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Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General
Originally published in Germany in 1955, and in England and the United States in 1958, this classic memoir of WWII by a man who was an acknowledged military genius and probably Germany's top WWII general, is now made available again. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described his book as a personal narrative of a soldier, discussing only those matters that had direct bearing on events in the military field. The essential thing, as he wrote, is to "know how the main personalities thought and reacted to events." This is what he tells us in this book. His account is detailed, yet dispassionate and objective. "Nothing is certain in war, when all is said and done," But in Manstein's record, at least, we can see clearly what forces were in action. In retrospect, perhaps his book takes on an even greater significance.
592 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1955
About the author
Erich von Manstein
21 books20 followersErich von Manstein served the German military as a lifelong professional soldier. He became one of the most prominent commanders of Germany's World War II armed forces (Wehrmacht). During World War II he attained the rank of Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) and was held in high esteem by his fellow officers as one of the Wehrmacht's best military minds.
He was the initiator and one of the planners of the Ardennes-offensive alternative in the invasion of France in 1940. He received acclaim from the German leadership for the victorious battles of Perekop Isthmus, Kerch, Sevastopol and Kharkov. He commanded the failed relief effort at Stalingrad and the Cherkassy pocket evacuation. He was dismissed from service by Adolf Hitler in March 1944, due to his frequent clashes with Hitler over military strategy.
In 1949 he was tried in Hamburg for war crimes and was convicted of "Neglecting to protect civilian lives" and using scorched earth tactics which denied vital food supplies to the local population. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison, later reduced to 12 but he only served 4 years before being released. Although claiming ignorance of the Holocaust, von Manstein nevertheless had shown disregard for the plight the of Jews, equating them with partisans and advocating harsh measures against both. After release from a British prison in 1953, he became a military advisor to the West German Government.
Excerpted from Wikipedia.
He was the initiator and one of the planners of the Ardennes-offensive alternative in the invasion of France in 1940. He received acclaim from the German leadership for the victorious battles of Perekop Isthmus, Kerch, Sevastopol and Kharkov. He commanded the failed relief effort at Stalingrad and the Cherkassy pocket evacuation. He was dismissed from service by Adolf Hitler in March 1944, due to his frequent clashes with Hitler over military strategy.
In 1949 he was tried in Hamburg for war crimes and was convicted of "Neglecting to protect civilian lives" and using scorched earth tactics which denied vital food supplies to the local population. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison, later reduced to 12 but he only served 4 years before being released. Although claiming ignorance of the Holocaust, von Manstein nevertheless had shown disregard for the plight the of Jews, equating them with partisans and advocating harsh measures against both. After release from a British prison in 1953, he became a military advisor to the West German Government.
Excerpted from Wikipedia.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 85 reviews
March 18, 2008
If Rommel was Germany's greatest fighting general from WWII, von Manstein was her greatest strategic general. A tremendous book, especially for its insights into dealing personally with Hitler (not easy!)
June 13, 2009
Having first read this book in 1988 I find that it is still one of the best military memoirs of WW2. It stands next to 'Panzer Leader' by Heinz Guderian, 'Neither Fear Nor Hope' by General F. Von Senger Und Etterlin and 'The Rommel Papers'. The book is very easy to read and is valuable to any one who wishes to understand 'the other side of the hill'. His accounts of the various actions he was involved in during the War are excellent and his views on Hitler and German strategy make this a great book.
January 8, 2023
Satan's general: From the forests of France to the steppes of Russia, Von Manstein was there, in victory and defeat. Erich von Manstein was the finest field commander of the Second World War. Consider that he personally drew up the plans for the Ardennes offensive that defeated the French in forty days in the summer of 1940, although to be fair Hitler had already reached the same conclusion, against his own general staff. A repeat of the Von Schifflien pivot through Belgium in 1914 could be easily defeated by the French, who possessed the largest army in the world. Victory over the Anglo-French required a bold stroke through supposedly impenetrable forests and rivers. During the Russo-German War von Manstein performed the most difficult task of Barbarossa---the taking of Crimea, though Sebastopol turned out to be a bitch, with the Soviets holding out for months. Von Manstein fought the only part of the battle of Kursk that actually produced some success; the attack on the Red Army bulge through its southern flank. After the defeat at Stalingrad von Manstein withdrew the German troops stationed in the Caucasus with minimal losses, thus prolonging the war for at least another year, to the horror of both Germany and the Soviet Union. Von Manstein's memoirs, like that of most generals, blame the politicians for his failures. (See, for instance, the memoirs of Gen. Bernard Montgomery.) I'll end with his assessment of Adolf Hitler: "Hitler had both the virtues and faults of the amateur in war. He was keener than most professional soldiers to try new tactics but also insisted on never retreating and always going on the offensive. Generals know sometimes it is necessary to cede territory and fight defensively in order to gain time for a fresh offensive". True, but Hitler always said, "the only thing generals learn at military school is how to hold a knife and fork properly".
June 15, 2023
I feel it's hard for me to review this book, and to write out a review itself and I have my reasons. While I found the book an easy read, written really well, and while I enjoyed it, I have my reservations about the author and the premise behind his memoirs. I will not doubt that Erich von Manstein was a military genius, the same applying to Guderian, Rommel, and others. But what I couldn't get past was how to judge the man and what he wrote in his memoirs. Was he an opportunist? was he honest? It seems that the German generals who wrote memoirs in the post war era made Hitler a scapegoat for their defeat, and claimed the Wehrmacht had no involvement in the atrocities that Nazi Germany committed. In recent years, their claims have become dubious and their works are viewed with much more apprehension, but I feel it is important to read what they wrote and study it even if it is whitewashed. A historian is supposed to think with reason, logic, and view things with an objective eye, and so when it came to reading this book, I had to read it objectively, question the validity of what Manstein was saying, but at the same time trying to balance the scales and listen to his argument.
Putting this aside and judging the book itself, I would give it a 4 star rating, because I enjoyed it and found it a good read.
August 11, 2023
Von Manstein was one of the most respected military commanders of the 20th century, so his memoirs are more than useful for everyone who wants to know more about military art. The only thing that impedes a maximal mark is the technical part of the book, which makes it rather difficult for the usual reader.
None the less, this is the most valuable argument that makes Lost Victories a matter of study for those who try to understand mechanisms of war. So, a interesting book, but also a hard one to deal with.
None the less, this is the most valuable argument that makes Lost Victories a matter of study for those who try to understand mechanisms of war. So, a interesting book, but also a hard one to deal with.
May 3, 2012
This was a really great book and I can't believe I haven't read this up until now. I can tell anyone that is interested in this area of history that this is a must read for WW II Eastern front military history buffs. Unlike the last set of books I just read written by David Glantz this book is very approachable for the person who has an interest in this area of history and wants a taste of what it was like from the viewpoint of a German general. This would be like reading a biography of a Confederate general shortly after the Civil War, to give some perspective, but not just any general. Erich von Manstein was the Robert E Lee/ Stonewall Jackson of the German army from a tactics and strategy stand point all rolled into one. His writing style and the information he conveys is very succinct and easy to follow regardless the subject matter he is discussing. He covers not only the battles he was involved but also the interactions with Hitler and he even has some personal matters he touches on including the death of his son. This is the type of biography I have always enjoyed reading as you get the persons view point and his thoughts totally unvarnished. Now in this particular case I know that Manstein glosses over the atrocities committed by German soldiers and he makes no mention of the Holocaust as did all the biographies written by any of the German generals. Knowing the context of the writing it still was a fascinating read about the largest conflict in human history told by a man who was in the middle of events both on the battlefield and behind the lines. Don't read this if you are looking for a factual based history of the war which deals with objective truth about the events and the people but do read it if you want a first hand account of battles and events Erich von Manstein saw and influenced during WWII.
Highly recommended
Highly recommended
November 21, 2016
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was probably the best operational commander the Germans produced during World War II, and possibly the best of any side; certainly he was up there with Slim, Patton, and Chuikov. This is his memoir, written in the 1950s. It is a purely military memoir, and very rarely goes into any personal or political topics.
The book begins with a very brief description of Manstein's service prior to the 1930s, having reached the rank of Captain by the end of World War I. He then describes his service largely as a staff officer during Germany's resurgence and the rebuilding of the armed forces under Hitler. He was Gerd von Rundsted's chief of staff during the 1939 Polish campaign. After that, he put considerable energy into devising a plan for the invasion of France--and just as much energy getting someone at the highest echelons of the Wehrmacht to notice his plan. Almost belatedly, his plan was adopted more or less intact, and Manstein got to help execute it as a corps commander. His contribution to the campaign in France earned him a promotion to general. This episode is covered in Part I (Poland--three chapters) and Part II (France--four chapters).
The remainder of the book (almost 300 pages) is devoted to Manstein's operations on the Eastern Front. A few months before the invasion of Russia, he was given command of LVI Panzer Korps in the north, part of the drive to quickly seize Leningrad. He and his troops performed very well, but as they were nearing their goal, Manstein was suddenly transferred to the Ukraine to take over 11th Army of Army Group South. His "Panzer drive" is described in a 25-page chapter.
His new task was the conquest of the Crimean peninsula. After initial successes, 11th Army had to fight off Soviet counterattacks and amphibious landings in their rear, which hindered their efforts to subdue the fortress city of Sevastopol. Showing great operational flexibility and creativity, Manstein dealt with these threats and then refocused efforts on Sevastopol, which fell to the Germans in July 1942. Manstein was promoted to field marshal as a result. He recounts the Crimea campaign in a single 55-page chapter.
Fresh from that success, Hitler moved Manstein back to the Leningrad front with orders to finally take that city. Just as Manstein arrived, however, the Soviets launched a series of large counterattacks which Manstein fended off, but which prevented the Germans from mounting their own assault on the city. Manstein writes about this in a 15-page chapter.
Then begins the main story of this memoir--Manstein's tenure as commander of Army Group Don (later called Army Group South). As a result of the foolish attempt to take the major city of Stalingrad and drive into the Caucasus to take the oil fields there, the Germans in the south were badly overextended, and forced to rely on the sub-standard armies of their allies the Italians, Rumanians, and Hungarians. In November 1942 the Soviets launched a major offensive which cut off the entire 6th Army at Stalingrad, and destroyed two Rumanian armies. Hitler sent Manstein south, hoping he could find a way to salvage the situation for the Germans. Long story short: he was never able to stop the Soviets or regain German initiative in the south (except for the brief offensive at Kursk), but he did, on numerous occasions, keep the Soviets from penetrating and surrounding the entire southern wing of the German army, which could have shortened the war by a year or even two. Manstein displayed operational brilliance on many occasions, but he was continually hamstrung by Hitler's "to the last man" directives, his parsimonious supply of reinforcements and replacements, and his refusal to make decisions on a timely basis. Manstein describes his interactions with Hitler, and analyzes Hitler's weaknesses as a military commander, in some depth on several occasions in the last few hundred pages of the book.
Lost Victories ends rather abruptly with Manstein's account of how he was unceremoniously transferred by Hitler from command of Army Group South to a "reserve" position back in Germany, a result of their repeated head-butting and Hitler's perception that Manstein was publicly questioning Hitler's ability to command. He does not describe how he finished the war, or how he escaped the frequently fatal chaos of the final days of the Reich.
Manstein was a proud German officer of the Prussian tradition, which led to repeated contretemps with Hitler over how the war in the East should be conducted. In this book he doesn't pass much judgement on Hitler's choices of strategic objectives, and he recognizes that some objectives had political or economic significance that a purely military planner would have ignored. But he wanted Hitler and the OKW to give him the independence due an army group commander to figure out how to achieve objectives in his own way. His biggest problem was Hitler's insistence on holding every inch of ground captured, which placed too great a burden on the Germans' over-extended and exhausted troops. As Manstein notes, such an approach ignores the ancient military dictum that "he who defends everything ends up holding nothing." Manstein wanted the flexibility to trade space for time, as the Russians had done so successfully; he wanted to have a mobile reserve to counterattack any Soviet penetrations, and to smash attacks as they were forming; but Hitler's micro-management and political machinations prevented this time and again, with disastrous results for the German Army on the Eastern Front.
Manstein also doesn't mention his part in the postwar Nuremburg trials, in which he was tried for turning a blind eye to the activities of the Einsatzgruppen who followed in the wake of his armies, murdering Jews and other declared enemies of the Nazi state. Accounts of the trial, the case against Manstein, and his defense are readily available online.
The things Manstein leaves out of Lost Victories are as important as the things he discusses, and lead one to search out other sources to fill in the lacunae. This perception that Manstein was covering for himself in this memoir are strengthened by the fact that this edition is a heavily edited version of the original, with many personal anecdotes excised, and the entire chapter on Operation Citadel (Kursk) has been replaced entirely with an article Manstein wrote for the Marine Corps Gazette, which I found wholly disappointing.
On the plus side, the book includes many very useful maps that cover the entirety the text. Even if they are sometimes cluttered, they are very well drawn and virtually all place names included in the narrative can be found on at least one map, making it very easy to follow the sometimes swirling action. Speaking of that, special kudos to the translator, Anthony Powell, who has taken sometimes convoluted German syntax (I speak from experience) and given Manstein a consistently erudite, dignified, and sometimes sardonic voice in English.
The book begins with a very brief description of Manstein's service prior to the 1930s, having reached the rank of Captain by the end of World War I. He then describes his service largely as a staff officer during Germany's resurgence and the rebuilding of the armed forces under Hitler. He was Gerd von Rundsted's chief of staff during the 1939 Polish campaign. After that, he put considerable energy into devising a plan for the invasion of France--and just as much energy getting someone at the highest echelons of the Wehrmacht to notice his plan. Almost belatedly, his plan was adopted more or less intact, and Manstein got to help execute it as a corps commander. His contribution to the campaign in France earned him a promotion to general. This episode is covered in Part I (Poland--three chapters) and Part II (France--four chapters).
The remainder of the book (almost 300 pages) is devoted to Manstein's operations on the Eastern Front. A few months before the invasion of Russia, he was given command of LVI Panzer Korps in the north, part of the drive to quickly seize Leningrad. He and his troops performed very well, but as they were nearing their goal, Manstein was suddenly transferred to the Ukraine to take over 11th Army of Army Group South. His "Panzer drive" is described in a 25-page chapter.
His new task was the conquest of the Crimean peninsula. After initial successes, 11th Army had to fight off Soviet counterattacks and amphibious landings in their rear, which hindered their efforts to subdue the fortress city of Sevastopol. Showing great operational flexibility and creativity, Manstein dealt with these threats and then refocused efforts on Sevastopol, which fell to the Germans in July 1942. Manstein was promoted to field marshal as a result. He recounts the Crimea campaign in a single 55-page chapter.
Fresh from that success, Hitler moved Manstein back to the Leningrad front with orders to finally take that city. Just as Manstein arrived, however, the Soviets launched a series of large counterattacks which Manstein fended off, but which prevented the Germans from mounting their own assault on the city. Manstein writes about this in a 15-page chapter.
Then begins the main story of this memoir--Manstein's tenure as commander of Army Group Don (later called Army Group South). As a result of the foolish attempt to take the major city of Stalingrad and drive into the Caucasus to take the oil fields there, the Germans in the south were badly overextended, and forced to rely on the sub-standard armies of their allies the Italians, Rumanians, and Hungarians. In November 1942 the Soviets launched a major offensive which cut off the entire 6th Army at Stalingrad, and destroyed two Rumanian armies. Hitler sent Manstein south, hoping he could find a way to salvage the situation for the Germans. Long story short: he was never able to stop the Soviets or regain German initiative in the south (except for the brief offensive at Kursk), but he did, on numerous occasions, keep the Soviets from penetrating and surrounding the entire southern wing of the German army, which could have shortened the war by a year or even two. Manstein displayed operational brilliance on many occasions, but he was continually hamstrung by Hitler's "to the last man" directives, his parsimonious supply of reinforcements and replacements, and his refusal to make decisions on a timely basis. Manstein describes his interactions with Hitler, and analyzes Hitler's weaknesses as a military commander, in some depth on several occasions in the last few hundred pages of the book.
Lost Victories ends rather abruptly with Manstein's account of how he was unceremoniously transferred by Hitler from command of Army Group South to a "reserve" position back in Germany, a result of their repeated head-butting and Hitler's perception that Manstein was publicly questioning Hitler's ability to command. He does not describe how he finished the war, or how he escaped the frequently fatal chaos of the final days of the Reich.
Manstein was a proud German officer of the Prussian tradition, which led to repeated contretemps with Hitler over how the war in the East should be conducted. In this book he doesn't pass much judgement on Hitler's choices of strategic objectives, and he recognizes that some objectives had political or economic significance that a purely military planner would have ignored. But he wanted Hitler and the OKW to give him the independence due an army group commander to figure out how to achieve objectives in his own way. His biggest problem was Hitler's insistence on holding every inch of ground captured, which placed too great a burden on the Germans' over-extended and exhausted troops. As Manstein notes, such an approach ignores the ancient military dictum that "he who defends everything ends up holding nothing." Manstein wanted the flexibility to trade space for time, as the Russians had done so successfully; he wanted to have a mobile reserve to counterattack any Soviet penetrations, and to smash attacks as they were forming; but Hitler's micro-management and political machinations prevented this time and again, with disastrous results for the German Army on the Eastern Front.
Manstein also doesn't mention his part in the postwar Nuremburg trials, in which he was tried for turning a blind eye to the activities of the Einsatzgruppen who followed in the wake of his armies, murdering Jews and other declared enemies of the Nazi state. Accounts of the trial, the case against Manstein, and his defense are readily available online.
The things Manstein leaves out of Lost Victories are as important as the things he discusses, and lead one to search out other sources to fill in the lacunae. This perception that Manstein was covering for himself in this memoir are strengthened by the fact that this edition is a heavily edited version of the original, with many personal anecdotes excised, and the entire chapter on Operation Citadel (Kursk) has been replaced entirely with an article Manstein wrote for the Marine Corps Gazette, which I found wholly disappointing.
On the plus side, the book includes many very useful maps that cover the entirety the text. Even if they are sometimes cluttered, they are very well drawn and virtually all place names included in the narrative can be found on at least one map, making it very easy to follow the sometimes swirling action. Speaking of that, special kudos to the translator, Anthony Powell, who has taken sometimes convoluted German syntax (I speak from experience) and given Manstein a consistently erudite, dignified, and sometimes sardonic voice in English.
June 4, 2016
59/100
Wenn es um Rhetorik aus der Liga der deutsche Soldat war tüchtig und tapfer, aber die oberste Führung war schlecht geht, verdient das Buch natürlich fünf Sterne. In der zweiten Hälfte kommt so etwa alle zehn Seiten eine Klage, dass Hitler die dringend erforderlichen und früh angeforderten Truppen erst viel zu spät und oft nur kleckerlesweise geliefert hätte. Auch die Unfähigkeit des GröFaz einmal erobertes Terrain fahren zu lassen, um nicht alles zu verlieren, wird im selben Rhythmus thematisiert. Das militärische Geschehen bleibt aber selten unplastisch und wirkt oft wie vorgelesene Statistiken oder Zahlenspielereien, die aufzeigen, warum man nicht gewinnen konnte. Zumal ja dieser komplett Unfähige, der meinte, die Willenskraft würde es schon richten, permanent jede vernünftige Planung durchkreuzte. Manstein mag zwar ein militärisches Genie gewesen sein, die literarische Vermittlung seiner Fähigkeiten und der Auswirkungen seiner taktischen Meisterleistungen gelingt nicht wirklich. Aber zum Zeitpunkt seiner Veröffentlichung haben die Verlorenen Siege sicher jedem alten Landser ein gutes Gefühl und ein noch besseres Gewissen ermöglicht.
Wenn es um Rhetorik aus der Liga der deutsche Soldat war tüchtig und tapfer, aber die oberste Führung war schlecht geht, verdient das Buch natürlich fünf Sterne. In der zweiten Hälfte kommt so etwa alle zehn Seiten eine Klage, dass Hitler die dringend erforderlichen und früh angeforderten Truppen erst viel zu spät und oft nur kleckerlesweise geliefert hätte. Auch die Unfähigkeit des GröFaz einmal erobertes Terrain fahren zu lassen, um nicht alles zu verlieren, wird im selben Rhythmus thematisiert. Das militärische Geschehen bleibt aber selten unplastisch und wirkt oft wie vorgelesene Statistiken oder Zahlenspielereien, die aufzeigen, warum man nicht gewinnen konnte. Zumal ja dieser komplett Unfähige, der meinte, die Willenskraft würde es schon richten, permanent jede vernünftige Planung durchkreuzte. Manstein mag zwar ein militärisches Genie gewesen sein, die literarische Vermittlung seiner Fähigkeiten und der Auswirkungen seiner taktischen Meisterleistungen gelingt nicht wirklich. Aber zum Zeitpunkt seiner Veröffentlichung haben die Verlorenen Siege sicher jedem alten Landser ein gutes Gefühl und ein noch besseres Gewissen ermöglicht.
April 23, 2014
-Fuente subjetiva pero fuente al fin y al cabo.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Trabajo que mezcla historia y autobiografía profesional del conocido, importante, destacado y laureado Mariscal de Campo, centrado en su intervención en el devenir militar de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y que nos llevará de Polonia a la URSS (la parte del león de esta obra) pasando por Francia, hasta el 3 de abril de 1944 en el que cede el mando de su Grupo de Ejércitos.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Trabajo que mezcla historia y autobiografía profesional del conocido, importante, destacado y laureado Mariscal de Campo, centrado en su intervención en el devenir militar de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y que nos llevará de Polonia a la URSS (la parte del león de esta obra) pasando por Francia, hasta el 3 de abril de 1944 en el que cede el mando de su Grupo de Ejércitos.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
August 16, 2007
I am about half way through this book. Manstein's book is too typical. German soldiers were brave, did their duty, didn't pillage, didn't torture, the Soviet's were brutal, and my favorite, were the victims of a totalitarian system!
This book doesn't provide any real insights, but I guess that is because what he said was published in 1958 and have been a part of the history books and debate since then.
I would read it in spite of all this, because even though he may say what is to be expected it is still von Manstein, and well, von Manstein is von Manstein, author of the sickle cut and the Third Battle of Kharkov.
What is missing? His early days as a solider in WW1. He starts of the book pretty much working for von Rundstedt just before the war. I find it interesting he doesn't speak of his days as an infantryman. Perhaps he is hiding something? Or perhaps he merely writes to what an audience probably wants to hear?
This book doesn't provide any real insights, but I guess that is because what he said was published in 1958 and have been a part of the history books and debate since then.
I would read it in spite of all this, because even though he may say what is to be expected it is still von Manstein, and well, von Manstein is von Manstein, author of the sickle cut and the Third Battle of Kharkov.
What is missing? His early days as a solider in WW1. He starts of the book pretty much working for von Rundstedt just before the war. I find it interesting he doesn't speak of his days as an infantryman. Perhaps he is hiding something? Or perhaps he merely writes to what an audience probably wants to hear?
Read
September 5, 2022A valuable historical document assuming the reader takes it with a very large grain of salt. There is a very clear agenda being pushed in this book. Germans are smart, strong and lost the war because Hitler ruined it. It just so happens that this agenda has found it's way into historical discussions on the war in the worst possible way, and the recent anniversary of the Normandy landings (and the public response to it) highlights perfectly how much we in the west disregard Russia's involvement and their ability to conduct a war.
We're lucky today in that we have far more available archival (Soviet mostly) information which contradicts a lot of Manstein's statements directly, especially with regards to troop numbers and the whole Stalingrad affair. Manstein flat out lies in his explanation of the event, but then vomits out his 'admiration' for Paulus and his men so often I'm reminded of a little kid caught out lying, then explaining his own side of the story. Adding as much information, praise, excuses as possible with his clear motive being to obfuscate the whole event so much that we can't get a clear picture.
His depiction of Hitler follows a similar trend (Hitler was wrong, but he was admittedly right on this tiny aspect of the situation!!!), and I'm surprised so many have swallowed his story so easily. It's very easy to lump all the evils of the war on an irrational personality, and Manstein doesnt even attempt to justify the actions of his (yes, his) soldiers on the eastern front. I believe it comes down to the state of the world at the time the book was released, and this memoir provided western allies with plenty of ammunition to discredit the Soviets in any way possible. German Generals good, Soviet Generals bad, outnumbered 8 to 1, Hitler lost us the war blah blah blah.
Finally, he's clearly a bit of tosser. "Zeitzler told me that when he showed [my] letter to Hitler, the latter had fumed with rage and averted that all I was interested in doing was conducting ingenious operations and justifying myself in my war diary." No denying what he achieved in France, but come on!
We're lucky today in that we have far more available archival (Soviet mostly) information which contradicts a lot of Manstein's statements directly, especially with regards to troop numbers and the whole Stalingrad affair. Manstein flat out lies in his explanation of the event, but then vomits out his 'admiration' for Paulus and his men so often I'm reminded of a little kid caught out lying, then explaining his own side of the story. Adding as much information, praise, excuses as possible with his clear motive being to obfuscate the whole event so much that we can't get a clear picture.
His depiction of Hitler follows a similar trend (Hitler was wrong, but he was admittedly right on this tiny aspect of the situation!!!), and I'm surprised so many have swallowed his story so easily. It's very easy to lump all the evils of the war on an irrational personality, and Manstein doesnt even attempt to justify the actions of his (yes, his) soldiers on the eastern front. I believe it comes down to the state of the world at the time the book was released, and this memoir provided western allies with plenty of ammunition to discredit the Soviets in any way possible. German Generals good, Soviet Generals bad, outnumbered 8 to 1, Hitler lost us the war blah blah blah.
Finally, he's clearly a bit of tosser. "Zeitzler told me that when he showed [my] letter to Hitler, the latter had fumed with rage and averted that all I was interested in doing was conducting ingenious operations and justifying myself in my war diary." No denying what he achieved in France, but come on!
April 23, 2014
-Fuente subjetiva pero fuente al fin y al cabo.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Trabajo que mezcla historia y autobiografía profesional del conocido, importante, destacado y laureado Mariscal de Campo, centrado en su intervención en el devenir militar de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y que nos llevará de Polonia a la URSS (la parte del león de esta obra) pasando por Francia, hasta el 3 de abril de 1944 en el que cede el mando de su Grupo de Ejércitos.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Trabajo que mezcla historia y autobiografía profesional del conocido, importante, destacado y laureado Mariscal de Campo, centrado en su intervención en el devenir militar de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y que nos llevará de Polonia a la URSS (la parte del león de esta obra) pasando por Francia, hasta el 3 de abril de 1944 en el que cede el mando de su Grupo de Ejércitos.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
May 22, 2013
This was one of the best war time memoirs that I've read. Manstein was a brillant commander. I wonder what his legacy would be if he could have spent all his efforts on his job instead of fighting for the resourses he needed to do his job from the narrow minded and weak superiors.The world is grateful that things played out the way they did. This book takes the reader from Poland to the offenses in the west to Barbarossa and the failed attempts to free Sixth Army and ultimatly there fate to the retreats of 43and44 until his sacking in 1944.
September 18, 2018
I first read an edition of this when I was a teenager, in the late 1970's. It was originally published in 1955 (in German) and the edition that I just re-read dates to 2004. The first time I read Lost Victories I was fascinated with military history, in particular, the conflict on the Eastern Front during WW2. At that time it seemed to me to be both the most pivotal and the coolest. To a 12/13 year-old boy the German Panzers were just very cool. I had a superficial knowledge of history. By that I mean I knew a whole lot more facts and figures and dates than most of my friends. However, I was completely lacking in anything resembling an in-depth or nuanced understanding of the events and dates I could rattle off.
Lost Victories is one of a number of volumes written by members of the German Army in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It is (as with almost of them) an important work providing insight and thoughts from one of the central actors in the 2nd World War. Upon re-reading, it is ultimately unsatisfying and leaves one wanting more.
The first issue is that Von Manstein ends the book with his dismissal from command of Army Group South at the end of March 1944. While this incident certainly provides a logical and convenient stopping point, one certainly would have appreciated his thoughts on the final year of the war, even if he was no longer actively in command. Along the same lines he never really provides an overview of the war in general that as commander that he really only had detailed knowledge of activities in his sphere. While there is certainly a great deal of truth in the idea that Hitler kept his generals compartmentalized there is also strong evidence that on the whole they know more than they cared to admit.
The second issue is how the relationship between Hitler and Von Manstein (and by extension that between Hitler and the German generals) is presented. It comes across as a series of ongoing professional disputes between an owner and a particularly dogged member of the board of directors. Every once in a while discussions become heated but overall everything is very sanitized and stiff upper lip. There is always just the problem of the soldiers on both sides being killed, wounded, and maimed. But somehow in the record of these conversations the sense of desperation, despair, exhaustion does not come across. We have Von Manstein's word that tell us these things but we have no feeling of them, there is no metaphorical punch in the gut. None of the sense of that comes through. Certainly Hitler lived in a fantasy world to an extent and did all he could to ignore the reality around him. But despite Von Manstein's words that he emphasized all these things and emotions to Hitler, you never feel them and you have the definite sense that Hitler never felt them either.
Finally and most critically Von Manstein literally dismisses the activities of the SS, the SD, and the Reich administration in the East. He defends the infamous "Commissar Order" by stating 'On the contrary, they were - without being soldiers - fanatical fighters, but fighters whose activities could only be regarded as illegal according to the traditional meaning of warfare'. The growth of partisans behind the German is similarly whitewashed. Von Manstein maintains where rear area administration was in the hands of the German Army there was not partisan activity. The role of the notorious Reich Commissioner Koch in the development of extensive partisan activity in the Ukraine is given all of a sentence: " The, other, however was that the rule of Reich Commissioner Koch had driven the population straight into their arms". This appeared by the way, not in the main body of the text, but in a footnote. The same footnote goes on to discuss in further depth the different types of partisans and where they were geographically based. As for the SS, nothing but praise for the efforts of the Waffen SS. Not a word about the extermination squads, the wholesale round-ups of the people for the concentration camps, etc. Even allowing for the era this was written this is a surprising and somewhat shocking omission. Von Manstein never forthrightly condemns those atrocities or the individuals involved. Throughout the book he takes swipes and Goring and Koch but never faces the issue of German mistreatment head-on. Instead from nebulous comments here and there one has the impression that Von Manstein found those actions distasteful (somewhat like an aristocrat reacting to an unpleasant odor in a distracted manner) but ultimately unworthy of his notice. It ends up lessening and tarnishing the image and reputation of one of the most brilliant of the German generals in World War 2.
Lost Victories is one of a number of volumes written by members of the German Army in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It is (as with almost of them) an important work providing insight and thoughts from one of the central actors in the 2nd World War. Upon re-reading, it is ultimately unsatisfying and leaves one wanting more.
The first issue is that Von Manstein ends the book with his dismissal from command of Army Group South at the end of March 1944. While this incident certainly provides a logical and convenient stopping point, one certainly would have appreciated his thoughts on the final year of the war, even if he was no longer actively in command. Along the same lines he never really provides an overview of the war in general that as commander that he really only had detailed knowledge of activities in his sphere. While there is certainly a great deal of truth in the idea that Hitler kept his generals compartmentalized there is also strong evidence that on the whole they know more than they cared to admit.
The second issue is how the relationship between Hitler and Von Manstein (and by extension that between Hitler and the German generals) is presented. It comes across as a series of ongoing professional disputes between an owner and a particularly dogged member of the board of directors. Every once in a while discussions become heated but overall everything is very sanitized and stiff upper lip. There is always just the problem of the soldiers on both sides being killed, wounded, and maimed. But somehow in the record of these conversations the sense of desperation, despair, exhaustion does not come across. We have Von Manstein's word that tell us these things but we have no feeling of them, there is no metaphorical punch in the gut. None of the sense of that comes through. Certainly Hitler lived in a fantasy world to an extent and did all he could to ignore the reality around him. But despite Von Manstein's words that he emphasized all these things and emotions to Hitler, you never feel them and you have the definite sense that Hitler never felt them either.
Finally and most critically Von Manstein literally dismisses the activities of the SS, the SD, and the Reich administration in the East. He defends the infamous "Commissar Order" by stating 'On the contrary, they were - without being soldiers - fanatical fighters, but fighters whose activities could only be regarded as illegal according to the traditional meaning of warfare'. The growth of partisans behind the German is similarly whitewashed. Von Manstein maintains where rear area administration was in the hands of the German Army there was not partisan activity. The role of the notorious Reich Commissioner Koch in the development of extensive partisan activity in the Ukraine is given all of a sentence: " The, other, however was that the rule of Reich Commissioner Koch had driven the population straight into their arms". This appeared by the way, not in the main body of the text, but in a footnote. The same footnote goes on to discuss in further depth the different types of partisans and where they were geographically based. As for the SS, nothing but praise for the efforts of the Waffen SS. Not a word about the extermination squads, the wholesale round-ups of the people for the concentration camps, etc. Even allowing for the era this was written this is a surprising and somewhat shocking omission. Von Manstein never forthrightly condemns those atrocities or the individuals involved. Throughout the book he takes swipes and Goring and Koch but never faces the issue of German mistreatment head-on. Instead from nebulous comments here and there one has the impression that Von Manstein found those actions distasteful (somewhat like an aristocrat reacting to an unpleasant odor in a distracted manner) but ultimately unworthy of his notice. It ends up lessening and tarnishing the image and reputation of one of the most brilliant of the German generals in World War 2.
February 27, 2024
Sagaidīju daudz no 2PK Nacistiskās Vācijas spožākā militārā prātā. Apzinoties kontekstu, jāsecina:
1. Manšteins apzināti izlaiž tās sadaļas, par ko viņu tiesāja pēc kara, ieskaitot kara noziegumus un holokausta atbalstu. Tā noteikti nebija zaudēta uzvara;
2. Gana liela porcija ir viņa cīņa ar sekām - Hitlera nekompetence, bailīgums, nespēja pieņemt lēmumu laicīgi. Kā rezultātā, sākot ar 1942.gada nogali Manšteins bija situācijas gūsteknis, pamatā tikai reaģējot un cīnoties ar sekām, kas pieņemtas stāvu augstāk.
Manšteins pasvītro divus interesantus faktus. Pirmkārt, Vācijai nebija kara plāna, bet tikai atsevišķi kampaņu plāni kā Polija 1939.gadā un rietumi 1940.gadā.
Otrkārt, pēc 1941.gada vasaras un jo īpaši pēc kaujas pie Maskavas, kad Hitlers oficiāli pārņēma varu, Vācijai pat vairs nebija kampaņas plāna.
Viņi vienkārši mauca. Hitlers visu argumentēja ar savām pseido zināšanām par ekonomiku un politiku, tā notušējot egomaniaka bailes no izgāšanās. Un visam pa vidu no parasta karavīra līdz tāda kaluma cilvēkam kā Manšteins, kurš nepastāsta pat pusi no pieredzētā vai domātā, bet pastāstot otru pusi, notušē savas vai savu padoto kļūdas.
1. Manšteins apzināti izlaiž tās sadaļas, par ko viņu tiesāja pēc kara, ieskaitot kara noziegumus un holokausta atbalstu. Tā noteikti nebija zaudēta uzvara;
2. Gana liela porcija ir viņa cīņa ar sekām - Hitlera nekompetence, bailīgums, nespēja pieņemt lēmumu laicīgi. Kā rezultātā, sākot ar 1942.gada nogali Manšteins bija situācijas gūsteknis, pamatā tikai reaģējot un cīnoties ar sekām, kas pieņemtas stāvu augstāk.
Manšteins pasvītro divus interesantus faktus. Pirmkārt, Vācijai nebija kara plāna, bet tikai atsevišķi kampaņu plāni kā Polija 1939.gadā un rietumi 1940.gadā.
Otrkārt, pēc 1941.gada vasaras un jo īpaši pēc kaujas pie Maskavas, kad Hitlers oficiāli pārņēma varu, Vācijai pat vairs nebija kampaņas plāna.
Viņi vienkārši mauca. Hitlers visu argumentēja ar savām pseido zināšanām par ekonomiku un politiku, tā notušējot egomaniaka bailes no izgāšanās. Un visam pa vidu no parasta karavīra līdz tāda kaluma cilvēkam kā Manšteins, kurš nepastāsta pat pusi no pieredzētā vai domātā, bet pastāstot otru pusi, notušē savas vai savu padoto kļūdas.
November 29, 2009
Manstein's "Lost Victories" has value for the reader for at least two different reasons. One, it is a first hand history of events in World War II from a key German general's perspective. Two, it is an intriguing, unself-conscious reflection on good people carrying out their tasks for the worst possible causes (in this case, Adolf Hitler's horrific vision of a Third Reich).
As Martin Blumenson notes in his "Introduction" (pages 10-11): "The tragedy for all thoughtful, knowledgeable, and sensitive soldiers like Manstein was the dilemma of trying faithfully to serve their country while disapproving the Fuehrer's aims and methods. True to their tradition of obedience, most of them, again like Manstein, kept their gaze unswervingly on the military role they were expected to play even as they deplored the growing vacuum of direction at the political top." B. H. Liddell Hart, in his "Foreword," speaks of Manstein's career well. And, finally, Manstein, in his "Author's Preface," oddly enough speaks to Blumenson's comment when he notes that (page 17): "This book is the personal narrative of a soldier, in which I have deliberately refrained from discussing political problems with no direct bearing in the military field." However, could one separate the political diabolism of Hitler from the military actions? This shows a blindness, amply commented upon by many others, of German generals.
The book itself focuses largely on Manstein's military experiences. Perhaps the most telling descriptions are the foolish strategy dictated from Hitler of attacking the Soviet Union on a far too broad front, given the limited military resources of the German army. There is great poignancy in Manstein's recalling the desperate situation in Stalingrad, as General Paulus followed Hitler's stupid order to defend at all costs. There is poignancy in his depiction of German troops and tanks fighting far superior Soviet armies to a standstill, before they would have to, ultimately, retreat before overpowering odds. And, in this context, of Hitler's orders not to retreat, despite the desperate strategic situation in which the German forces found themselves.
A fascinating commentary from a central actor in the German military. This book is usefully read in conjunction with the work by Heinz Guderian, "Panzer Leader." The most fascinating element of this work (and that of other commentaries about German military leaders) is their sense of duty for a cause that was not worthy of them. And their inability to see that fundamental disconnect.
As Martin Blumenson notes in his "Introduction" (pages 10-11): "The tragedy for all thoughtful, knowledgeable, and sensitive soldiers like Manstein was the dilemma of trying faithfully to serve their country while disapproving the Fuehrer's aims and methods. True to their tradition of obedience, most of them, again like Manstein, kept their gaze unswervingly on the military role they were expected to play even as they deplored the growing vacuum of direction at the political top." B. H. Liddell Hart, in his "Foreword," speaks of Manstein's career well. And, finally, Manstein, in his "Author's Preface," oddly enough speaks to Blumenson's comment when he notes that (page 17): "This book is the personal narrative of a soldier, in which I have deliberately refrained from discussing political problems with no direct bearing in the military field." However, could one separate the political diabolism of Hitler from the military actions? This shows a blindness, amply commented upon by many others, of German generals.
The book itself focuses largely on Manstein's military experiences. Perhaps the most telling descriptions are the foolish strategy dictated from Hitler of attacking the Soviet Union on a far too broad front, given the limited military resources of the German army. There is great poignancy in Manstein's recalling the desperate situation in Stalingrad, as General Paulus followed Hitler's stupid order to defend at all costs. There is poignancy in his depiction of German troops and tanks fighting far superior Soviet armies to a standstill, before they would have to, ultimately, retreat before overpowering odds. And, in this context, of Hitler's orders not to retreat, despite the desperate strategic situation in which the German forces found themselves.
A fascinating commentary from a central actor in the German military. This book is usefully read in conjunction with the work by Heinz Guderian, "Panzer Leader." The most fascinating element of this work (and that of other commentaries about German military leaders) is their sense of duty for a cause that was not worthy of them. And their inability to see that fundamental disconnect.
October 17, 2017
I was engrossed by this book of Erich von Manstein. I had heard of the German tank commander from reading other historical accounts of things during WWII. Therefore, I had to read this book when I saw it on the bookshelf of the local bookstore.
It gives a great insight to the German Tank units of WWII. I would say it is apologetic, in some ways. Especially, concerning some of the terrible things the Nazi regime did. He also spoke of the Italian artillery units, in the desert war. He expressed an opinion that they were more deserving of credit than history usually gives to them.
It glides over some of the more diabolical matters of war and civilians, but then we are listening to a soldier's account concerning military battles. Manstein was convicted of mistreating prisoners after WWII but was not sentenced to death. That is the only reason I don't give five stars. Perhaps that is bias on my part.
It is well worth reading from Manstein's perspective though because he does go into detail about the opponents he was up against in West Europe and the Soviet Eastern Front. Obviously, Manstein only lets us see the things he wants us to see, but this I found very interesting and I felt as though I was looking through his eyes when reading some accounts. The title 'Lost Victories' is aptly named. It did not matter how many times the German tank units won, there was always more enemy to face on another day. If you like Military History; then read this.
C.A. Powell
The Last Days of Thunder Child
It gives a great insight to the German Tank units of WWII. I would say it is apologetic, in some ways. Especially, concerning some of the terrible things the Nazi regime did. He also spoke of the Italian artillery units, in the desert war. He expressed an opinion that they were more deserving of credit than history usually gives to them.
It glides over some of the more diabolical matters of war and civilians, but then we are listening to a soldier's account concerning military battles. Manstein was convicted of mistreating prisoners after WWII but was not sentenced to death. That is the only reason I don't give five stars. Perhaps that is bias on my part.
It is well worth reading from Manstein's perspective though because he does go into detail about the opponents he was up against in West Europe and the Soviet Eastern Front. Obviously, Manstein only lets us see the things he wants us to see, but this I found very interesting and I felt as though I was looking through his eyes when reading some accounts. The title 'Lost Victories' is aptly named. It did not matter how many times the German tank units won, there was always more enemy to face on another day. If you like Military History; then read this.
C.A. Powell
The Last Days of Thunder Child
May 17, 2017
This book was an interesting perspective from one of the best German Generals. What I found fascinating was he often faced decisions where there were no good options. Indeed, Manstein, from a military perspective chose the least worst option throughout much of the campaign on the Eastern Front. Further, the dialogue between Hitler and Manstein brings to light how a leader inept in policy and strategic decision making can lead to defeat on the battlefield.
Manstein makes little to zero note on the evils of the Nazi regime, keeping the writing strictly to military decisions at the operational level.
Manstein makes little to zero note on the evils of the Nazi regime, keeping the writing strictly to military decisions at the operational level.
December 6, 2021
It’s great to read about the war from the Axis point of view. This book is the translated memoirs of Field Marshal Von Manstein and his commands and armies in WW2.
The memoirs cover from before the start of the war to early victories against the allies. The last part of the book covers the disastrous campaign in Russia, resulting in the retreat and capture the German and Romanian armies.
Von Manstein comes across as a firm but fair commander and certainly makes a point of mentioning he had nothing to do with the atrocities carried out by the likes of the SS.
Certainly 1 of the better books I’ve read from the German point of view in the war.
The memoirs cover from before the start of the war to early victories against the allies. The last part of the book covers the disastrous campaign in Russia, resulting in the retreat and capture the German and Romanian armies.
Von Manstein comes across as a firm but fair commander and certainly makes a point of mentioning he had nothing to do with the atrocities carried out by the likes of the SS.
Certainly 1 of the better books I’ve read from the German point of view in the war.
February 4, 2014
Well written. However, it goes into a lot of detail on who, why, what and where on too many events. Great for those that like this sort of thing. Good for historians and students of WW11. I should say REALLY GOOD for the historians and students. I am not one of them.
The first part of the book deals with Poland and of course the start of WW11 as we know it. That part was very, very interesting. But I got bogged down on the rest of the book.
I'll give it a 4 because of ALL the info that probably won't be found in other books.
The first part of the book deals with Poland and of course the start of WW11 as we know it. That part was very, very interesting. But I got bogged down on the rest of the book.
I'll give it a 4 because of ALL the info that probably won't be found in other books.
September 23, 2021
That Manstein was aware that Nazi political policy in Ukraine was counterproductive to their military operations implies that he was aware of much more than he let on about other Nazi atrocities, and yet he strained to his utmost to confine the writing within the purely military domain. We readers should keep in mind that his memoir serves to polish his own image for posterity.
The chapter on the Battle of France was the first climax of the book. It explains what the original Schlieffen Plan was all about, and why his modification was necessary and superior. It gives the reader a taste of how the professionals think through logistics.
The Crimean Campaign that earned the author a promotion to Field Marshal was the most vivid in storytelling. Manstein seemed to regard this work as his finest, or at least the most cherished. As a self-contained operation, it gave the author full freedom to exercise his mind and power.
The Battle of Stalingrad was written with strong emotions, mostly despair. I'm eager to read the memoir by Vasily Chuikov to get the full picture. Manstein placed the blame squarely on Hitler, who accepted his responsibility for the total destruction of the Sixth Army. One tidbit revealed by Manstein regarding why a break-out was not attempted pointed to Paulus' chief-of-staff Authur Schmidt who was more strong-willed than Paulus, and carried the final debate on whether to break out in defiance of Hitler's order to die.
The third Battle of Kharkov immediately following the Stalingrad defeat was arguably the success that placed Manstein on a pedestal among all WWII commanders. Here the author explained his leap-frog and concentric attack, terms I heard elsewhere but never fully grasped. It reinforces a theme that disasters usually follow overextension out of earlier success, no matter which side you were on. But humans never learn, alas.
Later chapters covering 1943-1944 were filled with details that appear repetitive, with a constant ding of "I can't hold on anymore because Hitler refuses to give me more troops". In a last gasp of gaining control of his troop movements, he tendered his resignation which was refused but got him what he wanted, i.e. letting First Panzer Army break out to avoid the fate of the Sixth Army. Less than a week later, he was fired and never employed again by Hitler.
The chapter on the Battle of France was the first climax of the book. It explains what the original Schlieffen Plan was all about, and why his modification was necessary and superior. It gives the reader a taste of how the professionals think through logistics.
The Crimean Campaign that earned the author a promotion to Field Marshal was the most vivid in storytelling. Manstein seemed to regard this work as his finest, or at least the most cherished. As a self-contained operation, it gave the author full freedom to exercise his mind and power.
The Battle of Stalingrad was written with strong emotions, mostly despair. I'm eager to read the memoir by Vasily Chuikov to get the full picture. Manstein placed the blame squarely on Hitler, who accepted his responsibility for the total destruction of the Sixth Army. One tidbit revealed by Manstein regarding why a break-out was not attempted pointed to Paulus' chief-of-staff Authur Schmidt who was more strong-willed than Paulus, and carried the final debate on whether to break out in defiance of Hitler's order to die.
The third Battle of Kharkov immediately following the Stalingrad defeat was arguably the success that placed Manstein on a pedestal among all WWII commanders. Here the author explained his leap-frog and concentric attack, terms I heard elsewhere but never fully grasped. It reinforces a theme that disasters usually follow overextension out of earlier success, no matter which side you were on. But humans never learn, alas.
Later chapters covering 1943-1944 were filled with details that appear repetitive, with a constant ding of "I can't hold on anymore because Hitler refuses to give me more troops". In a last gasp of gaining control of his troop movements, he tendered his resignation which was refused but got him what he wanted, i.e. letting First Panzer Army break out to avoid the fate of the Sixth Army. Less than a week later, he was fired and never employed again by Hitler.
May 14, 2021
As this is a book written by a German WW II army general, there is a lot about the tactical movement of forces -- and about how terrain (rivers, lakes, swamps, ravines, etc) may affect those tactics. Additionally, the location of rail hubs were sometimes mentioned since the railroads were necessary for the rapid transport of major German forces from one strategic area to another). In addition, since the Germany forces fought over large swaths of territory, innumerable cities, towns and villages near the areas of conflict were identified by name so that the reader could hopefully know roughly where the fighting being discussed was taking place. All of this means that, for the reader to be able to follow the ebb and flow of battle, MAPS ARE A MUST.
Did the Kindle have maps? There were 24 maps, but all were at the end of the book. Inconvenient.
Were the maps readable? Not on the Kindle.
Were the maps available in color online? No, so good luck distinguishing the Germans from their foe.
Could you follow the action without maps? Maybe, if you are proficient at playing chess blindfolded.
Indeed. as I was reading this book, I wished there was a map capability (in color, of course) similar to what many computer games have, with the ability to zoom in and out, and so allowing the reader to understand and appreciate the tactical and strategic situation.
Enough about formatting. What about the actual contents of the book? There was some interesting discussion on the lack of long range planning, the many missteps by Hitler, avoiding getting forces bogged down in street fighting (Stalingrad), literally planning offense and defense actions based on the muddy season, the variable quality of Germany’s allies’ armies, the inability to supply large forces by air transports alone …
Bottom line: Probably a great book for those few people who are very serious students of military history (and owners of a World Atlas). But I struggled to get through this book – especially with its totally inadequate maps.
Did the Kindle have maps? There were 24 maps, but all were at the end of the book. Inconvenient.
Were the maps readable? Not on the Kindle.
Were the maps available in color online? No, so good luck distinguishing the Germans from their foe.
Could you follow the action without maps? Maybe, if you are proficient at playing chess blindfolded.
Indeed. as I was reading this book, I wished there was a map capability (in color, of course) similar to what many computer games have, with the ability to zoom in and out, and so allowing the reader to understand and appreciate the tactical and strategic situation.
Enough about formatting. What about the actual contents of the book? There was some interesting discussion on the lack of long range planning, the many missteps by Hitler, avoiding getting forces bogged down in street fighting (Stalingrad), literally planning offense and defense actions based on the muddy season, the variable quality of Germany’s allies’ armies, the inability to supply large forces by air transports alone …
Bottom line: Probably a great book for those few people who are very serious students of military history (and owners of a World Atlas). But I struggled to get through this book – especially with its totally inadequate maps.
May 29, 2019
A fascinating and objective account of one of the Reich's greatest generals. Beginning with the preparations for the invasion of Poland in 1939, Manstein relates his wartime experiences in great detail, ending with his dismissal in the spring of 1944. Of particular interest was his assessment of Hitler's character (generally negative, noting his over-reliance on Nietzsch-ian willpower, new technology, and confidence in sycophants like Goring, but also his positive aspects, as occasionally he was a decent tactician).
The numerous battle maps will help the reader understand the troop movements Manstein describes. There was a very long but riveting chapter describing the Battle of Stalingrad which kept me on the edge of my seat. Each time he implored Hitler to let them break out of the pocket he met with refusal, which led to the surrender of the 6th Army. By the 1943-44 campaigns, it was apparent how desparate the situation on the Eastern Front had become.
There was a translator's note at the end of my edition which said that there were numerous personal and sentimental passages which were removed in the English-language editions. I wish these had not been taken out, as I would have been keen to read them. So much of the book is high-level tactics and grand strategy, so personal touches would have helped the book to read more evenly. I would have been very interested in his thoughts about the final year of the war, in which he was on the sidelines. A field marshal forced to watch his country slowly enveloped by the enemy must have been hard to endure. Additionally, I would have liked him to discuss his experience at the Nuremberg trials, but that would have made the book overly long and outside the scope of the topic.
I highly recommend this book not only as a study in military history and strategy, but to he how 'the other side' lived and fought in that titanic struggle.
The numerous battle maps will help the reader understand the troop movements Manstein describes. There was a very long but riveting chapter describing the Battle of Stalingrad which kept me on the edge of my seat. Each time he implored Hitler to let them break out of the pocket he met with refusal, which led to the surrender of the 6th Army. By the 1943-44 campaigns, it was apparent how desparate the situation on the Eastern Front had become.
There was a translator's note at the end of my edition which said that there were numerous personal and sentimental passages which were removed in the English-language editions. I wish these had not been taken out, as I would have been keen to read them. So much of the book is high-level tactics and grand strategy, so personal touches would have helped the book to read more evenly. I would have been very interested in his thoughts about the final year of the war, in which he was on the sidelines. A field marshal forced to watch his country slowly enveloped by the enemy must have been hard to endure. Additionally, I would have liked him to discuss his experience at the Nuremberg trials, but that would have made the book overly long and outside the scope of the topic.
I highly recommend this book not only as a study in military history and strategy, but to he how 'the other side' lived and fought in that titanic struggle.
September 21, 2017
If one has not witnessed WW II himself, reading about this era makes it look like a ‘mechanical script’. It ought to be like that. But Field Marshal Erich von Manstein leads the reader into the war rooms during the period 1939-1944, explaining how certain decisions were made and why. Manstein was the man who came up with the idea of the attack through the Ardennes and Sedan to conquer France. He was the hero of the Crimea forcing the Germans up to the Causasus. Hitler’s clinging to Stalingrad (the city bearing his main enemy’s name) made him lose the Sixth Army. Any Luftwaffe support was too little, too late. The required armies to break the encirclement never reached on time. Hitler’s procrastination prevented the German army from a successful counterattack at Kursk and forced the army into retreat. The scope of the book lasts until the removal of Manstein as chief of the Army Group acting in the South of the Soviet Union.
It was very enlightening to have a commander’s opinion on many important military decisions and actions during WW II. Of course, one needs to take into account that Hitler’s ambitions may have been wider or different than his military commanders due to other aims: political versus economical objectives, the struggle for resources between different armies. A German defeat in the East was never the way it was meant to be if only…
It was very enlightening to have a commander’s opinion on many important military decisions and actions during WW II. Of course, one needs to take into account that Hitler’s ambitions may have been wider or different than his military commanders due to other aims: political versus economical objectives, the struggle for resources between different armies. A German defeat in the East was never the way it was meant to be if only…
December 30, 2022
Rommel se llevó la fama, pero von Manstein fue el general alemán más brillante de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Por este motivo Victorias Frustradas es uno de los documentos históricos más importantes de la contienda.
Aunque las memorias de von Manstein están correctamente escritas, resultan difíciles de digerir por su estilo seco y monótono. A excepción de los pasajes en los que aborda sus reuniones con Hitler o la concepción del revolucionario plan que permitió a los alemanes aplastar a los franceses en la primavera de 1940, la mayor parte de las memorias es una sucesión de hechos y datos que hacen que el relato se haga pesado y abrumador, particularmente la segunda mitad cuando relata sus experiencias como comandante del grupo de ejércitos sur en el frente oriental.
Resulta evidente que von Manstein concibió sus memorias como un texto histórico, no como una lectura destinada al público generalista. En Victorias Frustradas el autor sacrifica la amenidad y soltura por el rigor y la exactitud, por lo que solo recomendaría este libro a aquellos lectores con un conocimiento e interés muy avanzado por la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Aunque las memorias de von Manstein están correctamente escritas, resultan difíciles de digerir por su estilo seco y monótono. A excepción de los pasajes en los que aborda sus reuniones con Hitler o la concepción del revolucionario plan que permitió a los alemanes aplastar a los franceses en la primavera de 1940, la mayor parte de las memorias es una sucesión de hechos y datos que hacen que el relato se haga pesado y abrumador, particularmente la segunda mitad cuando relata sus experiencias como comandante del grupo de ejércitos sur en el frente oriental.
Resulta evidente que von Manstein concibió sus memorias como un texto histórico, no como una lectura destinada al público generalista. En Victorias Frustradas el autor sacrifica la amenidad y soltura por el rigor y la exactitud, por lo que solo recomendaría este libro a aquellos lectores con un conocimiento e interés muy avanzado por la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
August 3, 2019
This is a competent read of arguably Germany's most accomplished field marshal of the Second World War. As I understand it from other books, Manstein viewed black soldiers, in particular French colonial troops, as beneath white soldiers and was irate by their use by France. Nothing of his racial views are mentioned in this book. He also hints that Russian prisoners and the general Soviet civilian population were treated respectfully and humanely by the occupying Germans. This is in contrast with what I've read elsewhere. I find his position virtually impossible to believe.
Whatever his failures as a human being were, I do readily concede he was a gifted military officer, one who's name is associated with several of the largest campaigns of the war, Sickle Cut, Crimea, Stalingrad and the extended fighting in the southern front of the Soviet Union.
Whatever his failures as a human being were, I do readily concede he was a gifted military officer, one who's name is associated with several of the largest campaigns of the war, Sickle Cut, Crimea, Stalingrad and the extended fighting in the southern front of the Soviet Union.
October 5, 2023
Excellent book, while some have complained that he didn't discuss the politics of the war. I found that refreshing. He concentrates on the strategy and tactics of the early campaigns of WW2 such as Poland and France but it gets really gets good with following Manstein through his campaigns in the East. From his race towards Leningrad, to the Crimea, back to Leningrad, to trying to save the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, to saving the southern front from being encircled and finally the battles to try and save the Southern Front from total collapse in the winter and early spring of 1944. It ends with his dismissal at the end of March 1944, by Hitler which he says was actually done the dignity even though Hitler and Manstein had been at odds for quite awhile over the command structure and the strategy of the war in the East. HIGHLY RECOMMEND
September 29, 2023
The book is easy to read and also provided with detailed descriptions and analysis of the important events from the authors perspective. It is a good source to get acquainted with the Wehrmacht and High Command views of the strategy and grand tactics and how they often differed and were in constant inner tug-of-war struggle throughout WWII.
What I most liked was not to read about the grand tactics (though it was the reason I started to read the book), but Erich von Manstein's noble'ish attitude towards his duty and obligations for his soldiers and shown leadership. Some insights are very worth noting as they hold true as much today as in the past.
What I most liked was not to read about the grand tactics (though it was the reason I started to read the book), but Erich von Manstein's noble'ish attitude towards his duty and obligations for his soldiers and shown leadership. Some insights are very worth noting as they hold true as much today as in the past.
May 6, 2017
Очень интересный документ эпохи. Особенно "впечатлили" полемика автора с Гитлером и пронесённое через всю жизнь непонимание, что "война есть продолжение политики иными средствами", о чём Клаузевиц сказал задолго до того, как Манштейн родился.
Лицемерие, ложь, приписки... Зачем всё это было добавлять в мемуары - не знаю. Но этого тоже полно и заметно невооружённым взглядом.
Читать стоит, читать нужно, так как именно этот человек во многом держал на себе удары советской армии в 1943-1944 годах. Но помнить о поговорке "лжёт как очевидец" тоже нужно вне всякого сомнения.
Лицемерие, ложь, приписки... Зачем всё это было добавлять в мемуары - не знаю. Но этого тоже полно и заметно невооружённым взглядом.
Читать стоит, читать нужно, так как именно этот человек во многом держал на себе удары советской армии в 1943-1944 годах. Но помнить о поговорке "лжёт как очевидец" тоже нужно вне всякого сомнения.
March 11, 2018
3 of 3 books this month on 3 most famous Germany's generals in WWII.
Manstein was famous for "Manstein plan" which was used to take the battle of France in WWII, he was widely considered the best general in his time, and this book provides a lot of details of this thinking of the war, and his struggle with Hitler's inner circle. The lesson is, a dictator, will more likely to listen to whoever he considers royal to him (always saying yes), not whoever has the best ideas, especially when the time it gets tough and he feel his authority is getting challenged.
Manstein was famous for "Manstein plan" which was used to take the battle of France in WWII, he was widely considered the best general in his time, and this book provides a lot of details of this thinking of the war, and his struggle with Hitler's inner circle. The lesson is, a dictator, will more likely to listen to whoever he considers royal to him (always saying yes), not whoever has the best ideas, especially when the time it gets tough and he feel his authority is getting challenged.
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