What do you think?
Rate this book
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues
To flourish, humans need to develop virtues of independent thought and acknowledged social dependence. In this book, a leading moral philosopher presents a comparison of humans to other animals and explores the impact of these virtues.
180 pages, Paperback
First published May 13, 1999
About the author
Alasdair MacIntyre
104 books437 followersAlasdair Chalmers MacIntyre is a leading philosopher primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy but known also for his work in history of philosophy and theology. He is the O'Brien Senior Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 46 reviews
August 4, 2010
This is a wonderful, lucid, and for me, reorienting work in philosophical anthropology and ethics. MacIntyre weaves together the Aristotelian/Thomistic trajectory of his earlier work with recent work in animal intelligence, on the one hand, and with an explication of the concept of dependency as a constitutive feature of human identity and agency, on the other.
MacIntyre rather convincingly demonstrates that a continuum of intelligence is at work in nature, that other animals exhibit what must be considered evidence of rationality and intelligence of a limited sort.
In addition, his discussion of practical reason is really fruitful. MacIntyre is a fantastic writer, and the argument that practical reason requires virtues of dependency and has an irreducibly social character I find compelling. My own preference is a version of this argument put forward through Mead and Dewey, but it is surprising how this Thomistic thinker's work here puts him in deep sympathy with Classical American Pragmatism. He extends the analysis of practical reason, putting identity in a tight relationship with social learning processes with respect to reasoning. This is a welcome extension of his model of agency on offer in his earlier work After Virtue.
Most importantly, his analysis of dependency in our lives, necessarily as infants and as senior citizens, and contingently on our life's path, has extended my sympathies ( and I would argue 'ought' extend any reader's sympathies ) toward my fellow human beings greatly. Something philosophy books all too rarely achieve.
MacIntyre rather convincingly demonstrates that a continuum of intelligence is at work in nature, that other animals exhibit what must be considered evidence of rationality and intelligence of a limited sort.
In addition, his discussion of practical reason is really fruitful. MacIntyre is a fantastic writer, and the argument that practical reason requires virtues of dependency and has an irreducibly social character I find compelling. My own preference is a version of this argument put forward through Mead and Dewey, but it is surprising how this Thomistic thinker's work here puts him in deep sympathy with Classical American Pragmatism. He extends the analysis of practical reason, putting identity in a tight relationship with social learning processes with respect to reasoning. This is a welcome extension of his model of agency on offer in his earlier work After Virtue.
Most importantly, his analysis of dependency in our lives, necessarily as infants and as senior citizens, and contingently on our life's path, has extended my sympathies ( and I would argue 'ought' extend any reader's sympathies ) toward my fellow human beings greatly. Something philosophy books all too rarely achieve.
January 7, 2016
According to philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre in his book Dependent Rational Animals, there are three facts about ourselves as people that we sometimes forget and that some people never learn. One of these facts is that a sign of maturity is learning to separate ourselves from our immediate desires. It may seem tempting to own every desire we have, come what may, but when we reflect upon what desires arise in our mind, we can make better decisions. Sometimes this will mean sacrificing immediate wants for longterm goals, and sometimes in favor of helping other people or doing our duties as friends, lovers, parents, children, teachers, students, managers, or workers.
The second fact that is so easy to forget is that knowing ourselves is quite hard. Often we don't know ourselves as well as we think we do. Those people around us can be helpful in letting us know our shortcomings or helping us by acknowledging and encouraging our strengths and virtues. Feedback from others is not the only way to know ourselves better; frequently we need quiet reflection, time to rethink goals and motives, and to move after this kind of deliberation. Private and social deliberation help us know about ourselves better.
The third fact about us human beings is that we are dependent on one another. When we see homeless people, perhaps we forget that those people are people first and lacking in homes second. And people with mental and physical disabilities are not so much different from us either. We could have just as easily been born as part of different families, in different communities, and with different desires, and then we could have wound up homeless or disabled. We all have homes because of our luck, whether genetic luck or environmental luck. It's easy to forget this dependence and claim self-sufficiency. But the fact is we have always needed the help of others to occupy the position we have today.
Maturity is tough, and some of us never learn. We are often beholden to immediate desires and emotions and feelings, we don't know ourselves very well and get protective of our own egos, and we want to claim an inordinate amount of independence for ourselves. Maturity comes when we acknowledge that these emotions and desires that are so overwhelming can be reflected upon and worked out in view of the kind of person we want to be or become. At that point, we need not be the slave of a temporary moment of anger or negative emotion. When this happens, we also think less about ourselves and don't take ourselves so seriously. Part of knowing ourselves is learning that to err is human and to feel dissatisfied is human. If I, for instance, begin to take the carelessness of strangers personally, as a sleight against me, then I am taking myself too seriously. This doesn't mean that we have to like everything that comes our way, but we do have to deal with it and accept it and put it in its place. Bad situations come up, they last for a short time, and then they pass; nothing personal. Knowing ourselves means only personalizing and making endure those moments in our lives that perpetuate our abilities to grow in character. And our character has to interact with the network of relationships we exist within. Some of these relationships are good, and some of them are bad. To the extent that we can, we spend time in the relationships that are positive and we cultivate them. And for the rest, we either change them or accept what they are. I've learned that even accepting the anger and frustration of others allows me to see those people in a new light. They know not what they do, and often neither do I.
The second fact that is so easy to forget is that knowing ourselves is quite hard. Often we don't know ourselves as well as we think we do. Those people around us can be helpful in letting us know our shortcomings or helping us by acknowledging and encouraging our strengths and virtues. Feedback from others is not the only way to know ourselves better; frequently we need quiet reflection, time to rethink goals and motives, and to move after this kind of deliberation. Private and social deliberation help us know about ourselves better.
The third fact about us human beings is that we are dependent on one another. When we see homeless people, perhaps we forget that those people are people first and lacking in homes second. And people with mental and physical disabilities are not so much different from us either. We could have just as easily been born as part of different families, in different communities, and with different desires, and then we could have wound up homeless or disabled. We all have homes because of our luck, whether genetic luck or environmental luck. It's easy to forget this dependence and claim self-sufficiency. But the fact is we have always needed the help of others to occupy the position we have today.
Maturity is tough, and some of us never learn. We are often beholden to immediate desires and emotions and feelings, we don't know ourselves very well and get protective of our own egos, and we want to claim an inordinate amount of independence for ourselves. Maturity comes when we acknowledge that these emotions and desires that are so overwhelming can be reflected upon and worked out in view of the kind of person we want to be or become. At that point, we need not be the slave of a temporary moment of anger or negative emotion. When this happens, we also think less about ourselves and don't take ourselves so seriously. Part of knowing ourselves is learning that to err is human and to feel dissatisfied is human. If I, for instance, begin to take the carelessness of strangers personally, as a sleight against me, then I am taking myself too seriously. This doesn't mean that we have to like everything that comes our way, but we do have to deal with it and accept it and put it in its place. Bad situations come up, they last for a short time, and then they pass; nothing personal. Knowing ourselves means only personalizing and making endure those moments in our lives that perpetuate our abilities to grow in character. And our character has to interact with the network of relationships we exist within. Some of these relationships are good, and some of them are bad. To the extent that we can, we spend time in the relationships that are positive and we cultivate them. And for the rest, we either change them or accept what they are. I've learned that even accepting the anger and frustration of others allows me to see those people in a new light. They know not what they do, and often neither do I.
December 10, 2019
5.5/10.
Not up to par with 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry' or 'After Virtue'. Some reviewers recommend starting with DRA as an entree in to MacIntyre's oeuvre. Don't listen to them. None of his truly original insights are in this book, though a lot of fluff about animal rights is. If I'd started here (instead of with 'After Virtue'), I'd have written the author off as a common second-rate philosopher and read no more of his works - and been spared exposure to some of the most radical and enlightening philosophical work done in the 20th century.
Start with 'After Virtue'. If you can't take it, start with 'God, Philosophy, and Universities'. Leave this book for dedicated collectors who want to read everything MacIntyre put out, or those with a focus on the animal-man debate.
Not up to par with 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry' or 'After Virtue'. Some reviewers recommend starting with DRA as an entree in to MacIntyre's oeuvre. Don't listen to them. None of his truly original insights are in this book, though a lot of fluff about animal rights is. If I'd started here (instead of with 'After Virtue'), I'd have written the author off as a common second-rate philosopher and read no more of his works - and been spared exposure to some of the most radical and enlightening philosophical work done in the 20th century.
Start with 'After Virtue'. If you can't take it, start with 'God, Philosophy, and Universities'. Leave this book for dedicated collectors who want to read everything MacIntyre put out, or those with a focus on the animal-man debate.
April 26, 2012
MacIntyre is one of those figures whom I respect immensely, and agree with on important points, and yet I just can't get fully on his side. This book is fantastic example of MacIntyre's later thoughts. He makes a really wonderful case for the necessity of human communities of giving and receiving as the environment in which humans best flourish through their practicing of the virtues.
It's a fantastic argument against liberals and "rational" choice theorists for a community of concern, recognition, and engagement. It's also a guide to a very demanding moral system that I believe few people would have the discipline and character to engage in (though I wish we all did).
It's a fantastic argument against liberals and "rational" choice theorists for a community of concern, recognition, and engagement. It's also a guide to a very demanding moral system that I believe few people would have the discipline and character to engage in (though I wish we all did).
June 12, 2022
NOT a book for a general reader. It assumes knowledge not just of well-known philosophers like Aristotle and Wittgenstein but of philosophers I never heard of like Paul Grice. The writing style is extremely pedantic.
Also very repetitive.
It's a shame, because the topic sounded interesting.
But I gotta finish it because my book group will be discussing it. I predict the discussion will be either very short or very long.
I will save myself time writing my feelings and just refer you to the review by my friend Michael Brewer, who is the leader of our book group:
The author spends the first part of the book arguing for a continuum between animals (notably, intelligent species like apes and dolphins) and humans. I was hopeful that he would continue this argument by basing his analysis of human morality in a pre-linguistic evolution of our species. He refers several times to Heidegger, who argued that the primordial experience of humans in the world is ontological, and not epistemological.
The second half of the book was therefore a disappointment to me. My fault, really, because I knew nothing of MacIntyre coming in. He is a scholar conversant with Aristotle and Aquinas, and so is prescriptively advancing the idea of rationally-derived precepts of morality. I found myself sympathetic to his egalitarian and deeply humane ideas, though it seems to me that social democracy already encompasses the world view he advocates.
I mark the book a two because I found his writing bloated and vague. I finished several chapters without any insight into his thinking. He often expressed commonplace ideas in academic prose. I conclude with a passage that is not atypical, which I found incomprehensible:
'Eating fish is among the goods of dolphin life. Hunting for fish is, unsurprisingly, a key activity. And the accurate description of episodes in the course of hunting commits us to asserting the truth of sets of counterfactual conditionals of exactly the same type as those to which we are committed by accurate descriptions of human activity.'
Counterfactual conditionals? Please.
Also very repetitive.
It's a shame, because the topic sounded interesting.
But I gotta finish it because my book group will be discussing it. I predict the discussion will be either very short or very long.
I will save myself time writing my feelings and just refer you to the review by my friend Michael Brewer, who is the leader of our book group:
The author spends the first part of the book arguing for a continuum between animals (notably, intelligent species like apes and dolphins) and humans. I was hopeful that he would continue this argument by basing his analysis of human morality in a pre-linguistic evolution of our species. He refers several times to Heidegger, who argued that the primordial experience of humans in the world is ontological, and not epistemological.
The second half of the book was therefore a disappointment to me. My fault, really, because I knew nothing of MacIntyre coming in. He is a scholar conversant with Aristotle and Aquinas, and so is prescriptively advancing the idea of rationally-derived precepts of morality. I found myself sympathetic to his egalitarian and deeply humane ideas, though it seems to me that social democracy already encompasses the world view he advocates.
I mark the book a two because I found his writing bloated and vague. I finished several chapters without any insight into his thinking. He often expressed commonplace ideas in academic prose. I conclude with a passage that is not atypical, which I found incomprehensible:
'Eating fish is among the goods of dolphin life. Hunting for fish is, unsurprisingly, a key activity. And the accurate description of episodes in the course of hunting commits us to asserting the truth of sets of counterfactual conditionals of exactly the same type as those to which we are committed by accurate descriptions of human activity.'
Counterfactual conditionals? Please.
April 21, 2021
I read this for a philosophy class, and it was pretty good! He explained himself very well (some philosophers seem nearly impossible to understand with all their big words, but MacIntyre was reasonable 😋).
I perhaps didn’t agree with every single statement he made, but as he himself said, debating ideas and beliefs helps us to flourish as human beings.
I especially appreciated his ideas about human beings as dependent on others. Since every person is dependent on others to some extent at some point in life, it is a common interest to care for those who are vulnerable and dependent.
I do have different ideas about the core reason why it is important to care for others, but as I said, I like bouncing my thoughts against others’ thoughts.
Overall, a good, informative, thought-provoking read.
I perhaps didn’t agree with every single statement he made, but as he himself said, debating ideas and beliefs helps us to flourish as human beings.
I especially appreciated his ideas about human beings as dependent on others. Since every person is dependent on others to some extent at some point in life, it is a common interest to care for those who are vulnerable and dependent.
I do have different ideas about the core reason why it is important to care for others, but as I said, I like bouncing my thoughts against others’ thoughts.
Overall, a good, informative, thought-provoking read.
July 25, 2011
I can see why MacIntyre has been recognized as one of the greatest philosophers of our time. Incorporating everyone from Aquinas to Marx, Aristotle to Nietzsche, MacIntyre shows how an analysis of animal intelligence determines how we view “beliefs”, “knowledge of self”, and what it means to be a part of community (among many other issues). The book covers a lot of ground in its 165 pages, but it is accessible, and is refreshing in that sense in that not a lot of prior philosophical reading is required to understand it. The concepts of being an “independent practical reasoner” and of “acknowledged dependence” are not respectively as “independent” or “dependent” as we might think, but MacIntyre effectively destroys any lingering ideas as to whether or not we are truly able to live without the “other”. There is a universality that is recognized by MacIntyre, and his explanation of that alone makes this book required reading.
March 10, 2011
This is my favorite MacIntyre book. It is accessible and makes some excellent points about human nature and the virtues. There's a lot in here about language, about dolphins, and about dependence and independence. It is well worth the read.
June 8, 2022
The author spends the first part of the book arguing for a continuum between animals (notably, intelligent species like apes and dolphins) and humans. I was hopeful that he would continue this argument by basing his analysis of human morality in a pre-linguistic evolution of our species. He refers several times to Heidegger, who argued that the primordial experience of humans in the world is ontological, and not epistemological.
The second half of the book was therefore a disappointment to me. My fault, really, because I knew nothing of MacIntyre coming in. He is a scholar conversant with Aristotle and Aquinas, and so is prescriptively advancing the idea of rationally-derived precepts of morality. I found myself sympathetic to his egalitarian and deeply humane ideas, though it seems to me that social democracy already encompasses the world view he advocates.
I mark the book a two because I found his writing bloated and vague. I finished several chapters without any insight into his thinking. He often expressed commonplace ideas in academic prose. I conclude with a passage that is not atypical, which I found incomprehensible:
'Eating fish is among the goods of dolphin life. Hunting for fish is, unsurprisingly, a key activity. And the accurate description of episodes in the course of hunting commits us to asserting the truth of sets of counterfactual conditionals of exactly the same type as those to which we are committed by accurate descriptions of human activity.'
Counterfactual conditionals? Please.
The second half of the book was therefore a disappointment to me. My fault, really, because I knew nothing of MacIntyre coming in. He is a scholar conversant with Aristotle and Aquinas, and so is prescriptively advancing the idea of rationally-derived precepts of morality. I found myself sympathetic to his egalitarian and deeply humane ideas, though it seems to me that social democracy already encompasses the world view he advocates.
I mark the book a two because I found his writing bloated and vague. I finished several chapters without any insight into his thinking. He often expressed commonplace ideas in academic prose. I conclude with a passage that is not atypical, which I found incomprehensible:
'Eating fish is among the goods of dolphin life. Hunting for fish is, unsurprisingly, a key activity. And the accurate description of episodes in the course of hunting commits us to asserting the truth of sets of counterfactual conditionals of exactly the same type as those to which we are committed by accurate descriptions of human activity.'
Counterfactual conditionals? Please.
October 1, 2017
Moral philosophy should reflect the fact that many parts of our life involve dependence on and embedding in social relationships. Reasonable short discussion on other social animal examples and on how we develop as rational practitioners in the context of virtues (categorized as either supporting "rational independence" or "acknowledged dependence"), but overall thin.
November 27, 2020
So correct it's almost dispiriting, considering that his prescriptions, at least in large communities here and now, are virtually impossible to enact. Thatwithstanding, this is a wonderful exposition on the nature of those virtues required to live and flourish with other animals, be they able or disabled.
June 8, 2021
This is the best MacIntyre book I’ve read and it’s not even that close.
May 1, 2021
We are all dependent on one another, and we cannot care for one another without the virtues of acknowledged dependence. Such a fantastic, important book for ethics.
February 11, 2024
Honestly excellent. Manages to be both a moral philosopher whilst also being (for the most part) very based.
October 27, 2021
This was out of my comprehension, I tried, but...
January 29, 2017
This book continues to be a much needed corrective in the field of philosophy that has far too often overlooked human animality and dependence. What MacIntyre argues, in the briefest possible terms, is 1) that human and animal rationality share more than we have usually recognized, 2) human dependence defines human flourishing and virtue, and 3) these, in turn, define what ought to be features of political organization and rational inquiry.
As with all of MacIntyre's writing, there is a lot packed into these pages, and yet, this book, in particular, bears the marks of needed expansion, as he himself admits in the introduction. There is so much more to be said, and it is only because I find the size of this work so inadequate to its subject matter that I give it 4 stars instead of 5.
As with all of MacIntyre's writing, there is a lot packed into these pages, and yet, this book, in particular, bears the marks of needed expansion, as he himself admits in the introduction. There is so much more to be said, and it is only because I find the size of this work so inadequate to its subject matter that I give it 4 stars instead of 5.
December 3, 2017
I found the first half of the book on the rationality of animals to be middling, by the high standards I set for MacIntyre. There were certainly some interesting insights, but it's not a topic that deeply interests me. On the other hand, the second half of the book is stellar... up there with the best parts of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (which is his magnum opus, in my view). His commentary on family and the parent-child relationship in particular is fascinating. If you are interested in MacIntyre's school of thought, definitely give this a read--it's shorter and more accessible than his prior two books as well (which makes sense, as it was converted from the lecture format).
Currently reading
December 12, 2010Mac gives me a serious headache. Organization: thy friend is not Alasdair MacIntyre.
March 31, 2020
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals is a very clear account of his core beliefs as a moral philosopher. It also has the merit of being quite readable. It’s most interesting flaw, however, is it’s Utopianism.
The book defends “three sets of theses.”
1. Our commonality with and resemblance to other intelligent species.
2. The moral importance of acknowledging our vulnerabilities, afflictions and disabilities, and the resulting dependencies these states create for self-understanding.
3. The types of social relationships and conception of the common good required to sustain a community in the ongoing practice of the intellectual and moral virtues.
If all this sounds rather Aristotelian you would not be far wrong, as MacIntyre describes himself as a “Thomistic Aristotelian.” His thought has been profoundly shaped by his reading of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. It should be noted that MacIntyre was a Marxist before he joined the Roman Catholic Church, so his thought has also been significantly impacted by his early experience as a Marxist.
Of the theses defended, the second one is primarily focused on his views about moral philosophy. They are subtle and interesting. They also form an Aristotelian critique of modern traditions of thought about ethical matters, including Kantianism, utilitarianism, and all forms of contractarianism. In other words, all other major approaches to the study of moral philosophy and social justice issues today! In one of his earlier (and most famous) books, After Virtue, MacIntyre provides a detailed defence of this take on moral philosophy.
I enjoyed reading his critiques of other philosophers in this component of the book. To name just three, his comments on Adam Smith, Martin Heidegger, and Nietzsche enriched my understanding of each of these very diverse philosophers. Indeed, one of MacIntyre’s strengths is his vast erudition.
Much less convincing, however, are the views he sets out for us about the best type community for human flourishing. In order to flourish we need to acquire and sustain the intellectual and moral virtues he discusses in his book. This, he says, can only be adequately accomplished in small scale communities characterized by face-to-face encounters. Political decisions in such communities would “reflect a common mind arrived at through widespread shared deliberation governed by norms of rational inquiry.” Additionally, these communities would need to impose limits to labour mobility and invest heavily in education and the provision of services for the disabled. As well, labour exchanges in the community would ensure that everyone would take a turn at “performing the tedious and dangerous jobs.” The communities’ guiding principle, even if only imperfectly achieved would be the same one that the elderly Marx said would govern the “higher” stage of communism: “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” MacIntyre dryly observes that his position involves “a rejection of the economic goals of advanced capitalism” and his ideal community is “inimical to and in conflict with the goals of a consumer society.”
While MacIntyre recognizes his community is Utopian, his position is that “trying to live by Utopian standards is not Utopian.” But, he also acknowledges that his model community is dependent (parasitic?) on the “enormous resources” of the modern nation state. If the community he is advocating for has to face serious internal or external threats it can rely on the army or the police of the adjacent nation state to help our! But perhaps, like some have said about Plato’s ideal society in the Republic, MacIntyre is merely jesting?
In case we might think that, he goes on to identify several potential candidates for his model community:
- New England fishing communities over the past 150 years
- Welsh mining communities
- Farming communities in Donegal
- Mayan towns in Guatemala and Mexico
- Some city-states from the distant past.
Sociologists and historians, he says, should embark upon a “comparative study” of such real-world local communities.
Of MacIntyre’s book, Dependent Rational Animals, I can only conclude by saying that it takes the reader from “the sublime to the ridiculous”! But it’s an interesting ride and I certainly recommend it to every thoughtful reader.
The book defends “three sets of theses.”
1. Our commonality with and resemblance to other intelligent species.
2. The moral importance of acknowledging our vulnerabilities, afflictions and disabilities, and the resulting dependencies these states create for self-understanding.
3. The types of social relationships and conception of the common good required to sustain a community in the ongoing practice of the intellectual and moral virtues.
If all this sounds rather Aristotelian you would not be far wrong, as MacIntyre describes himself as a “Thomistic Aristotelian.” His thought has been profoundly shaped by his reading of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. It should be noted that MacIntyre was a Marxist before he joined the Roman Catholic Church, so his thought has also been significantly impacted by his early experience as a Marxist.
Of the theses defended, the second one is primarily focused on his views about moral philosophy. They are subtle and interesting. They also form an Aristotelian critique of modern traditions of thought about ethical matters, including Kantianism, utilitarianism, and all forms of contractarianism. In other words, all other major approaches to the study of moral philosophy and social justice issues today! In one of his earlier (and most famous) books, After Virtue, MacIntyre provides a detailed defence of this take on moral philosophy.
I enjoyed reading his critiques of other philosophers in this component of the book. To name just three, his comments on Adam Smith, Martin Heidegger, and Nietzsche enriched my understanding of each of these very diverse philosophers. Indeed, one of MacIntyre’s strengths is his vast erudition.
Much less convincing, however, are the views he sets out for us about the best type community for human flourishing. In order to flourish we need to acquire and sustain the intellectual and moral virtues he discusses in his book. This, he says, can only be adequately accomplished in small scale communities characterized by face-to-face encounters. Political decisions in such communities would “reflect a common mind arrived at through widespread shared deliberation governed by norms of rational inquiry.” Additionally, these communities would need to impose limits to labour mobility and invest heavily in education and the provision of services for the disabled. As well, labour exchanges in the community would ensure that everyone would take a turn at “performing the tedious and dangerous jobs.” The communities’ guiding principle, even if only imperfectly achieved would be the same one that the elderly Marx said would govern the “higher” stage of communism: “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” MacIntyre dryly observes that his position involves “a rejection of the economic goals of advanced capitalism” and his ideal community is “inimical to and in conflict with the goals of a consumer society.”
While MacIntyre recognizes his community is Utopian, his position is that “trying to live by Utopian standards is not Utopian.” But, he also acknowledges that his model community is dependent (parasitic?) on the “enormous resources” of the modern nation state. If the community he is advocating for has to face serious internal or external threats it can rely on the army or the police of the adjacent nation state to help our! But perhaps, like some have said about Plato’s ideal society in the Republic, MacIntyre is merely jesting?
In case we might think that, he goes on to identify several potential candidates for his model community:
- New England fishing communities over the past 150 years
- Welsh mining communities
- Farming communities in Donegal
- Mayan towns in Guatemala and Mexico
- Some city-states from the distant past.
Sociologists and historians, he says, should embark upon a “comparative study” of such real-world local communities.
Of MacIntyre’s book, Dependent Rational Animals, I can only conclude by saying that it takes the reader from “the sublime to the ridiculous”! But it’s an interesting ride and I certainly recommend it to every thoughtful reader.
March 3, 2024
The book opens with the author correcting a mistake in his earlier book, ‘After Virtue.’ In that book he tried to develop an ethics which was independent of human biology. In this book the author recognises that that was a mistaken approach and so he now focuses upon the implications of human biology, and in particular upon what is shared between human biology and other animals.
He notes that Aquinas referred to humans ‘and other animals,’ and Aquinas even ascribed human like similarities to non-human animals, involving perception, judgement and aspects of practical reasoning, such as animals exercising a type of prudence. The author notes that some philosophers are very reluctant to ascribe beliefs or thinking to animals, but there are relevant senses in which that reluctance may be inappropriate. For example, a dog sitting under a tree could perhaps be said to have a ‘belief’ about what is in the tree. And animals learn from experience about what is harmful and beneficial, which means that they then choose to act differently. To put it another way, their thinking or their beliefs can be said to change.
Although animals (especially Dolphins) feature heavily in this book, it is not actually a book about animals, or animal rights. It is a book focused upon learning from the similarities between humans and ‘other animals,’ in order to get a better understanding of (biological) humanness. The book is particularly opposed to the Cartesian dualism which divides people into a core soul/identity and then a physical body which ends up being a kind of addendum. Part of the reason why philosophers have historically made that mistake, is that they have distinguished too sharply between human rational souls, and irrational brute animals.
One particularly interesting angle which the author pursues is the implications of disability or inability, and the relationships of giving and receiving which that gives rise to. In classic economics there are relationships of benevolence, and then there are market orientated relationships of advantage. But the author suggests that the giving and receiving of care and support does not easily fit into classic models. It seems to be neither an egotism nor altruism, but something more complex and something which is potentially more philosophically interesting…
Overall this is a thought provoking book, which includes about 14% of notes and follow up materials. However, it is written in the style of Analytic Anglo-American philosophy. That makes it a book which will probably be appreciated most by college level readers, and especially those with a prior familiarity with the subject matter.
He notes that Aquinas referred to humans ‘and other animals,’ and Aquinas even ascribed human like similarities to non-human animals, involving perception, judgement and aspects of practical reasoning, such as animals exercising a type of prudence. The author notes that some philosophers are very reluctant to ascribe beliefs or thinking to animals, but there are relevant senses in which that reluctance may be inappropriate. For example, a dog sitting under a tree could perhaps be said to have a ‘belief’ about what is in the tree. And animals learn from experience about what is harmful and beneficial, which means that they then choose to act differently. To put it another way, their thinking or their beliefs can be said to change.
Although animals (especially Dolphins) feature heavily in this book, it is not actually a book about animals, or animal rights. It is a book focused upon learning from the similarities between humans and ‘other animals,’ in order to get a better understanding of (biological) humanness. The book is particularly opposed to the Cartesian dualism which divides people into a core soul/identity and then a physical body which ends up being a kind of addendum. Part of the reason why philosophers have historically made that mistake, is that they have distinguished too sharply between human rational souls, and irrational brute animals.
One particularly interesting angle which the author pursues is the implications of disability or inability, and the relationships of giving and receiving which that gives rise to. In classic economics there are relationships of benevolence, and then there are market orientated relationships of advantage. But the author suggests that the giving and receiving of care and support does not easily fit into classic models. It seems to be neither an egotism nor altruism, but something more complex and something which is potentially more philosophically interesting…
Overall this is a thought provoking book, which includes about 14% of notes and follow up materials. However, it is written in the style of Analytic Anglo-American philosophy. That makes it a book which will probably be appreciated most by college level readers, and especially those with a prior familiarity with the subject matter.
December 9, 2020
MacIntyre considers the virtues that human beings need to live together in a flourishing communities that takes into account that we are inherently part of "networks of giving and receiving": we come into the world dependent on our parents, we depend on others to teach us to become "independent practical reasoners," we help others who are growing or who have various needs, and we often end up needing others more as we experience dependence and disability throughout life. He contrasts this with philosophical approaches that take the independent, rational individual as the standard type of human being, while disability and dependence are something that others experience. (I am not well-versed enough in philosophy to know if this is a serious problem.)
This paragraph is a good illustration of his approach, applied specifically to political communities:
I found MacIntyre's approach of considering networks of giving and receiving very helpful and a better way to think about human beings than social contract theory. MacIntyre does not reject individual rights but wants to situate human beings in a more human setting that social contract theory does. At least for me, it is unclear what exactly to build on MacIntyre's foundation, but it provided an interesting framework for thinking about community.
This paragraph is a good illustration of his approach, applied specifically to political communities:
What I am trying to envisage then is a form of political society in which it is taken for granted that disability and dependence on others are something that all of us experience at certain times in our lives and this to unpredictable degrees, and that consequently our interest in how the needs of the disabled are adequately voiced and met is not a special interest, the interest of one particular interest group rather than of others, but rather the interest of the whole political society, an interest that is integral to their conception of the common good. What kind of society might possess the structures necessary to achieve a common good thus conceived? (130)
I found MacIntyre's approach of considering networks of giving and receiving very helpful and a better way to think about human beings than social contract theory. MacIntyre does not reject individual rights but wants to situate human beings in a more human setting that social contract theory does. At least for me, it is unclear what exactly to build on MacIntyre's foundation, but it provided an interesting framework for thinking about community.
February 5, 2019
The motivating idea behind the book - that our conception of virtue must be tied to the fact that human beings are often dependent on each other (via infancy, old age or disability) - is powerful and relevant.
The book doesn't pretend to be more than a sketch of this argument and its implications. Despite this, I found the sketch to be ultimately unsatisfying relative to the appeal and promise of the idea. I suppose I would have preferred a longer book, or rather, one that had taken longer to write.
The beginning chapters spend a fair amount of time triangulating between Aquinas' and Aristotle's conceptions of virtue and the fact of human disability; it takes a third of the book to lay down the basic groundwork and you walk away with a long list of caveats and footnotes about work yet to be done. The description of what the virtues befitting our situation as dependent animals would look like is very short by comparison, although the author explicitly doesn't set out to list all or even the main virtues. Still, you get only a few parameters for how to think about what these virtues would be.
Finally, the book ends with a series of prescriptions implied by these virtues for a more just society. This makes complete sense but, since the virtues are sketched so briefly, the prescriptions seemed pulled out of a hat and therefore unsatisfying.
I'm glad I read the book, I just wish there had been more of it. Perhaps there is? I need to investigate.
The book doesn't pretend to be more than a sketch of this argument and its implications. Despite this, I found the sketch to be ultimately unsatisfying relative to the appeal and promise of the idea. I suppose I would have preferred a longer book, or rather, one that had taken longer to write.
The beginning chapters spend a fair amount of time triangulating between Aquinas' and Aristotle's conceptions of virtue and the fact of human disability; it takes a third of the book to lay down the basic groundwork and you walk away with a long list of caveats and footnotes about work yet to be done. The description of what the virtues befitting our situation as dependent animals would look like is very short by comparison, although the author explicitly doesn't set out to list all or even the main virtues. Still, you get only a few parameters for how to think about what these virtues would be.
Finally, the book ends with a series of prescriptions implied by these virtues for a more just society. This makes complete sense but, since the virtues are sketched so briefly, the prescriptions seemed pulled out of a hat and therefore unsatisfying.
I'm glad I read the book, I just wish there had been more of it. Perhaps there is? I need to investigate.
May 3, 2020
Todos somos dependientes al principio de nuestra vida, y casi todos en la vejez. Y entre ambos momentos, experimentaremos situaciones de dependencia por enfermedad o accidente. Además, dependemos de los demás para alcanzar el estado de seres racionales prácticos, como otros dependerán de nosotros. Se crean así relaciones de reciprocidad cuyo éxito depende de la practica en la comunidad de una serie de virtudes muy específicas, y que según MacIntyre, no pueden desarrollarse únicamente en el ámbito de la familia ni tampoco en el del Estado, sino en las comunidades a las que pertenecemos como parte de esas redes de generosidad. Un interesante libro que justifica la defensa de los discapacitados y de los que no tienen voz para participar en las deliberaciones de la comunidad. En algunos aspectos es más un punto de partida para desarrollos más profundos que un estudio minucioso de las tesis planteadas.
March 26, 2022
Not my favorite of MacIntyre’s boooks—coming from a series of lectures, it remains too vague about important points. Mostly, though, I was not convinced by his claim that in order to understand why we need the virtues we need to see ourselves as more like animals (his example is dolphins) than we usually do. It seems to me that he only demonstrates that we need virtues (while dolphins and chimps do not) exactly and only because of how significantly different we are from other species. I also think that the case for dependence might be more effective if it were extended beyond situations of illness and disability to fact that even the most healthy and “able” human is completely dependent on a host of others for everything she or he thinks she does by sheer dint of personal power. Overall, a good book and I learned from reading it, but not as much as from his more recent book “Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity”.
Read
October 1, 2020Esta es mi primera lectura de McIntyre y a juzgar por el contenido no será la última. Diré antes que nada quea la obra le faltan páginas que le habrían otorgado mayor unidad y coherencia interna, pero más allá de ese detalle concreto Animalesracioinales y dependientes es un gran libro. Parte de una acertada exposición del estado de la cuestión en torno a animalidad y racionalidad para embarcarse inmediatamente en un sosegado y certero análisis de las condiciones en las que el ser humano se desarrolla y del papel que las virtudes desempeñan en este proceso. Por lo general estoy de acuerdo con sus argumentos y con el modo de expresarlos, que es todo lo que se le puede pedir a un texto como este. Más aún, me ha hecho reflexioinar en abundancia y me será de utilidad para mis propias investigaciones, con lo que solo puedo sentir satisfacción ante esta lectura. Muy recomendable.
May 14, 2022
Es un ensayo de antropología filosófica que parte de dos ideas principales: 1) el hombre, aunque ser racional, sigue siendo un animal y no pierde su animalidad en su desarrollo 2) las virtudes son necesarias para ser independientes, especialmente las virtudes de reconocimiento de dependencia. Los primeros capítulos del libro se agotan en revisión de estudios de comportamiento animal para demostrar que existe una comunicación prelingüística. Todos esos capítulos en general me parecieron innecesarios para lo que sigue, sin embargo es compensado por el discurrir posterior de las ideas.
May 24, 2017
A very good book that argues convincingly how independence and autonomy can only be achieved through dependency. The rational thinker is fostered and does not make him or herself independent by breaking loose from one's dependency. The links to animals and how MacIntyre is reasoning about animal intention and so on are also well worth thinking about.
November 26, 2020
A helpful treatise on humans’ interdependence on each other and how relationships shape us from birth through old age - especially in our vulnerable season and even as we are individual practical reasoners. Many ideas about how cultivating the virtues in our lives will foster flourishing human communities that not only work for individuals’ good but for the common good.
May 29, 2018
Interesante libro.
Hay partes en que su discurso se vuelve repetitiva.
Buen análisis de nuestra acknowledged dependence y independent rational reasoning.
Hay partes en que su discurso se vuelve repetitiva.
Buen análisis de nuestra acknowledged dependence y independent rational reasoning.
February 16, 2019
MacIntyre makes a good argument in this volume about how we humans are essentially dependent, or vulnerable, as well as rational animals. I highly recommend it!
Displaying 1 - 30 of 46 reviews