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Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History
The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650 - 1815
An acclaimed book and widely acknowledged classic, The Middle Ground steps outside the simple stories of Indian-white relations – stories of conquest and assimilation and stories of cultural persistence. It is, instead, about a search for accommodation and common meaning. It tells how Europeans and Indians met, regarding each other as alien, as other, as virtually nonhuman, and how between 1650 and 1815 they constructed a common, mutually comprehensible world in the region around the Great Lakes that the French called pays d'en haut. Here the older worlds of the Algonquians and of various Europeans overlapped, and their mixture created new systems of meaning and of exchange. Finally, the book tells of the breakdown of accommodation and common meanings and the re-creation of the Indians as alien and exotic
562 pages, Paperback
First published September 27, 1991
About the author
Richard White
190 books112 followersRichard White is the author of many acclaimed histories, including the groundbreaking study of the transcontinentals, Railroaded, winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize, the Francis Parkman Prize, and a Pulitzer Prize finalist. He is Margaret Byrne Professor of American History, Emeritus, at Stanford University, and lives near Palo Alto, California.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews
May 31, 2021
This book is on the engagement and interactions of the various Indian tribes of the Great Lakes Region with the colonial powers – first the French, and then the British, and later the United States after the revolution of 1776. There was at various times the involvement of all three colonial powers – the French habitants and traders never left after France was defeated at Quebec City in 1759.
The several Indian tribes/nations all interfaced differently throughout the enormous time period under study in this book (1650 to 1815).
The “Middle Ground” refers to the accommodations and compromises that all sides made to the presence of the “other”. It is mis-leading to assume that the colonial powers “dominated” the Indian peoples during this time period. But as the author points out the tribes were all decimated by having little resistance to the epidemics brought over by the Europeans like smallpox.
The French did the most in terms of accommodation – they expanded to the Lower Great Lakes area – Detroit, Chicago, Green Bay and down the Mississippi, Wabash and Illinois rivers. They formed durable alliances with many tribes which included social and marital ties. The tribes also interacted with each other forming cross-family ties which could be quite strong and overcome tribal affiliations. It should also be said that there was violence. There were many conflicting groups. But the “Middle Ground” would often reach some kind of peaceable solution. War proved to be costly – it interfered with trade, it prevented the proper harvesting of crops and hunting.
The “Middle Ground” began to erode after the American Revolution. Many independent settlers were in search of new lands to cultivate and were moving onto Indian territory and their main aim was to eliminate the Indians and take their lands. For them it was an either/or proposition – there was no “Middle Ground” to negotiate. At times the American Government would try to intervene and reach an accommodation – but this was half-hearted and this new wave of settlers had no intention of adhering to government regulations.
The British, who now occupied Canada and parts of the Lower Great Lakes tried to intervene using the Indian tribes as a buffer to protect Canada. The growth and expansion of the Americans could not be halted.
The author hardly discusses the War of 1812 and does not discuss the impact of the vast movement of Loyalists (those in the United States opposed to the independence movement) who migrated to the Upper Great Lakes area and who had a tremendous impact on both the Indian people and the environment.
Also, the book is dry academic in tone. The author must be credited with using original source documents many of which were in French. There is an overload of detail where we cannot perceive the forest through the trees. The footnotes were numerous and, for me, simply irritating.
I read this, and to some extent trudged through it, because I am interested in this aspect of history. I live between two of the Great Lakes – Erie and Huron.
The several Indian tribes/nations all interfaced differently throughout the enormous time period under study in this book (1650 to 1815).
The “Middle Ground” refers to the accommodations and compromises that all sides made to the presence of the “other”. It is mis-leading to assume that the colonial powers “dominated” the Indian peoples during this time period. But as the author points out the tribes were all decimated by having little resistance to the epidemics brought over by the Europeans like smallpox.
The French did the most in terms of accommodation – they expanded to the Lower Great Lakes area – Detroit, Chicago, Green Bay and down the Mississippi, Wabash and Illinois rivers. They formed durable alliances with many tribes which included social and marital ties. The tribes also interacted with each other forming cross-family ties which could be quite strong and overcome tribal affiliations. It should also be said that there was violence. There were many conflicting groups. But the “Middle Ground” would often reach some kind of peaceable solution. War proved to be costly – it interfered with trade, it prevented the proper harvesting of crops and hunting.
The “Middle Ground” began to erode after the American Revolution. Many independent settlers were in search of new lands to cultivate and were moving onto Indian territory and their main aim was to eliminate the Indians and take their lands. For them it was an either/or proposition – there was no “Middle Ground” to negotiate. At times the American Government would try to intervene and reach an accommodation – but this was half-hearted and this new wave of settlers had no intention of adhering to government regulations.
The British, who now occupied Canada and parts of the Lower Great Lakes tried to intervene using the Indian tribes as a buffer to protect Canada. The growth and expansion of the Americans could not be halted.
The author hardly discusses the War of 1812 and does not discuss the impact of the vast movement of Loyalists (those in the United States opposed to the independence movement) who migrated to the Upper Great Lakes area and who had a tremendous impact on both the Indian people and the environment.
Also, the book is dry academic in tone. The author must be credited with using original source documents many of which were in French. There is an overload of detail where we cannot perceive the forest through the trees. The footnotes were numerous and, for me, simply irritating.
I read this, and to some extent trudged through it, because I am interested in this aspect of history. I live between two of the Great Lakes – Erie and Huron.
April 9, 2014
This is one of those touchstone books- everyone working in early American history, or Native American history, or early Canada, or the Atlantic world, or early modern France...a huge swath of historians, in other words, need to have read this book. It is true that the book is getting on in years a little, and it has been picked at periodically over the last two decades, but the thing is, you have to read it in order to understand the people who are arguing against it. Important book, in other words. Keep it on the shelf.
What White is arguing is that at the fringes of the French "empire", in the great lakes region of North America, the French were not strong enough to dictate to the Indians, but the Indians were similarly unable to dictate to the French. The French were competing against the British, the Algonquins were competing against the Iroquois, and both groups felt as though alliance with each other was necessary. But since neither group could have everything on their own terms, they were forced, through compromise and "creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings" to create a new thing- not entirely Indian, not entirely French. The Indians accepted the French as mediators between various groups, and the French accepted that they would have to play by the Indian rules of exchange or lose the alliance. This somewhat shaky but still viable "middle ground" lasted a century or so before the French lost New France to the British, and things changed.
I would not read this for the detail, as there is just too much of it. There is really a remarkable amount of data here, on a huge assortment of individuals and villages and particular diplomatic moments...these are interesting, but you are never going to retain all this info. I think the use of this is how it affects that easy, east to west frontier narrative that we all get fed to us as grade school students. As it turns out, Indians as far away as Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota (and farther) were trading and negotiating and engaging with Europeans as far back as the mid-1600s. They should not simply pop up in the American history narrative in 1800 or so. The story is far more complicated than that.
*Re-read for yet another class this month. This is a grad school hat trick book! Assigned for three different courses so far - American Historiography, Early America, and Early Modern Europe. Honestly, this is really a must for a lot of reading lists.
What White is arguing is that at the fringes of the French "empire", in the great lakes region of North America, the French were not strong enough to dictate to the Indians, but the Indians were similarly unable to dictate to the French. The French were competing against the British, the Algonquins were competing against the Iroquois, and both groups felt as though alliance with each other was necessary. But since neither group could have everything on their own terms, they were forced, through compromise and "creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings" to create a new thing- not entirely Indian, not entirely French. The Indians accepted the French as mediators between various groups, and the French accepted that they would have to play by the Indian rules of exchange or lose the alliance. This somewhat shaky but still viable "middle ground" lasted a century or so before the French lost New France to the British, and things changed.
I would not read this for the detail, as there is just too much of it. There is really a remarkable amount of data here, on a huge assortment of individuals and villages and particular diplomatic moments...these are interesting, but you are never going to retain all this info. I think the use of this is how it affects that easy, east to west frontier narrative that we all get fed to us as grade school students. As it turns out, Indians as far away as Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota (and farther) were trading and negotiating and engaging with Europeans as far back as the mid-1600s. They should not simply pop up in the American history narrative in 1800 or so. The story is far more complicated than that.
*Re-read for yet another class this month. This is a grad school hat trick book! Assigned for three different courses so far - American Historiography, Early America, and Early Modern Europe. Honestly, this is really a must for a lot of reading lists.
October 11, 2012
In the wake of the War of 1812, Americans re-conceptualized the Shawnee leader Tecumseh in a familiar tale of lost love. In this myth-making endeavor, Tecumseh is presented as a fully assimilated American character, equipped with the charm, appeal, and charisma of some of America’s greatest (white, male) politicians. Tecumseh falls in love with an Anglo-American beauty, asks her to marry him, and—upon her insistence that he fully integrate into American society—retreats into the woods. This story sets up a false dichotomy—between assimilation and cultural resistance—that would not only saturate myths of European-Indian relations, but also infiltrate histories of such exchanges. Historian Richard White’s groundbreaking work, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815, intends to fracture this constructed binary and introduce a new framework for understanding interactions between indigenous communities and European colonists in early America.
White’s rendition of this early American experience leaves much room for complexity, confusion, and, most importantly, negotiation. For many Shawnee, Miami, French, American, and other inhabitants of the Great Lakes region from the 1600s through the War of 1812, the line between assimilation and cultural persistence was never so stark. Instead, argues White, the Native Americans and colonial émigrés in the Great Lakes and Ohio River Valley created systems of meaning and exchange that constituted a “middle ground”—a place between “cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages” (White, X). In the middle ground, White explains, the lines between cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and social worlds blurred as residents sought to persuade others by “appealing to which they perceived to be the values and practices of those others” (White, X). Despite initial Kumbaya-type sentiments associated with a world of cross-cultural cohabitation, the middle ground maintained a tenuous, volatile foothold based upon mutual misunderstandings. As White’s narrative unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that this fragile terrain of mutual misinterpretation could easily disintegrate into violence.
Grand in both scale and analysis, The Middle Ground is a groundbreaking contribution to early American history. Yet, like many ambitious projects, there is room for critique. In particular, one may question White’s decision to place culturally and politically diverse peoples under a simplified Algonquian umbrella. Additionally, in his description of indigenous peoples as “nonstate” actors, White indirectly blankets his political valuation of the middle ground in Eurocentric terms, and thus subtly undermines his attempt to place “Indians at the center of the scene” and seek “to understand the reasons for their actions” (White, XI). Lastly, it is important to note that White puts forth two distinct middle grounds: one which is a particular historical experience bounded geographically by the Great Lakes Region and temporally from 1650 to 1815; the second serves as an interpretive model, which could likely be redeployed in other places at other times. White suggests that middle grounds could and did develop elsewhere, and throughout the narrative he shifts between the specific pays d’en haut experience and the larger interpretive framework. Thus the reader is left unsure of both the middle ground’s mutability and the extent to which it emerged in other historical contexts.
These critiques, however, should not diminish the importance of this work. Throughout The Middle Ground, White highlights the significant ability of middle ground negotiation to deter all-out war. This nuanced approach required an extensive re-reading of colonial sources in order to underscore both indigenous perspectives and the degree to which whites and Indians “shaded into each other” within the middle ground. In lucid prose, this forceful chronicle of Indian-white relations reimagines Native American and American history by amplifying the inherent complexity and contingency of early American colonization.
August 8, 2019
Incredible account of the interactions between European settlers and Native Americans in the Old Northwest, the region spanning roughly from Upper Canada through the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley in the modern Midwest. White's book posits the "middle ground" as an uneasy meeting place between empires, where cultures and personalities conflict, play off and ultimately shape on another in a sort of sociological syncretism. White shows this borderland as constantly in flux as new players enter the scene, each with their own cultural perceptions that render easy analysis difficult. French settlers and fur traders work to integrate with natives, especially the Algonquin (here, a broadly-defined group of linguistically and culturally similar Nations including the Shawnee, Miami, Kickapoo, Winnebago and other groups), through trade, negotiation and intermarriage that establish them as equals, in theory if not practice; the British, who reject French social assimilation in favor of patronizing dominance and (increasingly one-sided) co-dependence; and the Americans, initially too weak to press their claims but ultimately reflecting elements of both predecessors' approaches. The book's full of interesting pen portraits of dozens of native and white leaders, along with insightful looks at the maintenance of this "middle ground": how Britain's victories over France in the French and Indian War caused its erosion, only for Pontiac's War and other confederations to reinstate it; how the Algonquins used their military and economic strength to leverage favorable terms with the whites, until the situation grew too uncertain to maintain their independence; how Britain's postwar treaties ultimately abandoned them to the Americans, who showed little interest in coexistence, let alone cooperation with Natives; how divisions between nations, clans and individual leaders prevented effective resistance, emerging only in sporadic alliances (Blue Jacket's war against St. Clair and Wayne, Tecumseh's confederation) that proved unsustainable. It's an incredibly absorbing, fine-grain portrait of frontier relations, a tough read that defies easy synopsis. But for those seeking an understanding of early American history, it's well-worth the effort of digesting it.
October 12, 2017
This book is just bad at storytelling. Anecdote follows anecdote and the reader is often lost as to what geographical place we are talking about (hardly any maps), what the numbers were (no tables, at no point is it said for example that the English colonists outnumbered the French by 18 to 1), and what year we are even in - White is always jumping around.
I had to consult outside sources to get a sense of what was going on.
The idea of the Middle Ground is interesting enough. But really we always have a middle when cultures meet and I'm not sure what he is saying beyond that. It's also not clear what this book wants to be. Sometimes it sounds like anthropology, sometimes the history of an important episode in US history. And very often the author assumes that the reader is very aware of what the hell is going on, because he doesn't explain, he skips.
What I hoped for was an equivalent to 'When Jesus came the Corn Mothers went away' but for the Great Lakes region.
I had to consult outside sources to get a sense of what was going on.
The idea of the Middle Ground is interesting enough. But really we always have a middle when cultures meet and I'm not sure what he is saying beyond that. It's also not clear what this book wants to be. Sometimes it sounds like anthropology, sometimes the history of an important episode in US history. And very often the author assumes that the reader is very aware of what the hell is going on, because he doesn't explain, he skips.
What I hoped for was an equivalent to 'When Jesus came the Corn Mothers went away' but for the Great Lakes region.
August 22, 2019
White examines the frontiers between European colonists and native American Indians in the 16th and 17th Centuries. He describes how people of utterly alien, intrinsically hostile cultures can comingle and learn to interact in a manner that is in many respects decent and mutally beneficial. He does not attribute successful negotiation to mutual understanding; on the contrary, it could be better described as a conspiracy of mutual misunderstanding. He does not idealise the people involved; on the contrary, he demonstrates that the preferred way to achieve their goals is typically violent. But he does destroy the illusion that there is one side [white and European] representing civilisation and wisdom and an opposite side [red skinned and native American] representing savagery. The most important difference between them, it transpires, is that the Europeans wrote histories while the native American Indians relied on oral traditions.
The book gives much of its account from the perspective of the Indians and, among other things, it supplies fascinating accounts of their attitudes on the roles and status of women and their attitudes to property. These were starkly different to European attitudes and they provide, among other things, a profound rebuttal to those who assert (as they do) that sexual relations and property relations in modern society are fundamentally "natural" in the sense of being fixed and universal. They are not.
Needless to say, contact with Europeans over several centuries produced singificant changes and Indian societies moved towards European values in many respects, albeit a very slow process. For example, there were many conversions to Christianity, a move towards European styles of farming and in any case a lot of inter-marriage. The true history of America was a meeting of people perfectly well able to evolve together into a successful nation. It did not happen because, eventually, one side decided to get everything it wanted by force. The word used in this book to describe American settlers was "Indian Haters." Without romanticising its subject, the book does leave a sense that this was a great pity and a shame.
Quotes below are all from the first three chapters of the book: sorry for omitting page references.
“The creation of the middle ground involved a process of mutual invention by both the French and the Algonquians. This passed through various stages, of which the earliest is at once the most noticed and the least interesting. It was in this initial stage that the French, for example, simply assimilated Indians into their own conceptual order. Indians became sauvages, and the French reduced Indian religion to devil worship and witchcraft. The Algonquians, for their part. Thought of the first Europeans as manitous. On both sides, new people were crammed into existing categories in a mechanical way.”
“Literacy gave this initial stage a potency and durability for Europeans it might otherwise have lacked. Because the French were literate, knowledge of Indians was diffused far from the site of actual contact. Such knowledge, unchallenged by actual experience with Indians, survived as a potent cultural relict. Long after it ceased to govern the actions of those who actually lived among Indians, the idea of Indians as literally sauvages, or wild men embodying either natural virtue or ferocity, persisted among intellectuals and statesmen in France. Assimilated into European controversies, these imaginary Indians became the Indians of Chateaubriand and Rousseau. They took on importance, but it was one detached from the continuing process of contact between real Algonquians and real Europeans.” …
“It was Frenchmen (for Frenchwomen would not appear until much later) and Algonquian men and women who created a common ground – the middle ground – on which to proceed. This process of creation resulted quite naturally from attempts to follow normal conventions of behaviour in new situations… The result of each side’s attempts to apply its own cultural expectations in a new context was often change in culture itself. In trying to maintain the conventional order of its world, each group applied rules that gradually shifted to meet the exigencies of particular situations. The result of these efforts was a new set of common conventions.” ...
“Perhaps the central and defining aspect of the middle ground was the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms which they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises. Those operating in the middle ground acted for interests derived from their own culture, but they had to convince people of another culture that some mutual action was fair and legitimate. The congruences arrived at often seemed – and indeed were – results of misunderstandings or accidents. Indeed, to later observers, the interpretations offered by members of one society for the practices of the other can appear ludicrous. This, however, does not matter… Cultural conventions do not have to be true to be effective… They only have to be accepted.” ...
"The operation of the middle ground must be understood within a dual context. First, there was the weakness of hierarchical controls within Algonquian villages and the frailty of any authority French official exerted over Frenchmen in the West. Second, there was the cultural threat each society seemed to pose to the elite of the other. What this meant in practice was that both the extent and meaning of social relations between Frenchmen and Algonquians were often negotiated largely on a face-to-face level within the villages themselves and that these relations were not what either French authorities or Algonquian elders might have preferred them to be. This does not mean that there was no official element involved, but rather that the official decisions could not determine the course of actual relations.”
"“French accounts were united, first, by their inability to understand the status of women vis-a-vis men except in terms of conjugal relations and, secondly, by their tendency to group sexual relations in terms of two opposite poles of conduct, with marriage at one extreme and prostitution and adultery at the other. … The immediate result was to define women in terms of a person – her actual or potential husband – who may not have been anywhere near being the most significant figure in the woman’s life. Depending on her tribal identity, an Algonquian woman often had a more durable and significant relationship with her mother, father, brothers, sisters or grandparents, or with other, unrelated women that with her husband or husbands. Nor was an Algonquian woman’s status dependent solely on her husband. Her own membership in ritual organizations or, among some tribes such as Shawnees, Huron-Petuns and Miamis, her own political status in offices confined to women, had more influence on her social position than the status of her husband did.”
“Even when the most careful and sensitive of European observers talked about the status of women and sexual relations, .. they eliminated much of the actual social world that gave those relations their full meaning… European conceptions of marriage, adultery and prostitution just could not encompass the actual variety of sexual relations in the pays d’en haut.”
"“Algonquian and Iroquoian Indians were first attracted to European goods not for their utility but rather for their symbolic value... The political or religious benefits Algonquians obtained from European goods should not be confused with the prestige Europeans associated with wealth. Algonquians, as individuals, did not accumulate wealth. Goods in Algonquian society actually belonged to no single person, although they always rested with some person for a time... They passed them on to others. Goods, in effect, only paused with a recipient and then flowed on through established social channels. This did not mean that any commodity belonged to everyone in common – for all these social streams were distinct, and people shared only in particular ones – but rather that those people within what might be called the social watershed of family, clan, or village, might eventually come to claim an item for a time. Each recipient incurred a reciprocal obligation to the giver, thus ensuring that goods were constantly in motion. Defining what were surplus goods in this situation – goods beyond the basic needs for subsistence and production – is difficult, since groups, not individuals, accumulated goods and possession was so fluid. The only dam that stopped the circulation of goods in these social streams was death. The dead acquired goods through burial gifts, but they could no longer reciprocate.”
“...the Feast of the dead, a ceremony that the French, with their ideas of personal accumulation saw as mad. ... In preparation for the Feast of the dead, which took place periodically in order to rebury the dead after a temporary interment, the host village amassed large amounts of European and native goods. These they gave as grave offerings and as gifts to allied groups invited to the feast. ... Many of the goods given away in these ceremonies lost their utilitarian value. ... the village funerals and other occasions for exchanges strengthened and made manifest through the reallocation of goods a larger network of social relationships. The flow of goods within these relationships seemed backward to the French: Leaders did not amass wealth but rather, gave it away; the dead did not leave property to the living; instead, the living bestowed scarce goods on the dead. Algonquians had put European goods to the service of an existing social reality.”
The book gives much of its account from the perspective of the Indians and, among other things, it supplies fascinating accounts of their attitudes on the roles and status of women and their attitudes to property. These were starkly different to European attitudes and they provide, among other things, a profound rebuttal to those who assert (as they do) that sexual relations and property relations in modern society are fundamentally "natural" in the sense of being fixed and universal. They are not.
Needless to say, contact with Europeans over several centuries produced singificant changes and Indian societies moved towards European values in many respects, albeit a very slow process. For example, there were many conversions to Christianity, a move towards European styles of farming and in any case a lot of inter-marriage. The true history of America was a meeting of people perfectly well able to evolve together into a successful nation. It did not happen because, eventually, one side decided to get everything it wanted by force. The word used in this book to describe American settlers was "Indian Haters." Without romanticising its subject, the book does leave a sense that this was a great pity and a shame.
Quotes below are all from the first three chapters of the book: sorry for omitting page references.
“The creation of the middle ground involved a process of mutual invention by both the French and the Algonquians. This passed through various stages, of which the earliest is at once the most noticed and the least interesting. It was in this initial stage that the French, for example, simply assimilated Indians into their own conceptual order. Indians became sauvages, and the French reduced Indian religion to devil worship and witchcraft. The Algonquians, for their part. Thought of the first Europeans as manitous. On both sides, new people were crammed into existing categories in a mechanical way.”
“Literacy gave this initial stage a potency and durability for Europeans it might otherwise have lacked. Because the French were literate, knowledge of Indians was diffused far from the site of actual contact. Such knowledge, unchallenged by actual experience with Indians, survived as a potent cultural relict. Long after it ceased to govern the actions of those who actually lived among Indians, the idea of Indians as literally sauvages, or wild men embodying either natural virtue or ferocity, persisted among intellectuals and statesmen in France. Assimilated into European controversies, these imaginary Indians became the Indians of Chateaubriand and Rousseau. They took on importance, but it was one detached from the continuing process of contact between real Algonquians and real Europeans.” …
“It was Frenchmen (for Frenchwomen would not appear until much later) and Algonquian men and women who created a common ground – the middle ground – on which to proceed. This process of creation resulted quite naturally from attempts to follow normal conventions of behaviour in new situations… The result of each side’s attempts to apply its own cultural expectations in a new context was often change in culture itself. In trying to maintain the conventional order of its world, each group applied rules that gradually shifted to meet the exigencies of particular situations. The result of these efforts was a new set of common conventions.” ...
“Perhaps the central and defining aspect of the middle ground was the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms which they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises. Those operating in the middle ground acted for interests derived from their own culture, but they had to convince people of another culture that some mutual action was fair and legitimate. The congruences arrived at often seemed – and indeed were – results of misunderstandings or accidents. Indeed, to later observers, the interpretations offered by members of one society for the practices of the other can appear ludicrous. This, however, does not matter… Cultural conventions do not have to be true to be effective… They only have to be accepted.” ...
"The operation of the middle ground must be understood within a dual context. First, there was the weakness of hierarchical controls within Algonquian villages and the frailty of any authority French official exerted over Frenchmen in the West. Second, there was the cultural threat each society seemed to pose to the elite of the other. What this meant in practice was that both the extent and meaning of social relations between Frenchmen and Algonquians were often negotiated largely on a face-to-face level within the villages themselves and that these relations were not what either French authorities or Algonquian elders might have preferred them to be. This does not mean that there was no official element involved, but rather that the official decisions could not determine the course of actual relations.”
"“French accounts were united, first, by their inability to understand the status of women vis-a-vis men except in terms of conjugal relations and, secondly, by their tendency to group sexual relations in terms of two opposite poles of conduct, with marriage at one extreme and prostitution and adultery at the other. … The immediate result was to define women in terms of a person – her actual or potential husband – who may not have been anywhere near being the most significant figure in the woman’s life. Depending on her tribal identity, an Algonquian woman often had a more durable and significant relationship with her mother, father, brothers, sisters or grandparents, or with other, unrelated women that with her husband or husbands. Nor was an Algonquian woman’s status dependent solely on her husband. Her own membership in ritual organizations or, among some tribes such as Shawnees, Huron-Petuns and Miamis, her own political status in offices confined to women, had more influence on her social position than the status of her husband did.”
“Even when the most careful and sensitive of European observers talked about the status of women and sexual relations, .. they eliminated much of the actual social world that gave those relations their full meaning… European conceptions of marriage, adultery and prostitution just could not encompass the actual variety of sexual relations in the pays d’en haut.”
"“Algonquian and Iroquoian Indians were first attracted to European goods not for their utility but rather for their symbolic value... The political or religious benefits Algonquians obtained from European goods should not be confused with the prestige Europeans associated with wealth. Algonquians, as individuals, did not accumulate wealth. Goods in Algonquian society actually belonged to no single person, although they always rested with some person for a time... They passed them on to others. Goods, in effect, only paused with a recipient and then flowed on through established social channels. This did not mean that any commodity belonged to everyone in common – for all these social streams were distinct, and people shared only in particular ones – but rather that those people within what might be called the social watershed of family, clan, or village, might eventually come to claim an item for a time. Each recipient incurred a reciprocal obligation to the giver, thus ensuring that goods were constantly in motion. Defining what were surplus goods in this situation – goods beyond the basic needs for subsistence and production – is difficult, since groups, not individuals, accumulated goods and possession was so fluid. The only dam that stopped the circulation of goods in these social streams was death. The dead acquired goods through burial gifts, but they could no longer reciprocate.”
“...the Feast of the dead, a ceremony that the French, with their ideas of personal accumulation saw as mad. ... In preparation for the Feast of the dead, which took place periodically in order to rebury the dead after a temporary interment, the host village amassed large amounts of European and native goods. These they gave as grave offerings and as gifts to allied groups invited to the feast. ... Many of the goods given away in these ceremonies lost their utilitarian value. ... the village funerals and other occasions for exchanges strengthened and made manifest through the reallocation of goods a larger network of social relationships. The flow of goods within these relationships seemed backward to the French: Leaders did not amass wealth but rather, gave it away; the dead did not leave property to the living; instead, the living bestowed scarce goods on the dead. Algonquians had put European goods to the service of an existing social reality.”
August 10, 2017
I read this book as a selection of Let's Talk About It Oklahoma. It was interesting and I did learn some things. That said, it was much more of a time commitment than I want to make for a book club. Very academic if this is your field of study.
October 6, 2015
Richard White argues that a process of accommodation, itself the result of "creative misunderstandings" (xxvi), emerged from interactions between French, British, and Algonquins in the pays d'en haut from the middle of the 17th century until the War of 1812. The critical element enabling the emergence of the physical and metaphorical spaces where this accommodation took place, what White calls "the middle ground", is the inability for long periods of time of whites to either dictate to or ignore the Indians in the area. When this equilibrium disappeared, the middle ground went with it. White describes his book as a "circular" tale, beginning when Europeans and Indians first met and saw each other as alien/other, moving through a period when the groups constructed a mutually understandable world, and ending with the re-creation of the Indian as alien/exotic/other. (paraphrasing xxv-xxvi)
White acknowledges one of the issues with his sources up front, which is a common problem of availability, but perhaps dismisses it too easily. He notes that moments of crisis generate the most records but does not acknowledge the biases that can be introduced by relying on these anomalous bursts/clusters of records. (xxxi)
In many ways, this is a book about negotiation (what White calls mediation). In negotiation terms, there was a shifting but nevertheless extant zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) among the Indians and Europeans for long periods of time. The existing of a ZOPA reflected each side's belief that the other had good, viable alternatives to a negotiated settlement. When the Europeans ceased believing that the Indians had alternatives, accommodation and compromise gave way to domination.
Notes
Ch. 1: The French entered a fractured world, full of Indian refugees fleeing Iroquois attackers. In that context, they were initially welcomed as manitous (spirits that could take many physical forms) and their assistance was welcomed. But the powers of the French proved less than divine, and it was only the threat of further Iroquois violence that pushed the French and Algonquin refugees together. “The alliance rested on a delicate balance of fear and temptation.” (32) The French role as mediators became increasingly important throughout the late 17th Century, and mediation became a source of power for the French. (33-34) By the end of the 17th Century, the Algonquins had regained strength and defeated the Iroquois, thanks in no small part to French mediations to resolve internal Algonquin disputes. (34)
TP: The French patted themselves on the back for their ability to manage the Algonquins, and White also seems to give them credit for this (35), but relying as he is on French sourcing, this is perhaps a bit dubious.
The Algonquin, and later Iroquois, recognized the French governor — whom they called Onontio — as the leader of the alliance, and as “father.” (36) This was a demotion from manitou. The French cemented the alliance by bestowing gifts in the Algonquin tradition, and through Algonquin channels. (36) “The alliance essentially merged the French politics of empire with the kinship politics of the village.” (37)
Although final victory over the Iroquois in 1701 led to the dissolution of the refugee camps in which the French/Algonquin alliance developed, the alliance survived and grew stronger as “the middle ground” emerged. (49-50)
Ch. 2: The “middle ground” emerged in stages. First, each side slotted the other into preexisting categories: savages and manitous. Then they tried to come to terms with each other, which was necessary since neither side could get what it wanted through force. (52) “Perhaps the central and defining aspect of the middle ground was the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises.” (52) That these “premises” were often misunderstandings mattered little. As White notes, “Any congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to work and take on a life of its own if it is accepted by both sides.” (53) Indeed, this is something all negotiators know well!
The middle ground existed on both formal and informal levels, (53) but it was the informal level that defined the middle ground (59-60), even if it meant that it was not quite what either side would prefer under ideal circumstances. Sex and violence became two areas in which intense negotiation had to take place, and therefore bore much responsibility for the construction of the middle ground. (60) Sex example: 1694 Accault attempt to marry Aramepinchieue. (70-75) Violence examples (77-82)
Handing of murders provides a good example of the type of congruences, however, tenuous, that came to define the middle ground. (93)
Ch. 3: "The fur trade became part of the Middle Ground" (94) and was “structured by the overarching political relationship of French fathers to their Algonquin children. This alliance provided the means for linking the Algonquin system of exchange, with its emphasis on the primacy of social relation, to a much larger world economy.” (105) Goods had more than just material value for both parties, but particularly for the Algonquins, who used them for political, relational, practical, and symbolic purposes. (100-103) Despite epic levels of violence, trade “never completely broke down because the large political relationship of which it was a part persisted.” (112) All of this took place under the umbrella of familial relation that defined the middle ground. (112)
The emergence of the English gave the Algonquin additional leverage in negotiations with the French, initially in the context of the fur trade. (119-121) The French accepted less favorable terms to keep their alliance with the Algonquin together (127). Goods also had increasingly utilitarian value for the Algonquin. "...European goods became an integral part of Algonquin life, but by the end of the French period there was not, as yet, material dependence.” (140)
Ch. 4: The alliance "was largely Algonquin in form and spirit, and demanded a father who mediated more often than he commanded, who forgave more often than he punished, and who gave more than he received.” (143) “The result was an odd imperialism where mediation succeeded and force failed, where colonizers gave gifts to the colonized and patriarchal metaphors were the heart of politics.” (145) The alliance struggled in the first decade and a half of the 18th Century, but the strengthening British presence “provided the inducement for this reconstitution of the alliance….” (175) The French resumed gift giving and began medaling alliance chieftains (179). The alliance exploded “in imperial confrontation and village rebellions in the 1750s.” (185)
Ch. 5: In the mid-18th Century, French-British imperial competition focused on the Ohio Valley, creating new opportunities for “previously marginal” figures in Algonquin societies, such as Peter Chartier, who were able to create their own Indian Republics (189-192).
The end of King George’s War in 1748 gave the French a chance to repair the alliance, but instead they accelerated its decline. (202) This reflected, in part, the inexperience of the French leadership in Canada. (203) The French tried to remedy their mistakes in the 1750s with some success (212-217) It was perhaps too late. The politics in the pays d’en haut were changing. (222)
Ch. 6: The French and British came to see the outcome of the Ohio and Wabash village struggles as the key to the broader power struggle on the American continent. (223) The French underestimated the strength of their Algonquin alliance, over-estimated the strength of the British, and initiated an imperial confrontation that they would lose, losing Canada in the process. (227) The French and their Indian allies held out for a time, but in the end lost the Seven Years’ War, and Canada with it. (242-248) The Indians were not happy about this; they wanted the French and British to remain in a low-level state of competition, which would improve the Indian bargaining position. (255-256)
General Amherst and the British tried to forge a new paradigm for European-Indian relations that looked a lot more like traditional imperialism. Amherst was not interested in conciliation, and he sought to do away with the practice of giving presents. (257) The British approach led to the diminution of the power of chiefs, eliminating the possibility of mediation of disputes, and empowering the warriors ( 266-268) By 1762, the middle ground seemed ready to crumble. (268) Pontiac’s Rebellion led to the restoration of the middle ground, under a British father this time. (268)
Ch. 7: The story of Pontiac’s Rebellion is "the accommodation of the Alongquins and the British.” (270) The rebellion was a result of “the failure of the Indians to create a confederacy that would prevent British occupation of the region, the failure of the British to act as fathers or brothers, and the failure of Onontio to return.” (271) “In 1765-1766, peace and alliance on the middle ground returned.” (305)
The British resumed gift giving — budgeting 20,000 pounds annually for it. (310)
Ch. 7: William Johnson tried to model the British-Algonquin alliance on the French model, but could not persuade the British government to provide sufficient funds, nor could he reestablish the social infrastructure essential for the functioning of the middle ground. (315) The emergence of a new village world further complicated matters. The Stamp Act crisis of the 1870s led the British Crown to cut back gifts to the Indians, which, as we saw with French, can be fatal in a transactional relationship. (321) As the formal diplomatic middle ground receded, a new middle ground more analogous to the earlier French-Indian village level interactions emerged between backcountry settlers and Indians, beginning with the partial assimilation of white captives from the Seven Years’ War. (323) In this, Algonquin women played a central role. (325) The resistance of adult British prisoners to total assimilation led to the construction of a new middle ground. (327)
There were differences between the French and British experiences, however. The British found that they could buy what they wanted with rum — sex, among other things —and did not have to invest the time in building connections and cultural ties. (340-342) The results could be calamitous fits of violence, but resolution of these actually helped to build a middle ground. (343)
TP: The evil of alcohol. (423, among others)
Ch. 8: Simple version of post-American Revolution situation in the region: emergence of another imperial power — the Americans — recreated many of the same dynamics seen earlier between the French, British, and Indians. More complex version: village struggles for power were the predominant feature of the period, since the region had dissolved back into village level existence by the 1780s. (366-367) George Rogers Clark’s expedition provides an amusing tale of the power/necessity of working on the middle ground. (368-372)
indian hating, common among backcountry settlers, led to the destruction of parts of the middle ground, while occupying a small corner of it — that dealing with violence. (387) It also enabled the British to achieve their highest level of alliance success with the Algonquin in the 1780s, helping to restore some larger political coherence to the pays d’en haut. (410-412)
Ch. 9: Two fledgling confederacies confront each other — Algonquin and American. (415-416) The Americans fail to find the middle ground, while the British and French manage to remain on it. (448)
Ch. 10: The Americans no longer feared the Indians; the British were exiting the scene; and the Indians turned inward. Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh emerge, laying the foundation for the alliances of the War of 1812. Tecumseh after 1808 became the leader of an Indian confederation and then a British alliance-chief. (514-55) The British and Algonquin briefly resurrected an alliance on the middle ground in 1812-1813; Tecumseh’s death ended its rally. (517)
White acknowledges one of the issues with his sources up front, which is a common problem of availability, but perhaps dismisses it too easily. He notes that moments of crisis generate the most records but does not acknowledge the biases that can be introduced by relying on these anomalous bursts/clusters of records. (xxxi)
In many ways, this is a book about negotiation (what White calls mediation). In negotiation terms, there was a shifting but nevertheless extant zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) among the Indians and Europeans for long periods of time. The existing of a ZOPA reflected each side's belief that the other had good, viable alternatives to a negotiated settlement. When the Europeans ceased believing that the Indians had alternatives, accommodation and compromise gave way to domination.
Notes
Ch. 1: The French entered a fractured world, full of Indian refugees fleeing Iroquois attackers. In that context, they were initially welcomed as manitous (spirits that could take many physical forms) and their assistance was welcomed. But the powers of the French proved less than divine, and it was only the threat of further Iroquois violence that pushed the French and Algonquin refugees together. “The alliance rested on a delicate balance of fear and temptation.” (32) The French role as mediators became increasingly important throughout the late 17th Century, and mediation became a source of power for the French. (33-34) By the end of the 17th Century, the Algonquins had regained strength and defeated the Iroquois, thanks in no small part to French mediations to resolve internal Algonquin disputes. (34)
TP: The French patted themselves on the back for their ability to manage the Algonquins, and White also seems to give them credit for this (35), but relying as he is on French sourcing, this is perhaps a bit dubious.
The Algonquin, and later Iroquois, recognized the French governor — whom they called Onontio — as the leader of the alliance, and as “father.” (36) This was a demotion from manitou. The French cemented the alliance by bestowing gifts in the Algonquin tradition, and through Algonquin channels. (36) “The alliance essentially merged the French politics of empire with the kinship politics of the village.” (37)
Although final victory over the Iroquois in 1701 led to the dissolution of the refugee camps in which the French/Algonquin alliance developed, the alliance survived and grew stronger as “the middle ground” emerged. (49-50)
Ch. 2: The “middle ground” emerged in stages. First, each side slotted the other into preexisting categories: savages and manitous. Then they tried to come to terms with each other, which was necessary since neither side could get what it wanted through force. (52) “Perhaps the central and defining aspect of the middle ground was the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises.” (52) That these “premises” were often misunderstandings mattered little. As White notes, “Any congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to work and take on a life of its own if it is accepted by both sides.” (53) Indeed, this is something all negotiators know well!
The middle ground existed on both formal and informal levels, (53) but it was the informal level that defined the middle ground (59-60), even if it meant that it was not quite what either side would prefer under ideal circumstances. Sex and violence became two areas in which intense negotiation had to take place, and therefore bore much responsibility for the construction of the middle ground. (60) Sex example: 1694 Accault attempt to marry Aramepinchieue. (70-75) Violence examples (77-82)
Handing of murders provides a good example of the type of congruences, however, tenuous, that came to define the middle ground. (93)
Ch. 3: "The fur trade became part of the Middle Ground" (94) and was “structured by the overarching political relationship of French fathers to their Algonquin children. This alliance provided the means for linking the Algonquin system of exchange, with its emphasis on the primacy of social relation, to a much larger world economy.” (105) Goods had more than just material value for both parties, but particularly for the Algonquins, who used them for political, relational, practical, and symbolic purposes. (100-103) Despite epic levels of violence, trade “never completely broke down because the large political relationship of which it was a part persisted.” (112) All of this took place under the umbrella of familial relation that defined the middle ground. (112)
The emergence of the English gave the Algonquin additional leverage in negotiations with the French, initially in the context of the fur trade. (119-121) The French accepted less favorable terms to keep their alliance with the Algonquin together (127). Goods also had increasingly utilitarian value for the Algonquin. "...European goods became an integral part of Algonquin life, but by the end of the French period there was not, as yet, material dependence.” (140)
Ch. 4: The alliance "was largely Algonquin in form and spirit, and demanded a father who mediated more often than he commanded, who forgave more often than he punished, and who gave more than he received.” (143) “The result was an odd imperialism where mediation succeeded and force failed, where colonizers gave gifts to the colonized and patriarchal metaphors were the heart of politics.” (145) The alliance struggled in the first decade and a half of the 18th Century, but the strengthening British presence “provided the inducement for this reconstitution of the alliance….” (175) The French resumed gift giving and began medaling alliance chieftains (179). The alliance exploded “in imperial confrontation and village rebellions in the 1750s.” (185)
Ch. 5: In the mid-18th Century, French-British imperial competition focused on the Ohio Valley, creating new opportunities for “previously marginal” figures in Algonquin societies, such as Peter Chartier, who were able to create their own Indian Republics (189-192).
The end of King George’s War in 1748 gave the French a chance to repair the alliance, but instead they accelerated its decline. (202) This reflected, in part, the inexperience of the French leadership in Canada. (203) The French tried to remedy their mistakes in the 1750s with some success (212-217) It was perhaps too late. The politics in the pays d’en haut were changing. (222)
Ch. 6: The French and British came to see the outcome of the Ohio and Wabash village struggles as the key to the broader power struggle on the American continent. (223) The French underestimated the strength of their Algonquin alliance, over-estimated the strength of the British, and initiated an imperial confrontation that they would lose, losing Canada in the process. (227) The French and their Indian allies held out for a time, but in the end lost the Seven Years’ War, and Canada with it. (242-248) The Indians were not happy about this; they wanted the French and British to remain in a low-level state of competition, which would improve the Indian bargaining position. (255-256)
General Amherst and the British tried to forge a new paradigm for European-Indian relations that looked a lot more like traditional imperialism. Amherst was not interested in conciliation, and he sought to do away with the practice of giving presents. (257) The British approach led to the diminution of the power of chiefs, eliminating the possibility of mediation of disputes, and empowering the warriors ( 266-268) By 1762, the middle ground seemed ready to crumble. (268) Pontiac’s Rebellion led to the restoration of the middle ground, under a British father this time. (268)
Ch. 7: The story of Pontiac’s Rebellion is "the accommodation of the Alongquins and the British.” (270) The rebellion was a result of “the failure of the Indians to create a confederacy that would prevent British occupation of the region, the failure of the British to act as fathers or brothers, and the failure of Onontio to return.” (271) “In 1765-1766, peace and alliance on the middle ground returned.” (305)
The British resumed gift giving — budgeting 20,000 pounds annually for it. (310)
Ch. 7: William Johnson tried to model the British-Algonquin alliance on the French model, but could not persuade the British government to provide sufficient funds, nor could he reestablish the social infrastructure essential for the functioning of the middle ground. (315) The emergence of a new village world further complicated matters. The Stamp Act crisis of the 1870s led the British Crown to cut back gifts to the Indians, which, as we saw with French, can be fatal in a transactional relationship. (321) As the formal diplomatic middle ground receded, a new middle ground more analogous to the earlier French-Indian village level interactions emerged between backcountry settlers and Indians, beginning with the partial assimilation of white captives from the Seven Years’ War. (323) In this, Algonquin women played a central role. (325) The resistance of adult British prisoners to total assimilation led to the construction of a new middle ground. (327)
There were differences between the French and British experiences, however. The British found that they could buy what they wanted with rum — sex, among other things —and did not have to invest the time in building connections and cultural ties. (340-342) The results could be calamitous fits of violence, but resolution of these actually helped to build a middle ground. (343)
TP: The evil of alcohol. (423, among others)
Ch. 8: Simple version of post-American Revolution situation in the region: emergence of another imperial power — the Americans — recreated many of the same dynamics seen earlier between the French, British, and Indians. More complex version: village struggles for power were the predominant feature of the period, since the region had dissolved back into village level existence by the 1780s. (366-367) George Rogers Clark’s expedition provides an amusing tale of the power/necessity of working on the middle ground. (368-372)
indian hating, common among backcountry settlers, led to the destruction of parts of the middle ground, while occupying a small corner of it — that dealing with violence. (387) It also enabled the British to achieve their highest level of alliance success with the Algonquin in the 1780s, helping to restore some larger political coherence to the pays d’en haut. (410-412)
Ch. 9: Two fledgling confederacies confront each other — Algonquin and American. (415-416) The Americans fail to find the middle ground, while the British and French manage to remain on it. (448)
Ch. 10: The Americans no longer feared the Indians; the British were exiting the scene; and the Indians turned inward. Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh emerge, laying the foundation for the alliances of the War of 1812. Tecumseh after 1808 became the leader of an Indian confederation and then a British alliance-chief. (514-55) The British and Algonquin briefly resurrected an alliance on the middle ground in 1812-1813; Tecumseh’s death ended its rally. (517)
March 14, 2014
Much of American history presents the view of Native Americans as the conquered peoples in a linear story that begins with the landing of Columbus in the Caribbean and ends with the Trail of Tears and Wounded Knee. Richard White seeks to reframe that story, at least in the Great Lakes region. To do so, White has created the Middle Ground, the area known by the French as the pays d’en haut or upper country, which he writes of in his work of the same title. While there is a definite sense of place, the titular Middle Ground is much more than a geographic location. White argues that “between 1650 and 1815 (Native Americans and Europeans) constructed a common, mutually comprehensible world” in this region. But it was a cultural, economic, and social middle ground as well as geographic. White used many primary sources for his research, including American, British, Canadian, and French diplomatic archives in addition to a great deal of secondary literature regarding the Native population of the region.
For White, this organization came about as the first (French) explorers and fur traders made their way into the Great lakes region. At this point, even with a deficit in weaponry, the Indian population had the upper hand and could force the Europeans to accept a mutually agreeable relationship. After the American Revolution, this organization began to break down as the Native American power and influence shrank along with the Native population, and the Middle Ground was finished by 1815.
White also has a new interpretation of the organization of the area. For him, the power in the region lay at the village level. Empire and country were far too distant to have much influence in the Middle Ground. It was the individual village leaders that held the power to determine policy, such as it was, as well as diplomatic ties. The area was home to a staggering array of different peoples—different ethnicities, cultures and religions. White explains how, as they came together in the region, they formed multi-ethnic communities, blending languages, cultures, and religions. The result was by no means a homogenous society, but rather one in which each person could see some reflection of their former selves and learned to value those of others.
In telling the story, White did use the more famous inhabitants, such as Daniel Boone and Ottawa war Chief Pontiac, but he also uses the stories of more modest inhabitants as illustrations of his thesis. By using such examples, he was able to show the degree to which his arguments hold true. White spends a great deal of the book at this personal level, and it absolutely helps to illustrate the larger focus of the community. White also does a service by bringing the native peoples front and center, rather than placing them at the periphery. In most of the scholarship before his, Indians existed mainly as mere props to advance the European settlers. In White’s book, they are the ACTORS. They are just as responsible (if not more so, given his argument that the region started from a place of Native strength) for the creation of the Middle Ground as any of the European explorers, missionaries, or traders. Additionally, his intimate portrayals allowed him to illustrate the differences between the two societies. Most notably, he contrasted the limits placed on European women to the greater freedom allowed native women.
Somewhat ironically, according to White, the final failure of the Middle Ground occurred as the Native population came to be seen as a group that needed to be protected (from themselves as much as any other threat). Once the American Revolution and resultant War of 1812 had been concluded, the United States government stopped seeing the natives as a people and started viewing them as a responsibility. The result is the codification of paternalism which led to Native Americans being categorized as “less than” for the better part of two centuries. I’m not sure that the break was that clean and neat in reality, but it does make for a clean ending to White’s wor
For White, this organization came about as the first (French) explorers and fur traders made their way into the Great lakes region. At this point, even with a deficit in weaponry, the Indian population had the upper hand and could force the Europeans to accept a mutually agreeable relationship. After the American Revolution, this organization began to break down as the Native American power and influence shrank along with the Native population, and the Middle Ground was finished by 1815.
White also has a new interpretation of the organization of the area. For him, the power in the region lay at the village level. Empire and country were far too distant to have much influence in the Middle Ground. It was the individual village leaders that held the power to determine policy, such as it was, as well as diplomatic ties. The area was home to a staggering array of different peoples—different ethnicities, cultures and religions. White explains how, as they came together in the region, they formed multi-ethnic communities, blending languages, cultures, and religions. The result was by no means a homogenous society, but rather one in which each person could see some reflection of their former selves and learned to value those of others.
In telling the story, White did use the more famous inhabitants, such as Daniel Boone and Ottawa war Chief Pontiac, but he also uses the stories of more modest inhabitants as illustrations of his thesis. By using such examples, he was able to show the degree to which his arguments hold true. White spends a great deal of the book at this personal level, and it absolutely helps to illustrate the larger focus of the community. White also does a service by bringing the native peoples front and center, rather than placing them at the periphery. In most of the scholarship before his, Indians existed mainly as mere props to advance the European settlers. In White’s book, they are the ACTORS. They are just as responsible (if not more so, given his argument that the region started from a place of Native strength) for the creation of the Middle Ground as any of the European explorers, missionaries, or traders. Additionally, his intimate portrayals allowed him to illustrate the differences between the two societies. Most notably, he contrasted the limits placed on European women to the greater freedom allowed native women.
Somewhat ironically, according to White, the final failure of the Middle Ground occurred as the Native population came to be seen as a group that needed to be protected (from themselves as much as any other threat). Once the American Revolution and resultant War of 1812 had been concluded, the United States government stopped seeing the natives as a people and started viewing them as a responsibility. The result is the codification of paternalism which led to Native Americans being categorized as “less than” for the better part of two centuries. I’m not sure that the break was that clean and neat in reality, but it does make for a clean ending to White’s wor
August 14, 2017
I've lived in the pays d'en haut practically my whole life (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois). I've even made, compared to most people, an effort to learn about the history of the landscape and the Native Americans who have lived here in the past 400 years. And yet starting The Middle Ground still felt like the ground had changed under my feet. I knew that colonization here was complex and violent, in the abstract, but I guess I had a pretty poor estimate of not just how intricate this story was, but of how well it was recorded. It's kind of maddening to know that the historical record is so rich but so little of it makes its way through to most of the people who actually live here today.
The Middle Ground tells many vignettes about pays d'en haut history, interactions between French and Algonquian-speaking groups primarily, though also with Iroquois. Many of them are about various elements of political economy--criminal justice, trade policy, peacekeeping and alliance formation, etc. But many of them are extremely dramatic and gruesome, full of torture and murder and cannibalism. None of them are told in particular narrative coherence--that's not why White is telling them--but in aggregate, the whole setting is ripe for a grimdark historical fantasy novel. It would require a careful touch, but I think it could be a really neat project, making a mundane place rich with unsuspected depth, etc.
That level of inspiration was my biggest takeaway from the book. White's thesis is apparently a significant landmark in historical theory, but in 2016 it's a bit prosaic. The "Middle Ground" is a reality that emerges in the clumsy joining of French and Native American cultures, a functional translation that gets the underlying logic of each group's reality across just well enough to work together but not enough for either group to really understand the other's worldview. White tracks how this relationship ebbs and flows as the material circumstances underlying the alliance change, as well as leadership stability in the French hierarchy and, most importantly, in the shifting relationships among the Algonquian-speaking tribes.
The book takes a slow, evidence-heavy approach to making its point. There's a lot of these stories, chosen for their relevance to a particular subpoint, and therefore not always well slotted into a larger narrative of the dynamics and colonial and Native politics. That's fine as far as it goes, but I was satisfied by around 260 pages of this that I'd gotten the gist, and didn't need to read the next 250 pages at this point. It is an incredible trove of sources, though, and I can definitely imagine coming back to it in the future.
The Middle Ground tells many vignettes about pays d'en haut history, interactions between French and Algonquian-speaking groups primarily, though also with Iroquois. Many of them are about various elements of political economy--criminal justice, trade policy, peacekeeping and alliance formation, etc. But many of them are extremely dramatic and gruesome, full of torture and murder and cannibalism. None of them are told in particular narrative coherence--that's not why White is telling them--but in aggregate, the whole setting is ripe for a grimdark historical fantasy novel. It would require a careful touch, but I think it could be a really neat project, making a mundane place rich with unsuspected depth, etc.
That level of inspiration was my biggest takeaway from the book. White's thesis is apparently a significant landmark in historical theory, but in 2016 it's a bit prosaic. The "Middle Ground" is a reality that emerges in the clumsy joining of French and Native American cultures, a functional translation that gets the underlying logic of each group's reality across just well enough to work together but not enough for either group to really understand the other's worldview. White tracks how this relationship ebbs and flows as the material circumstances underlying the alliance change, as well as leadership stability in the French hierarchy and, most importantly, in the shifting relationships among the Algonquian-speaking tribes.
The book takes a slow, evidence-heavy approach to making its point. There's a lot of these stories, chosen for their relevance to a particular subpoint, and therefore not always well slotted into a larger narrative of the dynamics and colonial and Native politics. That's fine as far as it goes, but I was satisfied by around 260 pages of this that I'd gotten the gist, and didn't need to read the next 250 pages at this point. It is an incredible trove of sources, though, and I can definitely imagine coming back to it in the future.
April 5, 2024
This is an eloquent, detailed account of two things: first, the history of the peoples of the Great Lakes, Upper Mississippi, and Ohio Valley during the French and British imperial periods, and second, the relationship of those peoples with their European colonial neighbors. The French called the area the pays d’en haut and present-day Americans, the Old Northwest. “It tells how Europeans and Indians met and regarded each other as alien, as other, as virtually nonhuman. It tells how, over the next two centuries, they constructed a common, mutually comprehensible world in the region around the Great Lakes…the older worlds of Algonquians and various Europeans overlapped, and their mixture created new systems of meaning and exchange…[finally],the breakdown of accommodation and common meaning and the re-creation of the Indians as alien, as exotic, as other.”
Here is the relationship. The differences between European and Algonquian ideas of things like peace, war, economic exchange, sexual relationships, and many other things had to be bridged in order for them to have meaningful relationships, and, because neither held ultimate power in these relationships, they were bridged in ways that accommodated both. Here are some examples. From an Algonquian perspective, peace and economic exchange had to accompany each other. Both sides were expected to be generous in the handing out of presents, the French and British especially so if they were to take on the aspect of “father” as they did in their alliances with native peoples. When they held conferences, there were certain rituals such as the smoking of the calumet that needed to be followed. When there was war, war belts were circulated. Indians concepts of murder or prisoners of war were very different from Europeans. If someone from an allied group killed one of my group, then condolence rituals and presents healed the rift. If my group captured an enemy, he could be killed, made a slave, or perhaps brought into my group whole. The French and British had to compromise on all these points and more. But so did the Algonquians. That was the middle ground.
White follows standard histories in some ways when he is describing the Indian villages themselves, but he adds a very important and novel insight. Standard: Algonquians had a non-coercive political system, in which persuasion and influence were paramount. One of the few things that could get an Algonquian male killed by members of his own society was getting too big for his britches. Influence was generally divided between peace and war chiefs. When the native-European alliances were functioning well, European goods (“presents”) flowed from the Europeans through the peace chiefs, who became known as alliance chiefs. This brought influence. When the alliance broke down, war chiefs became more prominent. Here, though, is something he taught me. Tribes in the old Northwest were not as important as most historians have thought. The most important political unit was the village or town. Because of wars and depopulation by disease, most towns were multi-ethnic refugee centers. Just as most European settlements were made up of a combination of, for example, Dutch, English and German, most Indian villages were made up of a combination of, for example, Shawnee, Delaware, and Senecas. Chiefs and factions vied for influence on the level of individuals, clans, towns, tribes, and the Northwest as a whole, but the village was the most important. I would like to see that concept explored more.
White looks at topics such as the Beaver Wars, the Fox Wars, the Seven Years’ War, Pontiac’s Rebellion, the War of 1812, the fur trade, European colonization and more. His sources are problematic. He is forced to use European sources: reports of various military officers, Indian agents, or traders who were there, captives, narratives of people who voyaged to the region. But there are also speeches made by Indians in council with Europeans and even the words of the few literate native people. Because of this, some of the details are bound to be wrong, so I won’t dwell on them. There are several themes or theses in the book, though, that I think require mention.
First, I am not sure if I am shocked or amused by how White avoided any mention of the word realpolitik. Cambridge dictionary defines realpolitik as “practical politics, decided more by the urgent needs of the country, political party, etc., than by morals or principles.” That sounds exactly what this book is all about. Rather than behave according to the principles of their respective societies, Indians and Europeans were forced to negotiate their behavior and expectations of each other because neither had the power to force the other. When European and Americans finally had the power, they forced the Indians to behave according to Euro American norms and laws. I wonder if this exclusion by White was deliberate or not.
White disputes the claims of dependency theorists and asserts that, at this time and place, Indians were not dependent upon the trade goods they received from the Europeans. He follows two tracks of evidence for this. First, he relates incidences when groups of Indians were cut off from the flow of goods, and they were able to use traditional technologies to provide a living for themselves. They preferred to use guns rather than bows and arrows and to boil their food in iron pots rather than clay ones, but they proved able to make the adjustment well enough. Further, they were able to force Europeans to provide them with a flow of “presents” as the price for their alliance even when the value of the fur trade decreased. Indeed, both the French and British decried this expense, and when they tried to cut it, the Indians started murdering people until the flow was turned back on. A very good point White makes is that the French and British in Quebec were dependent upon the Indians of the pays d’en haut for the defense of Canada.
Violence towards French fur traders who ventured inland to get around groups of Indians to trade with groups in the interior has generally been interpreted as Indian anger at the loss of their middlemen status. White says no, Indians were generally not interested in being middlemen or monopolists. That is to ascribe European motives to their behavior. On the contrary, French were being killed and robbed because they were greedy and did not fulfill Indian ideals of trade and political alliance. Exchange could only be rightfully carried out with political alliance and the generous giving of gifts. French traders were not generous and so violated the norms of political alliance. They could be robbed or killed. I am not so sure about this. When White writes about the symbolic nature of French trade goods to the Indians, and the differences, such as, for the French accumulation brought status, but for the Indians, distribution did, he is correct. Sometimes, however, he writes as if these goods had no material meaning at all, as if guns were never fired, knives never cut anything, or pots were never used to boil a stew. I personally know of situations, such as with the Hurons in the 1640s, when Indians jealously and intentionally guarded their middleman status against other groups. I don’t think he is correct.
“[W]hites could neither dictate to Indians nor ignore them…the place in between: in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages.” The French needed the Indian as economic and sexual partners, and especially as allies against the Iroquois and English colonies to the south of Quebec. The Indians needed the French for those things too. And it dissolved when the Indians no longer had the power to force the Europeans to accept it. Those are powerful ideas and I think that they are true.
Here is the relationship. The differences between European and Algonquian ideas of things like peace, war, economic exchange, sexual relationships, and many other things had to be bridged in order for them to have meaningful relationships, and, because neither held ultimate power in these relationships, they were bridged in ways that accommodated both. Here are some examples. From an Algonquian perspective, peace and economic exchange had to accompany each other. Both sides were expected to be generous in the handing out of presents, the French and British especially so if they were to take on the aspect of “father” as they did in their alliances with native peoples. When they held conferences, there were certain rituals such as the smoking of the calumet that needed to be followed. When there was war, war belts were circulated. Indians concepts of murder or prisoners of war were very different from Europeans. If someone from an allied group killed one of my group, then condolence rituals and presents healed the rift. If my group captured an enemy, he could be killed, made a slave, or perhaps brought into my group whole. The French and British had to compromise on all these points and more. But so did the Algonquians. That was the middle ground.
White follows standard histories in some ways when he is describing the Indian villages themselves, but he adds a very important and novel insight. Standard: Algonquians had a non-coercive political system, in which persuasion and influence were paramount. One of the few things that could get an Algonquian male killed by members of his own society was getting too big for his britches. Influence was generally divided between peace and war chiefs. When the native-European alliances were functioning well, European goods (“presents”) flowed from the Europeans through the peace chiefs, who became known as alliance chiefs. This brought influence. When the alliance broke down, war chiefs became more prominent. Here, though, is something he taught me. Tribes in the old Northwest were not as important as most historians have thought. The most important political unit was the village or town. Because of wars and depopulation by disease, most towns were multi-ethnic refugee centers. Just as most European settlements were made up of a combination of, for example, Dutch, English and German, most Indian villages were made up of a combination of, for example, Shawnee, Delaware, and Senecas. Chiefs and factions vied for influence on the level of individuals, clans, towns, tribes, and the Northwest as a whole, but the village was the most important. I would like to see that concept explored more.
White looks at topics such as the Beaver Wars, the Fox Wars, the Seven Years’ War, Pontiac’s Rebellion, the War of 1812, the fur trade, European colonization and more. His sources are problematic. He is forced to use European sources: reports of various military officers, Indian agents, or traders who were there, captives, narratives of people who voyaged to the region. But there are also speeches made by Indians in council with Europeans and even the words of the few literate native people. Because of this, some of the details are bound to be wrong, so I won’t dwell on them. There are several themes or theses in the book, though, that I think require mention.
First, I am not sure if I am shocked or amused by how White avoided any mention of the word realpolitik. Cambridge dictionary defines realpolitik as “practical politics, decided more by the urgent needs of the country, political party, etc., than by morals or principles.” That sounds exactly what this book is all about. Rather than behave according to the principles of their respective societies, Indians and Europeans were forced to negotiate their behavior and expectations of each other because neither had the power to force the other. When European and Americans finally had the power, they forced the Indians to behave according to Euro American norms and laws. I wonder if this exclusion by White was deliberate or not.
White disputes the claims of dependency theorists and asserts that, at this time and place, Indians were not dependent upon the trade goods they received from the Europeans. He follows two tracks of evidence for this. First, he relates incidences when groups of Indians were cut off from the flow of goods, and they were able to use traditional technologies to provide a living for themselves. They preferred to use guns rather than bows and arrows and to boil their food in iron pots rather than clay ones, but they proved able to make the adjustment well enough. Further, they were able to force Europeans to provide them with a flow of “presents” as the price for their alliance even when the value of the fur trade decreased. Indeed, both the French and British decried this expense, and when they tried to cut it, the Indians started murdering people until the flow was turned back on. A very good point White makes is that the French and British in Quebec were dependent upon the Indians of the pays d’en haut for the defense of Canada.
Violence towards French fur traders who ventured inland to get around groups of Indians to trade with groups in the interior has generally been interpreted as Indian anger at the loss of their middlemen status. White says no, Indians were generally not interested in being middlemen or monopolists. That is to ascribe European motives to their behavior. On the contrary, French were being killed and robbed because they were greedy and did not fulfill Indian ideals of trade and political alliance. Exchange could only be rightfully carried out with political alliance and the generous giving of gifts. French traders were not generous and so violated the norms of political alliance. They could be robbed or killed. I am not so sure about this. When White writes about the symbolic nature of French trade goods to the Indians, and the differences, such as, for the French accumulation brought status, but for the Indians, distribution did, he is correct. Sometimes, however, he writes as if these goods had no material meaning at all, as if guns were never fired, knives never cut anything, or pots were never used to boil a stew. I personally know of situations, such as with the Hurons in the 1640s, when Indians jealously and intentionally guarded their middleman status against other groups. I don’t think he is correct.
“[W]hites could neither dictate to Indians nor ignore them…the place in between: in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages.” The French needed the Indian as economic and sexual partners, and especially as allies against the Iroquois and English colonies to the south of Quebec. The Indians needed the French for those things too. And it dissolved when the Indians no longer had the power to force the Europeans to accept it. Those are powerful ideas and I think that they are true.
May 23, 2013
Richard White’s landmark 1991 work The Middle Ground, based on the greater Great Lakes region which the French called the pays d’en haut, pioneered a focus and a vocabulary for the study of intercultural relationships between colonists and natives. As in the Old Southwest, where the agricultural decline of the Little Ice Age was compounded by the onset of European plagues and violent competition for access to trade networks, White tells us that the world that existed prior to the mid-17th century had ceased to be. “It had been shattered. Only fragments remained. Like a knife scoring a pane of glass, warfare apparently far more brutal than any known previously among these peoples had etched the first fine dangerous lines across the region in the 1640s . . . And then, between 1649 and the mid-1660s, Iroquois attacks had fallen like hammer blows across the length and breadth of the lands bordering the Great Lakes and descended down into the Ohio Valley.”
What replaced it among the Algonquian peoples who lived along the northern and western reaches of the Great Lakes was an alliance with the French that called order out of chaos – an alliance the French also badly needed to counterbalance the power of the English colonies to the south. “The alliance endured not because of some mystical affinity between Frenchmen and Indians, nor because Algonquians had been reduced to dependency on the French, but rather because two peoples created an elaborate network of economic, political cultural, and social ties to meet the demands of a particular historical situation . . . As in an Indian confederacy, the mobilization of force against outsiders was only a secondary achievement of the alliance. Primarily, the alliance sought to insure peace among its members.” Held together by diplomacy and ceremonies “based on cultural parallels and congruences, inexact and artificial as they originally may have been,” the French helped the fragmented Algonquians to maintain harmony through mediation and alleviated the threat of the rival Iroquois League based along the southeastern shore of the lakes.
What replaced it among the Algonquian peoples who lived along the northern and western reaches of the Great Lakes was an alliance with the French that called order out of chaos – an alliance the French also badly needed to counterbalance the power of the English colonies to the south. “The alliance endured not because of some mystical affinity between Frenchmen and Indians, nor because Algonquians had been reduced to dependency on the French, but rather because two peoples created an elaborate network of economic, political cultural, and social ties to meet the demands of a particular historical situation . . . As in an Indian confederacy, the mobilization of force against outsiders was only a secondary achievement of the alliance. Primarily, the alliance sought to insure peace among its members.” Held together by diplomacy and ceremonies “based on cultural parallels and congruences, inexact and artificial as they originally may have been,” the French helped the fragmented Algonquians to maintain harmony through mediation and alleviated the threat of the rival Iroquois League based along the southeastern shore of the lakes.
August 30, 2013
The Middle Ground is an impressive study of the interaction between the French, British, Indian and American peoples in the Great Lakes Region, or the pays d'en haut. Richard White attempts to recast the history of this area as a complex intermingling of Indian culture and European influence—in place of the traditional narrative of Indian defeat by European conquest. His detailed perspective of relationships between these communities greatly expands on previous discussions of White-Indian relations.
The “Middle Ground” for which the book is named is a metaphorical space created by the Indians, Europeans, and American colonists in the Great Lakes Region during the Iroquois wars. This space was fashioned through negotiated interaction between multiple parties including trade, intermarriage, breeding, violence, and religious mission work. A constant negotiation between these disparate cultures forged a tenuous “middle ground” cooperative agreement—achieved through complex mediation, not domination. A relationship based on European paternalism (first French, then British) and village leadership emerged—a blend of political and kinship relations. This association mediated differences and resolved tribal conflicts, provided moderate protection, and allowed for continued trade and relative peace in the region.
For each invading presence a new process of interaction, compromise, and assimilation was attempted. The already fragile relationships balancing the European and native population in the pays d'en haut came to an end when American forces advanced through the region after the American Revolution—defeating and eventually removing the Indian presence. Politically, the Indians lost their power when the pays d'en haut was no longer contested territory. Hard won accommodations and common understandings were rejected in light of the American resurrected view of the Indians as “savage.”
The “Middle Ground” for which the book is named is a metaphorical space created by the Indians, Europeans, and American colonists in the Great Lakes Region during the Iroquois wars. This space was fashioned through negotiated interaction between multiple parties including trade, intermarriage, breeding, violence, and religious mission work. A constant negotiation between these disparate cultures forged a tenuous “middle ground” cooperative agreement—achieved through complex mediation, not domination. A relationship based on European paternalism (first French, then British) and village leadership emerged—a blend of political and kinship relations. This association mediated differences and resolved tribal conflicts, provided moderate protection, and allowed for continued trade and relative peace in the region.
For each invading presence a new process of interaction, compromise, and assimilation was attempted. The already fragile relationships balancing the European and native population in the pays d'en haut came to an end when American forces advanced through the region after the American Revolution—defeating and eventually removing the Indian presence. Politically, the Indians lost their power when the pays d'en haut was no longer contested territory. Hard won accommodations and common understandings were rejected in light of the American resurrected view of the Indians as “savage.”
October 17, 2007
This book is a great way to begin to understand the complexity of a time period most people forget. However, it is a bit too focused on the eastern edge of Anishinaabe-aakiing. Still worth the read for historical perspective.
July 11, 2011
Well-written but tough for a non-expert of American Indians (like myself) to follow. Very scholarly and isn't for beginners!
September 29, 2015
White presents an extremely successful examination of his thesis.
December 28, 2017
Skip the monograph and read White's article version instead.
October 16, 2019
Excellent writing and a worthy subject. White does a masterful job examining the interplay of empires and natives, and how each could not gain the advantage over the other in the great lakes region, referred to as the pays d'en haut by the French. This book is a classic in early American studies, and having read it, I can see why. It makes me interested where the discussion has gone since White wrote this book, and where it will go. This subject, of a middle ground, really has interested me since I first learned about it in undergrad, and where it could exist in other situations, but White is careful to say that he is only writing about it in this particular place, and not to use it for other situations.
If you are interested in this period in colonial history, definitely give this one a chance. I will be on the lookout for more of Whites work and other works on this particular subject.
If you are interested in this period in colonial history, definitely give this one a chance. I will be on the lookout for more of Whites work and other works on this particular subject.
October 12, 2008
Where Boundaries Melted Together--Richard White on The Middle Ground
Richard White’s The Middle Ground is a richly documented and highly influential account of the constantly changing relationships and rivalries among the Indians of the Great Lakes region and their interactions with the French, British and Americans in succession during the period from 1650 to the end of the War of 1812. This area of North America, known by the French as the pays d’en haut, was the place where disparate peoples—the French and the Algonquians, specifically—met, mingled and merged into a relatively stable alliance that White terms “the middle ground.” This “middle ground, “as described by White, was both a product of a specific place and time, and a more general pattern of inter-cultural interaction in which the Indians of this particular region were actors and partners rather than just being acted upon by the Europeans at the boundaries of their empires. The circumstances of the “middle ground” were unique, of course, and White does a masterful job of describing and analyzing the cultural exchange and “melting” between the cultures of the French and Algonquians during the period of their alliance in the pays d’en haut. This analysis and the model it presents of a “middle ground” is central to the continued influence and usefulness of White’s work.
Critical to the concept of a “middle ground” is the observation by White that it involved “a process of mutual invention by the French and the Algonquians (p. 50.)” This was a gradual and rather organic process—the French wanted to “rationalize and order what they saw as the unpredictable world of the sauvage (p.51)” while the Algonquians sought to “change or re-adjust the given order by appeals for personal favor or exemption (p. 51.) It is important to note that this interaction took place in a time in which neither party had sufficient means to impose their will by force. As a result, both parties were compelled to accommodate one another in ways that were mutually beneficial. This was accomplished by what White describes as the “central and defining aspect of the middle ground”—“the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises (p. 52.)” As a result, the middle ground was knit together by what White describes as a process of creative misunderstanding--such as the common use of the terms “fathers” and “children” to describe the French relationship to the Algonquians. Both groups used the terms, but brought very different cultural meanings and expectations to the dialogue.
While it is true that the French and Algonquians maintained an alliance based on mutual need and mutual accommodation for a sustained period of time, the alliance was inherently unstable and subject to disruption by outside pressures and internal rivalries. Like many such alliances, it was strong when outside threats, such as pressure from the Iroquois, made the relationship vital for mutual survival. It was even stronger when the French effectively executed their role as mediators between rival groups and maintained the flow of trade goods or “presents” that enhanced and sustained the status of local and tribal leaders allied with them. The delicate balance began to unravel once the Iroquois were defeated, and the Indian population shifted into the Ohio region putting them in direct contact with the British and their American colonists. It was strained further when independent and fractious republics were set up on the periphery requiring more direct military control, and the alliance finally came to an end with the defeat of the French by the British. After experimenting with a different approach consisting of parsimony, command and an expectation of submission, which resulted in a revolt by Pontiac and others, the British briefly and rather effectively re-adopted many of the elements of the old alliance until they were forced to leave the renewed “middle ground” to the newly independent United States. The “middle ground” then gave way to a very different pattern of inter-cultural relations.
Richard White’s The Middle Ground is breathtaking in its wealth of detail about a vital period in the history of North America when the French and the Algonquians met, mingled and merged in the Great Lakes region and formed a unique and lasting alliance. The author writes in a very compelling manner and rather elegantly at times, which no doubt part of the book’s appeal. But, the strength of the book is in this wealth of detail as well as White’s description and analysis of what he describes as the “middle ground.” The concept is very useful in understanding the nature of the relationship between the French and Algonquians in a very specific context. Beyond that context, it appears from the additional readings and White’s own response that it has also been applied as a more general description of a common pattern of interaction between disparate cultures or parties seeking agreement. Since this is the case, it seems to confirm this writer’s impression that the “middle ground” is an artificial construct to describe a natural and very common pattern of inter-cultural interaction and accommodation. It certainly applies in this context, but the pattern itself is not unique.
Richard White’s The Middle Ground is a richly documented and highly influential account of the constantly changing relationships and rivalries among the Indians of the Great Lakes region and their interactions with the French, British and Americans in succession during the period from 1650 to the end of the War of 1812. This area of North America, known by the French as the pays d’en haut, was the place where disparate peoples—the French and the Algonquians, specifically—met, mingled and merged into a relatively stable alliance that White terms “the middle ground.” This “middle ground, “as described by White, was both a product of a specific place and time, and a more general pattern of inter-cultural interaction in which the Indians of this particular region were actors and partners rather than just being acted upon by the Europeans at the boundaries of their empires. The circumstances of the “middle ground” were unique, of course, and White does a masterful job of describing and analyzing the cultural exchange and “melting” between the cultures of the French and Algonquians during the period of their alliance in the pays d’en haut. This analysis and the model it presents of a “middle ground” is central to the continued influence and usefulness of White’s work.
Critical to the concept of a “middle ground” is the observation by White that it involved “a process of mutual invention by the French and the Algonquians (p. 50.)” This was a gradual and rather organic process—the French wanted to “rationalize and order what they saw as the unpredictable world of the sauvage (p.51)” while the Algonquians sought to “change or re-adjust the given order by appeals for personal favor or exemption (p. 51.) It is important to note that this interaction took place in a time in which neither party had sufficient means to impose their will by force. As a result, both parties were compelled to accommodate one another in ways that were mutually beneficial. This was accomplished by what White describes as the “central and defining aspect of the middle ground”—“the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises (p. 52.)” As a result, the middle ground was knit together by what White describes as a process of creative misunderstanding--such as the common use of the terms “fathers” and “children” to describe the French relationship to the Algonquians. Both groups used the terms, but brought very different cultural meanings and expectations to the dialogue.
While it is true that the French and Algonquians maintained an alliance based on mutual need and mutual accommodation for a sustained period of time, the alliance was inherently unstable and subject to disruption by outside pressures and internal rivalries. Like many such alliances, it was strong when outside threats, such as pressure from the Iroquois, made the relationship vital for mutual survival. It was even stronger when the French effectively executed their role as mediators between rival groups and maintained the flow of trade goods or “presents” that enhanced and sustained the status of local and tribal leaders allied with them. The delicate balance began to unravel once the Iroquois were defeated, and the Indian population shifted into the Ohio region putting them in direct contact with the British and their American colonists. It was strained further when independent and fractious republics were set up on the periphery requiring more direct military control, and the alliance finally came to an end with the defeat of the French by the British. After experimenting with a different approach consisting of parsimony, command and an expectation of submission, which resulted in a revolt by Pontiac and others, the British briefly and rather effectively re-adopted many of the elements of the old alliance until they were forced to leave the renewed “middle ground” to the newly independent United States. The “middle ground” then gave way to a very different pattern of inter-cultural relations.
Richard White’s The Middle Ground is breathtaking in its wealth of detail about a vital period in the history of North America when the French and the Algonquians met, mingled and merged in the Great Lakes region and formed a unique and lasting alliance. The author writes in a very compelling manner and rather elegantly at times, which no doubt part of the book’s appeal. But, the strength of the book is in this wealth of detail as well as White’s description and analysis of what he describes as the “middle ground.” The concept is very useful in understanding the nature of the relationship between the French and Algonquians in a very specific context. Beyond that context, it appears from the additional readings and White’s own response that it has also been applied as a more general description of a common pattern of interaction between disparate cultures or parties seeking agreement. Since this is the case, it seems to confirm this writer’s impression that the “middle ground” is an artificial construct to describe a natural and very common pattern of inter-cultural interaction and accommodation. It certainly applies in this context, but the pattern itself is not unique.
February 18, 2016
White argues that when Europeans and Native Americans encountered one another in the New World neither side initially imposed its culture on the other. Rather, a middle ground appeared that was a blending and accommodation of both cultures. The middle ground mostly came about through misunderstandings, but it was were trade and alliances took place. "The middle ground depended on the inability of bot sides to gain their ends through force" (52). This is a very important point because it explains ultimately why the middle ground dissolved in American history and why a middle ground did not last as long in encounters elsewhere in the New World.
White stresses the importance of gift exchanges. The European powers, especially the French, assumed the role of a father figure to Native Americans which entails providing for one's children with gifts. However, these gifts proved costly and abandoning gift giving often led to the downfall of the middle ground. White debunks many misconceptions. An Indian chief was not at all equivalent to a European king. Whites states that "chiefs could not rule; they could only persuade and influence" (496). Another major issue was the fact that both sides could not control their own people. The above quote demonstrates how difficult it could be for a chief to control warriors that are supposedly under his control. America proved equally inept at controlling its back country settlers. Since Britain and American were unable to enforce the law on their back country settlers, Native Americans assumed that these governments did not care about the inequities Native Americans were suffering. One last myth that White debunks, is the notion that Native Americans were dependent on European goods for survival. This statement is false and is more of a product of recent history. On a broader note, White argues that local interests, such as those of a particular village, dictated Native American-European relations rather than a broader tribal or imperial motive. The label of tribe appears to be not very significant in terms of predicting the actions of a village.
This book does go very in depth into a narrative history of Native American-European relations for those interested in that. Even for the more casual reader, the book is definitely worth a skim to grasp his concept of the middle ground.
White stresses the importance of gift exchanges. The European powers, especially the French, assumed the role of a father figure to Native Americans which entails providing for one's children with gifts. However, these gifts proved costly and abandoning gift giving often led to the downfall of the middle ground. White debunks many misconceptions. An Indian chief was not at all equivalent to a European king. Whites states that "chiefs could not rule; they could only persuade and influence" (496). Another major issue was the fact that both sides could not control their own people. The above quote demonstrates how difficult it could be for a chief to control warriors that are supposedly under his control. America proved equally inept at controlling its back country settlers. Since Britain and American were unable to enforce the law on their back country settlers, Native Americans assumed that these governments did not care about the inequities Native Americans were suffering. One last myth that White debunks, is the notion that Native Americans were dependent on European goods for survival. This statement is false and is more of a product of recent history. On a broader note, White argues that local interests, such as those of a particular village, dictated Native American-European relations rather than a broader tribal or imperial motive. The label of tribe appears to be not very significant in terms of predicting the actions of a village.
This book does go very in depth into a narrative history of Native American-European relations for those interested in that. Even for the more casual reader, the book is definitely worth a skim to grasp his concept of the middle ground.
December 3, 2023
Richard White is a historian and professor of history emeritus at Stanford University. He earned his bachelor of arts at the University of California at Santa Cruz, his master of arts and his Ph.D. at the University of Washington. Other notable works by White include: Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America in 2011, The Republic for Which It Stands - The United States during Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, 1865-1896 in 2017, and Who Killed Jane Stanford?: A Gilded Age Tale of Murder, Deceit, Spirits and the Birth of a University in 2022. In researching his work, I found that he wrote a book that would have been useful in writing my paper for the Global Environmental History class titled The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River in 1996. Dr. White is qualified to write about the topic.
In The Middle Ground, White seeks to find middle ground in the telling of the interactions of Native Americans and white colonizers. He doesn’t fault historians for taking one of two sides but believes that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. White begins by examining the conflicts between the French, Algonquians, and Iroquois in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Indian refugee centers emerged as indicators of Algonquian fortunes, growing during times of defeat and shrinking during times of victory. These centers provided defense for the refugees, but also brought about misery due to hunger and disease. However, they were preferable to the alternatives faced by the residents. The decline of the Iroquois resulted in the disbanding of the refugee centers, as the inhabitants moved to more fertile lands made available by the weakening Iroquois. The alliance between the French and Algonquians continued to grow despite these changes.
The Iroquois wars, occurring alongside larger imperial conflicts, persisted until 1701 when the Iroquois sought peace with Canada and its allies. This led to the Grand Settlement of 1701, establishing a general peace and the Iroquois agreeing to remain neutral in future Anglo-French wars. The triumph of the alliance over the Iroquois resulted in the decline of the communities that had formed the alliance. However, the alliance itself and the common European-Algonquian world it created continued to evolve. The ritual of surrender and redemption played a central role in the alliance. Each murder, surrender, and pardon became a test of the alliance’s strength and was crucial in maintaining it. The alliance brought about changes in both French and Algonquian societies, blurring the boundaries between them. The exchange network between the French and Algonquians involved both trade and gift exchanges, with both parties viewing it as mutually beneficial. The middle ground, where these exchanges took place, held significance and influenced the actions of both groups.
Pennahouel, a prominent figure among the young men, played a crucial role in negotiating alliances and compromises between the French and Ottawas. The resurrected alliance in the early 18th century created a complex and precarious world, intertwining village and imperial politics. However, internal rivalries and French aspirations for power eventually led to imperial confrontation and village rebellions in the 1750s. In the early 1750s, influential individuals such as Chartier, Orontony, and La Demoiselle started constructing a new political order in the pays d’en haut, characterized by intermarriage, factional rivalries, and declining hierarchies. This blending of village and imperial politics had far-reaching consequences, ultimately involving empires and resulting in significant conflicts and upheavals. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the middle ground between Algonquian villagers and European empires was a fragile and shifting space. Efforts to maintain cultural and political balance between the two groups often failed. The British posts, Algonquian horse thefts, prisoners, and lack of presents reflected a growing disconnect between rhetoric and reality. In 1763, Pontiac, an Ottawa war leader, rebelled against the British and aimed to restore the French alliance.
The middle ground frequently required mediation, as the British found it difficult to avoid. Various tribes sought reconciliation through British intervention. However, sporadic mediation did not lead to a stable alliance. Treaties and alliances were merely ceremonial and did not establish a strong English presence in the pays d’en haut. Ultimately, the events in the region were shaped by the actions of white and Algonquian villagers, rather than imperial officials. During Lord Dunmore’s War, the Shawnees agreed to peace terms that recognized British control, but their compliance meant little as the majority of pays d’en haut warriors were not involved in the conflict. The pays d’en haut remained a world of villages, with limited imperial control. North of the Ohio River, the Shawnee confederacy faltered, and the Six Nations’ influence diminished. South of the Ohio River, backcountry villagers had weak imperial ties, and the impending American Revolution further destabilized the region.
George Rogers Clark, in 1783, emphasized the need to crush Indian notions of superiority to ensure obedience. Although his plan for immediate invasion was not adopted, his attitude influenced American thinking. The end of the confederation and the British alliance seemed anticlimactic. In 1794, the American army engaged with Indians and English militia near the Maumee River. The Indians initially drove back the Americans but were ultimately defeated when reinforcements arrived. The British did not provide the expected aid, causing demoralization among the Indians. This defeat marked the decline of British-Indian alliances, and the Indians began seeking terms with the Americans.
By 1810, Algonquians and the British were on separate paths leading to war with the Americans, with the British fearing premature conflict. The Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 resulted in losses for the Indians, particularly for Tenskwatawa. Tecumseh, however, sought to rebuild the confederacy and strengthen connections with the British. The War of 1812 saw a temporary revival of the British-Algonquian alliance on the middle ground, but ultimately Tecumseh’s eloquence could not overcome British incompetence and larger imperial goals. The middle ground gradually eroded, with the War of 1812 marking the end of the imperial contest in the pays d’en haut. The political influence of the Indians diminished, and their economic significance declined with the fur trade. Tecumseh’s death spared him from witnessing the years of exile, defeat, and domination that followed. The middle ground’s attempt to rally and maintain balance ultimately failed.
I enjoyed reading The Middle Ground as I found it was a unique perspective on Native American and European / American relations. The nonlinear storytelling was sometimes disorienting but wasn’t impossible. White employs numerous primary sources including records, journals, etc. He also relies on the work of other historians. I was not a fan of how he used footnotes as opposed to a bibliography. For a history this size, it might have benefited from different sourcing. In any event, it is well written and easily accessible for anyone interested in the subject.
In The Middle Ground, White seeks to find middle ground in the telling of the interactions of Native Americans and white colonizers. He doesn’t fault historians for taking one of two sides but believes that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. White begins by examining the conflicts between the French, Algonquians, and Iroquois in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Indian refugee centers emerged as indicators of Algonquian fortunes, growing during times of defeat and shrinking during times of victory. These centers provided defense for the refugees, but also brought about misery due to hunger and disease. However, they were preferable to the alternatives faced by the residents. The decline of the Iroquois resulted in the disbanding of the refugee centers, as the inhabitants moved to more fertile lands made available by the weakening Iroquois. The alliance between the French and Algonquians continued to grow despite these changes.
The Iroquois wars, occurring alongside larger imperial conflicts, persisted until 1701 when the Iroquois sought peace with Canada and its allies. This led to the Grand Settlement of 1701, establishing a general peace and the Iroquois agreeing to remain neutral in future Anglo-French wars. The triumph of the alliance over the Iroquois resulted in the decline of the communities that had formed the alliance. However, the alliance itself and the common European-Algonquian world it created continued to evolve. The ritual of surrender and redemption played a central role in the alliance. Each murder, surrender, and pardon became a test of the alliance’s strength and was crucial in maintaining it. The alliance brought about changes in both French and Algonquian societies, blurring the boundaries between them. The exchange network between the French and Algonquians involved both trade and gift exchanges, with both parties viewing it as mutually beneficial. The middle ground, where these exchanges took place, held significance and influenced the actions of both groups.
Pennahouel, a prominent figure among the young men, played a crucial role in negotiating alliances and compromises between the French and Ottawas. The resurrected alliance in the early 18th century created a complex and precarious world, intertwining village and imperial politics. However, internal rivalries and French aspirations for power eventually led to imperial confrontation and village rebellions in the 1750s. In the early 1750s, influential individuals such as Chartier, Orontony, and La Demoiselle started constructing a new political order in the pays d’en haut, characterized by intermarriage, factional rivalries, and declining hierarchies. This blending of village and imperial politics had far-reaching consequences, ultimately involving empires and resulting in significant conflicts and upheavals. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the middle ground between Algonquian villagers and European empires was a fragile and shifting space. Efforts to maintain cultural and political balance between the two groups often failed. The British posts, Algonquian horse thefts, prisoners, and lack of presents reflected a growing disconnect between rhetoric and reality. In 1763, Pontiac, an Ottawa war leader, rebelled against the British and aimed to restore the French alliance.
The middle ground frequently required mediation, as the British found it difficult to avoid. Various tribes sought reconciliation through British intervention. However, sporadic mediation did not lead to a stable alliance. Treaties and alliances were merely ceremonial and did not establish a strong English presence in the pays d’en haut. Ultimately, the events in the region were shaped by the actions of white and Algonquian villagers, rather than imperial officials. During Lord Dunmore’s War, the Shawnees agreed to peace terms that recognized British control, but their compliance meant little as the majority of pays d’en haut warriors were not involved in the conflict. The pays d’en haut remained a world of villages, with limited imperial control. North of the Ohio River, the Shawnee confederacy faltered, and the Six Nations’ influence diminished. South of the Ohio River, backcountry villagers had weak imperial ties, and the impending American Revolution further destabilized the region.
George Rogers Clark, in 1783, emphasized the need to crush Indian notions of superiority to ensure obedience. Although his plan for immediate invasion was not adopted, his attitude influenced American thinking. The end of the confederation and the British alliance seemed anticlimactic. In 1794, the American army engaged with Indians and English militia near the Maumee River. The Indians initially drove back the Americans but were ultimately defeated when reinforcements arrived. The British did not provide the expected aid, causing demoralization among the Indians. This defeat marked the decline of British-Indian alliances, and the Indians began seeking terms with the Americans.
By 1810, Algonquians and the British were on separate paths leading to war with the Americans, with the British fearing premature conflict. The Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 resulted in losses for the Indians, particularly for Tenskwatawa. Tecumseh, however, sought to rebuild the confederacy and strengthen connections with the British. The War of 1812 saw a temporary revival of the British-Algonquian alliance on the middle ground, but ultimately Tecumseh’s eloquence could not overcome British incompetence and larger imperial goals. The middle ground gradually eroded, with the War of 1812 marking the end of the imperial contest in the pays d’en haut. The political influence of the Indians diminished, and their economic significance declined with the fur trade. Tecumseh’s death spared him from witnessing the years of exile, defeat, and domination that followed. The middle ground’s attempt to rally and maintain balance ultimately failed.
I enjoyed reading The Middle Ground as I found it was a unique perspective on Native American and European / American relations. The nonlinear storytelling was sometimes disorienting but wasn’t impossible. White employs numerous primary sources including records, journals, etc. He also relies on the work of other historians. I was not a fan of how he used footnotes as opposed to a bibliography. For a history this size, it might have benefited from different sourcing. In any event, it is well written and easily accessible for anyone interested in the subject.
August 8, 2011
On second reading, this book fared even better than the first. I've learned more about the life of Algonquian people, about colonial policy and reality, and about civilization and its various forms here than almost anywhere else. I trust the original sources R. W. uses on the question of brutality and cruelty of the Indian wars of the 17th and 18th centuries.
I don't think White considers the bias of his sources enough where they may be motivated to paint the Indians in as evil a light as is possible for ethnocentric and political reasons. Maybe he does and I missed it-- the desire to consider the aboriginal people as better than whites dies hard. And this book need not destroy such a notion: White says early in the book that the Indian wars of the period were not, by any means, the "normal" Indian warfare, this being a game by comparison to the post-contact variety. Elsewhere, I learned that the Sioux of the 19th century considered a dozen dead in an attack a catastrophe and could not conceive of a whole village wiped out. I think that despite being something of an exaggeration in the case of the mid 19th century Sioux, this statement is true regarding pre-contact Indian wars.
What I don't understand, is how the author can manage to synthesize his material from original sources as he does, and then cite the material, sentence by sentence in each paragraph, in the footnotes. It seems insane, and I can't imagine the kind of mind that can remember where each tidbit of his huge text comes from, or, alternately, can have the patience to cite everything as he writes it out.
I don't think White considers the bias of his sources enough where they may be motivated to paint the Indians in as evil a light as is possible for ethnocentric and political reasons. Maybe he does and I missed it-- the desire to consider the aboriginal people as better than whites dies hard. And this book need not destroy such a notion: White says early in the book that the Indian wars of the period were not, by any means, the "normal" Indian warfare, this being a game by comparison to the post-contact variety. Elsewhere, I learned that the Sioux of the 19th century considered a dozen dead in an attack a catastrophe and could not conceive of a whole village wiped out. I think that despite being something of an exaggeration in the case of the mid 19th century Sioux, this statement is true regarding pre-contact Indian wars.
What I don't understand, is how the author can manage to synthesize his material from original sources as he does, and then cite the material, sentence by sentence in each paragraph, in the footnotes. It seems insane, and I can't imagine the kind of mind that can remember where each tidbit of his huge text comes from, or, alternately, can have the patience to cite everything as he writes it out.
February 4, 2012
The Middle Ground is one of the seminal texts on colonial history covering the converging areas that Europeans (British, French and eventually Americans) and Native Americans (Algonquins, Iroquois, Shanwees, and many more) shared in and around the great lakes region for the years 1650-1815. Before the term middle ground was taken out of context by a slew of authors following Richard White you see the narrow definition that was meant to exist. By finding an area where these cultures did not dominate but share to give something new in his so called Pays d'en haut. By focusing on the complex relationships that built up between these groups and not simply stopping at resistance and assimilation White puts into context Pontiac and Tecumseh through a look at the ebbing and flowing of political and economic power in the area. From the power plays between Europeans and the ways in which native Americans exploited them to win trade concessions and expand their goods. Europeans also exploited the differences not only in tribes but even in the familial relationships and this book does an excellent job of delving into the structure of Indian society dispelling the myth of the great Indian chief. The chiefs that many people envision are a European creation that did arise after Europeans were able to funnel goods through one person and often the one Europeans wound up fighting was a chief of their own creation. While this book can by dry and dense at times it really is the best on the subject and not one to be missed for those interested in colonial history.
January 2, 2018
I grew up in the Great Lakes, with an interest in Colonial and Native American Histories so to read so nuanced and synthesized a narrative of another side of our History, one so obvious and yet seemingly ignored, is a treasure. The best book on the subject I have read, indispensable. What it lacks in a flashy narrative it more than makes up for in a Herculean synthesis of mountains of research, truly worth the read. There are many different kinds of History books. Some add stories to pad out a limited understanding, some must edit information through a sieve of unflinching discipline to make for a tome that doesn't task ones arms while holding it. I would address some of the critiques here as to the readability of the narrative with this caveat, that this is more the latter than the former. I have read both kinds of Histories, I know which I prefer.
September 28, 2014
White argues that the common notion of Euro-Native contact being one sided is a common misperception. White's focal point of the book are the French who came to the Great Lakes and the Native peoples in "the region around the Great Lakes the French called the 'pays d'en haut'"
White argues that their process of accommodation took place on a term he calls "the middle ground," which is "the place in between cultures,peoples,and in between empires in the nonstate world of villages." White says this "accommodation took place because for long periods of time in large parts of the colonial world whites could neither dictate to Indians nor ignore them.
"This book is 'new Indian History' because it places Indian peoples at the center of the scene and seeks to understand the reasons for their actions.
White argues that their process of accommodation took place on a term he calls "the middle ground," which is "the place in between cultures,peoples,and in between empires in the nonstate world of villages." White says this "accommodation took place because for long periods of time in large parts of the colonial world whites could neither dictate to Indians nor ignore them.
"This book is 'new Indian History' because it places Indian peoples at the center of the scene and seeks to understand the reasons for their actions.
May 5, 2015
This book is a classic and I can't disagree. I can't say more about this book than has been said by every notable historian and publication for the last 20 years. While incredibly extensive and detailed, it is a must for anyone who wants to understand the diplomatic relationship between the French, English, and Native Americans (notably the Algonquin). The common misconceptions and narrative history are clearly rebuked in this work. I can't say enough about how great this book is. I would warn, however, this is not a book for gentle reading. This is research and is presented as such -- this is not a novel. Still, Richard White's prose is far from boring.
July 9, 2018
Incredibly well-researched and thorough, this book is a wealth of information about the development and destruction of the Middle Ground in the Ohio region. It is an excellent source for understanding European-Indian interactions in this period. It is long and some sections can be boring, but it is worth reading if you want a fair and detailed look at this period.
Read
July 4, 2008interesting book about the French and Indians in the Great Lakes area during the first period of contact. The book shows how there was both give and take on the part of both parties, and there was a period where the natives had more power and control, which eventually gave way to the Europeans
Read
January 11, 2009A crucial book, in my opinion, in the study of indigenous peoples and their interactions with Europeans. Not only does this book establish indigenous networks as important elements to trade in the Great Lakes region, but also the extent Algonquian efforts had on Europeans as well.
August 16, 2014
A classic of American historical writing. From page one, White's prose is unusually gripping for a scholarly work, and his arguments continue to inform Native-American, Early American, and border studies.
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