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Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan
In the spring of 1839 British forces invaded Afghanistan for the first time, re-establishing Shah Shuja on the throne, in reality as their puppet, and ushering in a period of conflict over the territory still unresolved today. In 1842, the Afghan people rose in answer to the call for jihad against the foreign occupiers, and the country exploded into violent rebellion. In what is arguably the greatest military humiliation ever suffered by the West in the East, more than eighteen thousand cold and hungry British troops, Indian sepoys and camp followers retreated through the icy mountain passes, and of the last survivors who made their final stand at the village of Gandamak, only one man, Dr Brydon, made it through to the British garrison at Jellalabad. An entire army of what was then the most powerful military nation in the world was utterly routed by poorly equipped tribesmen. The West's first disastrous entanglement in Afghanistan has clear and relevant parallels with the current deepening crisis today, with extraordinary similarities between what NATO faces in cities like Kabul and Kandahar, and that faced by the British in the very same cities, fighting the very same tribes, nearly two centuries ago. History at its most urgent, The Return of a King is the definitive analysis of the first Afghan war. With access to a whole range of previously undiscovered sources, including crucial new material in Russian, Urdu and Persian, and contemporary Afghan accounts including the autobiography of Shah Shuja himself, prize-winning and bestselling historian William Dalrymple's masterful retelling of Britain's greatest imperial disaster is a powerful and important parable of neo-colonial ambition and cultural collision, folly and hubris, for our times.
608 pages, Hardcover
First published April 16, 2013
About the author
William Dalrymple
72 books2,922 followersWilliam Dalrymple was born in Scotland and brought up on the shores of the Firth of Forth. He wrote the highly acclaimed bestseller In Xanadu when he was twenty-two. The book won the 1990 Yorkshire Post Best First Work Award and a Scottish Arts Council Spring Book Award; it was also shortlisted for the John Llewellyn Rhys Memorial Prize.
In 1989 Dalrymple moved to Delhi where he lived for six years researching his second book, City of Djinns, which won the 1994 Thomas Cook Travel Book Award and the Sunday Times Young British Writer of the Year Award. From the Holy Mountain, his acclaimed study of the demise of Christianity in its Middle Eastern homeland, was awarded the Scottish Arts Council Autumn Book Award for 1997; it was also shortlisted for the 1998 Thomas Cook Award, the John Llewellyn Rhys Prize and the Duff Cooper Prize. A collection of his writings about India, The Age of Kali, won the French Prix D’Astrolabe in 2005.
White Mughals was published in 2003, the book won the Wolfson Prize for History 2003, the Scottish Book of the Year Prize, and was shortlisted for the PEN History Award, the Kiryama Prize and the James Tait Black Memorial Prize.
William Dalrymple is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and of the Royal Asiatic Society, and is the founder and co-director of the Jaipur Literature Festival.
In 2002 he was awarded the Mungo Park Medal by the Royal Scottish Geographical Society for his ‘outstanding contribution to travel literature’. He wrote and presented the television series Stones of the Raj and Indian Journeys, which won the Grierson Award for Best Documentary Series at BAFTA in 2002. His Radio 4 series on the history of British spirituality and mysticism, The Long Search, won the 2002 Sandford St Martin Prize for Religious Broadcasting and was described by the judges as ‘thrilling in its brilliance... near perfect radio’. In December 2005 his article on the madrasas of Pakistan was awarded the prize for Best Print Article of the Year at the 2005 FPA Media Awards. In June 2006 he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Letters honoris causa by the University of St Andrews “for his services to literature and international relations, to broadcasting and understanding”. In 2007, The Last Moghal won the prestigous Duff Cooper Prize for History and Biography. In November 2007, William received an Honourary Doctorate of Letters, honoris causa, from the University of Lucknow University “for his outstanding contribution in literature and history”, and in March 2008 won the James Todd Memorial Prize from the Maharana of Udaipur.
William is married to the artist Olivia Fraser, and they have three children. They now live on a farm outside Delhi.
In 1989 Dalrymple moved to Delhi where he lived for six years researching his second book, City of Djinns, which won the 1994 Thomas Cook Travel Book Award and the Sunday Times Young British Writer of the Year Award. From the Holy Mountain, his acclaimed study of the demise of Christianity in its Middle Eastern homeland, was awarded the Scottish Arts Council Autumn Book Award for 1997; it was also shortlisted for the 1998 Thomas Cook Award, the John Llewellyn Rhys Prize and the Duff Cooper Prize. A collection of his writings about India, The Age of Kali, won the French Prix D’Astrolabe in 2005.
White Mughals was published in 2003, the book won the Wolfson Prize for History 2003, the Scottish Book of the Year Prize, and was shortlisted for the PEN History Award, the Kiryama Prize and the James Tait Black Memorial Prize.
William Dalrymple is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and of the Royal Asiatic Society, and is the founder and co-director of the Jaipur Literature Festival.
In 2002 he was awarded the Mungo Park Medal by the Royal Scottish Geographical Society for his ‘outstanding contribution to travel literature’. He wrote and presented the television series Stones of the Raj and Indian Journeys, which won the Grierson Award for Best Documentary Series at BAFTA in 2002. His Radio 4 series on the history of British spirituality and mysticism, The Long Search, won the 2002 Sandford St Martin Prize for Religious Broadcasting and was described by the judges as ‘thrilling in its brilliance... near perfect radio’. In December 2005 his article on the madrasas of Pakistan was awarded the prize for Best Print Article of the Year at the 2005 FPA Media Awards. In June 2006 he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Letters honoris causa by the University of St Andrews “for his services to literature and international relations, to broadcasting and understanding”. In 2007, The Last Moghal won the prestigous Duff Cooper Prize for History and Biography. In November 2007, William received an Honourary Doctorate of Letters, honoris causa, from the University of Lucknow University “for his outstanding contribution in literature and history”, and in March 2008 won the James Todd Memorial Prize from the Maharana of Udaipur.
William is married to the artist Olivia Fraser, and they have three children. They now live on a farm outside Delhi.
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August 27, 2021
“When everyone is dead, the Great Game is finished. Not before.”
- Rudyard Kipling, Kim
“Only eighty survivors from the [British] column managed to make it alive over the Jagdalak holly-oak barrier…Most of these – some twenty officers and forty-five privates of Shelton’s 44th Foot, and a couple of artillerymen and sepoys – were exposed and surrounded at dawn as they stood, uncertain of the correct road, at the top of the hill of Grandamak…Overwhelmingly outnumbered…and with only twenty muskets and two rounds of ammunition each between them, the troops decided to make their last stand. They were offered quarter but refused. Many felt their regiment had been disgraced after running away…on the evening of 23 November, and now they were determined to die fighting and so redeem regimental honor. They formed a square, and defended themselves, ‘driving the Afghans several times down the hill’ until they had exhausted the last of their rounds, and then fought on with their bayonets. Then, one by one, they were slaughtered…”
- William Dalrymple, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42
The list of British imperial disasters is as long as my kids’ letters to Santa. As an American, I am of course fond of Yorktown, where General Charles Cornwallis found himself trapped between George Washington and the French, leading to an eventual surrender that convinced Great Britain that it was wiser – and cheaper – to let the thirteen American colonies go.
But that is only one example in a veritable roll call of mistakes, shortsightedness, and hubris leading to calamity.
In 1879, in South Africa, Colonel Henry Pulleine and the 1st/24th Foot were crushed between the converging horns of Cetshwayo’s Zulu impi. Some thirteen hundred British troops were killed, and the first invasion of Zululand turned back.
In 1885, in Egypt, Charles Gordon refused to abandon Khartoum. After a protracted siege, Mahdist forces sacked the city and destroyed the garrison. Gordon was killed.
In 1942, Singapore, the Gibraltar of the East, surrendered to the Japanese after a weeklong siege. This loss, at least according to Churchill, topped all.
In Return of a King, however, William Dalrymple offers a different candidate for the title of supreme folly of the British Empire: the 1839 invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent retreat through the dark defiles of the Hindu Kush.
The so-called First Anglo-Afghan War is a bit of an obscure subject that had a mini-renaissance following the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. At the time, warnings abounded about the “Graveyard of Empires,” positing that any military intervention was doomed by harsh terrain and byzantine tribal politics. While Dalrymple – who published this in 2013 – certainly has a few things to say about America’s failure to tame Afghanistan, he does so mainly by way of a few parting remarks in his Author’s Note. Rather than draw comparisons or enumerate mistakes, Dalrymple is mainly content to deliver an extremely readable popular history of a relatively complex saga. This is first and foremost a narrative, with a keen eye for its varied cast of characters.
The “king” of the title is Shah Shuja of the Sadozai tribe, who seized power in Kabul in 1803. His rule lasted some six years, before the Barakzais – along with Shuja’s half-brother – defeated him, forcing him into exile. The British East India Company offered him asylum, and Shuja used that space to launch several failed attempts to regain his throne. Following Shuja’s exit, a man named Dost Mohammad Khan rose to power in Afghanistan, ultimately naming himself an Amir and declaring jihad against the Sikhs.
Meanwhile, Great Britain’s interest was in guarding India, the crown jewel of its empire. When Russia began sniffing around Afghanistan, the Company began to worry that the Tsar was trying to encroach on their borders. The Great Game was afoot, and the first question the Company had to answer was who to back in Afghanistan. A brilliant young Scotsman named Alexander Burnes backed Dost Mohammad, and worked hard to build a relationship with him. His efforts, though, were undercut by super-bureaucrat William Hay Macnaghten, who filled the ear of Governor-General Lord Auckland with poisonous remarks about Dost Mohammad. Macnaghten preferred Shuja. In the end, relying on casus belli that actually disappeared before things could get started, the Company invaded Afghanistan to install its willing puppet Shuja on the throne.
All things considered, the invasion started well. But that changed in a hurry. As Dalrymple explains, calamity did not spring from any one thing.
Part of the problem was cultural, with a large number of Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs taking up residence in a majority-Muslim land. There were numerous insults, both real and perceived, many of them regarding the treatment of Muslim women.
Part of it was economic, as the invasion drained the coffers of the Company (whose existence as a quasi-state organization needed a better explanation), leading to the decrease of subsidies to the Ghilzai, who controlled some of the most important mountain passes (and who would otherwise plunder supply caravans rolling through their territory).
Finally, the situation deteriorated through no small measure of British conceit and blundering. Macnaghten habitually lied to his superiors; the gout-ridden General William Elphinstone, the Commander-in-Chief in Kabul, was both physically and mentally unfit to lead (the poorly-devised British cantonment was surrounded by high-ground and – for some reason – left the supplies outside the garrison); and Burnes allowed himself to become the target of vitriol by his ceaseless pursuit of Afghani women.
The result was murder, mayhem, and an ill-fated escape through the mountains in winter. A force of around sixteen-thousand men, women, and children left Kabul for Jalalabad under false promises of safety. (The women and children were camp followers; they were – by far – the majority of the column). Once in the passes, they died by the score, ambushed by an ad hoc coalition of Afghani forces led by Dost Mohammad’s son, Mohammad Akbar Khan (one of the more fascinating personages among a selection of fascinating personages). Those who did not fall to the long-barreled jezail, or to the blade of sword and knife, often died of frostbite or hunger. Only one Englishman, a doctor, made it alive to Jalalabad, thus giving rise to the legend of the lone survivor. In truth, there were dozens of European hostages – including the indomitable Lady Sale, who kept an invaluable diary – who eventually returned home, along with about two-thousand Indian troops (many Indian soldiers were reduced to begging in Kabul; others were sold into slavery).
The culminating event of this debacle was the last stand of the 44th Foot at Grandamak where, to quote Kipling, it did not take long for “[t]wo thousand pounds of education” to drop “to a ten-rupee jezail.”
Dalrymple covers this all with an amazing facility for keeping things straight. Though he is an expert, he writes for the layperson (this is only the second book on the First Anglo Afghan War I’ve read, and I never got lost). He is not a prose stylist, but his descriptions of the geography – aided by his own visits to the area – are pretty marvelous. He also does a good job weaving the first-person accounts into his own writing.
The most impressive thing about Return of a King, however, is the research. It is immense and – as Dalrymple explains in his acknowledgments – undertaken at no little risk to himself. He unearthed a lot in the archives, and was aided by a lucky find of Afghani sources at a Kabul bookstore. Dalrymple’s use of these primary documents – including an epic poem – adds an incredible roundedness to the tale. This is not simply about the plight of the hapless British column, but about the Afghans defending their territory.
To that end, Return of a King has a melancholic coda. While Great Britain was embarrassed (with those in service to Great Britain losing much more), she did not crumble and dissolve in the Hindu Kush. Shortly after the retreat, the unsubtly-named Army of Retribution returned, killing people and laying waste to villages in a fashion that would be remembered forever. The Empire itself would keep churning on for another century or so. Similarly, as the world focuses on other things (this was written during the Covid-19 Pandemic of 2020), America seems to be preparing for a quiet pullout, ending a decades-long involvement that has cost untold lives and uncountable dollars. As with Great Britain – and belying Afghanistan’s moniker – America will not be buried there. Her future, cloudy as it is, will not be decided by an inevitable decision to leave.
Afghanistan itself, on the other hand, will continue to suffer from the same realities that make her impervious to foreign armies: harsh terrain; ageless loyalties and enmities; and competing religious traditions. In the end, sadly, it seems the only thing that can unite Afghanistan is the arrival of a would-be occupier.
- Rudyard Kipling, Kim
“Only eighty survivors from the [British] column managed to make it alive over the Jagdalak holly-oak barrier…Most of these – some twenty officers and forty-five privates of Shelton’s 44th Foot, and a couple of artillerymen and sepoys – were exposed and surrounded at dawn as they stood, uncertain of the correct road, at the top of the hill of Grandamak…Overwhelmingly outnumbered…and with only twenty muskets and two rounds of ammunition each between them, the troops decided to make their last stand. They were offered quarter but refused. Many felt their regiment had been disgraced after running away…on the evening of 23 November, and now they were determined to die fighting and so redeem regimental honor. They formed a square, and defended themselves, ‘driving the Afghans several times down the hill’ until they had exhausted the last of their rounds, and then fought on with their bayonets. Then, one by one, they were slaughtered…”
- William Dalrymple, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42
The list of British imperial disasters is as long as my kids’ letters to Santa. As an American, I am of course fond of Yorktown, where General Charles Cornwallis found himself trapped between George Washington and the French, leading to an eventual surrender that convinced Great Britain that it was wiser – and cheaper – to let the thirteen American colonies go.
But that is only one example in a veritable roll call of mistakes, shortsightedness, and hubris leading to calamity.
In 1879, in South Africa, Colonel Henry Pulleine and the 1st/24th Foot were crushed between the converging horns of Cetshwayo’s Zulu impi. Some thirteen hundred British troops were killed, and the first invasion of Zululand turned back.
In 1885, in Egypt, Charles Gordon refused to abandon Khartoum. After a protracted siege, Mahdist forces sacked the city and destroyed the garrison. Gordon was killed.
In 1942, Singapore, the Gibraltar of the East, surrendered to the Japanese after a weeklong siege. This loss, at least according to Churchill, topped all.
In Return of a King, however, William Dalrymple offers a different candidate for the title of supreme folly of the British Empire: the 1839 invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent retreat through the dark defiles of the Hindu Kush.
The so-called First Anglo-Afghan War is a bit of an obscure subject that had a mini-renaissance following the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. At the time, warnings abounded about the “Graveyard of Empires,” positing that any military intervention was doomed by harsh terrain and byzantine tribal politics. While Dalrymple – who published this in 2013 – certainly has a few things to say about America’s failure to tame Afghanistan, he does so mainly by way of a few parting remarks in his Author’s Note. Rather than draw comparisons or enumerate mistakes, Dalrymple is mainly content to deliver an extremely readable popular history of a relatively complex saga. This is first and foremost a narrative, with a keen eye for its varied cast of characters.
The “king” of the title is Shah Shuja of the Sadozai tribe, who seized power in Kabul in 1803. His rule lasted some six years, before the Barakzais – along with Shuja’s half-brother – defeated him, forcing him into exile. The British East India Company offered him asylum, and Shuja used that space to launch several failed attempts to regain his throne. Following Shuja’s exit, a man named Dost Mohammad Khan rose to power in Afghanistan, ultimately naming himself an Amir and declaring jihad against the Sikhs.
Meanwhile, Great Britain’s interest was in guarding India, the crown jewel of its empire. When Russia began sniffing around Afghanistan, the Company began to worry that the Tsar was trying to encroach on their borders. The Great Game was afoot, and the first question the Company had to answer was who to back in Afghanistan. A brilliant young Scotsman named Alexander Burnes backed Dost Mohammad, and worked hard to build a relationship with him. His efforts, though, were undercut by super-bureaucrat William Hay Macnaghten, who filled the ear of Governor-General Lord Auckland with poisonous remarks about Dost Mohammad. Macnaghten preferred Shuja. In the end, relying on casus belli that actually disappeared before things could get started, the Company invaded Afghanistan to install its willing puppet Shuja on the throne.
All things considered, the invasion started well. But that changed in a hurry. As Dalrymple explains, calamity did not spring from any one thing.
Part of the problem was cultural, with a large number of Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs taking up residence in a majority-Muslim land. There were numerous insults, both real and perceived, many of them regarding the treatment of Muslim women.
Part of it was economic, as the invasion drained the coffers of the Company (whose existence as a quasi-state organization needed a better explanation), leading to the decrease of subsidies to the Ghilzai, who controlled some of the most important mountain passes (and who would otherwise plunder supply caravans rolling through their territory).
Finally, the situation deteriorated through no small measure of British conceit and blundering. Macnaghten habitually lied to his superiors; the gout-ridden General William Elphinstone, the Commander-in-Chief in Kabul, was both physically and mentally unfit to lead (the poorly-devised British cantonment was surrounded by high-ground and – for some reason – left the supplies outside the garrison); and Burnes allowed himself to become the target of vitriol by his ceaseless pursuit of Afghani women.
The result was murder, mayhem, and an ill-fated escape through the mountains in winter. A force of around sixteen-thousand men, women, and children left Kabul for Jalalabad under false promises of safety. (The women and children were camp followers; they were – by far – the majority of the column). Once in the passes, they died by the score, ambushed by an ad hoc coalition of Afghani forces led by Dost Mohammad’s son, Mohammad Akbar Khan (one of the more fascinating personages among a selection of fascinating personages). Those who did not fall to the long-barreled jezail, or to the blade of sword and knife, often died of frostbite or hunger. Only one Englishman, a doctor, made it alive to Jalalabad, thus giving rise to the legend of the lone survivor. In truth, there were dozens of European hostages – including the indomitable Lady Sale, who kept an invaluable diary – who eventually returned home, along with about two-thousand Indian troops (many Indian soldiers were reduced to begging in Kabul; others were sold into slavery).
The culminating event of this debacle was the last stand of the 44th Foot at Grandamak where, to quote Kipling, it did not take long for “[t]wo thousand pounds of education” to drop “to a ten-rupee jezail.”
Dalrymple covers this all with an amazing facility for keeping things straight. Though he is an expert, he writes for the layperson (this is only the second book on the First Anglo Afghan War I’ve read, and I never got lost). He is not a prose stylist, but his descriptions of the geography – aided by his own visits to the area – are pretty marvelous. He also does a good job weaving the first-person accounts into his own writing.
The most impressive thing about Return of a King, however, is the research. It is immense and – as Dalrymple explains in his acknowledgments – undertaken at no little risk to himself. He unearthed a lot in the archives, and was aided by a lucky find of Afghani sources at a Kabul bookstore. Dalrymple’s use of these primary documents – including an epic poem – adds an incredible roundedness to the tale. This is not simply about the plight of the hapless British column, but about the Afghans defending their territory.
To that end, Return of a King has a melancholic coda. While Great Britain was embarrassed (with those in service to Great Britain losing much more), she did not crumble and dissolve in the Hindu Kush. Shortly after the retreat, the unsubtly-named Army of Retribution returned, killing people and laying waste to villages in a fashion that would be remembered forever. The Empire itself would keep churning on for another century or so. Similarly, as the world focuses on other things (this was written during the Covid-19 Pandemic of 2020), America seems to be preparing for a quiet pullout, ending a decades-long involvement that has cost untold lives and uncountable dollars. As with Great Britain – and belying Afghanistan’s moniker – America will not be buried there. Her future, cloudy as it is, will not be decided by an inevitable decision to leave.
Afghanistan itself, on the other hand, will continue to suffer from the same realities that make her impervious to foreign armies: harsh terrain; ageless loyalties and enmities; and competing religious traditions. In the end, sadly, it seems the only thing that can unite Afghanistan is the arrival of a would-be occupier.
March 20, 2024
This was a fine and critical account of the British and their advance and painful and bloody exit in Afghanistan.
The author, who lives in India and has a clear liking for the region and peoples, provides good background to the main story. The build up with Britain and Russia sparring around each other over geo-political influence and extending power & favour to countries such as Persia is well told. This - the beginning of the "Great Game* - is interesting as we come across characters and events that influence and appear during the story. A
Central to the story however is Shah Shuja. A rather ineffective and not especially powerful leader who the British see as the key to assisting in making Afghanistan their new jewel in the crown. Shuja would be installed as a puppet and bingo job done. Mr Dalrymple provides more excellent background for the reader to get to "know" Shuja, his and his family's history, and his journey to exile in India.
From here the story - intertwining with the geo-politics and regional power struggle which shapes actions and pace - develops to the British entry into Afghanistan. Success at first is then slowly and steadily eroded by errors in judgement, policy, cultural and tribal misunderstanding and misunderstandings and simple pig-headedness and misplaced superiority.
The Afghans rise and starvation, illness and fighting lead to deaths on both sides. Eventually with the British hemmed in and eventually losing control in Kabul. they leave and retreat through the inhospitable and dangerous high mountain passes back to India. As the Afghan tribes under Dost Mohammed press and attack the British and Indian troops they experience their worst military disaster of the whole 19th century. Bitter cold weather couples with bitter, no quarter fighting leaves to thousands of casualties in both troops and camp followers (read wives, children, servants and others who provide services to a 1840s military column).
The British regroup recognising that Afghanistan has bled its East India Company army and treasury almost dry. Re-entry beckons and an army descending in Afghanistan from two points is created and then sent into action. "Liberation" of British units surviving in some parts takes place. The circumstances are bleak for all as death and scorched earth leads to the British clearing out of the country with the aim of bringing home the remaining whites, India soldiers and servants and camp followers. They succeed; but this is not victory, it is withdrawal by killing, destroying and leaving Afghan tribes and people who had allied to the British to be left to sink or swim - mainly sink.
This is an unhappy period in British history. It is not a success nor does it leave any good reputation behind - so much so that the British officers and leaders of Kabul are still known and despised. This view is not wholly accurate as the Afghan tribes themselves didn't cover themselves in glory. Had Russia taken Britain's place first or after I have no doubt they would have befallen the same outcome, and would have reacted the same. This is how wars were fought in 1840; no Geneva convention, no war crimes and no quarter from either side.
Mr Dalrymple is certainly fair and has no rose tinted glasses on Britain's conduct and the way it went about Afghanistan. He is detailed, but writes with such fluidity and colour. The other real quality is the use of much contemporary information; not just British and Russian but India, Persian and also Afghan. Much of this Mr Dalrymple located himself. He also travelled the country during time of war (so during NATO's operations) and lives in the region.
All in all as the British found two more times, the USSR in 1980 and ISAF/NATO from 2001 to 2014 also learned to their cost, the people, the country and the history make it impossible to bring the country and inhabitants to "heel".
History repeats itself; perhaps; but failing to learn from history means repeating the mistakes of the British Indian Governor General Lord Auckland who sent his men to disgrace, destruction and death in 1842.
* For readers who want to read more about this fascinating and influential period in Indo/Afghan/European history I highly recommend
The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia by Peter Hopkirk.
The author, who lives in India and has a clear liking for the region and peoples, provides good background to the main story. The build up with Britain and Russia sparring around each other over geo-political influence and extending power & favour to countries such as Persia is well told. This - the beginning of the "Great Game* - is interesting as we come across characters and events that influence and appear during the story. A
Central to the story however is Shah Shuja. A rather ineffective and not especially powerful leader who the British see as the key to assisting in making Afghanistan their new jewel in the crown. Shuja would be installed as a puppet and bingo job done. Mr Dalrymple provides more excellent background for the reader to get to "know" Shuja, his and his family's history, and his journey to exile in India.
From here the story - intertwining with the geo-politics and regional power struggle which shapes actions and pace - develops to the British entry into Afghanistan. Success at first is then slowly and steadily eroded by errors in judgement, policy, cultural and tribal misunderstanding and misunderstandings and simple pig-headedness and misplaced superiority.
The Afghans rise and starvation, illness and fighting lead to deaths on both sides. Eventually with the British hemmed in and eventually losing control in Kabul. they leave and retreat through the inhospitable and dangerous high mountain passes back to India. As the Afghan tribes under Dost Mohammed press and attack the British and Indian troops they experience their worst military disaster of the whole 19th century. Bitter cold weather couples with bitter, no quarter fighting leaves to thousands of casualties in both troops and camp followers (read wives, children, servants and others who provide services to a 1840s military column).
The British regroup recognising that Afghanistan has bled its East India Company army and treasury almost dry. Re-entry beckons and an army descending in Afghanistan from two points is created and then sent into action. "Liberation" of British units surviving in some parts takes place. The circumstances are bleak for all as death and scorched earth leads to the British clearing out of the country with the aim of bringing home the remaining whites, India soldiers and servants and camp followers. They succeed; but this is not victory, it is withdrawal by killing, destroying and leaving Afghan tribes and people who had allied to the British to be left to sink or swim - mainly sink.
This is an unhappy period in British history. It is not a success nor does it leave any good reputation behind - so much so that the British officers and leaders of Kabul are still known and despised. This view is not wholly accurate as the Afghan tribes themselves didn't cover themselves in glory. Had Russia taken Britain's place first or after I have no doubt they would have befallen the same outcome, and would have reacted the same. This is how wars were fought in 1840; no Geneva convention, no war crimes and no quarter from either side.
Mr Dalrymple is certainly fair and has no rose tinted glasses on Britain's conduct and the way it went about Afghanistan. He is detailed, but writes with such fluidity and colour. The other real quality is the use of much contemporary information; not just British and Russian but India, Persian and also Afghan. Much of this Mr Dalrymple located himself. He also travelled the country during time of war (so during NATO's operations) and lives in the region.
All in all as the British found two more times, the USSR in 1980 and ISAF/NATO from 2001 to 2014 also learned to their cost, the people, the country and the history make it impossible to bring the country and inhabitants to "heel".
History repeats itself; perhaps; but failing to learn from history means repeating the mistakes of the British Indian Governor General Lord Auckland who sent his men to disgrace, destruction and death in 1842.
* For readers who want to read more about this fascinating and influential period in Indo/Afghan/European history I highly recommend
The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia by Peter Hopkirk.
February 10, 2019
I know so little about life in central Asia, its history, culture, language, or anything else. Dalrymple's book was revelatory in many ways. I had no idea that British interests in the region were inspired by a desire to counter Russian activities, and ultimately protect the British money-making colonies in India. The characters Dalrymple paints are fascinating: from the Russian and British agents tasked with bending the ears of kings and tribal rulers, to the Afghan nobility themselves.
There is all the making of a great historical novel here, blood feuds, ancient jewels, political intrigue, and wholesale slaughter. I didn't know about the horrendous defeats the British endured, such that—Job-like—only one man out of an army of thousands was able to return home to tell the tale. Or that, in order to avenge their honor, the British marched new armies in, raped and pillaged, then left again, simply to make a point.
Dalrymple gets particular credit for diving deeply into Afghan sources to either corroborate or contradict the received British version of events. The translations of poetically-rendered news clips were gorgeous, intoxicating, and so much more descriptive than their English counterparts. It really did make the experience quite rich.
If you have even a passing interest in Afghanistan, whose history as the graveyard of empires feels more quickly cyclical than most, you must read this book.
There is all the making of a great historical novel here, blood feuds, ancient jewels, political intrigue, and wholesale slaughter. I didn't know about the horrendous defeats the British endured, such that—Job-like—only one man out of an army of thousands was able to return home to tell the tale. Or that, in order to avenge their honor, the British marched new armies in, raped and pillaged, then left again, simply to make a point.
Dalrymple gets particular credit for diving deeply into Afghan sources to either corroborate or contradict the received British version of events. The translations of poetically-rendered news clips were gorgeous, intoxicating, and so much more descriptive than their English counterparts. It really did make the experience quite rich.
If you have even a passing interest in Afghanistan, whose history as the graveyard of empires feels more quickly cyclical than most, you must read this book.
December 6, 2020
This is the story of one of Britain's greatest military defeats,the First Anglo-Afghan War of the nineteenth century.
Afghanistan has never been an easy place for foreign invaders to occupy or govern as one invader after another has discovered.It has aptly been called,"the graveyard of empires".
The invading British force,also comprising a large Indian contingent,suffered a staggering number of casualties and had to retreat.
The "Great Game" for control of Central Asia,was on between Britain and Russia at the time. Britain wanted its man,Shah Shuja,back in power in Afghanistan.
When the first British force was massacred,an "army of retribution" was sent to settle the score. It took its savage revenge and returned swiftly. Britain would,however, not gain a foothold in Afghanistan.
Dalrymple's account is livelier than another well known book on the subject,Peter Hopkirk's,The Great Game. The reader meets some memorable characters,most notably,Sir Alexander Burns (known in Afghanistan as Sikandar).
He was the among the first spies to travel to Central Asia,and was a key figure in The Great Game. His luck was to run out,as he stayed on in Afghanistan.His fate is described in chilling detail by Dalrymple.
There are striking parallels to the Soviet and US invasions of Afghanistan,when both superpowers found themselves mired in endless conflict,and couldn't win.
Afghanistan has never been an easy place for foreign invaders to occupy or govern as one invader after another has discovered.It has aptly been called,"the graveyard of empires".
The invading British force,also comprising a large Indian contingent,suffered a staggering number of casualties and had to retreat.
The "Great Game" for control of Central Asia,was on between Britain and Russia at the time. Britain wanted its man,Shah Shuja,back in power in Afghanistan.
When the first British force was massacred,an "army of retribution" was sent to settle the score. It took its savage revenge and returned swiftly. Britain would,however, not gain a foothold in Afghanistan.
Dalrymple's account is livelier than another well known book on the subject,Peter Hopkirk's,The Great Game. The reader meets some memorable characters,most notably,Sir Alexander Burns (known in Afghanistan as Sikandar).
He was the among the first spies to travel to Central Asia,and was a key figure in The Great Game. His luck was to run out,as he stayed on in Afghanistan.His fate is described in chilling detail by Dalrymple.
There are striking parallels to the Soviet and US invasions of Afghanistan,when both superpowers found themselves mired in endless conflict,and couldn't win.
February 17, 2024
"You have brought an army into the country, but how do you propose to take it out?" - An Afghan Tribal Chief
"I cannot understand why the rulers of so vast an empire should have gone across the Indus to deprive me of my poor and barren country." - Dost Mohammad Khan, Deposed and Restored Ruler of Afghanistan
************
William Dalrymple begins this account of the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1808 as the British approach Kabul offering gifts and alliance with Shah Shuja, the ruler of Afghanistan. The dynasty was founded by his grandfather who had seized Delhi's plunder from the Persian warlord Nader Shah. Britain learned of a treaty between Napoleon and the Tsar of Russia to attack India over the Hindu Kush. France had planned an invasion through Suez but it's fleet was sunk by Nelson at the Nile in 1798. The embassy was sent by Lord Wellington who would go on to defeat Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815.
Shuja became a pawn in the East India Company's 'Great Game'. Persians were promised his lands by the French for passage through Iran. His rule in decline, tribal intrigues forced him to flee to British Punjab. After Napoleon's death in 1821 Russia became a concern and spy networks were set up in central Asia. Threats of a joint Russian and Persian invasion gave a pretense to restore Shuja to the throne of Afghanistan. Britain secretly funded Shuja's army. Joined by Ranjit Singh, Maharajah of the Sikhs, he set out to retake Kabul in 1834 from Afghan usurper Dost Mohammad Khan.
Shuja's plan failed and now aware of British complicity Dost prevailed. Britain and Russia vied for influence in Persia. Russian plots prompted Persia to attack Herat in 1837 with troops armed and trained by the British. Spies Alexander Burnes and Ivan Vitkevitch competed for alliance with Dost. Lord Auckland, the new Governor General of India guided by hawkish bureaucrats, insisted Dost be deposed and replaced by Shuja, sabotaging Burnes efforts. Vitkevitch offered men and money to reclaim Kashmir from Ranjit Singh. After the events in Herat and Kabul Auckland fell into a state of panic.
As British prepared to invade there were warnings from local leaders and old hands alike that the terrain was formidable and people fierce. Where diplomacy might have succeeded war was now chosen. Twenty thousand Indian soldiers and their British officers were on the march. Before starting out the siege of Herat was lifted and Vitkevitch recalled to Russia ending any purpose for the expedition. Regardless, the plan commenced in 1839. Searing deserts, mountain passes, tribal ambushes, brigand gangs, dying animals, low rations and lack of water took their toll until Kandahar was reached.
In Kandahar Shuja was hailed as a hero by defectors from Dost. Flowers were thrown before his elephants feet and he rained British rupees upon his subjects. But when a soldier raped a girl opinion turned. Shuja became despised as he had come with a foreign infidel army. Ranjit Singh was to have approached Kabul with Muslim troops but reneged on his pledge. In Ghazni the British were astounded to find fifty meter high fortifications. A desperate night attack was made and the Afghan army defeated. Dost sued for peace but was forced to flee before the British army approached Kabul.
Dost was imprisoned in Bukhara as Russians invaded Khiva. British alarm was raised but the Opium War of 1840 diverted troops from Afghanistan to China. Requisitions for defensive construction were denied and five thousand soldiers slept in a large cantonment with low walls. Afghans were offended by foreigners openly drinking and whoring. Seen as a figure head for British rule the clergy excluded Shuja's name from the Friday prayers. Nobles chafed at patronage reforms and hyperinflation arose from the foreign occupation. When Dost escaped from jail he returned to raise the flag of holy war.
Dost's jihad failed and he surrendered to be exiled in India. Singh's death caused civil war in Punjab threatening supply and communication lines to Afghanistan. Herat made allies with Persia against Britain as rebellions arose in the country. Occupation was draining the East India Company treasury. Feudal protection money was reduced and nobility left the court to prepare insurrections. British forces were recalled to India to lessen the payroll as Afghan muskets fired from the cliffs above. Their infantry and cavalry weren't suitable for the guerrilla warfare the natives were accustomed to use.
Jihad was sworn upon the Quran. A mob set fire to Burnes house in Kabul and cut him to pieces. Militia rode in from the mountains. Foreigners were attacked in their forts and homes without reprisal in a popular uprising. Sheltered in the cantonment, ringed by hostile hill stations, ammunition and provision depots were captured. Shuja refused to join the rebels and was declared an infidel. Akbar Khan, the son of Dost, became leader of the resistance. Freezing and famine followed, and a treaty was negotiated for the British retreat. Seventeen thousand soldiers and civilians left for India.
For a week they marched through the snow dying from cold and by bullets shot by Akbar's militia. Only several reached Jalalabad and two thousand survived as hostages or slaves. As Shuja manoeuvred with Kabul nobles to retain the throne Akbar waged a political campaign claiming he was unwilling to fight the infidels. Forced to come out of his citadel he was slain in the street. Akbar laid siege to Jalalabad but he was routed by the defenders. In 1842 a British army of retribution burned and killed their way to Kabul. Dost Mohammad Khan was restored to rule by the empire that had deposed him.
All manner of military and political pitfalls are told in this tale; the cold war fears, espionage, regime changes, puppet rulers, leadership lapses and logistical quagmires. Americans and Russians would have done well to review the war before embarking on their later fiascos. Dalrymple is expansive in reflecting the deep research done. The events are clearly conveyed for the period and conflict. Afghans and English are covered well but Indian troops from Bombay and Bengal are given less notice. This is surprising as Dalrymple is a scholar, writer and long time resident of northern India.
"I cannot understand why the rulers of so vast an empire should have gone across the Indus to deprive me of my poor and barren country." - Dost Mohammad Khan, Deposed and Restored Ruler of Afghanistan
************
William Dalrymple begins this account of the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1808 as the British approach Kabul offering gifts and alliance with Shah Shuja, the ruler of Afghanistan. The dynasty was founded by his grandfather who had seized Delhi's plunder from the Persian warlord Nader Shah. Britain learned of a treaty between Napoleon and the Tsar of Russia to attack India over the Hindu Kush. France had planned an invasion through Suez but it's fleet was sunk by Nelson at the Nile in 1798. The embassy was sent by Lord Wellington who would go on to defeat Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815.
Shuja became a pawn in the East India Company's 'Great Game'. Persians were promised his lands by the French for passage through Iran. His rule in decline, tribal intrigues forced him to flee to British Punjab. After Napoleon's death in 1821 Russia became a concern and spy networks were set up in central Asia. Threats of a joint Russian and Persian invasion gave a pretense to restore Shuja to the throne of Afghanistan. Britain secretly funded Shuja's army. Joined by Ranjit Singh, Maharajah of the Sikhs, he set out to retake Kabul in 1834 from Afghan usurper Dost Mohammad Khan.
Shuja's plan failed and now aware of British complicity Dost prevailed. Britain and Russia vied for influence in Persia. Russian plots prompted Persia to attack Herat in 1837 with troops armed and trained by the British. Spies Alexander Burnes and Ivan Vitkevitch competed for alliance with Dost. Lord Auckland, the new Governor General of India guided by hawkish bureaucrats, insisted Dost be deposed and replaced by Shuja, sabotaging Burnes efforts. Vitkevitch offered men and money to reclaim Kashmir from Ranjit Singh. After the events in Herat and Kabul Auckland fell into a state of panic.
As British prepared to invade there were warnings from local leaders and old hands alike that the terrain was formidable and people fierce. Where diplomacy might have succeeded war was now chosen. Twenty thousand Indian soldiers and their British officers were on the march. Before starting out the siege of Herat was lifted and Vitkevitch recalled to Russia ending any purpose for the expedition. Regardless, the plan commenced in 1839. Searing deserts, mountain passes, tribal ambushes, brigand gangs, dying animals, low rations and lack of water took their toll until Kandahar was reached.
In Kandahar Shuja was hailed as a hero by defectors from Dost. Flowers were thrown before his elephants feet and he rained British rupees upon his subjects. But when a soldier raped a girl opinion turned. Shuja became despised as he had come with a foreign infidel army. Ranjit Singh was to have approached Kabul with Muslim troops but reneged on his pledge. In Ghazni the British were astounded to find fifty meter high fortifications. A desperate night attack was made and the Afghan army defeated. Dost sued for peace but was forced to flee before the British army approached Kabul.
Dost was imprisoned in Bukhara as Russians invaded Khiva. British alarm was raised but the Opium War of 1840 diverted troops from Afghanistan to China. Requisitions for defensive construction were denied and five thousand soldiers slept in a large cantonment with low walls. Afghans were offended by foreigners openly drinking and whoring. Seen as a figure head for British rule the clergy excluded Shuja's name from the Friday prayers. Nobles chafed at patronage reforms and hyperinflation arose from the foreign occupation. When Dost escaped from jail he returned to raise the flag of holy war.
Dost's jihad failed and he surrendered to be exiled in India. Singh's death caused civil war in Punjab threatening supply and communication lines to Afghanistan. Herat made allies with Persia against Britain as rebellions arose in the country. Occupation was draining the East India Company treasury. Feudal protection money was reduced and nobility left the court to prepare insurrections. British forces were recalled to India to lessen the payroll as Afghan muskets fired from the cliffs above. Their infantry and cavalry weren't suitable for the guerrilla warfare the natives were accustomed to use.
Jihad was sworn upon the Quran. A mob set fire to Burnes house in Kabul and cut him to pieces. Militia rode in from the mountains. Foreigners were attacked in their forts and homes without reprisal in a popular uprising. Sheltered in the cantonment, ringed by hostile hill stations, ammunition and provision depots were captured. Shuja refused to join the rebels and was declared an infidel. Akbar Khan, the son of Dost, became leader of the resistance. Freezing and famine followed, and a treaty was negotiated for the British retreat. Seventeen thousand soldiers and civilians left for India.
For a week they marched through the snow dying from cold and by bullets shot by Akbar's militia. Only several reached Jalalabad and two thousand survived as hostages or slaves. As Shuja manoeuvred with Kabul nobles to retain the throne Akbar waged a political campaign claiming he was unwilling to fight the infidels. Forced to come out of his citadel he was slain in the street. Akbar laid siege to Jalalabad but he was routed by the defenders. In 1842 a British army of retribution burned and killed their way to Kabul. Dost Mohammad Khan was restored to rule by the empire that had deposed him.
All manner of military and political pitfalls are told in this tale; the cold war fears, espionage, regime changes, puppet rulers, leadership lapses and logistical quagmires. Americans and Russians would have done well to review the war before embarking on their later fiascos. Dalrymple is expansive in reflecting the deep research done. The events are clearly conveyed for the period and conflict. Afghans and English are covered well but Indian troops from Bombay and Bengal are given less notice. This is surprising as Dalrymple is a scholar, writer and long time resident of northern India.
June 13, 2017
This is a fine, fine book. Dalrymple understands the tribal and cultural intricacies that elude most western historian writing about Afghanistan or the sub-continent. The story is a rather simple one, The British, obsessed with the idea of expanding their imperial control to the whole of world, invaded Afghanistan to reinstall a puppet regime. It didn’t end well.
The story begins with the power struggle between two powerful tribes. The Sadozais, the descendants of Ahmed Shah Abdali, the ruler and conqueror of a vast Afghan empire. And their Wazir, ministers and second in commands, the Barakzais.
After a long struggle Dost Muhammad Barakzai defeated and chased Shah Shuja (Grandson of Ahmed Shah), the Sadozai King out of Afghanistan. Shah Shuja, after a painful stay with Ranjeet Singh (Ruler of Punjab), left for Ludhiana where he lived under British protection.
The skepticism and Russo phobia of some, led to a common perception among the British that Russians were trying to woo Dost Muhammad, and Afghanistan was to become a “Russia House” if The British didn’t take immediate action. Afghanistan was strategically important for the British to stabilize and expand their control and trade in Asia. So a plan was made, defying the intelligence reports suggesting otherwise, to invade Afghanistan and install a puppet Shah Shuja as the king, and take indirect control of Afghanistan.
The Shah was then reinstalled without much opposition and with relative ease with the help of a strong British army of 20,000.
But things started to get sour, The ever sensitive Afghans dislike the foreign invaders and a few most indecent encounters made them abhor their British invaders all the more so. The tribes started converging under Dost Muhammad’s son Akbar khan, who then used the narrative of “Jihad against the Infidels”, the ever useful tactic, and started a rebellion. The indecisiveness of the leadership led to widespread massacre of British forces. Men, women and children were butchered and maimed by the Afghan fighters, and only a handful of a 20,000 strong army, reached to the safety of British controlled area. A disaster without precedent and a humiliating defeat to the most powerful nation at the time.
The British after brief stay, sent an “Army of Retribution”, to burn and pillage the whole country. This was a successful mission. Once again women were raped and children were butchered, this time by merciless company soldiers.
And the irony of ironies is that the deceased Shah Shuja was then replaced by Dost Muhammad, the one whose regime was attacked earlier in the first place to install Shuja.
Amid acts of terror and horrendous atrocities, there are instances where beauty and compassion can be seen; Lady Sale, Mackenzie, Lawrence and others who bravely endured all that befell them with sheer bravery.
A beautiful narrative makes it an easy read, the scenery is described with aptness of a travelogue and the character studies are fascinating. A must read for anyone who wants to know why war is the greatest of all evils.
The story begins with the power struggle between two powerful tribes. The Sadozais, the descendants of Ahmed Shah Abdali, the ruler and conqueror of a vast Afghan empire. And their Wazir, ministers and second in commands, the Barakzais.
After a long struggle Dost Muhammad Barakzai defeated and chased Shah Shuja (Grandson of Ahmed Shah), the Sadozai King out of Afghanistan. Shah Shuja, after a painful stay with Ranjeet Singh (Ruler of Punjab), left for Ludhiana where he lived under British protection.
The skepticism and Russo phobia of some, led to a common perception among the British that Russians were trying to woo Dost Muhammad, and Afghanistan was to become a “Russia House” if The British didn’t take immediate action. Afghanistan was strategically important for the British to stabilize and expand their control and trade in Asia. So a plan was made, defying the intelligence reports suggesting otherwise, to invade Afghanistan and install a puppet Shah Shuja as the king, and take indirect control of Afghanistan.
The Shah was then reinstalled without much opposition and with relative ease with the help of a strong British army of 20,000.
But things started to get sour, The ever sensitive Afghans dislike the foreign invaders and a few most indecent encounters made them abhor their British invaders all the more so. The tribes started converging under Dost Muhammad’s son Akbar khan, who then used the narrative of “Jihad against the Infidels”, the ever useful tactic, and started a rebellion. The indecisiveness of the leadership led to widespread massacre of British forces. Men, women and children were butchered and maimed by the Afghan fighters, and only a handful of a 20,000 strong army, reached to the safety of British controlled area. A disaster without precedent and a humiliating defeat to the most powerful nation at the time.
The British after brief stay, sent an “Army of Retribution”, to burn and pillage the whole country. This was a successful mission. Once again women were raped and children were butchered, this time by merciless company soldiers.
And the irony of ironies is that the deceased Shah Shuja was then replaced by Dost Muhammad, the one whose regime was attacked earlier in the first place to install Shuja.
Amid acts of terror and horrendous atrocities, there are instances where beauty and compassion can be seen; Lady Sale, Mackenzie, Lawrence and others who bravely endured all that befell them with sheer bravery.
A beautiful narrative makes it an easy read, the scenery is described with aptness of a travelogue and the character studies are fascinating. A must read for anyone who wants to know why war is the greatest of all evils.
January 18, 2013
Between a timeless subject, a world recounted in the raw, a skilled historian and a brilliant writer, what can you get but a book you can't put down...all 2000 grams of it!
I don't do 600 page hardbacks for the love of my aging wrists, and I don't do 600 page hardbacks when I've already read three previous versions of the same story (Peter Hopkirk's "The Great Game" and "On Secret Service", James Perry's "Arrogant Armies" and of course, J.A.Norris's "The First Afgan War" to say nothing about TV serials like "Far Pavillions"). But when William Dalrymple researches his subject on both sides of the conflict (again...as he did for the 1857 Indian Mutiny), what can you do but wear your tennis wrist straps and hit the quilt, coffee and tome in midwinter. I was not disappointed. This is a gripping account written in a gripping way by a man who has a grip on both his subject and its context. The contextualization of the conflict is superb, the universalization of the learning is deeply insightful.
And so I say, suffer the substantial size of this masonry sized book and savor both the substance of the history and the sensation of a master at work.
Just do it.
I don't do 600 page hardbacks for the love of my aging wrists, and I don't do 600 page hardbacks when I've already read three previous versions of the same story (Peter Hopkirk's "The Great Game" and "On Secret Service", James Perry's "Arrogant Armies" and of course, J.A.Norris's "The First Afgan War" to say nothing about TV serials like "Far Pavillions"). But when William Dalrymple researches his subject on both sides of the conflict (again...as he did for the 1857 Indian Mutiny), what can you do but wear your tennis wrist straps and hit the quilt, coffee and tome in midwinter. I was not disappointed. This is a gripping account written in a gripping way by a man who has a grip on both his subject and its context. The contextualization of the conflict is superb, the universalization of the learning is deeply insightful.
And so I say, suffer the substantial size of this masonry sized book and savor both the substance of the history and the sensation of a master at work.
Just do it.
May 6, 2015
Interesting background to the present situation. It's the same tribes still fighting the same enemies. It was a good history but only an average read. 3.5 stars.
September 18, 2015
This is the second Dalrymple book I have read in a short space of time. With that I now consider that he is a extraordinarily good writer. He has had the ability to enthral, enrage and leave me wanting for more with each read. With that I have grabbed a couple more of his tomes and will be looking forward to reading them.
Return Of a King is riveting narrative history. In fact lets just say that in my opinion, narrative history that is as good as it gets. There is no need to tell the story here, as many have covered it on Goodreads. All I need to say is that the man tells the story of his extensive research in a way that will appeal to both the professional historian and the lay reader such as myself who has an interest in the Great Game.
As to the story told he has used his footnotes from newly found sources brilliantly and has an extensive bibliography that could only leave any one who is looking to learn more on this subject salivating.
Highly recommended.
Return Of a King is riveting narrative history. In fact lets just say that in my opinion, narrative history that is as good as it gets. There is no need to tell the story here, as many have covered it on Goodreads. All I need to say is that the man tells the story of his extensive research in a way that will appeal to both the professional historian and the lay reader such as myself who has an interest in the Great Game.
As to the story told he has used his footnotes from newly found sources brilliantly and has an extensive bibliography that could only leave any one who is looking to learn more on this subject salivating.
Highly recommended.
December 25, 2019
My first book by William Dalrymple, who is a noted historian and mainstay of the Indian literary scene.
Napoleon wanted to steal India from the British by marching through Afghanistan (along with Russian troops) in the first half of the 19th century. The British sent an embassy to the Afghans. They decided to place their puppet ruler Shah Shuja in Afghanistan after invading it. But a dispute over an Afghan woman (who was a harem girl of a powerful Afghan warlord) who was seduced by a British officer turned the Afghans against the British. There are other reasons too but mainly the Afghans hated the British officers seducing their women. The Afghans proceed to brutally rout a retreating British army which sent shock waves across the British empire.
Before all this, the Afghans were in the habit of invading India once every year for their annual income. I guess a lot of what is happening today in the sub-continent started in the 19th century itself and continues to this day.
Ahmed Shah Abdali (who is sort of like the founder of Afghanistan) and other Afghan kings used to raid India atleast once every year. This was how they earned their annual income. Abdali even tried to form an alliance with Tipu Sultan of Mysore to challenge British hegemony in India.
Even the Mughals paid massive annual subsidies amounting to Rs.600,000 to these badass Afghan tribes to keep them at bay.
Here is a bit from the book about this:
"The British later learned to follow the Mughal model. According to a piece of imperial doggerel it became British policy to thrash the Sindhis, make friends with the Baluch, but pay the Pathans".
Another interesting bit which shows that not much has changed in the subcontinent:
"The Shikarpuri Sindhi money-lending community had long specialised in financing wars and dealing in arms, and the tradition continues to this day; the most notable Shikarpuris in this business today are the Hinduja Brothers, who, among many other such deals, were allegedly involved in the controversial sale of the Bofors guns to Rajiv Gandhi's government in the 1980's."
And the Sikhs were total badasses. I mean these guys built a Sikh kingdom right under the Afghan's noses in Peshawar. But the Afghans declared a holy war (Jihad) on the Sikhs. And they also put pressure on the British to make the Sikhs give Peshawar back to them.
Dalrymple never takes sides but seems to be more sympathetic towards the ruthless Afghans. He is a thorough historian (he quotes from numerous sources to present events from different points of view). He has a simple and elegant writing style without any great literary flourishes. Basically, it is a very no nonsense history book that is entertaining, informative and connects events from the mid-19th century with what is happening in Afghanistan today.
Let me end this rambling "review" with another interesting bit from the book - the British "Army of Retribution" (an army sent to take revenge on Afghanistan for the brutal murder of retreating British forces) removed the gates off a Mosque in Afghanistan because they thought it was the same gate that Mahmud of Ghazni had stolen from the Somnath Temple. The British brought the gate back to India and paraded it in front of the Hindus, trying to show what benevolent rulers they were. As if they had restored the pride of Hindustan. But none of the Hindus in front of whom the gate was paraded showed any emotion and they seemed to be unaware of the plunder of the Somnath Temple.
Napoleon wanted to steal India from the British by marching through Afghanistan (along with Russian troops) in the first half of the 19th century. The British sent an embassy to the Afghans. They decided to place their puppet ruler Shah Shuja in Afghanistan after invading it. But a dispute over an Afghan woman (who was a harem girl of a powerful Afghan warlord) who was seduced by a British officer turned the Afghans against the British. There are other reasons too but mainly the Afghans hated the British officers seducing their women. The Afghans proceed to brutally rout a retreating British army which sent shock waves across the British empire.
Before all this, the Afghans were in the habit of invading India once every year for their annual income. I guess a lot of what is happening today in the sub-continent started in the 19th century itself and continues to this day.
Ahmed Shah Abdali (who is sort of like the founder of Afghanistan) and other Afghan kings used to raid India atleast once every year. This was how they earned their annual income. Abdali even tried to form an alliance with Tipu Sultan of Mysore to challenge British hegemony in India.
Even the Mughals paid massive annual subsidies amounting to Rs.600,000 to these badass Afghan tribes to keep them at bay.
Here is a bit from the book about this:
"The British later learned to follow the Mughal model. According to a piece of imperial doggerel it became British policy to thrash the Sindhis, make friends with the Baluch, but pay the Pathans".
Another interesting bit which shows that not much has changed in the subcontinent:
"The Shikarpuri Sindhi money-lending community had long specialised in financing wars and dealing in arms, and the tradition continues to this day; the most notable Shikarpuris in this business today are the Hinduja Brothers, who, among many other such deals, were allegedly involved in the controversial sale of the Bofors guns to Rajiv Gandhi's government in the 1980's."
And the Sikhs were total badasses. I mean these guys built a Sikh kingdom right under the Afghan's noses in Peshawar. But the Afghans declared a holy war (Jihad) on the Sikhs. And they also put pressure on the British to make the Sikhs give Peshawar back to them.
Dalrymple never takes sides but seems to be more sympathetic towards the ruthless Afghans. He is a thorough historian (he quotes from numerous sources to present events from different points of view). He has a simple and elegant writing style without any great literary flourishes. Basically, it is a very no nonsense history book that is entertaining, informative and connects events from the mid-19th century with what is happening in Afghanistan today.
Let me end this rambling "review" with another interesting bit from the book - the British "Army of Retribution" (an army sent to take revenge on Afghanistan for the brutal murder of retreating British forces) removed the gates off a Mosque in Afghanistan because they thought it was the same gate that Mahmud of Ghazni had stolen from the Somnath Temple. The British brought the gate back to India and paraded it in front of the Hindus, trying to show what benevolent rulers they were. As if they had restored the pride of Hindustan. But none of the Hindus in front of whom the gate was paraded showed any emotion and they seemed to be unaware of the plunder of the Somnath Temple.
November 4, 2023
Peerless account of the First Anglo-Afghan War, besting extant volumes by Patrick Macrory and Peter Hopkirk. Dalrymple presents fresh primary research, tapping Afghan, Indian and Russian archives to provide a more rounded portrait. Dalrymple counterpoints the Anglo-Russian "Great Game" with ongoing Afghan tribal rivalries. Ousted Shah Shujah manipulates the British into placing him on the Afghan throne, as more compliant than the cagey Dost Mohammed. Dalrymple fleshes out the familiar story of Elphinstone's disastrous occupation and retreat from Kabul with new interpretations. He argues Afghans would have accepted Shujah's rule if not for the foreign bayonets propping him up. Similarly, Afghan resentment of the British began almost immediately, due to rampant exploitation of Kabul's women. And British military and political incompetence, from virulent Russophobia to Elphinstone's bizarre passivity towards the rumblings in Kabul, registers with stark clarity. A masterpiece of narrative history.
March 17, 2019
I have read a lot of Dalrymple's books - most before I reviewed on GR, and have enjoyed them. There is no risk of criticism of his research, as it is always thorough, and in depth. This is even more the case here, in this great tome of a book.
Here Dalrymple presents a tale of such incompetency, ego and mismanagement that he really needed to be accurate to avoid any backlash. Auckland and Macnaghten in particular are shown to make decisions against advice, to the point where reports are simply labelled as 'exaggeration'. Alexander Burnes, who for the first half of the book seems maligned by Macnaghten and ignored by Auckland gains much sympathy, until the Afghan perspective show his fraternising with and corruption of Afghan women shows a negative side of him. Elphinstone was shown as a terrible appointment made by Auckland, as he was physically unfit for command, and as such was responsible for terrible military and humanitarian decisions (or lack thereof).
On the Afghan side, Dalrymple shows a complex and ever changing group of leaders who make alliances as quickly as they break them, and who are no more trustworthy than the British. Shar Shuja was shown as incompetent in the first half of the book, but was the only leader on the British side to come through with any dignity in the war.
Such a level of incompetence was shown by the occupying British in their absolute destruction when Pollocks 'Army of Retribution' was able, with accurate planning and preparation, enter Afghanistan and sweep to victory with out setback. Revenge however for the British humiliation appeared to be the driving force, when at one point Ellenborough's command was to withdraw and abandon those British hostages/prisoners that Akbar Khan had taken, although this command was retracted in time.
This is book is an incredible undertaking. It is presented in chronological order, taking in the events across Afghanistan, in a single narrative - which is perhaps more complicated than it sounds. It reads very well, is generally well paced and interesting, and doesn't appear to leave too many loose ends. Often time the names do become complex due to the similarities, but Dalrymple does a good job of maintaining the characters in a way they remain present in the narrative and not forgotten.
Dalrymple's use of Afghan source material as well as the British (personal letters and journals as well as official source) provides two sides of the story and works to validate the true events and rule out those based on untruth or inaccuracy.
4 stars.
Here Dalrymple presents a tale of such incompetency, ego and mismanagement that he really needed to be accurate to avoid any backlash. Auckland and Macnaghten in particular are shown to make decisions against advice, to the point where reports are simply labelled as 'exaggeration'. Alexander Burnes, who for the first half of the book seems maligned by Macnaghten and ignored by Auckland gains much sympathy, until the Afghan perspective show his fraternising with and corruption of Afghan women shows a negative side of him. Elphinstone was shown as a terrible appointment made by Auckland, as he was physically unfit for command, and as such was responsible for terrible military and humanitarian decisions (or lack thereof).
On the Afghan side, Dalrymple shows a complex and ever changing group of leaders who make alliances as quickly as they break them, and who are no more trustworthy than the British. Shar Shuja was shown as incompetent in the first half of the book, but was the only leader on the British side to come through with any dignity in the war.
Such a level of incompetence was shown by the occupying British in their absolute destruction when Pollocks 'Army of Retribution' was able, with accurate planning and preparation, enter Afghanistan and sweep to victory with out setback. Revenge however for the British humiliation appeared to be the driving force, when at one point Ellenborough's command was to withdraw and abandon those British hostages/prisoners that Akbar Khan had taken, although this command was retracted in time.
This is book is an incredible undertaking. It is presented in chronological order, taking in the events across Afghanistan, in a single narrative - which is perhaps more complicated than it sounds. It reads very well, is generally well paced and interesting, and doesn't appear to leave too many loose ends. Often time the names do become complex due to the similarities, but Dalrymple does a good job of maintaining the characters in a way they remain present in the narrative and not forgotten.
Dalrymple's use of Afghan source material as well as the British (personal letters and journals as well as official source) provides two sides of the story and works to validate the true events and rule out those based on untruth or inaccuracy.
4 stars.
January 26, 2013
William Dalrymple is the definitive modern historian of the East India company's reign in India during the 18th and 19th centuries. With already two brilliant books – 'The White Mughals' and 'The Last Mughal' – on the subject, he has now written this masterly chronicle on the disastrous British misadventure in Afghanistan during the years 1839-1842. In his words, this first British war in Afghanistan was one of colonial arrogance, hubris, folly and cultural collision. What else can you call a foray where 20000 troops marched into Afghanistan in 1839 and only one returns to Peshawar in 1842?
Dalrymple shows in this book that the 'Great Game', popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel 'Kim', was actually the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Alexander Burnes, the dashing Scottish intelligence officer, was sent out to Central Asia as a spy to gather information on the threats, which were non-existent then, from Czarist Russia to British interests in India. Burnes did his work and wrote a successful book on the subject which were read by the Russians. As a result, they get suspicious and send Yan Vitkevich, a Polish adventurer and explorer, to Bukhara and then on to Kabul to gather their own intelligence on this question. Thus, the hawkish paranoia in Calcutta and London ended up making a non-existent threat a reality. So, the Great Game begins and still goes on, a full 170 years after it began.
Burnes and his brilliant Indian assistant and intelligence chief, Mohan Lal Kashmiri, give excellent advice to Calcutta and London on the state of affairs in Central Asia and the course to be followed, which was to support Dost Mohammed Khan as the Amir of Afghanistan. But policy was made by George Eden, William Mcnaghten and Claude Wade. Eden was the Governor General of India who had little knowledge or interest in the region. William Macnaghten was a bookish Russophobe who was Eden's chief advisor while Wade was a Persian scholar who had never been in Central Asia. They decide to reject Burnes' advice and decide to overthrow the incumbent Dost Mohammed and install Shah Shuja as a puppet king to do the British bidding in Central Asia.
An army of 20000 men is raised and they bumble along their way across the Indus river and the Khyber pass losing thousands of camels and horses and ending up emaciated, dispirited and worn-out in Kandahar. But luck is on their side as they encounter little resistance due to Dost Mohammed Khan fleeing Kabul with his loyalists. In spite of rejecting Burnes' advice, the British end up successfully occupying Afghanistan for two years, with Shah Shuja as king. But then, in 1842, the Afghans rise up in jihad and explode in a violent counter-attack which ends in the British army retreating ignominiously back to colonial India after being thoroughly routed by the Afghan tribes. The retreating troops get massacred mercilessly by the Afghans. But the story doesn't end there. There are hostages left behind in Kabul and Britain had to extract revenge and restore its 'honor'. So, an army of Retribution goes back to Afghanistan and repays the hatred and brutality in full measure, matching what would now be called 'war crime' for 'war crime'. Still, it was not feasible to continue occupying Afghanistan forever and so Britain withdraws, leaving Dost Mohammed Khan once again in power after all the carnage and destruction and expenditure of vast sums of money.
Dalrymple points to many eerie parallels with the current NATO occupation of Afghanistan. NATO went in to the country in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban. They did so and installed Hamid Karzai who, just like Shah Shuja in 1839, is seen as a Western puppet by the Afghans. Coincidentally, Karzai belongs to the same tribe as that of Shah Shuja. After twelve long years of occupation, NATO will retreat back in defeat in 2014, leaving possibly the Taliban, who are already said to be in control of 60% of the country, back in power. Just as Dost Mohammed Khan did in 1842. Interestingly the Taliban is made up from the same Ghilzai tribes who drove Britain out in 1842. Dalrymple also points out that Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy to the region, played much the same role that William Macnaghten played in 1839. Sir Cowper-Coles, the British Special Representative in 2010 in Kabul, described Holbrooke as a 'bull who brought his own china shop wherever he went'. Dalrymple says that this description sums up Macnaghten's style perfectly 174 years before. Finally, 170 years on, NATO is leaving Afghanistan for much the same primary reason for which Britain left – that Afghanistan was too poor then as it is today, for the occupiers to tax the country and make the occupied pay for their own subjugation!
This book shows how history can be written like a thriller without sacrificing facts and scholarship. One special feature of this book is that Dalrymple has used sources of research which have been used for the first time ever. Research material for the book has been sourced from British, Persian, Russian and Urdu archives. But the most interesting source is the nine previously untranslated full-length contemporary Afghan accounts of the conflict, including the autobiography of Shah Shuja himself. That makes the book unique.
The book has a big lesson for the powers which still want to play the Great Game. As Dalrymple recounts elsewhere, when Harold Macmillan was handing over the prime ministership of Britain to Alec Douglas-Home, he was supposed to have said, ‘My dear boy, you’ll be fine as long as you don’t invade Afghanistan.’ Pity that Tony Blair never knew about it!
A 'Must read' for anyone interested in the subject.
Dalrymple shows in this book that the 'Great Game', popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel 'Kim', was actually the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Alexander Burnes, the dashing Scottish intelligence officer, was sent out to Central Asia as a spy to gather information on the threats, which were non-existent then, from Czarist Russia to British interests in India. Burnes did his work and wrote a successful book on the subject which were read by the Russians. As a result, they get suspicious and send Yan Vitkevich, a Polish adventurer and explorer, to Bukhara and then on to Kabul to gather their own intelligence on this question. Thus, the hawkish paranoia in Calcutta and London ended up making a non-existent threat a reality. So, the Great Game begins and still goes on, a full 170 years after it began.
Burnes and his brilliant Indian assistant and intelligence chief, Mohan Lal Kashmiri, give excellent advice to Calcutta and London on the state of affairs in Central Asia and the course to be followed, which was to support Dost Mohammed Khan as the Amir of Afghanistan. But policy was made by George Eden, William Mcnaghten and Claude Wade. Eden was the Governor General of India who had little knowledge or interest in the region. William Macnaghten was a bookish Russophobe who was Eden's chief advisor while Wade was a Persian scholar who had never been in Central Asia. They decide to reject Burnes' advice and decide to overthrow the incumbent Dost Mohammed and install Shah Shuja as a puppet king to do the British bidding in Central Asia.
An army of 20000 men is raised and they bumble along their way across the Indus river and the Khyber pass losing thousands of camels and horses and ending up emaciated, dispirited and worn-out in Kandahar. But luck is on their side as they encounter little resistance due to Dost Mohammed Khan fleeing Kabul with his loyalists. In spite of rejecting Burnes' advice, the British end up successfully occupying Afghanistan for two years, with Shah Shuja as king. But then, in 1842, the Afghans rise up in jihad and explode in a violent counter-attack which ends in the British army retreating ignominiously back to colonial India after being thoroughly routed by the Afghan tribes. The retreating troops get massacred mercilessly by the Afghans. But the story doesn't end there. There are hostages left behind in Kabul and Britain had to extract revenge and restore its 'honor'. So, an army of Retribution goes back to Afghanistan and repays the hatred and brutality in full measure, matching what would now be called 'war crime' for 'war crime'. Still, it was not feasible to continue occupying Afghanistan forever and so Britain withdraws, leaving Dost Mohammed Khan once again in power after all the carnage and destruction and expenditure of vast sums of money.
Dalrymple points to many eerie parallels with the current NATO occupation of Afghanistan. NATO went in to the country in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban. They did so and installed Hamid Karzai who, just like Shah Shuja in 1839, is seen as a Western puppet by the Afghans. Coincidentally, Karzai belongs to the same tribe as that of Shah Shuja. After twelve long years of occupation, NATO will retreat back in defeat in 2014, leaving possibly the Taliban, who are already said to be in control of 60% of the country, back in power. Just as Dost Mohammed Khan did in 1842. Interestingly the Taliban is made up from the same Ghilzai tribes who drove Britain out in 1842. Dalrymple also points out that Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy to the region, played much the same role that William Macnaghten played in 1839. Sir Cowper-Coles, the British Special Representative in 2010 in Kabul, described Holbrooke as a 'bull who brought his own china shop wherever he went'. Dalrymple says that this description sums up Macnaghten's style perfectly 174 years before. Finally, 170 years on, NATO is leaving Afghanistan for much the same primary reason for which Britain left – that Afghanistan was too poor then as it is today, for the occupiers to tax the country and make the occupied pay for their own subjugation!
This book shows how history can be written like a thriller without sacrificing facts and scholarship. One special feature of this book is that Dalrymple has used sources of research which have been used for the first time ever. Research material for the book has been sourced from British, Persian, Russian and Urdu archives. But the most interesting source is the nine previously untranslated full-length contemporary Afghan accounts of the conflict, including the autobiography of Shah Shuja himself. That makes the book unique.
The book has a big lesson for the powers which still want to play the Great Game. As Dalrymple recounts elsewhere, when Harold Macmillan was handing over the prime ministership of Britain to Alec Douglas-Home, he was supposed to have said, ‘My dear boy, you’ll be fine as long as you don’t invade Afghanistan.’ Pity that Tony Blair never knew about it!
A 'Must read' for anyone interested in the subject.
May 11, 2021
The pattern of the story is familiar to students of contemporary history. A Western power invades Afghanistan. Their army easily overcomes the forces of the local government and occupies the country. The victory soon turns sour, however, as missteps in dealing with the complex tribal politics of the region soon engender an uprising in the mountainous countryside. Eventually, exhausted by the drain on their resources, the army withdraws, leaving the victorious survivors to squabble over the remains and rebuild their country.
This is a narrative that could easily describe the decade-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and increasingly it looks to be the inevitable outcome of the ongoing U.S.-led operation as well. But it is also one that could also serve as a summary of the British invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1830s. It was those parallels which inspired William Dalrymple to write a history of the first Anglo-Afghan War, one that spotlights the folly of such an effort and the disastrous consequences for all involved.
To tell the story of the invasion, Dalrymple begins not with the British but with the Afghans, specifically with the Afghan ruler Shah Shuja. A member of the Durrani dynasty, he was overthrown in 1809 by his half-brother and predecessor, Shah Mahmoud, and forced into exile. Over the next 29 years Shuja mounted three attempts to reclaim his throne by force, all of which were thwarted by his successors. In between these attempts Shuja languished in Ludhiana, where he and his entourage subsisted on a pension provided by the British East India Company on the off chance that they might need an Afghan monarch at some point.
Shuja’s fourth opportunity to reclaim the throne came about as a result of the growing Anglo-Russian competition in the region. As Russia advanced into central Asia, securing the northwestern frontier of India became an increasing anxiety for both East India Company officials and British politicians. Fearing that Russia would ally with the current ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammad Khan, the company’s governor-general, Lord Auckland, decided to remove Dost Mohammad and reinstall Shah Shuja on the throne. Allying with the neighboring Sikh kingdom, Auckland used the Sikhs’ war with Afghanistan over the Peshawar Valley as the pretext for a joint invasion of the country, which began in December 1838.
Over the next eight months the British forces gradually occupied Afghanistan. Dalrymple’s account of the invasion stresses the arrogance of the British, who brought with them a massive train of camp followers and camels carrying luxury goods. Though their march though the rough terrain took a toll on their ranks the Afghan tribal levies proved a poor match against British-trained sepoys on the open battlefield, and Dost Mohammad fled Kabul ahead of its capture in August 1839. With Shah Shuja restored to the throne the British withdrew the bulk of their forces, but the remaining British presence soon alienated the Afghan population. This was exacerbated by the company’s parsimony, as efforts to curtail the massive financial drain of the occupation on the company’s coffers by reducing payments to tribal leaders soon turned them against Shah Shuja’s reign. The result was an uprising in November 1841 that forced the British out of Kabul.
Despite the growing signs of Afghan disaffection, the British were unprepared for the scale of the attack on their forces. Dalrymple’s description of the fighting underscores the poor decisions made by British leaders throughout the period, particularly those of the company’s pompous political officer, William Hay Macnaghten, and the ailing commanding general, William Elphinstone, whose disregard for the deteriorating situation left British personnel vulnerable to the rising. While an agreement to withdraw was reached at the start of 1842, the retreating British forces came under constant attack as they withdrew under punishing winter weather, with many of those who survived subsequently enslaved by Afghan tribesmen.
Though the newly-elected Tory government under Robert Peel wanted to end the British intervention, news of the uprising was greeted with a determination for vengeance. An “Army of Retribution” was quickly gathered to relieve other besieged garrisons and to punish the Afghans. Dalrymple does not minimize the atrocities committed by British forces, who gutted whole villages during their march on the Afghan capital. After retaking Kabul in September 1842, however, the British withdrew just a month later, leaving a ravaged kingdom to be ruled a restored Dost Mohammad, who over the next two decades confirmed his dynasty’s hold on the throne and established the borders of the country as it is known today.
Given the epic fate of Britain’s intervention of Afghanistan there have been no shortage of books written about it. Yet Dalrymple’s account surpasses them all, thanks to his lucid writing and incorporation of Afghan and Persian sources ignored by previous authors. These he uses to create an account that provides a wealth of insight into the Afghan perspective of the conflict, one all too often lacking in most English language chronicles. Using them he spins an engrossing account of a war which produced no winners but cast a shadow in the region that stretches down to the present day. It is difficult to imagine a better book ever being written about the first Anglo-Afghan War, nor one that is more necessary reading for anyone who thinks that a war in the region could produce a positive outcome. As Dalrymple so powerfully demonstrates, the Afghans have more than enough experience with invasion to thwart the will of any conqueror.
This is a narrative that could easily describe the decade-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and increasingly it looks to be the inevitable outcome of the ongoing U.S.-led operation as well. But it is also one that could also serve as a summary of the British invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1830s. It was those parallels which inspired William Dalrymple to write a history of the first Anglo-Afghan War, one that spotlights the folly of such an effort and the disastrous consequences for all involved.
To tell the story of the invasion, Dalrymple begins not with the British but with the Afghans, specifically with the Afghan ruler Shah Shuja. A member of the Durrani dynasty, he was overthrown in 1809 by his half-brother and predecessor, Shah Mahmoud, and forced into exile. Over the next 29 years Shuja mounted three attempts to reclaim his throne by force, all of which were thwarted by his successors. In between these attempts Shuja languished in Ludhiana, where he and his entourage subsisted on a pension provided by the British East India Company on the off chance that they might need an Afghan monarch at some point.
Shuja’s fourth opportunity to reclaim the throne came about as a result of the growing Anglo-Russian competition in the region. As Russia advanced into central Asia, securing the northwestern frontier of India became an increasing anxiety for both East India Company officials and British politicians. Fearing that Russia would ally with the current ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammad Khan, the company’s governor-general, Lord Auckland, decided to remove Dost Mohammad and reinstall Shah Shuja on the throne. Allying with the neighboring Sikh kingdom, Auckland used the Sikhs’ war with Afghanistan over the Peshawar Valley as the pretext for a joint invasion of the country, which began in December 1838.
Over the next eight months the British forces gradually occupied Afghanistan. Dalrymple’s account of the invasion stresses the arrogance of the British, who brought with them a massive train of camp followers and camels carrying luxury goods. Though their march though the rough terrain took a toll on their ranks the Afghan tribal levies proved a poor match against British-trained sepoys on the open battlefield, and Dost Mohammad fled Kabul ahead of its capture in August 1839. With Shah Shuja restored to the throne the British withdrew the bulk of their forces, but the remaining British presence soon alienated the Afghan population. This was exacerbated by the company’s parsimony, as efforts to curtail the massive financial drain of the occupation on the company’s coffers by reducing payments to tribal leaders soon turned them against Shah Shuja’s reign. The result was an uprising in November 1841 that forced the British out of Kabul.
Despite the growing signs of Afghan disaffection, the British were unprepared for the scale of the attack on their forces. Dalrymple’s description of the fighting underscores the poor decisions made by British leaders throughout the period, particularly those of the company’s pompous political officer, William Hay Macnaghten, and the ailing commanding general, William Elphinstone, whose disregard for the deteriorating situation left British personnel vulnerable to the rising. While an agreement to withdraw was reached at the start of 1842, the retreating British forces came under constant attack as they withdrew under punishing winter weather, with many of those who survived subsequently enslaved by Afghan tribesmen.
Though the newly-elected Tory government under Robert Peel wanted to end the British intervention, news of the uprising was greeted with a determination for vengeance. An “Army of Retribution” was quickly gathered to relieve other besieged garrisons and to punish the Afghans. Dalrymple does not minimize the atrocities committed by British forces, who gutted whole villages during their march on the Afghan capital. After retaking Kabul in September 1842, however, the British withdrew just a month later, leaving a ravaged kingdom to be ruled a restored Dost Mohammad, who over the next two decades confirmed his dynasty’s hold on the throne and established the borders of the country as it is known today.
Given the epic fate of Britain’s intervention of Afghanistan there have been no shortage of books written about it. Yet Dalrymple’s account surpasses them all, thanks to his lucid writing and incorporation of Afghan and Persian sources ignored by previous authors. These he uses to create an account that provides a wealth of insight into the Afghan perspective of the conflict, one all too often lacking in most English language chronicles. Using them he spins an engrossing account of a war which produced no winners but cast a shadow in the region that stretches down to the present day. It is difficult to imagine a better book ever being written about the first Anglo-Afghan War, nor one that is more necessary reading for anyone who thinks that a war in the region could produce a positive outcome. As Dalrymple so powerfully demonstrates, the Afghans have more than enough experience with invasion to thwart the will of any conqueror.
March 24, 2020
Using both British/Indian and Afghani sources the author has written a superb look at the fiasco that was the first British incursion into Afghanistan in 1839-42, known to history as the 1st Anglo-Afghani War. To explain why Britain decided to go into that country, the author starts his narrative with the first meetings of the British with the Afghani gov’t in the early 1800s and with that traces the beginnings of the “Great Game” and how it affected the decisions in Calcutta and London to “Invade” that central Asian country.
In presenting the British case for invading Afghanistan, Mr. Dalrymple looks at the British leadership in Calcutta at the time the decision was being made. In his opinion the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, was not the most dynamic of leaders. The author basically says, the Gov-Gen let his bureaucracy make the decisions for him and he just rubber stamped them. In telling of the Bureaucratic infighting, the story of the reports from British agents in Afghanistan itself either being rewritten or flatly ignored by those in favor of the invasion is a fascinating read and brings to mind stories of more recent Middle Easter forays by western powers.
When the invasion actually happens, the author makes clear that it was never the intention of the British Gov’t or more importantly the British East India Company - BEIC (which was actually running British India at the time) to annex the country, but to put a more sympathetic ruler on the throne. The British conveniently had one. The previous ruler, Shah Shuja who had been overthrown some 20 yrs before, was under British/Rajput control. It was decided to put him back on his throne with the understanding he would be much more sympathetic to British interests and opposed to Russian ones.
Once the invasion starts, the author makes the case that everything started quite well. The Shah was installed in Kabul with not much problem, the Afghani tribes were bribed (given subsidies) to accept him, and pretty much the whole country was brought into the BEIC’s sphere of influence. That said, almost from the very beginning hints of trouble could be sensed. One big one was romantic liaisons between occupying troops and native Afghan women. Soldiers being Soldiers made female friends and all that that entails. High ranking British officers and political operatives took Afghan women for wives and mistresses. This did not sit well with the extremely conservative Afghan tribal and religious leaders. Later as the occupation went on, the BEIC realized that the occupation was costing much more than they could afford and took steps to reduce expenditures. This included reducing the “Subsidies” being paid to the Tribes. This was basically the last straw for the tribes. In late 1841, they rose in rebellion, not so much against the Shah, but against the British occupation.
Another problem for the British was their commander, MG Elphinstone. He was so afflicted with gout, he could barely ride, had not seen active service since Waterloo, some 25 yrs before and could/would not make a decision.
Before telling the story of the rebellion, the author looks at other mistakes the British made. One of the main was is the siting of the Cantonment area in Kabul. It was overlooked by high hills within easy Jezail range of Afghani Tribesmen. In addition, the ammo supply for the garrison was in different location, with the food supply in still a different site. In spite of ample warning that things were going to get bad, nothing was done to rectify these problems. Also the Cantonment was simply too large to defend with the troops available. The rebellion started on 2 November 1841 and the British in Kabul managed to hold out for 2 months. On 1 Jan, a truce was negotiated and the British agreed to leave Kabul with all of the their dependants. Appox 4500 troops and 12000 dependents left Kabul for Jalabad. What happened next is nothing but a horror story. The truce did not hold and the British were massacred in the Passes. Only one person managed to reach Jalabad, Surgeon William Brydon on 13 January, 1842. The vast majority of the rest were slaughtered in the passes. They were either shot out of hand, if captured, stripped naked and throne out in the weather, and other tortures. Not all were killed, some of the English women were taken captive.
After the disaster of the Retreat, the author tells the story of the British punitive expedition the next spring. The British came with vengeance in their mind and what they did was almost as bad as what had happen to them the previous winter. They basically burned and destroyed every town, field, city in their path and killing anyone who looked at them cross eyed (as my mom used to say) including Kabul. Then the British declared victory and went back to India.
Finally Mr. Dalrymple concludes his narrative with a look at the current, as of 2013, NATO expedition/occupation and compares it with what happened some 170 yrs ago.
To sum it up, the British made about every mistake possible and it resulted in what in modern military terms is a “Cluster F**k”. I found this an excellent read and very eye opening. I would rate it a 4.5 star read so I’ve rounded up
In presenting the British case for invading Afghanistan, Mr. Dalrymple looks at the British leadership in Calcutta at the time the decision was being made. In his opinion the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, was not the most dynamic of leaders. The author basically says, the Gov-Gen let his bureaucracy make the decisions for him and he just rubber stamped them. In telling of the Bureaucratic infighting, the story of the reports from British agents in Afghanistan itself either being rewritten or flatly ignored by those in favor of the invasion is a fascinating read and brings to mind stories of more recent Middle Easter forays by western powers.
When the invasion actually happens, the author makes clear that it was never the intention of the British Gov’t or more importantly the British East India Company - BEIC (which was actually running British India at the time) to annex the country, but to put a more sympathetic ruler on the throne. The British conveniently had one. The previous ruler, Shah Shuja who had been overthrown some 20 yrs before, was under British/Rajput control. It was decided to put him back on his throne with the understanding he would be much more sympathetic to British interests and opposed to Russian ones.
Once the invasion starts, the author makes the case that everything started quite well. The Shah was installed in Kabul with not much problem, the Afghani tribes were bribed (given subsidies) to accept him, and pretty much the whole country was brought into the BEIC’s sphere of influence. That said, almost from the very beginning hints of trouble could be sensed. One big one was romantic liaisons between occupying troops and native Afghan women. Soldiers being Soldiers made female friends and all that that entails. High ranking British officers and political operatives took Afghan women for wives and mistresses. This did not sit well with the extremely conservative Afghan tribal and religious leaders. Later as the occupation went on, the BEIC realized that the occupation was costing much more than they could afford and took steps to reduce expenditures. This included reducing the “Subsidies” being paid to the Tribes. This was basically the last straw for the tribes. In late 1841, they rose in rebellion, not so much against the Shah, but against the British occupation.
Another problem for the British was their commander, MG Elphinstone. He was so afflicted with gout, he could barely ride, had not seen active service since Waterloo, some 25 yrs before and could/would not make a decision.
Before telling the story of the rebellion, the author looks at other mistakes the British made. One of the main was is the siting of the Cantonment area in Kabul. It was overlooked by high hills within easy Jezail range of Afghani Tribesmen. In addition, the ammo supply for the garrison was in different location, with the food supply in still a different site. In spite of ample warning that things were going to get bad, nothing was done to rectify these problems. Also the Cantonment was simply too large to defend with the troops available. The rebellion started on 2 November 1841 and the British in Kabul managed to hold out for 2 months. On 1 Jan, a truce was negotiated and the British agreed to leave Kabul with all of the their dependants. Appox 4500 troops and 12000 dependents left Kabul for Jalabad. What happened next is nothing but a horror story. The truce did not hold and the British were massacred in the Passes. Only one person managed to reach Jalabad, Surgeon William Brydon on 13 January, 1842. The vast majority of the rest were slaughtered in the passes. They were either shot out of hand, if captured, stripped naked and throne out in the weather, and other tortures. Not all were killed, some of the English women were taken captive.
After the disaster of the Retreat, the author tells the story of the British punitive expedition the next spring. The British came with vengeance in their mind and what they did was almost as bad as what had happen to them the previous winter. They basically burned and destroyed every town, field, city in their path and killing anyone who looked at them cross eyed (as my mom used to say) including Kabul. Then the British declared victory and went back to India.
Finally Mr. Dalrymple concludes his narrative with a look at the current, as of 2013, NATO expedition/occupation and compares it with what happened some 170 yrs ago.
To sum it up, the British made about every mistake possible and it resulted in what in modern military terms is a “Cluster F**k”. I found this an excellent read and very eye opening. I would rate it a 4.5 star read so I’ve rounded up
September 10, 2016
Does this sound familiar? Afghanistan is invaded by the army of a superpower keen to reinforce its power and prestige within the region. An easy victory is achieved, a puppet ruler is installed and at first things seem to go relatively well. However, resistance to the occupation force grows over time. Serious and humiliating defeats are suffered and the occupier eventually withdraws.
This could describe the past thirteen years of Afghan history following the invasion by coalition forces in 2001. It could describe the ten years after the Russian invasion in 1979. However, in this book, it describes the first Anglo-Afghan War and its aftermath in the period from 1839 to 1842, a period which both the Russians and the Americans and their allies would have done well to remember in the succeeding centuries.
I've loved Dalrymple's writing since I read his first work, In Xanadu: A Quest. His research is always meticulous and his prose engaging. That's as true of this work as it is of the others I've read. One of the strongest features of the work is Dalrymple's use of Afghan sources not previously cited in histories of the conflict. He does so to great effect, making the Afghan leaders as real as their British adversaries. Perhaps the greatest weakness, from my perspective, is the relatively short section at the end in which Dalrymple describes his research in Aghanistan. The weakness is not in what Dalrymple writes, it's that the section is too short: I would have loved to read more about Dalrymple's observations on the current situation in Afghanistan and its links to what happened there in the past.
I read this work in e-book format which has its disadvantages. While I'm reasonably familiar with the geography of Afghanistan, it would have been good to consult the maps which are at the front of the book and the photographs at the back (I presume that they're in the middle of the regular book) at will, something very difficult to do with a book in electronic format. However, this was still an extremely interesting read and one I enjoyed sharing with my friend Jemidar, even though she powered through it while I limped along behind.
Hegel wrote: "The only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history". If ever there was an illustration of this, it's Afghanistan. Dalrymple brings that illustration to life.
February 3, 2015
The work of William Darymple is a treat to read. This is the second book work of Darymple’s that I have read (the first being The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty: Delhi, 1857). The author does an excellent job providing context and details of the times, characters, and decisions surrounding Britain’s first Afghan war as well as a cautionary tale (largely ignored) for NATO and US forces in Afghanistan.
May 29, 2013
The timing of the book is impeccable.Impeccable because there are a lot of similarities between what is Afghanistan now and what it was then.The book describes the history of Afghanistan from 1839-1842.
The similarities..
World's super-power : Then Britain , now USA.
The reasons for the battle for Afghanistan are also similar.The Brits wanted to secure India's borders and feared(wrongly) Russian influence in the region.The present situation has arised from what was a cold war skirmish between USSR and USA which led to the establishment of Taliban/Mujahideen and we all know what happened later.
They say history repeats itself and nothing can be a better example than Afghanistan.The Brits established a puppet regime by installing Shah Shuja(a Sadozai)on the throne.They won Afghanistan easily but failed to stay there for long and when they left Amir Dost Mohammad(a Barakzai) soon usurped power. Jump to the present, The Americans easily defeated Afghanistan and installed Hamid Karzai(a Barakzai) but find it very difficult to control.Mullah Omar ( a Barakzai) leads the resistance.
The question is what happens to Afghanistan when the Americans leave? The regime of Shah Shuja was toppled within a month of the British retreat back to India.The answer is pretty evident.
I have always wanted to read a William Dalrymple book and I now get why is so highly regarded.A thoroughly researched book by an historian who can write
The similarities..
World's super-power : Then Britain , now USA.
The reasons for the battle for Afghanistan are also similar.The Brits wanted to secure India's borders and feared(wrongly) Russian influence in the region.The present situation has arised from what was a cold war skirmish between USSR and USA which led to the establishment of Taliban/Mujahideen and we all know what happened later.
They say history repeats itself and nothing can be a better example than Afghanistan.The Brits established a puppet regime by installing Shah Shuja(a Sadozai)on the throne.They won Afghanistan easily but failed to stay there for long and when they left Amir Dost Mohammad(a Barakzai) soon usurped power. Jump to the present, The Americans easily defeated Afghanistan and installed Hamid Karzai(a Barakzai) but find it very difficult to control.Mullah Omar ( a Barakzai) leads the resistance.
The question is what happens to Afghanistan when the Americans leave? The regime of Shah Shuja was toppled within a month of the British retreat back to India.The answer is pretty evident.
I have always wanted to read a William Dalrymple book and I now get why is so highly regarded.A thoroughly researched book by an historian who can write
June 5, 2019
Before I read this book I was wondering why the U.S. still had troops in Afghanistan. The people of this country hate having foreign soldiers in their country. Their presence probably strengthens the Taliban more than it weakens them because at least they are natives and Muslim. Some Afghans believe that the Chinese will occupy their country after the Americans leave.
May 13, 2018
Not a bad book. Good for understanding the early history of Afghanistan.
September 12, 2021
GREAT GAME
Dalrymple believes that the first Anglo-Afghan war occurred due to the Great Game between Russia and Britain for territory in Asia and the British desire to safeguard India.
The British official presentation of their views was that the real fear they had was of a Russian invasion of India with the help of Russia’s Iranian allies. Iranian moves on the Afghan city of Herat in 1837 were identified as being moves taken by Russia. The British did not want Russia or its Qajar ally to seize Afghanistan so decided to invade Afghanistan itself and replace the ruler Dost Mohammed Khan with a more pliable candidate. The reality was that the British in India feared something altogether different, there was no fear of Russia which at that time was beyond the Caspian sea. What the British actually feared was the loss of their Indian empire at the hands of a Qajar and Afghan army entering the Khyber Pass. The Qajar and Afghan alliance engineered by Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was designed with a view to defeat the Sikhs and remove them from Peshawar and Lahore. The British feared an advancing Islamic army would lead to a popular revolt in India against British rule. There is evidence in the writings of the British participants of the first Anglo-Afghan war that if they failed in their Afghan invasionthey would also lose India. Dalrymple by repeating the Great Game argument simply misses the point that the Afghans and Qajars were the real threat that the British invasion of Afghanistan was aimed at – not a non-existent Russian threat.
Afghan women allegedly marrying British officers
Afghan women and British officers (p.223 Dalrymple): ‘Afghan’s sense of honour was now beginning to be seriously offended by the growing number of affairs taking place between British officers and Afghan women. The most prominent was probably the marriage between Captain Robert Warburton and the beautiful Shah Jahan Begum, a niece of Dost Mohammad, to which both Burnes and Lt Sturt were witnesses’ Equally sensitive was between Lieutenant Lynch, the Political Agent at Qalat, and the beautiful sister of Walu Khan Shamulzai, the local Ghilzai Chieftain.”
The marriage by Captain Warburton to Shah Jahan Begum was a forced Muslim nikah ceremony: See Collister Hostage in Afghanistan page: 21-22. Dalrymple cites Collister in his bibliography but had he bothered to familiarize himself with this work, he would not have made the above mistake. Essentially the nikah ceremony cannot be considered to be valid since a non-Muslim male cannot be married to a Muslim female.
Dalrymple provides no evidence that Lieutenant Lynch married WaluShamulzai’s sister Afghan or that there was an ‘affair’ – again this appears to have been a forced relationship since a British officer the infamous Nicholson intended to kill WaluShamulzai and relented under pressure from Lynch who in turn received WaluShamulzai’s sister: See p.321 Yapp Strategies of British India 1980.
PERSIAN IS CULTURED – PASHTO IS NOT
Dalrymple states with a large hint of anti-Pashtun bias there is no evidence Shuja could speak Pashto: “Shuja created around him a highly cultured Persianate world – there is no indication that the Shah ever knew Pashtu, and he certainly did not write in it. He lived, as the Mughals did before him, a life of mobile kingship and in many ways he emerges as the last Timurid, exercising his rule in a country that was still at the crossroads of Iran, Central Asia, China and Hindustan, not the mountainous periphery it would later become.” p.501 Return of a King. In essence Persian is “highly cultured” yet Pashto implicit in what William writes is not worth knowing about. However, Dalrymple is entirely wrong as Darlymple’s wife’s ancestor Colin Mackenzie asserted Pashto was spoken by Shuja since it was his mother tongue:
“He was a man of considerable ability, an Arabic scholar and a poet, well acquainted with Persian literature, speaking Persian perfectly, and Hindustani with ease, besides his mother-tongue
Pushtu; yet, strange to say, the court language on public occasions is Turki! Everything said to the Shah in Persian was repeated to him by his Master of the Ceremonies in Turki, and he replied in the same manner, a curious reminiscence of the time when Afghan kings reigned from Bokhara to the Indian Ocean, and from Meshed to Sirhind.p .185 Helen Mackenzie ‘Storms and sunshine in a soldier’s life’. Colin Mackenzie must surely be turning in his grave at Dalrymple’s ignorance, lack of research and overall lack of intelligence in respect of the central figure in Darlymple’s book, Shah ShujaUlMulk.
Dalrymple appears to look down on spoken Pashto and furthermore blames the Afghans for their country ceasing to be at the “cross roads” of the region but becoming a neglected “mountainous periphery” in effect a forgotten backwater. Afghanistan was forced into becoming a “mountainous periphery” by Britain which did not want foreign travellers coming to Afghanistan and by the expansion of Russia and Britain which came to border Afghanistan. Britain failed to integrate Afghanistan into its trading systems until after the second Anglo Afghan war. Dalrymple merely blames the victims for the crimes of imperialism, an imperialism whichDalrymple’s family has benefitted greatly from to keep them in the style in which they have become accustomed.
THE EXECUTION OF MULLAH SHAKOOR ISHAQZAI
In my book Afghanistan in the Age of Empires I detail how Mullah Shakoor is deposed and killed. Dalrymple did not appreciate in his book that the Mullah had been killed, which I detail as follows: “Macnaghten and Shuja spent the winter in the warmer climes of Jalalabad, where Macnaghten graciously took the best house leaving Shuja to make do with second best. Macnaghten made sure that Shuja got hot under the collar. The Khan of Bajaur came into pledge allegiance to Shuja and gave a present of three beautiful Kafiristan slave girls. Macnaghten was not content with Shuja keeping the present and made sure that the slaves were married off to Shujas’ followers (p.36 G Lawrence). More dangerously Macnaghten moved to seize power from Shuja.Mullah Shakoor was Shuja’s Prime Minister, his Wazir. Mullah ShakoorIshakzai loyally served Shuja throughout their exile in India. Shakoor had tried hard to prevent Kabuli shopkeepers inflating prices to fleece the public and attempted to maintain a facade of running a state independent of British control. Mullah Shakoor enjoyed the ire of Macnaghten because he would not bow to British authority.
Shakoor was undoubtedly a brave man who spoke the truth before Macnaghten irrespective of the consequences. However like all tyrants Macnaghten would eventually replace the Mullah but would not be satisfied with depriving Mullah Shakoor simply from the role of Wazir and replacing him with a more pliable candidate. Indeed, Lady Sale writes on 3rd November 1841, that several months ago documents surfaced stating that all true believers should rise against the Kaffirs, Mullah Shakoor was blamed “and as dead men tell no tales, much of the obloquy was allowed to rest on MoollahShakoor, who had paid the penalty of other state crimes.” (p46-47 Lady Sale Disasters in Afghanistan)Mullah Shakoor’s soul would probably be at rest knowing that you reap what you sow and Macnaghten would soon pay for his oppression.”
BURNES AND MACNAGHTEN PLAN TO OVERTHROW SHUJA
Dalrymple does not know that Burnes and Macnaghten wanted to overthrow Shah Shuja as I detail in my book:
“On Sept 1st 1841 Burnes records in his diary, “An expression from, Macnaghten to-day that Shah Soojah was an old woman not fit to rule his people, with divers (sic) other condemnations”(Alexander Burnes Diary, John Murray Archive, National Library of Scotland; p286 vol 2 Lives of Indian officers, Kaye (1880)). Burnes fully agreed with Macnaghtens’ anti Shuja sentiments. By 22 September 1841 Burnes and Macnaghten were reviewing who would succeed Shuja since a soothsayer, “A native predicts his death; he is not long-lived, I plainly see. If he dies, we were planning the modus operandi. I offered to go to Candahar, and bring up the new King Timour, and I predict he will make a good ruler.” Ironically Burnes and Macnaghten would be disappointed since both would predecease Shuja. Burnes’ life was dedicated to pleasure. Burnes’ God was that belonging to the true hedonist, for Burnes worshipped his own desires, which he pursued voraciously. For this reason Burnes was blind to the fate that would shortly befall him.”
BATTLE OF BADR AND THE KABUL UPRISING
Dalrymple in ‘Return of a King’ book wrongly asserts that the Kabul uprising of 2 November 1841 against British rule occurred in the first week of Ramadan.However, 2 November 1841 falls on 17 Ramadan 1257, which is the anniversary of the battle of Badr. The uprising occurred on 17 Ramadan to take advantage of the blessings of that holy date.
WILLIAM DALRYMPLE INSULTS AFGHANISTAN’S NATIONAL HERO WAZIR MOHAMMED AKBAR KHAN BY REFERRING TO HIM AS “RUTHLESS”.
On page 310 of ‘Return of a King’Dalrymple refers to Dost Mohammed’s “clever and ruthless son, Akbar Khan,”- ruthless is not an apt description. Mohammed Akbar Khan cannot be said to have no pity or compassion for others as Dalrymple himself writes on
page 401 prisoner’s account citing Akbar’s care for them. “Lawrence …noting that Akbar gave up his palanquin to Ladies Sale and Macnaghten…When Lawrence told Akbar that the prisoners needed a little money he was immediately offered a thousand rupees: ‘on giving him a receipt for it, he tore it up, saying such things were only required among traders, not between gentlemen’. “ So to claim that Mohammed Akbar Khan is “ruthless” is not supported by the facts.
THE JANUARY 1842 RETREAT FROM KABUL
Dalrymple misrepresents Elphinstone’s retreating British army from Kabul as ‘refugees”!
Page 369 ‘Return of a King’ “They (Afghans) travelled parallel to the British, on both flanks of the column firing parallel into the jostling rabble of refugees they were now driving between them” This is an utterly nonsensical description of a retreating army as “refugees”. Refugees are people who are being forced to flee their country of origin due to e.g. political persecution or ethnic persecution not an army retreating from a country they have occupied illegally. Indeed this British armed force was capable of inflicting violence on Afghans and did so. Mohammed Akbar Khan had promised safe passage to the British out of Afghanistan if they disarmed and handed over their weapons at Kabul but the British refused to abide by this agreement. Dalrymple continues the above sentence with further metaphors portraying the retreating army as defenceless sheep to the slaughter: “they (Afghans) were now driving between them, like shepherds expertly controlling a flock of panicked sheep”. I have never seen “sheep” with cannons or rifles. Dalrymple is attempting to very subtly engage the sympathy of the reader with the retreating British army. A soldier has his bayonet and rifle, the writer has words and knows the effect of their words, Dalrymple in this passage condemns himself as being sympathetic to the British army and their invasion of Afghanistan .
RETREAT SURVIVORS
In‘Return of a King’ we are told that survivors from the Kabul to Jellalabad retreat of January 1842 consisted of DrBrydon, a Greek man, some Gurkhas and camp followers. In fact another man also escaped, from Gandamak turning up in 1843 in Gujrat. Popular historians like Dalrymple simply regurgitate accepted historical facts such as Brydon being the sole British survivor of the retreat. In my book Afghanistan in the Age of Empires, I identify a Scot, a fellow countryman of Dalrymples who also survived the retreat:
“The oddest account of escape from Gundamuck concerns that of a dark skinned faqir who appeared in India in rags but was in fact a Scottish non commissioned officer who fled all the way to a British army Camp Deesa in Gujrat India,
“This morning a strange man came into camp, covered with hair, and almost naked his face burnt very much; he turned out to be Lance-Sergeant Philip Edwards of the Queen’s 44th Regiment who escaped at the general slaughter at Gundamuch, Affghanistan, and after travelling 15 months in a southerly direction by the sun, he found his way into camp here, not knowing where he was. He says the 44th men were all drunk, and could make no resistance…He was wounded by a bullet in the leg, and when the men were nearly all cut up he mounted a camel with another man and made off. They kept together eight months and then separated, as they could not agree about the direction of travelling. They lived on any grain they could find and killed goats now and then, but sometimes were obliged to live on grass and herbs. The Affghans treated them well, but on entering Scinde the natives…hunt them out of their villages and set dogs on them.” (excerpt from letter dated 2 March 1843 published in The Times on 15 May 1843.)
Afghanistan had turned the white man black, the proud red coated trooper into an Indian faqir, the Scot had become the oriental other, surviving on the grace of villagers who fed him. This man, Lance-Sergeant Edwards embodied the very real stripping away of British power and the Indians could see once and for all that their imperial overlord could be reduced to the level of a mere beggar.”(Excerpt from Afghanistan in the Age of Empires (2018)).
KABUL RETREAT ‘MASSACRE’
It is not true that Afghans massacred all the Indian camp followers with General Elphinstone’s retreating army during January 1842:
“Afghans have always been noted by travellers as a hospitable people and this was even extended to their erstwhile enemies, “A poor Hindustanee woman and two boys who had been prisoners were also recovered: they had all lost their feet from frost. They mention that in the village from which they were brought, there were two more Hindustanees, who refused to come back being very comfortable where they were.”” (p.455 T Diary of Lieut C F Trower 33rd Bengal Native infantry during the Anglo Afghan War of 1842.) Excerpt from Afghanistan in the Age of Empires. Yet Dalrymple’s book simply repeats the pattern of past British histories in blaming Afghans for massacring the camp followers when he writes, The least lucky were those hundreds of sepoys and camp followers who neither escaped nor were enslaved or killed. In the Tezin Pass alone 1,500 of these were stripped of their goods and their clothes by the Afghans, then left to starve and freeze to death in the snows” (pages 383-384 Return of a King).
Suggestions that the Afghans massacred the Indians fulfill the claim made by the British of the “Kabul massacre” which a google search shows is a reference to the extermination of Elphinstone’s army and accompanying Indians. However, this is a mere orientalist trope peddled by British writers. Many British officers and their wives were taken into safe custody by Wazir Mohammed Akbar Khan. The real “Kabul Massacre” was the British looting and slaughter of the Kabul inhabitants when General Pollock’s army left Kabul in October 1842. Yet an internet search does not address this massacre of Kabul civilians.
Mutilation by Afghan women
The worst orientalist assertion by Dalrmplye is towards the end of his book where he heaps further insults on Afghan women. Dalrymple alleges the role of Pakhtun women in battle is to mutilate British combatants (see page 467 Return of a King). Dalrymple cites his sources as John Allen author of ‘Soldier Sahib’, John alleges that gruesome practice is the custom of “Afghan women” but cites no source for this absurd insulting allegation. There are positive images of Afghan women in hand to hand combat and leading cavalry charges during the first Anglo-Afghan war in my book. However Dalrymple appears to think that the role of Afghan women in war was reduced to providing water for the fighting men and mutilating the British. This fits in with the classic prejudices of the British who see Afghan women as ‘savages’ as depicted in Kipling’s famous poem about the wounded soldier left on Afghanistan’s plains who should commit suicide before the Afghan women reach him. More maturity is expected of experienced historians like Dalrymple than to pass this nonsensical anecdote off as meaningful history. Such writing insults all Afghan women. The reason for such allegations is of course to disguise the abuse that the British committed against Afghan women. When the Afghan woman was armed, she was more than a match in combat against the British enemy.
WAZIR MOHAMMED AKBAR KHAN’S POISONING
“When Akbar khan was poisoned in 1847 it was widely rumoured that it was on his father’s orders” page 475 ‘Return of a King’. This is orientalist fantasy at its height – which father kills his son. This kind of accusation fits the orientalist narrative of savage Afghans repeated in many writings of British war veterans. Dalrymple as an experienced historian should have gone beyond the superficial rumours and explored further who could have killed Mohammed Akbar Khan but does not do so. Mohammed Akbar Khan was first poisoned in 1839 by a British agent when he was commanding Afghan forces in the Khyber to oppose a British advance. As a result of the poisoning the Wazir was withdrawn from the Khyber Pass.Furtherthe Wazir was killed in 1847 by his Indian doctor.Therefore as I write in my book Afghanistan in the Age of Empires the poisoning and Killing of the Wazir is likely to have been directed by the East India Company who did not want Afghans to support the Sikh struggle against the British.
Dalrymple believes that the first Anglo-Afghan war occurred due to the Great Game between Russia and Britain for territory in Asia and the British desire to safeguard India.
The British official presentation of their views was that the real fear they had was of a Russian invasion of India with the help of Russia’s Iranian allies. Iranian moves on the Afghan city of Herat in 1837 were identified as being moves taken by Russia. The British did not want Russia or its Qajar ally to seize Afghanistan so decided to invade Afghanistan itself and replace the ruler Dost Mohammed Khan with a more pliable candidate. The reality was that the British in India feared something altogether different, there was no fear of Russia which at that time was beyond the Caspian sea. What the British actually feared was the loss of their Indian empire at the hands of a Qajar and Afghan army entering the Khyber Pass. The Qajar and Afghan alliance engineered by Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was designed with a view to defeat the Sikhs and remove them from Peshawar and Lahore. The British feared an advancing Islamic army would lead to a popular revolt in India against British rule. There is evidence in the writings of the British participants of the first Anglo-Afghan war that if they failed in their Afghan invasionthey would also lose India. Dalrymple by repeating the Great Game argument simply misses the point that the Afghans and Qajars were the real threat that the British invasion of Afghanistan was aimed at – not a non-existent Russian threat.
Afghan women allegedly marrying British officers
Afghan women and British officers (p.223 Dalrymple): ‘Afghan’s sense of honour was now beginning to be seriously offended by the growing number of affairs taking place between British officers and Afghan women. The most prominent was probably the marriage between Captain Robert Warburton and the beautiful Shah Jahan Begum, a niece of Dost Mohammad, to which both Burnes and Lt Sturt were witnesses’ Equally sensitive was between Lieutenant Lynch, the Political Agent at Qalat, and the beautiful sister of Walu Khan Shamulzai, the local Ghilzai Chieftain.”
The marriage by Captain Warburton to Shah Jahan Begum was a forced Muslim nikah ceremony: See Collister Hostage in Afghanistan page: 21-22. Dalrymple cites Collister in his bibliography but had he bothered to familiarize himself with this work, he would not have made the above mistake. Essentially the nikah ceremony cannot be considered to be valid since a non-Muslim male cannot be married to a Muslim female.
Dalrymple provides no evidence that Lieutenant Lynch married WaluShamulzai’s sister Afghan or that there was an ‘affair’ – again this appears to have been a forced relationship since a British officer the infamous Nicholson intended to kill WaluShamulzai and relented under pressure from Lynch who in turn received WaluShamulzai’s sister: See p.321 Yapp Strategies of British India 1980.
PERSIAN IS CULTURED – PASHTO IS NOT
Dalrymple states with a large hint of anti-Pashtun bias there is no evidence Shuja could speak Pashto: “Shuja created around him a highly cultured Persianate world – there is no indication that the Shah ever knew Pashtu, and he certainly did not write in it. He lived, as the Mughals did before him, a life of mobile kingship and in many ways he emerges as the last Timurid, exercising his rule in a country that was still at the crossroads of Iran, Central Asia, China and Hindustan, not the mountainous periphery it would later become.” p.501 Return of a King. In essence Persian is “highly cultured” yet Pashto implicit in what William writes is not worth knowing about. However, Dalrymple is entirely wrong as Darlymple’s wife’s ancestor Colin Mackenzie asserted Pashto was spoken by Shuja since it was his mother tongue:
“He was a man of considerable ability, an Arabic scholar and a poet, well acquainted with Persian literature, speaking Persian perfectly, and Hindustani with ease, besides his mother-tongue
Pushtu; yet, strange to say, the court language on public occasions is Turki! Everything said to the Shah in Persian was repeated to him by his Master of the Ceremonies in Turki, and he replied in the same manner, a curious reminiscence of the time when Afghan kings reigned from Bokhara to the Indian Ocean, and from Meshed to Sirhind.p .185 Helen Mackenzie ‘Storms and sunshine in a soldier’s life’. Colin Mackenzie must surely be turning in his grave at Dalrymple’s ignorance, lack of research and overall lack of intelligence in respect of the central figure in Darlymple’s book, Shah ShujaUlMulk.
Dalrymple appears to look down on spoken Pashto and furthermore blames the Afghans for their country ceasing to be at the “cross roads” of the region but becoming a neglected “mountainous periphery” in effect a forgotten backwater. Afghanistan was forced into becoming a “mountainous periphery” by Britain which did not want foreign travellers coming to Afghanistan and by the expansion of Russia and Britain which came to border Afghanistan. Britain failed to integrate Afghanistan into its trading systems until after the second Anglo Afghan war. Dalrymple merely blames the victims for the crimes of imperialism, an imperialism whichDalrymple’s family has benefitted greatly from to keep them in the style in which they have become accustomed.
THE EXECUTION OF MULLAH SHAKOOR ISHAQZAI
In my book Afghanistan in the Age of Empires I detail how Mullah Shakoor is deposed and killed. Dalrymple did not appreciate in his book that the Mullah had been killed, which I detail as follows: “Macnaghten and Shuja spent the winter in the warmer climes of Jalalabad, where Macnaghten graciously took the best house leaving Shuja to make do with second best. Macnaghten made sure that Shuja got hot under the collar. The Khan of Bajaur came into pledge allegiance to Shuja and gave a present of three beautiful Kafiristan slave girls. Macnaghten was not content with Shuja keeping the present and made sure that the slaves were married off to Shujas’ followers (p.36 G Lawrence). More dangerously Macnaghten moved to seize power from Shuja.Mullah Shakoor was Shuja’s Prime Minister, his Wazir. Mullah ShakoorIshakzai loyally served Shuja throughout their exile in India. Shakoor had tried hard to prevent Kabuli shopkeepers inflating prices to fleece the public and attempted to maintain a facade of running a state independent of British control. Mullah Shakoor enjoyed the ire of Macnaghten because he would not bow to British authority.
Shakoor was undoubtedly a brave man who spoke the truth before Macnaghten irrespective of the consequences. However like all tyrants Macnaghten would eventually replace the Mullah but would not be satisfied with depriving Mullah Shakoor simply from the role of Wazir and replacing him with a more pliable candidate. Indeed, Lady Sale writes on 3rd November 1841, that several months ago documents surfaced stating that all true believers should rise against the Kaffirs, Mullah Shakoor was blamed “and as dead men tell no tales, much of the obloquy was allowed to rest on MoollahShakoor, who had paid the penalty of other state crimes.” (p46-47 Lady Sale Disasters in Afghanistan)Mullah Shakoor’s soul would probably be at rest knowing that you reap what you sow and Macnaghten would soon pay for his oppression.”
BURNES AND MACNAGHTEN PLAN TO OVERTHROW SHUJA
Dalrymple does not know that Burnes and Macnaghten wanted to overthrow Shah Shuja as I detail in my book:
“On Sept 1st 1841 Burnes records in his diary, “An expression from, Macnaghten to-day that Shah Soojah was an old woman not fit to rule his people, with divers (sic) other condemnations”(Alexander Burnes Diary, John Murray Archive, National Library of Scotland; p286 vol 2 Lives of Indian officers, Kaye (1880)). Burnes fully agreed with Macnaghtens’ anti Shuja sentiments. By 22 September 1841 Burnes and Macnaghten were reviewing who would succeed Shuja since a soothsayer, “A native predicts his death; he is not long-lived, I plainly see. If he dies, we were planning the modus operandi. I offered to go to Candahar, and bring up the new King Timour, and I predict he will make a good ruler.” Ironically Burnes and Macnaghten would be disappointed since both would predecease Shuja. Burnes’ life was dedicated to pleasure. Burnes’ God was that belonging to the true hedonist, for Burnes worshipped his own desires, which he pursued voraciously. For this reason Burnes was blind to the fate that would shortly befall him.”
BATTLE OF BADR AND THE KABUL UPRISING
Dalrymple in ‘Return of a King’ book wrongly asserts that the Kabul uprising of 2 November 1841 against British rule occurred in the first week of Ramadan.However, 2 November 1841 falls on 17 Ramadan 1257, which is the anniversary of the battle of Badr. The uprising occurred on 17 Ramadan to take advantage of the blessings of that holy date.
WILLIAM DALRYMPLE INSULTS AFGHANISTAN’S NATIONAL HERO WAZIR MOHAMMED AKBAR KHAN BY REFERRING TO HIM AS “RUTHLESS”.
On page 310 of ‘Return of a King’Dalrymple refers to Dost Mohammed’s “clever and ruthless son, Akbar Khan,”- ruthless is not an apt description. Mohammed Akbar Khan cannot be said to have no pity or compassion for others as Dalrymple himself writes on
page 401 prisoner’s account citing Akbar’s care for them. “Lawrence …noting that Akbar gave up his palanquin to Ladies Sale and Macnaghten…When Lawrence told Akbar that the prisoners needed a little money he was immediately offered a thousand rupees: ‘on giving him a receipt for it, he tore it up, saying such things were only required among traders, not between gentlemen’. “ So to claim that Mohammed Akbar Khan is “ruthless” is not supported by the facts.
THE JANUARY 1842 RETREAT FROM KABUL
Dalrymple misrepresents Elphinstone’s retreating British army from Kabul as ‘refugees”!
Page 369 ‘Return of a King’ “They (Afghans) travelled parallel to the British, on both flanks of the column firing parallel into the jostling rabble of refugees they were now driving between them” This is an utterly nonsensical description of a retreating army as “refugees”. Refugees are people who are being forced to flee their country of origin due to e.g. political persecution or ethnic persecution not an army retreating from a country they have occupied illegally. Indeed this British armed force was capable of inflicting violence on Afghans and did so. Mohammed Akbar Khan had promised safe passage to the British out of Afghanistan if they disarmed and handed over their weapons at Kabul but the British refused to abide by this agreement. Dalrymple continues the above sentence with further metaphors portraying the retreating army as defenceless sheep to the slaughter: “they (Afghans) were now driving between them, like shepherds expertly controlling a flock of panicked sheep”. I have never seen “sheep” with cannons or rifles. Dalrymple is attempting to very subtly engage the sympathy of the reader with the retreating British army. A soldier has his bayonet and rifle, the writer has words and knows the effect of their words, Dalrymple in this passage condemns himself as being sympathetic to the British army and their invasion of Afghanistan .
RETREAT SURVIVORS
In‘Return of a King’ we are told that survivors from the Kabul to Jellalabad retreat of January 1842 consisted of DrBrydon, a Greek man, some Gurkhas and camp followers. In fact another man also escaped, from Gandamak turning up in 1843 in Gujrat. Popular historians like Dalrymple simply regurgitate accepted historical facts such as Brydon being the sole British survivor of the retreat. In my book Afghanistan in the Age of Empires, I identify a Scot, a fellow countryman of Dalrymples who also survived the retreat:
“The oddest account of escape from Gundamuck concerns that of a dark skinned faqir who appeared in India in rags but was in fact a Scottish non commissioned officer who fled all the way to a British army Camp Deesa in Gujrat India,
“This morning a strange man came into camp, covered with hair, and almost naked his face burnt very much; he turned out to be Lance-Sergeant Philip Edwards of the Queen’s 44th Regiment who escaped at the general slaughter at Gundamuch, Affghanistan, and after travelling 15 months in a southerly direction by the sun, he found his way into camp here, not knowing where he was. He says the 44th men were all drunk, and could make no resistance…He was wounded by a bullet in the leg, and when the men were nearly all cut up he mounted a camel with another man and made off. They kept together eight months and then separated, as they could not agree about the direction of travelling. They lived on any grain they could find and killed goats now and then, but sometimes were obliged to live on grass and herbs. The Affghans treated them well, but on entering Scinde the natives…hunt them out of their villages and set dogs on them.” (excerpt from letter dated 2 March 1843 published in The Times on 15 May 1843.)
Afghanistan had turned the white man black, the proud red coated trooper into an Indian faqir, the Scot had become the oriental other, surviving on the grace of villagers who fed him. This man, Lance-Sergeant Edwards embodied the very real stripping away of British power and the Indians could see once and for all that their imperial overlord could be reduced to the level of a mere beggar.”(Excerpt from Afghanistan in the Age of Empires (2018)).
KABUL RETREAT ‘MASSACRE’
It is not true that Afghans massacred all the Indian camp followers with General Elphinstone’s retreating army during January 1842:
“Afghans have always been noted by travellers as a hospitable people and this was even extended to their erstwhile enemies, “A poor Hindustanee woman and two boys who had been prisoners were also recovered: they had all lost their feet from frost. They mention that in the village from which they were brought, there were two more Hindustanees, who refused to come back being very comfortable where they were.”” (p.455 T Diary of Lieut C F Trower 33rd Bengal Native infantry during the Anglo Afghan War of 1842.) Excerpt from Afghanistan in the Age of Empires. Yet Dalrymple’s book simply repeats the pattern of past British histories in blaming Afghans for massacring the camp followers when he writes, The least lucky were those hundreds of sepoys and camp followers who neither escaped nor were enslaved or killed. In the Tezin Pass alone 1,500 of these were stripped of their goods and their clothes by the Afghans, then left to starve and freeze to death in the snows” (pages 383-384 Return of a King).
Suggestions that the Afghans massacred the Indians fulfill the claim made by the British of the “Kabul massacre” which a google search shows is a reference to the extermination of Elphinstone’s army and accompanying Indians. However, this is a mere orientalist trope peddled by British writers. Many British officers and their wives were taken into safe custody by Wazir Mohammed Akbar Khan. The real “Kabul Massacre” was the British looting and slaughter of the Kabul inhabitants when General Pollock’s army left Kabul in October 1842. Yet an internet search does not address this massacre of Kabul civilians.
Mutilation by Afghan women
The worst orientalist assertion by Dalrmplye is towards the end of his book where he heaps further insults on Afghan women. Dalrymple alleges the role of Pakhtun women in battle is to mutilate British combatants (see page 467 Return of a King). Dalrymple cites his sources as John Allen author of ‘Soldier Sahib’, John alleges that gruesome practice is the custom of “Afghan women” but cites no source for this absurd insulting allegation. There are positive images of Afghan women in hand to hand combat and leading cavalry charges during the first Anglo-Afghan war in my book. However Dalrymple appears to think that the role of Afghan women in war was reduced to providing water for the fighting men and mutilating the British. This fits in with the classic prejudices of the British who see Afghan women as ‘savages’ as depicted in Kipling’s famous poem about the wounded soldier left on Afghanistan’s plains who should commit suicide before the Afghan women reach him. More maturity is expected of experienced historians like Dalrymple than to pass this nonsensical anecdote off as meaningful history. Such writing insults all Afghan women. The reason for such allegations is of course to disguise the abuse that the British committed against Afghan women. When the Afghan woman was armed, she was more than a match in combat against the British enemy.
WAZIR MOHAMMED AKBAR KHAN’S POISONING
“When Akbar khan was poisoned in 1847 it was widely rumoured that it was on his father’s orders” page 475 ‘Return of a King’. This is orientalist fantasy at its height – which father kills his son. This kind of accusation fits the orientalist narrative of savage Afghans repeated in many writings of British war veterans. Dalrymple as an experienced historian should have gone beyond the superficial rumours and explored further who could have killed Mohammed Akbar Khan but does not do so. Mohammed Akbar Khan was first poisoned in 1839 by a British agent when he was commanding Afghan forces in the Khyber to oppose a British advance. As a result of the poisoning the Wazir was withdrawn from the Khyber Pass.Furtherthe Wazir was killed in 1847 by his Indian doctor.Therefore as I write in my book Afghanistan in the Age of Empires the poisoning and Killing of the Wazir is likely to have been directed by the East India Company who did not want Afghans to support the Sikh struggle against the British.
April 26, 2020
I stumbled upon this book first when I played a board game (Pax Pamir) based on the Great Game, which was the political and military intrigue of 19th century Afghanistan between the British, the Russians, and the local ruling clans of what was then known as Khurasan. The designer of the board game strongly recommended this book to get a more deeper insight into the times than what a board game can provide.
A few 100 pages later, I'm incredibly astonished at the ability of the colonial British government to take a favorable situation, fuck it up completely, and then fuck it even more beyond what you could have thought possible. The entire story of the first Anglo-Afghan war and the events that preceeded it feels like watching a trainwreck happening. Given how things ended miserably for all but one of the major players of the Game, it's incredible how this part of history is not more widely known.
Dalrymple has done a stellar job of crafting the narrative of these events from hitherto unused sources. All characters --- the Sadozais, the Barakzais, and the British --- are fleshed out in careful manner, with their deepest motivations, desires, and arrogances laid bare in a way that explains all their actions, including the many, many costly mistakes that shaped 19th and 20th century Afghanistan.
Took me a while to get through, but definitely a solid 5/5.
A few 100 pages later, I'm incredibly astonished at the ability of the colonial British government to take a favorable situation, fuck it up completely, and then fuck it even more beyond what you could have thought possible. The entire story of the first Anglo-Afghan war and the events that preceeded it feels like watching a trainwreck happening. Given how things ended miserably for all but one of the major players of the Game, it's incredible how this part of history is not more widely known.
Dalrymple has done a stellar job of crafting the narrative of these events from hitherto unused sources. All characters --- the Sadozais, the Barakzais, and the British --- are fleshed out in careful manner, with their deepest motivations, desires, and arrogances laid bare in a way that explains all their actions, including the many, many costly mistakes that shaped 19th and 20th century Afghanistan.
Took me a while to get through, but definitely a solid 5/5.
September 11, 2022
Afghanistan has been known as "The graveyard of Empires " by world. William Dalrymple's book "The return of the King" records the events how Shah Shuja ( grandson of Ahmed Shah Abdali ) lost Durrani Empire because of tribal warfare.Shah Shuja left Afghanistan.He saw East India Company as his saviour and British considered him as their puppet ruler.Shah Shuja's tussle with Ranjit Singh made him lose the most precious diamond in the world history ( Koh e Noor ). Dost Muhammad - a tribal chief took command of Afghanistan . Here, marked the beginning of the Great Game. Russian and French forces wanted to counter British and to maintain their hegemony in India.In order to achieve this ambition, they send their diplomatic missions to Afghanistan. Fortunately, British espionage was a step ahead of Russians.In Ludhiana , Shah Shuja took refuge and started preparing for war. British successfully placed Shah Shujah on Afghanistan's throne. The Afghan Lords and Sufis announced Holy War against British and Shah Shujah. The driving force of this Holy war was a rape of Afghan women committed by a British soldier. Dost Muhammad surrendered himself to British.His son Akbar Khan rose to power and gave British the Karma of their atrocities in India.In first Anglo Afghan war , approximately 20,000 soldiers set their journey but Afghans and the winter killed all of them except a Surgeon.This defeat was a slap on the face of a superpower as many of the generals were killed.This frustrated British and they finally after fighting, placed Dost Muhammad as their puppet ruler.
This book will help you discover the tribal conflicts of Afghans still existing in the modern world , their bravery, strategies and their unacceptance of a foreign rule.
It's a little bit detailed and that's the beauty of Dalrymple's writing.You feel connected with the 19th century while sitting in 21st century.
This book will help you discover the tribal conflicts of Afghans still existing in the modern world , their bravery, strategies and their unacceptance of a foreign rule.
It's a little bit detailed and that's the beauty of Dalrymple's writing.You feel connected with the 19th century while sitting in 21st century.
August 24, 2021
A timely read on my part I guess. "Return of the King" makes for a compellling retelling of the disasterous 1st Anglo-Afghan War that took place from 1839-1842. Dalrymple's big contribution is to track down and include for the 1st time, original documentary sources from the Afghan side of the conflict as well as POV of Persian accounts.
Even though the events in the book were almost 180 years ago, Dalrymple concludes by noting how similar the British mistakes back then were to the mistakes NATO would make in our times. Hamid Karzai who was the Afghan leader that NATO backed after deposing the Taiban in 2001 is a direct descendant of the Afghan ruler the Brits installed in 1838 and the backbone of the Taliban, the Ghilazi tribe, made up a huge portion of the Afghan rebellion that anihilated the British back then. The US embassy in Kabul is even built on the very site of where the Britihs built their fort in 1838 and one can still see the spiked British cannons outside the building that houses the modern Afghan Intelligence Service which back then was the the fort Ahmed Shuj held out in
Even though the events in the book were almost 180 years ago, Dalrymple concludes by noting how similar the British mistakes back then were to the mistakes NATO would make in our times. Hamid Karzai who was the Afghan leader that NATO backed after deposing the Taiban in 2001 is a direct descendant of the Afghan ruler the Brits installed in 1838 and the backbone of the Taliban, the Ghilazi tribe, made up a huge portion of the Afghan rebellion that anihilated the British back then. The US embassy in Kabul is even built on the very site of where the Britihs built their fort in 1838 and one can still see the spiked British cannons outside the building that houses the modern Afghan Intelligence Service which back then was the the fort Ahmed Shuj held out in
November 23, 2020
Dalrymple is a good author. He's very British, and very detailed. This is one of the few books on The Great Game which uses both Afghan and British historical sources. This adds a lot more depth to the story than other books on the conflict I’ve read. Dalrymple also provides insight into the country and people of Afghanistan in 1839-42 that may be helpful in understanding it in the period 1979 to the present.
My book was a hefty 570-pages. I also was lucky enough to score an author signed copy.
Dalrymple is an accomplished writer. His prose is clean and easily understandable written to convey a maximum amount of information. His descriptions are evocative. I’ve found his histories to be more akin to journalistic stories than non-fiction. This is a talent many historians do not have. In addition, he salts his narrative of events with short anecdotes on the people, and places involved. I found this additional context to be very helpful in understanding the era and the events. I also must note his many books on South Asia share prose. For example, Koh-I-Noor: The History of the World's Most Infamous Diamond and this book share more than a few paragraphs.
This is an intermediate-level work on the beginning of the Great Game. Having a general knowledge of Victorian history, particularly the history of the East India Company and the run-up to the creation of the British Raj is needed to really leverage its contents.
This is very much a British history. The preponderance of anecdotes, and excerpts from correspondence, diaries, and biographies are British. However, Dalrymple has included a large amount of information from Afghan, period historical sources into the book. Most of these were translated from Persian. Persian was the language for official documentation in Central Asia. The Afghan historical documentation style is a combination of poetry and prose. These poetic descriptions provided an interesting contrast from the quoted Victorian British descriptions of the same person or event. I think the author may have overdone the quoting of so much of this poem prose. I would have been satisfied with more summation. However, this inclusion of Afghan sources adds an important local context not found in other books I’ve read on this particular conflict. This is the least (British) one-sided description of the conflict I’ve read so far.
This book is a pastiche of military and diplomatic history, with the addition of lessons on the organizational behavior of the East India Company. The military history is at a high-level. There is some discussion of tactics and operations. Overall military strategy, with the exception of The Army of Retribution gets short shrift. Diplomatic history receives more attention. This is an excellent description of the people and their motivations for setting The Great Game in motion. The character studies of the folks influencing the course of events both British, Russian, and Afghan are one of the book's strong suites. In addition, the org behavior (politics) of the East India Company are likewise well done, although the author does not go deeply enough into the Crown/Company relationship. The politics and political organization of the multi-ethnic and tribal Afghanistan are also well laid out. The author root causes the engineered regime change (the Return of a King) and the debacle of the First Anglo-Afghan War to be the wrong people in the right spot at the wrong time. The Company’s politics were a destructive force which effectively kept it from meeting both the Crown and its strategic goals.
Readers should not ignore the long Author’s Note at the end of the book. Here the author does an important compare and contrast between the events of 1839-42 and 1979- to the present in Afghanistan. In particular, the internal politics of Afghanistan are not too different from what they were 200 years ago. The direct descendants of Afghans mentioned in the book are names you'd recognize in the news from Afghanistan today.
The book was mixed in its use of pictures and maps. The included pictures were excellent, perhaps a bit overdone. They were mostly artwork and copies of publications from the period. I would have liked to have seen some current photographs of existing locations. The use of maps was poor. There are a lot of place names in the narrative. There were only three (3) hand drawn maps included. Central Asia, Afghanistan and the British Raj are far-off lands. The borders and place names have changed (or been modernized) in the past 200 years. Even the topography has changed. I found it difficult to use a modern atlas to follow the story or to get a high resolution picture of the terrain at key points in it. More and better maps would have been helpful.
The book assumes a historical background on the period and region. It is somewhat balanced in its narration, or at least more than is typical. I found it very readable. I've already read several books on the Great Game. The book added a lot to my understanding of the early part of it. I found it a worthy read for those interested in deepening their understanding of the Great Game and the early history of the influence on the Anglo-West on Afghanistan.
Readers interested in an introduction to The Great Game might try The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia . Hopkirk has written extensively on the region, and his work is very readable. Folks interested in historical fiction set in the same time as this book might try Flashman . (Its great fun.)
My book was a hefty 570-pages. I also was lucky enough to score an author signed copy.
Dalrymple is an accomplished writer. His prose is clean and easily understandable written to convey a maximum amount of information. His descriptions are evocative. I’ve found his histories to be more akin to journalistic stories than non-fiction. This is a talent many historians do not have. In addition, he salts his narrative of events with short anecdotes on the people, and places involved. I found this additional context to be very helpful in understanding the era and the events. I also must note his many books on South Asia share prose. For example, Koh-I-Noor: The History of the World's Most Infamous Diamond and this book share more than a few paragraphs.
This is an intermediate-level work on the beginning of the Great Game. Having a general knowledge of Victorian history, particularly the history of the East India Company and the run-up to the creation of the British Raj is needed to really leverage its contents.
This is very much a British history. The preponderance of anecdotes, and excerpts from correspondence, diaries, and biographies are British. However, Dalrymple has included a large amount of information from Afghan, period historical sources into the book. Most of these were translated from Persian. Persian was the language for official documentation in Central Asia. The Afghan historical documentation style is a combination of poetry and prose. These poetic descriptions provided an interesting contrast from the quoted Victorian British descriptions of the same person or event. I think the author may have overdone the quoting of so much of this poem prose. I would have been satisfied with more summation. However, this inclusion of Afghan sources adds an important local context not found in other books I’ve read on this particular conflict. This is the least (British) one-sided description of the conflict I’ve read so far.
This book is a pastiche of military and diplomatic history, with the addition of lessons on the organizational behavior of the East India Company. The military history is at a high-level. There is some discussion of tactics and operations. Overall military strategy, with the exception of The Army of Retribution gets short shrift. Diplomatic history receives more attention. This is an excellent description of the people and their motivations for setting The Great Game in motion. The character studies of the folks influencing the course of events both British, Russian, and Afghan are one of the book's strong suites. In addition, the org behavior (politics) of the East India Company are likewise well done, although the author does not go deeply enough into the Crown/Company relationship. The politics and political organization of the multi-ethnic and tribal Afghanistan are also well laid out. The author root causes the engineered regime change (the Return of a King) and the debacle of the First Anglo-Afghan War to be the wrong people in the right spot at the wrong time. The Company’s politics were a destructive force which effectively kept it from meeting both the Crown and its strategic goals.
Readers should not ignore the long Author’s Note at the end of the book. Here the author does an important compare and contrast between the events of 1839-42 and 1979- to the present in Afghanistan. In particular, the internal politics of Afghanistan are not too different from what they were 200 years ago. The direct descendants of Afghans mentioned in the book are names you'd recognize in the news from Afghanistan today.
The book was mixed in its use of pictures and maps. The included pictures were excellent, perhaps a bit overdone. They were mostly artwork and copies of publications from the period. I would have liked to have seen some current photographs of existing locations. The use of maps was poor. There are a lot of place names in the narrative. There were only three (3) hand drawn maps included. Central Asia, Afghanistan and the British Raj are far-off lands. The borders and place names have changed (or been modernized) in the past 200 years. Even the topography has changed. I found it difficult to use a modern atlas to follow the story or to get a high resolution picture of the terrain at key points in it. More and better maps would have been helpful.
The book assumes a historical background on the period and region. It is somewhat balanced in its narration, or at least more than is typical. I found it very readable. I've already read several books on the Great Game. The book added a lot to my understanding of the early part of it. I found it a worthy read for those interested in deepening their understanding of the Great Game and the early history of the influence on the Anglo-West on Afghanistan.
Readers interested in an introduction to The Great Game might try The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia . Hopkirk has written extensively on the region, and his work is very readable. Folks interested in historical fiction set in the same time as this book might try Flashman . (Its great fun.)
September 17, 2014
Dalrymple, William. Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan 1839-42, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2013 (515pp.$30)
The elephantine, racist and slightly bizarre Western imperial enterprise had some surprising impulses, none more than the one that impelled British troops into Afghanistan (then as now, a vague collocation of tribes, loyalties and religions at best) during 1839. After the battle of Friedland on June 14, 1807, a victorious Napoleon met with Russian Emperor Alexander II in the marshlands of the river Nemer, where Russian forces had, despite their defeat, reassembled in good order, reinforced by 200,000 militiamen. Instead of pursuing a war, Napoleon pursued an alliance with Russia, one that would allow France to seize India and impoverish Britain by securing avenues over which French troops could attack India through Persia. When the British government got wind of this supercilious (but not, Whigs thought, totally impossible) plan, there was nervousness and over-reaction.
William Dalrymple, author of seven previous books on history and travel, including “The Last Mughal” and “City of Djinns,” which won the Young British Writer of the Year Prize and the Thomas Cook Travel Book Award, examines Britain’s first Afghan war through the lens of newly discovered archives in Russia as well as extensive travels to obscure libraries in war-ravaged Afghanistan. “Return of a King” is a work of monumental scholarship marred by patches of dull writing and extensive quotes from archival material. It is, nonetheless, a definitive history of the First Anglo-Afghan War as well as an unsurpassed cautionary tale.
During 1838 a cabal of political hawks in England’s government convinced the dilettantish governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, to engage in a military adventure to replace the supposedly pro-Russian ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad, with an exiled former warlord named Shah Shuja, who would, the theory went, be pro-British. By 1839 the plan was under way, seeing a huge colonial British Army cross the Khyber Pass to occupy Kabul. Unfortunately for the British, its compounds, cantonments, barracks and civilian installations, accommodating nearly 16,000 soldiers, Indian sepoys, wives, children and camp followers, came under attack as a rebellion gained traction. Eventually, the British were forced to retreat. Disorganized, beset by cold and in the mountains of the Khyber deep snow, they were slaughtered nearly to the last man by Pashtun tribesmen who picked them off from lofty perches.
Naturally, the British came back in the form of an Army of Retribution, and retook Kabul in 1842. Along the way it committed terrible atrocities, leaving a young Neville Chamberlain disgusted with himself and the world. These events remain remarkably alive for Afghanis as well, who consider this war their Waterloo and Trafalgar rolled into one.
While “Return of a King” does not crackle to life as it should, it is still a remarkable book, beautifully made and chock full of lovely photographs and three helpful maps. Some critics have charged that Dalrymple’s historical comparisons are overdrawn and lacking causal specificity. But his book shows that the imperial enterprise in Afghanistan is folly pure and simple, no matter the century, no matter the color of the uniform. Those who pay the price for outside interference are Afghans, some living, some dead, some soon to die.
The elephantine, racist and slightly bizarre Western imperial enterprise had some surprising impulses, none more than the one that impelled British troops into Afghanistan (then as now, a vague collocation of tribes, loyalties and religions at best) during 1839. After the battle of Friedland on June 14, 1807, a victorious Napoleon met with Russian Emperor Alexander II in the marshlands of the river Nemer, where Russian forces had, despite their defeat, reassembled in good order, reinforced by 200,000 militiamen. Instead of pursuing a war, Napoleon pursued an alliance with Russia, one that would allow France to seize India and impoverish Britain by securing avenues over which French troops could attack India through Persia. When the British government got wind of this supercilious (but not, Whigs thought, totally impossible) plan, there was nervousness and over-reaction.
William Dalrymple, author of seven previous books on history and travel, including “The Last Mughal” and “City of Djinns,” which won the Young British Writer of the Year Prize and the Thomas Cook Travel Book Award, examines Britain’s first Afghan war through the lens of newly discovered archives in Russia as well as extensive travels to obscure libraries in war-ravaged Afghanistan. “Return of a King” is a work of monumental scholarship marred by patches of dull writing and extensive quotes from archival material. It is, nonetheless, a definitive history of the First Anglo-Afghan War as well as an unsurpassed cautionary tale.
During 1838 a cabal of political hawks in England’s government convinced the dilettantish governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, to engage in a military adventure to replace the supposedly pro-Russian ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad, with an exiled former warlord named Shah Shuja, who would, the theory went, be pro-British. By 1839 the plan was under way, seeing a huge colonial British Army cross the Khyber Pass to occupy Kabul. Unfortunately for the British, its compounds, cantonments, barracks and civilian installations, accommodating nearly 16,000 soldiers, Indian sepoys, wives, children and camp followers, came under attack as a rebellion gained traction. Eventually, the British were forced to retreat. Disorganized, beset by cold and in the mountains of the Khyber deep snow, they were slaughtered nearly to the last man by Pashtun tribesmen who picked them off from lofty perches.
Naturally, the British came back in the form of an Army of Retribution, and retook Kabul in 1842. Along the way it committed terrible atrocities, leaving a young Neville Chamberlain disgusted with himself and the world. These events remain remarkably alive for Afghanis as well, who consider this war their Waterloo and Trafalgar rolled into one.
While “Return of a King” does not crackle to life as it should, it is still a remarkable book, beautifully made and chock full of lovely photographs and three helpful maps. Some critics have charged that Dalrymple’s historical comparisons are overdrawn and lacking causal specificity. But his book shows that the imperial enterprise in Afghanistan is folly pure and simple, no matter the century, no matter the color of the uniform. Those who pay the price for outside interference are Afghans, some living, some dead, some soon to die.
April 12, 2018
Another masterly tome by Dalrymple who definitely has a novelists flair for narration. What makes Dalrymple a master of his genre is that he understands that history is best realised through people, and in this book, he shows the depredations of British Imperialism.
A couple of points of interest about this book.
1) When coming to the last 100 pages of this book I was struck by the similarity between today's would be jihadists and the Afghan fighters who successfully routed the British Army. Having recently read about the British colonisation of India; I was struck by how different the mentality of the Afghani native was to the Indian native. In India the British successfully co-opted an entire class of indigenous people, but in Afghanistan it seems they were not able to do so.
I think a reason for this is the Afghani sense of identity was rooted solely with the tribe whereas the Indian Muslim one was perhaps more rooted in their caste. Because the caste system was founded upon the principle of bondage and servitude; Indian Muslims were more easily subjugated than Afghani Muslims. Whereas the Afghani's were more apt to make the link between the British and Infidels, presaging the mentality of Muslim extremists today.
If you have lots of people of different races and religions living together but separated by caste. Then you will get an ingrained sense of hierarchy amongst the people. The British with their policy of divide and rule, were always able to control people, but with the Afghani's the only way to divide was to play off one tribe against the other. But where they ran into a stumbling block, was that in Afghan culture,self-respect was paramount.
If you respect yourself you are not easily enslaved. But if you come from a culture with a deeply entrenched system of bigotry and social segregation then you are more likely to become someone's slave. Same religion but very different cultures. As always it's the culture that shapes the religious outlook, not the other way around as people mistakenly assume.
A flaw of this book is that it does drag when describing the war scenes and their aftermath. But Dalrymple through the narrations of people living in that time, provides a fascinating insight into the immoral antics of Imperial Britain.
A couple of points of interest about this book.
1) When coming to the last 100 pages of this book I was struck by the similarity between today's would be jihadists and the Afghan fighters who successfully routed the British Army. Having recently read about the British colonisation of India; I was struck by how different the mentality of the Afghani native was to the Indian native. In India the British successfully co-opted an entire class of indigenous people, but in Afghanistan it seems they were not able to do so.
I think a reason for this is the Afghani sense of identity was rooted solely with the tribe whereas the Indian Muslim one was perhaps more rooted in their caste. Because the caste system was founded upon the principle of bondage and servitude; Indian Muslims were more easily subjugated than Afghani Muslims. Whereas the Afghani's were more apt to make the link between the British and Infidels, presaging the mentality of Muslim extremists today.
If you have lots of people of different races and religions living together but separated by caste. Then you will get an ingrained sense of hierarchy amongst the people. The British with their policy of divide and rule, were always able to control people, but with the Afghani's the only way to divide was to play off one tribe against the other. But where they ran into a stumbling block, was that in Afghan culture,self-respect was paramount.
If you respect yourself you are not easily enslaved. But if you come from a culture with a deeply entrenched system of bigotry and social segregation then you are more likely to become someone's slave. Same religion but very different cultures. As always it's the culture that shapes the religious outlook, not the other way around as people mistakenly assume.
A flaw of this book is that it does drag when describing the war scenes and their aftermath. But Dalrymple through the narrations of people living in that time, provides a fascinating insight into the immoral antics of Imperial Britain.
December 8, 2014
The tale, very gory and very sordid is told in a very readable manner. Therein lies genius of its author.
Though the time span of the story is extremely short for a history- hardly a decade- the spatial canvas is sizable; spanning from Bhuj to Bukhara and Ludhiana to Herat and beyond in Persia. That covers at least five present-day nations. Casual manner in which movement of various persons - Indian, British, Afghans and Russians across this vast landscape is described makes one wonder whether our claim of making world smaller is a valid one! Except for the adventures of players of Great Game between Britain and Russia, there is very little to be cheerful about in this story of British misadventure in Afghanistan. This is a story of duplicity-predominantly British and cruelty- both Afghan and British.While Afghans come across open and unapologetic, British couch their acts of betrayal and their atrocities in lofty words and rhetoric.There are a few revelations -at least to me. The first one is shattering of myth of British military genius of nineteenth century. Generals of a nation that had defeated Napoleon less than 40 years ago, were paralyzed into inaction in face of insurgency by largely untrained tribal bunch of irregulars. The second is a connection between first Afghan War and the Indian war of freedom in 1857. If the author is to be believed, the first troops to join the failed struggle were the troops betrayed and deserted by their British officers in Afghanistan!
The author has extensively used native sources of information- available in the form of poems and epics, in addition to the records official records maintained by both sides. This gives a rather complete picture and seamlessly interconnects the events. He draws some interesting parallels between this British misadventure and more recent American one.
All in all, a must read for anyone even remotely interested in the history of India and its surroundings.
Though the time span of the story is extremely short for a history- hardly a decade- the spatial canvas is sizable; spanning from Bhuj to Bukhara and Ludhiana to Herat and beyond in Persia. That covers at least five present-day nations. Casual manner in which movement of various persons - Indian, British, Afghans and Russians across this vast landscape is described makes one wonder whether our claim of making world smaller is a valid one! Except for the adventures of players of Great Game between Britain and Russia, there is very little to be cheerful about in this story of British misadventure in Afghanistan. This is a story of duplicity-predominantly British and cruelty- both Afghan and British.While Afghans come across open and unapologetic, British couch their acts of betrayal and their atrocities in lofty words and rhetoric.There are a few revelations -at least to me. The first one is shattering of myth of British military genius of nineteenth century. Generals of a nation that had defeated Napoleon less than 40 years ago, were paralyzed into inaction in face of insurgency by largely untrained tribal bunch of irregulars. The second is a connection between first Afghan War and the Indian war of freedom in 1857. If the author is to be believed, the first troops to join the failed struggle were the troops betrayed and deserted by their British officers in Afghanistan!
The author has extensively used native sources of information- available in the form of poems and epics, in addition to the records official records maintained by both sides. This gives a rather complete picture and seamlessly interconnects the events. He draws some interesting parallels between this British misadventure and more recent American one.
All in all, a must read for anyone even remotely interested in the history of India and its surroundings.
May 7, 2016
A riveting, comprehensive history of the first Anglo-Afghan war.
In a straightforward narrative, Dalrymple describes the British paranoia about supposed Russian threats to India, which existed only in the minds of London and pretty much created a crisis out of nothing. He also describes the general ignorance of the region by the government in India, the course of the British occupation, and the eventual retreat. Dalrymple easily describes the nuances of Afghan tribal politics and how both the British and the Russians often chose to ignore the intelligence of their own agents.
As expected, Dalrymple draws some simplistic parallels between Britain’s war and NATO’s current effort in Afghanistan, with the usual speculation about lessons we have failed to learn from the first war. Whether Dalrymple really believes that or whether it’s just a ploy to promote his book is unclear. The conflicts do have their differences, of course: the “invaders” are nowhere near as harsh as the Taliban, and whether NATO is already defeated “militarily” is debatable. He even claims that the NATO mission there is “neo-colonial,” whatever that means. The comparisons between McNaughten and Holbrooke seem quite forced. Also, Dalrymple devotes a good deal of space to the Great Game but little to the various declarations of jihad against the Hindus by the Pathans, or on the role played by the opium trade, or on the differing aims of the British government and the East India Company.
A well-written, well-researched work. There is little background about the era’s geopolitics, though, and the parallels between then and now aren't as clear as Dalrymple or his audience might like to believe.
In a straightforward narrative, Dalrymple describes the British paranoia about supposed Russian threats to India, which existed only in the minds of London and pretty much created a crisis out of nothing. He also describes the general ignorance of the region by the government in India, the course of the British occupation, and the eventual retreat. Dalrymple easily describes the nuances of Afghan tribal politics and how both the British and the Russians often chose to ignore the intelligence of their own agents.
As expected, Dalrymple draws some simplistic parallels between Britain’s war and NATO’s current effort in Afghanistan, with the usual speculation about lessons we have failed to learn from the first war. Whether Dalrymple really believes that or whether it’s just a ploy to promote his book is unclear. The conflicts do have their differences, of course: the “invaders” are nowhere near as harsh as the Taliban, and whether NATO is already defeated “militarily” is debatable. He even claims that the NATO mission there is “neo-colonial,” whatever that means. The comparisons between McNaughten and Holbrooke seem quite forced. Also, Dalrymple devotes a good deal of space to the Great Game but little to the various declarations of jihad against the Hindus by the Pathans, or on the role played by the opium trade, or on the differing aims of the British government and the East India Company.
A well-written, well-researched work. There is little background about the era’s geopolitics, though, and the parallels between then and now aren't as clear as Dalrymple or his audience might like to believe.
December 1, 2015
Though much has been written about Afghanistan over the years, not much has been understood. This book, based on the first Anglo-afghan war is a classic example of how we fail to learn anything at all from history, sometimes even the most obvious lessons, and how ignorance and egotism have crippled, failed & backfired the engagement plans of West with Muslim or Islamic nations culminating into a continuous web of errors. With this book Dalrymple has brought forth Afghanistan as a country -with origins, with its own systems and traditions and the predominant Afghan identity which precedes all the tribal, ethnic, religious schisms and political/ideological divides without injecting it with prejudice or judgment. He has presented a period of history which hasn't been written about but, which is important as the roots of Afghan civil wars and internal conflicts can be traced back here. In fact, the civil war has been there since Afghanistan's inception and we see how history has been repeating itself in this case all too self-evidently. The parallels between then and now are astounding. The phobias and unjustified suspicions which the world powers had and still have of each other along with those usual misreading and miscalculation resulted in one of the greatest military disasters. Lastly, invasions are tricky and we often end up paying a heavy price in some form or the other and in recent history have been collectively paying on some or the other level. Highly recommended for a better understanding of this country even though it's not recent history.
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