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The Origins of the Second World War
One of the most popular and controversial historians of the twentieth century, who made his subject accessible to millions, A.J.P. Taylor caused a storm of outrage with this scandalous bestseller. Debunking what were accepted truths about the Second World War, he argued provocatively that Hitler did not set out to cause the war as part of an evil master plan, but blundered into it partly by accident, aided by the shortcomings of others. Fiercely attacked for vindicating Hitler, A.J.P. Taylor's stringent re-examination of the events preceding the Nazi invasion of Poland on 1st September 1939 opened up new debate, and is now recognized as a brilliant and classic piece of scholarly research. 'Highly original and penetrating...No one who has digested this enthralling work will ever be able to look at the period again in quite the same way'
324 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1961
About the author
A.J.P. Taylor
108 books149 followersAlan John Percivale Taylor was an English historian of the 20th century and renowned academic who became well known to millions through his popular television lectures.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 137 reviews
February 10, 2009
There is much to commend in A.J.P. Taylor’s provocative revisionist study of the origins of the Second World War. The book is rich in argument and strong in analysis, but above all the theme that stands out is Taylor’s portrayal of Hitler as an ordinary German who achieved his objectives through patience – by letting the failures of others become his successes. This is a controversial argument for good reason: if Hitler was an ordinary German, what does that say about average Germans and their culpability in the atrocities of war? Subsequent history demonstrated that in fact Taylor was wrong in this respect. The German nation went on to become one of the bastions of democracy, peace, and stability in Europe and indeed the world. Yet in another respect perhaps Taylor was right. For him, Hitler was not an evil madman with a grand plan for global warfare, but rather an opportunist, albeit one who may have been particularly vulnerable to being swept up by the force of events. In this sense perhaps the later peace and stability achieved by Germany was the logical outcome for a nation that was not evil but vengeful, and which had no grand plan for destruction but rather a belief – affirmed around the world at the time – that the Treaty of Versailles was a moral injustice whose wrongs must be righted.
These academic matters, of course, should not obscure the simpler reality of the Second World War. There is no question that Hitler was evil and calculating to an extent perhaps unparalleled in the history of humankind. There is equally no question that Germany – however “good” it seems in retrospect – realized during the Second World War the worst excesses of its capacity for evil. These are the weaknesses of Taylor’s account: that he understated the wrongs of the Nazis simply because their evil was not abundantly clear (or present in the documents) at the time of the Third Reich; that he whitewashed Hitler in many ways; and most of all that he shifts the blame for the atrocities of the Second World War to the bumbling diplomacy of the Allies as if they were somehow supposed to realize the extent of the evil they faced in Hitler and the Nazi state. Much of Taylor’s account may be true – and this is its enduring strength – but one should recognize that it is neither “the whole truth” nor “nothing but the truth.”
These academic matters, of course, should not obscure the simpler reality of the Second World War. There is no question that Hitler was evil and calculating to an extent perhaps unparalleled in the history of humankind. There is equally no question that Germany – however “good” it seems in retrospect – realized during the Second World War the worst excesses of its capacity for evil. These are the weaknesses of Taylor’s account: that he understated the wrongs of the Nazis simply because their evil was not abundantly clear (or present in the documents) at the time of the Third Reich; that he whitewashed Hitler in many ways; and most of all that he shifts the blame for the atrocities of the Second World War to the bumbling diplomacy of the Allies as if they were somehow supposed to realize the extent of the evil they faced in Hitler and the Nazi state. Much of Taylor’s account may be true – and this is its enduring strength – but one should recognize that it is neither “the whole truth” nor “nothing but the truth.”
June 20, 2011
Now I know what all of the fuss was about. This is less of a history lesson and more of a hand grenade tossed into the street of public opinion. Taylor liked to make pithy comments and outrageous claims; and his book set the course of writing about the origins of WWII for decades. To his credit, in 1961 the received opinion was that Hitler had a plan, kept to the schedule, and that Germany alone was guilty. The correction that Taylor made was that the inept leadership of the United Kingdom and France made matters worse, and had to accept some of the blame for the coming of the war. What I don't accept is Taylor's contention that Hitler was a statesman in the traditional mode; and a crafty patient man who awaited events and let things fall into his lap. I've read enough to believe that Hitler was an ideologue with a peculiar set of beliefs, and that he would make his decisions based on them. He also was a gambler whose luck eventually ran out.
February 28, 2017
In this book Taylor argues that Hitler's foreign policy goals were like any other contemporary German statesman's and that World War II was just as much the fault of the allies as the Germans due to their flawed diplomacy. I think Taylor is totally wrong about Hitler, but this is a well written account and the author is on much firmer ground when discussing the general European situation after WWI and the negotiations between the Allies before 1939. Taylor's notion is that Hitler never meant what he said about going to war or making threats and was essentially a successful opportunist who believed that his opponents would always cave in to his demands at the last second. This argument makes some sense when Hitler was dealing with other statesmen, but it completely falls apart (in my opinion) when you look at the internal situation with his own ministers and generals who took his war plans very seriously. The most famous of these war planning sessions was probably one in 1937 where Hitler stated he would be ready to fight a war with Britain and France by 1943 (see the Hossbach Memorandum). Taylor tries to explain this meeting away by suggesting that Hitler was lying to his own ministers as well as other statesmen, and the deception was all meant to get them on-board with his domestic policies such as further re-armament. Despite his statements to the contrary, Hitler never wanted a war with Britain and France. He may have wanted a war in eastern Europe to get territory and eventually a war with the Soviet Union, but Taylor thinks even here Hitler might have accepted other concessions. All of this is interesting, but we essentially have to believe that Taylor has insight into Hitler's mind that is contrary to the written record to accept this argument. The author puts an emphasis on certain written sources like Mein Kampf where Hitler argues that Germany needs territory in eastern Europe, and dismisses other sources like the Hossbach memorandum where he contemplates a war with Britain and France.
Another problem with Taylor's views is that Hitler clearly planned for a war with the west from almost the beginning of his regime. He tried to make Germany as self-sufficient as possible by increasing production of Synthetic Oil and increasing output in the Agricultural sector. This really only makes sense if he thought Germany would be cut off by another British blockade in the future like it had been during WWI. Hitler also constructed fortifications on the french border, informed his ministers and generals that he was willing to fight Britain and France over the Czech crisis in 1938, and repeatedly told his allies the Italians that they would fight the western powers together and dominate Europe. Taylor thinks this was all deception or misdirection on Hitler's part, but I think it demonstrates that Hitler saw a war with the western powers as a strong possibility, whether he wanted it or not. My own view is that Hitler was always willing to accept a war with the western powers if they decided to oppose his territorial revisionism and was not terribly concerned about avoiding conflict with them in the long run. Taylor gets far too close to "normalizing" Hitler when he states that his goals were like any other German statesman of the time. For me, it is ludicrous to suggest that leaders like Stresemann, Schliecher, Papen, or Brüning would have risked a World War to resolve Germany's territorial claims in eastern Europe. It is well known that even Stresemann wanted to see Poland destroyed, but it took a special sort of hubris to accept a World War in exchange for this.
Another problem with Taylor's views is that Hitler clearly planned for a war with the west from almost the beginning of his regime. He tried to make Germany as self-sufficient as possible by increasing production of Synthetic Oil and increasing output in the Agricultural sector. This really only makes sense if he thought Germany would be cut off by another British blockade in the future like it had been during WWI. Hitler also constructed fortifications on the french border, informed his ministers and generals that he was willing to fight Britain and France over the Czech crisis in 1938, and repeatedly told his allies the Italians that they would fight the western powers together and dominate Europe. Taylor thinks this was all deception or misdirection on Hitler's part, but I think it demonstrates that Hitler saw a war with the western powers as a strong possibility, whether he wanted it or not. My own view is that Hitler was always willing to accept a war with the western powers if they decided to oppose his territorial revisionism and was not terribly concerned about avoiding conflict with them in the long run. Taylor gets far too close to "normalizing" Hitler when he states that his goals were like any other German statesman of the time. For me, it is ludicrous to suggest that leaders like Stresemann, Schliecher, Papen, or Brüning would have risked a World War to resolve Germany's territorial claims in eastern Europe. It is well known that even Stresemann wanted to see Poland destroyed, but it took a special sort of hubris to accept a World War in exchange for this.
September 2, 2021
Although at times the complex postwar international relations is difficult to keep track of, Taylor's tracking and analysis of events is expertly written. Although published just 22 years after the outbreak of war, it seems incredibly ahead of its time; most of his important observations are not widely recognised or taught today. Most criticism has been directed at Taylor's supposed vindication of Hitler, yet this is unfounded. Taylor's point that Hitler's desire to redraw the borders and regain territory lost at Versailles was reasonable is certainly valid; this does not condone Hitler's outright willingness to gamble on general war, nor does it make him rational, a point which is emphasised in the book. The book's merit also lies heavily in its analysis and criticism of (most importantly) British and French policy during the interwar years. Commonly, education of this period focuses on German actions and Hitler's fanaticism- that the two wars are not taught as intimately linked, and the actions of other states not properly examined in the same way is clearly a serious failure. This book, however is a masterclass in even-handed revisionism.
July 17, 2023
2.5 stars [History]
(W: 3; U: 2.75; T: 2.17)
Exact rating: 2.64
In this book, Taylor detailed the lead-up to the Second World War. He claimed he was just doing history and that no one knew how WWII could be avoided. However, he contended that Hitler didn't really want a larger war, and that poor diplomacy led to it. Taylor is, as is now well-known, correct about the first claim: Hitler's lack of concrete planning, as well as his surprise at getting himself into a war with Britain, demonstrated this. But Taylor displayed naivete indeed concerning Hitler's proclamations, as if the man weren't a pathological liar. He was. Therefore, much of the book suffered from a "plausible or mild bias or ignorance," my descriptor for 2 stars in the Truth category. A scant dusting of uncommon facts upped it to 2.17.
Of minor note, Taylor was also:
1) wrong about the Soviet threat
2) wrong about every snippet of economics he tried to comment upon (and no wonder, if he thinks John Maynard Keynes "enlightened" instead of the father of a irreconcilably stupid economic school of thought)
3) constantly said "there is no way to know" this or that fact, when modern works have answered these questions. Taylor's book was published in 1962.
(W: 3; U: 2.75; T: 2.17)
Exact rating: 2.64
In this book, Taylor detailed the lead-up to the Second World War. He claimed he was just doing history and that no one knew how WWII could be avoided. However, he contended that Hitler didn't really want a larger war, and that poor diplomacy led to it. Taylor is, as is now well-known, correct about the first claim: Hitler's lack of concrete planning, as well as his surprise at getting himself into a war with Britain, demonstrated this. But Taylor displayed naivete indeed concerning Hitler's proclamations, as if the man weren't a pathological liar. He was. Therefore, much of the book suffered from a "plausible or mild bias or ignorance," my descriptor for 2 stars in the Truth category. A scant dusting of uncommon facts upped it to 2.17.
Of minor note, Taylor was also:
1) wrong about the Soviet threat
2) wrong about every snippet of economics he tried to comment upon (and no wonder, if he thinks John Maynard Keynes "enlightened" instead of the father of a irreconcilably stupid economic school of thought)
3) constantly said "there is no way to know" this or that fact, when modern works have answered these questions. Taylor's book was published in 1962.
November 26, 2015
A.J.P. Taylor’s publication of The Origins of the Second World War provoked controversy on its release in 1961 and gained Taylor a reputation as a revisionist. Taylor’s popularity as a broadcaster brought him into legendary television debates with the likes of Hugh Trevor-Roper and many other historians, this subject being one of the more heated arguments. General sentiment scolded Taylor for not putting enough blame on Hitler, a leader with no plan for starting the war, demonstrating no lust for global domination and expansion as a man reacting to the reparations of the Treaty of Versailles with anger and a determination to fix injustice. The injustice he mostly blames on France’s fear for security, leading to deep resentment within every German community. He equates Hitler’s anti-Semitic views with the average German of the time and blames the war on diplomatic blunders. Taylor’s prose, logical and concise, creates a masterpiece but a controversial masterpiece that continues to require a mind open enough to reinterpret history.
September 1, 2022
Well, he plays devil's advocate, but maybe that's a useful device. Maybe for historians, understanding people is more important than deciding who was right. Could be better than assuming the ones we understand best must be the right ones.
March 8, 2024
"This is a story without heroes; and perhaps even without villains..."
Unfortunately, The Origins of the Second World War just did not meet my expectations. I found the writing to be too tedious and long-winded, and noticed my attention wandering numerous times. I eventually became frustrated and decided to put it down ~ halfway through - something I rarely do.
In an effort to combat my perfectionism, and desire to finish things I have started no matter what, I have decided to put down more books that I don't like and move on to greener pastures...
Author Alan John Percivale Taylor was a British historian who specialized in 19th- and 20th-century European diplomacy. Both a journalist and a broadcaster, he became well-known to millions through his television lectures.
A.J.P. Taylor:
Taylor drops the quote at the start of this review early on in the book, and further clarifies:
Unfortunately, as mentioned briefly above, I was just not a fan of the overall presentation of this one. In a way, it is somewhat sadly stereotypical British prose: dry, long-winded factual recitals that thoroughly bore the reader to tears and leave their attention wandering. Now, fault me if you will for my finicky attention, but I really don't like trudging through books written this way. I like my books lively and interesting. My reviews are always heavily weighted towards these criteria. You can compile the broadest data possible on a subject, but if you can't effectively communicate it to your readers, then it is all for naught, IMHO....
********************
I recently decided to not waste my time finishing books I don't like anymore. And this is a very long book. The audio I have clocked in at just shy of 12 hours. I was not prepared to spend any more time on it.
1 star, and off to the return bin.
Unfortunately, The Origins of the Second World War just did not meet my expectations. I found the writing to be too tedious and long-winded, and noticed my attention wandering numerous times. I eventually became frustrated and decided to put it down ~ halfway through - something I rarely do.
In an effort to combat my perfectionism, and desire to finish things I have started no matter what, I have decided to put down more books that I don't like and move on to greener pastures...
Author Alan John Percivale Taylor was a British historian who specialized in 19th- and 20th-century European diplomacy. Both a journalist and a broadcaster, he became well-known to millions through his television lectures.
A.J.P. Taylor:
Taylor drops the quote at the start of this review early on in the book, and further clarifies:
"I am concerned to understand what happened, not to vindicate or to condemn. I was an anti-appeaser from the day that Hitler came to power; and no doubt should be again under similar circumstances. But the point has no relevance in the writing of history. In retrospect, though many were guilty, none was innocent. The purpose of political activity is to provide peace and prosperity; and in this every statesman failed, for whatever reason..."
Unfortunately, as mentioned briefly above, I was just not a fan of the overall presentation of this one. In a way, it is somewhat sadly stereotypical British prose: dry, long-winded factual recitals that thoroughly bore the reader to tears and leave their attention wandering. Now, fault me if you will for my finicky attention, but I really don't like trudging through books written this way. I like my books lively and interesting. My reviews are always heavily weighted towards these criteria. You can compile the broadest data possible on a subject, but if you can't effectively communicate it to your readers, then it is all for naught, IMHO....
********************
I recently decided to not waste my time finishing books I don't like anymore. And this is a very long book. The audio I have clocked in at just shy of 12 hours. I was not prepared to spend any more time on it.
1 star, and off to the return bin.
July 4, 2020
A for the most part pretty engaging and readable account of how the Second World War broke out, although it does get a bit "one damn fact after another" in the later chapters. I don't know how much I should trust it, given that there was so much controversy about it and it was published only 20 years after these events, so I'm just registering it as one particular narrative which could be given.
That said, I didn't find anything in it particulary shocking or revelatory from a modern perspective. It seems the main source of controversy, at the time of publication, was the idea that Hitler was a reasonably normal leader, in terms of foreign policy at least (Taylor does acknowledge that his brutal approach to domestic politics and his antisemitism were more dependent on Hitler's character). But my impression (which might be wrong, as I'm not overly familiar with trends in academic history) is that the general tendency in the decades since the war has to been to deemphasize the "anomalousness" of the Nazi period, and Taylor's thesis seems to be in line with that trend.
Much of the controversy may have been to do with the fact that Taylor's narrative is completely un-moralistic. He tries to see things from the point of view of the leaders and their own interests. So he doesn't make a big deal about the way in which Germany ruthlessly sought to further its foreign interests whenever possible, because as far as he's concerned, that's just what powerful states do ("Powers will be Powers", to use his words.) And he doesn't make out Britain, France or anyone else to be altruistic, either. The narrative is a dispassionate one in the same vein as you might read in a book about the 18th or 19th century, where it's taken as a given that states just naturally act on their own self-interest and don't have much qualms about throwing about their military power when they can.
He is also not much of a believer in competence, or of the ability of political actors to carry out long-term plans. The statesmen in the narrative are portrayed as simply acting reactively to events, and often messing things up. This extends to Hitler: in Taylor's portrayal he was not a nihilist seeking destruction for its own sake, nor was the war instigated as part of a coherent plan to set up some sort of great empire in Eastern Europe. He was simply a ruthless opportunist with good instincts who wanted to restore Germany's status as a "great power", but would have preferred to do it by bluffing rather than actually having to fight the war. Britain and France were willing to give in to a considerable extent, but eventually, they couldn't go any further without making a mockery of their own status as "great powers"; and so they called Hitler's bluff and war broke out.
That said, I didn't find anything in it particulary shocking or revelatory from a modern perspective. It seems the main source of controversy, at the time of publication, was the idea that Hitler was a reasonably normal leader, in terms of foreign policy at least (Taylor does acknowledge that his brutal approach to domestic politics and his antisemitism were more dependent on Hitler's character). But my impression (which might be wrong, as I'm not overly familiar with trends in academic history) is that the general tendency in the decades since the war has to been to deemphasize the "anomalousness" of the Nazi period, and Taylor's thesis seems to be in line with that trend.
Much of the controversy may have been to do with the fact that Taylor's narrative is completely un-moralistic. He tries to see things from the point of view of the leaders and their own interests. So he doesn't make a big deal about the way in which Germany ruthlessly sought to further its foreign interests whenever possible, because as far as he's concerned, that's just what powerful states do ("Powers will be Powers", to use his words.) And he doesn't make out Britain, France or anyone else to be altruistic, either. The narrative is a dispassionate one in the same vein as you might read in a book about the 18th or 19th century, where it's taken as a given that states just naturally act on their own self-interest and don't have much qualms about throwing about their military power when they can.
He is also not much of a believer in competence, or of the ability of political actors to carry out long-term plans. The statesmen in the narrative are portrayed as simply acting reactively to events, and often messing things up. This extends to Hitler: in Taylor's portrayal he was not a nihilist seeking destruction for its own sake, nor was the war instigated as part of a coherent plan to set up some sort of great empire in Eastern Europe. He was simply a ruthless opportunist with good instincts who wanted to restore Germany's status as a "great power", but would have preferred to do it by bluffing rather than actually having to fight the war. Britain and France were willing to give in to a considerable extent, but eventually, they couldn't go any further without making a mockery of their own status as "great powers"; and so they called Hitler's bluff and war broke out.
August 16, 2022
А. J. P. Taylor има неповторим стил на писане и за мен е загадка как все още не е преведен на български. Тази книга и шедьовърът му "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918" са вечни класики в жанра дипломатическа история на XIX и XX век. Днес четем с интерес това, което Тейлър ни казва за причините и пътят към войната за "Данциг" (която ще се превърне едва по-късно в "световна"война) с интерес и така да се каже open mind. В годините, когато излиза тази книга обаче (60-те), тезите, заложени в нея, са били третирани като краен ревизионизъм и дори се стига дотам авторът да бъде дамгосван като адвокат на нацизма. Историята обаче, както дебело подчертава Тейлър, не ни дава прости истини. Не Хитлер, сам и по своя воля, започва война с Франция и Англия, която по-късно се разраства вълнообразно и обхваща почти целия свят. Да, той, със своите ексцентричност и хазартно поведение, допринася много, но в никакъв случай не би бил способен самостоятелно да движи колелата на международната политика. На тяхното движение влияят още много други сили, които в крайна сметка се оказват не по-малко "отговорни" за Втората световна война.
November 27, 2021
There’s so much related to WWI & WWII that I don’t know. This book helped fill in some of the gap that is the in-between years, specifically what led to WWII. He points out the connection between the 2 wars & seems to argue that, though Hitler was terrible, there were many bad decisions that contributed to WWII, especially those made by Britain & France.
September 2, 2022
"I was a victim of a series of accidents, as are we all."
- Kurt Vonnegut, The Sirens of Titan
Be it fiction or real life, witnesses of our past and observers of our present would testify that the allure of mythology has always bordered on being irresistible. That the ruthless sun makes the puny planets dance appeals both to logic and thrill. Mythology simplifies, ascribes, and thus elucidates.
But some of us choose to study the mechanics of the universe and try to understand forces that are the true puppet masters - without undermining the sun. When you acknowledge that even the sun has its limitations, even the moon has a role to play and that sometimes there are meteors burning and crashing without provocation, you are bound to accept that sometimes the greatest of human tragedies have more to them than what our limited cognition allows to burden itself with.
- Kurt Vonnegut, The Sirens of Titan
Be it fiction or real life, witnesses of our past and observers of our present would testify that the allure of mythology has always bordered on being irresistible. That the ruthless sun makes the puny planets dance appeals both to logic and thrill. Mythology simplifies, ascribes, and thus elucidates.
But some of us choose to study the mechanics of the universe and try to understand forces that are the true puppet masters - without undermining the sun. When you acknowledge that even the sun has its limitations, even the moon has a role to play and that sometimes there are meteors burning and crashing without provocation, you are bound to accept that sometimes the greatest of human tragedies have more to them than what our limited cognition allows to burden itself with.
June 28, 2021
'The Origins of the Second World War', written in 1961, opens with a meditation on how it had only just become possible to say that WW2 was something belonging to 'history'. Roosevelt, Chamberlain, Stalin and Mussolini were all dead, and university lecturers were teaching the war to students who were born after it had begun, and who could not remember its end. AJP Taylor extracts from this the opportunity to properly address the causes of the war, without personal investment warping his analysis nor preventing an objective allocation of blame.
Now to me, sixteen years does not sound very long at all, and I cannot say that sixteen years ago from now, which would have been May 2005, feels long enough ago to acquire membership of that foggy and mysterious world which lives only in history. I think that AJP's misjudgement on this helps to explain the astonishingly venomous backlash to his book when it was first published. A few people who were still alive at publication helps illustrate my point: Churchill, Eden and Daladier. Many of the star appeasers then, not to mention the millions who still had a direct emotional investment in the moral validity, and unavoidability, of the war.
However, I think enough time has now passed to allow us to wield the detachment required of the analyst, yet to also be free of the need to resort to extremes in order to crumble a charged consensus. Whilst we owe AJP credit for gouging cracks into that consensus, thus relieving us of the temptation to use hyperbole to provoke and challenge it, I think that his main thesis is wrong.
I will not spell it out here, nor offer my own views on it, as I don't want any spoilers in this review. But I will say that this book is a a compendium of claims, without too much detailed analysis or explanation of each. It is less useful for understanding the lead up to the war than it is for acting as a springboard from which to carry out further investigation. It certainly gets one thinking, but I did not feel I was in safe hands, nor that I could trust the claims I was reading. The off-handed way in which potent claims are made, and the provocative style, are not assuring, unlike when reading Richard J Evans or Tim Bouverie on the same topic.
It is a hard read, with so many affirmations packed in to every page, but AJP writes clearly, with humour, wince-inducing put-downs and a courage to 'put himself out there'. It has provided me with a lot of routes for further thinking on the topic, and will provide readers with more questions than answers. That is either a strength or a weakness of the book, depending on why you are drawn to it, but all future readers will nonetheless owe the book a debt whether they realise it or not. The courage it took to write it, and the onslaught the author received because of it, remind us not to invest too much of our faith in the trends and currencies of the present.
Now to me, sixteen years does not sound very long at all, and I cannot say that sixteen years ago from now, which would have been May 2005, feels long enough ago to acquire membership of that foggy and mysterious world which lives only in history. I think that AJP's misjudgement on this helps to explain the astonishingly venomous backlash to his book when it was first published. A few people who were still alive at publication helps illustrate my point: Churchill, Eden and Daladier. Many of the star appeasers then, not to mention the millions who still had a direct emotional investment in the moral validity, and unavoidability, of the war.
However, I think enough time has now passed to allow us to wield the detachment required of the analyst, yet to also be free of the need to resort to extremes in order to crumble a charged consensus. Whilst we owe AJP credit for gouging cracks into that consensus, thus relieving us of the temptation to use hyperbole to provoke and challenge it, I think that his main thesis is wrong.
I will not spell it out here, nor offer my own views on it, as I don't want any spoilers in this review. But I will say that this book is a a compendium of claims, without too much detailed analysis or explanation of each. It is less useful for understanding the lead up to the war than it is for acting as a springboard from which to carry out further investigation. It certainly gets one thinking, but I did not feel I was in safe hands, nor that I could trust the claims I was reading. The off-handed way in which potent claims are made, and the provocative style, are not assuring, unlike when reading Richard J Evans or Tim Bouverie on the same topic.
It is a hard read, with so many affirmations packed in to every page, but AJP writes clearly, with humour, wince-inducing put-downs and a courage to 'put himself out there'. It has provided me with a lot of routes for further thinking on the topic, and will provide readers with more questions than answers. That is either a strength or a weakness of the book, depending on why you are drawn to it, but all future readers will nonetheless owe the book a debt whether they realise it or not. The courage it took to write it, and the onslaught the author received because of it, remind us not to invest too much of our faith in the trends and currencies of the present.
August 30, 2020
The Origins of the Second World War by A.J.P. Taylor takes a look at how the cease fire and armistice at the conclusion of World War I set up the conditions that led inevitably to World War II. The victorious allies demands placed on Germany as reparations as well as restrictions on Germany's military size were thought to keep such a war from recurring. Instead it created such poverty and hard times on the general population it left them susceptible to the promises of better times from from a charismatic speaker like Adolph Hitler. Generally this author follows the general historical assessment of events leading to the start of and progression of WWII. Where he parts ways with most of them is that he theorizes that Hitler did not set out to conquer Europe as a master plan but rather bungled his way into it helped by other's mistakes. His take on how Hitler rose to power almost comes across as a defense of Hitler who mainly kept adapting to changing conditions. However, the main problem I see with this interesting interpretation of history is Hitler's own words in his book, Mein Kampf, where he essentially lays out his master plan for subjugation and wiping out certain populations of what he considers sub-humans including the Jews. I did find it an interesting read, and he does make some insightful points. But I think the real story is more in line with conventional understandings.
December 26, 2023
An idiosyncratic and extremely rational attempt to isolate the sources of the conflict. Taylor relies almost exclusively on the written record where it exists, so that he analysis is a little dry. That being aid he refrains almost completely from the sort of speculation about motives, especially Hitler's that are common among historians. When all is said and done, the infamous Treaty of Versailles, and the French attempt to maintain its provisions long after its demise together with the British attempts to conciliate Germany clearly count as causes. Taylor's contention that Hitler waited for opportunities rather than forcing issues is a little harder to accept. Altogether an ingenious and fascinating book.
On the second read it seems much more plausible - one thing is certain, neither the French nor the British behaved honorably toward either the Czechs or the Poles.
On the second read it seems much more plausible - one thing is certain, neither the French nor the British behaved honorably toward either the Czechs or the Poles.
September 19, 2016
Seems at first like a very interesting book but gradually the tone and preoccupied accusation, spoils the credibility. A book wherein writer knows best, and explains the origins of WWII by arrogantly accusing everyone, the whole European politics, and Britain in particular. A preoccupied, unscientific piece of work.
October 23, 2017
This book could have been titled "The Comedy Central Roast of British Foreign Policy in the Interwar Years." My favorite line is "[he] was as able intellectually as any British foreign secretary of the twentieth century -perhaps not a very high standard." We like to blame Hitler for World War II, but the Allied incompetence played a large part as well.
March 20, 2015
As is so often the case with older history books you are supposed to just take the authors word for it on account of his scholarly authority. Many unsubstantiated assertions without references, arguments or discussion as why it would be the case.
May 17, 2023
كل ما قرأته عن الحربين العالميتين لا يركز على الفترة بينهما، لذا معارفي عنها قليلة جدا. هذا الكتاب يناقش هذه الفترة ليحدد الأسباب التي قادت للحرب. دائما ما أقرأ أن الحرب ثارت بسبب إحساس الألمان بالاجحاف من شروط الاستسلام بعد هزيمة الحرب الأولى واستغلها هتلر لاشعال الحرب الثانية. هذا الكتاب يغوص بالتفاصيل لكي يستنتج مجموعة من الأسباب التي قادت للحرب والتي أحدها فقط هو الاحساس بالظلم. يرى الكاتب أن هتلر لم يكن متحمس للحرب ولا يملك خطة مسبقة لها لكنه كان ممتاز بالتقاط الفرص والمشي على الحافة. الفرنسيون بالذات لم يكونوا متحمسين للحرب أبدا والحكومة الفرنسية لم تكن مؤهلة للتعامل مع هتلر. الجنرالات الألمان لم يكونوا يثقون بهتلر ولا بسياسة التوسعية. لم تكن عصبة الأمم المتحدة على قدر من القوة. الكتاب ملئ بالتحليلات العميقة والتي تحتاج خلفية قوية بأسماء ومراكز الفاعلين من سياسيين ورؤوساء بتلك الفترة والتي من دونها, كما هو الحال عندي, تجعل قراءة الكتاب وفهمة صعبة.
August 14, 2020
AJP Taylor refused to make the origins of World War Two a personality contest with good and evil players. Instead he traces the socio political/economic issues leading to the conflict, including the gradual erosion of the Treaty of Versailles and the ambivalence Britain and France had towards the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. With the benefit of hindsight, it is all to easy to see how the failure of the mainstream political class to address the issues of the day feeds the fascist agenda. AJP Taylor describes with insight and understanding the timeline that lead ultimately to catastrophe.
September 15, 2019
Detailed, if controversial, book about the causes of WWII. Originally published in 1961 (the copy I read is a good old tattered version from 1965 with yellowed pages which I got from a book market for EUR 1) A.J.P. Taylor suggested that Hitler's foreign policy was opportunistic rather than following some sort of preordained master plan. Either way a well written and interesting read.
August 13, 2021
Really enjoyed it. Great insight into the period in the run up to WWII and the mistakes that were made in not addressing the fascist menace when it was on the rise. The fact that it was originally written some sixteen years after the war's end and how comprehensive it is under 300 pages, makes it all the more worth a revisit. I borrowed it from a library but have since bought a copy.
November 5, 2019
This book is for the people who want to be reminded of the peculiarities of military strategies of WW2, mostly from the perspective of Great Britain
Read
April 18, 2023DNF- this book is problematic as fuck & his citations/evidence is literally "trust me bro"
April 30, 2019
One detailed therefore complicated book covering complicated diplomatic dealings among many countries with changing diplomates, Presidents, Prime Ministers, Leaders, politicall parties etc. Hats off for the late A. J. P. Taylor for writing it.
June 14, 2015
The most disappointing book i ever read - i know the arguments from reading of hundreds of other books but was shocked at some bolder claims the author made with scant evidence - i guess if it was not hyped as much would have gotten a 2 or 3 instead of 1 - will try to get into why i found the book very week if time permits
February 14, 2024
Alan John Percivale Taylor is a British Historian known for his work as a journalist and broadcaster. Though never a full professor, Taylor lectured on history for Manchester University from 1930 to 1938. His area of expertise was in European diplomatic history during both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and he has written such works as The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, and The Reichstag Fire (introduction), to name a few. Like every good historian, Taylor claims to be devoted to finding the truth. In The Origins of the Second World War’s Preface for the American Reader, he notes this: “I do not believe that a historian should either excuse or condemn. He must explain.”
Taylor makes his thoughts on the causes of the Second World War very clear. It is his opinion that blaming World War II on Hitler and the Soviet Union is not accurate; instead, the blame could accurately be shifted to Britain, with France as a collaborator. The primary conclusions drawn by Taylor are that Hitler did not start World War II, and it was not fought because of an adherence to any principle. These controversial arguments on the causes of World War II are Taylor’s thesis, conclusion, and principal argument. They potentially change the way readers might think about the causes of World War II, and it’s a significant change from the contemporary view and interpretation of the data by other historians and their histories written about the time. However, Taylor confronts the contemporary view that Hitler was the leading cause of the Second World War head-on, and as such, Taylor must include massive amounts of evidence and dive deep into pre-war events to make his case. Taylor does stop during the introduction, and several times throughout the book, to remind the reader that he is not defending Hitler and is not trying to make Hitler out to be a “good guy.” Rather, he aims to show all the actual causes of World War II in an extensive historical text.
Taylor briefly previews his book in the “Second Thoughts” section of The Origins of the Second World War. He notes that France and Britain were the victors of World War I; they held the decision-making power in their grasp and knew that Germany desired to renew its status as a Great Power. Out of this preview comes his research questions. Why did the victors of World War I, France and Britain, not resist Germany? And secondly, why did France and Britain resist Germany in the end? These research questions, Taylor goes on to note, are contrary to the popular opinion that Hitler was solely responsible for the war.
Many reviewers of The Origins of the Second World War struggle to give him any credence and do not accept his work as historically sound. Taylor does an excellent job of reviewing international relations and the balance of power during the interwar years. All the while, he plays down Hitler’s power and interests in war. This systemic analysis puts Taylor at odds with his contemporaries. In fact, of ten reviews found of this book, only three do not criticize Taylor’s conclusion and historical backing. One review goes further than criticizing Taylor and condemns his writing as ammunition for Germans faithful to Hitler. G. F. Hudson notes in his review that The Origins of the Second World War “has naturally been translated into German and is providing an armory of propaganda for those Germans who regard Hitler’s Reich as the deeply wronged victim of the Second World War.”
Though Taylor goes against the grain and makes claims that are disagreed upon by his contemporaries, this book adds value to the historical narrative. Taylor does his research and includes an extensive bibliography that will help guide future historians. Furthermore, Taylor could have quickly taken the usual talking points about the causes of World War II, but instead, he grew the discussion and forced other historians to double down on their claims. By being willing to go against the grain and look at another perspective, Taylor allows the readers to decide about the causes of World War II.
Taylor makes his thoughts on the causes of the Second World War very clear. It is his opinion that blaming World War II on Hitler and the Soviet Union is not accurate; instead, the blame could accurately be shifted to Britain, with France as a collaborator. The primary conclusions drawn by Taylor are that Hitler did not start World War II, and it was not fought because of an adherence to any principle. These controversial arguments on the causes of World War II are Taylor’s thesis, conclusion, and principal argument. They potentially change the way readers might think about the causes of World War II, and it’s a significant change from the contemporary view and interpretation of the data by other historians and their histories written about the time. However, Taylor confronts the contemporary view that Hitler was the leading cause of the Second World War head-on, and as such, Taylor must include massive amounts of evidence and dive deep into pre-war events to make his case. Taylor does stop during the introduction, and several times throughout the book, to remind the reader that he is not defending Hitler and is not trying to make Hitler out to be a “good guy.” Rather, he aims to show all the actual causes of World War II in an extensive historical text.
Taylor briefly previews his book in the “Second Thoughts” section of The Origins of the Second World War. He notes that France and Britain were the victors of World War I; they held the decision-making power in their grasp and knew that Germany desired to renew its status as a Great Power. Out of this preview comes his research questions. Why did the victors of World War I, France and Britain, not resist Germany? And secondly, why did France and Britain resist Germany in the end? These research questions, Taylor goes on to note, are contrary to the popular opinion that Hitler was solely responsible for the war.
Many reviewers of The Origins of the Second World War struggle to give him any credence and do not accept his work as historically sound. Taylor does an excellent job of reviewing international relations and the balance of power during the interwar years. All the while, he plays down Hitler’s power and interests in war. This systemic analysis puts Taylor at odds with his contemporaries. In fact, of ten reviews found of this book, only three do not criticize Taylor’s conclusion and historical backing. One review goes further than criticizing Taylor and condemns his writing as ammunition for Germans faithful to Hitler. G. F. Hudson notes in his review that The Origins of the Second World War “has naturally been translated into German and is providing an armory of propaganda for those Germans who regard Hitler’s Reich as the deeply wronged victim of the Second World War.”
Though Taylor goes against the grain and makes claims that are disagreed upon by his contemporaries, this book adds value to the historical narrative. Taylor does his research and includes an extensive bibliography that will help guide future historians. Furthermore, Taylor could have quickly taken the usual talking points about the causes of World War II, but instead, he grew the discussion and forced other historians to double down on their claims. By being willing to go against the grain and look at another perspective, Taylor allows the readers to decide about the causes of World War II.
August 4, 2022
The good: very readable, I was hooked from the beginning and it was almost a ‘page turner’ in terms of wanting to know what came next; despite knowing the story
The first couple of chapters. I have read, studied and even taught this period, a lot, but even I found the grasp and explanation of interwar diplomatic relations in Europe to be eye opening and thought provoking. It competently challenges a lot of preconceptions and broad stroke explanations of why each country acted as it did.
I think it does a good job of discrediting the argument that Hitler had a concrete plan and timetable in terms of foreign policy, although that’s not something I had encountered too much in my history, perhaps due to Taylor’s work.
The bad:
Taylor is fundamentally wrong about Hitler. He claims, implicitly and explicitly, that Hitler in terms of his foreign policies aims and goals was no different than any contemporary or previous German statesman. This is obviously wrong. Read Black Earth or Bloodlands by Timothy Snyder or the Reich trilogy by Richard Evans. Hitler was a racialist, more than a nationalist. Someone who put more stock in races than nations. Taylor actually wrote that Hitler was supportive of Poland, when in actuality Hitler loathed Slavs almost as much as Jews. It is extremely clear that Hitler wanted to do in Eastern Europe what Europeans had done in Africa and Taylor completely ignores or downplays it, claiming that Lebensraum was just a vague rhetorical device, despite what Germany did in Eastern Europe during the war.
Hitler saw capitalism, communism, democracy, international systems as artificial Jewish inventions to prevent the natural healthy state of survival of the fittest with races battling it out for resources and survival. No other statesman had this view and this world view inevitably leads to expansion and conflict. It’s like Taylor just skim read a few passages of Mein Kampf and then thought even what he read was just clickbait.
His claims that Hitler didn’t want or didn’t plan on war might be literally true but true in the sense that the drunk driver doesn’t plan or want to kill the pedestrian. That level of gambling and callousness towards the consequences of your actions is criminally negligent and therefore you are still legally and morally responsible for your actions.
At first I found it refreshing that he would sometimes say ‘it’s impossible to know x’or ‘we will never know why x’ but he does it a LOT and for things I don’t think applicable
With Hitler it feels to me like he starts with the conclusion and works his way because sometimes he will use Hitlers own words as the truth and other times claim Hitler was lying or bluffing and it feels relatively arbitrary how he does this. Well no, no arbitrary basically he picks and chooses whatever justify his argument that Hitler never planned for war snd whilst ‘wicked’ was no ‘modern Attila’…he often speculated how hitlers motives and mindset (that’s fine) again when it supports his thesis but claims people who see Hitler as uniquely monstrous in his goals engaging in ‘mystic…psychology’.
The bibliography is shockingly short. This is not his fault, but there are no Soviet primary sources and very little secondary. His references…he will make massive sweeping statements on the sentiments of nations (claims the plebiscite in Austria was genuine show of support. And it was but still…) like no one in country x cared about issue y, with no source whatsoever to back that assertion up.
The way Czechoslovakia, Poland and to a lesser extent Austria are dealt with sits very uneasily with me…there is an implication that all these countries are partly to blame for their incorporation into the reich or that their incorporation was ‘natural’ and I think these matters are the ones that come closest to the accusation that the book acts as apologist for Hitler.
April 18, 2019
Taylor writes with an unusual sense of humor, but his account of the events that led to the Second World War is extremely flawed. In spite of his lack of resources - especially from the Soviet perspective, he makes too many unreasonable assumptions and explains away too many inconvenient truths with no more than a wave of his hand. Still, altogether a very enjoyable read. I particularly enjoyed Taylor's unabashed disdain for all parties in this conflict, and especially the sarcasm with which he addresses the various and plentiful blunders of European statesmen in the post-Versailles era.
Taylor is commended for writing a revolutionary revisionist history of the origins of the Second World War. He gets an unfortunate multitude of facts wrong, though this is undoubtedly at least in part because he was writing in 1961, a time when he would be infamous for being so dismissive of Hitler as an 'average' statesman (this was before the era of frequent megalomaniac leaders) and a time when he would have lacked access to innumerable sources that we now have as a result of the declassification process and the temporary opening of the Soviet archives in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I understand what Taylor was trying to do, and I know he did it to the best of his ability in 1961. But I haven't been convinced - and while his theory that war in 1939 was an accident is interesting to entertain (though matters little practically, since accident or not it happened), his theory that Hitler was a rational statesman and not an infamous gambler with an ego problem seems utterly unfounded.
Taylor is commended for writing a revolutionary revisionist history of the origins of the Second World War. He gets an unfortunate multitude of facts wrong, though this is undoubtedly at least in part because he was writing in 1961, a time when he would be infamous for being so dismissive of Hitler as an 'average' statesman (this was before the era of frequent megalomaniac leaders) and a time when he would have lacked access to innumerable sources that we now have as a result of the declassification process and the temporary opening of the Soviet archives in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I understand what Taylor was trying to do, and I know he did it to the best of his ability in 1961. But I haven't been convinced - and while his theory that war in 1939 was an accident is interesting to entertain (though matters little practically, since accident or not it happened), his theory that Hitler was a rational statesman and not an infamous gambler with an ego problem seems utterly unfounded.
May 2, 2020
A hugely controversial book when first published in 1961, which gets this its fourth star from me, it challenged the way historians assessed the causes of the Second World War. The central narrative is that Hitler did not have a grand plan for war and European domination, which he had signposted in Mein Kampf, rather he operated in the broadly traditional model of foreign affairs and grand politics, securing Central European domination by guile and opportunism. The incompetence, and self-centred approach of Great Britain and France is well set out, showing them willing to sell almost all their allies out to avoid another Great War, and these were certainly hugely contributing factors. Taylor, however, is too inclined to show that Hitler was the opportunist, without a clear vision in mind, dismissing all suggestions to the contrary as Hitler bluffing. Whilst he was content to secure his aims through aggressive, if peaceful means, he was willing to accept the risk of a wider war. Like his contemporaries Hitler did not control the events, and certainly exploited opportunities when they arose, but his determination to achieve his aims of domination of Central Europe would inevitably have led to conflict as time progressed.
Taylor has a difficult task, undoubtedly, separating Hitler the megalomaniac mass murderer, from Hitler the international statesman; and arguably Taylor goes too far in this separation. Written in his accessible style, this remains an important read for any serious student or historian of 20th century European history.
Taylor has a difficult task, undoubtedly, separating Hitler the megalomaniac mass murderer, from Hitler the international statesman; and arguably Taylor goes too far in this separation. Written in his accessible style, this remains an important read for any serious student or historian of 20th century European history.
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