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Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame
From the age of Darwin to the present day, biologists have been grappling with the origins of our moral sense. Why, if the human instinct to survive and reproduce is “selfish,” do people engage in self-sacrifice, and even develop ideas like virtue and shame to justify that altruism? Many theories have been put forth, some emphasizing the role of nepotism, others emphasizing the advantages of reciprocation or group selection effects. But evolutionary anthropologist Christopher Boehm finds existing explanations lacking, and in Moral Origins, he offers an elegant new theory.Tracing the development of altruism and group social control over 6 million years, Boehm argues that our moral sense is a sophisticated defense mechanism that enables individuals to survive and thrive in groups. One of the biggest risks of group living is the possibility of being punished for our misdeeds by those around us. Bullies, thieves, free-riders, and especially psychopaths—those who make it difficult for others to go about their lives—are the most likely to suffer this fate. Getting by requires getting along, and this social type of selection, Boehm shows, singles out altruists for survival. This selection pressure has been unique in shaping human nature, and it bred the first stirrings of conscience in the human species. Ultimately, it led to the fully developed sense of virtue and shame that we know today.A groundbreaking exploration of the evolution of human generosity and cooperation, Moral Origins offers profound insight into humanity’s moral past—and how it might shape our moral future.
432 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2012
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January 14, 2015
I am on-side with social selection, that allows for ‘human preferences’ in how we have evolved. Yes, we help pick who survives and define our own fitness: we select for cooperation and ‘extra-familial generosity’ (altruism) that help everybody in the group eat well.
This doesn’t mark us out as distinct from animals, who cooperate in ways we can’t conceive.
Where he goes after this rests on the ‘human uniqueness’ argument, and in my personal search for understanding I have crossed that off, through the work of primatologist Frans de Waal. My one quarrel with Boehm’s first book was with his primatology: he was very conservative in what he granted to the apes, and his bonobos, notably, I didn’t even recognise from other descriptions. It is worse in this book: early on, when he claims human uniqueness, without which what follows is useless – he says – he spends two pages on proof that animals don’t internalise values such as fairness and a sense of wrongdoing; and he cites only apes and the domestic dog. On apes, again, I found Frans de Waal a far more sensitive observer; and domestic dogs – are domestic, for one thing. My dissatisfaction with these two pages turned bug-eyed when he uses the word ‘doggie’ in a serious book. I’ll echo another reviewer, about how much he hangs on the fact that ‘only humans blush.’ Hey, I bet aliens use other physiological mechanisms to exhibit shame. ‘Man is the animal that blushes’ works as a quip from Mark Twain, but not as evidence that we alone feel shame. When he talks of internalising values – which we do, and other species don’t – his distinctions become very finely drawn. Often, as he says, we, like doggie, are just ‘afraid to be found out’; reading his insistence on true internalisation, you start to wonder if you ever did yourself. By the way, I blush from embarrassment mostly, and animals certainly have expression of embarrassment. I’m not sure I can prove my internalisation of values to the world; and when he admits we can never get inside the mind of an animal – it’s too hazy.
Before I leave animals: bonobos are important. He equates them with other apes – who only make the most primitive efforts to solve their ‘alpha male problems’. Enough for humans to be going on with.
The anthropological content of his first book, Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior, is replicated here: on how hunter-gatherers use coalitions to defeat alpha males. Because nobody likes a bully, nor ever did. However, in his first book he acknowledged the existence of ‘untouched’ hunter-gatherers who are not egalitarian; if my memory is right he admits he has no explanation for why they diverge. In this book, he leaves them out of his study group: on grounds they are not egalitarian and therefore don’t resemble Late Pleistocene humans. Because they don’t fit his theory? If he has a reason to leave them out, he fails to give it to us. This shook my confidence early, too.
His anthropological material is worth reading, if you are concerned about the politics of our species; but it’s better read in his first book.
Now to the meat. Fortunately, for myself, I see the pathways towards ethics in emotions, and in empathy, which we share with animals and can study in them. So I did not have to believe we evolved a conscience through social selection, by means of group punishments.
Perhaps group punishment worked better in the Pleistocene, than in historic time, or than I see in us today. Perhaps hunter-gatherers use group punishment more wisely than contemporary states: on his evidence they do, but has he chosen his examples?
My discomforts were made very explicit by his keywords. These are ‘capital punishment’ and ‘deviants’, both used a thousand times. In the Pleistocene, we employed ‘capital punishment’ against ‘deviants’, and that is how we evolved a conscience.
I can see where this might go wrong.
But he doesn’t. He never discusses what a blunt instrument capital punishment, as we know it, is, or looks at what our definitions of a deviant have included. Why does he use these words? Maybe we ‘took out’ (another of his phrases) the bullies and the selfish non-cooperators, and ‘solved our alpha male problem’ – and made extra-familial generosity a fitness. But in my experience and knowledge, group punishment – with gossip, ostracism and other social distancing – is no way to evolve a conscience.
I find his language use crashingly insensitive. He has a chapter, ‘Work of the Moral Majority’ – without a smile. He can’t have forgotten the Moral Majority, whose era I grew up in. Within that chapter, a subtitle: ‘Killing Unbalanced Deviants.’ He says it unselfconsciously, as if he has no expectation that my mind flashes to when the coppers killed an unbalanced guy on my street.
Social selection is a great step forward for humanity from biological determinism. Why was this book just as repugnant to read?
Page 336: “If it began much more gradually, long, long ago, with an authority-hating, autonomy-loving Homo erectus or early archaic Homo sapiens that perhaps wanted better access to females, our moral evolution is likely to have become more genetically stablized...” Just an example of carelessness I suppose, but were the females of a different species? Obviously they had no input into the evolution of our conscience.
Two pages later: “...even though, very fortunately, at least a portion of these conscienceless monsters are taken out of circulation so that they can’t stock our gene pools.” Yes, he’s talking about putative serial rapists in the Pleistocene, but I don’t care who the fuck he’s talking about. He forgets he’s talking about human beings, and I’ve discovered science doesn’t have to be written like that.
The epilogue on Humanity’s Moral Future was a disposable piece of journalism on current world affairs, and included political opinion. A weak end to the book.
This doesn’t mark us out as distinct from animals, who cooperate in ways we can’t conceive.
Where he goes after this rests on the ‘human uniqueness’ argument, and in my personal search for understanding I have crossed that off, through the work of primatologist Frans de Waal. My one quarrel with Boehm’s first book was with his primatology: he was very conservative in what he granted to the apes, and his bonobos, notably, I didn’t even recognise from other descriptions. It is worse in this book: early on, when he claims human uniqueness, without which what follows is useless – he says – he spends two pages on proof that animals don’t internalise values such as fairness and a sense of wrongdoing; and he cites only apes and the domestic dog. On apes, again, I found Frans de Waal a far more sensitive observer; and domestic dogs – are domestic, for one thing. My dissatisfaction with these two pages turned bug-eyed when he uses the word ‘doggie’ in a serious book. I’ll echo another reviewer, about how much he hangs on the fact that ‘only humans blush.’ Hey, I bet aliens use other physiological mechanisms to exhibit shame. ‘Man is the animal that blushes’ works as a quip from Mark Twain, but not as evidence that we alone feel shame. When he talks of internalising values – which we do, and other species don’t – his distinctions become very finely drawn. Often, as he says, we, like doggie, are just ‘afraid to be found out’; reading his insistence on true internalisation, you start to wonder if you ever did yourself. By the way, I blush from embarrassment mostly, and animals certainly have expression of embarrassment. I’m not sure I can prove my internalisation of values to the world; and when he admits we can never get inside the mind of an animal – it’s too hazy.
Before I leave animals: bonobos are important. He equates them with other apes – who only make the most primitive efforts to solve their ‘alpha male problems’. Enough for humans to be going on with.
The anthropological content of his first book, Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior, is replicated here: on how hunter-gatherers use coalitions to defeat alpha males. Because nobody likes a bully, nor ever did. However, in his first book he acknowledged the existence of ‘untouched’ hunter-gatherers who are not egalitarian; if my memory is right he admits he has no explanation for why they diverge. In this book, he leaves them out of his study group: on grounds they are not egalitarian and therefore don’t resemble Late Pleistocene humans. Because they don’t fit his theory? If he has a reason to leave them out, he fails to give it to us. This shook my confidence early, too.
His anthropological material is worth reading, if you are concerned about the politics of our species; but it’s better read in his first book.
Now to the meat. Fortunately, for myself, I see the pathways towards ethics in emotions, and in empathy, which we share with animals and can study in them. So I did not have to believe we evolved a conscience through social selection, by means of group punishments.
Perhaps group punishment worked better in the Pleistocene, than in historic time, or than I see in us today. Perhaps hunter-gatherers use group punishment more wisely than contemporary states: on his evidence they do, but has he chosen his examples?
My discomforts were made very explicit by his keywords. These are ‘capital punishment’ and ‘deviants’, both used a thousand times. In the Pleistocene, we employed ‘capital punishment’ against ‘deviants’, and that is how we evolved a conscience.
I can see where this might go wrong.
But he doesn’t. He never discusses what a blunt instrument capital punishment, as we know it, is, or looks at what our definitions of a deviant have included. Why does he use these words? Maybe we ‘took out’ (another of his phrases) the bullies and the selfish non-cooperators, and ‘solved our alpha male problem’ – and made extra-familial generosity a fitness. But in my experience and knowledge, group punishment – with gossip, ostracism and other social distancing – is no way to evolve a conscience.
I find his language use crashingly insensitive. He has a chapter, ‘Work of the Moral Majority’ – without a smile. He can’t have forgotten the Moral Majority, whose era I grew up in. Within that chapter, a subtitle: ‘Killing Unbalanced Deviants.’ He says it unselfconsciously, as if he has no expectation that my mind flashes to when the coppers killed an unbalanced guy on my street.
Social selection is a great step forward for humanity from biological determinism. Why was this book just as repugnant to read?
Page 336: “If it began much more gradually, long, long ago, with an authority-hating, autonomy-loving Homo erectus or early archaic Homo sapiens that perhaps wanted better access to females, our moral evolution is likely to have become more genetically stablized...” Just an example of carelessness I suppose, but were the females of a different species? Obviously they had no input into the evolution of our conscience.
Two pages later: “...even though, very fortunately, at least a portion of these conscienceless monsters are taken out of circulation so that they can’t stock our gene pools.” Yes, he’s talking about putative serial rapists in the Pleistocene, but I don’t care who the fuck he’s talking about. He forgets he’s talking about human beings, and I’ve discovered science doesn’t have to be written like that.
The epilogue on Humanity’s Moral Future was a disposable piece of journalism on current world affairs, and included political opinion. A weak end to the book.
October 20, 2012
Boehm argues that our morally modern self first developed around 45,000 before present (BP) because we needed the group to hunt large game. Selection pressure created good social traits (cooperation, modesty, respect) and suppressed free riders (selfish, thieves, bullies, etc.). The former enabled group success and group success enabled individual success (survival and reproductive), whereas selfishness was curbed through self control. Without self-control, various forms of ostracism led to non-reproductive success.
Throughout this book, Boehm fills considerable gaps (apes to foragers; foragers from 45,000 BP to the few forager bands of today), but there's a sense that there are more than a few weak spots in his theory. The virture of his book is that he attempts to ground moral life in evolutionary theory. He tries to move us out of the "kin selection" theory that has boxed in the evolutionary basis for moral behavior: If we operate on basis of selfish genes, why would we benefit others, besides our reproductive partners, at the expense of our self-interest? While Boehm does not toss out kin selection, he rightly questions that theory's explanation for other-regarding, group-oriented behavior. Kin selection explains it by saying that there's a "looseness" in kin selection so that the feeling of good will toward kin can be applied to non-kin as well. In other words, there's a "sloppy seconds" factor at work even though non-kin bears no genetic relationship, which undermines that theory's own premise. Aside from the situations where kin don't seem to care much about their fellow kin's welfare, there are questions about why the caring that is exhibited in a parent-child relationship would jump across direct genetic lines to benefit the welfare of non-direct but genetically-related lines. Boehm sees that more must be involved.
This is what sets the stage for his theory about the evolution of virtue. Where his theory runs into problems is his assertion that selfishness gets rooted out of behavior by selection pressures (reproductive success/failure) through the rewards that come from good reputation and the penalties that come from selfish behavior. He argues that this was first displayed in our "modern" era, starting from 45,000 BP when we began to live in egalitarian bands. That's when moral virtue first manifests itself. What's missing, though, is a credible theory about egoism. Boehm said it was effectively controlled or eliminated whereas the evidence suggests a very long, considerable and dishonorable history. For Boehm's theory to work, ostracism has to happen prior to sexual reproduction, but that would mean that all of the bad behavoir would have to occur before sexual reproduction and it's not inconceivable that such banishment may well have come after children were produced.
The more fundamental objection is a presupposition that only good group behavior has survival and reproductive value and that selfish behavior has no such value. Absent from Boehm's theory is the role of deception and manipulation or, in other words, extreme egoistic behavior that enabled individuals to be successful at life even at the expense of others and the welfare of the group. What may have made hunter-gatherer bands egalitarian is that such "cheaters" were easily routed out and dealt with because of the very direct contact, both before AND AFTER they had children that presumably passed along some of these less favorable traits. As groups got larger, these self-oriented traits could more easily escape the detection and punishment of the group so that cheaters were able to succeed in ways that created inequalities of power and hierarchies of status and benefit that we see today and are likely to see into the future.
History and philosophy document two poles of behavior. One is other-oriented and supportive of group life. The other is self-oriented, where individuals use the other or the group for their own success. Both poles can lead to evolutionary success and, given the variability of our genetic make up, it's not surprising that we can see both poles expressed and everything in between. Boehm's book eliminates one of these poles and presents a view of human nature and moral virtue that likely does not exist.
Throughout this book, Boehm fills considerable gaps (apes to foragers; foragers from 45,000 BP to the few forager bands of today), but there's a sense that there are more than a few weak spots in his theory. The virture of his book is that he attempts to ground moral life in evolutionary theory. He tries to move us out of the "kin selection" theory that has boxed in the evolutionary basis for moral behavior: If we operate on basis of selfish genes, why would we benefit others, besides our reproductive partners, at the expense of our self-interest? While Boehm does not toss out kin selection, he rightly questions that theory's explanation for other-regarding, group-oriented behavior. Kin selection explains it by saying that there's a "looseness" in kin selection so that the feeling of good will toward kin can be applied to non-kin as well. In other words, there's a "sloppy seconds" factor at work even though non-kin bears no genetic relationship, which undermines that theory's own premise. Aside from the situations where kin don't seem to care much about their fellow kin's welfare, there are questions about why the caring that is exhibited in a parent-child relationship would jump across direct genetic lines to benefit the welfare of non-direct but genetically-related lines. Boehm sees that more must be involved.
This is what sets the stage for his theory about the evolution of virtue. Where his theory runs into problems is his assertion that selfishness gets rooted out of behavior by selection pressures (reproductive success/failure) through the rewards that come from good reputation and the penalties that come from selfish behavior. He argues that this was first displayed in our "modern" era, starting from 45,000 BP when we began to live in egalitarian bands. That's when moral virtue first manifests itself. What's missing, though, is a credible theory about egoism. Boehm said it was effectively controlled or eliminated whereas the evidence suggests a very long, considerable and dishonorable history. For Boehm's theory to work, ostracism has to happen prior to sexual reproduction, but that would mean that all of the bad behavoir would have to occur before sexual reproduction and it's not inconceivable that such banishment may well have come after children were produced.
The more fundamental objection is a presupposition that only good group behavior has survival and reproductive value and that selfish behavior has no such value. Absent from Boehm's theory is the role of deception and manipulation or, in other words, extreme egoistic behavior that enabled individuals to be successful at life even at the expense of others and the welfare of the group. What may have made hunter-gatherer bands egalitarian is that such "cheaters" were easily routed out and dealt with because of the very direct contact, both before AND AFTER they had children that presumably passed along some of these less favorable traits. As groups got larger, these self-oriented traits could more easily escape the detection and punishment of the group so that cheaters were able to succeed in ways that created inequalities of power and hierarchies of status and benefit that we see today and are likely to see into the future.
History and philosophy document two poles of behavior. One is other-oriented and supportive of group life. The other is self-oriented, where individuals use the other or the group for their own success. Both poles can lead to evolutionary success and, given the variability of our genetic make up, it's not surprising that we can see both poles expressed and everything in between. Boehm's book eliminates one of these poles and presents a view of human nature and moral virtue that likely does not exist.
November 21, 2012
I recommend this book because it introduces archaeological evidence into the discussion of how human-level cooperation evolved. It is nice to hear an account from a cultural anthropologist. I especially liked Boehm’s lengthy discussion of what he calls “Late-Pleistocene-appropriate (LPA)” behavior. He bolsters his evolutionary theory by using the behavior of not just extant hunter-gatherers, but only those who have not been “tainted by modernity” (my characterization). Moreover, he borrows heavily from the database of hunter-gatherer behaviors that he is compiling, and this unequivocally reveals that humans are egalitarian creatures. This is the book’s major contribution, and not the concepts of egalitarianism, cooperative breeding, punishment (Boehm calls it “free-rider suppression theory”), and several other elements included in most accounts of evolved altruism.
In fact, Boehm supposes that the egalitarian sharing of high-energy content meats from large game was the essential ingredient that launched humans on a moral trajectory that differed from our closest relatives. He calls this the “egalitarian transition.” From this, our ever-present “egoism” (individuals still come first in terms of survival), and our coalition-forming behavior that effectively controls “bullies” and “free-riders” (which is shared with other Great Apes), Boehm supposes that humans developed a conscience. We essentially internalized the need to control our “egoism,” lest we instinctive “egoists” be severely punished by subordinate coalitions. This, Boehm believes, represents a sort of “social selection,” which can drive genetic change much as sexual selection drives genetic change. This was accentuated by cultural learning, and we have a modern “sense of virtuous good and shameful evil, along with our universal and symbolically stated love of altruistic generosity that sets us apart” from other Apes (. 329).
I also appreciated Boehm’s honest portrayal of the fact that this complex “extrafamilial” human generosity is “weak.” Humans are very flexible in displaying this evolved morality, and it must be continuously reinforced.
I do have a couple of complaints, and the first is a HUGE “administrative” complaint. I abhor a recent trend that Boehm continues whereby references are numbered, those numbers correspond to a notes section segmented by chapter, and then those numbers correspond to the references section. I have totally lost my train of thought by the time I peek at the reference! Worse still, among those notes are important clarifications, or “asides.” So, I am forced to interrupt my reading to see if every numbered reference might be an important note of clarification. That is an awful publishing trend! Publishers, “Stop it!” If the author has a clarification or important “aside,” publish it as a footnote on the page. That way, I know all other numbers correspond to references. If this seems to make a book too cluttered…then cut out the point of clarification or aside! If it is not important enough for inclusion in the body of the work, then there should be very few of these clarifications or asides.
One final complaint: The biographical discussion of the !Kung woman called Nisa is way too long. As Boehm admits, it is not only anecdotal information but may not even illustrate the meat sharing discussion, may not be truly representative. As such, it should not occupy several pages.
Bottom line: This is a good entry to your library regarding the evolutionary origins of human cooperation and moral behavior.
In fact, Boehm supposes that the egalitarian sharing of high-energy content meats from large game was the essential ingredient that launched humans on a moral trajectory that differed from our closest relatives. He calls this the “egalitarian transition.” From this, our ever-present “egoism” (individuals still come first in terms of survival), and our coalition-forming behavior that effectively controls “bullies” and “free-riders” (which is shared with other Great Apes), Boehm supposes that humans developed a conscience. We essentially internalized the need to control our “egoism,” lest we instinctive “egoists” be severely punished by subordinate coalitions. This, Boehm believes, represents a sort of “social selection,” which can drive genetic change much as sexual selection drives genetic change. This was accentuated by cultural learning, and we have a modern “sense of virtuous good and shameful evil, along with our universal and symbolically stated love of altruistic generosity that sets us apart” from other Apes (. 329).
I also appreciated Boehm’s honest portrayal of the fact that this complex “extrafamilial” human generosity is “weak.” Humans are very flexible in displaying this evolved morality, and it must be continuously reinforced.
I do have a couple of complaints, and the first is a HUGE “administrative” complaint. I abhor a recent trend that Boehm continues whereby references are numbered, those numbers correspond to a notes section segmented by chapter, and then those numbers correspond to the references section. I have totally lost my train of thought by the time I peek at the reference! Worse still, among those notes are important clarifications, or “asides.” So, I am forced to interrupt my reading to see if every numbered reference might be an important note of clarification. That is an awful publishing trend! Publishers, “Stop it!” If the author has a clarification or important “aside,” publish it as a footnote on the page. That way, I know all other numbers correspond to references. If this seems to make a book too cluttered…then cut out the point of clarification or aside! If it is not important enough for inclusion in the body of the work, then there should be very few of these clarifications or asides.
One final complaint: The biographical discussion of the !Kung woman called Nisa is way too long. As Boehm admits, it is not only anecdotal information but may not even illustrate the meat sharing discussion, may not be truly representative. As such, it should not occupy several pages.
Bottom line: This is a good entry to your library regarding the evolutionary origins of human cooperation and moral behavior.
April 3, 2013
The main point that the author tries to demonstrate in this book is how human morals have been shaped by evolutionary pressures on the group level since prehistoric times. Although his premises and conclusions are probably correct in principle, his arguments seem incomplete and his analysis methods seem to be not sufficiently rigorous from the scientific point of view.
Firstly, in order to do a statistical analysis of human societies that lived in the Late Pleistocene period, he arbitrarily selected 150 modern foraging bands (which he calls LPA or Late Pleistocene Appropriate) to be used as "contemporary models," under the assumption that they are "very similar to the culturally modern people who were evolving in Africa around 45,000 BP" (page 77). In order to select such bands he weeded out "those that obviously would have been atypical in the Late Pleistocene" (page 76). He excluded "several dozen sedentary foraging societies that began to intensively store food and eventually lost their egalitarian ways to become markedly hierarchical." (page 76) It is not so clear why such societies would be "atypical." Would this not skew his results? Later on on page 101 he adds, "If we look to the 150 LPA hunter-gatherer bands that most closely resemble more recent prehistoric human societies, we've seen already that they're highly egalitarian." However, is that not due to the fact that he had already excluded the non-egalitarian societies from his sample?
He also seems to imply that blushing is a necessary symptom of shame. He mentions the fact that "Apes don't blush for reasons that are social, whereas as Darwin demonstrated, humans everywhere do this. We blush with embarrassment, and we also blush with shame. No other species does it." According to him, this is a "telling gap in the ape repertoire that is wholly unambiguous." (page 110) He uses this fact to support his point that apes do not have moral feelings like embarrassment and shame. However, blushing might well be a uniquely human reaction to shame and as such other species might display shame in a different way; the fact that non-human animals do not blush does not necessary imply that they do not feel shame.
Another main point in this book is that the punishment of deviants is one of the drivers of moral evolution. His arguments clearly describe one of the mechanisms by which social behaviour is shaped. However, in regards to moral evolution they do not seem to follow in a straightforward way. He does not try to explain how the moral stance that drives societies to punish deviants evolved in the first place. This is where the emphasis should be: how our moral judgment evolved. Punishment of deviants should be seen more as an effect - rather than the cause - of moral evolution. Otherwise we fall into a circular argument.
One last point I would like to make is that the author repeats the same facts and arguments too many times throughout the book; he could have covered the subject in fewer pages without loss of content, which would make the book more enjoyable.
Firstly, in order to do a statistical analysis of human societies that lived in the Late Pleistocene period, he arbitrarily selected 150 modern foraging bands (which he calls LPA or Late Pleistocene Appropriate) to be used as "contemporary models," under the assumption that they are "very similar to the culturally modern people who were evolving in Africa around 45,000 BP" (page 77). In order to select such bands he weeded out "those that obviously would have been atypical in the Late Pleistocene" (page 76). He excluded "several dozen sedentary foraging societies that began to intensively store food and eventually lost their egalitarian ways to become markedly hierarchical." (page 76) It is not so clear why such societies would be "atypical." Would this not skew his results? Later on on page 101 he adds, "If we look to the 150 LPA hunter-gatherer bands that most closely resemble more recent prehistoric human societies, we've seen already that they're highly egalitarian." However, is that not due to the fact that he had already excluded the non-egalitarian societies from his sample?
He also seems to imply that blushing is a necessary symptom of shame. He mentions the fact that "Apes don't blush for reasons that are social, whereas as Darwin demonstrated, humans everywhere do this. We blush with embarrassment, and we also blush with shame. No other species does it." According to him, this is a "telling gap in the ape repertoire that is wholly unambiguous." (page 110) He uses this fact to support his point that apes do not have moral feelings like embarrassment and shame. However, blushing might well be a uniquely human reaction to shame and as such other species might display shame in a different way; the fact that non-human animals do not blush does not necessary imply that they do not feel shame.
Another main point in this book is that the punishment of deviants is one of the drivers of moral evolution. His arguments clearly describe one of the mechanisms by which social behaviour is shaped. However, in regards to moral evolution they do not seem to follow in a straightforward way. He does not try to explain how the moral stance that drives societies to punish deviants evolved in the first place. This is where the emphasis should be: how our moral judgment evolved. Punishment of deviants should be seen more as an effect - rather than the cause - of moral evolution. Otherwise we fall into a circular argument.
One last point I would like to make is that the author repeats the same facts and arguments too many times throughout the book; he could have covered the subject in fewer pages without loss of content, which would make the book more enjoyable.
April 2, 2020
This was not an easy read, and it’s more of an exploration of a topic than a set of definitive answers, but it made me THINK! And I enjoyed being along great the ride as the author shared his theories and how he came to them.
April 14, 2015
A lot of people who've read this seem to think he's short changing animals' emotional abilities. I actually think he might just be giving humans too much credit. One of the things he keeps bringing up as evidence that we are truly moral, and that animals aren't, is the fact that we blush and they don't. After finishing the book I still don't really understand why he considers that any different than wolves bowing their heads down and sticking their butts up in the air or any of the million other submissive behaviors that creatures do when they know they've pissed off their friends. He talks about humans "internalizing" rules, basically meaning that we have the mental and emotional ability to value the rules that are authorized rather than just fearing the consequences of breaking them, which I'm pretty sure I agree with. That still doesn't explain what's so significant about blushing though. It still seems like it should fit into the same category of other "I know I screwed up but I didn't mean to, so please don't kill me" reactions.
I do like a lot of what he has to say regarding the role of egoism, nepotism and altruism in our evolution. When it comes to generosity you come first, then your family, then whoever else you can afford to share with. I think altruism could be subdivided into generosity towards those you want to have sex with (and towards their friends and family as you try to improve your odds), generosity towards those you're culturally obligated to share with (the "gift economy") and then true altruism. He does bring those ideas up but not in a very organized manner, which leads to a confusing, overly complicated layout and tons of repetition. While a lot of the ideas in the book do seem like common sense it actually does get into complexities that most people have probably never really put much thought into, and the theories he's come up with definitely sound like they're on the right track. His criticisms of other scientists' theories on this stuff are really interesting as well.
My biggest problem with this book is the political ideas he brings up in the epilogue. I'm glad he saved these ideas for just a small section in the end because he gets really nutty, even extolling free trade! Then he brings up the idea of major conflicts bringing nations together to unite against a common enemy of some kind (users of nuclear weapons, climate catastrophe, even fake aliens from outer space like Alan Moore's ending to the Watchmen). He says he hopes it doesn't actually come to that but it feels like there's a "wink, wink" in there, like "just thought I'd throw that out there for any powerful politicians reading this." It's actually kind of funny how the majority of scientific breakthroughs that scientists think are needed to protect us just end up getting hijacked by the world's elites and used to further subjugate the masses. A lot of these guys are too stuck in their own little worlds to have anything of value to say when it comes to the bigger picture. Those last few pages don't keep this book from being worth a read but they did lower my opinion of Christopher Boehm substantially.
I do like a lot of what he has to say regarding the role of egoism, nepotism and altruism in our evolution. When it comes to generosity you come first, then your family, then whoever else you can afford to share with. I think altruism could be subdivided into generosity towards those you want to have sex with (and towards their friends and family as you try to improve your odds), generosity towards those you're culturally obligated to share with (the "gift economy") and then true altruism. He does bring those ideas up but not in a very organized manner, which leads to a confusing, overly complicated layout and tons of repetition. While a lot of the ideas in the book do seem like common sense it actually does get into complexities that most people have probably never really put much thought into, and the theories he's come up with definitely sound like they're on the right track. His criticisms of other scientists' theories on this stuff are really interesting as well.
My biggest problem with this book is the political ideas he brings up in the epilogue. I'm glad he saved these ideas for just a small section in the end because he gets really nutty, even extolling free trade! Then he brings up the idea of major conflicts bringing nations together to unite against a common enemy of some kind (users of nuclear weapons, climate catastrophe, even fake aliens from outer space like Alan Moore's ending to the Watchmen). He says he hopes it doesn't actually come to that but it feels like there's a "wink, wink" in there, like "just thought I'd throw that out there for any powerful politicians reading this." It's actually kind of funny how the majority of scientific breakthroughs that scientists think are needed to protect us just end up getting hijacked by the world's elites and used to further subjugate the masses. A lot of these guys are too stuck in their own little worlds to have anything of value to say when it comes to the bigger picture. Those last few pages don't keep this book from being worth a read but they did lower my opinion of Christopher Boehm substantially.
September 26, 2020
Main Ideas:
Social primates have fear-based arrangements, but not moral ones. They work mainly by domination/submission.
At some point in the evolution of humans, hunting large mammals necessitated cooperation.
Over time, free-riders of the bullying kind were ostracized or killed by coalitions.
The importance of new rules for sharing favored their internalization and the development of self-inhibition. Over time this lead to the development of conscience.
Contemporary hunter-gatherers show this relationship to bullies. These bullies are identified through gossip. Reputation is extremely important.
Consensus is necessary to deal with bullies, because the lack of consensus may impose big costs to executioners or may lead to factionalism instead of "justice".
Other types of free-riding are dealt with in the same way. However, they are not as important in today's hunter-gatherer tribes, nor were they in our evolutionary history.
Good reputations lead to better marriage prospects. This leads to two-way runaway evolution, because altruists have better fitness and will choose other altruists. We may also see group selection after a certain percentage of the group is composed of altruists.
Because altruism (and even nepotism) must break down in times of severe scarcity, the conscience selected for cannot be one that is absolute, but rather one that is flexible (Liebig's law of the minimum). Additionally, a mind that is inflexibly altruist will quickly go extinct. These are two reasons two support the evolutionary development of a flexibly moral mind.
Altruism can also be understood as a maladaptive trait advantaged by sexual selection (like the feathers of a peacock).
Belief in the supernatural may help internalize rules.
Nepotism may be a preadaptation (i.e. an adaptation that is needed for the development of an evolutionarily later adaptation) for altruism.
Around page 60 he presents 6 models that try to solve the altruism paradox.
Herbert Simon's docility model is basically the same thing as Joseph Heinrich's. The group selection model also supports Heinrichs ideas.
The importance of behavioral phylogenetics in understanding the evolution of morality
Problems:
The author assumes that all behavior has direct genetic roots and thus that selection against it will be selection against those genes. However, many traits are complex and arise from a combination of genetic and environmental (social and other) factors. For example, a bully may happen to be a bully because he happens to be the biggest in his cohort, or because he never had a chance to internalize certain rules (even if he had the genetic capacity).
Structure and writing:
This book is 200 pages too long. There is a ridiculous amount of repetition and most of the stories, although interesting, add very little value to the argument.
Social primates have fear-based arrangements, but not moral ones. They work mainly by domination/submission.
At some point in the evolution of humans, hunting large mammals necessitated cooperation.
Over time, free-riders of the bullying kind were ostracized or killed by coalitions.
The importance of new rules for sharing favored their internalization and the development of self-inhibition. Over time this lead to the development of conscience.
Contemporary hunter-gatherers show this relationship to bullies. These bullies are identified through gossip. Reputation is extremely important.
Consensus is necessary to deal with bullies, because the lack of consensus may impose big costs to executioners or may lead to factionalism instead of "justice".
Other types of free-riding are dealt with in the same way. However, they are not as important in today's hunter-gatherer tribes, nor were they in our evolutionary history.
Good reputations lead to better marriage prospects. This leads to two-way runaway evolution, because altruists have better fitness and will choose other altruists. We may also see group selection after a certain percentage of the group is composed of altruists.
Because altruism (and even nepotism) must break down in times of severe scarcity, the conscience selected for cannot be one that is absolute, but rather one that is flexible (Liebig's law of the minimum). Additionally, a mind that is inflexibly altruist will quickly go extinct. These are two reasons two support the evolutionary development of a flexibly moral mind.
Altruism can also be understood as a maladaptive trait advantaged by sexual selection (like the feathers of a peacock).
Belief in the supernatural may help internalize rules.
Nepotism may be a preadaptation (i.e. an adaptation that is needed for the development of an evolutionarily later adaptation) for altruism.
Around page 60 he presents 6 models that try to solve the altruism paradox.
Herbert Simon's docility model is basically the same thing as Joseph Heinrich's. The group selection model also supports Heinrichs ideas.
The importance of behavioral phylogenetics in understanding the evolution of morality
Problems:
The author assumes that all behavior has direct genetic roots and thus that selection against it will be selection against those genes. However, many traits are complex and arise from a combination of genetic and environmental (social and other) factors. For example, a bully may happen to be a bully because he happens to be the biggest in his cohort, or because he never had a chance to internalize certain rules (even if he had the genetic capacity).
Structure and writing:
This book is 200 pages too long. There is a ridiculous amount of repetition and most of the stories, although interesting, add very little value to the argument.
April 8, 2015
The central theme of the book is the evolutionary development of the human conscience and the associated social mechanisms. The non-scientist can see at least one indication that physiology (indicating evolution) is involved: people from cultures and ethnic groups around the world blush when experiencing shame.
Throughout the book the author works to provide as much evidence as possible for his hypothesis. On various occasions he is clear that he isn't claiming the evidence is at the level of a scientific proof. His efforts focus on what we know of human ancestors, what we can observe from closely related primate species and data collected by anthropologists on foragers / hunter-gatherers (as they most closely resemble how all humans lived tens of thousands of years ago). This focus limits the possible evidence which has been collected to date and/or can be collected.
Disclaimer: I found much of his hypothesis convincing - but it was consistent with impressions I had had before reading the book. Also, I was probably more receptive because his clear statements of where more evidence would be desirable suggested an author who wasn't too impressed with his own hypothesis to see these points.
He argues the origin of the conscience began with members of local groups acting together against alpha male / female domination. By having harsh consequences for certain kinds of behavior, there became a reproductive benefit for individuals who were able to control their behavior based on expectation of possible consequences. Over time the human conscience grew and cultures developed traditions, norms and methods of dealing with those whose behavior is problematic for the approximately egalitarian relations in a forager group or disruptive to team work of a forager group. (Although the result is the ability of people to act altruistically, people still have a selfish side. Preferences will be given to those personally closer to an individual, and this is accentuated in hard times.)
He doesn't attribute one single mechanism to the reproductive benefits that pushed the evolution of the conscience. He mentions several things which probably played a role: mating and other survival help for those who had a reputation for sharing and being a team player; the benefits of indirect reciprocity as insurance for when one needs help; and group selection (groups with cooperation among its members are more likely to survive).
He argues that sharing of meat in particular, and direct and/or indirect reciprocity is important for foragers, which leads to the need to deal with free riders. This is dealt with by gossip (which lets everyone know who is trustworthy and helpful), and forms of social pressure and penalties. [Note: While sharing is practiced in forager groups, this doesn't mean there is no bickering about how fairly it's done.]
As the title suggests, the focus of the book is on origins. In the epilogue, there is some discussion of possible implications for the modern world (especially international relations). However, I found the book seemed to beg for a hypothesis on how we got from "egalitarian" forager groups to modern societies which have large income inequality, can be dominated by dictators or corrupt politicians. And a hypothesis on what aspects of our lives are results of people who evolved for egalitarian, no-alpha-domination cultures to live in non-egalitarian, alpha-dominated cultures. (See Scientific American article Why Greed Begets More Greed and ask "What are the implications in a greed-oriented economy?")
Clearly, modern people still help neighbors. If one thinks of American frontier days, with corn-husking and barn-building community efforts, one might see something closer to the forager tradition under the less-stratified frontier conditions. But what happens in more stratified conditions?
The discussion of conscience, alphas, free riders, and others who go beyond typical human selfishness almost never mentioned that category of humans who have no conscience ("psychopaths"). Although the word "psychopath" does appear in the book a couple of times, it's not integrated into the hypothesis. Studies (not mentioned in this book) indicate psychopaths' brains don't communicate between two sections the way most people's brains do. This may indicate a physiological / evolutionary basis for conscience. And it may explain the more extreme cases of problem individuals that egalitarian foragers dealt with. A greater understanding of the physiology and behavior of psychopathy might shed more light on the evolution of conscience and other matters in the book.
--
The author continues to examine deeper and deeper to understand more details, variations under different circumstances, and other aspects that can help understand how human "moral" behavior will work in more than just general or average ways. This is good for a rounded view of these questions. However, some readers will either not feel the need for the depth of detail or have preferred to learn conclusions as to the depth without the extent of the material backing the conclusions.
--
Towards the end of the book, he briefly gives his impressions of a number of other books on the origins of morality and related topics.
Throughout the book the author works to provide as much evidence as possible for his hypothesis. On various occasions he is clear that he isn't claiming the evidence is at the level of a scientific proof. His efforts focus on what we know of human ancestors, what we can observe from closely related primate species and data collected by anthropologists on foragers / hunter-gatherers (as they most closely resemble how all humans lived tens of thousands of years ago). This focus limits the possible evidence which has been collected to date and/or can be collected.
Disclaimer: I found much of his hypothesis convincing - but it was consistent with impressions I had had before reading the book. Also, I was probably more receptive because his clear statements of where more evidence would be desirable suggested an author who wasn't too impressed with his own hypothesis to see these points.
He argues the origin of the conscience began with members of local groups acting together against alpha male / female domination. By having harsh consequences for certain kinds of behavior, there became a reproductive benefit for individuals who were able to control their behavior based on expectation of possible consequences. Over time the human conscience grew and cultures developed traditions, norms and methods of dealing with those whose behavior is problematic for the approximately egalitarian relations in a forager group or disruptive to team work of a forager group. (Although the result is the ability of people to act altruistically, people still have a selfish side. Preferences will be given to those personally closer to an individual, and this is accentuated in hard times.)
He doesn't attribute one single mechanism to the reproductive benefits that pushed the evolution of the conscience. He mentions several things which probably played a role: mating and other survival help for those who had a reputation for sharing and being a team player; the benefits of indirect reciprocity as insurance for when one needs help; and group selection (groups with cooperation among its members are more likely to survive).
He argues that sharing of meat in particular, and direct and/or indirect reciprocity is important for foragers, which leads to the need to deal with free riders. This is dealt with by gossip (which lets everyone know who is trustworthy and helpful), and forms of social pressure and penalties. [Note: While sharing is practiced in forager groups, this doesn't mean there is no bickering about how fairly it's done.]
As the title suggests, the focus of the book is on origins. In the epilogue, there is some discussion of possible implications for the modern world (especially international relations). However, I found the book seemed to beg for a hypothesis on how we got from "egalitarian" forager groups to modern societies which have large income inequality, can be dominated by dictators or corrupt politicians. And a hypothesis on what aspects of our lives are results of people who evolved for egalitarian, no-alpha-domination cultures to live in non-egalitarian, alpha-dominated cultures. (See Scientific American article Why Greed Begets More Greed and ask "What are the implications in a greed-oriented economy?")
Clearly, modern people still help neighbors. If one thinks of American frontier days, with corn-husking and barn-building community efforts, one might see something closer to the forager tradition under the less-stratified frontier conditions. But what happens in more stratified conditions?
The discussion of conscience, alphas, free riders, and others who go beyond typical human selfishness almost never mentioned that category of humans who have no conscience ("psychopaths"). Although the word "psychopath" does appear in the book a couple of times, it's not integrated into the hypothesis. Studies (not mentioned in this book) indicate psychopaths' brains don't communicate between two sections the way most people's brains do. This may indicate a physiological / evolutionary basis for conscience. And it may explain the more extreme cases of problem individuals that egalitarian foragers dealt with. A greater understanding of the physiology and behavior of psychopathy might shed more light on the evolution of conscience and other matters in the book.
--
The author continues to examine deeper and deeper to understand more details, variations under different circumstances, and other aspects that can help understand how human "moral" behavior will work in more than just general or average ways. This is good for a rounded view of these questions. However, some readers will either not feel the need for the depth of detail or have preferred to learn conclusions as to the depth without the extent of the material backing the conclusions.
--
Towards the end of the book, he briefly gives his impressions of a number of other books on the origins of morality and related topics.
October 3, 2012
The content of this book was fascinating. Christopher Boehm analyzes the existing data and presents a compelling case to describe the manner in which the human species evolved a sense of morality. His explanations are believable, his arguments compelling, and the overall feeling of the book is one of enlightenment. Unfortunately, however, this is a difficult book to read. In the first three chapters, it felt like reading an extended introduction. I kept thinking, okay, get on with it already. He repeatedly refers to forthcoming chapters in the beginning of the book, where he promises to make certain key points even more clear. He also explains the same information multiple times as it relates in different ways. On one hand, I appreciate how careful he is. There is no mistaking what he is saying, how he believes it relates, or how the processes behind it are activated. He is also extremely careful to point out exactly how much credibility each piece of information has, even pointing out areas where his hypothesis is weak and needs further research. I really appreciated that as I was reading. But I think the book could have been about 100 pages shorter if he hadn't repeated himself so often, constantly referred to other chapters, and spent so much time introducing every aspect of the book.
That said, I enjoyed the detective work that went into this book. I learned so many things. Without being an expert in any of the fields he talked about, it seemed he had a very reasonable approach to his explanation of how we evolved from just another of the Great Apes to being a species that operates, not just socially but also individually, according to deeply held morals. If you can have the patience to make it through the book, I would definitely recommend it. The book is written for a nonscientific audience and his logic is easy to follow. In his epilogue, he discusses the future of our race, given what he has uncovered about our past, and while I'm not sure I agree with all of his politics, I appreciate reading about his sense of hope and his warnings of potential pitfalls for the future of the human race.
That said, I enjoyed the detective work that went into this book. I learned so many things. Without being an expert in any of the fields he talked about, it seemed he had a very reasonable approach to his explanation of how we evolved from just another of the Great Apes to being a species that operates, not just socially but also individually, according to deeply held morals. If you can have the patience to make it through the book, I would definitely recommend it. The book is written for a nonscientific audience and his logic is easy to follow. In his epilogue, he discusses the future of our race, given what he has uncovered about our past, and while I'm not sure I agree with all of his politics, I appreciate reading about his sense of hope and his warnings of potential pitfalls for the future of the human race.
September 2, 2012
I am only on page 85, but it seems every 10 minutes I read "this will be explained later in Chapter 7,10...". This is really annoying. It is interesting but hard to get through. I couldn't finish it.
September 13, 2012
Essential. Perhaps the closest approximation to date of a sequel to Darwin's natural historical project in 'Descent of Man'
September 16, 2014
I loved this synthesis between anthropology, palaeontology and primatology. A very thoughtful and I think important book on the origins of human morality.
January 5, 2016
Great read! Very solid theory.
April 30, 2022
A very interesting and convincing examination of the evolution of our internalized conscience. Apes and other mammals already possess significant means of cooperation and conflict resolution. Humans went a different path from our Chimpanzee and Bonobo cousins. It is likely our last common ancestor with the other Apes had these social tendencies but from examination of our cousins the main means of curbing anti social behavior is fear based of immediate retaliation rather in contrast to us where a component of our conscience (most of us at least) is shame and fear based.
Violent suppression of social deviants that did not exhibit altruism which was a necessity to hunt wild game and then resultant sexual selection of monogamous partners with altruistic shapes rapidly accelerated the human genome with more altruistic leanings. This eventually becomes internalized to a conscience based on a rules oriented society around sharing. Deviants were easy to spot in small foraging groups and the propensity for gossip (!!) made known even deceptive deviants.
What I find most fascinating is that this is not a narrative of hippie foragers but simply an evolutionary path of humana exerting power over each other. Extremely vigilance in hunting down social deviants to the point of a self imposed eugenics against selfishness. An altruism that involves indirect reciprocity to non family members without immediate pay backs.
However the human conscience is flexible. While we have self restraint without violence due to our conscience it can be overriden which is an essential survival technique in times of scarcity and in instances when minor moral infractions increase individual fitness.
We ended the alphas in our own species for a time through direct imposition. And the role of that power is important. Power is required to maintain any social order even equality.
The book unfortunately suffers from the typical ending where we try and project morality to nation states and assume modern democracies really are predicated on social input. However Boehm does avoid the worst of this by explaining the destructive nature of our geopolitics. The history and evolutionary anthropology is great. Epilogue can probably be skipped.
Violent suppression of social deviants that did not exhibit altruism which was a necessity to hunt wild game and then resultant sexual selection of monogamous partners with altruistic shapes rapidly accelerated the human genome with more altruistic leanings. This eventually becomes internalized to a conscience based on a rules oriented society around sharing. Deviants were easy to spot in small foraging groups and the propensity for gossip (!!) made known even deceptive deviants.
What I find most fascinating is that this is not a narrative of hippie foragers but simply an evolutionary path of humana exerting power over each other. Extremely vigilance in hunting down social deviants to the point of a self imposed eugenics against selfishness. An altruism that involves indirect reciprocity to non family members without immediate pay backs.
However the human conscience is flexible. While we have self restraint without violence due to our conscience it can be overriden which is an essential survival technique in times of scarcity and in instances when minor moral infractions increase individual fitness.
We ended the alphas in our own species for a time through direct imposition. And the role of that power is important. Power is required to maintain any social order even equality.
The book unfortunately suffers from the typical ending where we try and project morality to nation states and assume modern democracies really are predicated on social input. However Boehm does avoid the worst of this by explaining the destructive nature of our geopolitics. The history and evolutionary anthropology is great. Epilogue can probably be skipped.
January 13, 2019
I am constantly fascinated in trying to understand who we are today, based on who we used to be. Given that we were living a certain way, as a species, for hundreds of thousands of years, it would make perfect sense that our being is shaped based on a different set of circumstances.
In “Moral Origins”, the author Christopher Boehm, has a harder job than usual, in trying to find a link between a current human function with an evolutionary purpose for the its existence. Morality is a difficult concept to even define well, much less find its source. In the book, Boehm does set out some interesting ideas, with the main argument being that being moral towards others served us well as species in tribal settings. Those that based their actions on their internal moral rules, were treated better by their peers, with helped their fitness in the tribe, and therefore such genes were passed on.
While I’m simplifying it, of course, allow me to raise the two issues I found in the book. One was to make human’s moral judgements unique among other animals. If there is a clear argument made for its evolutionary purpose, then it is nothing more than an automatic, programmed behavior through generations of corrections. We don’t really need to assign anymore importance to it, to be honest. Additionally, the second point which bothered me more was his insistence on trying to use current existing hunter-gatherer tribes as stand-ins for our ancestors. A lot of books do this, and I can understand the temptation given that we don’t have much other ways to examine humans from 50,000 years ago. But the problem is that the hunter-gather tribes existing today are outliers. The fact that they exist as a tribe out of time probably means that their ancestors probably differed than the ancestors of those that are now writing such books. This alone makes it really hard to use them as an examples of who we were.
In “Moral Origins”, the author Christopher Boehm, has a harder job than usual, in trying to find a link between a current human function with an evolutionary purpose for the its existence. Morality is a difficult concept to even define well, much less find its source. In the book, Boehm does set out some interesting ideas, with the main argument being that being moral towards others served us well as species in tribal settings. Those that based their actions on their internal moral rules, were treated better by their peers, with helped their fitness in the tribe, and therefore such genes were passed on.
While I’m simplifying it, of course, allow me to raise the two issues I found in the book. One was to make human’s moral judgements unique among other animals. If there is a clear argument made for its evolutionary purpose, then it is nothing more than an automatic, programmed behavior through generations of corrections. We don’t really need to assign anymore importance to it, to be honest. Additionally, the second point which bothered me more was his insistence on trying to use current existing hunter-gatherer tribes as stand-ins for our ancestors. A lot of books do this, and I can understand the temptation given that we don’t have much other ways to examine humans from 50,000 years ago. But the problem is that the hunter-gather tribes existing today are outliers. The fact that they exist as a tribe out of time probably means that their ancestors probably differed than the ancestors of those that are now writing such books. This alone makes it really hard to use them as an examples of who we were.
May 19, 2019
Interesting attempt at formulating a plausible scenario for the emergence of morality in Homo sapiens. The starting point is the propensity in chimpanzees for the collective in a flock to react and take action against an overbearing and severely abusive alpha male. The author argues that this propensity must have been present in the common ancestor to humans and chimpanzee. Add to this the egalitarian trends that followed (or preceded?) ancient humans developing a hunting strategy for larger prey. Such prey could be brought down only through collaboration, and the meat had to be divided in reasonably equal shares, or the group would not be able to maintain this strategy. An important step was the development of a conscience and of shame, which the author hypothesizes was the evolutionary result of the group's aversion to alpha-male bullying and free-riding. Being thrown out of the group, or killed outright, because the rest of the group got fed up with them, was a risk that put a severe selection pressure on strong and successful individuals to rein in their egoistical impulses. By anticipating and internalizing the judgement of the group, such individuals could pass on their genes. Altruism, primarily with the immediate next-of-kin but also with the rest of the group, would bestow a reputational benefit on individuals, thus enhancing their chance of passing on their genes. This argument depends on reputation being communicated, so language is required. This text does not discuss how language evolved, so there is a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem here. Did language evolve for this kind of communication (gossip), or, as Mercier and Sperber suggest, as a means of justifying an individuals actions? Possibly both, but reasonable scenarios remain to be provided.
March 31, 2021
Timothy Snyder when interviewed about his short book On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century noted that it is quite difficult these days to get publishers to consider a book that isn't a standard 300+ pages. This one is a case in point: decent editing would have removed the endless repetition, condensed the arguments (and removed the absolutely execrable coffee-room-discussion of an epilogue), and given us a pithy, readable book of 150 pages.
It's nevertheless interesting to get a more anthropological approach to the question of moral origins - even if it is all rather speculative. There is no doubt that there is something to account for in human behaviours and cognition in this general area - and this perspective is worthy. I suppose there is a good reason for assuming that - since the benefits of cooperation are so great - that the story that has free-riders suppressing altruism could be extended to one which has further layers of free-rider suppression (whether externally through direct intervention, or internally through the development of self-control, then a conscience, then a morality).
It's nevertheless interesting to get a more anthropological approach to the question of moral origins - even if it is all rather speculative. There is no doubt that there is something to account for in human behaviours and cognition in this general area - and this perspective is worthy. I suppose there is a good reason for assuming that - since the benefits of cooperation are so great - that the story that has free-riders suppressing altruism could be extended to one which has further layers of free-rider suppression (whether externally through direct intervention, or internally through the development of self-control, then a conscience, then a morality).
February 17, 2020
The cover shows a snake and an apple. So it's about a christian writer babbling something about how the imagination of goat herders three millennia ago was the best.
Yet the first chapter is about Darwin. So is it about how virtue evolved over the last century? Surely the text indicates that Boehm, although as refined as an unwashed goat herder, poses as a scientific mind.
Hence the book is about the idiotic associations made by a paper pusher. As his two year paid mountain retreat in his youth, which he calls research, gives him some amazing inside information. By interacting in sign language with Serb villagers he not only can grasp the two centuries ago interaction in the Balkans, but also he has a clear grasp of the natives of North America before the Europeans started pushing them West.
Yet the first chapter is about Darwin. So is it about how virtue evolved over the last century? Surely the text indicates that Boehm, although as refined as an unwashed goat herder, poses as a scientific mind.
Hence the book is about the idiotic associations made by a paper pusher. As his two year paid mountain retreat in his youth, which he calls research, gives him some amazing inside information. By interacting in sign language with Serb villagers he not only can grasp the two centuries ago interaction in the Balkans, but also he has a clear grasp of the natives of North America before the Europeans started pushing them West.
August 18, 2020
Not for me
I guess the book is deeper than I could read as a matter of fun. This is for initiated philosophers.
I guess the book is deeper than I could read as a matter of fun. This is for initiated philosophers.
July 25, 2013
Anthropologist Christopher Boehm has written an engaging account hypothesizing the remote prehistorical origins of virtue, altruism, and shame; although much of this work is highly speculative, the results are quite readable. Boehm, who has studied chimpanzee behavior, examines the behavioral homologies among humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas, and from these makes guesses about the behaviors of our hypothetical (but unknown) common ancestor 8 million years ago. He also summarizes what is known about the small bands of hunter-gather societies in which humans are believed to have lived for most of our evolutionary history, using secondary data about what he deems "Late Pleistocene-appropriate" groups, that is, groups whose survival does not depend on farming or other "modern" activities.
He finds that humans, unlike other animal species, are the only speices that experiences true shame, accompanied by blushing and feelings of remorse when a moral rule is violated. He hypothesizes that, about a quarter of a million years ago, when humans began to cooperatively hunt large game, a more egalitarian social order was evolving. At first, he hypothesizes, mainly punitive selection against overly aggressive alpha males occurred; fairly early in the history of mankind, humans developed a strong resentment of being dominated and a tendency to punish and even kill bullies. By about 200,000 years ago, cooperative division of meat by a single individual within a band was believed to be occurring (unlike the situation with chimpanzees, whose smaller kills are divided only among family members and allies). Capital punishment of those who repeatedly broke social rules, often by a close relative, was believed to occur, based on reports by anthropologists studying hunter-gatherers within historical times.
Later in prehistory, positive selection of generous, altruistic behavior by reputation began to occur. All of today's hunter-gatherer societies, according to Boehm, place a strong emphasis on sharing and generosity (he uses sharing of meat as an example) and individuals who repeatedly break social rules are subject to gossip, shaming, punishment, and sometimes even capital punishment. In normal times, bands of hunter gatherers are altruistic abouts sharing even with non-kin, although in times of extreme scarcity and famine, nepotism and then egoism may take over. Boehm believes that most of our evolution toward morality and the "Golden Rule" had taken place by the time we became fully modern; he speculates as to what the future may hold.
He finds that humans, unlike other animal species, are the only speices that experiences true shame, accompanied by blushing and feelings of remorse when a moral rule is violated. He hypothesizes that, about a quarter of a million years ago, when humans began to cooperatively hunt large game, a more egalitarian social order was evolving. At first, he hypothesizes, mainly punitive selection against overly aggressive alpha males occurred; fairly early in the history of mankind, humans developed a strong resentment of being dominated and a tendency to punish and even kill bullies. By about 200,000 years ago, cooperative division of meat by a single individual within a band was believed to be occurring (unlike the situation with chimpanzees, whose smaller kills are divided only among family members and allies). Capital punishment of those who repeatedly broke social rules, often by a close relative, was believed to occur, based on reports by anthropologists studying hunter-gatherers within historical times.
Later in prehistory, positive selection of generous, altruistic behavior by reputation began to occur. All of today's hunter-gatherer societies, according to Boehm, place a strong emphasis on sharing and generosity (he uses sharing of meat as an example) and individuals who repeatedly break social rules are subject to gossip, shaming, punishment, and sometimes even capital punishment. In normal times, bands of hunter gatherers are altruistic abouts sharing even with non-kin, although in times of extreme scarcity and famine, nepotism and then egoism may take over. Boehm believes that most of our evolution toward morality and the "Golden Rule" had taken place by the time we became fully modern; he speculates as to what the future may hold.
August 14, 2015
An intriguing hypotheses mired in redundant verbiage and ponderous writing style. Nevertheless, the central theme is quite fascinating: the idea that our moral conscience grew out of group social selection, evolutionarily speaking, due to our ancestor's egalitarian impulses. Initially, the small groups of human forager/hunter/gatherers would form factions to deal with any, mostly male, people who tried to dominate the group and horde resources. Over time, this fear of group sanction was internalized and evolved into a conscience with attendant feelings of shame, blushing, and the ability to think about moral consequences before taking an action that may be punished by the group.
That shame could be a factor in keeping a group society egalitarian is intriguing. That humans existed in small, egalitarian bands for at least 200,000 years also gives lie to the idea that our current hierarchical way of organizing society is immutable.
Too bad the book just drags on as he makes his point several ways, provides too many anecdotes that don't elaborate on the theme an awful lot, and--while the scientific principles and research he utilizes are sound--, he clearly states that this is mostly speculation until better scientific tools come forward or are discovered. Also, he relies solely on hunter/gatherer meat consumption as the basis of sharing or hording. As if meat weren't a special supplement and was the main dietary component of these people's diets. This focus on meat, while convenient, completely obscures the work of foraging and gathering and the way such pursuits, mainly the domain of women and children in the groups he studies, are shared and provide the bulk of peopl's dietary needs (in most of the cultures, not all).
That shame could be a factor in keeping a group society egalitarian is intriguing. That humans existed in small, egalitarian bands for at least 200,000 years also gives lie to the idea that our current hierarchical way of organizing society is immutable.
Too bad the book just drags on as he makes his point several ways, provides too many anecdotes that don't elaborate on the theme an awful lot, and--while the scientific principles and research he utilizes are sound--, he clearly states that this is mostly speculation until better scientific tools come forward or are discovered. Also, he relies solely on hunter/gatherer meat consumption as the basis of sharing or hording. As if meat weren't a special supplement and was the main dietary component of these people's diets. This focus on meat, while convenient, completely obscures the work of foraging and gathering and the way such pursuits, mainly the domain of women and children in the groups he studies, are shared and provide the bulk of peopl's dietary needs (in most of the cultures, not all).
April 28, 2013
It's a good book, though definitely more a theory piece with limited support.
The premise is group selection theory with a twist. Utilizing economics concepts of free-rider suppression and basic genetics, he proposes that morality was a way of checking against those that took advantage of groups and leveled the playing field for cooperative, but more passive hunter gatherers. His basis for this is LPD data sets and observations, which he has hard coded with some values as well as a few datasets. Not sufficient to really draw hard conclusions, but an interesting theory none-the-less and having some support if one considers the amount of data available on punishment from hunter-gatherer perspective.
The theory itself is appealing, but follows many modern merges of economics and standard genetics theory. The cross-breeding of which is interesting, but has a definitive presence in the field and a heavier inclination with mathematically inclined (or modeled) geneticists.
The theory itself is interesting enough to read about, but it leaves you wanting for more definitive proof. One assumption that I really wish he'd address is female sexual selection of alpha male-type traits found in theories such as the "sexy-son" hypothesis. He addresses it as a pure random chance and never addresses theories that say this is a selected trait. For example, in some books it mentions that successful hunters tend to be on a reproductive note more successful and "sexy-son" discusses infidelity/ fertility cycle selection bias based on this behavior.
The premise is group selection theory with a twist. Utilizing economics concepts of free-rider suppression and basic genetics, he proposes that morality was a way of checking against those that took advantage of groups and leveled the playing field for cooperative, but more passive hunter gatherers. His basis for this is LPD data sets and observations, which he has hard coded with some values as well as a few datasets. Not sufficient to really draw hard conclusions, but an interesting theory none-the-less and having some support if one considers the amount of data available on punishment from hunter-gatherer perspective.
The theory itself is appealing, but follows many modern merges of economics and standard genetics theory. The cross-breeding of which is interesting, but has a definitive presence in the field and a heavier inclination with mathematically inclined (or modeled) geneticists.
The theory itself is interesting enough to read about, but it leaves you wanting for more definitive proof. One assumption that I really wish he'd address is female sexual selection of alpha male-type traits found in theories such as the "sexy-son" hypothesis. He addresses it as a pure random chance and never addresses theories that say this is a selected trait. For example, in some books it mentions that successful hunters tend to be on a reproductive note more successful and "sexy-son" discusses infidelity/ fertility cycle selection bias based on this behavior.
November 1, 2015
Felt more like an essay than a science book. The author has some good points but the evidence for most of the claims he makes are so-so. It was interesting reading the various real life examples of humans/chimps/bonobos in the wild and that was probably the only thing that kept me going. Even those examples however are interpreted through the lens of the author who tries hard to drive the point of uniqueness of humans that are supposed to have special moral traits like shame and conscience.
If the book was more objective in it's approach and focused more on case studies and trying to forcefully drive a point, I would've enjoyed a tad bit more.
If the book was more objective in it's approach and focused more on case studies and trying to forcefully drive a point, I would've enjoyed a tad bit more.
April 1, 2023
Boehm's basic argument is that altruism evolved from mutual reciprocity, and the expectation that one good act will warrant another. Over time, this evolved in the social group to a point where altruism was expected of all people (though both rewards of rule-followers, and shaming/punishment of rule-breakers), to the point that altruism became an innate part of human interaction at the societal and individual levels. At it simplest, the story of altruism is from (1) reciprocity; to (2) enforcement of reciprocity; to (3) internalization of altruism and the emergence of consciousness.
November 26, 2012
Moral Origins starts off well enough. The first 6 or 7 chapters are a good read. He presents his data in a very readable way and seems to focus on the right things. The problems come when he goes to draw conclusions. The last half flails in a frustratingly weak attempt to support his hypothesis.
It's worth reading for his presentation of what he calls Late Pleistocene Appropriate societies. But I'd be wary of his theoretical analysis.
It's worth reading for his presentation of what he calls Late Pleistocene Appropriate societies. But I'd be wary of his theoretical analysis.
June 23, 2013
A provocative book on to
He origins of morals, shame, consciousness... The author does a nice job of making his case based on evidence and speculation (admittedly of course). The base of egalitarian hunter groups was suppressing egos and those who could control their egos spawned human kind. Altruism built one's reputation and thus increased odds of mating... Unfortunately the writing would benefit from better editing. Redundancy abounds.
He origins of morals, shame, consciousness... The author does a nice job of making his case based on evidence and speculation (admittedly of course). The base of egalitarian hunter groups was suppressing egos and those who could control their egos spawned human kind. Altruism built one's reputation and thus increased odds of mating... Unfortunately the writing would benefit from better editing. Redundancy abounds.
November 8, 2016
Christopher Boehm did great job in transforming scientific material into an easy-to-read popular publication. I recommend to everyone who is interested in understanding current hunter-gatherer societies. One can learn about the hierarchy and egalitarianism as well as what tools hunter-gatherers employ to achieve egalitarian state. I mostly enjoyed Boehm's explanation of ridicule and laughter by using an ethnographic example from Collin Turnbull's The Forest People.
June 20, 2012
A great follow up to his 1999 "Hierarchy in the Forest" as he updates his theory that the "rough egalitarianism" of human hunter-gathers arose from the need to cooperate in big game hunting originating 250,000 years ago. He is a pioneer in suggesting that group selection occurred within and not between group.
July 2, 2013
An interesting read that had to have one star docked for the writing style, repetitiveness and some gaping holes in the reasoning.
Irony: there would have been no veganism if we hadn't started hunting large game on regular bases.
A conclusion I agree with: this species would benefit from a small nuclear war.
Irony: there would have been no veganism if we hadn't started hunting large game on regular bases.
A conclusion I agree with: this species would benefit from a small nuclear war.
May 12, 2016
An evolutionary approach to moral development among homo sapiens over the last couple million years.
Boehm explores the role of agriculture, big-game hunting, preaching, discipline, and a host of other influences on moral evolution. Pretty fascinating, if a bit too long.
Marty Troyer
Author, The Gospel Next Door
Boehm explores the role of agriculture, big-game hunting, preaching, discipline, and a host of other influences on moral evolution. Pretty fascinating, if a bit too long.
Marty Troyer
Author, The Gospel Next Door
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