow are something of a hidden core to the Platonic corpus, as it would seem -- Parmenides, in his dialogue, had provided a convincing account of a world made of self-generating forms and souls, but his student the Stranger casually decides to slay his antecedent's metaphysics in a radical act called 'parricide', at risk of seeming insane -- such are the things one can do, when away from those with whom one lives. The world is not a single egg, instantiated out to souls; the world is the infinitely many and shifting river of the Herakleiteans all the way to its most metaphysical level, where tout-le-monde is in motion save for the mind (but not the soul), for whom logos is a contradistnictly static image made tangible by passing differentiations; as such, the Sophist is a making and self-made image acting in ignorance, and the philosopher who does the same is an ironist.
Is this the secret behind Plato's works? Theaetetus is not astute enough an observer to question the stranger's declaration in speech that all speech is an image, or this proof through chaotic and constantly shifting paradigms that all speech is totally static. It is not clear the meaning of this metaphysic, which intrudes upon the political question of sophistry and ends with an ultimate appeal to God, somehow the divine intelligence behind the waking world -- what is clear that Socrates, who sat silently listening through this entire speech, willfully committed suicide not long after.
What, then, of this mystery about the praxis of the philosopher and the sophist? The stranger does not present a complete metaphysics, and indeed Plato never did throughout his life -- indeed, in Athens, Plato had, perhaps from political pressure, provided a mathematical metaphysics in a speech entitled "On The Good", had written a letter in similarly political circumstances to the Sicilians advocating a peripatetic metaphysics, and provided a competing image in the Parmenides. Contemporaries who received any of these explications had called him insane, and all of his students, who had been given this same information and more, continued on to espouse contradictory, wildly diverging and radically simplified theories -- which the dialogues themselevs often very clearly refute ... it is not even clear that he had ever really wanted to really educate anyone in these matters.
I'm not going to read this book again for at least five years, for my health on all levels.
April 3, 2016
“Bilmek ve bilinmek sizce etki midir, etkilenme midir; yoksa her ikisi birden midir?”
Platon, Sofist.s.80
Antik Çağ’ın lanetli biraderleri olan sofistler, ilk başta, bilgiyi sorgulayarak ve şüpheyi düşünceye sokarak felsefe sahnesine nefis bir giriş yapmışlardı. Pek kısa bir zaman içerisinde bu sorgulama ve şüphe tehlikeli bir akıl yürütmeye ve sonra da kullanışlı, kaypak bir ilkeye dönüştü: Düşünmek, var olan bir şeyi düşünmektir. Yanlış düşünmek ise var olmayan bir şeyi düşünmektir. Var olmayan bir şey düşünülemez. O halde yanlış düşünmek ve dolayısıyla yanlış konuşmak mümkün değildir. Bu ilkeden hareketle çıkılan yolda Sofistler, sanatları ve hatta erdemleri, kendileri bunlara hâkim olmasalar bile dil becerisiyle başkalarına para karşılığında öğretmeye başladılar. Sonunda Protagoras, işi Atina’nın pek sevgili tanrılarının gerçekte var olup olmadıklarının bilinemeyeceğine kadar vardırınca şehirden sürüldü ve eserleri yakıldı. Sofistlerin eserlerinin yakılması işini bizzat Platon’un idare ettiği söylenir.
İsa’dan Önce 365 yılında yazıldığı düşünülen Sofist, Platon’un yaşlılık dönemine denk gelir ve tahminen Theaitetos’tan sonra, Politeia’dan önce yazılmıştır. Yani aslında, bu sırayla yapılacak bir okumanın daha faydalı ve anlaşılır olacağı söylenebilir. Buna rağmen Sofist, sade ve keskin yapısı ile tek başına dahi, düşünce ile ilgilenen ve bu yolda susamışları bekleyen sakin ama derin bir pınar gibi.
Platon, Sofist’in ilk bölümünde Sherlock Holmes’ü aratmayan, incelikli bir mantık yürütme ve baş döndüren keskin bir dikotomi ile sofistin peşine düşüyor. Bu takip esnasında Platon, önce sofist ve avcı arasında bir benzerlik kuruyor. (Bu kısımlar kitabın en eğlenceli kısımları.) Bu esnada anlatılan, takip etmesi keyifli o temel dikotomiyi buraya aktarmaya çalışayım:
Avcı:
Deniz avcısı – Kara avcısı,
Kara Avcısı:
Yabani hayvan avlayan – Evcil hayvan, insan avlayan,
Evcil hayvan, insan avlayan:
Silahla – İkna ederek,
İkna ederek:
Topluluk içinde – Bire bir görüşerek,
Bire bir görüşerek:
Hediye almak için- Kazanç sağlamak için,
Kazanç sağlamak için:
Geçim için (Dalkavuk ) – Para için (Sofist)
İşte Platon ele geçmesi zor Sofist’i bu şekilde derdest ediyor ama gölgelerde dolaşmayı seven Sofist yine de elinden kurtulmayı başarıyor. Eser boyunca bu dikotomiyi başka dallarından budaklandıran Platon, Sofist’in peşini bırakmıyor. Platon’un asıl meselesi Sofist’i ele geçirmek de değil zaten. O, sofist avını bahane ederek aslen Parmenides’in “var olmayanın var olmaması” şeklinde ifade edebileceğimiz tezini çürütmeye çalışıyor. Kitabın ikinci kısmı bu metafizik konuya ayrılmış. Platon var gücüyle yanlışın mümkünlüğünü ispat etmeye çalışıyor ve sofistlerin en temel ilkesini diyalektik modeli kullanarak çürütüyor.
İletişim Yayınları’nın Siyaset Felsefesi Klasikleri serisi içinde 2016’da ilk baskısını yapan bu yeni çeviriyi ben çok beğendim. Kitaba Emile Chambry’nin vaziyeti güzel özetleyen bir önsözü ve Ahmet İnsel’in sofistleri a’cıcık da olsa savunan sonsözü de eklenmiş. Bunlar hoş detaylar. Eseri okumak için temel bir felsefe altyapısı gerekiyor. Özellikle de ikinci bölümde yer alan “var-olmayan” ile ilgili metafizik diyalogları anlamlandırabilmek için. Ama bu basit eşik aşılırsa, Cenap Karakaya’nın duru, okuyana yardım eden çevirisi ile Sofist şeker gibi bir okumaya dönüşüyor.
Platon, Sofist.s.80
Antik Çağ’ın lanetli biraderleri olan sofistler, ilk başta, bilgiyi sorgulayarak ve şüpheyi düşünceye sokarak felsefe sahnesine nefis bir giriş yapmışlardı. Pek kısa bir zaman içerisinde bu sorgulama ve şüphe tehlikeli bir akıl yürütmeye ve sonra da kullanışlı, kaypak bir ilkeye dönüştü: Düşünmek, var olan bir şeyi düşünmektir. Yanlış düşünmek ise var olmayan bir şeyi düşünmektir. Var olmayan bir şey düşünülemez. O halde yanlış düşünmek ve dolayısıyla yanlış konuşmak mümkün değildir. Bu ilkeden hareketle çıkılan yolda Sofistler, sanatları ve hatta erdemleri, kendileri bunlara hâkim olmasalar bile dil becerisiyle başkalarına para karşılığında öğretmeye başladılar. Sonunda Protagoras, işi Atina’nın pek sevgili tanrılarının gerçekte var olup olmadıklarının bilinemeyeceğine kadar vardırınca şehirden sürüldü ve eserleri yakıldı. Sofistlerin eserlerinin yakılması işini bizzat Platon’un idare ettiği söylenir.
İsa’dan Önce 365 yılında yazıldığı düşünülen Sofist, Platon’un yaşlılık dönemine denk gelir ve tahminen Theaitetos’tan sonra, Politeia’dan önce yazılmıştır. Yani aslında, bu sırayla yapılacak bir okumanın daha faydalı ve anlaşılır olacağı söylenebilir. Buna rağmen Sofist, sade ve keskin yapısı ile tek başına dahi, düşünce ile ilgilenen ve bu yolda susamışları bekleyen sakin ama derin bir pınar gibi.
Platon, Sofist’in ilk bölümünde Sherlock Holmes’ü aratmayan, incelikli bir mantık yürütme ve baş döndüren keskin bir dikotomi ile sofistin peşine düşüyor. Bu takip esnasında Platon, önce sofist ve avcı arasında bir benzerlik kuruyor. (Bu kısımlar kitabın en eğlenceli kısımları.) Bu esnada anlatılan, takip etmesi keyifli o temel dikotomiyi buraya aktarmaya çalışayım:
Avcı:
Deniz avcısı – Kara avcısı,
Kara Avcısı:
Yabani hayvan avlayan – Evcil hayvan, insan avlayan,
Evcil hayvan, insan avlayan:
Silahla – İkna ederek,
İkna ederek:
Topluluk içinde – Bire bir görüşerek,
Bire bir görüşerek:
Hediye almak için- Kazanç sağlamak için,
Kazanç sağlamak için:
Geçim için (Dalkavuk ) – Para için (Sofist)
İşte Platon ele geçmesi zor Sofist’i bu şekilde derdest ediyor ama gölgelerde dolaşmayı seven Sofist yine de elinden kurtulmayı başarıyor. Eser boyunca bu dikotomiyi başka dallarından budaklandıran Platon, Sofist’in peşini bırakmıyor. Platon’un asıl meselesi Sofist’i ele geçirmek de değil zaten. O, sofist avını bahane ederek aslen Parmenides’in “var olmayanın var olmaması” şeklinde ifade edebileceğimiz tezini çürütmeye çalışıyor. Kitabın ikinci kısmı bu metafizik konuya ayrılmış. Platon var gücüyle yanlışın mümkünlüğünü ispat etmeye çalışıyor ve sofistlerin en temel ilkesini diyalektik modeli kullanarak çürütüyor.
İletişim Yayınları’nın Siyaset Felsefesi Klasikleri serisi içinde 2016’da ilk baskısını yapan bu yeni çeviriyi ben çok beğendim. Kitaba Emile Chambry’nin vaziyeti güzel özetleyen bir önsözü ve Ahmet İnsel’in sofistleri a’cıcık da olsa savunan sonsözü de eklenmiş. Bunlar hoş detaylar. Eseri okumak için temel bir felsefe altyapısı gerekiyor. Özellikle de ikinci bölümde yer alan “var-olmayan” ile ilgili metafizik diyalogları anlamlandırabilmek için. Ama bu basit eşik aşılırsa, Cenap Karakaya’nın duru, okuyana yardım eden çevirisi ile Sofist şeker gibi bir okumaya dönüşüyor.
June 15, 2019
Not very interesting😢
July 20, 2014
Sophist is not the most beautiful dialogue in the canon, but it is important, and this is an excellent translation. Sophist follows on the heels of Theaetetus, which explores how error occurs when the categories of thought are confused. Sophist examines how those categories interact with each other in an effort to locate where the Sophist hides: in non-being. But first the Stranger has to resolve a logical obstacle: how can the Sophist hide in non-being, when on the face of it non-being simply is not?
The Eleatic Stranger takes over where Socrates leaves off in Theaetetus and demonstrates over the course of the dialogue how non-being does exist, and furthermore, how it is interwoven with being. Where Protagoras is refuted in Theaetetus for proposing that human understanding is a relative and changing matter, Parmenides is refuted in Sophist for proposing that it is eternal and changeless. What the Eleatic Stranger proposes (and it's important that it is he and not Socrates who does this) is that the case is not either Change or Rest, Being or Non-Being, Same or Other -- it is both/and in all these cases.
The argument is logically complicated because these difficulties reside in the categories of language, but upon taking these apart it becomes clearer. Where Theaetetus shows the impossibility of perfect knowledge, Sophist shows why and how this is so -- it is due to the categories (the "Forms") and how we think and communicate. On a theoretical level we expect that perfect knowledge is possible because things are what they are. True statements require a correspondence to a certain and stable state of affairs, otherwise what we say at one moment is not longer true as the state of affairs has changed and the statement is no longer true. We project this requirement upon the world because that is the way we think and speak. The Eleatic Stranger shows us the danger of doing this -- ignoring non-being allows the sophist to run free and hide in the interstices of our categories of thought.
Fun stuff.
The Eleatic Stranger takes over where Socrates leaves off in Theaetetus and demonstrates over the course of the dialogue how non-being does exist, and furthermore, how it is interwoven with being. Where Protagoras is refuted in Theaetetus for proposing that human understanding is a relative and changing matter, Parmenides is refuted in Sophist for proposing that it is eternal and changeless. What the Eleatic Stranger proposes (and it's important that it is he and not Socrates who does this) is that the case is not either Change or Rest, Being or Non-Being, Same or Other -- it is both/and in all these cases.
The argument is logically complicated because these difficulties reside in the categories of language, but upon taking these apart it becomes clearer. Where Theaetetus shows the impossibility of perfect knowledge, Sophist shows why and how this is so -- it is due to the categories (the "Forms") and how we think and communicate. On a theoretical level we expect that perfect knowledge is possible because things are what they are. True statements require a correspondence to a certain and stable state of affairs, otherwise what we say at one moment is not longer true as the state of affairs has changed and the statement is no longer true. We project this requirement upon the world because that is the way we think and speak. The Eleatic Stranger shows us the danger of doing this -- ignoring non-being allows the sophist to run free and hide in the interstices of our categories of thought.
Fun stuff.
September 16, 2020
The dialogue's explicit aim is to define, oppose, and discredit “the Sophist”; but it ends up discussing very important issues like being, non-being, truth, dialectics, motion, rest, sameness, difference, sophistry, philosophy, and so on. The Sophist raises serious problems against Plato's philosophy, while Socrates (“the Philosopher”) stays there in the background and does not intervene at all in order to clarify, rebuke, or defend. Theaetetus, mechanically agrees to everything that the Sophist says.
Probably the most topic is the one concerning being/non-being and its relation to truth. Truth is to claim that what “is” is and what “is not” is not. But what “is” is? I love when we are told that there are two ways to approach beings/to be – one that claims that only what you can grasp with our hands “is” and another one that is more theoretical/ideal/general. “Is” can be a form of predicating; but more importantly it concerns beings in their existence. But how can we talk about a non-being as if it “is” and moreover in singular (or plural); and how can we generalize and find some common ground between clearly-different beings (like motion and rest) by virtue of their being/to be?
The topic of beings/non-beings, Being, and its connection with truth raised here by Plato stayed more or less in the background for more than two thousands of years until Heidegger brought it explicitly to the forefront again.
Probably the most topic is the one concerning being/non-being and its relation to truth. Truth is to claim that what “is” is and what “is not” is not. But what “is” is? I love when we are told that there are two ways to approach beings/to be – one that claims that only what you can grasp with our hands “is” and another one that is more theoretical/ideal/general. “Is” can be a form of predicating; but more importantly it concerns beings in their existence. But how can we talk about a non-being as if it “is” and moreover in singular (or plural); and how can we generalize and find some common ground between clearly-different beings (like motion and rest) by virtue of their being/to be?
The topic of beings/non-beings, Being, and its connection with truth raised here by Plato stayed more or less in the background for more than two thousands of years until Heidegger brought it explicitly to the forefront again.
October 31, 2018
Un clásico...
Interesting. Plato is one of the best thinkers to have lived on this planet. I liked a lot his description of charlatans (sophists) and their word-playing.
Probably worth reading for people who are into classics, philosophy or the sort.
Interesting. Plato is one of the best thinkers to have lived on this planet. I liked a lot his description of charlatans (sophists) and their word-playing.
Probably worth reading for people who are into classics, philosophy or the sort.
October 14, 2017
Leave it to Plato to ask a simple question - Who is the sophist? - and create an entire ontology as a bi-product.
Read
January 25, 2023Great book. Being gives being to motion and rest. So motion and rest are different, except in their participation from being.
Also, the sofists are those hiding in non-being. Are the apophatic theologians then sofists?
Also, the sofists are those hiding in non-being. Are the apophatic theologians then sofists?
Read
November 23, 2023Quite a dense text whilst it being a thin book. I might reread it at one point because I can see how every time you read it again, your mind can wander off to new ideas. Next time I'll read it with Wittgenstein's Tractatus next to me.
January 28, 2024
2024:
3 Stars
As always there are interesting tidbits here that give an insight into the time. The dialogue itself I think flew a little over my head. I still struggle a little with some of the concepts; the one and the many and being/not being. Will return to it later I think.
3 Stars
As always there are interesting tidbits here that give an insight into the time. The dialogue itself I think flew a little over my head. I still struggle a little with some of the concepts; the one and the many and being/not being. Will return to it later I think.
October 25, 2020
Crucial in understanding the development of Aristotle's substance/accident differentiation. Should be taught in every ancient philosophy course.
November 12, 2021
Chato demais. Mas tal qual o Parmênides, vale pelo modo de raciocinar
May 30, 2022
An interesting discussion on sophist definition and its connection with arts and martial arts. On some cases the dialogs was circling around, but its quite logical.
April 1, 2024
The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reasoning; for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attain to discourse of reason”
September 18, 2021
Contains a very solid introduction and lucid translation of a potentially challenging dialogue.
August 8, 2019
Platon öncesi dönemde savunulan var olan ve var olmayan düşüncesine yeni bir bakış açısı. Felsefenin temel taşlarından. Felsefeyle ilgilenen herkesin okuması gerekir. “Sofist”in kim olduğuna dair bir araştırmayla başlıyor daha sonrasındaysa varlık tartışmasına geçiyor. Önemli olan aralarda yaptığı gönderimleri kavramak. Şahsen ben kitabı okurken birden fazla kaynak kullandım, daha iyi oturması amacıyla. Her ne kadar ingilizcesini kavramları açısındandan tercih etsem de, çok detaylı bir okuma yapmıyorsanız, türkçesi gayet güzel.
July 28, 2016
Naprijed, ZGB. 1975.
Preveo Milivoj Sironić. Sironić je super dopunio prijevod fusnotama u kojima je ukazao na dvosmislenosti i problematici određenih mjesta u tekstu. Primjerice;
"Teetet- Uistinu se, stranče, čini da je istinito ono u početku rečeno o sofisti da je to vrsta ljudi koju je teško uloviti. Čini se da je on pun zaklona..."
Riječ "zaklona" u matičnom jeziku posjeduje duhovitu crtu dvosmislenosti,"problema" na starogrčkom označava i "zaklon", "zid", "barijera" ali također i "prijeporno pitanje" odnosno "problem".
Srpski lokativ, "o sofisti", je zanimljiv jer Sironić prevodi (i)jekavštinom te inače ne baca srbizme. Simpatični su ti jezični pulsevi bivše države u jugoslavenskim izdanjima.
Srboliki su također oblici nominativa "vrst" i "osnov" te je srbolika riječ "protivurječje" koja se javlja usporedno s riječju "proturječenje".
U vezi samog djela valja istaknuti da je vođa dijaloga nazvan misteriozno, "Stranac". Platon u svojim djelima inače uvijek navodi Sokrata kao najveću facu u raspravi.
Cijelo djelo je napisano protiv sofizma.
U vezi sadržaja izdvojio bih par zanimljivosti.
Prva je;
"Stranac- Kažem da što god ima neku snagu da ili djeluje na bilo koju drugu stvar ili da trpi i najmanje djelovanje od najneznatnije stvari, pa bilo to i samo jedanput, kažem da sve to zaista ima bitak. Postavljam definiciju bića da ono nije ništa drugo osim mogućnost."
Bačeni citat baca na egzistencijalizam, bivstvovanje je mogućnost, kretanje, promjena koja može biti aktivna.
Kul je također kada Stranac baca ove umovitosti;
"I mi smo tijelom putem osjeta u vezi s postojanjem, a dušom putem mišljenja s pravom egzistencijom, za koju kažete da je uvijek ista i nepromjenjiva, a postojanje da je svaki čas drukčije."
Platon se u "Sofistu" dotiče i jezikoslovlja govoreći, kroz Stranca, da je niz sastavljen od isključivo glagola ili isključivo imenica neskladan odnosno besmislen. Govor sačinjavaju glagoli i imenice u skladu.
Sociološki, a i kulturološki, je zanimljivo kada Stranac govori da pučka vjerovanja zastupaju da priroda stvara sva smrtna bića te "tjelesa bez života topiva i netopiva" za razliku od umnih koji tvrde da navedno nastade od boga (str.186). Bog se javlja u jednini, da li su to kršćani kasnije izmijenili? Zanimljivo je također da pučka vjerovanja vjeruju prirodi a ne bogu.
Pročitajte "Sofista"!
Preveo Milivoj Sironić. Sironić je super dopunio prijevod fusnotama u kojima je ukazao na dvosmislenosti i problematici određenih mjesta u tekstu. Primjerice;
"Teetet- Uistinu se, stranče, čini da je istinito ono u početku rečeno o sofisti da je to vrsta ljudi koju je teško uloviti. Čini se da je on pun zaklona..."
Riječ "zaklona" u matičnom jeziku posjeduje duhovitu crtu dvosmislenosti,"problema" na starogrčkom označava i "zaklon", "zid", "barijera" ali također i "prijeporno pitanje" odnosno "problem".
Srpski lokativ, "o sofisti", je zanimljiv jer Sironić prevodi (i)jekavštinom te inače ne baca srbizme. Simpatični su ti jezični pulsevi bivše države u jugoslavenskim izdanjima.
Srboliki su također oblici nominativa "vrst" i "osnov" te je srbolika riječ "protivurječje" koja se javlja usporedno s riječju "proturječenje".
U vezi samog djela valja istaknuti da je vođa dijaloga nazvan misteriozno, "Stranac". Platon u svojim djelima inače uvijek navodi Sokrata kao najveću facu u raspravi.
Cijelo djelo je napisano protiv sofizma.
U vezi sadržaja izdvojio bih par zanimljivosti.
Prva je;
"Stranac- Kažem da što god ima neku snagu da ili djeluje na bilo koju drugu stvar ili da trpi i najmanje djelovanje od najneznatnije stvari, pa bilo to i samo jedanput, kažem da sve to zaista ima bitak. Postavljam definiciju bića da ono nije ništa drugo osim mogućnost."
Bačeni citat baca na egzistencijalizam, bivstvovanje je mogućnost, kretanje, promjena koja može biti aktivna.
Kul je također kada Stranac baca ove umovitosti;
"I mi smo tijelom putem osjeta u vezi s postojanjem, a dušom putem mišljenja s pravom egzistencijom, za koju kažete da je uvijek ista i nepromjenjiva, a postojanje da je svaki čas drukčije."
Platon se u "Sofistu" dotiče i jezikoslovlja govoreći, kroz Stranca, da je niz sastavljen od isključivo glagola ili isključivo imenica neskladan odnosno besmislen. Govor sačinjavaju glagoli i imenice u skladu.
Sociološki, a i kulturološki, je zanimljivo kada Stranac govori da pučka vjerovanja zastupaju da priroda stvara sva smrtna bića te "tjelesa bez života topiva i netopiva" za razliku od umnih koji tvrde da navedno nastade od boga (str.186). Bog se javlja u jednini, da li su to kršćani kasnije izmijenili? Zanimljivo je također da pučka vjerovanja vjeruju prirodi a ne bogu.
Pročitajte "Sofista"!
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