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The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism
This book argues the case for a society organized by private property, individual rights, and voluntary co-operation, with little or no government. David Friedman's standpoint, known as 'anarcho-capitalism', has attracted a growing following as a desirable social ideal since the first edition of The Machinery of Freedom appeared in 1971. This new edition is thoroughly revised and includes much new material, exploring fresh applications of the author's libertarian principles. Among topics covered: how the U.S. would benefit from unrestricted immigration; why prohibition of drugs is inconsistent with a free society; why the welfare state mainly takes from the poor to help the not-so-poor; how police protection, law courts, and new laws could all be provided privately; what life was really like under the anarchist legal system of medieval Iceland; why non-intervention is the best foreign policy; why no simple moral rules can generate acceptable social policies -- and why these policies must be derived in part from the new discipline of economic analysis of law.
267 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1973
About the author
David D. Friedman
21 books138 followersfrom amazon.com:
I am an academic economist currently employed as a law professor, although I have never taken a course for credit in either field. My specialty, insofar as I have one, is the economic analysis of law, the subject of my book _Law's Order_.
In recent years I have created and taught two new law school seminars at Santa Clara University. One was on legal issues of the 21st century, discussing revolutions that might occur as a result of technological change over the next few decades. Interested readers can find its contents in the manuscript of _Future Imperfect_, linked to my web page. Topics included encryption, genetic engineering, surveillance, and many others. The other seminar, which I am currently teaching, is on legal systems very different from ours. Its topics included the legal systems of modern gypsies, Imperial China, Ancient Athens, the Cheyenne Indians, ... . My web page has a link to the seminar web page.
I have been involved in recreational medievalism, via the Society for Creative Anachronism, for over thirty years. My interests there include cooking from medieval cookbooks, making medieval jewelery, telling medieval stories around a campfire creating a believable medieval islamic persona and fighting with sword and shield.
My involvement with libertarianism goes back even further. Among other things I have written on the possibility of replacing government with private institutions to enforce rights and settle disputes, a project sometimes labelled "anarcho-capitalism" and explored in my first book, _The Machinery of Freedom_, published in 1972 and still in print.
My most recent writing project is my first novel, _Harald_. Most of my interests feed into it in one way or another, but it is intended as a story, not a tract on political philosophy, law or economics. It is not exactly a fantasy, since there is no magic, nor quite a historical novel, since the history and geography are invented. The technology and social institutions are based on medieval and classical examples, with one notable exception.
I am an academic economist currently employed as a law professor, although I have never taken a course for credit in either field. My specialty, insofar as I have one, is the economic analysis of law, the subject of my book _Law's Order_.
In recent years I have created and taught two new law school seminars at Santa Clara University. One was on legal issues of the 21st century, discussing revolutions that might occur as a result of technological change over the next few decades. Interested readers can find its contents in the manuscript of _Future Imperfect_, linked to my web page. Topics included encryption, genetic engineering, surveillance, and many others. The other seminar, which I am currently teaching, is on legal systems very different from ours. Its topics included the legal systems of modern gypsies, Imperial China, Ancient Athens, the Cheyenne Indians, ... . My web page has a link to the seminar web page.
I have been involved in recreational medievalism, via the Society for Creative Anachronism, for over thirty years. My interests there include cooking from medieval cookbooks, making medieval jewelery, telling medieval stories around a campfire creating a believable medieval islamic persona and fighting with sword and shield.
My involvement with libertarianism goes back even further. Among other things I have written on the possibility of replacing government with private institutions to enforce rights and settle disputes, a project sometimes labelled "anarcho-capitalism" and explored in my first book, _The Machinery of Freedom_, published in 1972 and still in print.
My most recent writing project is my first novel, _Harald_. Most of my interests feed into it in one way or another, but it is intended as a story, not a tract on political philosophy, law or economics. It is not exactly a fantasy, since there is no magic, nor quite a historical novel, since the history and geography are invented. The technology and social institutions are based on medieval and classical examples, with one notable exception.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 93 reviews
October 6, 2010
This book was disappointing. Instead of crafting a convincing argument, it seemed like Friedman was writing to an audience of believers. He often spends no more than three pages on a complex topic, like how national security would work without a centralized state, then satisfied that he has made his case, moves on to something much more inane.
There were some interesting ideas about the morality of government and the practical aspects of anarcho-capitalism, but they were too intertwined with half thought through ideas and libertarian platitudes to make them compelling to me.
I'd recommend something like Hazlitt's Economics in One Lesson something by Murray Rothbard for a more thoughtful discussion.
There were some interesting ideas about the morality of government and the practical aspects of anarcho-capitalism, but they were too intertwined with half thought through ideas and libertarian platitudes to make them compelling to me.
I'd recommend something like Hazlitt's Economics in One Lesson something by Murray Rothbard for a more thoughtful discussion.
July 14, 2009
This was recommended to me as the best case for anarchocapitalism... if this is true, then I did not find the strongest arguments for anarchocapitalism (or libertarian anarchy) compelling enough. It is an interesting case that Friedman makes, when he states that socialism would only work if it was populated by saints, and anarchy would only fail if its filled with demons.
Ostensibly, the argument is that for imperfect beings, anarchocapitalism is the best arrangement. The costs of violence or imposing one's will on some group of people would require too much effort and be too costly to appeal to rational self-interest... unlike in a government system, where voters are so far removed from the costs of their proposed actions, that they will vote for things that they might not be willing to do if they had to carry the burden of doing it.
Also, he argues that in order to get something done in a democracy, you need the majority of people to agree to it... given this premise, people would be willing to enter into free associations and form private charities, or schools, etc, to help their fellow man. Given that the cost of doing any privately would be much less -- and removing the burden of taxation and the distortionary and inflationary effects of the state -- would greatly raise the standard of living of all people and make it easier to help your fellow man.
Friedman also makes a pretty good argument for how liberal (in the contemporary American sense) democratic policies tend to hurt the poor -- as they do not control any interest groups, tend to be more isolated from the knowledge necessary to utilize government programs effectively, and are much more likely to be effected by government prohibitions. Protectionist measures such as sugar tariffs also disproportionately effect the poor who spend more of their income on necessities like food. Minimum wage laws empirically also effect young minorities the most.
For the first 2/3rds of the book he argues for essentially classic liberal policies, but then takes it to its logical conclusion of competing court systems, private protection agencies, and other anarchist institutions. His only concession, maybe, is in national defense -- because he claims it would be better to pay a minimal tax for that protection here, than to risk having to pay a greater tax to a conqueror. Despite this, though, he still makes a case for how non-coercive and voluntary free market national defense might operate.
He does concede that liberty is not certain in anarchy. But, he counters, it is not certain in a State either. He believes that it is easier to ensure liberty is an anarchocapitalist system, than in a system which has concentrated power and legitimized coercive authority.
Its worth a read... but there are certain aspects and results of a coercive society that I appreciate. Perhaps I am naive in things that it'll operate in the way that I want it to, but there are certain goals that seem less likely materializing in an anarchic state -- such as urban planning, conservation and open spaces, and coherent mass transit. I've heard the arguments for all of these in a free market before -- but I'm not ready to accept them.
I'm a generally a minarchist... but support local tyrannies in some cases. Ultimately, I'm a utilitarian. I'm a pussy compared to Friedman.
Ostensibly, the argument is that for imperfect beings, anarchocapitalism is the best arrangement. The costs of violence or imposing one's will on some group of people would require too much effort and be too costly to appeal to rational self-interest... unlike in a government system, where voters are so far removed from the costs of their proposed actions, that they will vote for things that they might not be willing to do if they had to carry the burden of doing it.
Also, he argues that in order to get something done in a democracy, you need the majority of people to agree to it... given this premise, people would be willing to enter into free associations and form private charities, or schools, etc, to help their fellow man. Given that the cost of doing any privately would be much less -- and removing the burden of taxation and the distortionary and inflationary effects of the state -- would greatly raise the standard of living of all people and make it easier to help your fellow man.
Friedman also makes a pretty good argument for how liberal (in the contemporary American sense) democratic policies tend to hurt the poor -- as they do not control any interest groups, tend to be more isolated from the knowledge necessary to utilize government programs effectively, and are much more likely to be effected by government prohibitions. Protectionist measures such as sugar tariffs also disproportionately effect the poor who spend more of their income on necessities like food. Minimum wage laws empirically also effect young minorities the most.
For the first 2/3rds of the book he argues for essentially classic liberal policies, but then takes it to its logical conclusion of competing court systems, private protection agencies, and other anarchist institutions. His only concession, maybe, is in national defense -- because he claims it would be better to pay a minimal tax for that protection here, than to risk having to pay a greater tax to a conqueror. Despite this, though, he still makes a case for how non-coercive and voluntary free market national defense might operate.
He does concede that liberty is not certain in anarchy. But, he counters, it is not certain in a State either. He believes that it is easier to ensure liberty is an anarchocapitalist system, than in a system which has concentrated power and legitimized coercive authority.
Its worth a read... but there are certain aspects and results of a coercive society that I appreciate. Perhaps I am naive in things that it'll operate in the way that I want it to, but there are certain goals that seem less likely materializing in an anarchic state -- such as urban planning, conservation and open spaces, and coherent mass transit. I've heard the arguments for all of these in a free market before -- but I'm not ready to accept them.
I'm a generally a minarchist... but support local tyrannies in some cases. Ultimately, I'm a utilitarian. I'm a pussy compared to Friedman.
April 16, 2018
Updated 16 April 2018) Excellent book. Anyone who wants an understanding of how individuals interact and solve problems freely, without government should read this book. David Friedman does a marvelous job of explaining how property rights is the key to a just and prosperous society and how government mucks up just about everything it gets power over. You will be amazed at how logical and practical totally free markets are.
I recently (3-18-12) re-read about 2/3 of the book about 25-30 years after first reading it. It has held up VERY well. In fact, I am much more convinced of the author's arguments and conclusions than when I first read the book. The years between readings have born-out many of the author's statements about how awful the government messes up society with its programs of redistribution, regulation, wars and taxation. The few areas where the market was set free: space exploration (to a very limited degree) and the deregulation of the airlines, trucking, railroads, telecom (all to varying extents), the market has responded very well by reduced costs, improved efficiency, and increasing options almost beyond belief. And recently there has been virtually no deregulation, but new entrepreneurial ideas and technologies have gotten around all sorts of old, stifling, and high cost government regulations and monopolies: mail, taxis (think Uber and Lift), AirBnB, etc.
Some other never regulated areas of the economy that have grown up in the meantime have radically changed our world for the better: computers, certain communications (though actually often still hamstrung by regulations) and the whole internet platform.
But with the increasing calls for restrictions on freedom of speech, more government regulations, more military strikes (wars), more surveillance by the government, this book is more important than ever.
Highly recommended.
I recently (3-18-12) re-read about 2/3 of the book about 25-30 years after first reading it. It has held up VERY well. In fact, I am much more convinced of the author's arguments and conclusions than when I first read the book. The years between readings have born-out many of the author's statements about how awful the government messes up society with its programs of redistribution, regulation, wars and taxation. The few areas where the market was set free: space exploration (to a very limited degree) and the deregulation of the airlines, trucking, railroads, telecom (all to varying extents), the market has responded very well by reduced costs, improved efficiency, and increasing options almost beyond belief. And recently there has been virtually no deregulation, but new entrepreneurial ideas and technologies have gotten around all sorts of old, stifling, and high cost government regulations and monopolies: mail, taxis (think Uber and Lift), AirBnB, etc.
Some other never regulated areas of the economy that have grown up in the meantime have radically changed our world for the better: computers, certain communications (though actually often still hamstrung by regulations) and the whole internet platform.
But with the increasing calls for restrictions on freedom of speech, more government regulations, more military strikes (wars), more surveillance by the government, this book is more important than ever.
Highly recommended.
April 29, 2017
UPDATE: David Friedman himself responded to this review in the comments. I am a firm believer in hearing both sides before passing a verdict, so: Please read his feedback. It is succinct enough that I don't think I have to summarize it.
The Machinery of Freedom differs from the anarchocapitalist mainstream, as established by Murray Rothbard, in two aspects: Economically, David Friedman stands in the tradition of the Chicago School, not the Austrian School; ethically, he is a utilitarian, and doesn't accept a natural law (more on that later). While I believe that the approach of Rothbard and his disciples is superior, I think that these differences should make The Machinery of Freedom very attractive to people to whom the traditional approaches are too outlandish. Friedmans more modest claims and his less confrontative style should help with that. I read this book partly to challenge my views, as I knew of his different approach, and to find more arguments in favor of them. It succeeded on both counts.
Most of the book is dedicated to outlining free market-solutions to problems such as public transport, healthcare and law enforcement. Especially the latter subject is very interesting, with Friedman giving a detailed account on how defense firms would create an entirely contractual law and enforce it, and why they would be preferable to a state. I think few writers have created a more vivid vision of how an anarchocapitalist society could function in practice, which is another big point in favor of this book and something else that should make it particularly attractive to newcomers.
He also dedicates an entire chapter on military defense, and while I appreciate the input from it too, I find him too pessimistic. Friedman agrees with the critics of anarchocapitalism that military defense is a public good, but he still thinks it can potentially work on a non-coercive basis. As was pointed out by Walter Block in an essay in The Myth of National Defense, a public good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. The only aspect of military defense that could possibly qualify as a public good would be military deterrence, but even that is more than questionable in an anarchocapitalist society. If the USA embraced anarchocapitalism tomorrow, would a strong military defense provided by firms in California deterr potential invaders of Florida? That is more than doubtful. So even if the only good you'd buy was military deterrence, enough people would invest in it to create a strong national defense. My bigger objection, however, is that the actual good most people would buy would be real defense, not just deterrence, and defense in this narrow manner is very much rivalrous and excludable. That I have a very good defense contract would not keep my neighbor from getting one himself, or from taking other precautions in case of an attack.
What I find very problematic is David Friedman's view on nuclear prolification. He bought the propaganda that Mutually Assured Destruction is a guarantee for peace, and so claimed that free society would be well-advised to buy itself a nuclear arsenal. Not only is this ethically impermissible, according to the view of me and many other anarchocapitalists (which I obviously see as the correct view, or I wouldn't have adopted it), it's also unnecessary. I cannot blame Friedman for not taking the possibility of a missile shield into account, as that is a new development and was probably science fiction at the time The Machinery of Freedom was first written, but he could've addressed the role of foreign intervention and diplomacy in more detail, as Michael Huemer did in The Problem of Political Authority.
Another chapter was about the shortcomings of anarchocapitalist theories based on the notion of a natural law. Friedman himself admitted that he's not a philosopher, and I have to say that it shows. His critique is rather superficial, he underestimates how well-defined the natural law can be. For example, he asks what the threshold is at which a contact with foreign property becomes a violation of said property. He claims that this threshold cannot be established without arbitrariness, but I maintain that this is very much possible, both in abstracto and for concrete cases by applying these abstract rules. Here's my solution: If an immission remains below the threshold your property had been subjected to before you homesteaded it, then it's not a violation of your property. If you build or buy a house in a busy street, you cannot sue the people passing by or talking loudly, but you could sue them if they take out a loudspeaker at 3 AM to shout at your house. The former immission is part of the package you acquired, the latter isn't, so to speak. Now, this chapter isn't horrible by any means, it just isn't very good.
After this letdown, I got to read one of the best chapters of any anarchocapitalist book I've ever read: David Friedman's analysis of Medieval Iceland. His account of this society and its legal and cultural achievements was thrilling to read and one of the best arguments in favor of customary and contractual legal systems I've ever read. I started reading Njal's Saga due to his recommendation, and I don't regret it. I believe Friedman is working on another book about Medieval Iceland, and I cannot wait for the final product!
The book closes with a few recommendations for further reading and some critiques of the works of other authors, a bit outdated and not exhaustive, but nevertheless great to read. If I recall correctly, he missed out on Rothbard's two great books, For a New Liberty and The Ethics of Liberty, but as his list is still diverse and shows he's done his research, I can look over that.
To sum my review up: The Machinery of Freedom is a comparatively easy and short read, compared to the other libertarian manifestos, and so especially recommendable to beginners. Those who are more well-versed in libertarian theory can still profit greatly from it, though, especially from the chapter on Iceland. I was pretty close to giving it five stars, too, and it was only the chapter on natural law that pushed it down a star.
The Machinery of Freedom differs from the anarchocapitalist mainstream, as established by Murray Rothbard, in two aspects: Economically, David Friedman stands in the tradition of the Chicago School, not the Austrian School; ethically, he is a utilitarian, and doesn't accept a natural law (more on that later). While I believe that the approach of Rothbard and his disciples is superior, I think that these differences should make The Machinery of Freedom very attractive to people to whom the traditional approaches are too outlandish. Friedmans more modest claims and his less confrontative style should help with that. I read this book partly to challenge my views, as I knew of his different approach, and to find more arguments in favor of them. It succeeded on both counts.
Most of the book is dedicated to outlining free market-solutions to problems such as public transport, healthcare and law enforcement. Especially the latter subject is very interesting, with Friedman giving a detailed account on how defense firms would create an entirely contractual law and enforce it, and why they would be preferable to a state. I think few writers have created a more vivid vision of how an anarchocapitalist society could function in practice, which is another big point in favor of this book and something else that should make it particularly attractive to newcomers.
He also dedicates an entire chapter on military defense, and while I appreciate the input from it too, I find him too pessimistic. Friedman agrees with the critics of anarchocapitalism that military defense is a public good, but he still thinks it can potentially work on a non-coercive basis. As was pointed out by Walter Block in an essay in The Myth of National Defense, a public good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. The only aspect of military defense that could possibly qualify as a public good would be military deterrence, but even that is more than questionable in an anarchocapitalist society. If the USA embraced anarchocapitalism tomorrow, would a strong military defense provided by firms in California deterr potential invaders of Florida? That is more than doubtful. So even if the only good you'd buy was military deterrence, enough people would invest in it to create a strong national defense. My bigger objection, however, is that the actual good most people would buy would be real defense, not just deterrence, and defense in this narrow manner is very much rivalrous and excludable. That I have a very good defense contract would not keep my neighbor from getting one himself, or from taking other precautions in case of an attack.
What I find very problematic is David Friedman's view on nuclear prolification. He bought the propaganda that Mutually Assured Destruction is a guarantee for peace, and so claimed that free society would be well-advised to buy itself a nuclear arsenal. Not only is this ethically impermissible, according to the view of me and many other anarchocapitalists (which I obviously see as the correct view, or I wouldn't have adopted it), it's also unnecessary. I cannot blame Friedman for not taking the possibility of a missile shield into account, as that is a new development and was probably science fiction at the time The Machinery of Freedom was first written, but he could've addressed the role of foreign intervention and diplomacy in more detail, as Michael Huemer did in The Problem of Political Authority.
Another chapter was about the shortcomings of anarchocapitalist theories based on the notion of a natural law. Friedman himself admitted that he's not a philosopher, and I have to say that it shows. His critique is rather superficial, he underestimates how well-defined the natural law can be. For example, he asks what the threshold is at which a contact with foreign property becomes a violation of said property. He claims that this threshold cannot be established without arbitrariness, but I maintain that this is very much possible, both in abstracto and for concrete cases by applying these abstract rules. Here's my solution: If an immission remains below the threshold your property had been subjected to before you homesteaded it, then it's not a violation of your property. If you build or buy a house in a busy street, you cannot sue the people passing by or talking loudly, but you could sue them if they take out a loudspeaker at 3 AM to shout at your house. The former immission is part of the package you acquired, the latter isn't, so to speak. Now, this chapter isn't horrible by any means, it just isn't very good.
After this letdown, I got to read one of the best chapters of any anarchocapitalist book I've ever read: David Friedman's analysis of Medieval Iceland. His account of this society and its legal and cultural achievements was thrilling to read and one of the best arguments in favor of customary and contractual legal systems I've ever read. I started reading Njal's Saga due to his recommendation, and I don't regret it. I believe Friedman is working on another book about Medieval Iceland, and I cannot wait for the final product!
The book closes with a few recommendations for further reading and some critiques of the works of other authors, a bit outdated and not exhaustive, but nevertheless great to read. If I recall correctly, he missed out on Rothbard's two great books, For a New Liberty and The Ethics of Liberty, but as his list is still diverse and shows he's done his research, I can look over that.
To sum my review up: The Machinery of Freedom is a comparatively easy and short read, compared to the other libertarian manifestos, and so especially recommendable to beginners. Those who are more well-versed in libertarian theory can still profit greatly from it, though, especially from the chapter on Iceland. I was pretty close to giving it five stars, too, and it was only the chapter on natural law that pushed it down a star.
November 19, 2015
La obra que concentra el análisis consecuencialista de David Friedman, desarrolla algunas reformas que se pueden aplicar en la sociedad actual que nos podrían ayudar a alcanzar más libertad, luego hace un análisis de lo que podría ser una sociedad anarco-capitalista desde el punto de vista utilitarista cuestionándose algunas de las propuestas de los libertarios que razonan desde el derecho natural (iusnaturalistas) aunque siendo sincero no me convencieron algunas aunque podrían ser debatibles (sobretodo su análisis de la suma de felicidad y cuándo sería adecuado violar la propiedad privada para salvar a una multitud de personas) también hace un análisis económico a la formación de leyes sin estado, una breve descripción histórica de la sociedad de la Islandia celta el cual tenía un sistema de leyes más o menos policentrico en el que se respetaba una clase de propiedad privada. Como apéndice recomienda muchísimos libros para expandir el conocimiento libertario, desde economía, derecho, psicología y teoría de juegos. Es un excelente libro.
January 31, 2013
The worst book I have ever read. This book is a series of statements that are designed solely for the converted and not supported by facts (there are no sources in the book). Friedman does not argue his case, he simply states it in a ridiculously over-simplified and unrealistic manner. It does not acknowledge possible criticism but rather defeats strawmen. It draws a false dichotomy by implying that you are either a libertarian or a communist. The only theory he criticises is Marxism, as though that is the only alternative to his theories.
That is my problem with the libertarian section of the book. After that he moves onto describing an anarchist world. This section is actually painful. It is the worst argument I have ever heard. It is so absurd, it might as well come with a sign saying "Leave your brain at the door". His belief that there should be multiple courts and laws and they should compete for customers in the free market, was particularly daft.
That is my problem with the libertarian section of the book. After that he moves onto describing an anarchist world. This section is actually painful. It is the worst argument I have ever heard. It is so absurd, it might as well come with a sign saying "Leave your brain at the door". His belief that there should be multiple courts and laws and they should compete for customers in the free market, was particularly daft.
June 7, 2008
It was a little too extreme in parts for my taste, and I found myself saying, hey, that would never work in parts, but hey, you gotta appreciate the spirit, haha. Definitely worth a read in the spirit of thinking out of the box a bit.
December 9, 2017
Old but pure gold. Thanks David Friedman
November 25, 2014
A very well-thought out, provocative read. I would recommend this for anyone, though chiefly Friedman seeks to convince the non-libertarian. He identifies himself alternately as classical Liberal, Goldwater conservative, libertarian, and/or anarcho-capitalist. Overall, he makes penetrating arguments using principally a pragmatic focus on outcomes. He does delve into moral philosophy at points, though he seems to exhibit some skepticism of morality generally (his description of himself as a Catholic without God is interesting). In his own words:
The central idea of libertarianism is that people should be permitted to run their own lives as they wish. We totally reject the idea that people must be forcibly protected from themselves...We also reject the idea that people have an enforceable claim on others for anything more than being left alone. (location 287-290) Some strengths and weaknesses as I found them below.
Part I provides a general overview of Liberal economics and property, and the principals are of little controversy except to very committed Marxists. However, even here he applies these principals in ways that might make many readers raise their eyebrows. One does not need to be an economist nor even have a lot of education to understand and appreciate his chapters here. He acknowledges one cannot construct systems or societies to be populated only by saints. He is rather frank about the risks of trying anarchy or anything largely untried: "Human beings and human societies are far too complicated for us to have confidence in a priori predictions about how institutions that have never been tried would work." (locations 651-658) Yet there are points (in later parts) where he seems to do just that, though, for the most part, he does so without coming off as overly-confident.
Part II provides a small-government libertarian approach to reducing the scope, size, authority, and cost of government, without proceeding to make a complete argument for anarchy. This section is convincing and strongly argued. His attacks on "experts" are well-spoken, and his ideas on mass transit prescient of Uber and other such services (though deregulating taxis could also help in that area). Chapter 12 was unusually weak, claiming that a modern university is impossible. While Friedman's many critiques have merit, it does not render a modern university "impossible," evidenced by his own and his children's attendance at them. Universities have been around for centuries, flaws and all. That said, I would welcome an "Adam Smith U" (Chapter 13) as Friedman outlines it and see how it competes against the other models of universities. Still, even his "Adam Smith U" shell company would have corporate interests, making one wonder how it is immune to the problems he outlines for regular universities (while his version would tend to limit the impact of those prejudices, he does not make the case that it would be wholly exempt).
His call for completely open immigration also fails to account for reality. While all classical Liberal-leaning people favor the free movement of goods, services, money, and people, the difference between the last and the former are that goods, services, and money don't come with language, culture, religion, or any other baggage that can be disruptive to a working society. While Friedman claims in a later part that those immigrating are largely leaving behind undesirable factors from their former homes, uncontestable evidence to the contrary has appeared in Europe with large Muslim migrants who have brought female genital mutilation, "honor" killings, arranged child marriages, and murder of European filmmakers along with them (just to give one such real-world example). Therefore, throwing the doors completely open to immigration while ignoring such factors and in the face of such evidence would be folly. I would favor a much more open legal immigration system with much stronger deterrence for illegal immigrants, but a completely open system would end in unmaking any society desirable to live in, at least in the short run.
His Chapter 22 idea for emancipating children at the age of 9 is surprising as a massive intrusion of government into the private affairs of family coming from someone of Friedman's otherwise libertarian leanings. Furthermore (as he acknowledges in Appendix II), his having not read Hazlitt's Economics in One Lesson: The Shortest & Surest Way to Understand Basic Economics shows most in this chapter. A 9 year old could be easily lured away from his/her family by the many child predators in existence, both pedophile and slaver, and is hardly in a position to fend for him/herself. Even in traditional societies, rites of passage to manhood/womanhood occurred frequently around 12-13 years of age and sometimes a little older. In a modern society, a person should probably be full grown or nearly so, so as to be able to operate a motor vehicle, better defend him/herself, etc., before being emancipated. Though it would be welcome if emancipation meant exactly that, and allowed for operation of a motor vehicle, consuming alcoholic beverages, voting, serving in armed services, and all the rest of such age-based restrictions.
I applaud Friedman's Chapter 26 frank discussion of pollution as market externality, especially as he fails to make a convincing case that it can be solved entirely without government. The Cuyahoga River burned not once but several times in my youth, so it is an apparent fact the environment will not police itself (nor the market all polluters). Unfortunately, as Friedman's aim is to abolish government, he offers only the barest notions of useful market-based strategies for governments to employ to better effect than the current reams of incomprehensible regulations and laws. His father Milton Friedman did a more useful job of this in some of his works and I recommend them.
Part III is his first foray into defining workable anarchy and illustrating how it might work and what it might look like. While being provocative, it is quite simply the weakest part of the book. His idea for putting law enforcement and law itself on the market is interesting, but needs further development. A large segment of criminals come from the very poor, who are not exactly going to be paying into the kind of rights enforcement agency (private police force) Friedman envisions. Those not able to pay, or able to pay perhaps only for minimal enforcement, are going to be short-changed on justice, if they get it at all. Private arbitration works well between well-funded entities that can offer up similar stakes, but does not necessarily work as well between vast differences of resources. While he tries to grapple with the idea of rights enforcement agencies appealing to criminals, what about organized crime, which, in effect have built-in rights enforcement capabilities and an agenda to go with. A person concerned for liberty for all has to insist Friedman further develop this idea. After all, the elite and privileged have liberty in virtually every system, so the effects on the middle and poor are the most important to consider if there is to be any real difference. The problems of rights enforcement/private justice are especially important in light of Friedman's own illustration of how saga Iceland did not endure but rather, through internal factionalism and Norwegian pressure, evolved into a more statist version. And this was in light of Iceland's ideal circumstances for a more anarchic situation: a combination of undesirability (to outsiders) and geographic isolation. Also, as Friedman eventually makes clear, any market-based legal system will resort to naked force in the last resort, so those squeamish about capital punishment, blood feuds, or even using lethal force in self-defense are going to have moral problems with it no matter what.
Perhaps the weakest argument put forward for total anarchy is Chapter 34, on national defense (written at that time in the Cold War). Throughout Friedman is tentative and unconvincing (well, maybe if we get enough donations, and since we don't need Hawaii, maybe we can extort more from them, and maybe...). What good would it be to establish an anarchical utopia, only to have some envious neighbor invade and take it over? For a small government person like me, defense is one of the few legitimate pursuits I relegate to government, and in the absence of stronger arguments and proofs from Friedman, abolishing government defense would be something I would oppose. I do like his later amendments concerning the militia, which certainly go with the intent of the Constitution's founders and the history of the American military before World War II. But even in that section, added later, Friedman does not succeed in making good a proof against any government defense (the need for the professional core to train/organize the larger militias). That said, serious consideration of these chapters could lead to an increase in personal liberty and a reduction in the military's size and expense.
Parts IV, V, and VI were written later and make the purchase of the third edition a must! These are some of the strongest parts of his argument, and were clearly developed over decades of argument, study, and consideration. One of the best points he makes that a limited government proponent like myself has to answer is, "The logic of limited governments is to grow." (location 2868) Jefferson's warning has proved itself in the U.S. and is something to address and contend with. However, his own illustration of saga Iceland warns the reader that anarchic societies may not be immune either. The only short answer I can give in any kind of representative government or society responsive to market forces: win the culture war! At least that Friedman is attempting with vigor and skill.
While his foreign policy/defense discussion here is remarkably clear-headed and frank, he becomes disingenuous criticizing changing foreign policies to match changing circumstances (defending China only to oppose it, for instance). His criticism of an interventionist policy seems to assume autarchy; that is, if a nation needs access to rare resources (rare earth metals, for instance) not native to it, then it is hard to see it taking a strictly non-interventionist policy during those periods when, inevitably, access to limited resources will be threatened. So either he is suggesting a return to pre-modern living or failing to account for the many varied and serious threats to a nation's interests abroad, firstly the lanes of trade.
His review of Chesterton is interesting. So many libertarians are absolutely convinced of their positions in vivid, moralistic terms while being skeptical of morality generally. Friedman largely sidesteps the problem by focusing mainly on the pragmatic, but to his credit, he does not fear to venture in the morality field. On that note, he claims to refute Ayn Rand's objectivism. His first objection fails to do so, as the animal mating examples he uses are the result of instinct, not rational choice (the male preying mantis does not choose his destruction through mating, and even in most lower mammals, consensual sex as we understand it does not exist). All that aside, it's not as if lower animals make a rational decision to mate knowing they are decreasing their own personal survival probabilities. As Jonathan Swift points out, when humans are busy begetting children, the children are often not what they're thinking of... His next two objections are much stronger; his fourth objection comes off as quibbling by means of oversimplifying Rand's argument, when, in fact, Friedman seems to share her conclusion, only criticizing the path she took.
It is refreshing that Friedman does not suffer from the goldbug illusions so many other libertarians do--Friedman's suggestions for bank notes based on barrels of mixed commodities presents an interesting solution. His ideas about cyber money are also interesting as Bitcoin proceeds apace. His appendices provide useful recommended reading from the author and others, and some interesting tables of figures. Below are some notable quotables from the book:
property rights are not the rights of property; they are the rights of humans with regard to property. They are a particular kind of human right. (location 353-354)
each person is best qualified to choose for himself which among a multitude of possible lives is best for him. (location 1202-1203)
If many of those choices involve needs, things of infinite value to one person, which can be best determined by someone else, what is the use of freedom? If I disagree with the expert about my needs I make not a value judgment but a mistake. (location 1203-1205)
Today a small elite goes to private prep schools, middle-class children go to moderately good suburban schools and the inner city poor get schools that are little more than custodial institutions. (location 1345-1347)
For years we have been told that all the public school system needs is more money. For years we have watched its per pupil spending rise, with little visible effect on quality. It is time to try something new. (location 1360-1362)
Greedy capitalists get money by trade. Good liberals steal it. (location 1780)
in our society where the poor are also politically weak, they do far worse on things provided by the government, such as schooling and police protection, than on those sold privately, such as food and clothes. (location 2137-2139)
people act according to what they perceive as right, proper, and practical. (location 2454-2455)
People who want to control other people's lives are rarely eager to pay for the privilege; (location 2528-2529)
There are more good cars in the ghetto than good schools. (location 2583-2585)
Most varieties of socialism implicitly assume unanimous agreement on goals. (location 2621-2622)
The organization of a capitalist society implicitly assumes that different people have different ends and that the institutions of the society must allow for that difference. (location 2625-2527)
Capitalism allows for a conflict of ends; it does not require it. (location 2634-2635)
These arguments suggest that it may be possible to defend against foreign nations by voluntary means. They do not prove that it will be; (location 2808-2809)
I do not approve of any government but I will tolerate one so long as the only other choice is another and worse government. (location 2816-2817)
It seems more reasonable to suppose that there is no ruling class, that we are ruled, rather, by a myriad of quarreling gangs, constantly engaged in stealing from each other to the great impoverishment of their own members as well as the rest of us. (location 3004-3006)
government as a whole exists because most people believe it is necessary. Most particular government activities beyond the most fundamental exist because they benefit some special interest at the cost of the rest of us. (location 3088-3089)
Either we follow a policy which makes it easy and profitable for any powerful nation to conquer us or we defend ourselves by means that are at least questionable in terms of libertarian principles. If we make the latter choice, we are taking the position that, if the only way to defend ourselves involves injuring innocent people, we are entitled to do so. (location 4043-4045)
what we are observing is not the incompetence of the people making our foreign policy but their competence at achieving objectives other than the defense of the U.S., most notably their own wealth and power. (location 4084-4086)
If an interventionist policy can be expected to work badly, the obvious next question is whether a non-interventionist policy can adequately defend us. If the answer is no, then, however skeptical we are of the government's ability to conduct an interventionist policy well, we may have no alternative. (location 4102-4104)
a world in which major countries are responsible for their own defense is likely to be a good deal safer than one in which they depend on us. (location 4131 - 4132)
The fundamental problem with government money is not that government cannot provide stable money but that it is not always in its interest to do so. Inflation via the printing press is a way in which the government can spend money without collecting taxes. It may also be politically profitable as a device to benefit debtors at the expense of creditors, (location 4173-4175)
in the real world, the alternative to laissez-faire is not rule by benevolent and supremely competent dictator, it is having decisions made on the political market instead of the private market. (location 4957-4958)
On the political market individual actors--voters, politicians, lobbyists, judges, policemen--almost never bear much of the cost of their actions or receive much of the benefit. Hence market failure, the exception on the private market, is the rule on the political market.
underlying the market for law is an instinct threat game. (location 5094-5095)
Each person knows that he does not have sufficient resources to compel everyone else to grant him everything he believes he is entitled to. An actual society, a civil order, embodies a set of compromises, giving each participant enough of what he wants and believes he is entitled to get so that he does not find it worth trying, with his allies, to forcibly overthrow the system and substitute one closer to his desires. (location 5108-5111)
The surface of the earth was not created by any human being, so nobody starts with a right to exclude any other human being from any part of it. It follows that such exclusion is a rights violation. It is, however, highly desirable that individuals be able to own land and exclude others from it, since without private property in land the ways in which land can be used are very limited. (location 5268-5271)
The existence of easy migration makes welfare state policies less attractive, with the result that levels of redistribution are likely to be lower. (location 5356-5357)
our knowledge of moral facts comes in the same way as our knowledge of physical facts and so has the same epistemological status--a reasonable, although not in either case certain, basis for belief. (location 5599-5601)
The central idea of libertarianism is that people should be permitted to run their own lives as they wish. We totally reject the idea that people must be forcibly protected from themselves...We also reject the idea that people have an enforceable claim on others for anything more than being left alone. (location 287-290) Some strengths and weaknesses as I found them below.
Part I provides a general overview of Liberal economics and property, and the principals are of little controversy except to very committed Marxists. However, even here he applies these principals in ways that might make many readers raise their eyebrows. One does not need to be an economist nor even have a lot of education to understand and appreciate his chapters here. He acknowledges one cannot construct systems or societies to be populated only by saints. He is rather frank about the risks of trying anarchy or anything largely untried: "Human beings and human societies are far too complicated for us to have confidence in a priori predictions about how institutions that have never been tried would work." (locations 651-658) Yet there are points (in later parts) where he seems to do just that, though, for the most part, he does so without coming off as overly-confident.
Part II provides a small-government libertarian approach to reducing the scope, size, authority, and cost of government, without proceeding to make a complete argument for anarchy. This section is convincing and strongly argued. His attacks on "experts" are well-spoken, and his ideas on mass transit prescient of Uber and other such services (though deregulating taxis could also help in that area). Chapter 12 was unusually weak, claiming that a modern university is impossible. While Friedman's many critiques have merit, it does not render a modern university "impossible," evidenced by his own and his children's attendance at them. Universities have been around for centuries, flaws and all. That said, I would welcome an "Adam Smith U" (Chapter 13) as Friedman outlines it and see how it competes against the other models of universities. Still, even his "Adam Smith U" shell company would have corporate interests, making one wonder how it is immune to the problems he outlines for regular universities (while his version would tend to limit the impact of those prejudices, he does not make the case that it would be wholly exempt).
His call for completely open immigration also fails to account for reality. While all classical Liberal-leaning people favor the free movement of goods, services, money, and people, the difference between the last and the former are that goods, services, and money don't come with language, culture, religion, or any other baggage that can be disruptive to a working society. While Friedman claims in a later part that those immigrating are largely leaving behind undesirable factors from their former homes, uncontestable evidence to the contrary has appeared in Europe with large Muslim migrants who have brought female genital mutilation, "honor" killings, arranged child marriages, and murder of European filmmakers along with them (just to give one such real-world example). Therefore, throwing the doors completely open to immigration while ignoring such factors and in the face of such evidence would be folly. I would favor a much more open legal immigration system with much stronger deterrence for illegal immigrants, but a completely open system would end in unmaking any society desirable to live in, at least in the short run.
His Chapter 22 idea for emancipating children at the age of 9 is surprising as a massive intrusion of government into the private affairs of family coming from someone of Friedman's otherwise libertarian leanings. Furthermore (as he acknowledges in Appendix II), his having not read Hazlitt's Economics in One Lesson: The Shortest & Surest Way to Understand Basic Economics shows most in this chapter. A 9 year old could be easily lured away from his/her family by the many child predators in existence, both pedophile and slaver, and is hardly in a position to fend for him/herself. Even in traditional societies, rites of passage to manhood/womanhood occurred frequently around 12-13 years of age and sometimes a little older. In a modern society, a person should probably be full grown or nearly so, so as to be able to operate a motor vehicle, better defend him/herself, etc., before being emancipated. Though it would be welcome if emancipation meant exactly that, and allowed for operation of a motor vehicle, consuming alcoholic beverages, voting, serving in armed services, and all the rest of such age-based restrictions.
I applaud Friedman's Chapter 26 frank discussion of pollution as market externality, especially as he fails to make a convincing case that it can be solved entirely without government. The Cuyahoga River burned not once but several times in my youth, so it is an apparent fact the environment will not police itself (nor the market all polluters). Unfortunately, as Friedman's aim is to abolish government, he offers only the barest notions of useful market-based strategies for governments to employ to better effect than the current reams of incomprehensible regulations and laws. His father Milton Friedman did a more useful job of this in some of his works and I recommend them.
Part III is his first foray into defining workable anarchy and illustrating how it might work and what it might look like. While being provocative, it is quite simply the weakest part of the book. His idea for putting law enforcement and law itself on the market is interesting, but needs further development. A large segment of criminals come from the very poor, who are not exactly going to be paying into the kind of rights enforcement agency (private police force) Friedman envisions. Those not able to pay, or able to pay perhaps only for minimal enforcement, are going to be short-changed on justice, if they get it at all. Private arbitration works well between well-funded entities that can offer up similar stakes, but does not necessarily work as well between vast differences of resources. While he tries to grapple with the idea of rights enforcement agencies appealing to criminals, what about organized crime, which, in effect have built-in rights enforcement capabilities and an agenda to go with. A person concerned for liberty for all has to insist Friedman further develop this idea. After all, the elite and privileged have liberty in virtually every system, so the effects on the middle and poor are the most important to consider if there is to be any real difference. The problems of rights enforcement/private justice are especially important in light of Friedman's own illustration of how saga Iceland did not endure but rather, through internal factionalism and Norwegian pressure, evolved into a more statist version. And this was in light of Iceland's ideal circumstances for a more anarchic situation: a combination of undesirability (to outsiders) and geographic isolation. Also, as Friedman eventually makes clear, any market-based legal system will resort to naked force in the last resort, so those squeamish about capital punishment, blood feuds, or even using lethal force in self-defense are going to have moral problems with it no matter what.
Perhaps the weakest argument put forward for total anarchy is Chapter 34, on national defense (written at that time in the Cold War). Throughout Friedman is tentative and unconvincing (well, maybe if we get enough donations, and since we don't need Hawaii, maybe we can extort more from them, and maybe...). What good would it be to establish an anarchical utopia, only to have some envious neighbor invade and take it over? For a small government person like me, defense is one of the few legitimate pursuits I relegate to government, and in the absence of stronger arguments and proofs from Friedman, abolishing government defense would be something I would oppose. I do like his later amendments concerning the militia, which certainly go with the intent of the Constitution's founders and the history of the American military before World War II. But even in that section, added later, Friedman does not succeed in making good a proof against any government defense (the need for the professional core to train/organize the larger militias). That said, serious consideration of these chapters could lead to an increase in personal liberty and a reduction in the military's size and expense.
Parts IV, V, and VI were written later and make the purchase of the third edition a must! These are some of the strongest parts of his argument, and were clearly developed over decades of argument, study, and consideration. One of the best points he makes that a limited government proponent like myself has to answer is, "The logic of limited governments is to grow." (location 2868) Jefferson's warning has proved itself in the U.S. and is something to address and contend with. However, his own illustration of saga Iceland warns the reader that anarchic societies may not be immune either. The only short answer I can give in any kind of representative government or society responsive to market forces: win the culture war! At least that Friedman is attempting with vigor and skill.
While his foreign policy/defense discussion here is remarkably clear-headed and frank, he becomes disingenuous criticizing changing foreign policies to match changing circumstances (defending China only to oppose it, for instance). His criticism of an interventionist policy seems to assume autarchy; that is, if a nation needs access to rare resources (rare earth metals, for instance) not native to it, then it is hard to see it taking a strictly non-interventionist policy during those periods when, inevitably, access to limited resources will be threatened. So either he is suggesting a return to pre-modern living or failing to account for the many varied and serious threats to a nation's interests abroad, firstly the lanes of trade.
His review of Chesterton is interesting. So many libertarians are absolutely convinced of their positions in vivid, moralistic terms while being skeptical of morality generally. Friedman largely sidesteps the problem by focusing mainly on the pragmatic, but to his credit, he does not fear to venture in the morality field. On that note, he claims to refute Ayn Rand's objectivism. His first objection fails to do so, as the animal mating examples he uses are the result of instinct, not rational choice (the male preying mantis does not choose his destruction through mating, and even in most lower mammals, consensual sex as we understand it does not exist). All that aside, it's not as if lower animals make a rational decision to mate knowing they are decreasing their own personal survival probabilities. As Jonathan Swift points out, when humans are busy begetting children, the children are often not what they're thinking of... His next two objections are much stronger; his fourth objection comes off as quibbling by means of oversimplifying Rand's argument, when, in fact, Friedman seems to share her conclusion, only criticizing the path she took.
It is refreshing that Friedman does not suffer from the goldbug illusions so many other libertarians do--Friedman's suggestions for bank notes based on barrels of mixed commodities presents an interesting solution. His ideas about cyber money are also interesting as Bitcoin proceeds apace. His appendices provide useful recommended reading from the author and others, and some interesting tables of figures. Below are some notable quotables from the book:
property rights are not the rights of property; they are the rights of humans with regard to property. They are a particular kind of human right. (location 353-354)
each person is best qualified to choose for himself which among a multitude of possible lives is best for him. (location 1202-1203)
If many of those choices involve needs, things of infinite value to one person, which can be best determined by someone else, what is the use of freedom? If I disagree with the expert about my needs I make not a value judgment but a mistake. (location 1203-1205)
Today a small elite goes to private prep schools, middle-class children go to moderately good suburban schools and the inner city poor get schools that are little more than custodial institutions. (location 1345-1347)
For years we have been told that all the public school system needs is more money. For years we have watched its per pupil spending rise, with little visible effect on quality. It is time to try something new. (location 1360-1362)
Greedy capitalists get money by trade. Good liberals steal it. (location 1780)
in our society where the poor are also politically weak, they do far worse on things provided by the government, such as schooling and police protection, than on those sold privately, such as food and clothes. (location 2137-2139)
people act according to what they perceive as right, proper, and practical. (location 2454-2455)
People who want to control other people's lives are rarely eager to pay for the privilege; (location 2528-2529)
There are more good cars in the ghetto than good schools. (location 2583-2585)
Most varieties of socialism implicitly assume unanimous agreement on goals. (location 2621-2622)
The organization of a capitalist society implicitly assumes that different people have different ends and that the institutions of the society must allow for that difference. (location 2625-2527)
Capitalism allows for a conflict of ends; it does not require it. (location 2634-2635)
These arguments suggest that it may be possible to defend against foreign nations by voluntary means. They do not prove that it will be; (location 2808-2809)
I do not approve of any government but I will tolerate one so long as the only other choice is another and worse government. (location 2816-2817)
It seems more reasonable to suppose that there is no ruling class, that we are ruled, rather, by a myriad of quarreling gangs, constantly engaged in stealing from each other to the great impoverishment of their own members as well as the rest of us. (location 3004-3006)
government as a whole exists because most people believe it is necessary. Most particular government activities beyond the most fundamental exist because they benefit some special interest at the cost of the rest of us. (location 3088-3089)
Either we follow a policy which makes it easy and profitable for any powerful nation to conquer us or we defend ourselves by means that are at least questionable in terms of libertarian principles. If we make the latter choice, we are taking the position that, if the only way to defend ourselves involves injuring innocent people, we are entitled to do so. (location 4043-4045)
what we are observing is not the incompetence of the people making our foreign policy but their competence at achieving objectives other than the defense of the U.S., most notably their own wealth and power. (location 4084-4086)
If an interventionist policy can be expected to work badly, the obvious next question is whether a non-interventionist policy can adequately defend us. If the answer is no, then, however skeptical we are of the government's ability to conduct an interventionist policy well, we may have no alternative. (location 4102-4104)
a world in which major countries are responsible for their own defense is likely to be a good deal safer than one in which they depend on us. (location 4131 - 4132)
The fundamental problem with government money is not that government cannot provide stable money but that it is not always in its interest to do so. Inflation via the printing press is a way in which the government can spend money without collecting taxes. It may also be politically profitable as a device to benefit debtors at the expense of creditors, (location 4173-4175)
in the real world, the alternative to laissez-faire is not rule by benevolent and supremely competent dictator, it is having decisions made on the political market instead of the private market. (location 4957-4958)
On the political market individual actors--voters, politicians, lobbyists, judges, policemen--almost never bear much of the cost of their actions or receive much of the benefit. Hence market failure, the exception on the private market, is the rule on the political market.
underlying the market for law is an instinct threat game. (location 5094-5095)
Each person knows that he does not have sufficient resources to compel everyone else to grant him everything he believes he is entitled to. An actual society, a civil order, embodies a set of compromises, giving each participant enough of what he wants and believes he is entitled to get so that he does not find it worth trying, with his allies, to forcibly overthrow the system and substitute one closer to his desires. (location 5108-5111)
The surface of the earth was not created by any human being, so nobody starts with a right to exclude any other human being from any part of it. It follows that such exclusion is a rights violation. It is, however, highly desirable that individuals be able to own land and exclude others from it, since without private property in land the ways in which land can be used are very limited. (location 5268-5271)
The existence of easy migration makes welfare state policies less attractive, with the result that levels of redistribution are likely to be lower. (location 5356-5357)
our knowledge of moral facts comes in the same way as our knowledge of physical facts and so has the same epistemological status--a reasonable, although not in either case certain, basis for belief. (location 5599-5601)
August 16, 2018
(Note: the review was edited after having gone through the initial chapters once again, re-reading my underlinings. I'd say this in fact deserves like... 4,2 instead of 3,8. Additionally, I believe my copy is of the first edition of the book, so I guess it doesn't yet include Friedman's famous discussion of the Icelandic law system)
The book gets more interesting and nuanced towards the end, when the author starts dealing with the actual difficulties of implementing an anarchist society (although I think I disagree with his formal exposition of the "public good" problem at times...). The beginning also provides some useful insights on the basis for private property as an ethical and practical principle.
Although Friedman admits that it was his intention all along to give a practical rather than theoretical discussion of the role of government in society, one is left with the idea that the book is a bit too disperse to serve as a true libertarian bible. At least from my point of view, I was hoping for some kind of well-rounded treatise, and this ended up as a collection of short essays/articles which show the author's outstanding intelligence, but which I'm afraid will tend to convince only those who already stand predisposed to these ideas. I'm not saying there's a way a collectivist statist could be brought to reason. Perhaps many "neutral" people will find Friedman's practical examples to be enough to make them start questioning the present social order. But readers with a thirsty theoretical/principled mind will perhaps find this underwhelming (it's not in vain that they call Friedman a consequentialist utilitarian, I guess...).
I wonder if this is not the result of Friedman's surprising jokes? They're a lot of fun, but somehow add to the feeling that this is a collection of notes left by your crazy uncle before leaving to Mars on a space shuttle, rather than the book that you'll proudly wield in court when the police arrests you for civil disobedience... Anyways, this is still highly recommended reading! Perhaps one of these days I end up increasing the rating even further..
Final note: when I ponder over Friedman's reasons for staying a bit out of principles, I can't help but wonder if perhaps he is the one with the most consistent approach after all:
"My purpose is not to argue that we should stop being libertarians. My purpose is to argue that libertarianism is not a collection of straightforward and unambiguous arguments establishing with certainty a set of unquestionable propositions. It is rather the attempt to apply certain economic and ethical insights to a very complicated world. The more carefully one does so, the more complications one is likely to discover and the more qualifications one must put on one's results."
(from the updated postscript to the second edition)
Now, if you want so read another libertarian who kind of... hates Friedman on these issues, read this by Rothbard:
https://mises.org/library/do-you-hate...
I feel I'm tending more and more away from Rothbard and towards Friedman and Hayek, even though deep in my heart I still hate the State.
The book gets more interesting and nuanced towards the end, when the author starts dealing with the actual difficulties of implementing an anarchist society (although I think I disagree with his formal exposition of the "public good" problem at times...). The beginning also provides some useful insights on the basis for private property as an ethical and practical principle.
Although Friedman admits that it was his intention all along to give a practical rather than theoretical discussion of the role of government in society, one is left with the idea that the book is a bit too disperse to serve as a true libertarian bible. At least from my point of view, I was hoping for some kind of well-rounded treatise, and this ended up as a collection of short essays/articles which show the author's outstanding intelligence, but which I'm afraid will tend to convince only those who already stand predisposed to these ideas. I'm not saying there's a way a collectivist statist could be brought to reason. Perhaps many "neutral" people will find Friedman's practical examples to be enough to make them start questioning the present social order. But readers with a thirsty theoretical/principled mind will perhaps find this underwhelming (it's not in vain that they call Friedman a consequentialist utilitarian, I guess...).
I wonder if this is not the result of Friedman's surprising jokes? They're a lot of fun, but somehow add to the feeling that this is a collection of notes left by your crazy uncle before leaving to Mars on a space shuttle, rather than the book that you'll proudly wield in court when the police arrests you for civil disobedience... Anyways, this is still highly recommended reading! Perhaps one of these days I end up increasing the rating even further..
Final note: when I ponder over Friedman's reasons for staying a bit out of principles, I can't help but wonder if perhaps he is the one with the most consistent approach after all:
"My purpose is not to argue that we should stop being libertarians. My purpose is to argue that libertarianism is not a collection of straightforward and unambiguous arguments establishing with certainty a set of unquestionable propositions. It is rather the attempt to apply certain economic and ethical insights to a very complicated world. The more carefully one does so, the more complications one is likely to discover and the more qualifications one must put on one's results."
(from the updated postscript to the second edition)
Now, if you want so read another libertarian who kind of... hates Friedman on these issues, read this by Rothbard:
https://mises.org/library/do-you-hate...
I feel I'm tending more and more away from Rothbard and towards Friedman and Hayek, even though deep in my heart I still hate the State.
Want to read
February 29, 2020https://libertycon.net/?fbclid=IwAR1-...
https://m.facebook.com/EuropeSFL/
March 6-8, Madrid, Spain.
https://m.facebook.com/EuropeSFL/
March 6-8, Madrid, Spain.
January 2, 2008
“There is no way to give a politician power that can be used only to do good.” – p17
This guide to anarcho-capitalism turned out to be less definitive than I had hoped. The book is filled with truths derived from libertarian thought and pro-capitalist economics though with regard to a few issues, most noteably the core issue of property rights, the defense is not so much a proof as it is a best-case scenario. For example, how private property rights over natural resources (ie. land) are initially allocated is not straightforward (and can't really be derived from some a priori theory of natural rights) but since we know that allocating them has overwhelmingly positive results, we need not be overly concerned. (p171) Furthermore, with regard to foreign policy, interventionism vs. non-interventionism is revealed a lose-lose choice since interventionism entails allying with bad governments and thus aiding them in the opression of their people and non-interventionism involves nuclear weapons which indiscriminately kill the innocent along with the guilty. (p209) Nevertheless, the book is well written and filled with thought provoking arguments and novel ideas for moving towards an anarcho-capitalist society. However, after reading this book, I am more convinced that, in the end, anarcho-capitalism is impractical and that limited government is the way to go.
Another revelation I had from this book is that while I had always thought of the welfare state and government intervention in general as being detrimental to the rich and beneficial to the poor, it is more likely that it is detrimental to both but, on balance, more detrimental to the poor. The broad argument is that the government is controlled by the special interest groups that have the most money and since the ones that have the most money are funded by the wealthy, it is unlikely that they would be willing to just allow themselves to be screwed over for the benefit of the poor. Some quick examples of how the poor get screwed over by the government : 1) inflation – this hurts everbody but since the poor are already scraping it, they can scarcely afford higher prices, whereas the quality of life of the rich is hardly affected 2) farm subsidies – cause higher food prices which have the effect of a regressive tax, since the poor spend a larger proportion of their income on food 3) state universities subsidize the schooling of the upper classses with money much of which comes from the relatively poor taxpayers 4) social security – the poor tend to start paying into the system earlier and have lower life expectancies so many times they die before ever collecting – additionally, they pay a greater proportion of their incomes into social security. “This is not to deny that poor people get some benefit from some government programs.” But on net, nearly everyone loses.
Other topics covered include :
- Arguments against government enforced monopolies such as medical licensing. p43
- Medicare – p51
- Education – p55-68
- Immigration – Let’s have open immigration, but “new immigrants should face a fifteen year residency requirement before they become eligible for welfare.” – p69
This guide to anarcho-capitalism turned out to be less definitive than I had hoped. The book is filled with truths derived from libertarian thought and pro-capitalist economics though with regard to a few issues, most noteably the core issue of property rights, the defense is not so much a proof as it is a best-case scenario. For example, how private property rights over natural resources (ie. land) are initially allocated is not straightforward (and can't really be derived from some a priori theory of natural rights) but since we know that allocating them has overwhelmingly positive results, we need not be overly concerned. (p171) Furthermore, with regard to foreign policy, interventionism vs. non-interventionism is revealed a lose-lose choice since interventionism entails allying with bad governments and thus aiding them in the opression of their people and non-interventionism involves nuclear weapons which indiscriminately kill the innocent along with the guilty. (p209) Nevertheless, the book is well written and filled with thought provoking arguments and novel ideas for moving towards an anarcho-capitalist society. However, after reading this book, I am more convinced that, in the end, anarcho-capitalism is impractical and that limited government is the way to go.
Another revelation I had from this book is that while I had always thought of the welfare state and government intervention in general as being detrimental to the rich and beneficial to the poor, it is more likely that it is detrimental to both but, on balance, more detrimental to the poor. The broad argument is that the government is controlled by the special interest groups that have the most money and since the ones that have the most money are funded by the wealthy, it is unlikely that they would be willing to just allow themselves to be screwed over for the benefit of the poor. Some quick examples of how the poor get screwed over by the government : 1) inflation – this hurts everbody but since the poor are already scraping it, they can scarcely afford higher prices, whereas the quality of life of the rich is hardly affected 2) farm subsidies – cause higher food prices which have the effect of a regressive tax, since the poor spend a larger proportion of their income on food 3) state universities subsidize the schooling of the upper classses with money much of which comes from the relatively poor taxpayers 4) social security – the poor tend to start paying into the system earlier and have lower life expectancies so many times they die before ever collecting – additionally, they pay a greater proportion of their incomes into social security. “This is not to deny that poor people get some benefit from some government programs.” But on net, nearly everyone loses.
Other topics covered include :
- Arguments against government enforced monopolies such as medical licensing. p43
- Medicare – p51
- Education – p55-68
- Immigration – Let’s have open immigration, but “new immigrants should face a fifteen year residency requirement before they become eligible for welfare.” – p69
December 29, 2012
This was a pretty good book. Maybe I was too familiar with Rothbard when I gave his book only 3 stars. In any case, there were a few downsides to this book, but somewhat negligible. To be ironic, the benefits exceeded the costs in reading this book. The pros: Friedman takes a refreshing approach instead of the hard-headed Austrian natural rights approach, he covers many different topics, much of it might appeal to somebody who is not buying the natural rights approach. The cons: Friedman speaks in a very casual matter-of-fact way. It almost seems too easy for him to just dismiss the other views. This isn't really a fault of him, though. All cost-benefit analysis libertarians have that because it is just, "here's what the government does, they suck at it, and the free market is most likely better." That being said, I felt like the book was too short. He acknowledges a few times that he's disappointed that the book has to be so short. It would be nice for him to have expanded on some things. The last con is that some things didn't really seem necessary. For instance, he talks about socialist rhetoric with capitalism. It just wasn't really all that important. The GK Chesterson review was probably not necessary, although I do see that it may have influenced Catholics so I could be wrong. All in all, while the three anarcho-capitalist books that I've read are good, I am still looking forward to Huemer's, The Problem of Political Authority.
Edit: I have just finished The Problem of Political Authority by Professor Huemer. In light of the recent read, I've decided to knock this down one star. It was a good book, but relative to its current competition, I must say, it does not come close to The Problem of Political Authority.
Edit: I have just finished The Problem of Political Authority by Professor Huemer. In light of the recent read, I've decided to knock this down one star. It was a good book, but relative to its current competition, I must say, it does not come close to The Problem of Political Authority.
July 21, 2016
Fun reading in the "selling a stateless society" genre. Like a utilitarian version of Rothbard's "For a New Liberty" He starts off with pretty mainstream libertarian stuff but as the book goes on he pushes it into stateless society territory awwwwww yeah. His best stuff is on polycentric legal firms/security firms/courts/etc.
He also isn't "vulgar" at all, in the sense that he doesn't often apologize for existing "capitalist" institutions, nor is he distracted by capitalist socialist word games.
At the end he deals with random topics like medieval Icelandic statelessness and G.K. Chesterton. That was nice of him.
He also isn't "vulgar" at all, in the sense that he doesn't often apologize for existing "capitalist" institutions, nor is he distracted by capitalist socialist word games.
At the end he deals with random topics like medieval Icelandic statelessness and G.K. Chesterton. That was nice of him.
December 20, 2015
Interesting Quotes:
"The direct use of physical force is so poor a solution to the problem of limited resources that it is
commonly employed only by small children and great nations."
David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
----------------------
"Since the function of politics is to reduce the diversity of individual ends to a set of 'common ends' (the ends of the majority, the dictator, the party in power, or whatever person or group is in effective control of the political institutions), public property imposes those 'common ends' on the individual. 'Ask not what your country can do for you; ask rather what you can do for your country.' Ask not, in other words, how you can pursue what you believe is good, but how you can pursue what the government tells you is good."
David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
---------------------------------------
"If almost everyone believes strongly that heroin addiction is so horrible that it should not be permitted anywhere under any circumstances, anarcho-capitalist institutions will produce laws against heroin. Laws are being produced for a market, and that is what the market wants.
"But market demands are in dollars, not votes. The legality of heroin will be determined, not by how many are for or against but by how high a cost each side is willing to bear in order to get its way. People who want to control other people's lives are rarely eager to pay for the privilege; they usually expect to be paid for the 'services' they provide for their victims. And those on the receiving end— whether of laws against drugs, laws against pornography, or laws against sex—get a lot more pain out of the oppression than their oppressors get pleasure. They are willing to pay a much higher price to be left alone than anyone is willing to pay to push them around. For that reason the laws of an anarcho-capitalist society should be heavily biased toward freedom.
"So compulsory puritanism—'crimes without victims'—should be much rarer under anarcho-capitalism than under political institutions."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
-------------------
"I have encountered precisely the same error among libertarians who prefer limited government to anarcho-capitalism. Limited government, they say, can guarantee uniform justice based on objective principles. Under anarcho-capitalism, the law varies from place to place and person to person, according to the irrational desires and beliefs of the different customers that different protection and arbitration agencies must serve.
"This argument assumes that the limited government is set up by a population most or all of whose members believe in the same just principles of law. Given such a population, anarcho-capitalism will produce that same uniform, just law; there will be no market for any other. But just as capitalism can accommodate to a diversity of individual ends, so anarcho-capitalism can accommodate to a diversity of individual judgments about justice
"An ideal objectivist society with a limited government is superior to an anarcho-capitalist society in precisely the same sense that an ideal socialist society is superior to a capitalist society. Socialism does better with perfect people than capitalism does with imperfect people; limited government does better with perfect people than anarcho-capitalism with imperfect. And it is better to wear a bikini with the sun shining than a raincoat when it is raining. That is no argument against carrying an umbrella."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
---------------------------
"One argument against utilitarianism is that it cannot be a correct moral rule because there is no way we can tell whether we are following it. We cannot observe other people's utility and are therefore unable to judge what will increase it. Even if we could observe individual utilities, we do not know how to compare the utility of different people and so have no way of judging whether a gain in happiness to one person does or does not balance a loss to another.
"I find this argument unconvincing. Consider the act of buying a present. If you really have no knowledge at all about what makes other people happy, then buying a present is pure guesswork; you might just as well open a page of the Sears catalog at random, throw a dart at it, and buy whatever you hit. Nobody believes that; if we did, we would not buy presents.
"Consider a court awarding damages. If we really know nothing at all about other people's utility, how can a court decide how much someone owes me for breaking my arm? For all the judge knows, I enjoyed having my arm broken. Assuming that I disliked it, he has no way of knowing whether my disutility for a broken arm is measured by a penny or a billion dollars.
"We give presents and award damages, and we do not believe that other people's utility is entirely unobservable. What we do believe, or at least what many of us believe, is that each of us knows more about his own values than most other people do, and that people are therefore usually better off deciding what they want for themselves. That is one of the main arguments in favor of a free society. It is a long step from that to the claim that we know nothing at all about other people's values."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
----------------------------
"A better argument against an interventionist [foreign] policy is that such a policy almost inevitably involves allying with oppressive governments . . . In practice, an interventionist policy almost inevitably involves alliances with the Shah of Iran, or Joseph Stalin, or Ferdinand Marcos, or, in the case of the actual policy of the U.S. over the past 70 years, all of the above . . .
"The case for an interventionist policy can be summed up in one phrase: the lesson of Munich. It has been widely argued that if only the British and French had been willing to stop Hitler at the time of the Munich agreements, he would have backed down and World War II would never have happened. Many people conclude that the appropriate way to deal with potential enemies, especially enemies aiming at world conquest, is to fight them before they get strong enough to fight you, to prevent their expansion by allying with the nations they want to annex, to ally with any government willing to join you in opposing them.
"If the Nazis attack Czechoslovakia, the Czechs will fight in their own defense as long as they see any chance of winning. If we help them, we fight the Nazis, in large part, with Czechoslovakian blood and treasure. If we let Czechoslovakia go, five years later we find ourselves fighting against the products of the Skoda arms works in the hands of the German army. It is a persuasive argument. It seems to have persuaded U.S. policy makers and much of the U.S. public, with the result that we have tried to follow such a policy in dealing with the Soviet Union.
"The weak point in the argument is its assumption that the interventionist foreign policy will be done well—that your foreign minister is Machiavelli or Metternich. In order for the policy to work, you must correctly figure out which countries are going to be your enemies and which your allies ten years down the road. If you get it wrong, you find yourself unnecessarily blundering into other people's wars, spending your blood and treasure in their fights instead of theirs in yours. You may, to take an example not entirely at random, get into one war as a result of trying to defend China from Japan, spend the next thirty years trying to defend Japan (and Korea, and Vietnam,. ..) from China, then finally discover that the Chinese are your natural allies against the Soviet Union.
"One problem with an interventionist foreign policy is that you may intervene unnecessarily or on the wrong side; that, arguably, is the history of much of our China policy. A second problem is that, even if you are on the right side, you are frequently involved in conflicts which are much more important to the other players, with the result that you end up paying the cost of intervention but not achieving very much . . .
"The Soviets may reasonably doubt whether the U.S. is willing to start World War III in order to defend Germany or France. There is much less doubt that Germany or France would be willing to. So a world in which major countries are responsible for their own defense is likely to be a good deal safer than one in which they depend on us."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
--------------
"[The] approach [of Schelling points] provides a clearer answer to that question than I was able to give in the first edition of this book. A government is an institution against which people have dropped the commitment strategies that defend what they view as their rights against other people. An anarchy is a society in which there is no such institution."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
-----------------------
"Market failure exists because individuals are making decisions much of whose cost or benefit goes to someone else. That situation sometimes occurs on the private market, but there it is the exception, not the rule. Most goods are ordinary private goods, so the producer can convert much of the benefit to the buyer into a benefit to himself via the price he charges. Most production uses inputs - labor, raw materials, capital, land - that the producer can only use if he compensates their owners for what they give up by letting him use them . . .
"Individual actors usually receive most of the benefit and pay most of the cost of their actions, making market failure the exception, not the rule. On the political market individual actors - voters, politicians, lobbyists, judges, policemen - almost never bear much of the cost of their actions or receive much of the benefit. Hence market failure, the exception on the private market, is the rule on the political market."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
---------------------
"Imagine that public key encryption for secure communications and identity, a network of digital remailers, and some form of anonymous digital cash are all in common use. Further suppose that technologies such as virtual reality are far enough developed so that many people spend large parts of their lives interacting online. The result is a world, cyberspace, with a level of privacy humans have never known.
"It is hard to tax what you cannot see. If you earn money in realspace and spent it online, the government can tax your income. If you earn money online but spend it in realspace, the government can tax your spending. If you earn money online and spend it online, both income and expenditure are invisible to the IRS.
"It is hard to regulate what you cannot see. Suppose I want to sell legal advice, despite not being a member of the bar. I create a web site and an online identity: Legal Eagle Online. Also a public key. I spent the next year building my reputation by offering legal advice for free, good legal advice, as those who take it discover. Thereafter I charge for it, accepting payment in digital cash. I am violating state licensing rules. But since the Bar Association has no idea who I am or where I live, there is no way they can enforce those rules against me.
"Generalize those examples and you have a world where governments control realspace but cyberspace is stateless."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
-----------------------
"The direct use of physical force is so poor a solution to the problem of limited resources that it is
commonly employed only by small children and great nations."
David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
----------------------
"Since the function of politics is to reduce the diversity of individual ends to a set of 'common ends' (the ends of the majority, the dictator, the party in power, or whatever person or group is in effective control of the political institutions), public property imposes those 'common ends' on the individual. 'Ask not what your country can do for you; ask rather what you can do for your country.' Ask not, in other words, how you can pursue what you believe is good, but how you can pursue what the government tells you is good."
David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
---------------------------------------
"If almost everyone believes strongly that heroin addiction is so horrible that it should not be permitted anywhere under any circumstances, anarcho-capitalist institutions will produce laws against heroin. Laws are being produced for a market, and that is what the market wants.
"But market demands are in dollars, not votes. The legality of heroin will be determined, not by how many are for or against but by how high a cost each side is willing to bear in order to get its way. People who want to control other people's lives are rarely eager to pay for the privilege; they usually expect to be paid for the 'services' they provide for their victims. And those on the receiving end— whether of laws against drugs, laws against pornography, or laws against sex—get a lot more pain out of the oppression than their oppressors get pleasure. They are willing to pay a much higher price to be left alone than anyone is willing to pay to push them around. For that reason the laws of an anarcho-capitalist society should be heavily biased toward freedom.
"So compulsory puritanism—'crimes without victims'—should be much rarer under anarcho-capitalism than under political institutions."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
-------------------
"I have encountered precisely the same error among libertarians who prefer limited government to anarcho-capitalism. Limited government, they say, can guarantee uniform justice based on objective principles. Under anarcho-capitalism, the law varies from place to place and person to person, according to the irrational desires and beliefs of the different customers that different protection and arbitration agencies must serve.
"This argument assumes that the limited government is set up by a population most or all of whose members believe in the same just principles of law. Given such a population, anarcho-capitalism will produce that same uniform, just law; there will be no market for any other. But just as capitalism can accommodate to a diversity of individual ends, so anarcho-capitalism can accommodate to a diversity of individual judgments about justice
"An ideal objectivist society with a limited government is superior to an anarcho-capitalist society in precisely the same sense that an ideal socialist society is superior to a capitalist society. Socialism does better with perfect people than capitalism does with imperfect people; limited government does better with perfect people than anarcho-capitalism with imperfect. And it is better to wear a bikini with the sun shining than a raincoat when it is raining. That is no argument against carrying an umbrella."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
---------------------------
"One argument against utilitarianism is that it cannot be a correct moral rule because there is no way we can tell whether we are following it. We cannot observe other people's utility and are therefore unable to judge what will increase it. Even if we could observe individual utilities, we do not know how to compare the utility of different people and so have no way of judging whether a gain in happiness to one person does or does not balance a loss to another.
"I find this argument unconvincing. Consider the act of buying a present. If you really have no knowledge at all about what makes other people happy, then buying a present is pure guesswork; you might just as well open a page of the Sears catalog at random, throw a dart at it, and buy whatever you hit. Nobody believes that; if we did, we would not buy presents.
"Consider a court awarding damages. If we really know nothing at all about other people's utility, how can a court decide how much someone owes me for breaking my arm? For all the judge knows, I enjoyed having my arm broken. Assuming that I disliked it, he has no way of knowing whether my disutility for a broken arm is measured by a penny or a billion dollars.
"We give presents and award damages, and we do not believe that other people's utility is entirely unobservable. What we do believe, or at least what many of us believe, is that each of us knows more about his own values than most other people do, and that people are therefore usually better off deciding what they want for themselves. That is one of the main arguments in favor of a free society. It is a long step from that to the claim that we know nothing at all about other people's values."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
----------------------------
"A better argument against an interventionist [foreign] policy is that such a policy almost inevitably involves allying with oppressive governments . . . In practice, an interventionist policy almost inevitably involves alliances with the Shah of Iran, or Joseph Stalin, or Ferdinand Marcos, or, in the case of the actual policy of the U.S. over the past 70 years, all of the above . . .
"The case for an interventionist policy can be summed up in one phrase: the lesson of Munich. It has been widely argued that if only the British and French had been willing to stop Hitler at the time of the Munich agreements, he would have backed down and World War II would never have happened. Many people conclude that the appropriate way to deal with potential enemies, especially enemies aiming at world conquest, is to fight them before they get strong enough to fight you, to prevent their expansion by allying with the nations they want to annex, to ally with any government willing to join you in opposing them.
"If the Nazis attack Czechoslovakia, the Czechs will fight in their own defense as long as they see any chance of winning. If we help them, we fight the Nazis, in large part, with Czechoslovakian blood and treasure. If we let Czechoslovakia go, five years later we find ourselves fighting against the products of the Skoda arms works in the hands of the German army. It is a persuasive argument. It seems to have persuaded U.S. policy makers and much of the U.S. public, with the result that we have tried to follow such a policy in dealing with the Soviet Union.
"The weak point in the argument is its assumption that the interventionist foreign policy will be done well—that your foreign minister is Machiavelli or Metternich. In order for the policy to work, you must correctly figure out which countries are going to be your enemies and which your allies ten years down the road. If you get it wrong, you find yourself unnecessarily blundering into other people's wars, spending your blood and treasure in their fights instead of theirs in yours. You may, to take an example not entirely at random, get into one war as a result of trying to defend China from Japan, spend the next thirty years trying to defend Japan (and Korea, and Vietnam,. ..) from China, then finally discover that the Chinese are your natural allies against the Soviet Union.
"One problem with an interventionist foreign policy is that you may intervene unnecessarily or on the wrong side; that, arguably, is the history of much of our China policy. A second problem is that, even if you are on the right side, you are frequently involved in conflicts which are much more important to the other players, with the result that you end up paying the cost of intervention but not achieving very much . . .
"The Soviets may reasonably doubt whether the U.S. is willing to start World War III in order to defend Germany or France. There is much less doubt that Germany or France would be willing to. So a world in which major countries are responsible for their own defense is likely to be a good deal safer than one in which they depend on us."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
--------------
"[The] approach [of Schelling points] provides a clearer answer to that question than I was able to give in the first edition of this book. A government is an institution against which people have dropped the commitment strategies that defend what they view as their rights against other people. An anarchy is a society in which there is no such institution."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
-----------------------
"Market failure exists because individuals are making decisions much of whose cost or benefit goes to someone else. That situation sometimes occurs on the private market, but there it is the exception, not the rule. Most goods are ordinary private goods, so the producer can convert much of the benefit to the buyer into a benefit to himself via the price he charges. Most production uses inputs - labor, raw materials, capital, land - that the producer can only use if he compensates their owners for what they give up by letting him use them . . .
"Individual actors usually receive most of the benefit and pay most of the cost of their actions, making market failure the exception, not the rule. On the political market individual actors - voters, politicians, lobbyists, judges, policemen - almost never bear much of the cost of their actions or receive much of the benefit. Hence market failure, the exception on the private market, is the rule on the political market."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
---------------------
"Imagine that public key encryption for secure communications and identity, a network of digital remailers, and some form of anonymous digital cash are all in common use. Further suppose that technologies such as virtual reality are far enough developed so that many people spend large parts of their lives interacting online. The result is a world, cyberspace, with a level of privacy humans have never known.
"It is hard to tax what you cannot see. If you earn money in realspace and spent it online, the government can tax your income. If you earn money online but spend it in realspace, the government can tax your spending. If you earn money online and spend it online, both income and expenditure are invisible to the IRS.
"It is hard to regulate what you cannot see. Suppose I want to sell legal advice, despite not being a member of the bar. I create a web site and an online identity: Legal Eagle Online. Also a public key. I spent the next year building my reputation by offering legal advice for free, good legal advice, as those who take it discover. Thereafter I charge for it, accepting payment in digital cash. I am violating state licensing rules. But since the Bar Association has no idea who I am or where I live, there is no way they can enforce those rules against me.
"Generalize those examples and you have a world where governments control realspace but cyberspace is stateless."
-David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Third Edition
-----------------------
November 9, 2018
A brilliant book, thought provoking on every page.
The text is mostly free of straw-men. Friedman himself raises and attempts to answer the arguments against each of his points. He also points out where he feels there can be no definitive argument (in the case of morality for example) in which case he is just discussing his own personal preference.
Instead of starting from natural-rights arguments like some libertarians, Friedman looks at the removal of government from a more utilitarian point of view (he himself is not a utilitarian it seems, but his arguments will work for most flavors of morality). Libery is used as a heuristic, but backed by utilitarianism:
"I tried to show that the institutions of anarcho-capitalism would tend to generate libertarian laws. A key step in that argument was my claim that the value to individuals of being able to run their own lives is typically greater than the value to anyone else of being able to control them—or in other words, that increases in liberty tend to increase total utility.
Reading this book it also struck me how we seem to be slowly drifting toward a more decentralized, anarcho-capitalist world via technology. Public transport eroded by Uber, government money by bitcoin. Companies such as uber, deliveroo and airbnb evading existing regulation, etc.
A central argument is that government failure is worse and more certain than market failure.
"On the political market individual actors—voters, politicians, lobbyists, judges, policemen—almost never bear much of the cost of their actions or receive much of the benefit. Hence market failure, the exception on the private market, is the rule on the political market. Which suggests that the existence of market failure is, on net, an argument against government, not for it.
I agree with removing government where it is not fixing a clear issue, and attempting to improve the incentives of the current system (futarchy, small subset of population chosen to vote, etc.).
The same arguments also point us toward smaller governments where possible. Independent charter cities under the protection of the nation state maybe? The nation state would provide an army, immigration policy, and coordination of shared laws (such as carbon tax, rules of the road, etc. where universality is more important than freedom). The cities would have their own system of law, contract enforcement, etc. This should make the results of voting much more direct, and allow people to exit or change their current city if they are unhappy with it, leading to people living in communities that are much closer to their own optimum. We would see issues such as migration to cities with high wellfare payments, but those cities could implement policies to restrict those payments to residents etc.
I am still not entirely convinced that anarchy would be better than a minimal government. People consistently act against their own interests, there are many market failures that are only efficiently handled by a government of some type (pollution, armed forces, charity/redistribution). Friedman does answer these criticisms in the book, it may be that I am underestimating how badly government currently performs.
"since the poor are, as a rule, politically weak, they are at least as likely to be the victims of governmental income transfers as they are to be the beneficiaries. [...] The second is that the struggle among groups trying to make themselves beneficiaries rather than victims is likely to be an expensive one, making practically all of us, rich and poor, worse off in a society that permits such redistribution than in one that does not.
While I concede the second point, the first point seems to be empirically wrong. In the UK, if we stopped all redistribution, it they would be vastly worse off.
I understand the argument is that we need to take into account all the redistribution, including redistribution to special interests, like regulation causing higher prices, corporate welfare and other random cases of rent seeking (and not just the obvious things like tax credits, benefits, health care, etc). I am still unsure, and would need to look at data to convince myself either way.
One of the most interesting arguments was the idea that in a free society, peoples values will be reflected by the choices they make in the market, that they are best placed to maximize their own utility function, and that this is an excellent way of handling the fact that each person has different values. In aggregate this might not result in the higest possible utility, but it is probably better than we could manage if we tried to do it by making changes top-down.
"Even if we were entirely unable to observe other people's values, that would not necessarily prevent us from constructing a society designed to maximize total utility. Each person knows his own values, so all of us put together know everybody's values. In order to maximize the total utility of the society we would construct rules and institutions that utilized all of that information via some sort of decentralized decision making system, with each person making the decisions that require the particular knowledge he has. This is not, of course, merely an abstract possibility. One of the strongest arguments in favor of letting people interact freely in a market under property rights institutions is that it is the best known way to utilize the decentralized knowledge of the society, including the knowledge that each individual has about his own values.
I also enjoyed the idea of rights emerging via Schelling points
"What is added to a state of nature in order to turn it into civil order, to convert the war of each against all into peace, is a network of commitment strategies based on an elaborate set of mutually perceived Schelling points. [...]
What matters is that each person is committed to bearing substantial costs to maintain his commitment strategy, that people for the most part correctly perceive each others’ commitment strategies, and that those strategies are for the most part consistent, that I am not committed to getting from you something you are committed to not giving me.
Notes: https://maxjmartin.com/book-notes/the...
The text is mostly free of straw-men. Friedman himself raises and attempts to answer the arguments against each of his points. He also points out where he feels there can be no definitive argument (in the case of morality for example) in which case he is just discussing his own personal preference.
Instead of starting from natural-rights arguments like some libertarians, Friedman looks at the removal of government from a more utilitarian point of view (he himself is not a utilitarian it seems, but his arguments will work for most flavors of morality). Libery is used as a heuristic, but backed by utilitarianism:
"I tried to show that the institutions of anarcho-capitalism would tend to generate libertarian laws. A key step in that argument was my claim that the value to individuals of being able to run their own lives is typically greater than the value to anyone else of being able to control them—or in other words, that increases in liberty tend to increase total utility.
Reading this book it also struck me how we seem to be slowly drifting toward a more decentralized, anarcho-capitalist world via technology. Public transport eroded by Uber, government money by bitcoin. Companies such as uber, deliveroo and airbnb evading existing regulation, etc.
A central argument is that government failure is worse and more certain than market failure.
"On the political market individual actors—voters, politicians, lobbyists, judges, policemen—almost never bear much of the cost of their actions or receive much of the benefit. Hence market failure, the exception on the private market, is the rule on the political market. Which suggests that the existence of market failure is, on net, an argument against government, not for it.
I agree with removing government where it is not fixing a clear issue, and attempting to improve the incentives of the current system (futarchy, small subset of population chosen to vote, etc.).
The same arguments also point us toward smaller governments where possible. Independent charter cities under the protection of the nation state maybe? The nation state would provide an army, immigration policy, and coordination of shared laws (such as carbon tax, rules of the road, etc. where universality is more important than freedom). The cities would have their own system of law, contract enforcement, etc. This should make the results of voting much more direct, and allow people to exit or change their current city if they are unhappy with it, leading to people living in communities that are much closer to their own optimum. We would see issues such as migration to cities with high wellfare payments, but those cities could implement policies to restrict those payments to residents etc.
I am still not entirely convinced that anarchy would be better than a minimal government. People consistently act against their own interests, there are many market failures that are only efficiently handled by a government of some type (pollution, armed forces, charity/redistribution). Friedman does answer these criticisms in the book, it may be that I am underestimating how badly government currently performs.
"since the poor are, as a rule, politically weak, they are at least as likely to be the victims of governmental income transfers as they are to be the beneficiaries. [...] The second is that the struggle among groups trying to make themselves beneficiaries rather than victims is likely to be an expensive one, making practically all of us, rich and poor, worse off in a society that permits such redistribution than in one that does not.
While I concede the second point, the first point seems to be empirically wrong. In the UK, if we stopped all redistribution, it they would be vastly worse off.
I understand the argument is that we need to take into account all the redistribution, including redistribution to special interests, like regulation causing higher prices, corporate welfare and other random cases of rent seeking (and not just the obvious things like tax credits, benefits, health care, etc). I am still unsure, and would need to look at data to convince myself either way.
One of the most interesting arguments was the idea that in a free society, peoples values will be reflected by the choices they make in the market, that they are best placed to maximize their own utility function, and that this is an excellent way of handling the fact that each person has different values. In aggregate this might not result in the higest possible utility, but it is probably better than we could manage if we tried to do it by making changes top-down.
"Even if we were entirely unable to observe other people's values, that would not necessarily prevent us from constructing a society designed to maximize total utility. Each person knows his own values, so all of us put together know everybody's values. In order to maximize the total utility of the society we would construct rules and institutions that utilized all of that information via some sort of decentralized decision making system, with each person making the decisions that require the particular knowledge he has. This is not, of course, merely an abstract possibility. One of the strongest arguments in favor of letting people interact freely in a market under property rights institutions is that it is the best known way to utilize the decentralized knowledge of the society, including the knowledge that each individual has about his own values.
I also enjoyed the idea of rights emerging via Schelling points
"What is added to a state of nature in order to turn it into civil order, to convert the war of each against all into peace, is a network of commitment strategies based on an elaborate set of mutually perceived Schelling points. [...]
What matters is that each person is committed to bearing substantial costs to maintain his commitment strategy, that people for the most part correctly perceive each others’ commitment strategies, and that those strategies are for the most part consistent, that I am not committed to getting from you something you are committed to not giving me.
Notes: https://maxjmartin.com/book-notes/the...
February 2, 2021
This is an excellent book on freedom (both from a libertarian and an anarcho-capitalist perspective).
Interesting how the book has 4 editions, and each just added to the last. There were sections where in the 1970s or 1980s Friedman outlined how anonymous digital currency could work, but said it didn't exist -- with an update later describing what had been built and how it enabled his earlier predictions. This was true for many topics throughout the book -- Friedman is remarkably good at predicting a specific set of innovations and their consequences.
It's a bit long and in some places ponderous (mostly because the range of material covered includes the 800-1100 AD Icelandic legal system as well as the optimal strategy for the Libertarian Party and the SCA/Pennsic wars and a lot of other topics), but it's still one of the best books on libertarian, capitalist philosophy and its application that I've read, mostly through a focus on concrete examples rather than abstract moral philosophy. (Ironically, the takedown of Ayn Rand and the like is one of the more useful (if more tedious) parts of the book.)
Interesting how the book has 4 editions, and each just added to the last. There were sections where in the 1970s or 1980s Friedman outlined how anonymous digital currency could work, but said it didn't exist -- with an update later describing what had been built and how it enabled his earlier predictions. This was true for many topics throughout the book -- Friedman is remarkably good at predicting a specific set of innovations and their consequences.
It's a bit long and in some places ponderous (mostly because the range of material covered includes the 800-1100 AD Icelandic legal system as well as the optimal strategy for the Libertarian Party and the SCA/Pennsic wars and a lot of other topics), but it's still one of the best books on libertarian, capitalist philosophy and its application that I've read, mostly through a focus on concrete examples rather than abstract moral philosophy. (Ironically, the takedown of Ayn Rand and the like is one of the more useful (if more tedious) parts of the book.)
October 12, 2017
This book is a sizable collection of essays and articles by first published over forty years ago. There have been additions and updates with each reprinting so it offers and interesting perspective that illuminates a lot of libertarian thought from the era of Jimmy Carter up to the first term of Barrack Obama.
This broad range of perspective is probably most visible in Part II. These are essays from forty years ago and while many are dated some are amazingly prescient. Both show a deep level of thought and reason to David Friedman's works.
Part IV is were this lost a star. I am uncertain to the dates of these articles, but some show a very statist perspective of anarchy and others are poorly framed arguments filled with false choices and straw men. It is a hard adjustment from the deep thoughts in Part II to the intellectual laziness of Part IV.
The rest of the book is solidly put together and offers a great deal of insight into the past generations perspective on libertarian ideology and anarchist thought.
This broad range of perspective is probably most visible in Part II. These are essays from forty years ago and while many are dated some are amazingly prescient. Both show a deep level of thought and reason to David Friedman's works.
Part IV is were this lost a star. I am uncertain to the dates of these articles, but some show a very statist perspective of anarchy and others are poorly framed arguments filled with false choices and straw men. It is a hard adjustment from the deep thoughts in Part II to the intellectual laziness of Part IV.
The rest of the book is solidly put together and offers a great deal of insight into the past generations perspective on libertarian ideology and anarchist thought.
March 15, 2018
A fascinating walk through libertarian ideals and anarcho-capitalism. It doesn’t address many modern critiques, such as the fact that humans are not idealized economic actors, and problems like climate change that require massive scale coordination. An interesting thought experiment.
September 17, 2018
Classic of Ancap Philosophy! Love the length of chapters and anecdotes of his storytelling
April 20, 2023
The rambling free association of a well-read but uninspired economist is presented in a poorly sourced manner in which:
October 18, 2023
I really wanted to like this book. David Friedman is clearly a unique thinker as several very interesting chapters will attest to. But unfortunately, the majority of the book either feels very dated or too poorly organized to make for a compelling read in full. It's unclear who the audience is intended to be. Most of the book is available for free online so I'd recommend just reading the specific chapters that interest you if needed.
October 29, 2023
A ‘UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO LIBERTARIANISM
David Friedman (Milton Friedman’s son) wrote in the Preface to the Second Edition (1995), “Most of this book was written between 1967 and 1973, when the first edition was published. I have made only minor changes… In some cases the reader will find the examples dated… Where this seemed to be a serious problem I have updated examples… I have followed the same policy with regard to numbers… These are all minor changes… One thing I should perhaps have explained… which has puzzled some readers since, is the apparent inconsistency among the chapters. In [Part II], for instance, I advocate a voucher system, in which tax monies are used to subsidize schooling, but in Part III I argue for a society with no taxes, no government, and therefore no vouchers. Part II of the book is intended to suggest specific reforms, within the structure of our present institutions, that would… [be] moving us close to a libertarian society… In Part III I try to describe what a full-fledged anarcho-capitalism society might look like and how it would work…”
In his Preface to the First Edition (1989), he states, “I believe… that everyone has the right to run his own life… I conclude… that all censorship should be done away with. Also that all laws against drugs---marijuana, heroin, or Dr. Quack’s cancer cure---should be repealed. Also laws requiring cars to have seat belts. The right to control my life does not mean the right to have anything I want free; I can do that only by making someone else pay for what I get… I oppose welfare programs that support the poor with money taken by force from the taxpayers. I also oppose tariffs, subsidies, loan guarantees, urban renewal, agricultural price supports… I am an Adam Smith liberal, or… a Goldwater conservative. Only I carry my devotion to laissez-faire further than Goldwater does…. Sometimes I call myself a Goldwater anarchist… This book is concerned with libertarian ideas, not with a history of the libertarian ‘movement’ or a description of its present condition…”
In the opening chapter, he states, “The FCC recently ruled that songs that seem to advocate drug use may not be broadcast. Is that an infringement of freedom of speech? Of course not. You can say anything you want, but not on the public’s airwaves… It is not possible to let everyone use the airwaves for whatever he wants; there isn’t enough room on the radio dial. If the government owns the airwaves, it must ration them; it must decide what should and should not be broadcast…. Could this be changed? Easily. Convert the airwaves to private property. Let the government auction off the right to broadcast at a particular frequency… until the entire broadcast band is privately owned. Would this mean control of the airwaves by the rich? No more than private property in newsprint means newspapers are printed only for the rich.” (Pg. 7)
He explains, “I hold that there are NO proper functions of government. In that sense I am an anarchist… The system of institutions I would like to see achieved ultimately would be entirely private---what is sometimes called anarcho-capitalism, or libertarian anarchy.” (Pg. 19)
He says of “people [who] consider inheritance unjust. They assume that if a father earns money and leaves it to his son, who lives off the interest, the son is really living AT THE EXPENSE of the people around him… The reality is that … someone else must be paying for it. It is his father who pays for it…the father chooses to invest wealth instead of consuming it or turning it into stores of food. By buying a factory instead of a yacht, he is increasing the productivity of the society… It is that additional production which feeds his son. To the true egalitarian… this is no defense. Inheritance is unequal, thus unjust. His is a view with which I have no sympathy. I see no reason better than greed for claiming that I ‘deserve’ a share of someone else’s wealth, which I have had no part in producing, when he dies. I see no reason noble than jealousy for objecting to another man’s good fortune in being left an ‘unearned’ inheritance.” (Pg. 48)
He proposes, “Suppose… there are no government police, but instead private protection agencies. These agencies sell the service of protecting their clients against crime… How might such protection agencies protect? That would be an economic decision, depending on the costs and effectiveness of different alternatives… they might limit themselves to passive defenses, installing elaborate locks and alarms. Or they might take no preventative action at all, but make great efforts to hunt down criminals guilty of crimes against their clients… In any case, they would be selling a service to their customers and would have a strong incentive to provide as high a quality service as possible, at the lowest possible cost. It is reasonable to suppose that the quality of service would be higher and the cost lower than with the present governmental protective system.” (Pg. 115)
Later, he adds, “This does not mean that they will never coerce anyone. A protection agency, like a government, can make a mistake and arrest the wrong man. In exactly the same way, a private citizen can shoot at what he thinks is a prowler and bag the postman instead… The citizen can be indicted for postman-slaughter and the protection agency sued for false arrest.” (Pg. 125)
He contends. “a national defense agency might raise enough money to finance national defense without taxation. Obviously, a system that depends on local agencies evolved for a different purpose or a ramshackle system financed by charity, passport sales… is economically very imperfect. So is a system financed by coercion and run by government.” (Pg. 143)
He explains, “Libertarian anarchy is only a very sketchy framework, a framework based on the idea of individual property rights---the right to one’s own body, to what one produces oneself, and to what others voluntarily give one.” (Pg. 144)
He clarifies, “The claim that we put individual rights above everything else, for most of us, is false. Although we give some value, perhaps very great value, to individual rights , we do not give them an infinite value. We can pretend the contrary only by resolutely refusing to consider situations in which we might have to choose between individual rights and other things that are also of great value. My purpose is not to argue that we should stop being libertarians. My purpose is to argue that libertarianism is not a collection of straightforward and unambiguous arguments establishing with certainty a set of unquestionable propositions.” (Pg. 176)
He notes, “[My] starting point is utilitarianism. As a moral philosopher I am a libertarian, insofar as I am anything. As an economist I am a utilitarian. One could describe most of this book as a utilitarian approach to libertarianism. I have tried to show that libertarian institutions produce attractive results, but I have not defined ‘attractive’ as anything so specific as ‘tending to maximize the sum total of human happiness.’” (Pg. 183)
He suggests, “My own opinion is that, even if there were no legal barriers to the use of private money, the existing fiat system would remain in use unless it became much worse than it now is. For similar reasons, I think it likely that if a private system does not come into use it will be based on gold, even though gold is not a very suitable commodity for the purpose… it is desirable that banks issuing private money agree on a common commodity standard. It would be very much easier to agree on gold, which has been widely used in the past, than on some complicated commodity bundle, despite the advantages of the latter.” (Pg. 225)
This book will be of keen interest to many Libertarians and Anarchists.
David Friedman (Milton Friedman’s son) wrote in the Preface to the Second Edition (1995), “Most of this book was written between 1967 and 1973, when the first edition was published. I have made only minor changes… In some cases the reader will find the examples dated… Where this seemed to be a serious problem I have updated examples… I have followed the same policy with regard to numbers… These are all minor changes… One thing I should perhaps have explained… which has puzzled some readers since, is the apparent inconsistency among the chapters. In [Part II], for instance, I advocate a voucher system, in which tax monies are used to subsidize schooling, but in Part III I argue for a society with no taxes, no government, and therefore no vouchers. Part II of the book is intended to suggest specific reforms, within the structure of our present institutions, that would… [be] moving us close to a libertarian society… In Part III I try to describe what a full-fledged anarcho-capitalism society might look like and how it would work…”
In his Preface to the First Edition (1989), he states, “I believe… that everyone has the right to run his own life… I conclude… that all censorship should be done away with. Also that all laws against drugs---marijuana, heroin, or Dr. Quack’s cancer cure---should be repealed. Also laws requiring cars to have seat belts. The right to control my life does not mean the right to have anything I want free; I can do that only by making someone else pay for what I get… I oppose welfare programs that support the poor with money taken by force from the taxpayers. I also oppose tariffs, subsidies, loan guarantees, urban renewal, agricultural price supports… I am an Adam Smith liberal, or… a Goldwater conservative. Only I carry my devotion to laissez-faire further than Goldwater does…. Sometimes I call myself a Goldwater anarchist… This book is concerned with libertarian ideas, not with a history of the libertarian ‘movement’ or a description of its present condition…”
In the opening chapter, he states, “The FCC recently ruled that songs that seem to advocate drug use may not be broadcast. Is that an infringement of freedom of speech? Of course not. You can say anything you want, but not on the public’s airwaves… It is not possible to let everyone use the airwaves for whatever he wants; there isn’t enough room on the radio dial. If the government owns the airwaves, it must ration them; it must decide what should and should not be broadcast…. Could this be changed? Easily. Convert the airwaves to private property. Let the government auction off the right to broadcast at a particular frequency… until the entire broadcast band is privately owned. Would this mean control of the airwaves by the rich? No more than private property in newsprint means newspapers are printed only for the rich.” (Pg. 7)
He explains, “I hold that there are NO proper functions of government. In that sense I am an anarchist… The system of institutions I would like to see achieved ultimately would be entirely private---what is sometimes called anarcho-capitalism, or libertarian anarchy.” (Pg. 19)
He says of “people [who] consider inheritance unjust. They assume that if a father earns money and leaves it to his son, who lives off the interest, the son is really living AT THE EXPENSE of the people around him… The reality is that … someone else must be paying for it. It is his father who pays for it…the father chooses to invest wealth instead of consuming it or turning it into stores of food. By buying a factory instead of a yacht, he is increasing the productivity of the society… It is that additional production which feeds his son. To the true egalitarian… this is no defense. Inheritance is unequal, thus unjust. His is a view with which I have no sympathy. I see no reason better than greed for claiming that I ‘deserve’ a share of someone else’s wealth, which I have had no part in producing, when he dies. I see no reason noble than jealousy for objecting to another man’s good fortune in being left an ‘unearned’ inheritance.” (Pg. 48)
He proposes, “Suppose… there are no government police, but instead private protection agencies. These agencies sell the service of protecting their clients against crime… How might such protection agencies protect? That would be an economic decision, depending on the costs and effectiveness of different alternatives… they might limit themselves to passive defenses, installing elaborate locks and alarms. Or they might take no preventative action at all, but make great efforts to hunt down criminals guilty of crimes against their clients… In any case, they would be selling a service to their customers and would have a strong incentive to provide as high a quality service as possible, at the lowest possible cost. It is reasonable to suppose that the quality of service would be higher and the cost lower than with the present governmental protective system.” (Pg. 115)
Later, he adds, “This does not mean that they will never coerce anyone. A protection agency, like a government, can make a mistake and arrest the wrong man. In exactly the same way, a private citizen can shoot at what he thinks is a prowler and bag the postman instead… The citizen can be indicted for postman-slaughter and the protection agency sued for false arrest.” (Pg. 125)
He contends. “a national defense agency might raise enough money to finance national defense without taxation. Obviously, a system that depends on local agencies evolved for a different purpose or a ramshackle system financed by charity, passport sales… is economically very imperfect. So is a system financed by coercion and run by government.” (Pg. 143)
He explains, “Libertarian anarchy is only a very sketchy framework, a framework based on the idea of individual property rights---the right to one’s own body, to what one produces oneself, and to what others voluntarily give one.” (Pg. 144)
He clarifies, “The claim that we put individual rights above everything else, for most of us, is false. Although we give some value, perhaps very great value, to individual rights , we do not give them an infinite value. We can pretend the contrary only by resolutely refusing to consider situations in which we might have to choose between individual rights and other things that are also of great value. My purpose is not to argue that we should stop being libertarians. My purpose is to argue that libertarianism is not a collection of straightforward and unambiguous arguments establishing with certainty a set of unquestionable propositions.” (Pg. 176)
He notes, “[My] starting point is utilitarianism. As a moral philosopher I am a libertarian, insofar as I am anything. As an economist I am a utilitarian. One could describe most of this book as a utilitarian approach to libertarianism. I have tried to show that libertarian institutions produce attractive results, but I have not defined ‘attractive’ as anything so specific as ‘tending to maximize the sum total of human happiness.’” (Pg. 183)
He suggests, “My own opinion is that, even if there were no legal barriers to the use of private money, the existing fiat system would remain in use unless it became much worse than it now is. For similar reasons, I think it likely that if a private system does not come into use it will be based on gold, even though gold is not a very suitable commodity for the purpose… it is desirable that banks issuing private money agree on a common commodity standard. It would be very much easier to agree on gold, which has been widely used in the past, than on some complicated commodity bundle, despite the advantages of the latter.” (Pg. 225)
This book will be of keen interest to many Libertarians and Anarchists.
July 8, 2016
The main body of the book itself is predictably well-executed but will probably leave most libertarians nodding their heads and everybody else scratching theirs – in 160 pages Friedman discusses all the classic ways in which private property and absence of coercion can lead to a well-functioning society that requires little state (Part II) or no state (Part III). Part II is perfectly reasonable and almost practical, part III is a theoretical pipe dream, logically consistent but almost surely impractical - privately funded military and justice system ain’t for the fainthearted.
The real gem of the book is the 70-page “expanded postscript” available from 2nd edition on and it contains the sharpest analysis of deontological libertarianism I’ve read to date. Friedman brilliantly shows how libertarianism cannot and should not be defended from first principles or ethical principles. He is perfectly willing to concede that policies proposed in parts II and especially III may not lead to desirable outcomes, but he is happy to compare them side-by-side with any alternative to see which works better in practice. Instead of using principles to justify the outcomes he uses almost utilitarian arguments for desirability of outcomes to defend libertarian principles, and he does it convincingly via Coasian lines of thinking. He then goes through a brief but fascinating economic analysis of law judging it in an explicitly Coasian framework. Overall Friedman’s case for ripping deontology out of libertarianism is remarkably refreshing and leaves me less optimistic about today’s culture and politics that is witnessing a depressing revival of deontological justifications.
Notes to self:
- Iceland in 1050-1300s - the only practical case of working anarcho capitalism. Ironically it was willingly given up on the account of Hobbesian pressures, but the key is “willingly” and 300 years is a damn good run.
- Makes a tasty argument for Chesterton’s conversion to Catholicism as a result of his deontological libertarianism.
- Utility is less opaque than justice.
- Good laws are a public good which is precisely why there are no incentives to pass them!
The real gem of the book is the 70-page “expanded postscript” available from 2nd edition on and it contains the sharpest analysis of deontological libertarianism I’ve read to date. Friedman brilliantly shows how libertarianism cannot and should not be defended from first principles or ethical principles. He is perfectly willing to concede that policies proposed in parts II and especially III may not lead to desirable outcomes, but he is happy to compare them side-by-side with any alternative to see which works better in practice. Instead of using principles to justify the outcomes he uses almost utilitarian arguments for desirability of outcomes to defend libertarian principles, and he does it convincingly via Coasian lines of thinking. He then goes through a brief but fascinating economic analysis of law judging it in an explicitly Coasian framework. Overall Friedman’s case for ripping deontology out of libertarianism is remarkably refreshing and leaves me less optimistic about today’s culture and politics that is witnessing a depressing revival of deontological justifications.
Notes to self:
- Iceland in 1050-1300s - the only practical case of working anarcho capitalism. Ironically it was willingly given up on the account of Hobbesian pressures, but the key is “willingly” and 300 years is a damn good run.
- Makes a tasty argument for Chesterton’s conversion to Catholicism as a result of his deontological libertarianism.
- Utility is less opaque than justice.
- Good laws are a public good which is precisely why there are no incentives to pass them!
November 14, 2018
The only reason this gets two stars instead of one is that it does provoke some thought into alternatives to government. However, the book is a poor "guide to radical capitalism".
First, the book is very badly structured - it reads like a very loose collection of essays (and, inexplicably, poems) that do not form a consistent narrative. At times, they stray way off topic, as is the case of the chapter reviewing Ayn Rand's philosophy, for example.
Second, and more damningly, what the author does time and time again is take a controversial idea and give a few examples of where and how it might work; when he anticipates counter-examples and arguments on where his ideas might fail, he only examines weak ones and fails to address (what I would consider) more serious challenges to his proposed socio-economic-legal models.
A few examples: he talks about how children as young as nine years old should be allowed to leave their parents if they are able to provide for themselves (be it through their own labour, or through finding a new custodian). As my wife pointed out, it doesn't take much thought to realise this would make children extremely vulnerable to predators.
Another example concerns the provision of public goods. While the author does give a few examples of public goods that could be provided by the free market, there are plenty others where the matter is not obvious - the development of common standards is a good example (think things like power sockets, traffic light signals, etc). While private markets might be able to coordinate to produce such goods, they may well be less efficient at it than a public body. Either way, there is an argument to be had there, that the author avoids.
Finally, a question arises: if private markets are not only much more efficient at providing public goods, but also stable as institutions, then why is it that no pure free-market society has developed? How is it that government (or, in the absence of what we would consider government in the West, strong-men like drug cartels) always creeps in?
First, the book is very badly structured - it reads like a very loose collection of essays (and, inexplicably, poems) that do not form a consistent narrative. At times, they stray way off topic, as is the case of the chapter reviewing Ayn Rand's philosophy, for example.
Second, and more damningly, what the author does time and time again is take a controversial idea and give a few examples of where and how it might work; when he anticipates counter-examples and arguments on where his ideas might fail, he only examines weak ones and fails to address (what I would consider) more serious challenges to his proposed socio-economic-legal models.
A few examples: he talks about how children as young as nine years old should be allowed to leave their parents if they are able to provide for themselves (be it through their own labour, or through finding a new custodian). As my wife pointed out, it doesn't take much thought to realise this would make children extremely vulnerable to predators.
Another example concerns the provision of public goods. While the author does give a few examples of public goods that could be provided by the free market, there are plenty others where the matter is not obvious - the development of common standards is a good example (think things like power sockets, traffic light signals, etc). While private markets might be able to coordinate to produce such goods, they may well be less efficient at it than a public body. Either way, there is an argument to be had there, that the author avoids.
Finally, a question arises: if private markets are not only much more efficient at providing public goods, but also stable as institutions, then why is it that no pure free-market society has developed? How is it that government (or, in the absence of what we would consider government in the West, strong-men like drug cartels) always creeps in?
October 28, 2014
This book is great for introduction to libertarian (or anarcho-capitalism) ideas to someone not familiar with them but also for “already convinced” libertarians or anyone who only roughly knows what it means, but otherwise cannot imagine living in society without a government.
Friedman does not write from ideological (moral) perspective, his approach is highly practical. Being economist he rather focuses on efficiency of how mechanics of society work now and how they would work in market driven world without legitimized coercion.
He offers comparison of current and stateless society for topics like inequality, monopolies, schooling, immigration, healthcare and regulations. He tackles harder (probably the most interesting) aspects which most of the people cannot imagine could be private only – like police, courts and law. But also hardest problems like national defense or externalities (like pollution) are analysed. It shows not only desired target for libertarians but how to get there in small steps.
Arguments are well thought, based on facts, numbers, often with examples from history. Author is not closing his eyes to real problems like paradoxes appearing when libertarian dogmas are followed literally. Interesting is topic about market failure and his explanation why this real inefficiency is bigger in society with government.
Book was originally written 40 years ago and this is its third edition (interesting to see how some his older thoughts became reality during that time).
Negative: Structure of the book is not very systematic, sometimes it feels like bundle of loosely related articles (this applies mainly to appendices).
Friedman does not write from ideological (moral) perspective, his approach is highly practical. Being economist he rather focuses on efficiency of how mechanics of society work now and how they would work in market driven world without legitimized coercion.
He offers comparison of current and stateless society for topics like inequality, monopolies, schooling, immigration, healthcare and regulations. He tackles harder (probably the most interesting) aspects which most of the people cannot imagine could be private only – like police, courts and law. But also hardest problems like national defense or externalities (like pollution) are analysed. It shows not only desired target for libertarians but how to get there in small steps.
Arguments are well thought, based on facts, numbers, often with examples from history. Author is not closing his eyes to real problems like paradoxes appearing when libertarian dogmas are followed literally. Interesting is topic about market failure and his explanation why this real inefficiency is bigger in society with government.
Book was originally written 40 years ago and this is its third edition (interesting to see how some his older thoughts became reality during that time).
Negative: Structure of the book is not very systematic, sometimes it feels like bundle of loosely related articles (this applies mainly to appendices).
February 5, 2023
I'm disappointed by "The Machinery of Freedom" by David Friedman. For years I have been told this is the book to read to understand anarchist principles (anarcho-capitalist, more specifically). When reading it, all he offers is a lukewarm defense based on very shallow moral philosophy and an appeal to his own kindness, almost narcissist in nature. His philosophy of rights is, practically speaking, not worth much at all and he even acknowledges so explicitly on several instances in the book. His take on a society without government but, instead, with private rights enforcing agencies is a, at best, rationalized form of economics on steroids ignoring a long list of problems usually cited (legitimately so) by minarchists. He cites 10th century or so Iceland as a historic precedent, which is actually his most appealing argument, but it is not exactly an example that lends itself to generalize from. He writes nicely about unschooling though and one or two chapters were interesting to read, but on the whole it wasn't worth the time invested (in an economist sense even, ie the actualized cost was greater than the opportunity cost and the invested cost contra expected benefit). If this is *the book* in anarcho-capitalist circles, I understand why you have problems getting your message across.
April 10, 2021
This can best be compared to those books that try to explain away contradictions or inconsistencies in the bible. It's apologetic theory craft for anarcho-capitalists that exists only to ease the qualms of believers. The idea of it convincing anyone who didn't already agree with it is as laughable as Left Behind converting an atheist.
It also seems to be missing any practicality. Friedman can list a dozen ways private roads would work in an ancap society, but not one way to actually reach that society. After a while, it feels like he's just describing his own fantasy world (not that much of a stretch, since he's actually written fantasy novels). There's a strong fanfiction vibe that undermines any pretense of intellectual rigor.
This is the worst kind of book to me: one that only serves to stroke the people who already agree with it and not an honest exploration of its ideas. It does everyone a disservice.
It also seems to be missing any practicality. Friedman can list a dozen ways private roads would work in an ancap society, but not one way to actually reach that society. After a while, it feels like he's just describing his own fantasy world (not that much of a stretch, since he's actually written fantasy novels). There's a strong fanfiction vibe that undermines any pretense of intellectual rigor.
This is the worst kind of book to me: one that only serves to stroke the people who already agree with it and not an honest exploration of its ideas. It does everyone a disservice.
January 30, 2015
I'm a big fan of David Friedman. His flavor of libertarianism is very close to mine (in contrast to Misesian or Randian approaches). In this book he lays out his argument for anarcho-capitalism while commenting on a wide range of issues--which brings me to my primary criticism. Now in its third edition, the book is a bit like an onion with newer layers tacked on to older ones. That's not necessarily a problem, but it does give the book a piecemeal feel in places. I particularly enjoyed the original poems that begin some of the sections. The appendices list a bunch of reading material from a libertarian view including fiction, history, law, public policy, economics with enough suggestions to keep you going for quite a while.
February 11, 2022
Distinto a lo que esperaba. Friedman Jr. utiliza argumentos prácticos en lugar de filosóficos para demostrar que el anarcocapitalismo no solo funciona en el ética sino también en la vida real, proponiendo soluciones que permiten suprimir todas las funciones del gobierno y sustituirlas por instituciones de no coacción.
Sus contraejemplos resultan desafiantes para quienes creemos que los derechos naturales son un argumento suficiente para abrazar las ideas libertarias y que si además, desde el punto de vista utilitario es lo que mejor funciona, eso es solo un beneficio colateral.
Buena lectura para pensar fuera de la caja rothbardiana.
Sus contraejemplos resultan desafiantes para quienes creemos que los derechos naturales son un argumento suficiente para abrazar las ideas libertarias y que si además, desde el punto de vista utilitario es lo que mejor funciona, eso es solo un beneficio colateral.
Buena lectura para pensar fuera de la caja rothbardiana.
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