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Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits
Russell's classic examination of the relation between individual experience and the general body of scientific knowledge. It is a rigorous examination of the problems of an empiricist epistemology.
548 pages, Paperback
Published May 21, 1992
About the author
Bertrand Russell
915 books6,741 followersBertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell, OM, FRS, was a Welsh philosopher, historian, logician, mathematician, advocate for social reform, pacifist, and prominent rationalist. Although he was usually regarded as English, as he spent the majority of his life in England, he was born in Wales, where he also died.
He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950 "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought."
He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950 "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought."
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
August 14, 2020
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948) is arguably the best defense of empiricism I've ever read. It is a philosophical position which I personally subscribe to and which is, I think, the most consistent doctrine of theory of knowledge available. Throughout the book, Russell meticulously argues for his position through analyzing alternative interpretations and theories and refuting them. Along the way he honestly states the flaws and limits of his own theories and acknowledges plurality of choice whenever this is factually the case.
The most important point here is that while Russell refutes all forms of idealism as valid epistemology, he does concede that instantaneous solipsism is as valid as his own empiricist theory of knowledge. The problem is, the solipsist refuses all common sense experiences - such as personal history, future expectations, the existence of other minds, etc. - and ends up in absurdities.
The book itself is written in a style that offers the reader lucidity, accessibility and comprehensiveness. As a whole, the book takes the reader by the hand on an analytical exploration of the scientific method and its concepts and it continuously builds on earlier results and conclusions. As one moves on one is offered summaries and short recapitulations of earlier points, which makes for easy reading and eases one into deeper understanding of the problems concerned. The only exception is Part V, which deals with probability theory and is rather theory-driven, so I think this part might be problematic for those readers that find mathematics hard to follow. Another major plus is that most chapters end with one or two paragraphs in which Russell summarizes the main arguments and conclusions of the chapter - which helps in returning to earlier parts of the book to better understand later, more complex parts.
Russell was besides a skilled lecturer a gifted writer and a very original thinker, and in Human Knowledge he combines all three to offer the reader a gem of philosophical exploration. It is rather sad that Human Knowledge is among Russell's lesser known works. (It's also, apart from his mathematical works, the biggest works - perhaps this plays a role...)
It would go too far to explicitly state all of Russell's analyses and conclusions, which would not fit in such a review. Let me summarize the end result:
Russell's problem revolves around the question: How is synthetic knowledge, inferred from personal experiences, possible? And if it's possible, what is the status of this knowledge?
The problem is this: knowledge of the physical and mental world is fundamentally private. We each experience sensations and recollections of things and persons. Science describes the physical and mental world as objectively out there. How are our private world and the world of science related? And what does it mean to know something about some thing in the world? In other words: what general principles are necessary in order to be able to establish scientific knowledge?
In logic and mathematics we deal with certain knowledge, yet all our knowledge in these spheres is, ultimately, tautological. That is, it doesn't offer us any information about the world. It is only when we apply mathematics to empirical data that science can take off. And these empirical data are rooted in the life of common sense. We are used to see A occur and then see B follow. Hence we infer that A causes B. As Hume already said: causality is nothing but habit. Now, we only see B, and infer that A caused B even though we missed A altogether. Are we allowed to claim this? If so, why? And how?
Relying only on empirical data (i.e. experience) leads to solipsism. So we have to find some general principles that allow us to form rational expectations about the future and unobserved events but that cannot be themselves part of this experience. Usually people now yell "induction!" But Russell is smart to notice that induction in itself is a tautology - it only states in a general form that past experiences allow for certain expectations. It is only when we substitute particular experiences for the empty variables that induction becomes useful. Yet when we do this, we already suppose induction to be valid. It seems we need more general principles that allow for induction as method to be used in science.
Russell in essence seeks to understand how we generate knowledge from personal experiences. And in this language is crucial. We denote objects and we express our attitudes in words (object-words and syntax words respectively). Sentences are complexes of these. Knowledge consists in us grasping certain propositions to be true and others to be false. That is, we align our beliefs to our experiences. Russell is looking for general, a priori principles as the foundation of human knowledge - and is thus, in effect, looking for the truth of universal propositions and existence-propositions. That is, he wants (1) propositions that are true and valid at all times and (2) propositions that state the existence of things (and ultimately all things in the universe) independent of personal experience. I.e. we know of things existing through testimony of others, through books, through historical sources, etc. and we also know of things existing that cannot be experienced by any human.
Now, both (1) and (2) are both necessary for human knowledge and, ultimately, unprovable. So why should we adopt them? Well, because they pay to be held true as general principles of all our knowledge. In the end, Russell falls back on our biological roots: forming habits and expectations out of past and present experiences - while allowing for continual re-adjustment of beliefs - is biologically adaptive. The alternative is to become a solipsist who not only denies the existence of others and the world, but also his/her own past and future.
Admittedly, this Russell's final answer might leave us somewhat unsatisfied. Yet he does claim many times in the book that all he's looking for is grounds for rational expectations that transcend common sense and open up the path to science. Science is a continuous progress of endless adjustments of these grounds, through experiences, which would be impossible without these unprovable principles.
To sum up: Russell offers five postulates that allow for scientific inferences (i.e. laws, theories, hypotheses, concepts, etc.) from experience. These principles cannot be proved yet without them, science would be impossible. The consequence of these principles is that all our knowledge of the physical and mental world is uncertain, inexact and partial. That is, all scientific knowledge is characterized by degrees of certainty and exactness; in some cases these degrees can be calculated (through applied mathematics - probability theory) but in most cases these degrees have to be estimated by rules of thumb or best guesses. Our knowledge of the world is biologically rooted, which means the major assumption is that it pays (evolutionarily speaking) to have true beliefs about the world. These beliefs manifest themselves in behavior - communication, action, etc. - that are guided by expectations about the future state of the world. Through the development of language, and ultimately logic and mathematics, human beings can overcome the primitive, pre-scientific knowledge of common sense; yet we can never obtain absolute and certain knowledge.
I'll probably re-read this book in the future, since it is so vast in its scope and so dense in its material. Throughout the book Russell uses examples from cosmology and biology to psychology and geography in order to illustrate his theories. This means that on his/her journey through the book a reader has to jump mentally from here to there and back again, and sometimes the sheer amount of information numbs the mind. I guess this is one of those books that offers new payments on every subsequent readings. (Which is what brilliant philosophy has to do, in my opinion).
Definitely recommended for anyone interested in these topics!
The most important point here is that while Russell refutes all forms of idealism as valid epistemology, he does concede that instantaneous solipsism is as valid as his own empiricist theory of knowledge. The problem is, the solipsist refuses all common sense experiences - such as personal history, future expectations, the existence of other minds, etc. - and ends up in absurdities.
The book itself is written in a style that offers the reader lucidity, accessibility and comprehensiveness. As a whole, the book takes the reader by the hand on an analytical exploration of the scientific method and its concepts and it continuously builds on earlier results and conclusions. As one moves on one is offered summaries and short recapitulations of earlier points, which makes for easy reading and eases one into deeper understanding of the problems concerned. The only exception is Part V, which deals with probability theory and is rather theory-driven, so I think this part might be problematic for those readers that find mathematics hard to follow. Another major plus is that most chapters end with one or two paragraphs in which Russell summarizes the main arguments and conclusions of the chapter - which helps in returning to earlier parts of the book to better understand later, more complex parts.
Russell was besides a skilled lecturer a gifted writer and a very original thinker, and in Human Knowledge he combines all three to offer the reader a gem of philosophical exploration. It is rather sad that Human Knowledge is among Russell's lesser known works. (It's also, apart from his mathematical works, the biggest works - perhaps this plays a role...)
It would go too far to explicitly state all of Russell's analyses and conclusions, which would not fit in such a review. Let me summarize the end result:
Russell's problem revolves around the question: How is synthetic knowledge, inferred from personal experiences, possible? And if it's possible, what is the status of this knowledge?
The problem is this: knowledge of the physical and mental world is fundamentally private. We each experience sensations and recollections of things and persons. Science describes the physical and mental world as objectively out there. How are our private world and the world of science related? And what does it mean to know something about some thing in the world? In other words: what general principles are necessary in order to be able to establish scientific knowledge?
In logic and mathematics we deal with certain knowledge, yet all our knowledge in these spheres is, ultimately, tautological. That is, it doesn't offer us any information about the world. It is only when we apply mathematics to empirical data that science can take off. And these empirical data are rooted in the life of common sense. We are used to see A occur and then see B follow. Hence we infer that A causes B. As Hume already said: causality is nothing but habit. Now, we only see B, and infer that A caused B even though we missed A altogether. Are we allowed to claim this? If so, why? And how?
Relying only on empirical data (i.e. experience) leads to solipsism. So we have to find some general principles that allow us to form rational expectations about the future and unobserved events but that cannot be themselves part of this experience. Usually people now yell "induction!" But Russell is smart to notice that induction in itself is a tautology - it only states in a general form that past experiences allow for certain expectations. It is only when we substitute particular experiences for the empty variables that induction becomes useful. Yet when we do this, we already suppose induction to be valid. It seems we need more general principles that allow for induction as method to be used in science.
Russell in essence seeks to understand how we generate knowledge from personal experiences. And in this language is crucial. We denote objects and we express our attitudes in words (object-words and syntax words respectively). Sentences are complexes of these. Knowledge consists in us grasping certain propositions to be true and others to be false. That is, we align our beliefs to our experiences. Russell is looking for general, a priori principles as the foundation of human knowledge - and is thus, in effect, looking for the truth of universal propositions and existence-propositions. That is, he wants (1) propositions that are true and valid at all times and (2) propositions that state the existence of things (and ultimately all things in the universe) independent of personal experience. I.e. we know of things existing through testimony of others, through books, through historical sources, etc. and we also know of things existing that cannot be experienced by any human.
Now, both (1) and (2) are both necessary for human knowledge and, ultimately, unprovable. So why should we adopt them? Well, because they pay to be held true as general principles of all our knowledge. In the end, Russell falls back on our biological roots: forming habits and expectations out of past and present experiences - while allowing for continual re-adjustment of beliefs - is biologically adaptive. The alternative is to become a solipsist who not only denies the existence of others and the world, but also his/her own past and future.
Admittedly, this Russell's final answer might leave us somewhat unsatisfied. Yet he does claim many times in the book that all he's looking for is grounds for rational expectations that transcend common sense and open up the path to science. Science is a continuous progress of endless adjustments of these grounds, through experiences, which would be impossible without these unprovable principles.
To sum up: Russell offers five postulates that allow for scientific inferences (i.e. laws, theories, hypotheses, concepts, etc.) from experience. These principles cannot be proved yet without them, science would be impossible. The consequence of these principles is that all our knowledge of the physical and mental world is uncertain, inexact and partial. That is, all scientific knowledge is characterized by degrees of certainty and exactness; in some cases these degrees can be calculated (through applied mathematics - probability theory) but in most cases these degrees have to be estimated by rules of thumb or best guesses. Our knowledge of the world is biologically rooted, which means the major assumption is that it pays (evolutionarily speaking) to have true beliefs about the world. These beliefs manifest themselves in behavior - communication, action, etc. - that are guided by expectations about the future state of the world. Through the development of language, and ultimately logic and mathematics, human beings can overcome the primitive, pre-scientific knowledge of common sense; yet we can never obtain absolute and certain knowledge.
I'll probably re-read this book in the future, since it is so vast in its scope and so dense in its material. Throughout the book Russell uses examples from cosmology and biology to psychology and geography in order to illustrate his theories. This means that on his/her journey through the book a reader has to jump mentally from here to there and back again, and sometimes the sheer amount of information numbs the mind. I guess this is one of those books that offers new payments on every subsequent readings. (Which is what brilliant philosophy has to do, in my opinion).
Definitely recommended for anyone interested in these topics!
July 2, 2018
Why not learn epistemology from Bertrand Russell? :D He makes it accessible to everyone. It would be a good book for someone who wanted to start reading Russell.
April 10, 2012
Almost everything in this book has been dealt with by Russell in greater detail and to greater length in previous works, but, regardless, the synthesis here is impeccable. He has taken the question of knowledge, combined with insights and emendations from earlier works, and constructed his most comprehensive epistemological statement. The only significant criticism I have is that he seemed to have forgotten he was writing for the general public during the section on probability.
March 10, 2016
Russell has an acute style of tackling epistemological discussions. The thing I loved about this book is that its language is simple but comprehensive. BR introduces a problem in simple words and gradually he takes the reader to a point where he can atleast get the idea behind the discussion if not fully grab the whole. In intro he mentioned that this book is for both philosophers and enthusiasts, and I being a non-philosophy guy can second that, the only thing that gave me a hardtime was the chapter on probability.
May 7, 2021
Russell takes you on an epistemological ride with, as ever, intense clarity of mind and a sense of humor; an absolute joy to read and learn.
March 5, 2018
Look, we love Bertrand Russell, OK? And that love is easy to find on Ground Control. Every year we take a chance to read and discuss his books and we’re pleasantly surprised at how they’re unique, witty, and enlightening. The man hardly ever does wrong (like he does on his Autobiography). That’s why Human Knowledge, his last “big book” dealing with epistemology, is such a surprise.
We’re sure more in-depth studies of this book exists and that there even fans of it out there, but if you ask us, this is a very very boring book. And it’s easy to say why. Human Knowledge is just way too philosophical. Russell here is dissecting different aspects of human knowledge (for lack of a better term) and just seems to go on and on discussing and unraveling how we know what we know but uses pure philosophy to do so. So there’s no hard evidence and science to what he says and all “well, if this means that, than that must also mean this” kind of logic. It’s 450 pages dedicated to “if a equals b and b equals c, when does a not equal c?” type of analyses. So, it’s hard to follow, super repeatitive, and mind-tearingly boring. This is the lucid Bertrand Russell we know and love?
We took one for the team here, people. This just went on and on with no end in sight. What a relief that it’s over. This book is for a very specific crowd who gets its jollies dealing with thought-experiments and the abstract. Boo.
We’re sure more in-depth studies of this book exists and that there even fans of it out there, but if you ask us, this is a very very boring book. And it’s easy to say why. Human Knowledge is just way too philosophical. Russell here is dissecting different aspects of human knowledge (for lack of a better term) and just seems to go on and on discussing and unraveling how we know what we know but uses pure philosophy to do so. So there’s no hard evidence and science to what he says and all “well, if this means that, than that must also mean this” kind of logic. It’s 450 pages dedicated to “if a equals b and b equals c, when does a not equal c?” type of analyses. So, it’s hard to follow, super repeatitive, and mind-tearingly boring. This is the lucid Bertrand Russell we know and love?
We took one for the team here, people. This just went on and on with no end in sight. What a relief that it’s over. This book is for a very specific crowd who gets its jollies dealing with thought-experiments and the abstract. Boo.
December 6, 2009
There's a lot to learn from Bertrand Russell.
July 5, 2016
Science is about trying to make observations about the world and express it in terms of a language/notation accessible to public.
But epistemology tries to look at it the other way around. Trying to express common knowledge in terms of data accessible only to the individual - such as sensory data. It is in a way, the individuals attempt to understand how common knowledge is derived from their own perceptions.
The first part of the book which addresses these issues was very interesting. The latter part - the one on probability felt a bit outdated and the justifications for Inferential knowledge a bit unsatisfactory.
But epistemology tries to look at it the other way around. Trying to express common knowledge in terms of data accessible only to the individual - such as sensory data. It is in a way, the individuals attempt to understand how common knowledge is derived from their own perceptions.
The first part of the book which addresses these issues was very interesting. The latter part - the one on probability felt a bit outdated and the justifications for Inferential knowledge a bit unsatisfactory.
September 17, 2023
Aunque la analítica sea una negación en premisas de los viejos racionalismos, lo apremiante de este libro viene exactamente de su valiente intento de aproximarnos a la cosa-en-si. Un libro que no solo une conceptos, sino nos ayuda a identificar las uniones mismas, va desde la regresión cartesiana hasta el empirismo por intuición en busca de las coordenadas de la tierra fértil donde creció el pensamiento científico.
July 14, 2021
Libro muy interesante sobre filosofía de la ciencia; su crítica a la obtención conocimiento por medio de la inferencia y por medio del empirismo puro y su crítica al solipsismo. Russell claramente afronta una búsqueda del conocimiento mediante la lógica y la analítica de una forma bastante interesante.
July 1, 2021
This was my first full-length book but Russell, and I have to say I feel rather let down. This work was overlong and bland, but it did occasionally present an interesting insight into the question of how we know things.
March 9, 2020
It's all about verifying the scientific method of induction, I think.
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April 17, 2020ok
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews