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The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War
The Japanese experience of war from the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century presents a stunning example of the meteoric rise and shattering fall of a great power. As Japan modernized and became the one non-European great power, its leaders concluded that an empire on the Asian mainland required the containment of Russia. Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) but became overextended in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45), which escalated, with profound consequences, into World War II. A combination of incomplete institution building, an increasingly lethal international environment, a skewed balance between civil and military authority, and a misunderstanding of geopolitics explains these divergent outcomes. This analytical survey examines themes including the development of Japanese institutions, diversity of opinion within the government, domestic politics, Japanese foreign policy and China's anti-Japanese responses. It is an essential guide for those interested in history, politics and international relations.
218 pages, Paperback
Published March 6, 2017
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1111 people want to read
About the author
S.C.M. Paine
17 books273 followersSarah C. M. Paine is William S. Sims Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 32 reviews
August 29, 2019
An excellent appraisal of Imperial Japanese grand strategy from 1868-1945. Written largely as a critique, the overall text comes across as a cautionary tale about a naval power doing everything right in its early context under the wordly Meiji Oligarchs and then letting a combination of victory disease and, inter-service rivalry, and lack of a cohesive strategic vision take over the succeeding generations.
By emphasizing the geopolitics of land power and naval power, Paine puts this work squarely in the international relations tradition. While I am always a fan of that approach as it is so often my own, here is where my own critique of this book can be found:
I believe Paine is correct that naval powers and land powers are massively different, and that since the 18th Century or so the advantage has been heavily with the ocean trekkers, but she over-emphasizes the difference of these things as due to ideological elements. The first global naval power was the British, an enterprise of piracy as much as anything else which eventually spiraled into a rapacious order whose record of violence and apatheid surpassed even Japan and Russia's on the global stage. The United States did not inherit this mantle out of integration with the British but by dismantling them when post-war British impotence was undeniable. Maritime powers are more reliable (for coastal nations) a path to take due to geographic, not ideological factors. And its arguable that the United States, as well as a possible future China, are simultaneous continental and naval powers.
This is a very minor and reasonable divergence though and in general I find this book to be an excellent summary of modern Japanese strategic history as well as the pitfalls of a flawed grand strategy. Present U.S. policymakers continuing to enable endless brushfire wars in Africa and the Middle East could take heed from the cautionary tale of Imperial Japan. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere really was a precursor to neoconservatism in many ways.
By emphasizing the geopolitics of land power and naval power, Paine puts this work squarely in the international relations tradition. While I am always a fan of that approach as it is so often my own, here is where my own critique of this book can be found:
I believe Paine is correct that naval powers and land powers are massively different, and that since the 18th Century or so the advantage has been heavily with the ocean trekkers, but she over-emphasizes the difference of these things as due to ideological elements. The first global naval power was the British, an enterprise of piracy as much as anything else which eventually spiraled into a rapacious order whose record of violence and apatheid surpassed even Japan and Russia's on the global stage. The United States did not inherit this mantle out of integration with the British but by dismantling them when post-war British impotence was undeniable. Maritime powers are more reliable (for coastal nations) a path to take due to geographic, not ideological factors. And its arguable that the United States, as well as a possible future China, are simultaneous continental and naval powers.
This is a very minor and reasonable divergence though and in general I find this book to be an excellent summary of modern Japanese strategic history as well as the pitfalls of a flawed grand strategy. Present U.S. policymakers continuing to enable endless brushfire wars in Africa and the Middle East could take heed from the cautionary tale of Imperial Japan. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere really was a precursor to neoconservatism in many ways.
April 8, 2024
Book analyzes Japan's success and eventual decline, starting with the Meiji Restoration, ending with WW2. During the Meiji Restoration, China, the traditional great power in East Asia, was on the decline. In contrast, Japan, mainly through Westernizing their institutions, was able to grow its economy and military and was able to beat China in the first Sino-Japanese War. Fearful of Russia's growing influence, Japan soon fought Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, winning again. Both wars were pretty close; if Russia and China hadn't made some pretty stupid mistakes, they likely wouldve won. When the generation that lead Japan through the Meiji Restoration began to get older, their replacements were much more radical/fanatic. Eventually Japan got far too aggressive, started wars against China and the United States leading to WW2.
Some interesting grand strategy points made in this book. First, Japan's downfall was bc they tried to build a large land empire in Asia. Instead, they should've used their strength (being an island, surrounded on all sides by water) to develop their navy and pursue international trade as a model of development, not imperialism. Second, Japan's victories against China and Russia Ade them overconfident, and led to a risky and overconfident military taking over the military by the WW2 generation. Third, Japan's paranoia about Russia played a huge role in their foreign policy, and their decision to invade China. In fact, part of the reason Japan surrounded in WW2 wasn't just the atom bombs; they were worried that the Soviets would occupy part of Japan if they didn't surrender to the Americans.
Relatively short book for how much I learned. Strong recommend for anyone interested in East Asian history. 4.5
Quotes
"...Japan’s phenomenal success in its two wars of Russian containment set it up for failure in the mid-twentieth century. Each rested content on its achievements without inquiring into its shortcomings, let alone into the ambitions of its neighbors. The ancient Greeks long ago identified the fatal flaw of hubris that has destroyed so many gifted peoples."
"On 7–8 December 1941, Japan attacked not only Hawaii but also British and Dutch interests across the Pacific in the most operationally successful simultaneous attacks in human history. Victory, however, is always assessed at the strategic, not the operational, level."
"Although the leaders of the Meiji generation were brilliant, the institutions they built were incomplete. They were the virtuoso performers of their age, who failed to leave a completed score to guide others after their deaths."
Some interesting grand strategy points made in this book. First, Japan's downfall was bc they tried to build a large land empire in Asia. Instead, they should've used their strength (being an island, surrounded on all sides by water) to develop their navy and pursue international trade as a model of development, not imperialism. Second, Japan's victories against China and Russia Ade them overconfident, and led to a risky and overconfident military taking over the military by the WW2 generation. Third, Japan's paranoia about Russia played a huge role in their foreign policy, and their decision to invade China. In fact, part of the reason Japan surrounded in WW2 wasn't just the atom bombs; they were worried that the Soviets would occupy part of Japan if they didn't surrender to the Americans.
Relatively short book for how much I learned. Strong recommend for anyone interested in East Asian history. 4.5
Quotes
"...Japan’s phenomenal success in its two wars of Russian containment set it up for failure in the mid-twentieth century. Each rested content on its achievements without inquiring into its shortcomings, let alone into the ambitions of its neighbors. The ancient Greeks long ago identified the fatal flaw of hubris that has destroyed so many gifted peoples."
"On 7–8 December 1941, Japan attacked not only Hawaii but also British and Dutch interests across the Pacific in the most operationally successful simultaneous attacks in human history. Victory, however, is always assessed at the strategic, not the operational, level."
"Although the leaders of the Meiji generation were brilliant, the institutions they built were incomplete. They were the virtuoso performers of their age, who failed to leave a completed score to guide others after their deaths."
January 9, 2024
This is a great read walking through Japanese history from the Meiji Restoration through the end of the WW2. The author provides a great framework presenting how early successes for Japan lead to short sightedness and hubris in its later history leading to the end of the Japanese Empire. Definitely would recommend if you’re interested in this period of history.
May 3, 2025
I found about this book after watching a few of Dr. Paine’s talk on YouTube.
A lot of nonfiction tend to be dry, just facts after facts thrown at you but this book was not one of them. Dr. Paine did an exceptional job making this book concise, simple to read while still retaining depth through her analysis. The book was focused on Japan, China, Russia and how power dynamics, disputes, and infighting lead to Japan’s decision to invade during WWII. Very interesting strategies were discussed as well.
A lot of nonfiction tend to be dry, just facts after facts thrown at you but this book was not one of them. Dr. Paine did an exceptional job making this book concise, simple to read while still retaining depth through her analysis. The book was focused on Japan, China, Russia and how power dynamics, disputes, and infighting lead to Japan’s decision to invade during WWII. Very interesting strategies were discussed as well.
February 17, 2025
I bought this book because I saw several videos of Sarah Paine on YouTube. She is knowledgeable, relatable and pithy.
This book is heavy on the knowledge. It filled a lot of blank spaces in my knowledge of the war in the Pacific and the decades that lead up to it.
But the book is short on humanity and humor. There is very little discussion of individuals and no attempt to turn the major figures of this drama into characters.
I would have given this book 3 1/2 stars if that was an option. The analysis is excellent but as a reading experience the dry style and lack of any attempt to make the figures making these decisions memorable as human beings made reading this book less enjoyable than it was informative.
But look her up on YouTube. You'll learn a lot. (And yes I hate that I cam here to plug social media at thee expense of a worthy work of literature.)
This book is heavy on the knowledge. It filled a lot of blank spaces in my knowledge of the war in the Pacific and the decades that lead up to it.
But the book is short on humanity and humor. There is very little discussion of individuals and no attempt to turn the major figures of this drama into characters.
I would have given this book 3 1/2 stars if that was an option. The analysis is excellent but as a reading experience the dry style and lack of any attempt to make the figures making these decisions memorable as human beings made reading this book less enjoyable than it was informative.
But look her up on YouTube. You'll learn a lot. (And yes I hate that I cam here to plug social media at thee expense of a worthy work of literature.)
July 13, 2021
Very specific, though quite good, study on the military policies of Imperial Japan
The Japanese Empire provides a solid overview for the rise and fall of Imperial Japan in terms of foreign policy, particularly in regard to military policies and choices. If one is seeking a thorough, or in depth history of the Empire, this is not the study to access.
Interestingly, this book does provide a succinct analysis of the primary factors driving the overall developments and consequences of Japan's military policies at a high level. It also places the direction of those policy choices into a useful theoretical framework of strategic, tactical, situational, and functional evaluations.
I found the study valuable for what it covers and it should serve well either as an overview to introduce a reader to the subject for a broader study of the Japanese Empire as a whole or for even more thorough studies into the for the history of Japanese foreign policy in the period from the Meiji Restoration through World War 2.
What it is best for, however, is as a case study in the practical factors that influenced the successes and/or failures of the leadership in Imperial Japan in pursuing its military policies.
The Japanese Empire provides a solid overview for the rise and fall of Imperial Japan in terms of foreign policy, particularly in regard to military policies and choices. If one is seeking a thorough, or in depth history of the Empire, this is not the study to access.
Interestingly, this book does provide a succinct analysis of the primary factors driving the overall developments and consequences of Japan's military policies at a high level. It also places the direction of those policy choices into a useful theoretical framework of strategic, tactical, situational, and functional evaluations.
I found the study valuable for what it covers and it should serve well either as an overview to introduce a reader to the subject for a broader study of the Japanese Empire as a whole or for even more thorough studies into the for the history of Japanese foreign policy in the period from the Meiji Restoration through World War 2.
What it is best for, however, is as a case study in the practical factors that influenced the successes and/or failures of the leadership in Imperial Japan in pursuing its military policies.
June 23, 2020
A confession. My dissertation - which I'm still revising into something longer-form even as I've abandoned academe as a career - concerns an episode of geopolitics, but I can't for the life of me follow diplomatic or military history. History, I want to insist, is not just one damn thing after another, but diplomatic and military history are.
This book solves being tedious by being tendentious - a trade that, for me as a reader, was worth it. The grand narrative is pretty simple - the West and/or maritime powers are logical and benevolent, Japan won the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars by being that, then lost the Fifteen Years' War by not, partially because of the merits of the Western/thallassocratic way and partially because, having a moat but lacking native iron and oil/coal, Japan was geographically more suited to it. How well does this narrative stand up? Well, I don't know enough to say. But when I encounter the next tendentious narrative on a similar subject, I'll have remembered enough to think about them both, rather than forgetting it all as with military/diplomatic histories with fewer preconceptions.
This book solves being tedious by being tendentious - a trade that, for me as a reader, was worth it. The grand narrative is pretty simple - the West and/or maritime powers are logical and benevolent, Japan won the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars by being that, then lost the Fifteen Years' War by not, partially because of the merits of the Western/thallassocratic way and partially because, having a moat but lacking native iron and oil/coal, Japan was geographically more suited to it. How well does this narrative stand up? Well, I don't know enough to say. But when I encounter the next tendentious narrative on a similar subject, I'll have remembered enough to think about them both, rather than forgetting it all as with military/diplomatic histories with fewer preconceptions.
November 27, 2017
Good short summary of Japanese strategic aims.
Mr. Paine provides a very good history of the strategic framework for Japan from the Meiji era through WW 2. What I found particularly interesting was how in the Meiji period there was a close matching of military goals with ultimate political objectives while there wasn't in later periods. The discussion about Japan playing the role that the British traditional played in European politics was very interesting in terms of Asian international relations. Have it 4 stars rather than 5 due to a lack of maps, but then the focus is on Grand Strategy.
Mr. Paine provides a very good history of the strategic framework for Japan from the Meiji era through WW 2. What I found particularly interesting was how in the Meiji period there was a close matching of military goals with ultimate political objectives while there wasn't in later periods. The discussion about Japan playing the role that the British traditional played in European politics was very interesting in terms of Asian international relations. Have it 4 stars rather than 5 due to a lack of maps, but then the focus is on Grand Strategy.
February 10, 2021
A fairly brief, slightly dry, somewhat quirky, but definitely informative account of Japanese War aims from 1868-1945.
I have not found too many good books on the topic (not looking for so-called military histories) — Toland’s struck me as a long apologetic (as I remember it) for Imperial Japan. Open to suggestions...
I have not found too many good books on the topic (not looking for so-called military histories) — Toland’s struck me as a long apologetic (as I remember it) for Imperial Japan. Open to suggestions...
March 25, 2022
Concise, readable, and enlightening on Japan's strategy throughout four wars and detailing the difference in leadership from the Meiji generation and its successors who's poor decision-making and strategy left the nation defeated by the end of World War II.
A top-tier book detailing the four wars that Japan underwent from the Meiji Restoration and the ultimate defeat to the Allies. Paine covers the Meiji generation with a great amount of sympathy for their ability to balance all the factors of their expansion. Compared to the later generation whose actions completely ignored Japan's precarious situation next to other great powers and the nation's ability when it comes to natural resources.
Reading the book really made me baffled at how poor the leadership in Japan was in terms of poor decision-making in the long term. Foolishness in thinking that expanded conquests would lead to Japanese self-sufficiency did the opposite as the expanded war front consumed more resources than could be produced. Alongside poor thinking on isolating other powers through their actions and not protecting western interests, as the Meiji generation had done. However, despite a large amount of praise given to the Meiji generation, Paine points to the fact that they were unable to build strong institutions. This left the door open for military authority to completely dominate the running of the country.
A top-tier book detailing the four wars that Japan underwent from the Meiji Restoration and the ultimate defeat to the Allies. Paine covers the Meiji generation with a great amount of sympathy for their ability to balance all the factors of their expansion. Compared to the later generation whose actions completely ignored Japan's precarious situation next to other great powers and the nation's ability when it comes to natural resources.
Reading the book really made me baffled at how poor the leadership in Japan was in terms of poor decision-making in the long term. Foolishness in thinking that expanded conquests would lead to Japanese self-sufficiency did the opposite as the expanded war front consumed more resources than could be produced. Alongside poor thinking on isolating other powers through their actions and not protecting western interests, as the Meiji generation had done. However, despite a large amount of praise given to the Meiji generation, Paine points to the fact that they were unable to build strong institutions. This left the door open for military authority to completely dominate the running of the country.
August 5, 2024
A great introduction to modern Asia that explains the current balance of power, disputes, underlying tension, and alliance networks.
A fascinating exploration of institutions and culture of Japan, how they've dramatically changed the world for the last century with honourable mentions to the Chinese and Russian equivalents.
This book has been a great starter to understanding the old Asia dynamic and how the industrial revolution shattered it and introduced a new system in its place that has determined the course of Asia for the last 150 years.
Now when I imagine a map of Asia things are more defined. I have a new appreciation for the grand strategy concept and the generation of new institutions.
A fascinating book with fantastic concepts.
A fascinating exploration of institutions and culture of Japan, how they've dramatically changed the world for the last century with honourable mentions to the Chinese and Russian equivalents.
This book has been a great starter to understanding the old Asia dynamic and how the industrial revolution shattered it and introduced a new system in its place that has determined the course of Asia for the last 150 years.
Now when I imagine a map of Asia things are more defined. I have a new appreciation for the grand strategy concept and the generation of new institutions.
A fascinating book with fantastic concepts.
April 25, 2024
An extremely competent concise history of the geopolitics and security politics of the Japanese Empire. Excellent summaries of each major war. Sharp argument on a transition between inclusive grand maritime strategy and narrow army-led continental strategy, driven by the passing of a political generation, weak or contradictory institutions and several unfortunate contingencies. This ultimately undid the Empire.
Recommended as a basic textbook. However, would highly recommend layering the additional scholarship on Japanese Empire on top of this. Its lack of sustained in-text engagement with Japanese Empire history is a small but notable weakness.
Recommended as a basic textbook. However, would highly recommend layering the additional scholarship on Japanese Empire on top of this. Its lack of sustained in-text engagement with Japanese Empire history is a small but notable weakness.
July 28, 2024
I rated this 2 because it is extremely Orientalist and racist, as if Japan just "made a few whoopsies" after the first Sino Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. It is a complete revisionist history that completely glosses over all of Japan's insane war crimes and brutality, who's only real problem was overextending themselves by fighting China for dominance over them and challenging the United States for power.
If you're a military person and you just want to know the details of each of Japan's wars and troop movements and military strategy and such, I suppose this book will be useful for you.
If you're a military person and you just want to know the details of each of Japan's wars and troop movements and military strategy and such, I suppose this book will be useful for you.
April 17, 2019
Overview of Japanese strategy 1895-1945
This is not a boom about World War 2 but rather a boom about the strategies and mis& strategies of Japan from 1895-1945 it very clearly lays out and contrasts the wars of Japan during this period and helps readers understand Japan's decline to militaristic state. It explains the many miscalculations made a!ong the way and provides perspective background for the study of World War 2 in Asia
This is not a boom about World War 2 but rather a boom about the strategies and mis& strategies of Japan from 1895-1945 it very clearly lays out and contrasts the wars of Japan during this period and helps readers understand Japan's decline to militaristic state. It explains the many miscalculations made a!ong the way and provides perspective background for the study of World War 2 in Asia
October 20, 2024
Terrific insights, but ultimately better suited for military historians than for political scientists. The book is rife with key insights that help the reader understand the Japanese imperial period in new and better ways, but the writing is tedious, repetitive, and often plodding. One finds themselves hungry for the author’s knowledge and conclusions without having to suffer through his writing and storytelling. Overall, worth the read…but, just barely.
May 1, 2025
I started following Dr. Paine on YouTube about a year ago and find her geopolitical assessments fascinating! This is the first of her books I have read, and I have learned so much. My knowledge of the events that led up to the Asian WWII theatre has changed immensely. The depth of detail regarding the Sino-Japanese wars, the Russo-Japanese wars, and the Asian WWII theatre is incredible!
I can't wait to read more of her works.
I can't wait to read more of her works.
November 20, 2024
Was a good book to pick up after reading about the Meiji Restoration. A bit of it was like this battle happened then this battle happened then this battle. But I guess the important big picture messages were still quite comprehensible. Surprisingly the first time reading about the First Sino-Japanese War.
December 12, 2024
6. A great introduction to Japanese history from the Meiji restoration to the end of WW2. Would have preferred less on the military movements and more on the institutional changes which were discussed incredibly well when mentioned. I come out of this book a huge fan of SCM Paine and her clear thoughts.
January 26, 2025
Clear and comprehensive
Sarah Paine does it again: a sweeping history of imperial Japan from Meiji Restoration through end of WWII. This is the best presentation I’ve read yet on Hirohito’s role in governance. I would have enjoyed more on Japan’s Manchuria adventure, and a bit less on mainland Chinese battles.
Sarah Paine does it again: a sweeping history of imperial Japan from Meiji Restoration through end of WWII. This is the best presentation I’ve read yet on Hirohito’s role in governance. I would have enjoyed more on Japan’s Manchuria adventure, and a bit less on mainland Chinese battles.
July 9, 2019
The book delivered on its promises. This books mainly focusses on military strategy and diplomacy. Incredible books for those who want a deep understanding of Japanese military history from 1866 until 1945.
February 2, 2025
A dense but fascinating quick read. The rigorous analytical methods displayed are very useful beyond geopolitics - underlying vs proximate causes, maritime vs continental powers, unified vs fragmented military services, etc.
September 2, 2017
Informational
There is no doubt Paine knows his stuff and it makes for an easy digestible read. It is very introductory to the period in history. Good for starting research.
There is no doubt Paine knows his stuff and it makes for an easy digestible read. It is very introductory to the period in history. Good for starting research.
October 16, 2019
A good book if you want to catch a glimpse of how the military and fascism took over Japan prior to WWII.
August 5, 2020
Very helpful for me when learning about a new topic.
April 3, 2022
The writing style is dry, but there is a lot of useful information about the history of wars involving Japan.
May 27, 2024
Professor Paine is a superb analyst and writer, this is one of the best histories I have read.
December 13, 2024
Written with Dr. Paine's signature comprehensive study and quiet humor, this book fills in the story of the other side for those of us that get our WWII history from movies.
March 18, 2025
Really fascinating. Look forward to reading more of her work
July 13, 2025
A great short read on a new topic for me. Learned some interesting new things.
December 30, 2022
An excellent book which contextualises the rise of Japan in relation to other great powers such as China, the United States and Russa.
The book explains well how Meiji generation adapted Western practises to modernise but also effectively worked as a benevolent dictatorship, which failed to establish proper institutions that would sustain the country after their passing, leaving a Shogunate-style military government in charge with little concern for finance or diplomacy.
It also contextualises Japan within a changing world: wars against the failing Qing and Romanov dynasties left the Japanese unprepared for wars against nationalist Chinese and Russian populations; the actions of the Japanese in Russia in fact helped to unite the Nationalist and Communists under one flag.
This book is fundamentally a strategy book (no suprise from the title) and also does extremely well explaining the lack of strategy that lead to disaster in WW2. Whereas the initial Chinese war and Russian war had been prepared with an exit plan and specific goals: Korea and Manchuria respectively. The Japanese fought until both goals were reasonable settlement terms. In WW2, there was no specific goal and further invasions of China required more resources, hence further invasions, resulting ultimately in an attack on the US with the goal of gaining access to oil resources in the Philippines and Dutch Indies.
The key lesson of the book: Japan tried to become a continental power when by nature it was a maritime one.
The Iwakura mission concluded that the sources of Western power were not just merely technological or military, but also institutional and civilian. That is, the problem was not simply modernization, meaning the acquisition of the most up-to-date technology and particularly military technology and armaments, but also westernization, meaning the introduction of westernized institutions - and not simply westernized military institutions, but a whole array of civil institutions as well. (p. 6)
The two-China problem of the early twenty-first century was born with Taiwan’s transfer from the Qing to the Japanese empire. (p. 44)
When Japan rapidly defeated China militarily, this not only proved that China no longer dominated but also shattered the Confucian world order. Japan’s victory disproved the underlying assumptions of Confucianism, that sinification was a one-way street, that the world accomodated only one civilzation, and that Chinese civilization was superior to all others… ...Japan’s victory shattered the Confucian bedrock of Chinese civilization and the Chinese have yet to find a replacement. (p. 46)
Nogi had a sense of the disaster he had almost brought upon his country. Of the 89,000 casualties suffered by men under his command, including the deaths of his two sons, over 64,000 had occured at Lüshun. After its fall, he requested permission from the Emperor Meiji to commit suicide. The emperor ordered him to live, but Nogi and his wife commited suicide the day the emperor died fibe years later. (p. 73)
The most pressing national-security problem was neither Russia nor the United States, but China, the neighboring failed state on whose economic welfare Japan’s own economic health depended. (p. 75)
The more of China it occupied, the larger the theater of military operations, and the longer the duration of hostilties, the greater the resource requirements in an ever-expanding reverse Ponzi scheme. (p. 153)
They had forgotten the lessons from their own histories: short wars against peer competitors require a generous peace. The Germans failed to appreciate this legacy of Otto von Bismarck just as the Japanese failed to appreciate the same legacy from the Meiji generation. (p. 156)
As a result of the Russian revolution and the development of nationalism in China, Japan's enemies had become lethal. Japan no longer faced declining royal houses, the Qing dynasty in the case of the First Sino-Japanese War or the Romanov dynasty in the case of the Russo-Japanese War. Instead it faced a Chinese people increasingly unified by a viscerally anti-Japanese nationalism and Russians spreading a messianic export of Communism. (p. 184)
The book explains well how Meiji generation adapted Western practises to modernise but also effectively worked as a benevolent dictatorship, which failed to establish proper institutions that would sustain the country after their passing, leaving a Shogunate-style military government in charge with little concern for finance or diplomacy.
It also contextualises Japan within a changing world: wars against the failing Qing and Romanov dynasties left the Japanese unprepared for wars against nationalist Chinese and Russian populations; the actions of the Japanese in Russia in fact helped to unite the Nationalist and Communists under one flag.
This book is fundamentally a strategy book (no suprise from the title) and also does extremely well explaining the lack of strategy that lead to disaster in WW2. Whereas the initial Chinese war and Russian war had been prepared with an exit plan and specific goals: Korea and Manchuria respectively. The Japanese fought until both goals were reasonable settlement terms. In WW2, there was no specific goal and further invasions of China required more resources, hence further invasions, resulting ultimately in an attack on the US with the goal of gaining access to oil resources in the Philippines and Dutch Indies.
The key lesson of the book: Japan tried to become a continental power when by nature it was a maritime one.
The Iwakura mission concluded that the sources of Western power were not just merely technological or military, but also institutional and civilian. That is, the problem was not simply modernization, meaning the acquisition of the most up-to-date technology and particularly military technology and armaments, but also westernization, meaning the introduction of westernized institutions - and not simply westernized military institutions, but a whole array of civil institutions as well. (p. 6)
The two-China problem of the early twenty-first century was born with Taiwan’s transfer from the Qing to the Japanese empire. (p. 44)
When Japan rapidly defeated China militarily, this not only proved that China no longer dominated but also shattered the Confucian world order. Japan’s victory disproved the underlying assumptions of Confucianism, that sinification was a one-way street, that the world accomodated only one civilzation, and that Chinese civilization was superior to all others… ...Japan’s victory shattered the Confucian bedrock of Chinese civilization and the Chinese have yet to find a replacement. (p. 46)
Nogi had a sense of the disaster he had almost brought upon his country. Of the 89,000 casualties suffered by men under his command, including the deaths of his two sons, over 64,000 had occured at Lüshun. After its fall, he requested permission from the Emperor Meiji to commit suicide. The emperor ordered him to live, but Nogi and his wife commited suicide the day the emperor died fibe years later. (p. 73)
The most pressing national-security problem was neither Russia nor the United States, but China, the neighboring failed state on whose economic welfare Japan’s own economic health depended. (p. 75)
The more of China it occupied, the larger the theater of military operations, and the longer the duration of hostilties, the greater the resource requirements in an ever-expanding reverse Ponzi scheme. (p. 153)
They had forgotten the lessons from their own histories: short wars against peer competitors require a generous peace. The Germans failed to appreciate this legacy of Otto von Bismarck just as the Japanese failed to appreciate the same legacy from the Meiji generation. (p. 156)
As a result of the Russian revolution and the development of nationalism in China, Japan's enemies had become lethal. Japan no longer faced declining royal houses, the Qing dynasty in the case of the First Sino-Japanese War or the Romanov dynasty in the case of the Russo-Japanese War. Instead it faced a Chinese people increasingly unified by a viscerally anti-Japanese nationalism and Russians spreading a messianic export of Communism. (p. 184)
Displaying 1 - 30 of 32 reviews