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Violence: Six Sideways Reflections
Philosopher, cultural critic, and agent provocateur Slavoj Žižek constructs a fascinating new framework to look at the forces of violence in our world.
Using history, philosophy, books, movies, Lacanian psychiatry, and jokes, Slavoj Žižek examines the ways we perceive and misperceive violence. Drawing from his unique cultural vision, Žižek brings new light to the Paris riots of 2005; he questions the permissiveness of violence in philanthropy; in daring terms, he reflects on the powerful image and determination of contemporary terrorists.
Violence, Žižek states, takes three forms--subjective (crime, terror), objective (racism, hate-speech, discrimination), and systemic (the catastrophic effects of economic and political systems)--and often one form of violence blunts our ability to see the others, raising complicated questions.
Does the advent of capitalism and, indeed, civilization cause more violence than it prevents? Is there violence in the simple idea of "the neighbour"? And could the appropriate form of action against violence today simply be to contemplate, to think?
Beginning with these and other equally contemplative questions, Žižek discusses the inherent violence of globalization, capitalism, fundamentalism, and language, in a work that will confirm his standing as one of our most erudite and incendiary modern thinkers.
Using history, philosophy, books, movies, Lacanian psychiatry, and jokes, Slavoj Žižek examines the ways we perceive and misperceive violence. Drawing from his unique cultural vision, Žižek brings new light to the Paris riots of 2005; he questions the permissiveness of violence in philanthropy; in daring terms, he reflects on the powerful image and determination of contemporary terrorists.
Violence, Žižek states, takes three forms--subjective (crime, terror), objective (racism, hate-speech, discrimination), and systemic (the catastrophic effects of economic and political systems)--and often one form of violence blunts our ability to see the others, raising complicated questions.
Does the advent of capitalism and, indeed, civilization cause more violence than it prevents? Is there violence in the simple idea of "the neighbour"? And could the appropriate form of action against violence today simply be to contemplate, to think?
Beginning with these and other equally contemplative questions, Žižek discusses the inherent violence of globalization, capitalism, fundamentalism, and language, in a work that will confirm his standing as one of our most erudite and incendiary modern thinkers.
272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2007
About the author
Slavoj Žižek
588 books6,626 followersSlavoj Žižek is a Slovene sociologist, philosopher, and cultural critic.
He was born in Ljubljana, Slovenia (then part of SFR Yugoslavia). He received a Doctor of Arts in Philosophy from the University of Ljubljana and studied psychoanalysis at the University of Paris VIII with Jacques-Alain Miller and François Regnault. In 1990 he was a candidate with the party Liberal Democracy of Slovenia for Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia (an auxiliary institution, abolished in 1992).
Since 2005, Žižek has been a member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts.
Žižek is well known for his use of the works of 20th century French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan in a new reading of popular culture. He writes on many topics including the Iraq War, fundamentalism, capitalism, tolerance, political correctness, globalization, subjectivity, human rights, Lenin, myth, cyberspace, postmodernism, multiculturalism, post-marxism, David Lynch, and Alfred Hitchcock.
In an interview with the Spanish newspaper El País he jokingly described himself as an "orthodox Lacanian Stalinist". In an interview with Amy Goodman on Democracy Now! he described himself as a "Marxist" and a "Communist."
He was born in Ljubljana, Slovenia (then part of SFR Yugoslavia). He received a Doctor of Arts in Philosophy from the University of Ljubljana and studied psychoanalysis at the University of Paris VIII with Jacques-Alain Miller and François Regnault. In 1990 he was a candidate with the party Liberal Democracy of Slovenia for Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia (an auxiliary institution, abolished in 1992).
Since 2005, Žižek has been a member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts.
Žižek is well known for his use of the works of 20th century French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan in a new reading of popular culture. He writes on many topics including the Iraq War, fundamentalism, capitalism, tolerance, political correctness, globalization, subjectivity, human rights, Lenin, myth, cyberspace, postmodernism, multiculturalism, post-marxism, David Lynch, and Alfred Hitchcock.
In an interview with the Spanish newspaper El País he jokingly described himself as an "orthodox Lacanian Stalinist". In an interview with Amy Goodman on Democracy Now! he described himself as a "Marxist" and a "Communist."
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June 17, 2020
The Poetry of Dominance
Violence is a necessary if regrettable condition of civilisation. A few of us who enjoy the comforts of civilisation are uncomfortable with that reality. Such violence appears overtly from time to time but it exists continuously in subtle forms of coercion that sustain relationships of domination and exploitation which are what constitute civilisation. It is the threat of violence which keeps us secure, at least when we are not the recipient of the threat.
It is this that constitutes “the invisible background of systemic violence” which is the subject of Žižek’s analysis. It is an awkward subject precisely because it is invisible to most of us. We can only see it askance, as it were, out of the corner of the eye. This kind of violence he calls “the dark matter” of society (I should have preferred ‘dark energy’). It must be present for society to exist at all. But we must infer its properties because it can’t be observed directly. We are therefore forced into a poetical mode of discourse: “poetry is always, by definition, ‘about’ something that cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to.”
Liberal sympathies, says Žižek, are with those subjected to overt, visible violence, never with those oppressed by the invisible violence which assures the comforts of liberality. Yet it is the invisible violence that most often generates the visible. The invisible is systemic violence and by definition it is directed toward those who are perceived merely as potential, not actual, threats. Whatever might disrupt liberal security must be prevented. Liberals fail to connect the dots. Social conservatives at least recognise the reality of the use of violence against specific parts of a polity.
As I write, London as well as other cities around the world are experiencing the protests organised by the so-called Extinction Rebellion. This seems to be a coalition of the somewhat young and the somewhat old to exert pressure for the political awareness of climate change. Yesterday, after a week of disruption, several protestors were beaten when they interrupted train services in London Docklands. Liberal commentators have been outraged that ‘honest’ protest has met with such a violent response.
But the Extinction Rebellion actions have accomplished something important. They have made visible first the objective systemic violence that they themselves have created (there is no doubt that closing down London Transport is a violent act). And, second, several of their members have suffered the subjective violence perpetrated by the responding systemic violence of a London mob. Whether the protestors will also be prosecuted with the implicit systemic violence of the state is not yet determined. Žižek, I think, would appreciate the concrete example of his theory in all its intricacies.
Žižek, being Žižek, that is to say, a Marxist of the old school, names the ultimate source of systemic violence as Capitalism. Many in Extinction Rebellion appear to agree with him. And indeed there is good reason to associate the economic inequalities and environmental destruction around the world with what is blithely called global capitalism. But this structure of violent control is as unlike what Marx thought of as Capitalism as what Stalin thought of as Democracy. Marxist theory was obsolete almost as soon as it was formulated. Marx knew about the factory and the factory owner not the corporation and corporate members. Using Marxist theory today to formulate a theory of systemic violence is futile.
The world as it exists is neither capitalist in the sense that Marx used the term, nor freely competitive in the sense that liberal economists use to defend ‘efficient’ economic arrangements. The world is corporate. That is, it is ruled by very large institutions whose primary function is to internalise competitive economics and make them personal under rules dictated by the corporation. These institutions dominate not only the individuals whom they employ but the governments which depend upon corporate employees health and well-being to fund their democratic elections and to fulfil their political promises of prosperity and security.
It is the corporate world, not the political or judicial world which has systemic power and controls systemic violence. It maintains this power in a way never contemplated by Marx, nor by liberal economic theorists, by enrolling individuals into the safety and security of the corporate structure. Having a place in the independent corporate hierarchy insulates its members from personal attack, at least regarding the consequences of their professional or economic actions. As a society, we enthusiastically want this kind of security even if it implies far less security in society in all its other aspects.
To summarise the situation: the dominant modern institution of the corporation has popularised avarice. Avarice is not greed in the sense of desiring the acquisition of an excess of certain things - food, shelter, warmth, physical care - but the accumulation of nothing in particular, merely more of whatever it is that others have. Capital is now corporate capital, which is not owned by anyone. What others do have is position, reputation, status, and reward within the corporation. This is what really counts as the key to all other parts of life, particularly to the physical, legal and other social aspects of security one might naturally desire. All modern life is corporate life; the corporation, we implicitly presume, will protect us as the rest of the world goes to hell in a basket.
Hence Žižek is often blowing stale hot air. He knows that old fashioned communism is a dead letter in the archives of history. Among other things, communism involves at least as much systemic violence as capitalism. He also knows that we are in the position of “G. K. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday, in which the highest police authority is the same person as the super-criminal, staging a battle with himself.” We bring systemic violence on ourselves and simultaneously distract ourselves with concerns for the victims of that same violence. But the cause is not the inherent conflict of those who possess capital and those who do not. It is between those who have corporate protection and those who do not.*
Žižek’s implicit message is that we need to read more, especially more poetry, and more critically. I can’t deny that this is probably a good idea. But despite his erudition and numerous literary, sociological, and philosophical insights, I think he still doesn’t understand today’s world for what it is: namely, governed everywhere by corporate interests which are impervious to any equivalent countervailing power, including poetry.
*This seems to me a rather good theory for explaining the rise of Trumpism. Trumpists would be horrified to find themselves associated with Marx. It is their alienation from the corporate world not from capitalism that is most apparent from both their geographic locations and their gripes about being effectively ejected from their secure corporate existence.
Postscript: My wife has reminded me that in fact poetry may indeed be just the thing needed and quoted this from memory:
I Am the Only Being Whose Doom
by EMILY BRONTË
I am the only being whose doom
No tongue would ask, no eye would mourn;
I never caused a thought of gloom,
A smile of joy, since I was born.
In secret pleasure, secret tears,
This changeful life has slipped away,
As friendless after eighteen years,
As lone as on my natal day.
There have been times I cannot hide,
There have been times when this was drear,
When my sad soul forgot its pride
And longed for one to love me here.
But those were in the early glow
Of feelings since subdued by care;
And they have died so long ago,
I hardly now believe they were.
First melted off the hope of youth,
Then fancy’s rainbow fast withdrew;
And then experience told me truth
In mortal bosoms never grew.
’Twas grief enough to think mankind
All hollow, servile, insincere;
But worse to trust to my own mind
And find the same corruption there.
Post-postscript: For more 0n the literary theory of the corporate world see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
And on the institution of the corporation itself, see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Post-post-postscript: there are a number of fictional accounts of corporate violence; but one of the most moving is this: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Violence is a necessary if regrettable condition of civilisation. A few of us who enjoy the comforts of civilisation are uncomfortable with that reality. Such violence appears overtly from time to time but it exists continuously in subtle forms of coercion that sustain relationships of domination and exploitation which are what constitute civilisation. It is the threat of violence which keeps us secure, at least when we are not the recipient of the threat.
It is this that constitutes “the invisible background of systemic violence” which is the subject of Žižek’s analysis. It is an awkward subject precisely because it is invisible to most of us. We can only see it askance, as it were, out of the corner of the eye. This kind of violence he calls “the dark matter” of society (I should have preferred ‘dark energy’). It must be present for society to exist at all. But we must infer its properties because it can’t be observed directly. We are therefore forced into a poetical mode of discourse: “poetry is always, by definition, ‘about’ something that cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to.”
Liberal sympathies, says Žižek, are with those subjected to overt, visible violence, never with those oppressed by the invisible violence which assures the comforts of liberality. Yet it is the invisible violence that most often generates the visible. The invisible is systemic violence and by definition it is directed toward those who are perceived merely as potential, not actual, threats. Whatever might disrupt liberal security must be prevented. Liberals fail to connect the dots. Social conservatives at least recognise the reality of the use of violence against specific parts of a polity.
As I write, London as well as other cities around the world are experiencing the protests organised by the so-called Extinction Rebellion. This seems to be a coalition of the somewhat young and the somewhat old to exert pressure for the political awareness of climate change. Yesterday, after a week of disruption, several protestors were beaten when they interrupted train services in London Docklands. Liberal commentators have been outraged that ‘honest’ protest has met with such a violent response.
But the Extinction Rebellion actions have accomplished something important. They have made visible first the objective systemic violence that they themselves have created (there is no doubt that closing down London Transport is a violent act). And, second, several of their members have suffered the subjective violence perpetrated by the responding systemic violence of a London mob. Whether the protestors will also be prosecuted with the implicit systemic violence of the state is not yet determined. Žižek, I think, would appreciate the concrete example of his theory in all its intricacies.
Žižek, being Žižek, that is to say, a Marxist of the old school, names the ultimate source of systemic violence as Capitalism. Many in Extinction Rebellion appear to agree with him. And indeed there is good reason to associate the economic inequalities and environmental destruction around the world with what is blithely called global capitalism. But this structure of violent control is as unlike what Marx thought of as Capitalism as what Stalin thought of as Democracy. Marxist theory was obsolete almost as soon as it was formulated. Marx knew about the factory and the factory owner not the corporation and corporate members. Using Marxist theory today to formulate a theory of systemic violence is futile.
The world as it exists is neither capitalist in the sense that Marx used the term, nor freely competitive in the sense that liberal economists use to defend ‘efficient’ economic arrangements. The world is corporate. That is, it is ruled by very large institutions whose primary function is to internalise competitive economics and make them personal under rules dictated by the corporation. These institutions dominate not only the individuals whom they employ but the governments which depend upon corporate employees health and well-being to fund their democratic elections and to fulfil their political promises of prosperity and security.
It is the corporate world, not the political or judicial world which has systemic power and controls systemic violence. It maintains this power in a way never contemplated by Marx, nor by liberal economic theorists, by enrolling individuals into the safety and security of the corporate structure. Having a place in the independent corporate hierarchy insulates its members from personal attack, at least regarding the consequences of their professional or economic actions. As a society, we enthusiastically want this kind of security even if it implies far less security in society in all its other aspects.
To summarise the situation: the dominant modern institution of the corporation has popularised avarice. Avarice is not greed in the sense of desiring the acquisition of an excess of certain things - food, shelter, warmth, physical care - but the accumulation of nothing in particular, merely more of whatever it is that others have. Capital is now corporate capital, which is not owned by anyone. What others do have is position, reputation, status, and reward within the corporation. This is what really counts as the key to all other parts of life, particularly to the physical, legal and other social aspects of security one might naturally desire. All modern life is corporate life; the corporation, we implicitly presume, will protect us as the rest of the world goes to hell in a basket.
Hence Žižek is often blowing stale hot air. He knows that old fashioned communism is a dead letter in the archives of history. Among other things, communism involves at least as much systemic violence as capitalism. He also knows that we are in the position of “G. K. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday, in which the highest police authority is the same person as the super-criminal, staging a battle with himself.” We bring systemic violence on ourselves and simultaneously distract ourselves with concerns for the victims of that same violence. But the cause is not the inherent conflict of those who possess capital and those who do not. It is between those who have corporate protection and those who do not.*
Žižek’s implicit message is that we need to read more, especially more poetry, and more critically. I can’t deny that this is probably a good idea. But despite his erudition and numerous literary, sociological, and philosophical insights, I think he still doesn’t understand today’s world for what it is: namely, governed everywhere by corporate interests which are impervious to any equivalent countervailing power, including poetry.
*This seems to me a rather good theory for explaining the rise of Trumpism. Trumpists would be horrified to find themselves associated with Marx. It is their alienation from the corporate world not from capitalism that is most apparent from both their geographic locations and their gripes about being effectively ejected from their secure corporate existence.
Postscript: My wife has reminded me that in fact poetry may indeed be just the thing needed and quoted this from memory:
I Am the Only Being Whose Doom
by EMILY BRONTË
I am the only being whose doom
No tongue would ask, no eye would mourn;
I never caused a thought of gloom,
A smile of joy, since I was born.
In secret pleasure, secret tears,
This changeful life has slipped away,
As friendless after eighteen years,
As lone as on my natal day.
There have been times I cannot hide,
There have been times when this was drear,
When my sad soul forgot its pride
And longed for one to love me here.
But those were in the early glow
Of feelings since subdued by care;
And they have died so long ago,
I hardly now believe they were.
First melted off the hope of youth,
Then fancy’s rainbow fast withdrew;
And then experience told me truth
In mortal bosoms never grew.
’Twas grief enough to think mankind
All hollow, servile, insincere;
But worse to trust to my own mind
And find the same corruption there.
Post-postscript: For more 0n the literary theory of the corporate world see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
And on the institution of the corporation itself, see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Post-post-postscript: there are a number of fictional accounts of corporate violence; but one of the most moving is this: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
July 24, 2011
One doesn't go to Slavoj Žižek for answers. One goes to him for questions. He raises them, then raises some more, and asks us to raise questions for every answer we get. That is his genius, and that's what makes him worth while. The interrogatives -- Who? What? Where? When? Why? and How? -- are his and our most powerful tools, and he challenges us to use them.
When I was a 4 year old boy, I wore a helmet for a year because I fractured my skull. That's the story I grew up with. "I" fractured my skull. I was running down the hallway in our apartment, I was wearing socks, and I smacked my head against the protruding corner of the wall; my skull cracked.
I always accepted that story.
I accepted that story even after my father punched me so hard that he knocked me out of the cast I had on my broken hand.
I accepted that story even after my father punched me in the face (while we were boxing) and my head hit a similar corner in what was then our house; it took seven stiches to close the cut.
I accepted that story even after my father fucked up my back by pulling a dangerous wrestling move on me (he was a high school wrestling champ in Upstate NY) when I made the mistake of putting him in a playful full nelson.
I accepted that story when he knocked me into our shoe closet with a punch that permanently scarred my mouth; it took 6 internal stiches and fourteen external stitches to repair the damage.
I accepted the story after repeated gut shots, rib shots (which have led to arthritis where my ribs join my sternum), spankings with paddles (with holes drilled in them to lower the resistance and increase the speed of the blow), humiliations and slaps.
And then a few years ago my mother and I were coming out of a Mexican restaurant with my twins. Miloš loved to swing between us back then. He'd grab our hands, take a little run and swing his legs out, and we (me and any other adult I happened to be with), would swing him and set him down as many times as he liked. That day my Mom's hands were wet. Miloš grabbed our hands, started his swing, and when he reached the apex my Mom's grip gave way. Miloš went flying. I couldn't hold on, and there he went, about six feet in the air. His body flipped, he turned face first, and his head hit the sidewalk at speed with a sickening thud.
It freaked me out. Freaked him out too, of course. And we spent a stressful afternoon in the hospital while they observed him and ran tests and interrogated me as a possible abuser. Miloš has never wanted to swing again. But he was fine. He had a minor concussion, a big scrape where he hit the pavement, and a goose egg. But that was it. One of the most horrifying head injuries I had ever been witness to, and it was almost nothing.
It got me thinking about my fractured skull.
Had "I" broken it? Or was that just the story I was told? How many times had I heard the comment, "Brad's got a head like a rock. Nothing hurts that kid"? And it seemed to be true but for that one time. Why had I gone to stay with my grandparents for a little while after the damage was done? Where was my Dad when it happened? What if it wasn't me who was to blame at all? Did "I" really do it when my Dad was at work?
I wanted to know; I still want to know, but I never will. My Mom died before I worked up the courage to ask her. I wasn't worried about offending her, but I don't know if I could have handled the potential lie. My Dad is still alive, so I could confront him, but he can't be trusted to tell the truth about anything that has to do with me. My grandparents are all dead, so I don't know the answer, and I will always only suspect. And suspect I do.
You can see now why I am fascinated by violence, and why Žižek's work would call to me. And why the final sentence of Violence Six Sideways Reflections would have a powerful personal impact:
Luckily, though, she and I resolved the issue of her tacit guilt for the acts of violence she knew about before she died. We had a falling out, then we had a coming together, and we were able to become very close -- closer than we'd ever been. We just never got to what I suspect was the biggest lie of all: that she had covered up the earliest and most dangerous piece of abuse in my life.
Quick thought it is, Žižek tries to dig into the whys and hows and wherefores of systemic violence. He takes his thought and ours beyond the subjective acts we see and ponders what lies beneath it all. He demystifies our mystification and asks us dispel our own illusions as much as we can. He spends an awfully long time talking about the big moments of violence -- the Holocaust, the Collectivisation, 9-11, etc., etc. -- which is fine, but and I, for one, would have liked this book better had he focused his mind blowing brain on the everyday acts of violence that are at the root of it all.
That's my own selfishness talking, however, and the book is important regardless of Žižek's focus. I will be coming back to this book again. Next time, though, I will only come back after I've brushed up on my Lacan and Kant and Hegel and Heidegger and Freud.
Stop name dropping, Slavoj, you beautiful sonuvabitch.
When I was a 4 year old boy, I wore a helmet for a year because I fractured my skull. That's the story I grew up with. "I" fractured my skull. I was running down the hallway in our apartment, I was wearing socks, and I smacked my head against the protruding corner of the wall; my skull cracked.
I always accepted that story.
I accepted that story even after my father punched me so hard that he knocked me out of the cast I had on my broken hand.
I accepted that story even after my father punched me in the face (while we were boxing) and my head hit a similar corner in what was then our house; it took seven stiches to close the cut.
I accepted that story even after my father fucked up my back by pulling a dangerous wrestling move on me (he was a high school wrestling champ in Upstate NY) when I made the mistake of putting him in a playful full nelson.
I accepted that story when he knocked me into our shoe closet with a punch that permanently scarred my mouth; it took 6 internal stiches and fourteen external stitches to repair the damage.
I accepted the story after repeated gut shots, rib shots (which have led to arthritis where my ribs join my sternum), spankings with paddles (with holes drilled in them to lower the resistance and increase the speed of the blow), humiliations and slaps.
And then a few years ago my mother and I were coming out of a Mexican restaurant with my twins. Miloš loved to swing between us back then. He'd grab our hands, take a little run and swing his legs out, and we (me and any other adult I happened to be with), would swing him and set him down as many times as he liked. That day my Mom's hands were wet. Miloš grabbed our hands, started his swing, and when he reached the apex my Mom's grip gave way. Miloš went flying. I couldn't hold on, and there he went, about six feet in the air. His body flipped, he turned face first, and his head hit the sidewalk at speed with a sickening thud.
It freaked me out. Freaked him out too, of course. And we spent a stressful afternoon in the hospital while they observed him and ran tests and interrogated me as a possible abuser. Miloš has never wanted to swing again. But he was fine. He had a minor concussion, a big scrape where he hit the pavement, and a goose egg. But that was it. One of the most horrifying head injuries I had ever been witness to, and it was almost nothing.
It got me thinking about my fractured skull.
Had "I" broken it? Or was that just the story I was told? How many times had I heard the comment, "Brad's got a head like a rock. Nothing hurts that kid"? And it seemed to be true but for that one time. Why had I gone to stay with my grandparents for a little while after the damage was done? Where was my Dad when it happened? What if it wasn't me who was to blame at all? Did "I" really do it when my Dad was at work?
I wanted to know; I still want to know, but I never will. My Mom died before I worked up the courage to ask her. I wasn't worried about offending her, but I don't know if I could have handled the potential lie. My Dad is still alive, so I could confront him, but he can't be trusted to tell the truth about anything that has to do with me. My grandparents are all dead, so I don't know the answer, and I will always only suspect. And suspect I do.
You can see now why I am fascinated by violence, and why Žižek's work would call to me. And why the final sentence of Violence Six Sideways Reflections would have a powerful personal impact:
Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do.Which is the act I place squarely in the hands of my mother. I do not exonerate my father and his subjective violence in any way, but my mother's embrace of systemic violence shouldn't be ignored either. Even if she didn't cover up a fractured skull, even if "I" really did slip into the corner of the wall, even if a wispy four year old's weight and inertia was somehow enough to literally crack his skull, even if my father had no hand in that long ago wound, she did know about many of the others. She knew, and she had options (unlike so many women), and she had potential support systems and escape routes (unlike too many women), and she did nothing. And I am fairly sure that even when I was four and had to wear a helmet ... even then when escape and safety was at its easiest ... I am fairly sure she did nothing.
Luckily, though, she and I resolved the issue of her tacit guilt for the acts of violence she knew about before she died. We had a falling out, then we had a coming together, and we were able to become very close -- closer than we'd ever been. We just never got to what I suspect was the biggest lie of all: that she had covered up the earliest and most dangerous piece of abuse in my life.
Quick thought it is, Žižek tries to dig into the whys and hows and wherefores of systemic violence. He takes his thought and ours beyond the subjective acts we see and ponders what lies beneath it all. He demystifies our mystification and asks us dispel our own illusions as much as we can. He spends an awfully long time talking about the big moments of violence -- the Holocaust, the Collectivisation, 9-11, etc., etc. -- which is fine, but and I, for one, would have liked this book better had he focused his mind blowing brain on the everyday acts of violence that are at the root of it all.
That's my own selfishness talking, however, and the book is important regardless of Žižek's focus. I will be coming back to this book again. Next time, though, I will only come back after I've brushed up on my Lacan and Kant and Hegel and Heidegger and Freud.
Stop name dropping, Slavoj, you beautiful sonuvabitch.
August 15, 2008
I don't want to assert that 'the rock star of cultural theory' is full of shit, but y'know, Slavoj Žižek seems to me to be kind of full of shit.
Me: Hey Mr Žižek! What did you think of the last season of Lost?
Žižek: Well, in the context of a Hegelian dialectic, this work must be considered ultimately a usurpation/derivation of Freud's pathetic "death drive" mythos, if you get me. By which I mean, it's opposed to Nietzsche's ironic reading of the story of Job, but only in letter; not so much in spirit.
Me: Are you saying that you think that TV show is stupid?
Žižek: Well yes, but I am saying it a lot more complicatedly.
I mean, I don't really read philosophy, so what the fuck do I know, right? I read this in the back seat of a car on a two-day trip from Oakland to Camp Trans Michigan, and then on the two-day trip back, with an adorable little dog bouncing around the car and a bunch of Atmosphere on Micah's iPod. But I mostly tuned the other stuff out because what's the point of reading a dense book of cultural theory if you can't really take it in, right? (Well, except for the joke where the dog is sleeping and you pretend that passages from said cultural theory are a bedtime story and you read them out loud to her.) Mostly I followed it, and mostly, what Zizek was doing was going, 'here is the complicated place where this phenomenon is situated, and here is why it is stupid.' So, whatever.
There were a couple highlights, like when he asserted that the commonality in human culture is mostly the struggle against human culture, instead of any kind of altruism or anything. But for every really good moment like that, there's at least one moment where he goes, 'hey guys, masturbation is stupid,' or talks kind of aimlessly and pointlessly (and briefly) about the plasticity of gender in the context of "sex-change operations" (nice terminology, rock star) and you think that maybe he's saying transsexuality is stupid (since he thinks everything else is stupid [except, annoyingly, atheism; since the explosion of angry books espousing atheism in the last couple years, I am very over having people shove atheism down my throat], so probably), so you get pissed at him for just touching on it instead of really saying anything about it. Y'know?
(Nice sentence structure there, Imogen. Way to mock the professionals.)
Anyway, whatever. I was engaged and I get why folks are so stoked about him and yes: heck of erudite. But ultimately, y'know, so what?
Me: Hey Mr Žižek! What did you think of the last season of Lost?
Žižek: Well, in the context of a Hegelian dialectic, this work must be considered ultimately a usurpation/derivation of Freud's pathetic "death drive" mythos, if you get me. By which I mean, it's opposed to Nietzsche's ironic reading of the story of Job, but only in letter; not so much in spirit.
Me: Are you saying that you think that TV show is stupid?
Žižek: Well yes, but I am saying it a lot more complicatedly.
I mean, I don't really read philosophy, so what the fuck do I know, right? I read this in the back seat of a car on a two-day trip from Oakland to Camp Trans Michigan, and then on the two-day trip back, with an adorable little dog bouncing around the car and a bunch of Atmosphere on Micah's iPod. But I mostly tuned the other stuff out because what's the point of reading a dense book of cultural theory if you can't really take it in, right? (Well, except for the joke where the dog is sleeping and you pretend that passages from said cultural theory are a bedtime story and you read them out loud to her.) Mostly I followed it, and mostly, what Zizek was doing was going, 'here is the complicated place where this phenomenon is situated, and here is why it is stupid.' So, whatever.
There were a couple highlights, like when he asserted that the commonality in human culture is mostly the struggle against human culture, instead of any kind of altruism or anything. But for every really good moment like that, there's at least one moment where he goes, 'hey guys, masturbation is stupid,' or talks kind of aimlessly and pointlessly (and briefly) about the plasticity of gender in the context of "sex-change operations" (nice terminology, rock star) and you think that maybe he's saying transsexuality is stupid (since he thinks everything else is stupid [except, annoyingly, atheism; since the explosion of angry books espousing atheism in the last couple years, I am very over having people shove atheism down my throat], so probably), so you get pissed at him for just touching on it instead of really saying anything about it. Y'know?
(Nice sentence structure there, Imogen. Way to mock the professionals.)
Anyway, whatever. I was engaged and I get why folks are so stoked about him and yes: heck of erudite. But ultimately, y'know, so what?
October 2, 2023
- يطرح جيجك في هذا الكتاب الكثير من الأسئلة ويحاول الإجابة على بعضها، على مدار ستة فصول عاقداً لمقارنات كثيرة بين الرأسمالية الحالية والشيوعية السابقة، الإيديولوجيات المتعددة، الإرهاب، القتل الجماعي، علم النفس، الإصولية وغيرها من المفاهيم
- يفرق جيجك بين ثلاثة انواع من العنف: الذاتي (إطلاق نار على شخص ما) والموضوعي (سياسي، اقتصادي) والرمزي (لغة، موروث ثقافي) ويبدأ بتحليلها وسوق القرائن والأمثلة العديدة من الحياة الواقعية (احداث فرنسا 2005، احداث 11 ايلول، بيل غايتس) ومن الروايات والأفلام ومسرح بريخت وغيره.
- في الختام يخلص جيجك الى تفنيد الدروس المستقاة من الكتاب، وينهي كتابه بجملة "إن عدم القيام بأي تحرك يكون أحياناً، أقوى التحركات التي يمكن القيام بها"
- قرأت الكتاب على فترة 10 أيام، بعض الأفكار في كيفية اختباء العنف وراء قناع من التسامح والمصالح الإقتصادية والسياسية كان واضحاً وجيداً لكن في المقابل كنت اعيد بعض الفقرات عدة مرات لأحاول فهم كيفية الربط خصوصاً مع إدخال نظريات هيغل ولاكان وطروحات بنيامين. لكنني لم انجح للأسف ولم اقتنع بمعظم الذي اورده ووجدته معقداً اكثر مما يجب! لذلك ربما يحتاج لإعادة قراءة مرة اخرى
- - -
بعض الإقتباسات:
ان معنى التعاطف الإنساني في حالات الطوارئ مفبرك، ومبالغ فيه بالفعل، جراء اعتبارات سياسية واضحة
ما علينا فعله اليوم عندما يقصفنا الإعلام بوابل من صور العنف هو ان نتعلم ثم نتعلم ونتعلم ايضاً، للوقوف على الأسباب الكامنة وراء العنف.
في علم الأخلاق لدى الشيوعيين الليبراليين تُواجه آفة الجري المحموم وراء الربح عن طريق الإحسان وعمل الخير. والإحسان هذا هو القناع الإنساني الذي
يخفي وجه الإستغلال الإقتصادي
حين يجري اغراقنا بوابل من الانباء السارة للقلوب عن الغاء ديون معينة او عن حملة انسانية كبرى لإستئصال هذا الوباء او ذاك، يكفي ان تحرك البطاقة البريدية قليلاً كي تلتقط الشخصية الداعرة للشيوعي الليبرالي في غمرة العمل خلف الستار.
ما الذي يمكن ان يجعل كيسنجر الذي امر بقصف كمبوديا قصفا كثيفا ومركزاً أدى الى هلاك مئات الآلاف من البشر، أقل إجراماً من أولئك المسؤولين عن انهيار برجي التجارة في نيويورك؟ أليس سبب ذلك متمثلاً في كوننا ضحايا نوع من "الوهم الأخلاقي"؟
اذا كان اصوليو هذه الأيام المزعومون مؤمنين بأنهم اهتدوا الى الحقيقة، فما الذي يضطرهم الى الشعور بأنهم مهددون من غير المؤمنين؟ ما الداعي الى ان يحسدوهم؟
- يفرق جيجك بين ثلاثة انواع من العنف: الذاتي (إطلاق نار على شخص ما) والموضوعي (سياسي، اقتصادي) والرمزي (لغة، موروث ثقافي) ويبدأ بتحليلها وسوق القرائن والأمثلة العديدة من الحياة الواقعية (احداث فرنسا 2005، احداث 11 ايلول، بيل غايتس) ومن الروايات والأفلام ومسرح بريخت وغيره.
- في الختام يخلص جيجك الى تفنيد الدروس المستقاة من الكتاب، وينهي كتابه بجملة "إن عدم القيام بأي تحرك يكون أحياناً، أقوى التحركات التي يمكن القيام بها"
- قرأت الكتاب على فترة 10 أيام، بعض الأفكار في كيفية اختباء العنف وراء قناع من التسامح والمصالح الإقتصادية والسياسية كان واضحاً وجيداً لكن في المقابل كنت اعيد بعض الفقرات عدة مرات لأحاول فهم كيفية الربط خصوصاً مع إدخال نظريات هيغل ولاكان وطروحات بنيامين. لكنني لم انجح للأسف ولم اقتنع بمعظم الذي اورده ووجدته معقداً اكثر مما يجب! لذلك ربما يحتاج لإعادة قراءة مرة اخرى
- - -
بعض الإقتباسات:
ان معنى التعاطف الإنساني في حالات الطوارئ مفبرك، ومبالغ فيه بالفعل، جراء اعتبارات سياسية واضحة
ما علينا فعله اليوم عندما يقصفنا الإعلام بوابل من صور العنف هو ان نتعلم ثم نتعلم ونتعلم ايضاً، للوقوف على الأسباب الكامنة وراء العنف.
في علم الأخلاق لدى الشيوعيين الليبراليين تُواجه آفة الجري المحموم وراء الربح عن طريق الإحسان وعمل الخير. والإحسان هذا هو القناع الإنساني الذي
يخفي وجه الإستغلال الإقتصادي
حين يجري اغراقنا بوابل من الانباء السارة للقلوب عن الغاء ديون معينة او عن حملة انسانية كبرى لإستئصال هذا الوباء او ذاك، يكفي ان تحرك البطاقة البريدية قليلاً كي تلتقط الشخصية الداعرة للشيوعي الليبرالي في غمرة العمل خلف الستار.
ما الذي يمكن ان يجعل كيسنجر الذي امر بقصف كمبوديا قصفا كثيفا ومركزاً أدى الى هلاك مئات الآلاف من البشر، أقل إجراماً من أولئك المسؤولين عن انهيار برجي التجارة في نيويورك؟ أليس سبب ذلك متمثلاً في كوننا ضحايا نوع من "الوهم الأخلاقي"؟
اذا كان اصوليو هذه الأيام المزعومون مؤمنين بأنهم اهتدوا الى الحقيقة، فما الذي يضطرهم الى الشعور بأنهم مهددون من غير المؤمنين؟ ما الداعي الى ان يحسدوهم؟
Read
September 15, 2010zizek thinks "the village" was a good movie
June 3, 2020
جملهای معروف از لنین بود که دقیق یادم نمیآد اما مضمونش چنین چیزی بود : "دموکراسی برای کدام طبقه؟"
در دنیای دموکراتیک امروز که بیش از همهی اعصار، بشریت - همان ۹۹ درصد که الان احتمالاً شده ۹۹.۵ درصد - پرولتاریزه! شده، نگرانی دولتها نه از مخالفت یا مثلاً رأی دادن مردم به فلان کاندید، که از انفعال سیاسی مردم هست.
هشتگ بزنید، راجع به ضریحلیسی و پدوفیلی تتلو جنبش مجازی راه بندازید، علیه اونها که شمال میرن و ماسک نمیزنن فحشنامه تنظیم کنید، از ترسِ رویکاراومدنِ "بدتر" برای "بد" رأی جمع کنید اما سکوت نکنید که همانا "بیتفاوتی کشندهترین اسلحهست."
ژیژک در این کتاب از انواع خشونت میگه و توضیح میده که چهطور خشونتهایی "فعالانه" مثل حوادث تروریستی و غارت فروشگاه و امثالهم خودشون نتیجهی خشونتی دیگه - خشونت سیستمی و نمادین - هستند که البته مثل مورد اول رسانهای نمیشن!
به قول بودریار فعالیت رسانه در حیطهی خشونت آگاهیبخشی نیست، بلکه کارکردش نمایاندن آشوب دنیایی هولناکه و وظیفهی دادن حسِ امنیت به مخاطب رو بهعهده داره؛ احتمالاً در همین موردی که این روزها داره اتفاق میافته، واکنش مخاطب سیانان، رأی ندادن به ترامپی هست که باعث و بانی نژادپرستی در تمام تاریخ ایالات متحدهست! و یک ماه بعد از انتخابات هم فراموش میشه که اصلاً اعتراضی بود.
علی ایّحال، به قول ژیژک - که خودش از لنین نقل قول میکنه - در مواجهه با رسانه و اخباری که هر روز و هر ساعت ما رو با خشونت و قتل و فجایع انسانی روبهرو میکنه و از ما انتظار واکنش سریع و دست روی دست نگذاشتن داره، بخزیم به کنجی و سه کار انجام بدیم: "آموختن، آموختن، آموختن".
پ.ن : عنوان اصلی کتاب " Violence: Six Sideways Reflections " بود که یک نگا��ِ زیرچشمی بهکل حذف شد و موند پنج نگاه.
در دنیای دموکراتیک امروز که بیش از همهی اعصار، بشریت - همان ۹۹ درصد که الان احتمالاً شده ۹۹.۵ درصد - پرولتاریزه! شده، نگرانی دولتها نه از مخالفت یا مثلاً رأی دادن مردم به فلان کاندید، که از انفعال سیاسی مردم هست.
هشتگ بزنید، راجع به ضریحلیسی و پدوفیلی تتلو جنبش مجازی راه بندازید، علیه اونها که شمال میرن و ماسک نمیزنن فحشنامه تنظیم کنید، از ترسِ رویکاراومدنِ "بدتر" برای "بد" رأی جمع کنید اما سکوت نکنید که همانا "بیتفاوتی کشندهترین اسلحهست."
ژیژک در این کتاب از انواع خشونت میگه و توضیح میده که چهطور خشونتهایی "فعالانه" مثل حوادث تروریستی و غارت فروشگاه و امثالهم خودشون نتیجهی خشونتی دیگه - خشونت سیستمی و نمادین - هستند که البته مثل مورد اول رسانهای نمیشن!
به قول بودریار فعالیت رسانه در حیطهی خشونت آگاهیبخشی نیست، بلکه کارکردش نمایاندن آشوب دنیایی هولناکه و وظیفهی دادن حسِ امنیت به مخاطب رو بهعهده داره؛ احتمالاً در همین موردی که این روزها داره اتفاق میافته، واکنش مخاطب سیانان، رأی ندادن به ترامپی هست که باعث و بانی نژادپرستی در تمام تاریخ ایالات متحدهست! و یک ماه بعد از انتخابات هم فراموش میشه که اصلاً اعتراضی بود.
علی ایّحال، به قول ژیژک - که خودش از لنین نقل قول میکنه - در مواجهه با رسانه و اخباری که هر روز و هر ساعت ما رو با خشونت و قتل و فجایع انسانی روبهرو میکنه و از ما انتظار واکنش سریع و دست روی دست نگذاشتن داره، بخزیم به کنجی و سه کار انجام بدیم: "آموختن، آموختن، آموختن".
پ.ن : عنوان اصلی کتاب " Violence: Six Sideways Reflections " بود که یک نگا��ِ زیرچشمی بهکل حذف شد و موند پنج نگاه.
Read
August 26, 2017I've read something like 16 Zizek books at this point. So this Itty Bitty Book served as a nice trip down memory lane. It's not all here by a long shot, but a lot of it is ; in it's shortened form.
And I'll be honest with you. Really up front. The little thing about subjective vs objective violence? Makes it pretty clear why the Z=Man said he'd vote for Trump. He really does believe (and shouldn't you? and don't you?) that it is the objective violence underlying and enabling the smooth functioning of a peaceful neoliberalism that needs to be destroyed. So meanwhile, he would seemingly have taken it upon himself to commit the subjective violence of voting for Trump. Accelerationist? Sure, possibly. But what about those of us who for decades have fought neoliberalism and then once more found ourselves taken hostage and voting happily for the slime? I first started reading Zizek after having that experience being blackmailed (again) into voting for Obama. What can I say? Zizek knows how it feels.
But. As is becoming increasingly clear ; the only changes Rump is bringing is making sure it all stays the same, only more so.
Soundtrak ::
Two Minutes to Midnight
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9qbRH...
Where the Slime Live
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0cn5...
Imaginary Music
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sI_r7...
Time's End
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWKHs...
A Lesson in Violence
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ypbS...
Nazi Trump Fuck Off
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58aSJ...
And I'll be honest with you. Really up front. The little thing about subjective vs objective violence? Makes it pretty clear why the Z=Man said he'd vote for Trump. He really does believe (and shouldn't you? and don't you?) that it is the objective violence underlying and enabling the smooth functioning of a peaceful neoliberalism that needs to be destroyed. So meanwhile, he would seemingly have taken it upon himself to commit the subjective violence of voting for Trump. Accelerationist? Sure, possibly. But what about those of us who for decades have fought neoliberalism and then once more found ourselves taken hostage and voting happily for the slime? I first started reading Zizek after having that experience being blackmailed (again) into voting for Obama. What can I say? Zizek knows how it feels.
But. As is becoming increasingly clear ; the only changes Rump is bringing is making sure it all stays the same, only more so.
Soundtrak ::
Two Minutes to Midnight
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9qbRH...
Where the Slime Live
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0cn5...
Imaginary Music
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sI_r7...
Time's End
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWKHs...
A Lesson in Violence
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ypbS...
Nazi Trump Fuck Off
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58aSJ...
May 20, 2011
خیلی باهاش خوش گذشت. تو عنوان اصلی اومده که کتاب شیش تا نگاه مختلف به خشونت کرده اما ما تو فارسی "پنج نگاه زیر چشمی" میخونیم. مترجم هم توضیحی نداده که اون یه نگاه کجا رفته و چرا حذف شده. من نگاه ژیژک رو دوست دارم که از همه چی آشناییزدایی میکنه. ایرادش اینه که با رندی از غفلت و احتمالن دانش کم خوانندهش استفاده میکنه که مبهوتش کنه. یعنی میبینی یه جاهای از یه موضوع کمترین اطلاعات رو میده، و اینطوری وانمود میکنه که این اطلاعت کل اطلاعات و داشتههاست و بر اساس همون اطلاعات نظریهش رو مطرح میکنه و نتیجهگیری میکنه تا شوکهت کنه. توی متن یه سری ارجاعات به نظریههای فیلسوفای مختلف داره که اگه چیزی از نظرات اون فیلسوف ندونی شاید دستگیرت نشه که چیه ماجرا. ترجمه هم یه جاهایی واقعن اذیت میکرد.
October 17, 2022
یادآوری به آقای ژیژک!
کتاب «خشونت، پنج نگاه زیرچشمی» نوشته اسلاوی ژیژک کتابی خواندنی است از فیلسوفی که شاید ستیهنده ترین منتقد لیبرال سرمایه داری باشد. او در این کتاب مثالهای فروانی از شکلهای مختلف خشونت آفرینی توسط نظام سرمایه داری را ذکر میکند. (1) و چند نمونه از اعتراضهای غربی را مثال میزند برای این که بگوید نظامهای غربی و رسانه هایشان در برخورد با این اعتراضات هیچ ملاحظه اخلاقی را رعایت نمیکنند. از جمله اعتراضات حومه پاریس (2) و وضع اسفبار و غارتگرانه نیواورلئان بعد از طوفان کاترینا. (3)
مسئله «انتخاب آزاد» را حلاجی و نقد میکند و نشان میدهد که فرهنگ غربی هیچگاه خودش منصفانه با انتخاب آزاد برخورد نکرده است. (4) و اتفاقا برخورد غرب با انتخاب آزاد در قضیه حجاب را مثال میزند. (5)
یادآوری میکند که رسانه ها با دروغگویی و بزرگنمایی مسائل ذهنی ما را تعیین میکنند (6) و همه ما دچار این ضعف هستیم که در برابر تصویر دلخراش گزارش شده فریب اخلاقی بخوریم (7) مخصوصا وقتی فرد تنها در برابر تارنمای جهان گستر را در نظر بگیریم! (8)
با همه این مقدمات اگر روی این کره خاکی یک نفر، فقط یک نفر پیدا میشد که باید در برابر گزارش رسانه های غربی از وضعیت ایران طی یک ماه گذشته سکوت اختیار میکرد کسی نبود جز آقای ژیژک!
وقتی از خودم میپرسم چرا ژیژک در پیام ویدئویی از اعتراضات ایران حمایت کرده چند جواب به ذهنم میرسد که هم از این کتاب ارزشمند خودش آموخته ام و هم سرنخ را از همان ویدئوی خودش کشف کرده ام. در این ویدئو و در نامه اش ژیژک میگوید پیر و بیمار است و نمیتواند در کنار معترضان باشد (تا جایی که میدانم به فرانسه هم نرفت تا در کنار جلیقه زردها باشد) گویا بیشتر تبدیل به فرد بی دفاع در برابر تارنمای جهان گستر شده و ساده تر فریب میخورد. اما از آن مهم تر او مدام تکرار میکند غرب چیزی برای آموختن به معترضان ایرانی ندارد چون فمینیسم غربی افتضاحی مثل می تو (metoo) بالا آورده بنابراین ژیژک به اعتراضات ایران چشم دوخته بلکه یک فمینیسم آبرومند از دل آن بیرون بیاید.
چقدر ناراحت خواهدشد اگر بداند ما هم اینجا یک می تو رونوشت برابر اصل غرب داریم. و چه قدر دلش خواهدشکست وقتی برهنه شدن پتیاره ها را در خیابان ببیند. به قرینه مثالهایی که از نقض حقوق زنان در کشورهای اسلامی میزند گمان میکنم فکر میکند هنوز ختنه دختران به طور گسترده در ایران انجام میشود ( از قضا کردستان بیشتر با این مشکل دست به گریبان است!)
به همه اینها باید افزود افتادن در تله اطاعت را. تله ای که انبوهی از چهره های شناخته شده را وادار کرد از "نظر اکثریت" تبعیت کنند. خیلی جالب است که ژیژک در این کتاب توضیح میدهد چگونه این فضای سرکوبگر که ظاهری دموکراتیک اما ماهیتی اروولی دارد و جایگزین ایده "برادر بزرگتر" شده است هیچ نظر مخالفی را برنمیتابد. (9)
اما کسی نباید از اندیشمندان چیزی به دل بگیرد. مگر میشود ارسطو را به خاطر زن ستیزی و حمایت از برده داری، داستایفسکی را به خاطر یهودستیزی و هایدگر را به خاطر حمایت از نازیسم کنار گذاشت؟ اتفاقا امروز باید همه ما (مخصوصا اگر وسوسه میشویم به خشونت مشروعیت و میدان بدهیم) این کتاب ارزشمند را بخوانیم و درس بزرگی که ژیژک در مقدمه و موخره کتاب بر آن تاکید کرده را بیاموزیم:
«ما امروزه وقتی خودمان را زیر رگبار تصویرهایی می بینیم که رسانه ها از صحنه های خشونت بار ارائه میکنند باید یک گوشه خلوت پیدا کنیم و «بیاموزیم، بیاموزیم و بیاموزیم» که علت این خشونت ها چیست.»
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گزیده های کتاب «خشونت، پنج نگاه زیرچشمی» نوشته اسلاوی ژیژک:
(1) سرنوشت کل اقشار جامعه و گاه کل کشورها را رقص بورس بازانه و «خودمدارانه» سرمایه ای می تواند رقم بزند که با نوعی بی تفاوتی لعنتی نسبت به این که جابه جایی اش چه تأثیری بر واقعیت اجتماعی خواهد گذاشت هدف خودش را که سودآوری است دنبال می کند. رقص متافیزیکی خودکار سرمایه صحنه گردان نمایش است و کلید تحولات و مصیبت های زندگی واقعی را به دست می دهد. خشونت سیستمی اساسی سرمایه داری که به مراتب غریب تر از هرگونه خشونت اجتماعی - ایدئولوژیک مستقیم پیشا سرمایه داری است در همین رقص خودکار سرمایه نهفته است.
(2) معترضان با این که عملا محروم و کنار گذاشته شده بودند به هیچ وجه افرادی گرسنه نبودند. همچنین به سطح بقای محض نیز سقوط نکرده بودند. مردمی که در تنگنای مادی به مراتب بدتری گرفتار بوده اند - چه رسد به اینکه تنها دچار سرکوب فیزیکی و ایدئولوژیک باشند - قادر بوده اند خودشان را در قالب سازمان هایی سیاسی با دستور کار روشن یا حتی آشفتهای سازمان دهند. پس این واقعیت که در پشت آتش افزوی های حومه پاریس هیچ برنامه ای وجود نداشت خود نیازمند تفسیر است. این واقعیت بیانگر حقایق فراوانی درباره وضع ایدئولوژیک - سیاسی ناجوری است که در آن گرفتار آمده ایم.
(3) به یقین، بی نظمی و خشونت واقعی بود که جرقه احساس خطر را زد: به مجردی که توفان از نیواورلئان گذشت به راستی چپاول و غارتگری آغاز شد. این رفتارها از دزدی بی شرمانه تا گشتن به دنبال ضروریات زندگی را در بر می گرفت. اما واقعیت (محدود) جنایت ها به هیچ وجه «گزارش هایی» را توجیه نمی کند که درباره فروپاشی تمام عیار نظم و قانون ارسال می شد، نه از آن رو که این گزارش ها «اغراق آمیز» بود، بلکه به دلیلی به مراتب ریشه ای تر از این: حتی اگر تمامی گزارش های موجود در باره خشونت و تعرض جنسی واقعیت داشت و درست بود حکایت های نقل شده درباره آنها باز هم بیمارگون، و نژادپرستانه بود زیرا محرک این حکایت ها واقعیت نبود بلکه پیشداوری نژادپرستانه بود؛ احساس رضایت خاطر کسانی بود که می توانستند بگویند «می بینید! سیاه پوستان در واقع این جوری هستند، وحشیانی خشونت طلب که زیر لایه نازکی از تمدن پنهان شده اند». به دیگر سخن، این جا با چیزی سروکار داریم که می توان آن را دروغ گفتن در پوشش حقیقت خواند: حتی اگر آنچه می گوییم از نظر واقعیات حقیقت داشته باشد انگیزه هایی که ما را وادار به گفتن آن کرده است نادرست و کاذب است.
(4) تنها فرهنگ سرمایه داری غربی نو است که خودمختاری و آزادی فردی را والاتر از همبستگی جمعی، ارتباط، مسئولیت شناسی در قبال دیگرانی که به ما وابسته اند و وظیفه احترام گذاشتن به سنتها و عرفهای جامعه خود می داند. بنابراین خود لیبرالیسم برای فرهنگ خاصی امتیاز قائل است: فرهنگ غربی نو. در ارتباط با آزادی انتخاب هم، لیبرالیسم دچار جانبداری شدیدی است. لیبرالیسم تحمل نمی کند که به افراد دیگر فرهنگ ها آزادی انتخاب داده نشود.
(5) محدودیت های نگرش لیبرالی جا افتاده به زنان مسلمانی که مقنعه به سر می کنند نیز این جا نمایان است. زنان اجازه دارند مقنعه به سر کنند مشروط بر اینکه انتخاب آزاد خودشان باشد و نه گزینه ای که همسر با خانواده شان به آنها تحمیل کرده باشد. اما همین که زنان مقنعه را برای اعمال انتخاب آزاد فردی شان مثلا برای تحقق معنویت خودشان به سر کنند معنای مقنعه به سر کردن کاملا تغییر می کند. دیگر مقنعه نشانه تعلق آنان به جمع مسلمانان نیست بلکه نمود فردیت خاص خودشان است. تفاوت این دو همان تفاوت میان کشاورزی چینی که غذای چینی می خورد چون از خیلی قدیم مردم روستای شان چنین کرده اند و شهروندی در یکی از کلان شهرهای غربی است که تصمیم می گیرد شام را در یک رستوران چینی محلی بخورد. به همین د��یل است که در جوامع عرفی ما که اساس آن را انتخاب آزاد تشکیل می دهد افرادی که تعلق مذهبی چشمگیری دارند موقعیت فرودست تری دارند. حتی اگر آنان اجازه یابند اعتقادات شان را حفظ کنند. این اعتقاد (فقط) به عنوان انتخاب یا عقیده شخصی خاص خودشان «تحمل می شود». به مجردی که آنان اعتقادات شان را علنا به همان معنایی که برای خودشان دارد مثلا به عنوان نشانه تعلق اساسی شان جار بزنند متهم به «بنیادگرایی» می شوند. این معنایش آن است که «سوژه انتخاب آزاد» در معنای «تساهل گرایانه» چندفرهنگی غربی تنها می تواند در نتیجه روند فوق العاده خشن کنده شدن از زیست جهانی خاص و بریدن از ریشه های خود سر برآورد.
(6) وقتی رسانه ها ما را با «بحران هایی بشری» که ظاهرا پیوسته در سراسر جهان پدیدار می شوند بمباران می کنند همواره باید به خاطر داشته باشیم که هر بحران خاصی تنها در نتیجه تقلایی پیچیده یکباره در کانون توجه رسانه ها قرار می گیرد. على القاعده در این جا نقش ملاحظات واقعة بشردوستانه کم اهمیت تر از ملاحظات فرهنگی، ایدئولوژیک - سیاسی و اقتصادی است.
(7) می توان گفت که آدم امروزی که روی تارنمای جهان گستر تنها در برابر صفحه نمایشگر رایانه شخصی خود نشسته و موج سواری میکند، هرچه بیشتر به فردی جوهری تبدیل شده است که هیچ پنجره مستقیمی رو به واقعیت در اختیار ندارد و تنها با پیکره های مجازی روبه روست و در عین حال بیش از هر زمان دیگری در نوعی شبکه جهانی ارتباطات غرق شده است.
(8) می توان گفت که آدم امروزی که روی تارنمای جهان گستر تنها در برابر صفحه نمایشگر رایانه شخصی خود نشسته و موج سواری میکند، هرچه بیشتر به فردی جوهری تبدیل شده است که هیچ پنجره مستقیمی رو به واقعیت در اختیار ندارد و تنها با پیکره های مجازی روبه روست و در عین حال بیش از هر زمان دیگری در نوعی شبکه جهانی ارتباطات غرق شده است.
(9) بسیاری از داستان هایی که درباره آینده پرداخته شده است حول چیزی مانند «برادر بزرگتر» جورج اورول دور می زند. ولی به نظر من این نگرشی قرن بیستمی به جباریت است. جباریت امروز دارد چهره مبدل تازه ای پیدا می کند. جباریت سده بیست و یکم مردم سالاری نامیده می شود.
کتاب «خشونت، پنج نگاه زیرچشمی» نوشته اسلاوی ژیژک کتابی خواندنی است از فیلسوفی که شاید ستیهنده ترین منتقد لیبرال سرمایه داری باشد. او در این کتاب مثالهای فروانی از شکلهای مختلف خشونت آفرینی توسط نظام سرمایه داری را ذکر میکند. (1) و چند نمونه از اعتراضهای غربی را مثال میزند برای این که بگوید نظامهای غربی و رسانه هایشان در برخورد با این اعتراضات هیچ ملاحظه اخلاقی را رعایت نمیکنند. از جمله اعتراضات حومه پاریس (2) و وضع اسفبار و غارتگرانه نیواورلئان بعد از طوفان کاترینا. (3)
مسئله «انتخاب آزاد» را حلاجی و نقد میکند و نشان میدهد که فرهنگ غربی هیچگاه خودش منصفانه با انتخاب آزاد برخورد نکرده است. (4) و اتفاقا برخورد غرب با انتخاب آزاد در قضیه حجاب را مثال میزند. (5)
یادآوری میکند که رسانه ها با دروغگویی و بزرگنمایی مسائل ذهنی ما را تعیین میکنند (6) و همه ما دچار این ضعف هستیم که در برابر تصویر دلخراش گزارش شده فریب اخلاقی بخوریم (7) مخصوصا وقتی فرد تنها در برابر تارنمای جهان گستر را در نظر بگیریم! (8)
با همه این مقدمات اگر روی این کره خاکی یک نفر، فقط یک نفر پیدا میشد که باید در برابر گزارش رسانه های غربی از وضعیت ایران طی یک ماه گذشته سکوت اختیار میکرد کسی نبود جز آقای ژیژک!
وقتی از خودم میپرسم چرا ژیژک در پیام ویدئویی از اعتراضات ایران حمایت کرده چند جواب به ذهنم میرسد که هم از این کتاب ارزشمند خودش آموخته ام و هم سرنخ را از همان ویدئوی خودش کشف کرده ام. در این ویدئو و در نامه اش ژیژک میگوید پیر و بیمار است و نمیتواند در کنار معترضان باشد (تا جایی که میدانم به فرانسه هم نرفت تا در کنار جلیقه زردها باشد) گویا بیشتر تبدیل به فرد بی دفاع در برابر تارنمای جهان گستر شده و ساده تر فریب میخورد. اما از آن مهم تر او مدام تکرار میکند غرب چیزی برای آموختن به معترضان ایرانی ندارد چون فمینیسم غربی افتضاحی مثل می تو (metoo) بالا آورده بنابراین ژیژک به اعتراضات ایران چشم دوخته بلکه یک فمینیسم آبرومند از دل آن بیرون بیاید.
چقدر ناراحت خواهدشد اگر بداند ما هم اینجا یک می تو رونوشت برابر اصل غرب داریم. و چه قدر دلش خواهدشکست وقتی برهنه شدن پتیاره ها را در خیابان ببیند. به قرینه مثالهایی که از نقض حقوق زنان در کشورهای اسلامی میزند گمان میکنم فکر میکند هنوز ختنه دختران به طور گسترده در ایران انجام میشود ( از قضا کردستان بیشتر با این مشکل دست به گریبان است!)
به همه اینها باید افزود افتادن در تله اطاعت را. تله ای که انبوهی از چهره های شناخته شده را وادار کرد از "نظر اکثریت" تبعیت کنند. خیلی جالب است که ژیژک در این کتاب توضیح میدهد چگونه این فضای سرکوبگر که ظاهری دموکراتیک اما ماهیتی اروولی دارد و جایگزین ایده "برادر بزرگتر" شده است هیچ نظر مخالفی را برنمیتابد. (9)
اما کسی نباید از اندیشمندان چیزی به دل بگیرد. مگر میشود ارسطو را به خاطر زن ستیزی و حمایت از برده داری، داستایفسکی را به خاطر یهودستیزی و هایدگر را به خاطر حمایت از نازیسم کنار گذاشت؟ اتفاقا امروز باید همه ما (مخصوصا اگر وسوسه میشویم به خشونت مشروعیت و میدان بدهیم) این کتاب ارزشمند را بخوانیم و درس بزرگی که ژیژک در مقدمه و موخره کتاب بر آن تاکید کرده را بیاموزیم:
«ما امروزه وقتی خودمان را زیر رگبار تصویرهایی می بینیم که رسانه ها از صحنه های خشونت بار ارائه میکنند باید یک گوشه خلوت پیدا کنیم و «بیاموزیم، بیاموزیم و بیاموزیم» که علت این خشونت ها چیست.»
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گزیده های کتاب «خشونت، پنج نگاه زیرچشمی» نوشته اسلاوی ژیژک:
(1) سرنوشت کل اقشار جامعه و گاه کل کشورها را رقص بورس بازانه و «خودمدارانه» سرمایه ای می تواند رقم بزند که با نوعی بی تفاوتی لعنتی نسبت به این که جابه جایی اش چه تأثیری بر واقعیت اجتماعی خواهد گذاشت هدف خودش را که سودآوری است دنبال می کند. رقص متافیزیکی خودکار سرمایه صحنه گردان نمایش است و کلید تحولات و مصیبت های زندگی واقعی را به دست می دهد. خشونت سیستمی اساسی سرمایه داری که به مراتب غریب تر از هرگونه خشونت اجتماعی - ایدئولوژیک مستقیم پیشا سرمایه داری است در همین رقص خودکار سرمایه نهفته است.
(2) معترضان با این که عملا محروم و کنار گذاشته شده بودند به هیچ وجه افرادی گرسنه نبودند. همچنین به سطح بقای محض نیز سقوط نکرده بودند. مردمی که در تنگنای مادی به مراتب بدتری گرفتار بوده اند - چه رسد به اینکه تنها دچار سرکوب فیزیکی و ایدئولوژیک باشند - قادر بوده اند خودشان را در قالب سازمان هایی سیاسی با دستور کار روشن یا حتی آشفتهای سازمان دهند. پس این واقعیت که در پشت آتش افزوی های حومه پاریس هیچ برنامه ای وجود نداشت خود نیازمند تفسیر است. این واقعیت بیانگر حقایق فراوانی درباره وضع ایدئولوژیک - سیاسی ناجوری است که در آن گرفتار آمده ایم.
(3) به یقین، بی نظمی و خشونت واقعی بود که جرقه احساس خطر را زد: به مجردی که توفان از نیواورلئان گذشت به راستی چپاول و غارتگری آغاز شد. این رفتارها از دزدی بی شرمانه تا گشتن به دنبال ضروریات زندگی را در بر می گرفت. اما واقعیت (محدود) جنایت ها به هیچ وجه «گزارش هایی» را توجیه نمی کند که درباره فروپاشی تمام عیار نظم و قانون ارسال می شد، نه از آن رو که این گزارش ها «اغراق آمیز» بود، بلکه به دلیلی به مراتب ریشه ای تر از این: حتی اگر تمامی گزارش های موجود در باره خشونت و تعرض جنسی واقعیت داشت و درست بود حکایت های نقل شده درباره آنها باز هم بیمارگون، و نژادپرستانه بود زیرا محرک این حکایت ها واقعیت نبود بلکه پیشداوری نژادپرستانه بود؛ احساس رضایت خاطر کسانی بود که می توانستند بگویند «می بینید! سیاه پوستان در واقع این جوری هستند، وحشیانی خشونت طلب که زیر لایه نازکی از تمدن پنهان شده اند». به دیگر سخن، این جا با چیزی سروکار داریم که می توان آن را دروغ گفتن در پوشش حقیقت خواند: حتی اگر آنچه می گوییم از نظر واقعیات حقیقت داشته باشد انگیزه هایی که ما را وادار به گفتن آن کرده است نادرست و کاذب است.
(4) تنها فرهنگ سرمایه داری غربی نو است که خودمختاری و آزادی فردی را والاتر از همبستگی جمعی، ارتباط، مسئولیت شناسی در قبال دیگرانی که به ما وابسته اند و وظیفه احترام گذاشتن به سنتها و عرفهای جامعه خود می داند. بنابراین خود لیبرالیسم برای فرهنگ خاصی امتیاز قائل است: فرهنگ غربی نو. در ارتباط با آزادی انتخاب هم، لیبرالیسم دچار جانبداری شدیدی است. لیبرالیسم تحمل نمی کند که به افراد دیگر فرهنگ ها آزادی انتخاب داده نشود.
(5) محدودیت های نگرش لیبرالی جا افتاده به زنان مسلمانی که مقنعه به سر می کنند نیز این جا نمایان است. زنان اجازه دارند مقنعه به سر کنند مشروط بر اینکه انتخاب آزاد خودشان باشد و نه گزینه ای که همسر با خانواده شان به آنها تحمیل کرده باشد. اما همین که زنان مقنعه را برای اعمال انتخاب آزاد فردی شان مثلا برای تحقق معنویت خودشان به سر کنند معنای مقنعه به سر کردن کاملا تغییر می کند. دیگر مقنعه نشانه تعلق آنان به جمع مسلمانان نیست بلکه نمود فردیت خاص خودشان است. تفاوت این دو همان تفاوت میان کشاورزی چینی که غذای چینی می خورد چون از خیلی قدیم مردم روستای شان چنین کرده اند و شهروندی در یکی از کلان شهرهای غربی است که تصمیم می گیرد شام را در یک رستوران چینی محلی بخورد. به همین د��یل است که در جوامع عرفی ما که اساس آن را انتخاب آزاد تشکیل می دهد افرادی که تعلق مذهبی چشمگیری دارند موقعیت فرودست تری دارند. حتی اگر آنان اجازه یابند اعتقادات شان را حفظ کنند. این اعتقاد (فقط) به عنوان انتخاب یا عقیده شخصی خاص خودشان «تحمل می شود». به مجردی که آنان اعتقادات شان را علنا به همان معنایی که برای خودشان دارد مثلا به عنوان نشانه تعلق اساسی شان جار بزنند متهم به «بنیادگرایی» می شوند. این معنایش آن است که «سوژه انتخاب آزاد» در معنای «تساهل گرایانه» چندفرهنگی غربی تنها می تواند در نتیجه روند فوق العاده خشن کنده شدن از زیست جهانی خاص و بریدن از ریشه های خود سر برآورد.
(6) وقتی رسانه ها ما را با «بحران هایی بشری» که ظاهرا پیوسته در سراسر جهان پدیدار می شوند بمباران می کنند همواره باید به خاطر داشته باشیم که هر بحران خاصی تنها در نتیجه تقلایی پیچیده یکباره در کانون توجه رسانه ها قرار می گیرد. على القاعده در این جا نقش ملاحظات واقعة بشردوستانه کم اهمیت تر از ملاحظات فرهنگی، ایدئولوژیک - سیاسی و اقتصادی است.
(7) می توان گفت که آدم امروزی که روی تارنمای جهان گستر تنها در برابر صفحه نمایشگر رایانه شخصی خود نشسته و موج سواری میکند، هرچه بیشتر به فردی جوهری تبدیل شده است که هیچ پنجره مستقیمی رو به واقعیت در اختیار ندارد و تنها با پیکره های مجازی روبه روست و در عین حال بیش از هر زمان دیگری در نوعی شبکه جهانی ارتباطات غرق شده است.
(8) می توان گفت که آدم امروزی که روی تارنمای جهان گستر تنها در برابر صفحه نمایشگر رایانه شخصی خود نشسته و موج سواری میکند، هرچه بیشتر به فردی جوهری تبدیل شده است که هیچ پنجره مستقیمی رو به واقعیت در اختیار ندارد و تنها با پیکره های مجازی روبه روست و در عین حال بیش از هر زمان دیگری در نوعی شبکه جهانی ارتباطات غرق شده است.
(9) بسیاری از داستان هایی که درباره آینده پرداخته شده است حول چیزی مانند «برادر بزرگتر» جورج اورول دور می زند. ولی به نظر من این نگرشی قرن بیستمی به جباریت است. جباریت امروز دارد چهره مبدل تازه ای پیدا می کند. جباریت سده بیست و یکم مردم سالاری نامیده می شود.
August 16, 2009
Here is a slightly patronizing way of summarizing the methodology of Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek; address a relevant social issue (such as violence) and certain ideological perspectives that have been applied to it, cut and paste seemingly disparate examples of high and low culture arbitrarily throughout the text, draw reaching connections between the two, and hopefully attempt to arrive at an intelligible conclusion or thesis. This became apparent during my reading of Violence, part of Picador's BIG IDEA'S/small books series and what is, more or less, Zizek's most accessible work to date.
It starts out with the relatively lucid premise or distinction of three types of violence; subjective (clearly identifiable, direct), symbolic (language or forms of), and systemic (objective; political and economic). After the groundwork is laid out for this commentary on violence, Zizek then starts in on his typical fugue-like series of a variety of subchapters. In each of these, he'll be bringing up a good deal of Lacan, Hegel, and Marx. Approaching surface-level, logical assessments of violence with paradoxical and ironic reasoning, Zizek rambles on about subjects such as the Paris riots of 2005, Bill Gates and subversive entrepreneurship, torture, religious fundamentalism, atheism, and Benjamin's concept of Divine Violence.
I'm not even going to attempt to paraphrase the respective chapters of Violence, and I'll take the deserved criticism for my own lazy criticism here. However, I must say that I do this out of a dismissive attitude toward Zizek's writing style. He is like a kid in the candy store of cultural theory; too excited by the endless possibility of example and analogy at hand to really make a focused point. One second he is criticizing Sam Harris and his controversial, but rational, opinions on political torture, then he suddenly makes the transition into the "Judeo-Christian-Freudian" (ugh) weight of the concept of the Lacanian notion of the Neighbor and the significance of the physical distance and proximity of this Neighbor (the Other being tortured) to the level of ease with which one is able to torture. Granted, he is still following Harris (sort of), but his "point" here is so utterly bloated, and the ones that follow are even more digressive and trivial.
The man basically needs to stick to public lectures and debates, and even those can be interminable. Maybe I'm not even making the greatest point about what is wrong with his writing, but at around page 170, I was about to throw this book against the wall. He's good for an occasional, cultural-studies-type joke, but as I've said before, the man is a completely shallow thinker.
It starts out with the relatively lucid premise or distinction of three types of violence; subjective (clearly identifiable, direct), symbolic (language or forms of), and systemic (objective; political and economic). After the groundwork is laid out for this commentary on violence, Zizek then starts in on his typical fugue-like series of a variety of subchapters. In each of these, he'll be bringing up a good deal of Lacan, Hegel, and Marx. Approaching surface-level, logical assessments of violence with paradoxical and ironic reasoning, Zizek rambles on about subjects such as the Paris riots of 2005, Bill Gates and subversive entrepreneurship, torture, religious fundamentalism, atheism, and Benjamin's concept of Divine Violence.
I'm not even going to attempt to paraphrase the respective chapters of Violence, and I'll take the deserved criticism for my own lazy criticism here. However, I must say that I do this out of a dismissive attitude toward Zizek's writing style. He is like a kid in the candy store of cultural theory; too excited by the endless possibility of example and analogy at hand to really make a focused point. One second he is criticizing Sam Harris and his controversial, but rational, opinions on political torture, then he suddenly makes the transition into the "Judeo-Christian-Freudian" (ugh) weight of the concept of the Lacanian notion of the Neighbor and the significance of the physical distance and proximity of this Neighbor (the Other being tortured) to the level of ease with which one is able to torture. Granted, he is still following Harris (sort of), but his "point" here is so utterly bloated, and the ones that follow are even more digressive and trivial.
The man basically needs to stick to public lectures and debates, and even those can be interminable. Maybe I'm not even making the greatest point about what is wrong with his writing, but at around page 170, I was about to throw this book against the wall. He's good for an occasional, cultural-studies-type joke, but as I've said before, the man is a completely shallow thinker.
April 10, 2016
What a classy book. The book, as the name suggests is a study of violence but a massively intellectual look on things and often zizek puts a new spin on what you may consider to be themes which are quite pertinent at the moment. One of his key points is that there is something alluring about violence, that head for a head mentality which stops individuals from really thinking about what the right thing really is to do. Zizek is clearly more left of centre inclined and has huge gripes with the global capitalist agenda most of us in the west are bedazzled with. He also talks very interestingly about the importance of language and some of the symbolisation that sits behind it which we can become enslaved to. There is also a strong understanding of some of the fundamentalism we see in Islam today and some of the insights he offers in that area are sharp also, for example the way modernisation affected the west gradually over the centuries but how that has impacted the Muslim world over the course of a much shorter period of time and the ramification that has had on places like Dubai which are the living embodiment of that crass adherence to modernisation. Other interesting chapters looked at the liberal communist village, fearing the neighbour as oneself, the violence of language, terrorist resentment, liberalism or fundamentalism, the religion of atheism, the culturalisation of politics, divine violence - what it is and what it is not. Overall a hugely intellectual book which covered a plethora of topics and certainly work a read.
January 6, 2012
Last year I grew inexcusably lazy with philosophy, favoring watered-down texts infused with psychobabble and sociological schemata. Zizek was the worst offender on my bad-philosophers list. The sole purpose behind my absolute enamour with his writings was the potpurrian style of combining popular culture with historical philosophy. As my reading within his realm of work progressed, I realized that Zizek in fact does very little philosophizing of his own, aside from condemning marginalized groups and condemning the actions of financial charity and tolerance. Though Slavoj's argument is somewhat reasonable at times (that is, why promote equality through the institutions that perpetuate disparity ie capitalism), most of the time his privilege and obsessive styles of writing overwhelm any sensibility of thought (ie tolerance policies foster 'true violence' as they encourage distance, blah blah blah). This work is largely unintelligible, illiterate, disjointed, foolish, discriminatory, hypocritical, discordant; Zizek is disillusioned, obsessive, disgusting, and foolish. Every time he mentions the Holocaust or Jewish people, I think, "Oh no," to myself.
January 6, 2018
این کتاب، خشونت را به دوگونه خشونت فعالانه و خشونت منفعلانه دستهبندی میکند. خشونت منفعلانه سطح دیگری از خشونت است که آشکارا به چشم نمیآید، خشونتهای سیستمی و خشونت نمادین (بواسطه زبان)، در این دسته میگنجند.
به عبارت دیگر، این کتاب، مبدایی که به کمک آن خشونت، مورد شناسایی قرار می گیرد را زیر سوال میبرد. سطح صفری که ما به عنوان سطح صفر خشونت، جایی که خشونت وجود ندارد، میشناسیم، در واقع سطح صفر نیست، بلکه جایی است که خشونت منفعلانه و پنهان در آن سربرمیآورند و کمتر اعتراض کسی را برمیانگیزانند.
به عبارت دیگر، این کتاب، مبدایی که به کمک آن خشونت، مورد شناسایی قرار می گیرد را زیر سوال میبرد. سطح صفری که ما به عنوان سطح صفر خشونت، جایی که خشونت وجود ندارد، میشناسیم، در واقع سطح صفر نیست، بلکه جایی است که خشونت منفعلانه و پنهان در آن سربرمیآورند و کمتر اعتراض کسی را برمیانگیزانند.
February 16, 2019
Žižekas, aišku, yra biškį išprotėjęs, bet vis tiek vienas įdomiausių šiuolaikinės popkultūros komentatorių. Kai iškyla koks klausimas ar įtampa, jisai renkasi tą kelią, kaip maždaug buvo pavaizduota jo filme "Pervert's guide to the cinema", kur "Matricos" scenoje yra siūlomos raudona ir mėlyna tabletės, o Žižekas sako: "Kur trečia tabletė? Aš noriu trečios tabletės."
Kelios citatos:
Kelios citatos:
Kai suvokiame ką nors kaip smurto aktą, mes vertiname jį pagal tai, ką laikome "normalia" situacija be smurto. Tokiu būdu aukščiausia smurto forma yra šio normos standarto, pagal kurį tam tikri įvykiai atrodys smurtiniai arba ne, primetimas. Štai kodėl pati kalba, toji smurto atsisakymo ir tarpusavio pripažinimo priemonė, apima ir besąlygišką smurtą.
Jei nūdienos vadinamieji fundamentalistai išties tiki suradę savo kelią į tiesą, kodėl jie turėtų jaustis taip, tarsi netikintieji keltų grėsmę, kodėl turėtų jiems pavydėti? <...> Priešingai nei tikrus fundamentalistus, teroristinius pseudofundamentalistus nuodėmingas netikinčiųjų gyvenmas labai domina, intriguoja, žavi. <...> Fundamentalistinio islamo teroras nėra pagrįstas teroristų įsitikinimu savo pranašumu ir troškimu apsaugoti savąją kultūrinę ir religinę tapatybę nuo globalios vartotojų civilizacijos antpuolio. Fundamentalistų problema - ne kad mes juos laikome menkesniais už save, bet greičiau tai, kad jie patys save laiko menkesniais. Štai kodėl mūsų melagingi, politiškai korektiški patikinimai, jog nesijaučiame anei kiek pranašesni, tik dar labiau juos siutina ir kelia apmaudą.
Taigi blogas asmuo nėra egoistas, "mąstantis tik apie savo paties interesus". Tikras egoistas yra pernelyg užsimėęs siekdamas sau gėrio, kad turėtų laiko pridaryti kitiems bėdų. Pirminė blogo asmens yda yra būtent ta, kad jam labiau rūpi kiti nei jis pats.
Prisiminkime gerai žinomą antropologinį anekdotą: "primityvai", kurie, manoma, turi tam tikrų prietaringų įsitikinimų (pavyzdžiui, kad yra kilę iš žuvies ar paukščio), paklausti apie tuos įsitikinimus tiesiai, atsako: "Žinoma, ne - mes ne tokie kvaili! Bet man pasakojo, kad kai kurie mūsų protėviai išties tuo tikėjo..." Trumpai tariant, jie perkelia savo tikėjimą kitam. <...> Kad ir kaip tai atrodytų keista, kai kurie tikėjimai visada atrodo funkcionuojantys "per atstumą": kad tikėjimas funkcionuotų, turi būti koks nors galutinis jo garantas, tačiau tas garantas visada atidėtas, perkeltas kitur, niekada nepasirodantis in persona. Žinoma, svarbiausia, kad šis kitas subjektas, kuris visiškai tiki, neprivalo egzistuoti, kad tikėjimas būtų veiksmingas.
March 4, 2009
If you're ready to go along with Zizek for the ride...this book is sure to take you out of whatever box you're currently in and do to your box exactly what the cover of this book portrays.
He may be self-indulgent, but it's a nice blend of psych, linguistics and philosophy that makes his case complete.
He may be self-indulgent, but it's a nice blend of psych, linguistics and philosophy that makes his case complete.
May 16, 2020
((گاهی کاری نکردن خشونت بار ترین کاری��ت که میتوان کرد.))جمله ای در پایان کتاب می آید و بهترین و شاید مفید ترین نتیجه ای است که میتوان از آن به دست آورد.
December 11, 2013
Nobody is subject to such diminishing returns as Zizek, in large part because by the time I've finished this review he'll have published two books. 'Violence' makes a great point about how difficult it is to write about violence: if you don't make a big show about how sympathetic you are to victims of (what we usually call) violence, you look like a psychopath; if you do put on that show, you're unlikely to say anything interesting. So, he argues, you have to write about violence obliquely. He proceeds to do this in six fairly uninteresting 'digressions.'
There's good analysis, nonetheless: he distinguishes subjective violence (roughly, when a known agent perpetuates a discrete act, like shooting someone), objective violence (roughly, injustice that can't be blamed on an individual agent; structural violence and so on), and symbolic violence, which I assume is linked to Lacan's 'symbolic', but that doesn't come up in the book after the introduction. That's probably for the best.
In the conclusion, Zizek suggests three lessons that can be taken from the book. First, the mere chastising of violence ('Mandela is a terrorist!') is pure ideology that ignores whatever a specific act of subjective violence is responding to (i.e., usually objective violence). Second, true violence disturbs the basic parameters of social life (= the symbolic?); this is almost impossible. Finally, the violence of an act is always contextual. For instance, in Saramago's 'Seeing,' the mere act of abstaining from the vote is 'violent', in the sense that it disturbs the way things have been going. This leads Zizek to claim that "doing nothing is the most violent thing to do."
But that is almost never true, no matter how you define violence. In between the analysis and the conclusion, there's a bunch of stuff you can get less painlessly from Zizek's other books. I can't be the only one for whom all the cultural analogies are getting both boring and intrusive. Can I?
There's good analysis, nonetheless: he distinguishes subjective violence (roughly, when a known agent perpetuates a discrete act, like shooting someone), objective violence (roughly, injustice that can't be blamed on an individual agent; structural violence and so on), and symbolic violence, which I assume is linked to Lacan's 'symbolic', but that doesn't come up in the book after the introduction. That's probably for the best.
In the conclusion, Zizek suggests three lessons that can be taken from the book. First, the mere chastising of violence ('Mandela is a terrorist!') is pure ideology that ignores whatever a specific act of subjective violence is responding to (i.e., usually objective violence). Second, true violence disturbs the basic parameters of social life (= the symbolic?); this is almost impossible. Finally, the violence of an act is always contextual. For instance, in Saramago's 'Seeing,' the mere act of abstaining from the vote is 'violent', in the sense that it disturbs the way things have been going. This leads Zizek to claim that "doing nothing is the most violent thing to do."
But that is almost never true, no matter how you define violence. In between the analysis and the conclusion, there's a bunch of stuff you can get less painlessly from Zizek's other books. I can't be the only one for whom all the cultural analogies are getting both boring and intrusive. Can I?
April 2, 2017
Why We Fight
2 April 2017
I must be starting to get a bit tired of Zizek, not because he isn't a bad writer, nor because he isn't confronting, but rather because, as another reviewer suggested, it has more to do with the law of diminishing returns than anything else. There was a time when I thought that I should read everything by an author that I loved (or admired) until I discovered that not everything that a great author writes is actually any good. In fact, like everything else, pretty much all authors suffer from the law of diminishing returns, and the more that they write, the worse the content tends to become. As I suggested at one time the key to becoming a successful author is not always writing good books (thought that does help, and writing something that becomes a modern classic is even better), but rather creating such a cult following that whenever you release a book you have a hoard of adoring fans that camp outside the local bookshop waiting for its release.
I have probably been a bit too harsh on this book though because as the same reviewer suggested, writing a book about violence without feeling some form of sympathy for the victim, is actually quite hard. In a sense we have this idea of violence being bad drilled into our minds that we end up becoming disconnected behind the reasons as to why people commit violence, and we also become somewhat desensitised to it when it is perpetrated a world away as opposed to being in our own back yard. However these is something of a dichotomy here because while our governments do everything to prevent violence being perpetrated against 'innocent' victims (such as the lock out laws in Sydney which basically forces pubs to close at around midnight, and also having something akin to passport control in some areas), we still seem to have violence being forced onto us from the television and cinema screen or on the sporting field. Isn't it interesting that a sport that is violent (such as football) draws larger crowds than sorts that aren't (such as lawn bowls – though sports like Baseball and Cricket seem to go against this trend).
The interesting thing about violence is that it does tend to be very victim focused, and we tend to want to deal with the perpetrator rather than looking at the reason why the perpetrators are committing the violent act. For instance we have the school yard bully that goes out of their way to pick on those weaker than them, but we never seem to look at the reasons as to why the bully is behaving in that manner, and one of the reasons I suspect that this is the case is because the bully is himself (or herself) also a victim of violence. For instance if a child were to grow up in a house where the father (or mother) is violent, then the child is not going to know any better, and the child is not only going to behave like that in public, but is also going to see this as a norm and behave like that in their adult lives. While I am not trying to justify the actions of the bully, particularly since I have been at the receiving end of it, we need to remember that violence rarely occurs in a vacuum.
One of the things that Zizek explores is the idea of the sacred cow, such as the Holocaust. In a sense it seems as if this is one of the reasons behind why there is such turmoil in the Israel/Palestinian territories. What is actually quite baffling is that Israel is actually a secular state (or at least it is according to Zizek), which makes it odd that they seem to use the religious writings as a reason to claim this particular land. Actually, it probably has more to do with tradition than anything else as to why they want this particular piece of territory, though interestingly many of the orthodox Jews really aren't interested in sharing it.
Actually, it isn't as if people in the past didn't want to give the Jews a territory of their own – the Russians gave them some land in the far reaches of Siberia, while the United Nations originally wanted to give them some land down near Oman – it is just that they wanted this particular piece of land, and basically started moving in, and even went as far as declaring themselves a country. Obviously all of the fundamentalist Christians got really excited over this because this was apparently a prophecy that had been fulfilled, though it does seem interesting that it is the Christians that are far more supportive of Israel on religious grounds than the Israelis, but as I suggested this probably has much more to do with tradition than any real religious basis.
A discussion on violence probably should at least explore the idea of religious violence. Isn't it interesting that for religions that are supposed to promote peace the supporters are actually quite violent in the way they go about propagating their faith – in a sense of believe or die. I'm not just talking about Christianity here because with most religions, and I'm not even narrowing myself to the people of the book, there is always this fear that one's religious view is going to be proven to be little more than nothing – basically somebody's whole basis of existence is being challenged, and if they are proven to be wrong then their entire life, and in fact their entire meaning for existence, is going to come to naught. The problem is that religions tend not to be flexible (and in talking about religion, I'm not referring to Buddhism because in my mind that is more of a philosophy).
The problem with religion is that it is inflexible, and practitioners tend not to want to be flexible – if one part of the religion is wrong then it is possible that everything is wrong, and people fear doubt. However, there is a difference between being wrong about an interpretation of religion, and the religion being wrong. However, many practitioners don't actually think for themselves, but rather follow some leader that they all believe is infallible. It would be interesting in seeing how many people drifted away from religion when the televangelists came out as being basically pretty corrupt. Yet even when they are exposed for the hedonists that they really are, they still manage to survive, and even flourish. Maybe it has something to do with this concept of repentance, and when they are seen as being human, they are accepted all the more – a leader that admits his flaws do tend to generate much more empathy than one who denies them. In a way it is all part of the stage show.
Taking this into account, it is not surprising that many practitioners of religion tend to be conservative, and many conservatives tend to live in rural areas. In the country the pace of life tends to be much slower, which means that the speed of development that occurs in the cities, as well as the interchange of ideas, tends to challenge the conservative. It goes without saying that conservatives do not like change, though I should probably suggest that what they don't like is fast change – things change, they always do, it is the nature of the universe, however change works better for most people when it is slow and gradual as opposed to when it is fast. Still, there are those that don't like change at all because that is how things have always been. I guess that is probably a good reason why I didn't end up moving out to the country because even though the money would have been nice, I also like change.
Which brings us back to violence – one of the reasons that conservatives react with violence when change happens is because they don't like change, and will violently attempt to suppress it. This is not just the rancher clutching his Bible and his gun, but also the Islamic fundamentalist that can't handle the changing pace of technology. Then again it is not only technology, it is basically attempting to make sure things stay the way that they have always been. Isn't it interesting that the rise of Islamic violence occurs now as opposed to back in the days of the British Empire – one of the reasons is the idea of gender equality. Back in the 20s women dressed a lot more modestly than they do now, but the other thing was that the British tended to rule on the cheap – namely they didn't really interfere with the cultural practices of the lands that they had conquered, unless they found the practice offensive (such as the widows throwing themselves onto their husband's pyre). However, when the Americans invaded Iraq it wasn't seen as liberating the Iraqis from a dictator, but rather Americanising the middle east. Rumour has it that Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea weren't members of the IMF, which also happen have been the countries on George Bush's axis of evil.
Which brings me to capitalism. Sure, I know I said that I would finish off with religion, but I feel that I should also say a few things about Capitalism because capitalism is inherently violent. It is all about greed and wealth, and people will go to great lengths to get as much money as possible. Isn't it interesting that if you rip off a bank you are a thief but if a bank rips you off then it is the normal course of doing business. The thing with capitalism is that it is always looking for new markets, and it will go to great lengths to open up these new markets. China and Japan for instance - neither countries wanted to participate in a world of global trade, but the British (and Americans) didn't take no for an answer and forced them to open up through violence – the British with the Opium Wars and the Americans by sailing a gunship into Tokyo harbour. No wonder the Japanese declared war against the United States in the 1940s.
Well, this is getting a bit long in the tooth, particularly for a book that I only gave a couple of stars However, I should make mention of Atheism. Zizek suggests that based upon the propensity for religious violence, Atheism is actually a peaceful religion. Look, I would disagree, not to the extent where some Christian preachers have claimed that because Stalin and Pol Pot were atheists and mass murderers therefore all atheists are mass murderers, but rather because of the lack of any moral basis. Sure, we have the old adage of do unto others (which is actually Christian), but in reality the whole idea of 'as long as it doesn't hurt anybody' is a bit of a fallacy because there are a lot of things that we do that causes lots of misery and heartache, it is just that because we don't see it, we pretend that it doesn't exist, which brings us back to where I started – violence is aberrant, but only if it is in our back yard.
2 April 2017
I must be starting to get a bit tired of Zizek, not because he isn't a bad writer, nor because he isn't confronting, but rather because, as another reviewer suggested, it has more to do with the law of diminishing returns than anything else. There was a time when I thought that I should read everything by an author that I loved (or admired) until I discovered that not everything that a great author writes is actually any good. In fact, like everything else, pretty much all authors suffer from the law of diminishing returns, and the more that they write, the worse the content tends to become. As I suggested at one time the key to becoming a successful author is not always writing good books (thought that does help, and writing something that becomes a modern classic is even better), but rather creating such a cult following that whenever you release a book you have a hoard of adoring fans that camp outside the local bookshop waiting for its release.
I have probably been a bit too harsh on this book though because as the same reviewer suggested, writing a book about violence without feeling some form of sympathy for the victim, is actually quite hard. In a sense we have this idea of violence being bad drilled into our minds that we end up becoming disconnected behind the reasons as to why people commit violence, and we also become somewhat desensitised to it when it is perpetrated a world away as opposed to being in our own back yard. However these is something of a dichotomy here because while our governments do everything to prevent violence being perpetrated against 'innocent' victims (such as the lock out laws in Sydney which basically forces pubs to close at around midnight, and also having something akin to passport control in some areas), we still seem to have violence being forced onto us from the television and cinema screen or on the sporting field. Isn't it interesting that a sport that is violent (such as football) draws larger crowds than sorts that aren't (such as lawn bowls – though sports like Baseball and Cricket seem to go against this trend).
The interesting thing about violence is that it does tend to be very victim focused, and we tend to want to deal with the perpetrator rather than looking at the reason why the perpetrators are committing the violent act. For instance we have the school yard bully that goes out of their way to pick on those weaker than them, but we never seem to look at the reasons as to why the bully is behaving in that manner, and one of the reasons I suspect that this is the case is because the bully is himself (or herself) also a victim of violence. For instance if a child were to grow up in a house where the father (or mother) is violent, then the child is not going to know any better, and the child is not only going to behave like that in public, but is also going to see this as a norm and behave like that in their adult lives. While I am not trying to justify the actions of the bully, particularly since I have been at the receiving end of it, we need to remember that violence rarely occurs in a vacuum.
One of the things that Zizek explores is the idea of the sacred cow, such as the Holocaust. In a sense it seems as if this is one of the reasons behind why there is such turmoil in the Israel/Palestinian territories. What is actually quite baffling is that Israel is actually a secular state (or at least it is according to Zizek), which makes it odd that they seem to use the religious writings as a reason to claim this particular land. Actually, it probably has more to do with tradition than anything else as to why they want this particular piece of territory, though interestingly many of the orthodox Jews really aren't interested in sharing it.
Actually, it isn't as if people in the past didn't want to give the Jews a territory of their own – the Russians gave them some land in the far reaches of Siberia, while the United Nations originally wanted to give them some land down near Oman – it is just that they wanted this particular piece of land, and basically started moving in, and even went as far as declaring themselves a country. Obviously all of the fundamentalist Christians got really excited over this because this was apparently a prophecy that had been fulfilled, though it does seem interesting that it is the Christians that are far more supportive of Israel on religious grounds than the Israelis, but as I suggested this probably has much more to do with tradition than any real religious basis.
A discussion on violence probably should at least explore the idea of religious violence. Isn't it interesting that for religions that are supposed to promote peace the supporters are actually quite violent in the way they go about propagating their faith – in a sense of believe or die. I'm not just talking about Christianity here because with most religions, and I'm not even narrowing myself to the people of the book, there is always this fear that one's religious view is going to be proven to be little more than nothing – basically somebody's whole basis of existence is being challenged, and if they are proven to be wrong then their entire life, and in fact their entire meaning for existence, is going to come to naught. The problem is that religions tend not to be flexible (and in talking about religion, I'm not referring to Buddhism because in my mind that is more of a philosophy).
The problem with religion is that it is inflexible, and practitioners tend not to want to be flexible – if one part of the religion is wrong then it is possible that everything is wrong, and people fear doubt. However, there is a difference between being wrong about an interpretation of religion, and the religion being wrong. However, many practitioners don't actually think for themselves, but rather follow some leader that they all believe is infallible. It would be interesting in seeing how many people drifted away from religion when the televangelists came out as being basically pretty corrupt. Yet even when they are exposed for the hedonists that they really are, they still manage to survive, and even flourish. Maybe it has something to do with this concept of repentance, and when they are seen as being human, they are accepted all the more – a leader that admits his flaws do tend to generate much more empathy than one who denies them. In a way it is all part of the stage show.
Taking this into account, it is not surprising that many practitioners of religion tend to be conservative, and many conservatives tend to live in rural areas. In the country the pace of life tends to be much slower, which means that the speed of development that occurs in the cities, as well as the interchange of ideas, tends to challenge the conservative. It goes without saying that conservatives do not like change, though I should probably suggest that what they don't like is fast change – things change, they always do, it is the nature of the universe, however change works better for most people when it is slow and gradual as opposed to when it is fast. Still, there are those that don't like change at all because that is how things have always been. I guess that is probably a good reason why I didn't end up moving out to the country because even though the money would have been nice, I also like change.
Which brings us back to violence – one of the reasons that conservatives react with violence when change happens is because they don't like change, and will violently attempt to suppress it. This is not just the rancher clutching his Bible and his gun, but also the Islamic fundamentalist that can't handle the changing pace of technology. Then again it is not only technology, it is basically attempting to make sure things stay the way that they have always been. Isn't it interesting that the rise of Islamic violence occurs now as opposed to back in the days of the British Empire – one of the reasons is the idea of gender equality. Back in the 20s women dressed a lot more modestly than they do now, but the other thing was that the British tended to rule on the cheap – namely they didn't really interfere with the cultural practices of the lands that they had conquered, unless they found the practice offensive (such as the widows throwing themselves onto their husband's pyre). However, when the Americans invaded Iraq it wasn't seen as liberating the Iraqis from a dictator, but rather Americanising the middle east. Rumour has it that Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea weren't members of the IMF, which also happen have been the countries on George Bush's axis of evil.
Which brings me to capitalism. Sure, I know I said that I would finish off with religion, but I feel that I should also say a few things about Capitalism because capitalism is inherently violent. It is all about greed and wealth, and people will go to great lengths to get as much money as possible. Isn't it interesting that if you rip off a bank you are a thief but if a bank rips you off then it is the normal course of doing business. The thing with capitalism is that it is always looking for new markets, and it will go to great lengths to open up these new markets. China and Japan for instance - neither countries wanted to participate in a world of global trade, but the British (and Americans) didn't take no for an answer and forced them to open up through violence – the British with the Opium Wars and the Americans by sailing a gunship into Tokyo harbour. No wonder the Japanese declared war against the United States in the 1940s.
Well, this is getting a bit long in the tooth, particularly for a book that I only gave a couple of stars However, I should make mention of Atheism. Zizek suggests that based upon the propensity for religious violence, Atheism is actually a peaceful religion. Look, I would disagree, not to the extent where some Christian preachers have claimed that because Stalin and Pol Pot were atheists and mass murderers therefore all atheists are mass murderers, but rather because of the lack of any moral basis. Sure, we have the old adage of do unto others (which is actually Christian), but in reality the whole idea of 'as long as it doesn't hurt anybody' is a bit of a fallacy because there are a lot of things that we do that causes lots of misery and heartache, it is just that because we don't see it, we pretend that it doesn't exist, which brings us back to where I started – violence is aberrant, but only if it is in our back yard.
Read
March 12, 2020این دفعه دومیه که میخوام این کتاب رو بخونم و نمیتونم. زبانش خیلی سخته نمیدونم به خاطر ترجمهس یا پیچیدگی نوشتار ژیژک یا شاید هم هردو.
June 30, 2019
امروزه علم عملاً با مذهب رقابت دارد زیرا دو نیاز ایدئولوژیک را برآورده میسازد که از دیرباز مذهب عهدهدار تأمینش بود نیاز به امید و نیاز به سانسور.
در خصوص حملات تروریستی بنیادگرایان، نخستین چیزی که جلب توجه میکند نارسایی این اندیشه است که اقدامات انسان دارای انگیزههای عقلاییست و میتوان آنها را برحسب باورها و تمنیات کنشگر توضیح داد : از جمله به عنوان توضیحی عقلایی برای اینکه چرا فرد مؤمن حاضر است خود را منفجر کند روی این باور انگشت میگذارد که در بهشت چهارصد دختر باکره انتظار او را میکشند. این نظریهها در تلاش برای اینکه دیگری را شبیه خودمان کنند وی را به شکل خندهداری عجیب و غریب میسازند.
بهترینها فاقد هرگونه اعتقادی هستند و بدترینها/آکنده از شوری آتشین. این توصیفی عالی از شکافیست که در حال حاضر بین لیبرالهای رنگپریده و بنیادگرایان پرشور وجود دارد. بهترینها دیگر قادر نیستند به طور کامل درگیر شوند حال آنکه بدترینها گرفتار خشکاندیشی نژادپرستانه، مذهبی، و جنسیتگرایانه اند.
یکی از راهبردهای رژیمهای تمامیتخواه یا توتالیتر این است که چنان مقررات حقوقی(قوانین کیفری) سختگیرانهای وضع میکنند که اگر نص آنها در نظر گرفته شود همگان مجرماند. ولی در مرحلهی بعد از اجرای کامل آنها امتناع میشود. بدینترتیب رژیم میتواند با گذشت بودن خود را به رخ بکشد.
( میبینید! اگر میخواستیم میتوانستیم همهتان را دستگیر و محکوم کنیم ولی نترسید ما اهل مدارا و آسانگیری هستیم..) در عین حال رژیم همواره اتباع خود را تهدید به تنبیه میکند : (بیش از حد با ما بازی درنیاورید یادتان باشد که هر لحظه میتوانیم..)
در خصوص حملات تروریستی بنیادگرایان، نخستین چیزی که جلب توجه میکند نارسایی این اندیشه است که اقدامات انسان دارای انگیزههای عقلاییست و میتوان آنها را برحسب باورها و تمنیات کنشگر توضیح داد : از جمله به عنوان توضیحی عقلایی برای اینکه چرا فرد مؤمن حاضر است خود را منفجر کند روی این باور انگشت میگذارد که در بهشت چهارصد دختر باکره انتظار او را میکشند. این نظریهها در تلاش برای اینکه دیگری را شبیه خودمان کنند وی را به شکل خندهداری عجیب و غریب میسازند.
بهترینها فاقد هرگونه اعتقادی هستند و بدترینها/آکنده از شوری آتشین. این توصیفی عالی از شکافیست که در حال حاضر بین لیبرالهای رنگپریده و بنیادگرایان پرشور وجود دارد. بهترینها دیگر قادر نیستند به طور کامل درگیر شوند حال آنکه بدترینها گرفتار خشکاندیشی نژادپرستانه، مذهبی، و جنسیتگرایانه اند.
یکی از راهبردهای رژیمهای تمامیتخواه یا توتالیتر این است که چنان مقررات حقوقی(قوانین کیفری) سختگیرانهای وضع میکنند که اگر نص آنها در نظر گرفته شود همگان مجرماند. ولی در مرحلهی بعد از اجرای کامل آنها امتناع میشود. بدینترتیب رژیم میتواند با گذشت بودن خود را به رخ بکشد.
( میبینید! اگر میخواستیم میتوانستیم همهتان را دستگیر و محکوم کنیم ولی نترسید ما اهل مدارا و آسانگیری هستیم..) در عین حال رژیم همواره اتباع خود را تهدید به تنبیه میکند : (بیش از حد با ما بازی درنیاورید یادتان باشد که هر لحظه میتوانیم..)
February 4, 2018
Zizek's main appeal and problem is that he's an idiosyncratic thinker and he's incapable of making his point without referring to pop culture. But it's what we love about him, right? His capacity of making us understand difficult things through what we know and love. Zizek is trying his damnedest not to do that here. This is very academic and while I've enjoyed his railing on invisible, systematic violence we all revel in (his passages on charity and philanthropy were absolutely scathing), but his ideas are not structured and hard to rein in, here. Fun book, but not as enlightening as I thought it would.
December 10, 2017
This is the first book by the prolific Slavoj Žižek that I have read. The most valuable aspect of his writing appears to be its provocation of thought. Žižek’s examples are often questionable, his arguments sometimes off the wall and the train of his thought off the tracks, but he has a brilliance that keeps making you think about things you haven’t thought about before, or at least not in a particular way.
This book is not about violence really, but then again, it's about a different sort of violence (and many other things) that we don't consider as violent, but should.
This book is not about violence really, but then again, it's about a different sort of violence (and many other things) that we don't consider as violent, but should.
October 26, 2018
"إن العنف ليس صفة مميزة لأفعال معينة، بل هو موزع بين أفعال وسياقاتها، بين النشاط وعدم النشاط، وبين الحركة والجمود، إن من شأن الفعل نفسه أن يعد عنيفا أو غير عنيف تبعا للسياق؛ أحيانا ربما تكون ابتسامة لبقة أشد عنفا من سورة غضب قاسية."
العنف لا يقتصر على ما درج في مخنا من صورة نمطية له حيث هناك أحدهم يقدم على ايذاء شخص ما أو يشتمه باسوأ ما يكون أو على شاكلة هذا الفعل من أمور، والكتاب يتحدث عن العنف بوجوهه الأخرى التي نستجيب لها وتحرك كل ما فينا من عنف كامن أو نتعرض لها ونشعر باذلال العنف ولكننا لا نستطيع تصريفه بمسماه الصحيح المناسب.
اختلف مع الكاتب في جانب عرضه للقضية الفلسطينية فهو كان معاديا لقيام الدولة الاسرائيلية ويرى فيها دولة قامت على العنف المحض والشر الواضح ولكنه لم يستطع تحليل الأمر بطريقة سليمة فعزى فشل كل المحاولات الاصلاحية بين الفلسطينيين والاسرائيليين لسيطرة الكسب الغريزي الشهووي بالدخول في نفق مسدود!
وأن الحل الحقيقي للمعضلة يتمثل بالدائرة الطبشورية للقدس أي تركها بلا شعب لكل العالم حيث تصبح ملاذا وراحة للمرتحلين!
نقاش هذه الفكرة ودحضها واضح كعين الشمس فطبيعة المحتل المعتد بقوته ولا قانون يردعه أو يخيفه التمادي كما وطبيعة صاحب الحق التمسك ورفض المساومة المذلة رغم أن حكام الجانب الأضعف ابدعوا في قبول أشد الحلول انتقاصا لنا والنكوص لا يكون من جانبهم في الأغلب -فالوفاء المبالغ فيه ليست من شيم الكلاب وحدها.
أما حل القدس بهذه الطريقة فهو حل رومنسي كيوت ولكنه مرفوض بكل قوانين المنطق.
وأيضا رغم محاولاته لتوضيح جانب المسلمين عند انتفاضتهم على الرسوم المهينة للرسول والأفعال التي صاحبتها، ومحاولته لتبرير الأمر بأسباب مختلفة فهو لا يزال ينتقص من الاسلام في كل دلالات كلماته فهو على أقل تقدير عند التحدث عن العنف السماوي والله تناول الإله من جانب مسيحي ويهودي وبوذي، وبهذا أظنه أوضح مثالا عمليا على العنف اللغوي الذي أبدع في التحدث عنه.
عدا ذلك الكتاب جيد جدا ويتناول العنف بطريقة جديدة وتستحق القراءة والنقاش، الاتفاق والاختلاف معه غير ضروري وليس المقياس لأهميته، إنما المواضيع والأفكار الثرية.
العنف لا يقتصر على ما درج في مخنا من صورة نمطية له حيث هناك أحدهم يقدم على ايذاء شخص ما أو يشتمه باسوأ ما يكون أو على شاكلة هذا الفعل من أمور، والكتاب يتحدث عن العنف بوجوهه الأخرى التي نستجيب لها وتحرك كل ما فينا من عنف كامن أو نتعرض لها ونشعر باذلال العنف ولكننا لا نستطيع تصريفه بمسماه الصحيح المناسب.
اختلف مع الكاتب في جانب عرضه للقضية الفلسطينية فهو كان معاديا لقيام الدولة الاسرائيلية ويرى فيها دولة قامت على العنف المحض والشر الواضح ولكنه لم يستطع تحليل الأمر بطريقة سليمة فعزى فشل كل المحاولات الاصلاحية بين الفلسطينيين والاسرائيليين لسيطرة الكسب الغريزي الشهووي بالدخول في نفق مسدود!
وأن الحل الحقيقي للمعضلة يتمثل بالدائرة الطبشورية للقدس أي تركها بلا شعب لكل العالم حيث تصبح ملاذا وراحة للمرتحلين!
نقاش هذه الفكرة ودحضها واضح كعين الشمس فطبيعة المحتل المعتد بقوته ولا قانون يردعه أو يخيفه التمادي كما وطبيعة صاحب الحق التمسك ورفض المساومة المذلة رغم أن حكام الجانب الأضعف ابدعوا في قبول أشد الحلول انتقاصا لنا والنكوص لا يكون من جانبهم في الأغلب -فالوفاء المبالغ فيه ليست من شيم الكلاب وحدها.
أما حل القدس بهذه الطريقة فهو حل رومنسي كيوت ولكنه مرفوض بكل قوانين المنطق.
وأيضا رغم محاولاته لتوضيح جانب المسلمين عند انتفاضتهم على الرسوم المهينة للرسول والأفعال التي صاحبتها، ومحاولته لتبرير الأمر بأسباب مختلفة فهو لا يزال ينتقص من الاسلام في كل دلالات كلماته فهو على أقل تقدير عند التحدث عن العنف السماوي والله تناول الإله من جانب مسيحي ويهودي وبوذي، وبهذا أظنه أوضح مثالا عمليا على العنف اللغوي الذي أبدع في التحدث عنه.
عدا ذلك الكتاب جيد جدا ويتناول العنف بطريقة جديدة وتستحق القراءة والنقاش، الاتفاق والاختلاف معه غير ضروري وليس المقياس لأهميته، إنما المواضيع والأفكار الثرية.
July 19, 2014
Zizek often seems like a mixed bag from what I've read/listened to of his thinking in the past, but this for the most part is actually pretty strong. His ideas about violence are, like most things Zizek, idiosyncratic; a blend of critical theory, Hegelian philosophy and psychoanalysis while at the same time a critical rejection and modification of each of those thing. But unlike some of his other writings, this one never gets too bogged down in tedious Lacanian/Hegelian nomenclature and he sticks to the topic at hand very tightly with plenty of real world examples. In fact this book probably offers the best take on the 2005 Paris riots that I've encountered anywhere. Zizek kind of tears into everyone in this book. Accusing both the political right and left of complacently refusing to really examine the deep structures of their beliefs on violence, tolerance, etc. There's not really a thesis here, which is fine by me. Like the subtitle says, these are reflections, not a prescription, not a manifesto. I think this book is actually a really good place to start if you want to get into Zizek, he seems to be at his best when the topic isn't one of his own choosing.
November 30, 2021
شاید بتوان گفت مقوله خشونت یکی از مهمترین مباحثی است که در دوران مدرن و خصوصا هزاره جدید مطرح شده است. به راستی ریشه انقلابهای خشونت آمیز، ظهور تفکرات افراطی مانند داعش، اتفاقاتی مانند غارت نیواورلئان پس از طوفان کاترینا چیست؟ چرا در عصری که تصور میشد دیگر جنگها به پایان رسیده است، هنوز هم چنین اتفاقاتی در جهان رخ میدهد؟
اسلاوی ژیژک سعی کرده است به مقوله خشونت از پنج زاویه بنگرد.
اول خشونت یاری طلب. در واقع خشونت به تنهایی منجر به خشونت نخواهد شد. ژیژک معتقد است خشونت دو نوع دارد اول خشونت کنشگرانه و دوم خشونت کنشپذیرانه که آن نوع خشونتی است که تنها به مدد حضور در نوع خاصی از اجتماع به ما تحمیل میشود. حضور در یک جامعه نژادپرست ما را به خودی خود یک نژادپرست خواهد کرد.
دوم از همسایهات چونان خودت بترس. در این فصل ژیژک به دنبال آن است که ببیند چگونه در جوامع غربی افراد حتی از همسایههای خود نیز میترسند؟ یک استدلال جالبی که ژیژک مطرح میکند آن است که در سنت مسیحیت که معتقد است تمام ابنا بشر با یکدیگر برادرند در واقع در دل خود این گزاره عدم برادری مستتر است. حال آنکه تساهل یهودیان که به چنین گزارهای اعتقاد ندارند بسیار بیشتر از مسیحیت است. به چه صورت؟ در واقع مسیحیان با این کار نوعی استحاله را در فرهنگ هم خود و هم «دیگری» ایجاد کردهاند که در نهایت به نوعی از خود بیگانگی در افراد دامن میزند.
سوم موجی خونین بلند شده است. در این فصل به تبیین مفهوم شناسی خود خشونت پرداخته شده است. ژیژک معتقد است خشونتهای حومه پاریس یا نیواورلئان حاوی پیام نبودند بلکه خودشان پیام بودند. پیامی از یک قشر آسیب دیده و حذف شده که در نهایت این پیام در خشونت نمایان شد.
چهارم تساهل چونان مقولهای ایدئولوژیک. در این فصل نیز ژیژک به نقل تساهل لیبرالی میپردازد. وی معتقد است اتفاقا تساهل لیبرالی نه تنها باعث کاهش خشونت نمیشود بلکه خود یکی از دلایل ایجاد خشونت است. همچنین در این فصل به تناقضهای موجود در مفهوم تساهل لیبرالی میپردازد.
پنجم خشونت خدایگانی. خشونتی خارج از برنامه که معنای خود را از بیمعنایی میگیرد. هنگامی که حضرت ایوب (ع) دچار بلاهای متعددی شد عدهای سعی کردند وی را متقاعد کنند که این بلاها دلیلی دارد. اما ایوب میدانست که دلیل این بلاها در بی دلیلی نهفته است. گاهی نیز خشونت مردم صرفا از عدم دلیل بر میآید برای فهم دقیق آن خشونت باید به یک تصویر کلانتر رجوع کرد که ممکن است در آن زمان در دسترس ما نباشد.
اسلاوی ژیژک سعی کرده است به مقوله خشونت از پنج زاویه بنگرد.
اول خشونت یاری طلب. در واقع خشونت به تنهایی منجر به خشونت نخواهد شد. ژیژک معتقد است خشونت دو نوع دارد اول خشونت کنشگرانه و دوم خشونت کنشپذیرانه که آن نوع خشونتی است که تنها به مدد حضور در نوع خاصی از اجتماع به ما تحمیل میشود. حضور در یک جامعه نژادپرست ما را به خودی خود یک نژادپرست خواهد کرد.
دوم از همسایهات چونان خودت بترس. در این فصل ژیژک به دنبال آن است که ببیند چگونه در جوامع غربی افراد حتی از همسایههای خود نیز میترسند؟ یک استدلال جالبی که ژیژک مطرح میکند آن است که در سنت مسیحیت که معتقد است تمام ابنا بشر با یکدیگر برادرند در واقع در دل خود این گزاره عدم برادری مستتر است. حال آنکه تساهل یهودیان که به چنین گزارهای اعتقاد ندارند بسیار بیشتر از مسیحیت است. به چه صورت؟ در واقع مسیحیان با این کار نوعی استحاله را در فرهنگ هم خود و هم «دیگری» ایجاد کردهاند که در نهایت به نوعی از خود بیگانگی در افراد دامن میزند.
سوم موجی خونین بلند شده است. در این فصل به تبیین مفهوم شناسی خود خشونت پرداخته شده است. ژیژک معتقد است خشونتهای حومه پاریس یا نیواورلئان حاوی پیام نبودند بلکه خودشان پیام بودند. پیامی از یک قشر آسیب دیده و حذف شده که در نهایت این پیام در خشونت نمایان شد.
چهارم تساهل چونان مقولهای ایدئولوژیک. در این فصل نیز ژیژک به نقل تساهل لیبرالی میپردازد. وی معتقد است اتفاقا تساهل لیبرالی نه تنها باعث کاهش خشونت نمیشود بلکه خود یکی از دلایل ایجاد خشونت است. همچنین در این فصل به تناقضهای موجود در مفهوم تساهل لیبرالی میپردازد.
پنجم خشونت خدایگانی. خشونتی خارج از برنامه که معنای خود را از بیمعنایی میگیرد. هنگامی که حضرت ایوب (ع) دچار بلاهای متعددی شد عدهای سعی کردند وی را متقاعد کنند که این بلاها دلیلی دارد. اما ایوب میدانست که دلیل این بلاها در بی دلیلی نهفته است. گاهی نیز خشونت مردم صرفا از عدم دلیل بر میآید برای فهم دقیق آن خشونت باید به یک تصویر کلانتر رجوع کرد که ممکن است در آن زمان در دسترس ما نباشد.
October 23, 2023
Esse livro é cheio de ideias geniais e citações maravilhosas e oportunas à poesia, cinema, teatro e excertos de filósofos que provavelmente nunca irei ler na vida como Walter Benjamin e Derrida.
É, portanto, uma leitura muito prazerosa. Mas o estilo literário é, ao mesmo tempo, a grande virtude e a grande tragédia dessa coletânea de ensaios sobre violência. É a grande tragédia porque claramente as lições dos textos seriam mais fáceis de apreender se o livro fosse mais organizado. Estilo demais sempre fere conteúdo. Às vezes de morte. Não é o caso, contudo.
De todo modo, consola o fato de que essa organização do livro, que deixa o leitor com mais dúvidas que respostas, é proposital.
Não há necessidade de ler todo o texto para capturar algumas ideias interessantes. Se um dia você topar com esse livro e não puder ler tudo, recomendo a leitura dos ensaios: "SOS Violence", que distingue violência subjetiva e objetiva; e "Divine violence", que trata da violência não teleológica
É, portanto, uma leitura muito prazerosa. Mas o estilo literário é, ao mesmo tempo, a grande virtude e a grande tragédia dessa coletânea de ensaios sobre violência. É a grande tragédia porque claramente as lições dos textos seriam mais fáceis de apreender se o livro fosse mais organizado. Estilo demais sempre fere conteúdo. Às vezes de morte. Não é o caso, contudo.
De todo modo, consola o fato de que essa organização do livro, que deixa o leitor com mais dúvidas que respostas, é proposital.
Não há necessidade de ler todo o texto para capturar algumas ideias interessantes. Se um dia você topar com esse livro e não puder ler tudo, recomendo a leitura dos ensaios: "SOS Violence", que distingue violência subjetiva e objetiva; e "Divine violence", que trata da violência não teleológica
May 24, 2011
واقعا عالی بود، خیلی خوشم اومد به خصوص جمعبندی آخرش تو "پسگفتار". اواسط و اواخر کتاب قصد داشتم به خاطر ترجمهی ضعیفش 4 بدم ولی با خوندن قسمت آخر دیدم واقعا باید 5 بدم حتی با این ترجمه.
February 10, 2009
It feels more than a little strange to be reading and enjoying a book calling for the violent overthrow of capitalism and liberal democracy when my most fervent political hope of the moment is that Barack Obama will re-start the American economy by passing an effective stimulus bill, and humanize American capitalism by re-regulating big business and enacting some form of universal health care legislation. But I did enjoy the book and that is what Zizek is calling for here isn't it? Or is it?
The fact is he's a little cagey about that. On the one hand the book takes the idea that capitalism desperately needs to be abolished as its premise. There's no attempt to argue with those who believe that it really needs to be reformed, perhaps drastically so, but reformed nevertheless. Zizek takes it's irredeemability as a given, and for the most part he's preaching to a choir of readers who hold the same conviction. But this reader was left with some confusion as to just what he means by violence and just when it might be justified. And just what kind of society is to follow in its wake.
Zizek claims that there are two kinds of violence: objective and subjective. Counterintuitively, Zizek terms physical violence subjective violence, while objective violence is the set of invisible but nonetheless coercive social/cultural/political structures (norms, habits, laws, conventions etc.) that govern the way we think and act. All people, in other words, are subject to coercion, to "violence," all the time. All of us are forced, or strongly encouraged, to act and think a certain way "against our will," not in the sense that we consciously and openly object to the way things are, but because we are thrown into a world not of our own making, and are unable to imagine, much less bring into being, a radically different state of things. We can't see beyond the limits set by ideology, and indeed our very subjectivities (which are as fluid as they are fixed) are created and defined by ideology. Physical/subjective violence is just the tip of the iceberg. By declaring physical violence the only form of violence worthy of the name, ideology masks all the other more fundamental forms of coercion, of violence, that we are all subject to every moment of our lives.
So, in other words, Zizek defines violence quite broadly, and this does three things: 1) softens the readers resistance to his claim that violence is a legitimate, indeed necessary, political tactic 2) allows him to call lots of things violence that one wouldn't necessarily think of as violence--like "nonviolently" withdrawing consent from a given political regime and 3) blurs the line between nonviolent resistance and the kind of violence that leads to the direct loss of human life, or that has the taking of human life as one of its primary tactics (although, admittedly, classic forms of nonviolence rely on the willingness of their opponents to use violence as part of their political effectiveness).
If I'm reading him correctly (and I'm by no means sure I am, so someone correct me if I'm wrong), Zizek endorses "emancipatory" violence, by which he means violence that aims at "a radical upheaval of the basic social relations." He cites the terror that followed the French Revolution and the killings carried out by Che Guevara during and after the Cuban Revolution as acceptable instances of genuinely revolutionary violence. Hitler's and Stalin's killings, by contrast, do not qualify as revolutionary violence because they don't effect "a radical upheaval of the basic social relations" (though I think at one point he says that Stalin's forced collectivization was closer to genuine revolutionary violence than the terror that accompanied the Moscow show trials). At the same time he seems to argue that the most effective form of violence at the moment is some form of passive violence, some form of withdrawal of consent from the system. He cites the Saramago novel Seeing, where the majority of the citizens of a country cast blank ballots, creating a crisis of legitimacy. He quotes Lenin to the effect that the best thing to do is not to act but to hunker down and study, to "learn, learn and learn." The final paragraph of the book reads: "If one means by violence a radical upheaval of the basic social relations, then, crazy and tasteless as it may sound, the problem with historical monsters who slaughtered millions was that they were not violent enough. Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do."
How does one read this statement? Does it mean that if Hitler and Stalin had slaughtered millions AND effected a "radical upheaval of the basic social relations", then those deaths would be justified? Because, theoretically at least, one could abolish capitalism AND kill 6 million Jews. The two are not mutually exclusive. Or does it mean that more classically nonviolent means are a more effective form of "violence"?
There's lots of dazzling analysis in Zizek, but if one treats it as something more than just a politics of the academy, as a call to action of sorts, it becomes extremely problematic. The first and most obvious objection is that if the main criteria for the use of violence is that it aim at a "radical upheaval of the basic social relations", then violence deployed in the service of dystopian political aims is just as justifiable as violence deployed for laudable aims. Zizek argues that Hitler did not actually aim at a "radical upheaval of the basic social relations", but in principle there's no reason why one can't imagine a fundamentally reordered society based on white supremacy, or some other equally despicable ideology. This criteria is too value neutral about the society that is to follow.
Next, if everyone's psyche/self is fundamentally distorted by ideology, then everyone is both guilty and innocent at the same time. Zizek is fond of chiding leftists who believe that you can make a revolutionary omelette without breaking a few counterrevolutionary eggs. So he's a bit more honest than the revolutionary beautiful souls who believe you can have a total socio-economic transformation without some equivalent of the secret police. But if we are all more or less bamboozled by ideology all the time, it would be well nigh impossible to sort out the guilty from the innocent in any event.
Zizek seems to be striving for something more than a politics of the academy, but for a social democrat like me his writings are interesting as literature, but less than useful as a spur to political action. Maybe the best way to describe his appeal, to me at any rate, is that he is a useful person to think against. Personally I am morally committed to an extremely pragmatic politics focused on technocratic and incremental solutions to small and manageable problems. Or more sweeping solutions to not-so-small and manageable problems, as in the case of the current economic collapse, or larger injustices like botched wars of choice, or equal rights for gay people. I think the individual dignity and flourishing of ordinary people should be the main goal of governing, and that people ought to be able to decide for themselves what the conditions of their dignity and flourishing are (one way Zizek is useful is in exploring the psychological and ideological barriers to even imagining such conditions). And I think that too often political theorists of a certain stripe are intoxicated by ideas of total emancipation, and individual lives, and the modest expectations that govern them, get discounted in favor of totalizing visions of the good society. I enjoy reading Zizek, but I don't think I'd want him running the world.
On the other hand, what's probably more accurate is that when people like Zizek start running the world, they necessarily become pragmatists!
The fact is he's a little cagey about that. On the one hand the book takes the idea that capitalism desperately needs to be abolished as its premise. There's no attempt to argue with those who believe that it really needs to be reformed, perhaps drastically so, but reformed nevertheless. Zizek takes it's irredeemability as a given, and for the most part he's preaching to a choir of readers who hold the same conviction. But this reader was left with some confusion as to just what he means by violence and just when it might be justified. And just what kind of society is to follow in its wake.
Zizek claims that there are two kinds of violence: objective and subjective. Counterintuitively, Zizek terms physical violence subjective violence, while objective violence is the set of invisible but nonetheless coercive social/cultural/political structures (norms, habits, laws, conventions etc.) that govern the way we think and act. All people, in other words, are subject to coercion, to "violence," all the time. All of us are forced, or strongly encouraged, to act and think a certain way "against our will," not in the sense that we consciously and openly object to the way things are, but because we are thrown into a world not of our own making, and are unable to imagine, much less bring into being, a radically different state of things. We can't see beyond the limits set by ideology, and indeed our very subjectivities (which are as fluid as they are fixed) are created and defined by ideology. Physical/subjective violence is just the tip of the iceberg. By declaring physical violence the only form of violence worthy of the name, ideology masks all the other more fundamental forms of coercion, of violence, that we are all subject to every moment of our lives.
So, in other words, Zizek defines violence quite broadly, and this does three things: 1) softens the readers resistance to his claim that violence is a legitimate, indeed necessary, political tactic 2) allows him to call lots of things violence that one wouldn't necessarily think of as violence--like "nonviolently" withdrawing consent from a given political regime and 3) blurs the line between nonviolent resistance and the kind of violence that leads to the direct loss of human life, or that has the taking of human life as one of its primary tactics (although, admittedly, classic forms of nonviolence rely on the willingness of their opponents to use violence as part of their political effectiveness).
If I'm reading him correctly (and I'm by no means sure I am, so someone correct me if I'm wrong), Zizek endorses "emancipatory" violence, by which he means violence that aims at "a radical upheaval of the basic social relations." He cites the terror that followed the French Revolution and the killings carried out by Che Guevara during and after the Cuban Revolution as acceptable instances of genuinely revolutionary violence. Hitler's and Stalin's killings, by contrast, do not qualify as revolutionary violence because they don't effect "a radical upheaval of the basic social relations" (though I think at one point he says that Stalin's forced collectivization was closer to genuine revolutionary violence than the terror that accompanied the Moscow show trials). At the same time he seems to argue that the most effective form of violence at the moment is some form of passive violence, some form of withdrawal of consent from the system. He cites the Saramago novel Seeing, where the majority of the citizens of a country cast blank ballots, creating a crisis of legitimacy. He quotes Lenin to the effect that the best thing to do is not to act but to hunker down and study, to "learn, learn and learn." The final paragraph of the book reads: "If one means by violence a radical upheaval of the basic social relations, then, crazy and tasteless as it may sound, the problem with historical monsters who slaughtered millions was that they were not violent enough. Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do."
How does one read this statement? Does it mean that if Hitler and Stalin had slaughtered millions AND effected a "radical upheaval of the basic social relations", then those deaths would be justified? Because, theoretically at least, one could abolish capitalism AND kill 6 million Jews. The two are not mutually exclusive. Or does it mean that more classically nonviolent means are a more effective form of "violence"?
There's lots of dazzling analysis in Zizek, but if one treats it as something more than just a politics of the academy, as a call to action of sorts, it becomes extremely problematic. The first and most obvious objection is that if the main criteria for the use of violence is that it aim at a "radical upheaval of the basic social relations", then violence deployed in the service of dystopian political aims is just as justifiable as violence deployed for laudable aims. Zizek argues that Hitler did not actually aim at a "radical upheaval of the basic social relations", but in principle there's no reason why one can't imagine a fundamentally reordered society based on white supremacy, or some other equally despicable ideology. This criteria is too value neutral about the society that is to follow.
Next, if everyone's psyche/self is fundamentally distorted by ideology, then everyone is both guilty and innocent at the same time. Zizek is fond of chiding leftists who believe that you can make a revolutionary omelette without breaking a few counterrevolutionary eggs. So he's a bit more honest than the revolutionary beautiful souls who believe you can have a total socio-economic transformation without some equivalent of the secret police. But if we are all more or less bamboozled by ideology all the time, it would be well nigh impossible to sort out the guilty from the innocent in any event.
Zizek seems to be striving for something more than a politics of the academy, but for a social democrat like me his writings are interesting as literature, but less than useful as a spur to political action. Maybe the best way to describe his appeal, to me at any rate, is that he is a useful person to think against. Personally I am morally committed to an extremely pragmatic politics focused on technocratic and incremental solutions to small and manageable problems. Or more sweeping solutions to not-so-small and manageable problems, as in the case of the current economic collapse, or larger injustices like botched wars of choice, or equal rights for gay people. I think the individual dignity and flourishing of ordinary people should be the main goal of governing, and that people ought to be able to decide for themselves what the conditions of their dignity and flourishing are (one way Zizek is useful is in exploring the psychological and ideological barriers to even imagining such conditions). And I think that too often political theorists of a certain stripe are intoxicated by ideas of total emancipation, and individual lives, and the modest expectations that govern them, get discounted in favor of totalizing visions of the good society. I enjoy reading Zizek, but I don't think I'd want him running the world.
On the other hand, what's probably more accurate is that when people like Zizek start running the world, they necessarily become pragmatists!
February 19, 2021
what a truly superb and insightful book - loved the imagery at the end of the state almost being an insolent child relying on democratic participation of the masses , concluding on inaction being the most violent thing to do!
it’s cynical and gives you some proper good thinking points and even makes you laugh !!! creasing 24/7 at this hew
it’s cynical and gives you some proper good thinking points and even makes you laugh !!! creasing 24/7 at this hew
August 3, 2023
This is like the political theory version of good quality cocaine.
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