What do you think?
Rate this book
The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization
Was the fall of Rome a great catastrophe that cast the West into darkness for centuries to come? Or, as scholars argue today, was there no crisis at all, but simply a peaceful blending of barbarians into Roman culture, an essentially positive transformation?
In The Fall of Rome, eminent historian Bryan Ward-Perkins argues that the "peaceful" theory of Rome's "transformation" is badly in error. Indeed, he sees the fall of Rome as a time of horror and dislocation that destroyed a great civilization, throwing the inhabitants of the West back to a standard of living typical of prehistoric times. Attacking contemporary theories with relish and making use of modern archaeological evidence, he looks at both the wider explanations for the disintegration of the Roman world and also the consequences for the lives of everyday Romans, who were caught in a world of marauding barbarians, and economic collapse.
The book recaptures the drama and violence of the last days of the Roman world, and reminds us of the very real terrors of barbarian occupation. Equally important, Ward-Perkins contends that a key problem with the new way of looking at the end of the ancient world is that all difficulty and awkwardness is smoothed out into a steady and positive transformation of society. Nothing ever goes badly wrong in this vision of the past. The evidence shows otherwise.
Up-to-date and brilliantly written, combining a lively narrative with the latest research and thirty illustrations, this superb volume reclaims the drama, the violence, and the tragedy of the fall of Rome.
From Back Cover:
For decades, the dominant view amongst historians has been that the 'fall of Rome' was a largely peaceful transition to Germanic rule, within a period of positive cultural evolution. Now, Bryan Ward-Perkins argues for what you always thought but didn't dare say: the Roman Empire really did fall to violent invasion; the 'transformation' of the Roman world saw a catastrophic collapse of living standards; and the 'Dark Ages' were genuinely sombre.
In The Fall of Rome, eminent historian Bryan Ward-Perkins argues that the "peaceful" theory of Rome's "transformation" is badly in error. Indeed, he sees the fall of Rome as a time of horror and dislocation that destroyed a great civilization, throwing the inhabitants of the West back to a standard of living typical of prehistoric times. Attacking contemporary theories with relish and making use of modern archaeological evidence, he looks at both the wider explanations for the disintegration of the Roman world and also the consequences for the lives of everyday Romans, who were caught in a world of marauding barbarians, and economic collapse.
The book recaptures the drama and violence of the last days of the Roman world, and reminds us of the very real terrors of barbarian occupation. Equally important, Ward-Perkins contends that a key problem with the new way of looking at the end of the ancient world is that all difficulty and awkwardness is smoothed out into a steady and positive transformation of society. Nothing ever goes badly wrong in this vision of the past. The evidence shows otherwise.
Up-to-date and brilliantly written, combining a lively narrative with the latest research and thirty illustrations, this superb volume reclaims the drama, the violence, and the tragedy of the fall of Rome.
From Back Cover:
For decades, the dominant view amongst historians has been that the 'fall of Rome' was a largely peaceful transition to Germanic rule, within a period of positive cultural evolution. Now, Bryan Ward-Perkins argues for what you always thought but didn't dare say: the Roman Empire really did fall to violent invasion; the 'transformation' of the Roman world saw a catastrophic collapse of living standards; and the 'Dark Ages' were genuinely sombre.
239 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
About the author
Bryan Ward-Perkins
12 books38 followersBryan Ward-Perkins is an archaeologist and historian of the later Roman Empire and early Middle Ages, with a particular focus on the transitional period between those two eras, an historical sub-field also known as Late Antiquity. Ward-Perkins is a fellow and tutor in history at Trinity College, Oxford. The son of historian John Bryan Ward-Perkins, he was born and raised in Rome and spoke Italian from childhood.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 189 reviews
November 28, 2019
I was given this book as a birthday present. Not having previewed it myself, I initially thought it was one of the many books looking at why the Western Empire collapsed. Although the author touches on that, it’s really more a rebuttal of recently fashionable academic theories arguing that the Western Roman Empire came to an end through largely peaceful migration by the Germanic peoples, and a “transition” towards a medieval economy. The author holds firmly to the longer established (and imo more accurate) view that the fifth century saw “a profound military and political crisis, caused by the violent seizure of power and much wealth by the barbarian invaders.”
I’d previously read a bit about this period, both books by modern scholars and translations of contemporary accounts such as “On the Ruin of Britain”, by the Romano-British monk Gildas. My previous reading had already caused me to form a view broadly in line with this author’s, so it’s not surprising that I think he has made a compelling case, supported by a great deal of detail. He draws on a variety of both contemporary writing and archaeological sources, the latter looking particularly at evidence from pottery and from housing materials (e.g. bricks, roof tiles) to paint a convincing picture of a catastrophic economic collapse during and after the 5th century. In some areas, such as Southern Britain, people’s material wealth ended up lower than it had been in the pre-Roman Iron Age period. The situation was not quite as bad in areas such as Italy, but it too experienced a huge decline in economic activity. By contrast, the Eastern Empire, which remained intact, did not see the kind of decay experienced in the west (at least, not for some centuries).
The author quotes some interesting evidence for widespread levels of literacy in the Roman Empire. By contrast, there is a description of how even Charlemagne himself struggled to “learn his letters” in adult life.
In summary, I enjoyed the book and thought it a worthwhile addition to the literature on the subject.
Early on in the book the author quotes a German writer who compiled a list of 210 reasons that have been offered over the centuries as reasons for the fall of the Western Empire, one of which was “Hunnensturm”. That’s a great word! I think I’ll have to read a biography of Attila or something, just so I can use it in another review.
I’d previously read a bit about this period, both books by modern scholars and translations of contemporary accounts such as “On the Ruin of Britain”, by the Romano-British monk Gildas. My previous reading had already caused me to form a view broadly in line with this author’s, so it’s not surprising that I think he has made a compelling case, supported by a great deal of detail. He draws on a variety of both contemporary writing and archaeological sources, the latter looking particularly at evidence from pottery and from housing materials (e.g. bricks, roof tiles) to paint a convincing picture of a catastrophic economic collapse during and after the 5th century. In some areas, such as Southern Britain, people’s material wealth ended up lower than it had been in the pre-Roman Iron Age period. The situation was not quite as bad in areas such as Italy, but it too experienced a huge decline in economic activity. By contrast, the Eastern Empire, which remained intact, did not see the kind of decay experienced in the west (at least, not for some centuries).
The author quotes some interesting evidence for widespread levels of literacy in the Roman Empire. By contrast, there is a description of how even Charlemagne himself struggled to “learn his letters” in adult life.
In summary, I enjoyed the book and thought it a worthwhile addition to the literature on the subject.
Early on in the book the author quotes a German writer who compiled a list of 210 reasons that have been offered over the centuries as reasons for the fall of the Western Empire, one of which was “Hunnensturm”. That’s a great word! I think I’ll have to read a biography of Attila or something, just so I can use it in another review.
October 6, 2015
Around 70% of this short book is about pottery, coins and beards. That may put you off. It must be admitted that when historians peruse these far off centuries there is very little hard evidence to show what happened. So, we are left with pottery, coins and beards.
Actually this is really NOT a book for the general reader. I found myself in a room where a bunch of specialists in the “Late Antiquity” period were yelling
“Transformation!”
And Bryan Ward-Perkins was yelling back “Invasion!”
“Transformation!”
“Invasion!”
"Yah – your mother smelled of elderberries and your sister had several romances with haddock, flounders and other types of marine life!”
Etc etc
So what’s it all about? The original view put forward by everyone up to 1970 was that the Roman Empire collapsed in ruins during the 5th century as waves of invasions by Germanic tribes with cool names gave them such beatings that their epicurean somnolence could not withstand and they were turfed out. These barbarians were called Goths and Vandals and Visigoths (maybe the latter were just Goths with bad eyesight, the archaeological records do not say). So, pretty straight-forward, right? The Romans were effete and couldn’t get off their sofas without three slaves to help them, and the Goths were all big & brawny and had next to no manners. It was no contest.
The traditional view in which catastrophe destroys the magnificent Roman dinosaur, but leaves a few tiny dark-age mammals alive, to evolve very slowly over the coming centuries into the sophisticated creatures of the renaissance.
In 1970 an alternative to the traditional story was proposed. Decline and fall was replaced with integration, transformation, cultural revolution, where the German tribes were invited in to the Empire and kind of fused with it. The idea was that the narrative of the decline and fall of Roman civilisation implied that what came after was inferior – brutish, unlettered, ignorant, awful. The traditional narrative was on the site of the patrician Romans. It was – well, it was antidemocratic. It had to go. You can see that kind of thinking coming out of the sixties.
It is currently deeply unfashionable to state that anything like a ‘crisis’ or a ‘decline’ occurred at the end of the Roman empire, let alone that a ‘civilisation’ collapsed and a ‘dark age’ ensued.
This new narrative has taken over the history departments, but it’s like the debates about Christianity which the clergy always have – the public are blithely ignorant of it all, and in this case they stick with the traditional view - Rome 0, Goths 1.
So this book is a counter-counter argument, it’s really for the in crowd who can enjoy a good professorial punch-up. It’s not an entirely black & white issue, as you may expect. BW-P accepts that, for instance,
in many regions, despite some expropriation and loss, Roman aristocratic families continued wealthy and influential under Germanic rule
And
Most of the new rulers ran their kingdoms in a style that closely imitated that of the empire, and that required Roman administrators to make it work
So that sounds like transformation to me, not eradication. But when you think he’s trying to have his cake and eat it, he comes down strongly on the side of cultural decline. This is where the coins, pottery and beards come in. No, the archaeologists do not dig up remains of old beards. The Romans didn’t have them and the Goths did. So in portraits – well, maybe we should stick to the big picture here, not the little ones.
BW-P paints a convincing big picture of the complexity of the Roman economy, with functioning distribution of sophisticated products not just for the elite but the average citizen. After the barbarians (such a pejorative term!) this all stopped. The transformation guys say it was because the imperial power was replaced by local egalitarianism. BW-P says stuff and nonsense – the material level of society plummeted after Rome. E.g. buildings had tiled roofs in Italy as a matter of course in the 5th century. It was 1000 years before that became true again.
It may initially be hard to believe, but post-Roman Britain in fact sank to a level of economic complexity well below that of the pre-Roman Iron Age
He has to explain this – because he says “the invaders entered the empire with a wish to share in its high standard of living, not to destroy it”. But destroy it they did, unwittingly, says the professor. Mainly by removing security, so that trade became difficult, then impossible. The Roman world was highly specialised (like our world is) and without the security of movement and trust in money the complex trade of the empire shrivelled very rapidly. The Goths were the bulls in the Roman chinashop.
One curious point BW-P makes is that his argument sounds like he is defending the concept of an Empire, and as this is as politically unacceptable as possible these days, that’s why his argument is resisted. I am sorry to hear that. I had hoped that scholars were able to find the meanings within words, and not have their thinking blocked by mere syllables.
Note Romans fighting a giant insect on reverse of coin.
Actually this is really NOT a book for the general reader. I found myself in a room where a bunch of specialists in the “Late Antiquity” period were yelling
“Transformation!”
And Bryan Ward-Perkins was yelling back “Invasion!”
“Transformation!”
“Invasion!”
"Yah – your mother smelled of elderberries and your sister had several romances with haddock, flounders and other types of marine life!”
Etc etc
So what’s it all about? The original view put forward by everyone up to 1970 was that the Roman Empire collapsed in ruins during the 5th century as waves of invasions by Germanic tribes with cool names gave them such beatings that their epicurean somnolence could not withstand and they were turfed out. These barbarians were called Goths and Vandals and Visigoths (maybe the latter were just Goths with bad eyesight, the archaeological records do not say). So, pretty straight-forward, right? The Romans were effete and couldn’t get off their sofas without three slaves to help them, and the Goths were all big & brawny and had next to no manners. It was no contest.
The traditional view in which catastrophe destroys the magnificent Roman dinosaur, but leaves a few tiny dark-age mammals alive, to evolve very slowly over the coming centuries into the sophisticated creatures of the renaissance.
In 1970 an alternative to the traditional story was proposed. Decline and fall was replaced with integration, transformation, cultural revolution, where the German tribes were invited in to the Empire and kind of fused with it. The idea was that the narrative of the decline and fall of Roman civilisation implied that what came after was inferior – brutish, unlettered, ignorant, awful. The traditional narrative was on the site of the patrician Romans. It was – well, it was antidemocratic. It had to go. You can see that kind of thinking coming out of the sixties.
It is currently deeply unfashionable to state that anything like a ‘crisis’ or a ‘decline’ occurred at the end of the Roman empire, let alone that a ‘civilisation’ collapsed and a ‘dark age’ ensued.
This new narrative has taken over the history departments, but it’s like the debates about Christianity which the clergy always have – the public are blithely ignorant of it all, and in this case they stick with the traditional view - Rome 0, Goths 1.
So this book is a counter-counter argument, it’s really for the in crowd who can enjoy a good professorial punch-up. It’s not an entirely black & white issue, as you may expect. BW-P accepts that, for instance,
in many regions, despite some expropriation and loss, Roman aristocratic families continued wealthy and influential under Germanic rule
And
Most of the new rulers ran their kingdoms in a style that closely imitated that of the empire, and that required Roman administrators to make it work
So that sounds like transformation to me, not eradication. But when you think he’s trying to have his cake and eat it, he comes down strongly on the side of cultural decline. This is where the coins, pottery and beards come in. No, the archaeologists do not dig up remains of old beards. The Romans didn’t have them and the Goths did. So in portraits – well, maybe we should stick to the big picture here, not the little ones.
BW-P paints a convincing big picture of the complexity of the Roman economy, with functioning distribution of sophisticated products not just for the elite but the average citizen. After the barbarians (such a pejorative term!) this all stopped. The transformation guys say it was because the imperial power was replaced by local egalitarianism. BW-P says stuff and nonsense – the material level of society plummeted after Rome. E.g. buildings had tiled roofs in Italy as a matter of course in the 5th century. It was 1000 years before that became true again.
It may initially be hard to believe, but post-Roman Britain in fact sank to a level of economic complexity well below that of the pre-Roman Iron Age
He has to explain this – because he says “the invaders entered the empire with a wish to share in its high standard of living, not to destroy it”. But destroy it they did, unwittingly, says the professor. Mainly by removing security, so that trade became difficult, then impossible. The Roman world was highly specialised (like our world is) and without the security of movement and trust in money the complex trade of the empire shrivelled very rapidly. The Goths were the bulls in the Roman chinashop.
One curious point BW-P makes is that his argument sounds like he is defending the concept of an Empire, and as this is as politically unacceptable as possible these days, that’s why his argument is resisted. I am sorry to hear that. I had hoped that scholars were able to find the meanings within words, and not have their thinking blocked by mere syllables.
Note Romans fighting a giant insect on reverse of coin.
Read
December 13, 2018The great thing about the fall of Rome is that there is no need to stop discussing it even once the cows have come home. The range of sources are rich enough to hint at huge ranges of possible causes and effects, yet not precise enough to pin down much decisively. As a result every age is free to reinterpret the fall of Rome in the image of its own hopes, fears, and preoccupations.
This is true of Ward-Perkins' book too which can be read as a statement of, what on one island at least would be called, British Empiricism as opposed to the history of Continental Idealists aiming to re-imagine the post Roman western European world as a prefiguring of the contemporary European Union which also seeks to unite the sunny Mediterranean world with the damp and perpetually overcast north-west of Europe. As a result there is more than a whiff of the outraged letters from middle England written to the editor of the Daily Telegraph about the book. Look at these pottery sherds, we hear him shout, these are the facts from the ground. Because of this, there is a growing impression of Don Quixote about his essay, however fun it is, that it is misunderstanding the position actually taken by those historians who stress accommodation between Barbarians and Romans or new developments made in the post-Roman world.
Ward-Perkins' book isn't definitive, nor would I recommend it as the only book to read on the subject. It is a bright, short, polemical work that aims to attack the notion that the passage from antiquity to barbarian rule was a smooth one preferring to emphasise the disruption and level of decline that resulted from the events of the fourth and fifth centuries.
I particularly enjoyed the use of archaeological evidence such as coin and pottery finds and the change in size of livestock skeletons over time. This was a welcome extension of the argument beyond the literary sources that I read in The Fall of the Roman Empire and, as the author intended, gave a picture of the relative wealth and sophistication of the late Roman economy .
No need to throw out your copy of The World of Late Antiquity, but certainly worth a read if you are interested in the business of the decline and fall of the western half of the Roman Empire.
This is true of Ward-Perkins' book too which can be read as a statement of, what on one island at least would be called, British Empiricism as opposed to the history of Continental Idealists aiming to re-imagine the post Roman western European world as a prefiguring of the contemporary European Union which also seeks to unite the sunny Mediterranean world with the damp and perpetually overcast north-west of Europe. As a result there is more than a whiff of the outraged letters from middle England written to the editor of the Daily Telegraph about the book. Look at these pottery sherds, we hear him shout, these are the facts from the ground. Because of this, there is a growing impression of Don Quixote about his essay, however fun it is, that it is misunderstanding the position actually taken by those historians who stress accommodation between Barbarians and Romans or new developments made in the post-Roman world.
Ward-Perkins' book isn't definitive, nor would I recommend it as the only book to read on the subject. It is a bright, short, polemical work that aims to attack the notion that the passage from antiquity to barbarian rule was a smooth one preferring to emphasise the disruption and level of decline that resulted from the events of the fourth and fifth centuries.
I particularly enjoyed the use of archaeological evidence such as coin and pottery finds and the change in size of livestock skeletons over time. This was a welcome extension of the argument beyond the literary sources that I read in The Fall of the Roman Empire and, as the author intended, gave a picture of the relative wealth and sophistication of the late Roman economy .
No need to throw out your copy of The World of Late Antiquity, but certainly worth a read if you are interested in the business of the decline and fall of the western half of the Roman Empire.
September 15, 2021
Over the past few decades, it has become common for medievalists to assert that there was no such thing as a ‘Dark Age’ after the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. Such views are now being propounded by members of the educated public who have been influenced by these historians. In The Fall of Rome, Oxford historian Bryan Ward-Perkins argues that these developments represent an egregious overcorrection for the excesses of Renaissance and Enlightenment-era work on the Middle Ages.
Scholars in these eras, exemplified by the likes of Petrarch and Gibbon respectively, held a bleak view of the post-Roman period in the West prior to the Renaissance. However, they stand accused of concocting a story of ‘civilisational decline’ in order to exaggerate the virtues of their own eras or to attack Christianity (which survived and indeed thrived after the collapse of the Empire). There is likely to be some merit to these accusations, but excessive focus on motive can distract from the facts themselves.
Ward-Perkins, in this slim but densely packed work, provides plenty of them. His mastery of the primary sources, and other primary research, is superb. As an archaeologist, he mainly focuses on what evidence from excavations can tell us about living standards in the post-Roman period. For instance, the quality and quantity of pottery declined; houses in places like Britain and Italy were usually made of perishable materials rather than of stone or brick as in Roman times; and coinage was no longer widely used.
On occasion, work from other fields is drawn upon: analysis of the Greenland icecaps suggests that lead and copper pollution, indicative of metalworking, fell substantially in the post-Roman centuries, only to return to Roman levels around the time of the Renaissance. Overall, this evidence suggests
The author’s treatment of the evidence is careful and meticulous (he takes considerable care to acknowledge weaknesses and caveats), so these findings– suggestive of a “remarkable qualitative change, with the disappearance of entire industries and commercial networks” – should not be taken lightly. He also combines archaeological findings with written records from the period to examine the decline of reading and writing in the post-Roman West, concluding that widespread literacy “definitely became confined to the clergy”. Even the emperor Charlemagne would keep writing tablets under his pillows so that he could practice writing in his spare time; Einhard, his biographer, was not optimistic about his prospects.
What is most striking is how much agreement about the facts there is between Ward-Perkins on the one hand, and medievalists such as Chris Wickham who question the ‘Dark Age’ narrative on the other. Wickham, in his Inheritance of Rome (review here), acknowledges many of Ward-Perkins’ arguments, writing:
Similarly, though Ward-Perkins primarily attributes the fall of the Roman Empire to the barbarian migrations and invasions, he is in full agreement with Wickham that the Germanic peoples did not intentionally cause its collapse: “the invaders were not guilty of murder, but they had committed manslaughter”. The ‘barbarians’ wanted a share of the benefits of the Roman Empire, and appropriated some of its culture, though the decline of literacy at the top of society was caused by changes to the culture of the secular elite (literacy in other strata likely declined due to the decline of administrative and economic structures which encouraged reading and writing).
Both authors also agree that the economic decline after the fall of the empire can be attributed to the shift, driven by the barbarians, from a tax-based to a land-based economy. However (and this is where there are some disagreements) Ward-Perkins deftly demonstrates, using primary sources, that barbarian demands were often violent; fifth century Romans were certainly cognisant of imperial decline and unhappy that the empire was no longer strong enough to resist the barbarians, even if they did not forecast imminent collapse.
The differences are usually ones of emphasis, though. Ward-Perkins is willing to explicitly state what is staring scholars in the face (civilisation did end, primarily due to the barbarians); Wickham seems to fear that such findings could invalidate early medieval history as a field of study, or be used to cast moral aspersions on the groups (and religions?) which took over the West. He argues that we should be “neutral” about the decline of poetry and complex prose, and the fact that by the end of the ninth century, aristocracies were generally unable to read (another example of an absence of a factual dispute). Ward-Perkins gently reflects on and pushes back against such cultural relativism towards the end of the book.
Overall, The Fall of Rome is a monumental achievement, and ought to be read by anyone interested in classical antiquity, medieval history, or state collapse.
Scholars in these eras, exemplified by the likes of Petrarch and Gibbon respectively, held a bleak view of the post-Roman period in the West prior to the Renaissance. However, they stand accused of concocting a story of ‘civilisational decline’ in order to exaggerate the virtues of their own eras or to attack Christianity (which survived and indeed thrived after the collapse of the Empire). There is likely to be some merit to these accusations, but excessive focus on motive can distract from the facts themselves.
Ward-Perkins, in this slim but densely packed work, provides plenty of them. His mastery of the primary sources, and other primary research, is superb. As an archaeologist, he mainly focuses on what evidence from excavations can tell us about living standards in the post-Roman period. For instance, the quality and quantity of pottery declined; houses in places like Britain and Italy were usually made of perishable materials rather than of stone or brick as in Roman times; and coinage was no longer widely used.
On occasion, work from other fields is drawn upon: analysis of the Greenland icecaps suggests that lead and copper pollution, indicative of metalworking, fell substantially in the post-Roman centuries, only to return to Roman levels around the time of the Renaissance. Overall, this evidence suggests
… a startling decline in western standards of living… This was a change that affected everyone, from peasants to kings… It was no mere transformation – it was decline on a scale that can reasonably be described as ‘the end of a civilisation’
The author’s treatment of the evidence is careful and meticulous (he takes considerable care to acknowledge weaknesses and caveats), so these findings– suggestive of a “remarkable qualitative change, with the disappearance of entire industries and commercial networks” – should not be taken lightly. He also combines archaeological findings with written records from the period to examine the decline of reading and writing in the post-Roman West, concluding that widespread literacy “definitely became confined to the clergy”. Even the emperor Charlemagne would keep writing tablets under his pillows so that he could practice writing in his spare time; Einhard, his biographer, was not optimistic about his prospects.
What is most striking is how much agreement about the facts there is between Ward-Perkins on the one hand, and medievalists such as Chris Wickham who question the ‘Dark Age’ narrative on the other. Wickham, in his Inheritance of Rome (review here), acknowledges many of Ward-Perkins’ arguments, writing:
Building became far less ambitious, artisanal production became less professionalized; exchange became more localized. The fiscal system, the judicial system, the density of Roman administrative activity in general, all began to simplify as well. These are real changes which cannot be talked away…
Similarly, though Ward-Perkins primarily attributes the fall of the Roman Empire to the barbarian migrations and invasions, he is in full agreement with Wickham that the Germanic peoples did not intentionally cause its collapse: “the invaders were not guilty of murder, but they had committed manslaughter”. The ‘barbarians’ wanted a share of the benefits of the Roman Empire, and appropriated some of its culture, though the decline of literacy at the top of society was caused by changes to the culture of the secular elite (literacy in other strata likely declined due to the decline of administrative and economic structures which encouraged reading and writing).
Both authors also agree that the economic decline after the fall of the empire can be attributed to the shift, driven by the barbarians, from a tax-based to a land-based economy. However (and this is where there are some disagreements) Ward-Perkins deftly demonstrates, using primary sources, that barbarian demands were often violent; fifth century Romans were certainly cognisant of imperial decline and unhappy that the empire was no longer strong enough to resist the barbarians, even if they did not forecast imminent collapse.
The differences are usually ones of emphasis, though. Ward-Perkins is willing to explicitly state what is staring scholars in the face (civilisation did end, primarily due to the barbarians); Wickham seems to fear that such findings could invalidate early medieval history as a field of study, or be used to cast moral aspersions on the groups (and religions?) which took over the West. He argues that we should be “neutral” about the decline of poetry and complex prose, and the fact that by the end of the ninth century, aristocracies were generally unable to read (another example of an absence of a factual dispute). Ward-Perkins gently reflects on and pushes back against such cultural relativism towards the end of the book.
Overall, The Fall of Rome is a monumental achievement, and ought to be read by anyone interested in classical antiquity, medieval history, or state collapse.
September 15, 2011
This was a very frustrating book. Ward-Perkins sets out to counter a perceived historiographical trend to gloss over the Germanic invasions and paint the period from about 200-800 as a rosy period of lovely, happy continuity that coincided with the rise and spread of Christianity. That's a fair enough argument to make. The invasion of Germanic groups was pretty clearly an unpleasant experience for a lot of the people involved. While it's unfair to paint the invasions as hordes of bloodthirsty warriors entirely ravaging everything in their paths just for kicks, it's also an over correction to assume they marched politely into the empire and cleanly adopted Roman administrative practices. Similarly, Ward-Perkins is right to point out that specialization and overall agricultural production probably decreased during the period. All fair enough, and I think this could probably make a fairly interesting book.
But Ward-Perkins doesn't really pull it off. Despite his claims to the contrary, he frequently veers off into polemic and outright melodrama. He openly admits to being 'bewildered' by historical concern with religion and at one point comes fairly close to grouping such historians in with the New Age movement. There are weird attempts to tie the barbarian assimilation theory to the European Union. His evidence is also occasionally rather flimsy or scatter-shot: he'll pull various examples from geographically disparate places and analyze all of it as a sort of mishmash. Roman pottery fragments are described lovingly and at length (while assuring the reader that he or she could never really understand) while a photo of Anglo Saxon pottery fragments is accompanied by the sarcastic caption, "Pottery fit for a king?" At one point he includes graphs of regional economic complexity but the x axis is entirely numberless (it's labelled only with 'considerable' and 'minimal'), so I guess he just sort of drew the lines in a way he figured kind of looked right?
I may be being a little bit unfair. It's not a terrible introduction to the topic, and Ward-Perkins is an engaging writer. But it's a polemic, and one that doesn't do an thorough enough job of backing up it's ideas.
But Ward-Perkins doesn't really pull it off. Despite his claims to the contrary, he frequently veers off into polemic and outright melodrama. He openly admits to being 'bewildered' by historical concern with religion and at one point comes fairly close to grouping such historians in with the New Age movement. There are weird attempts to tie the barbarian assimilation theory to the European Union. His evidence is also occasionally rather flimsy or scatter-shot: he'll pull various examples from geographically disparate places and analyze all of it as a sort of mishmash. Roman pottery fragments are described lovingly and at length (while assuring the reader that he or she could never really understand) while a photo of Anglo Saxon pottery fragments is accompanied by the sarcastic caption, "Pottery fit for a king?" At one point he includes graphs of regional economic complexity but the x axis is entirely numberless (it's labelled only with 'considerable' and 'minimal'), so I guess he just sort of drew the lines in a way he figured kind of looked right?
I may be being a little bit unfair. It's not a terrible introduction to the topic, and Ward-Perkins is an engaging writer. But it's a polemic, and one that doesn't do an thorough enough job of backing up it's ideas.
July 17, 2013
3.5 stars. Engaging academically honest and hence academically politically incorrect look at the decline of Rome, specific focus given to Rome in the West.
Being a total naif in terms of a lot of history, but having enough resolve to give anything approachable and well written, I found a good guide in Perkins. The book is unfussy and colloquial.
I had no idea that the current academic orthodoxy has decided that the period of Late Antiquity (buzzword since Brown I guess) was some kind of gentle transformation, a Romano-Barbarian love-in of sociocultural melting pot-ish genteelity, where your Hun/Goth/Visigoth/Ostrogoth/Frank invader of last year was this year's benign master or best bud, and everyone got along famously (with some hiccoughs of course, like wholesale betrayal of garrisons, towns, destruction of armies, seiges, massacres and the like) hardcore barbarian vs barbarian action as well as Roman versus Barbarian and so on.
I was surprised at this because I have in the past played a lot of computer games like Age of Empires, Empire Earth, Civilisation and the like to know that one minute you are merrily building porticoed pavilions of wonder, amphitheatres, beautiful markets and fountains and aqueducts, and the next minute, blammo, its the Dark Ages and the hottest thing on the market is a mudhut with a thatched roof.
Perkins is at his best rubbishing the entire notion of gradual economic shifts, gentle transitions. Fashion is apparently to shy away from the term "Decline" and "Collapse" Most tellingly he shows that after Romans left, Britain disintegrated: levels of economic output and quality and sophistication of material culture fell back to pre Iron Age levels. One minute you are using beautiful mass produced glazeware from Rome or Colchester or Ravenna or Tunis (yes they found some all the way from Tunis for gods sake) and then 50 years later you're using a hand moulded bowl fired quickly that'll fall apart after a few uses made by Grob the local storyteller because he needs some kind of way to earn a living as he's forgotten Roman stories and you probably live in a cultural vacuum after those Romans left and worse its an economic vacuum due to the utter collapse of fungible currency because no one knows how to make coins let alone spin a pot on a wheel anymore. All this living in your wood hut because everyone forgot how to make stone buildings and roof tiles. Things were bad, man. Apparently some guy called Benedict Biscop "at the very end if the seventh century" wanted to build churches like those he'd seen in pilgrimage to Rome but no one could remember how to work stone or even make glazed windows so he had to import craftsmen from Gaul to help. What windows were made were apparently miniscule. Perkins says it took until late 700s that economic activity began to resemble level of complexity found in pre Roman Iron age. Academics: if this ain't decline, I don't no what is.
Even the famous Sutton Hoo ship burial across the river from my house (approx AD 625) had pots that an 8 year old Roman apprentice potter from the third century would have laughed at and chucked away as trash. In some hill communities, population levels weren't the same until early 19th century. Roof tiles began to be as common as Roman times in Italy only in the late middle ages. Again, I am astounded that it seems like some academic fashions gloss over all this. Even leaving aside episodes of sieges that led to people eating grass and their own children, Roman emperors being used as kneeling stools to help mount a horse then flayed afterwards as a trophy, even leaving aside the fact that sea trade declined so massively from roughly AD 400 onwards such that it didn't attain same levels of trade again until 19th century, and the whole stuff about people forgetting what glazed windows are or stone paved floors or even stone as building material and what tiles are, leaving aside all these minor points, the evidence for systemic collapse, contraction, demise decline withering retardation suffocation is/are huge, yes? no?
I am reminded of Grey's famous lamentation: "The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our life-time" which surely, Europe aside, mutatis mutandi, applies here to the world of um...Late Antiquity. Am I missing something? Surely Perkins fights a straw man?
Anyway enough incredulity. Overall a good read for a general reader such as I.
In five words:
Shows Romulus Remus in extre...mus.
Being a total naif in terms of a lot of history, but having enough resolve to give anything approachable and well written, I found a good guide in Perkins. The book is unfussy and colloquial.
I had no idea that the current academic orthodoxy has decided that the period of Late Antiquity (buzzword since Brown I guess) was some kind of gentle transformation, a Romano-Barbarian love-in of sociocultural melting pot-ish genteelity, where your Hun/Goth/Visigoth/Ostrogoth/Frank invader of last year was this year's benign master or best bud, and everyone got along famously (with some hiccoughs of course, like wholesale betrayal of garrisons, towns, destruction of armies, seiges, massacres and the like) hardcore barbarian vs barbarian action as well as Roman versus Barbarian and so on.
I was surprised at this because I have in the past played a lot of computer games like Age of Empires, Empire Earth, Civilisation and the like to know that one minute you are merrily building porticoed pavilions of wonder, amphitheatres, beautiful markets and fountains and aqueducts, and the next minute, blammo, its the Dark Ages and the hottest thing on the market is a mudhut with a thatched roof.
Perkins is at his best rubbishing the entire notion of gradual economic shifts, gentle transitions. Fashion is apparently to shy away from the term "Decline" and "Collapse" Most tellingly he shows that after Romans left, Britain disintegrated: levels of economic output and quality and sophistication of material culture fell back to pre Iron Age levels. One minute you are using beautiful mass produced glazeware from Rome or Colchester or Ravenna or Tunis (yes they found some all the way from Tunis for gods sake) and then 50 years later you're using a hand moulded bowl fired quickly that'll fall apart after a few uses made by Grob the local storyteller because he needs some kind of way to earn a living as he's forgotten Roman stories and you probably live in a cultural vacuum after those Romans left and worse its an economic vacuum due to the utter collapse of fungible currency because no one knows how to make coins let alone spin a pot on a wheel anymore. All this living in your wood hut because everyone forgot how to make stone buildings and roof tiles. Things were bad, man. Apparently some guy called Benedict Biscop "at the very end if the seventh century" wanted to build churches like those he'd seen in pilgrimage to Rome but no one could remember how to work stone or even make glazed windows so he had to import craftsmen from Gaul to help. What windows were made were apparently miniscule. Perkins says it took until late 700s that economic activity began to resemble level of complexity found in pre Roman Iron age. Academics: if this ain't decline, I don't no what is.
Even the famous Sutton Hoo ship burial across the river from my house (approx AD 625) had pots that an 8 year old Roman apprentice potter from the third century would have laughed at and chucked away as trash. In some hill communities, population levels weren't the same until early 19th century. Roof tiles began to be as common as Roman times in Italy only in the late middle ages. Again, I am astounded that it seems like some academic fashions gloss over all this. Even leaving aside episodes of sieges that led to people eating grass and their own children, Roman emperors being used as kneeling stools to help mount a horse then flayed afterwards as a trophy, even leaving aside the fact that sea trade declined so massively from roughly AD 400 onwards such that it didn't attain same levels of trade again until 19th century, and the whole stuff about people forgetting what glazed windows are or stone paved floors or even stone as building material and what tiles are, leaving aside all these minor points, the evidence for systemic collapse, contraction, demise decline withering retardation suffocation is/are huge, yes? no?
I am reminded of Grey's famous lamentation: "The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our life-time" which surely, Europe aside, mutatis mutandi, applies here to the world of um...Late Antiquity. Am I missing something? Surely Perkins fights a straw man?
Anyway enough incredulity. Overall a good read for a general reader such as I.
In five words:
Shows Romulus Remus in extre...mus.
August 30, 2022
Aside from the academic prowess that I describe below, this book deserves recognition for its ability to transplant the implications of an ancient crumbling empire into modern-day relevance. Ward-Perkins’ approach strikes at the heart of our society. For better or worse, we are in the midst of modernity in the very same way that Romans felt that they were living at the pinnacle of their world two thousand years ago. History is repeating itself and Ward-Perkins aptly reminds us of this reality.
The book is a no-nonsense history of the fall of Rome and its aftermath spanning from third century to the eighth century AD. Bryan Ward-Perkins is the quintessential professor and gives this history as if teaching a freshman history class. To this effect, he uses photos, illustrations and graphics to emphasize the main points of this period of history. He also strikes at the heart of historical trends by focusing on the economic forces at play in the Roman Empire before, during, and after its demise. In true schollary fashion, evidence is presented and sources are documented. The overall effect is a thoroughly believable text that supports confidence in its stated conclusions.
Underlying his assertive presentation of history is Ward-Perkins’ arguments against modern trends by some western historians who claim that the empire experienced more of a gradual, mutually beneficial transformation into Germanic rule rather than a violent fall to barbarian invasions. Thus, this book is a rebuttal to those trying to soften the fall of Roman society for what Ward-Perkins describes as mostly present-day political reasons. In my opinion, Ward-Perkins succeeds in disproving this softer interpretation. And in my personal experience, visiting the city of Venice is proof that at least one segment of Roman society was forced to move their civilization to the middle of an ocean lagoon in order to insulate themselves from the barbarian invaders.
The book is a no-nonsense history of the fall of Rome and its aftermath spanning from third century to the eighth century AD. Bryan Ward-Perkins is the quintessential professor and gives this history as if teaching a freshman history class. To this effect, he uses photos, illustrations and graphics to emphasize the main points of this period of history. He also strikes at the heart of historical trends by focusing on the economic forces at play in the Roman Empire before, during, and after its demise. In true schollary fashion, evidence is presented and sources are documented. The overall effect is a thoroughly believable text that supports confidence in its stated conclusions.
Underlying his assertive presentation of history is Ward-Perkins’ arguments against modern trends by some western historians who claim that the empire experienced more of a gradual, mutually beneficial transformation into Germanic rule rather than a violent fall to barbarian invasions. Thus, this book is a rebuttal to those trying to soften the fall of Roman society for what Ward-Perkins describes as mostly present-day political reasons. In my opinion, Ward-Perkins succeeds in disproving this softer interpretation. And in my personal experience, visiting the city of Venice is proof that at least one segment of Roman society was forced to move their civilization to the middle of an ocean lagoon in order to insulate themselves from the barbarian invaders.
December 6, 2015
Bryan Ward-Perkins, through this book, tried to contest the "dominant" views on Late Antiquity by trying to essentially return to a more nuanced form of the catastrophistic (and quite Gibbonian in general aspects) view that ruled before the revolution of late antique studies in the last 40 years.
In the first four chapters he discusses specifically the fall of Rome. He starts by presenting his goals about the book and that's where problems start. His speech is very polemic and ranty, almost taking things to a very personal level by asserting the difference between his view (the normal and reasonable one according to him) of this historical period and that of "continuity" and "transformation", aiming special fire to Peter Brown (as he was the main responsible for shattering the old "decadentist" view of post-classical culture and popularized the term "Late Antiquity") and Goffard (who really deserved the attacks made on him). He then continues and lays out his opinion on the subject, but meanwhile he makes several distortions on the use of primary sources. That's surely the case, for instance of the Chronicon of Hydatius of Chaves, where Bryan, despite referring the apocaliptic tone and intent of the chronicle, simply takes it practically at face value without any considerations over whether there were exaggerations or the context of the Suevic actions. He simply doesn't consider in his example of the entry of year 459 the possibility of hostility between one of the two Suebic factions against some Callaecian elites in a contet of civil war and split power after the death of Rechiar in 457, when the Suebi kingdom was almost destroyed by the Visigothic king Theoderic and doesn't even inform about Orosius' account when he referred Hydatius' narration of the Suevic settlement, that is much more peaceful ("However immediately after these events, the barbarians foreswore their swords and turned to the plough and cherished the remaining Romans as allies of a kind and friends, with the result that some Romans who prefer freedom in poverty to trouble and taxation under Rome can be found among them"- "Seven Books of History Against the Pagans", Book 7, 41;7). As I'm Portuguese and have some interest in the Suevic kingdom, I wasn't caught in Perkins' web, however that isn't the only case where he basically hid a lot to reinforce his theory. I could refer Priscus' account of his embassy to Attila where he finds a Roman merchant who preferred the Hunnic court for being not as corrupt and not demanding as much taxes or the case of men of the Italo-Roman elite who openly worked with Theoderic the Great like Cassiodorus or Boethius (although the latter was executed for a supposed conspiracy with the Roman court of Constantinople) to further their interests and possibly with the hope of a restored Roman authority in the western provinces by the Ostrogoths. This isn't to say there weren't conflicts between Romans and "barbarians" or that the 5th century was peaceful, yet the picture is very complex and depends not only on the region, but also on the considered social class or even on individuals.
I also find his assertions on the power of the eastern armies and the 4th century economy on chapter IV quite problematic and here he also distorts the record by claiming that Roman economy didn't suffer much of a decline in the later 4th century or that the eastern armies asked for help from the west in 395 and 397 when in fact at 394 the "weak" eastern armies of Theodosius I defeated the western armies led by Arbogast at the battle of the Frigidus and in 397 Stilicho held not only the western but also much of the eastern field armies that were still in the West), besides the fact the eastern armies were very agressively active in the 420's both on the Persian frontier and in the West and were able to recover from the defeats made by Attila quite quickly, to the point Leo I could almost take the portion of the Empire he ruled to bankruptcy in an amphibious operation against the Vandals in 468. The eastern armies took some beatings against powerful foes lik Attila or the Vandals, but it was more due to bad leadership than really due to any inferiority of the eastern soldiers. By the way, as we are talking about armies, he should also have considered the probable numeric decline of the Roman army during the late 4th century and the fact the western provinces had their armies depleted as result of the conflict in 394 (I think there's surely a pattern between great raids on Gaul and civil wars ravaging the western armies, of which a good example are the raids of the 350's, precisely a few years after Mursa Major). I also agree with his argument on geography, yet I don't think that was enough: surely both the relative peace with Persia (although in the end related with geography as that peace was due to the Hephtalite threats on the Sassanians) and the actions of the eastern emperors after the death of Theodosius II in curbing the power of the barbarian "foederati" in the Balkans and the powerful generalissimos like Aspar were very important.
In the following chapters (V-VII) he discusses the existence and extent of decline in material culture in the Roman world. I loved his archaeological approach including perhaps ironically his arguments on pottery (given his assertions that people usually hate it), yet it has several issues. First of all, he doesn't approach the extent of decline or prosperity in the Roman world for the 3rd and the 4th centuries (besides making a few general assertions on the provinces and highlighting shortly North Africa as a prosperous region) and makes constant comparisons between the classical and post-Roman worlds without properly considering precisely those mentioned centuries by merging them with the classical period, which obviously distorts data a bit and makes the conclusions a bit more catastrophic. Then there's also the problem the archaeological examples are neither systematic (he basically switches provinces while analyzing different factors like the quantity of found pottery or coins while keeping some special cases like Britain or not explaining the Italian situation in the 6th-7th centuries properly) nor representative of the whole Roman world (where are Hispania or Gaul, for instance? He makes a few assertions and refers those regions once or often, but I don't remember a single mention to them in graphics or any real case example of the two regions besides a few points and, by the way, even in the African case he doesn't refer the prosperity of Africa until the mid 7th century (we know it was quite prosperous and a source of money for the government of Constantinople, besides being a relatively safe zone) and the Arab role in its disturbance. That means again that he's being quite selective on his data and is making deliberate distortions to make his case stronger. The last issue is that his view of economic complexity, despite all he mentions, isn't objective, as the following graphic shows. Which are its criteria? Which are the units on the 0y axis? How do we know if Perkins didn't use his creativity? I'm not saying there wasn't any kind of material decline, but these graphics have issues and surely don't match completely our available data. For someone who meant to be throughroughly objective, this is quite a flaw.
https://www.goodreads.com/photo/user/...
In the final chapter Ward-Perkins unleashes the axes he has to grind again (well, the polemicist tone is a bit throughout the book, but it's markedly clear in the first and last chapters) on the historiography of Late Antiquity, although he also acknowledges some positive parts of the "trasformation" school, rebukes some people like Massimo Manfredi for their simplist vision (Perkins has effectively a more nuanced version than at least some of his colleagues), debunks Goffard and some more rosy views of the period (always a good job) and alerts for the effect of politics in historiography (never beneficial, as my experience tells me). Yet he makes too many generalizations regarding the historians of Late Antiquity and their geographical origins (I think he forgets many of the best universities are in America or northwestern and central Europe, which adds a layer of complexity to his cultural subject as naturally "heterodox" theories tend to appear there; and even in southern Europe the "decline" theory isn't very marked outside of Italy, which has its own cultural and nationalistic problems) and I feel he ends up making straw man fallacies a bit like the creationists by targeting his attacks on Goffard (who doesn't need much debunking, to be honest) and Peter Brown (who worked mainly on a cultural level and made his work as a reaction to post-Gibbonian ideas on late antique culture) or in the cases where historiography was dictated by politics, not considering intermediate or moderate opposit positions.
Concluding, The Fall of Rome And the End of Civilization has a very positive archaeological approach, is well-written and had a great potential of launching further historical debate on the old issue of whether there was a fall or transformation of the Roman Empire in the West (I must remind that all these talks about the fall of Rome are a bit fluffy because nobody really saw the Empire falling in 476 or 480 and the eastern provinces of the Empire would remain with several territorial losses and reconquests until the 15th century and think the question should be rephrased), but Ward-Perkins ruined it all with his rants and his selective distortions of facts both in the primary sources and the archaeological data. By the way, as he wrote about the imposition of models, why does he want to impose the events of Britain or Italy in the late 6th, 7th and 8th centuries to the whole of the West?
In the first four chapters he discusses specifically the fall of Rome. He starts by presenting his goals about the book and that's where problems start. His speech is very polemic and ranty, almost taking things to a very personal level by asserting the difference between his view (the normal and reasonable one according to him) of this historical period and that of "continuity" and "transformation", aiming special fire to Peter Brown (as he was the main responsible for shattering the old "decadentist" view of post-classical culture and popularized the term "Late Antiquity") and Goffard (who really deserved the attacks made on him). He then continues and lays out his opinion on the subject, but meanwhile he makes several distortions on the use of primary sources. That's surely the case, for instance of the Chronicon of Hydatius of Chaves, where Bryan, despite referring the apocaliptic tone and intent of the chronicle, simply takes it practically at face value without any considerations over whether there were exaggerations or the context of the Suevic actions. He simply doesn't consider in his example of the entry of year 459 the possibility of hostility between one of the two Suebic factions against some Callaecian elites in a contet of civil war and split power after the death of Rechiar in 457, when the Suebi kingdom was almost destroyed by the Visigothic king Theoderic and doesn't even inform about Orosius' account when he referred Hydatius' narration of the Suevic settlement, that is much more peaceful ("However immediately after these events, the barbarians foreswore their swords and turned to the plough and cherished the remaining Romans as allies of a kind and friends, with the result that some Romans who prefer freedom in poverty to trouble and taxation under Rome can be found among them"- "Seven Books of History Against the Pagans", Book 7, 41;7). As I'm Portuguese and have some interest in the Suevic kingdom, I wasn't caught in Perkins' web, however that isn't the only case where he basically hid a lot to reinforce his theory. I could refer Priscus' account of his embassy to Attila where he finds a Roman merchant who preferred the Hunnic court for being not as corrupt and not demanding as much taxes or the case of men of the Italo-Roman elite who openly worked with Theoderic the Great like Cassiodorus or Boethius (although the latter was executed for a supposed conspiracy with the Roman court of Constantinople) to further their interests and possibly with the hope of a restored Roman authority in the western provinces by the Ostrogoths. This isn't to say there weren't conflicts between Romans and "barbarians" or that the 5th century was peaceful, yet the picture is very complex and depends not only on the region, but also on the considered social class or even on individuals.
I also find his assertions on the power of the eastern armies and the 4th century economy on chapter IV quite problematic and here he also distorts the record by claiming that Roman economy didn't suffer much of a decline in the later 4th century or that the eastern armies asked for help from the west in 395 and 397 when in fact at 394 the "weak" eastern armies of Theodosius I defeated the western armies led by Arbogast at the battle of the Frigidus and in 397 Stilicho held not only the western but also much of the eastern field armies that were still in the West), besides the fact the eastern armies were very agressively active in the 420's both on the Persian frontier and in the West and were able to recover from the defeats made by Attila quite quickly, to the point Leo I could almost take the portion of the Empire he ruled to bankruptcy in an amphibious operation against the Vandals in 468. The eastern armies took some beatings against powerful foes lik Attila or the Vandals, but it was more due to bad leadership than really due to any inferiority of the eastern soldiers. By the way, as we are talking about armies, he should also have considered the probable numeric decline of the Roman army during the late 4th century and the fact the western provinces had their armies depleted as result of the conflict in 394 (I think there's surely a pattern between great raids on Gaul and civil wars ravaging the western armies, of which a good example are the raids of the 350's, precisely a few years after Mursa Major). I also agree with his argument on geography, yet I don't think that was enough: surely both the relative peace with Persia (although in the end related with geography as that peace was due to the Hephtalite threats on the Sassanians) and the actions of the eastern emperors after the death of Theodosius II in curbing the power of the barbarian "foederati" in the Balkans and the powerful generalissimos like Aspar were very important.
In the following chapters (V-VII) he discusses the existence and extent of decline in material culture in the Roman world. I loved his archaeological approach including perhaps ironically his arguments on pottery (given his assertions that people usually hate it), yet it has several issues. First of all, he doesn't approach the extent of decline or prosperity in the Roman world for the 3rd and the 4th centuries (besides making a few general assertions on the provinces and highlighting shortly North Africa as a prosperous region) and makes constant comparisons between the classical and post-Roman worlds without properly considering precisely those mentioned centuries by merging them with the classical period, which obviously distorts data a bit and makes the conclusions a bit more catastrophic. Then there's also the problem the archaeological examples are neither systematic (he basically switches provinces while analyzing different factors like the quantity of found pottery or coins while keeping some special cases like Britain or not explaining the Italian situation in the 6th-7th centuries properly) nor representative of the whole Roman world (where are Hispania or Gaul, for instance? He makes a few assertions and refers those regions once or often, but I don't remember a single mention to them in graphics or any real case example of the two regions besides a few points and, by the way, even in the African case he doesn't refer the prosperity of Africa until the mid 7th century (we know it was quite prosperous and a source of money for the government of Constantinople, besides being a relatively safe zone) and the Arab role in its disturbance. That means again that he's being quite selective on his data and is making deliberate distortions to make his case stronger. The last issue is that his view of economic complexity, despite all he mentions, isn't objective, as the following graphic shows. Which are its criteria? Which are the units on the 0y axis? How do we know if Perkins didn't use his creativity? I'm not saying there wasn't any kind of material decline, but these graphics have issues and surely don't match completely our available data. For someone who meant to be throughroughly objective, this is quite a flaw.
https://www.goodreads.com/photo/user/...
In the final chapter Ward-Perkins unleashes the axes he has to grind again (well, the polemicist tone is a bit throughout the book, but it's markedly clear in the first and last chapters) on the historiography of Late Antiquity, although he also acknowledges some positive parts of the "trasformation" school, rebukes some people like Massimo Manfredi for their simplist vision (Perkins has effectively a more nuanced version than at least some of his colleagues), debunks Goffard and some more rosy views of the period (always a good job) and alerts for the effect of politics in historiography (never beneficial, as my experience tells me). Yet he makes too many generalizations regarding the historians of Late Antiquity and their geographical origins (I think he forgets many of the best universities are in America or northwestern and central Europe, which adds a layer of complexity to his cultural subject as naturally "heterodox" theories tend to appear there; and even in southern Europe the "decline" theory isn't very marked outside of Italy, which has its own cultural and nationalistic problems) and I feel he ends up making straw man fallacies a bit like the creationists by targeting his attacks on Goffard (who doesn't need much debunking, to be honest) and Peter Brown (who worked mainly on a cultural level and made his work as a reaction to post-Gibbonian ideas on late antique culture) or in the cases where historiography was dictated by politics, not considering intermediate or moderate opposit positions.
Concluding, The Fall of Rome And the End of Civilization has a very positive archaeological approach, is well-written and had a great potential of launching further historical debate on the old issue of whether there was a fall or transformation of the Roman Empire in the West (I must remind that all these talks about the fall of Rome are a bit fluffy because nobody really saw the Empire falling in 476 or 480 and the eastern provinces of the Empire would remain with several territorial losses and reconquests until the 15th century and think the question should be rephrased), but Ward-Perkins ruined it all with his rants and his selective distortions of facts both in the primary sources and the archaeological data. By the way, as he wrote about the imposition of models, why does he want to impose the events of Britain or Italy in the late 6th, 7th and 8th centuries to the whole of the West?
March 30, 2013
A short, witty counter blast to the fashionable theories of peaceful continuity which dominate Late Antique and Early Medieval studies. Ward-Perkins argues strongly what seems obvious to most new students to the field - that the fall of the Roman Empire was a violent period, marked by widespread destruction and economic and material decline. This book is worth it for the chapters on "The Disappearance of Comfort" alone - they are superbly written without falling into the excessive detail or archaeological terminology which turn reading many accounts of this topic into a chore (I'm looking at you, Chris Wickham).
This book is quite fair minded and Ward-Perkins is genuinely appreciative of the new perspectives introduced by cultural, sociological and religious studies of the Late Antique period over the last few decades. He's basically just arguing that the pendulum has swung too far, and that these perspectives need to be placed in a more traditional framework of political narrative and economic and military history. Yes, there were continuities between the late Roman Empire and its successors, mostly due to political leaders who looked back to the Roman Empire to grant themselves legitimacy or the efforts of churchmen to keep Classical knowledge alive. But the Roman Empire was a period in which there was a single administrative state governing the entire Mediterranean, cheap mass produced goods and foods could be transported wide distances, and literacy was widespread enough for Phoebus, a perfume seller, to scribble that he had a 'good fuck' on the walls of a Pompeiian brothel. Jump forward several hundred years, and throughout Western Europe there are a large number of independent kingdoms constantly squabbling, most goods are locally made and of much poorer quality, and literacy is limited to a few clergy and elite secular officials. To simply brush this change away with talk of transformations and continuities won't quite do. There has been a major change here, and it needs explaining.
The sheer breadth of evidence that Ward-Perkins musters is quite breathtaking given how short this book is - my copy is 185 pages without notes and it can easily be knocked over in a couple of sittings. It's also quite a fun book to read - not many histories of this period quote Tarantino. I would stress however, that this is a work of analysis and an academic right hook - although perfectly accessible to the layman, it's best read with a more traditional narrative history in order to get the most out of it. I recommend Peter Heather's "The Fall of the Roman Empire". Those interested in the other side would do well to check out Peter Brown's "The World of Late Antiquity", which is always a pleasure to read and gives you a superb example of what 'continuity' theories can contribute at their best.
This book is quite fair minded and Ward-Perkins is genuinely appreciative of the new perspectives introduced by cultural, sociological and religious studies of the Late Antique period over the last few decades. He's basically just arguing that the pendulum has swung too far, and that these perspectives need to be placed in a more traditional framework of political narrative and economic and military history. Yes, there were continuities between the late Roman Empire and its successors, mostly due to political leaders who looked back to the Roman Empire to grant themselves legitimacy or the efforts of churchmen to keep Classical knowledge alive. But the Roman Empire was a period in which there was a single administrative state governing the entire Mediterranean, cheap mass produced goods and foods could be transported wide distances, and literacy was widespread enough for Phoebus, a perfume seller, to scribble that he had a 'good fuck' on the walls of a Pompeiian brothel. Jump forward several hundred years, and throughout Western Europe there are a large number of independent kingdoms constantly squabbling, most goods are locally made and of much poorer quality, and literacy is limited to a few clergy and elite secular officials. To simply brush this change away with talk of transformations and continuities won't quite do. There has been a major change here, and it needs explaining.
The sheer breadth of evidence that Ward-Perkins musters is quite breathtaking given how short this book is - my copy is 185 pages without notes and it can easily be knocked over in a couple of sittings. It's also quite a fun book to read - not many histories of this period quote Tarantino. I would stress however, that this is a work of analysis and an academic right hook - although perfectly accessible to the layman, it's best read with a more traditional narrative history in order to get the most out of it. I recommend Peter Heather's "The Fall of the Roman Empire". Those interested in the other side would do well to check out Peter Brown's "The World of Late Antiquity", which is always a pleasure to read and gives you a superb example of what 'continuity' theories can contribute at their best.
April 22, 2024
This was a great and well-written book by Ward-Perkins about the fall of the Roman Empire and its effects on its former territories. In this book, he argues against 'recent opinions of scholars' that the fall of Rome was not apocalyptic at all and that the invading barbarians mixed well with the locals in a relatively peaceful manner. Through the use of archaeology and the careful reading of the few sources from the period available to us, Ward-Perkins gives a very credible rebuttal to this previous idea.
He primarily looks at relatively 'boring' archaeological finds, such as the spread and sophistication of pottery shards, roof tiles and coins in the lands of the former empire. By doing this he looks at the effects of the fall of the empire on the lower and middle classes of society, and the results are telling. The fall of Rome hit some regions more drastically than others. In Britain for example, the economic sophistication, use of currency, population and literacy dropped to a bronze age level, which is insane. The average person in the Roman Empire lived better off than in the centuries directly after the fall, and they had access to more household items of better quality. The barbarian invasions of the empire - like all invasions - were very violent and destructive, and this not only shows in the archaeological record but also in the written sources.
While reading whole chunks of text about pottery fragments might not be the most exciting thing to do, I can still say that this book was very enjoyable and exciting thanks to Ward-Perkins' great and engaging style of writing, together with the finds and discoveries that I find very fascinating. I also thought it was very interesting how the discussions on the fall of Rome changed throughout history, such as directly after WW2, where the Germanic tribes were ruthless uncivilised barbarians, or how with the German recovery and integration of Europe, somehow the Germanic tribes were not so bad after all. Glad to have read this book by Ward-Perkins, who doesn't shy away from taking on frequently used arguments by others!
He primarily looks at relatively 'boring' archaeological finds, such as the spread and sophistication of pottery shards, roof tiles and coins in the lands of the former empire. By doing this he looks at the effects of the fall of the empire on the lower and middle classes of society, and the results are telling. The fall of Rome hit some regions more drastically than others. In Britain for example, the economic sophistication, use of currency, population and literacy dropped to a bronze age level, which is insane. The average person in the Roman Empire lived better off than in the centuries directly after the fall, and they had access to more household items of better quality. The barbarian invasions of the empire - like all invasions - were very violent and destructive, and this not only shows in the archaeological record but also in the written sources.
While reading whole chunks of text about pottery fragments might not be the most exciting thing to do, I can still say that this book was very enjoyable and exciting thanks to Ward-Perkins' great and engaging style of writing, together with the finds and discoveries that I find very fascinating. I also thought it was very interesting how the discussions on the fall of Rome changed throughout history, such as directly after WW2, where the Germanic tribes were ruthless uncivilised barbarians, or how with the German recovery and integration of Europe, somehow the Germanic tribes were not so bad after all. Glad to have read this book by Ward-Perkins, who doesn't shy away from taking on frequently used arguments by others!
March 18, 2010
Bryan Ward-Perkins published The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization in 2005. Countering the trend to minimize the effects of the barbarian invasions, initiated by Peter Brown, Ward-Perkins uses material evidence (archaeological, atmospheric, etc.) to support his claim that the fall of Rome was, indeed, a cataclysmic event that shattered the old world and initiated completely new forms of civilization for Europe. Those interested in economics will find his treatment of Rome’s specialized, sophisticated trade system chillingly applicable to the modern world of consumerism. Ward-Perkins shows what might happen when Adam Smith’s proverbial pin-makers find their world has grown too dangerous to operate long-distance trade.
June 24, 2023
The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilisation is an excellent refutation of the modern historical trend which denies the existence of the Dark Ages.
Ever since the 70s-80s some historians have been claiming that there was no real fall of Rome, they are using the term 'transformation' and presenting the barbarian invasions as peaceful migrations and settlements. While some of these migrations were indeed peaceful, many of these barbarians actually serving in the Roman army there is a mountain of evidence to show that there was indeed a civilisational collapse.
The author touches on several areas to prove his thesis:
- the level of economic activity dropped as evidenced by a decrease in the number of amphorae and other trade goods discovered during the period after the fall of Rome
- the sophistication of society also dropped as evidenced by the quality of the household goods. Pottery is a large part of the book and the author explains that there is a marked decrease in the sophistication and quality of pottery sherds found. It seems that pottery techniques were also forgotten after the fall of Rome.
- the number of inscriptions and writing overall had a huge decrease after the fall of Rome, in the next centuries fewer and fewer writings are found and it is believed in some places such as Britain writing was completely forgotten. By comparison during the Roman times even some lower class people could read and write.
- the size of cities and buildings decreased. New churches built in the centuries after the fall of Rome were small and dwarfed by their Roman counterparts. Roof tiles which were an important part of Roman city building almost disappeared due to the loss of the manufacturing centres.
- the quality of buildings and the building materials dropped. For example the windows became smaller and stained glass a lot simpler.
- even the size of the animals such as cattle experienced a marked drop. The author actually presents the different sizes of cow bones found which show that the cows became a lot smaller after the fall of Rome due to the loss of good quality grazing grounds and proper maintenance. The Romans invested a lot of time and effort in livestock growth which was simply no longer possible afterwards.
The effects of the fall of Rome were so serious that some areas actually reached a level of development lower than even prior to the period when Rome conquered them. It took several centuries to even reach pre-Roman levels of development as evidenced by archaeology and existing records.
This book was quite tedious in some parts due to the focus on archaeology, pottery and tiles. However, it is a welcome counter to the modern historical trends and well worth the read for anyone interested in late antiquity and early medieval period.
Ever since the 70s-80s some historians have been claiming that there was no real fall of Rome, they are using the term 'transformation' and presenting the barbarian invasions as peaceful migrations and settlements. While some of these migrations were indeed peaceful, many of these barbarians actually serving in the Roman army there is a mountain of evidence to show that there was indeed a civilisational collapse.
The author touches on several areas to prove his thesis:
- the level of economic activity dropped as evidenced by a decrease in the number of amphorae and other trade goods discovered during the period after the fall of Rome
- the sophistication of society also dropped as evidenced by the quality of the household goods. Pottery is a large part of the book and the author explains that there is a marked decrease in the sophistication and quality of pottery sherds found. It seems that pottery techniques were also forgotten after the fall of Rome.
- the number of inscriptions and writing overall had a huge decrease after the fall of Rome, in the next centuries fewer and fewer writings are found and it is believed in some places such as Britain writing was completely forgotten. By comparison during the Roman times even some lower class people could read and write.
- the size of cities and buildings decreased. New churches built in the centuries after the fall of Rome were small and dwarfed by their Roman counterparts. Roof tiles which were an important part of Roman city building almost disappeared due to the loss of the manufacturing centres.
- the quality of buildings and the building materials dropped. For example the windows became smaller and stained glass a lot simpler.
- even the size of the animals such as cattle experienced a marked drop. The author actually presents the different sizes of cow bones found which show that the cows became a lot smaller after the fall of Rome due to the loss of good quality grazing grounds and proper maintenance. The Romans invested a lot of time and effort in livestock growth which was simply no longer possible afterwards.
The effects of the fall of Rome were so serious that some areas actually reached a level of development lower than even prior to the period when Rome conquered them. It took several centuries to even reach pre-Roman levels of development as evidenced by archaeology and existing records.
This book was quite tedious in some parts due to the focus on archaeology, pottery and tiles. However, it is a welcome counter to the modern historical trends and well worth the read for anyone interested in late antiquity and early medieval period.
Read
September 25, 2015A work that has quickly become a standard, it uses archaeology to provocatively draw a harsh line between the Roman and post-Roman world. It also functions as an excellent introduction to archaeology and the Roman economy.
July 17, 2022
Σκοπός του βιβλίου δεν είναι η ανάλυση της πτώσης της Ρώμης, αλλά η κατάρριψη της ιδέας πως η πτώση δεν οφειλόταν στις εισβολές βαρβάρων. Βασιζόμενο σε πληθώρα πηγών, καταφέρενει άριστα τον σκοπό του.
June 7, 2021
06/06/2021 (*****)
Saggio molto godibile, scritto benissimo, e nel contempo molto onesto.
Consapevole del dibattito in corso negli anni di redazione del libro (2005-06), più ideologico che fattuale, Ward-Perkins cerca di dimostrare l'ovvio, ossia che l'epoca delle invasioni barbariche (o, più correttamente, delle grandi migrazioni), principale causa del collasso dello stato romano, fu un periodo catastrofico, di impensabile arretramento tecnologico e culturale.
A suffraggio della constatazione l'autore porta una serie di dati e testimonianze archeologiche e, dove presenti e accettabili dal punto di vista storiografico, letterarie. Dal tracollo della produzione e della distribuzione del vasellame (bene di fondamentale importanza in epoca romana) alla enorme rarefazione, fino alla quasi scomparsa, della circolazione monetaria, tutta la complessa e stratificata società romana collassò gradualmente verso uno stato di sostanziale caos e sottosviluppo. Questo passaggio, dalla complessità alla semplicità, avvenne in un paio di secoli caratterizzati da turbinii di guerre, saccheggi, invasioni e carestie, in cui la struttura economica e culturale romana arretrò a livelli (variabili, a seconda delle diverse zone del Mediterraneo centrale e occidentale) non dissimili da quelli di età preromana, con picchi di sottosviluppo impressionanti nelle aree più periferiche (in Britannia si persero sia l'uso della lingua scritta che tutta una serie di basilari tecnologie, fra cui l'arte delle costruzioni in pietra e il tornio per vasai).
Notevole è la chiusura, in cui l'autore cerca - con somma onestà - di capire i motivi ideologici alla base di quelle specifiche correnti accademiche che si sono, in quegli anni ma anche successivamente, poste l'obiettivo di dipingere la caduta della civiltà romana come un moderato pacifico e (addirittura) concordato passaggio di consegne fra popoli all'interno del medesimo orizzonte culturale. Cosa ovviamente falsa, dato che non ci nessun concordamento e che i popoli germanici ebbero la meglio con la forza su un Impero raffinato e complesso ma stremato a causa delle sue turbolenze interne e delle sue irrisolte tare strutturali, soprattutto in ambito di organizzazione economica.
Direi che non stupisce nessuno che questa impostazione, prettamente ideologica, si sia sviluppata nei think tank americani e abbia trovato terreno fertile anche in Europa (soprattutto in ambienti, putacaso, germanici e nordeuropei); molto meno attrattiva è risultata nell'Europa latina, e per una volta gli accademici italiani sembrano aver mantenuto una loro posizione più realista, suffragata soprattutto dai rilievi archeologici.
Questo nonostante l'Italia post-romana sia stata una delle zone occidentali in cui la civiltà subì gli arretramenti meno apocalittici: per tutto l'alto Medioevo il tessuto urbano italiano tenne sostanzialmente, anche se molto ritratto per dimensioni, qualità costruttiva, complessità e demografia. Tale situazione, unita alla favorevole posizione geografica al centro delle rotte commerciali, fu alla base del rilancio economico e culturale dell'anno Mille. Esiste ormai una importante branca di studi storici e archeologici inerenti l'Italia tardo antica e alto medievale, epoca prima negletta e schiacciata mortalmente fra i due poli culturali della nostra cultura (età romana e età bassomedievale), che ha decisamente reso lampante come i dati archeologici in nostro possesso dimostrano e suffragano in sostanza i resoconti letterari di cui disponiamo, pur con le necessarie mediazioni e interpretazioni su un periodo, quello dal V al VII secolo, in ogni caso da approfondire. Il fatto che sussistano sfaccettature diverse non significa però trasformare secoli di depressione e involuzione nell'esatto opposto.
La caduta della civiltà romana, di gran lunga la più complessa e strutturata dell'età antica (e tale rimasta almeno fino al Rinascimento), fu un processo relativamente lento, dovuto a varie cause e avvenuto in maniera violenta, che culminò nei tremendi secoli V e VI con un rovinoso collasso, che seppellì quasi del tutto un intero mondo di complessità, sapere, relazioni, azzerando commerci e riducendo in misura drastica la ricchezza nel bacino del Meditteraneo (con l'esclusione, importante, dell'Oriente, che ebbe la fortuna di non essere travolto dalle migrazioni barbariche e che sopravvisse e prosperò sotto uno stato unitario e forte).
Se da un lato il revisionismo e la messa in discussione di tesi prestabilite o di lunga durata sono parte di un meccanismo di discussione senz'altro utile e profittevole, sconcerta l'abuso che correnti ideologiche o politiche ne possono fare, arrivando a paradossali travisamenti o capovolgimenti di realtà fattuali e consolidate, basandosi sul nulla.
E' ormai una realtà di fatto del nostro mondo contemporaneo, esacerbata ulteriormente negli ultimi anni rispetto all'epoca in cui fu scritto il saggio, e gli esempi - mediatici - sono innumerevoli. Fa spavento, soprattutto in un'epoca di infodumping e superficialità di analisi come la nostra, in cui ogni teoria, anche la più bislacca, non fa fatica a passare.
Al netto di questo aspetto, in ogni caso fondamentale come l'autore stesso chiosa nell'ultimo capitolo, è un saggio curato, appassionante e ampiamente condivisibile. Non posso che consigliarlo.
Un'unica critica: i grafici sullo sviluppo della complessità economica per area, costruiti più sulle sensazioni che sui dati empirici (peraltro, impossibili da definire e ricostruire), non si possono vedere, anche se ne ammetto l'immediatezza a uso divulgativo.
Saggio molto godibile, scritto benissimo, e nel contempo molto onesto.
Consapevole del dibattito in corso negli anni di redazione del libro (2005-06), più ideologico che fattuale, Ward-Perkins cerca di dimostrare l'ovvio, ossia che l'epoca delle invasioni barbariche (o, più correttamente, delle grandi migrazioni), principale causa del collasso dello stato romano, fu un periodo catastrofico, di impensabile arretramento tecnologico e culturale.
A suffraggio della constatazione l'autore porta una serie di dati e testimonianze archeologiche e, dove presenti e accettabili dal punto di vista storiografico, letterarie. Dal tracollo della produzione e della distribuzione del vasellame (bene di fondamentale importanza in epoca romana) alla enorme rarefazione, fino alla quasi scomparsa, della circolazione monetaria, tutta la complessa e stratificata società romana collassò gradualmente verso uno stato di sostanziale caos e sottosviluppo. Questo passaggio, dalla complessità alla semplicità, avvenne in un paio di secoli caratterizzati da turbinii di guerre, saccheggi, invasioni e carestie, in cui la struttura economica e culturale romana arretrò a livelli (variabili, a seconda delle diverse zone del Mediterraneo centrale e occidentale) non dissimili da quelli di età preromana, con picchi di sottosviluppo impressionanti nelle aree più periferiche (in Britannia si persero sia l'uso della lingua scritta che tutta una serie di basilari tecnologie, fra cui l'arte delle costruzioni in pietra e il tornio per vasai).
Notevole è la chiusura, in cui l'autore cerca - con somma onestà - di capire i motivi ideologici alla base di quelle specifiche correnti accademiche che si sono, in quegli anni ma anche successivamente, poste l'obiettivo di dipingere la caduta della civiltà romana come un moderato pacifico e (addirittura) concordato passaggio di consegne fra popoli all'interno del medesimo orizzonte culturale. Cosa ovviamente falsa, dato che non ci nessun concordamento e che i popoli germanici ebbero la meglio con la forza su un Impero raffinato e complesso ma stremato a causa delle sue turbolenze interne e delle sue irrisolte tare strutturali, soprattutto in ambito di organizzazione economica.
Direi che non stupisce nessuno che questa impostazione, prettamente ideologica, si sia sviluppata nei think tank americani e abbia trovato terreno fertile anche in Europa (soprattutto in ambienti, putacaso, germanici e nordeuropei); molto meno attrattiva è risultata nell'Europa latina, e per una volta gli accademici italiani sembrano aver mantenuto una loro posizione più realista, suffragata soprattutto dai rilievi archeologici.
Questo nonostante l'Italia post-romana sia stata una delle zone occidentali in cui la civiltà subì gli arretramenti meno apocalittici: per tutto l'alto Medioevo il tessuto urbano italiano tenne sostanzialmente, anche se molto ritratto per dimensioni, qualità costruttiva, complessità e demografia. Tale situazione, unita alla favorevole posizione geografica al centro delle rotte commerciali, fu alla base del rilancio economico e culturale dell'anno Mille. Esiste ormai una importante branca di studi storici e archeologici inerenti l'Italia tardo antica e alto medievale, epoca prima negletta e schiacciata mortalmente fra i due poli culturali della nostra cultura (età romana e età bassomedievale), che ha decisamente reso lampante come i dati archeologici in nostro possesso dimostrano e suffragano in sostanza i resoconti letterari di cui disponiamo, pur con le necessarie mediazioni e interpretazioni su un periodo, quello dal V al VII secolo, in ogni caso da approfondire. Il fatto che sussistano sfaccettature diverse non significa però trasformare secoli di depressione e involuzione nell'esatto opposto.
La caduta della civiltà romana, di gran lunga la più complessa e strutturata dell'età antica (e tale rimasta almeno fino al Rinascimento), fu un processo relativamente lento, dovuto a varie cause e avvenuto in maniera violenta, che culminò nei tremendi secoli V e VI con un rovinoso collasso, che seppellì quasi del tutto un intero mondo di complessità, sapere, relazioni, azzerando commerci e riducendo in misura drastica la ricchezza nel bacino del Meditteraneo (con l'esclusione, importante, dell'Oriente, che ebbe la fortuna di non essere travolto dalle migrazioni barbariche e che sopravvisse e prosperò sotto uno stato unitario e forte).
Se da un lato il revisionismo e la messa in discussione di tesi prestabilite o di lunga durata sono parte di un meccanismo di discussione senz'altro utile e profittevole, sconcerta l'abuso che correnti ideologiche o politiche ne possono fare, arrivando a paradossali travisamenti o capovolgimenti di realtà fattuali e consolidate, basandosi sul nulla.
E' ormai una realtà di fatto del nostro mondo contemporaneo, esacerbata ulteriormente negli ultimi anni rispetto all'epoca in cui fu scritto il saggio, e gli esempi - mediatici - sono innumerevoli. Fa spavento, soprattutto in un'epoca di infodumping e superficialità di analisi come la nostra, in cui ogni teoria, anche la più bislacca, non fa fatica a passare.
Al netto di questo aspetto, in ogni caso fondamentale come l'autore stesso chiosa nell'ultimo capitolo, è un saggio curato, appassionante e ampiamente condivisibile. Non posso che consigliarlo.
Un'unica critica: i grafici sullo sviluppo della complessità economica per area, costruiti più sulle sensazioni che sui dati empirici (peraltro, impossibili da definire e ricostruire), non si possono vedere, anche se ne ammetto l'immediatezza a uso divulgativo.
February 3, 2018
Thoroughly enjoyable counterblast to the Peter Brown school of studies of late antiquity: Ward-Perkins argues forcefully that, in the Western Roman Empire, civilization, at least as represented by decent pottery, good food and tiled roofs that kept out the rain, really did end. As such, it provides a welcome corrective to the Brown school of civilizational continuity and transition. In the end, it seems clear that both views are correct: late antiquity was a time of both continuity and collapse, in part dependent on where in the Empire you lived, but this reminds us that, for the people living through this, things really had changed.
Speaking as a reader of history, I must also note how fortunate we are to have this dispute argued out between two such wonderfully fluent historians. Reading Bryan Ward-Perkins and Peter Brown is one of the great literary pleasures available today: long may they dispute!
Speaking as a reader of history, I must also note how fortunate we are to have this dispute argued out between two such wonderfully fluent historians. Reading Bryan Ward-Perkins and Peter Brown is one of the great literary pleasures available today: long may they dispute!
January 18, 2016
Although this book is fairly short, coming in at about 180 pages of reading material and a lot of meticulous footnotes, it packs a pretty serious impact for several related reasons in a subject that appears arcane on the surface but is surprisingly relevant when its implications are considered, as the author explicitly does. The book is a powerful effort in an argument that divides those students of history whose areas of interest include the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages. This book argues that the use of the term “Late Antiquity” has often been used to minimize or soft-pedal or ignore the real and serious declines in material conditions after the Western Roman Empire fell and power was taken by successor barbarian states. The author is nuanced and moderate in his discussions, comparing the Western Empire to the much longer lasting period of classical material culture in the Eastern Empire, until it too fell to the invasions and incursions of Slaves, Avars, Persians, and Arabs, in the seventh and eighth centuries, pointing out that the material culture of the Roman imperial age was greater than that in the following period, and that it is likely that a great deal of death along with a lot of losses in literacy and standard of living occurred when both the Western and Eastern Empires were subject to repeated invasions that disrupted the lives of the ordinary farmers and townspeople upon which the economic and demographic strength of the empire depended. This is a sound thesis and it is well defended.
In terms of its contents, this book contains eight chapters and an appendix and chronology. The first chapter asks the question of whether Rome fell, and answers, with a strong use of primary sources from the fifth century Roman world, strongly in the affirmative. The next three chapters look at the fall of Rome from the point of view of the very real horrors of rape, starvation, and dispossession, aside from death, that resulted from the wars between different factions of Romans with each other and between and among different Barbarian realms, the road to defeat that showed how Rome fell as a result of a set of interrelated factors that included economic decline, military impotency, and glaring failures of leadership, and also the difficult but possible accommodations that the Romans were able to make with their new barbarian masters. The second part of the book looks at the fall of civilization by examining the disappearance of comfort from a material perspective, looking at such issues as pottery, the size of beef cattle, the areas settled in various periods, and the distribution of coinage. The author then looks at reasons why these material aspects of Roman civilization, which were widespread far down into very modest peasant dwellings and remote towns in obscure parts of the empire, disappeared to such an extent that what would have been widespread items in the late Roman period would have been elite luxuries in the periods that followed. The author then examines what he means by civilization, reminding the reader that it is not a moral judgment but rather a judgment about the material complexity of society. The author then closes with a commentary on the useful ways that Late Antiquity frees us from too dim a view of the Middle Ages, but also comments that too many historians have used the label of Late Antiquity to deny the material aspects of human existence by focusing only on those areas of the past that are of interest in our given political or cultural worldview.
Although the specific debate this book is a part of is most of interest to historians, there are subjects of far wider relevance as well. Although the author is an openly avowed irreligious person, and even though his area of research is in material culture and not such moral and spiritual matters as decadence, this book is a helpful reminder that in bemoaning decadence and societal decline it may be too easy to overlook the benefits that even a corrupt civilization provides that less complex societies, without networks of trade and the ability for people to specialize, are lacking. In railing against the corruption of elites, it is easy to want to destroy a corrupt society, without realizing that it is ultimately the common people who suffer the most when civilizations fall [1], because even corrupt societies allow ordinary people the opportunity to be literate and creative, to specialize in areas of skill, and to achieve remarkable levels of freedom and well-being. Simple societies ruled over by uneducated thugs reduce those opportunities and those freedoms considerably. As the author states to close his book, “I also think there is a real danger for the present day in a vision of the past that explicitly sets out to eliminate all crisis and all decline. The end of the Roman West witnessed horrors and dislocation of a kind I sincerely hope never to have to live through; and it destroyed a complex civilization, throwing the inhabitants of the West back to a standard of living typical of prehistoric times. Romans before the fall were as certain as we are today that their world would continue forever substantially unchanged. They were wrong. We would be wise not to repeat their complacency (183).”
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
In terms of its contents, this book contains eight chapters and an appendix and chronology. The first chapter asks the question of whether Rome fell, and answers, with a strong use of primary sources from the fifth century Roman world, strongly in the affirmative. The next three chapters look at the fall of Rome from the point of view of the very real horrors of rape, starvation, and dispossession, aside from death, that resulted from the wars between different factions of Romans with each other and between and among different Barbarian realms, the road to defeat that showed how Rome fell as a result of a set of interrelated factors that included economic decline, military impotency, and glaring failures of leadership, and also the difficult but possible accommodations that the Romans were able to make with their new barbarian masters. The second part of the book looks at the fall of civilization by examining the disappearance of comfort from a material perspective, looking at such issues as pottery, the size of beef cattle, the areas settled in various periods, and the distribution of coinage. The author then looks at reasons why these material aspects of Roman civilization, which were widespread far down into very modest peasant dwellings and remote towns in obscure parts of the empire, disappeared to such an extent that what would have been widespread items in the late Roman period would have been elite luxuries in the periods that followed. The author then examines what he means by civilization, reminding the reader that it is not a moral judgment but rather a judgment about the material complexity of society. The author then closes with a commentary on the useful ways that Late Antiquity frees us from too dim a view of the Middle Ages, but also comments that too many historians have used the label of Late Antiquity to deny the material aspects of human existence by focusing only on those areas of the past that are of interest in our given political or cultural worldview.
Although the specific debate this book is a part of is most of interest to historians, there are subjects of far wider relevance as well. Although the author is an openly avowed irreligious person, and even though his area of research is in material culture and not such moral and spiritual matters as decadence, this book is a helpful reminder that in bemoaning decadence and societal decline it may be too easy to overlook the benefits that even a corrupt civilization provides that less complex societies, without networks of trade and the ability for people to specialize, are lacking. In railing against the corruption of elites, it is easy to want to destroy a corrupt society, without realizing that it is ultimately the common people who suffer the most when civilizations fall [1], because even corrupt societies allow ordinary people the opportunity to be literate and creative, to specialize in areas of skill, and to achieve remarkable levels of freedom and well-being. Simple societies ruled over by uneducated thugs reduce those opportunities and those freedoms considerably. As the author states to close his book, “I also think there is a real danger for the present day in a vision of the past that explicitly sets out to eliminate all crisis and all decline. The end of the Roman West witnessed horrors and dislocation of a kind I sincerely hope never to have to live through; and it destroyed a complex civilization, throwing the inhabitants of the West back to a standard of living typical of prehistoric times. Romans before the fall were as certain as we are today that their world would continue forever substantially unchanged. They were wrong. We would be wise not to repeat their complacency (183).”
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
January 25, 2017
Since the time of Peter Brown and the definition of the field of late antiquity, scholarship has increasingly painted a rosy picture of the late Roman world which gradually transformed into the early medieval world. While Ward-Perkins holds that this is largely true of the Roman east until the beginning of the seventh century, he challenges this notion for the west. On the basis of archaeological evidence, he argues instead that the end of the Roman world came rapidly and was far harsher in the west than recent scholarship has supposed and was largely on account of the failure of the Roman state to ensure security from the violence of the barbarians. When that security broke down, it became impossible for the Romans to defend their empire because they no longer received the necessary revenues from the provinces, and it all became a vicious cycle that prevented led to the end of ancient prosperity. In doing this, he looks at how people lived, and notes that durable housing seems to have come to an end in the west and was replaced with houses made of more perishable goods. Ward-Perkins also examines the decline in ancient pottery, and how it became increasingly coarse and increasingly local as Roman power disintegrated.
The book is divided into two sections roughly equal in size. The first is primarily designed for the popular audience who are no doubt reading this book because it introduces a basic history of the end of the Roman world and some of the major historical issues that surround it. It's good reading and a good introduction that sets the stage for the book quite nicely. The second part is where Ward-Perkins really begins his argumentation backed up with the archaeological data. As is necessary for books that deal quite heavily with archaeological source material, Ward-Perkins includes many useful images inserted right into the text. They are of good quality and the vast majority of them are very relevant and useful.
Nonetheless, there are a few curious things about this book. For example, it is a little odd that an historian who focused on archaeological source material at the end of antiquity would ignore that aspect entirely in his discussion of whether the barbarians were becoming more sophisticated. There is some evidence that Germanic cultures beyond the Danube were beginning to create high quality indigenous pottery and metalwork, yet Ward-Perkins says nothing about it. To see some of this evidence, take a look at Goths in the Fourth Century (Liverpool University Press - Translated Texts for Historians). Another problem, and one that runs throughout this entire book is that one might think that Gaul did not exist from purely reading this book. Ward-Perkins brings in a lot of Italian and British archaeological material. We know that Roman civilization came to a dramatic end in the fifth century in Britain, and we also know that Italy was devastated and depopulated during the sixth century wars between Justinian and the Ostrogoths. If we are to look at the end of the entire Roman west, then we need to look at the entire west. Instead, the majority of the evidence comes from Italy and Britain alone, and the fact that Gaul and Hispania are a bit neglected make me wonder whether Ward-Perkins is being selective with his evidence.
This book is a fascinating and easy read on the end of the Roman Empire in the west, and an important enough challenge to scholarship that it can appeal to both scholars and laypeople. It may not be telling the entire story, and while the story it is telling is well worth listening to, Ward-Perkins' selective use of evidence makes me seriously question the validity of this book.
The book is divided into two sections roughly equal in size. The first is primarily designed for the popular audience who are no doubt reading this book because it introduces a basic history of the end of the Roman world and some of the major historical issues that surround it. It's good reading and a good introduction that sets the stage for the book quite nicely. The second part is where Ward-Perkins really begins his argumentation backed up with the archaeological data. As is necessary for books that deal quite heavily with archaeological source material, Ward-Perkins includes many useful images inserted right into the text. They are of good quality and the vast majority of them are very relevant and useful.
Nonetheless, there are a few curious things about this book. For example, it is a little odd that an historian who focused on archaeological source material at the end of antiquity would ignore that aspect entirely in his discussion of whether the barbarians were becoming more sophisticated. There is some evidence that Germanic cultures beyond the Danube were beginning to create high quality indigenous pottery and metalwork, yet Ward-Perkins says nothing about it. To see some of this evidence, take a look at Goths in the Fourth Century (Liverpool University Press - Translated Texts for Historians). Another problem, and one that runs throughout this entire book is that one might think that Gaul did not exist from purely reading this book. Ward-Perkins brings in a lot of Italian and British archaeological material. We know that Roman civilization came to a dramatic end in the fifth century in Britain, and we also know that Italy was devastated and depopulated during the sixth century wars between Justinian and the Ostrogoths. If we are to look at the end of the entire Roman west, then we need to look at the entire west. Instead, the majority of the evidence comes from Italy and Britain alone, and the fact that Gaul and Hispania are a bit neglected make me wonder whether Ward-Perkins is being selective with his evidence.
This book is a fascinating and easy read on the end of the Roman Empire in the west, and an important enough challenge to scholarship that it can appeal to both scholars and laypeople. It may not be telling the entire story, and while the story it is telling is well worth listening to, Ward-Perkins' selective use of evidence makes me seriously question the validity of this book.
February 9, 2020
"Yes, Roman civilization collapsed and it was not nice to live through it" - this can be said to be the main message of the book. Meticulously based on fact (pottery shards, written records[including graffiti], occurence of roof tiles etc) the author proves chapter after chapter that the collapse of the Roman empire, although slow when comparing changes in different regions [early in Britain, late in Italy], most definitely reduced the quality of life or ordinary people. The barbarian invaders really did invade and their infusion into roman lands was rarely peaceful.
The book is a response to a trend I did not know existed - the rise of "late antiquity" in the study of history which is an umbrella term for research into the early middle ages but with a positive spin (some of it justified, some not). I came away as a strong supporter of the position of Bryan Ward-Perkins not only because of his position in the main question of the book - did Rome collapse or was it replaced peacefully by a new set of cultures but rather by two other things: a) he based his arguments on lots of strong evidence (and some of the kind I did not even think to consider), b) he is here in some ways an economic historian (a rare profession a possess a fondness of) and tries very hard to give a picture of how ordinary people lived through the changes.
I would reccomend this book to all who have an interest in a) Roman history and/or b) the collapse of complex civilizations.
The book is a response to a trend I did not know existed - the rise of "late antiquity" in the study of history which is an umbrella term for research into the early middle ages but with a positive spin (some of it justified, some not). I came away as a strong supporter of the position of Bryan Ward-Perkins not only because of his position in the main question of the book - did Rome collapse or was it replaced peacefully by a new set of cultures but rather by two other things: a) he based his arguments on lots of strong evidence (and some of the kind I did not even think to consider), b) he is here in some ways an economic historian (a rare profession a possess a fondness of) and tries very hard to give a picture of how ordinary people lived through the changes.
I would reccomend this book to all who have an interest in a) Roman history and/or b) the collapse of complex civilizations.
June 23, 2013
A quick read which puts forth the rather old and unfortunately unfashionable idea that the Roman era did not just transition without tumult into Late Antiquity. Ward-Perkins convincingly argues that while the Germanic invasions were not the cataclysmic struggle with barbarians that scholarship prior to the middle of the twentieth century suggests they were, the archaeological evidence nevertheless demonstrates a marked decline in living standards across all social classes as the highly specialized and sophisticated Roman economy collapsed (and thus the population and population's literacy), and plunged Europe into a standard of living not seen since prehistoric times.
April 1, 2020
An exception analysis of the exceptional reasons - merely hypothesis - of the fall of the greatest civilization the world has ever seen. Comprehensible and well supported by stout facts. A must read for any roman empire enthusiast.
April 26, 2024
"La fine dell'Occidente romano vide orrori e disordini quali io spero sinceramente di non dover mai sperimentare, oltre a distruggere una complessa civiltà, facendo retrocedere gli abitanti dell'Occidente a un livello di vita tipico della preistoria. Prima della caduta di Roma, i Romani erano sicuri quanto lo siamo noi oggi che il loro mondo sarebbe continuato per sempre senza sostanziali mutamenti. Si sbagliavano. Noi saremmo saggi a non imitare la loro sicumera."
March 25, 2020
This was written mainly as a response to Peter brown’s The World Of Late Antiquity. It’s a very interesting read and quite detailed with archeological evidence for his claims. He uses ox sizes and pottery to describe the decline in living standards in late western Rome. The sources he quotes are very useful to establish his claims. One drawback is the fact that it’s quite short for its aim. Overall, good read.
January 6, 2022
El autor mantiene que la caida del Imperio romano se debió fundamentalmente a la caida de su complejo sistema económico, propio de un mundo «globalizado» en el que la metropolis ejercia de motor económico que a su vez era fuente de bienestar social y económico en su radio de influencias. Fruto de este progreso se generó la especializacion laboral, tanto agrícola como industrial, lo que hacía aún más eficientes los procesos y más asequibles los productos. No obstante, las continuas incursiones barbaras consiguieron enfriar el sistema, menos beneficios, menos impuestos, menos seguridad, y vuelta al modelo de producción local, no especializado, de comercio de cercanías y precios mas elevados para los consumidores.
No sé si es solo a mi al que se le estan ocurriendo algunas ideas que nos hacen reforzar algunas conclusiones que ilustran experiencias mas cercanas a nuestros días.
No sé si es solo a mi al que se le estan ocurriendo algunas ideas que nos hacen reforzar algunas conclusiones que ilustran experiencias mas cercanas a nuestros días.
February 9, 2023
boohoo the Roman Empire fell who cares
July 28, 2014
À queda de Roma, seguiu-se a Idade Média (em inglês, Dark Age). O autor augumenta e explicita porque a queda de Roma foi o maior retrocesso civilizacional de que há memória (a rede de estradas do império perdeu-se, o navegação no mediterrâneo decaiu, e com ela o comércio internacional e a aceitação de moeda cunhada, o sistema legal fraccionou-se e desapareceu, etc., etc., etc., etc.)
January 28, 2018
Libro che ho trovato divertente e interessante, oltre al fatto che, da profano, condivido la sua visione "classica" sugli effetti delle invasioni barbariche. Molto istruttiva anche la parte finale nella quale dibatte il perché negli ultimi decenni sia comparsa una storiografia molto più "dolce" nei confronti degli invasori.
February 10, 2020
If only all good arguments could be so convincing in so concise a form.
A year later and without even rereading it I think about this book almost every single day, because it covinced me of such a flaw in the revisionism of medieval history, despite it being one that should come as a natural anathema to my politics.
A year later and without even rereading it I think about this book almost every single day, because it covinced me of such a flaw in the revisionism of medieval history, despite it being one that should come as a natural anathema to my politics.
January 21, 2018
Grim, Thoughtful, Wonderful
A fascinating breakdown on how the Western Roman Empire fell, Ward-Perkins points to a number of sources and archaeological evidence to prove that the Western Roman Empire did collapse and what it was like to live through the resultant changes.
A fascinating breakdown on how the Western Roman Empire fell, Ward-Perkins points to a number of sources and archaeological evidence to prove that the Western Roman Empire did collapse and what it was like to live through the resultant changes.
December 18, 2014
Bello.
Troppo ripetitivo: fosse stato più snello sarebbe stato perfetto
Troppo ripetitivo: fosse stato più snello sarebbe stato perfetto
Displaying 1 - 30 of 189 reviews