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Philosophy of Logic Paperback – June 6, 1986
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- Print length122 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherHarvard University Press
- Publication dateJune 6, 1986
- Dimensions5.87 x 0.31 x 9 inches
- ISBN-100674665635
- ISBN-13978-0674665637
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“By virtue of intellectual power, range and fertility of ideas and brilliance of presentation, Quine is the most distinguished and influential of living philosophers.”―London Review of Books
“Quine pursues his philosophical vision with an uncompromising consistency of purpose that makes his doctrines impossible to ignore. You either go with him or define your position in reaction to his. And this is one mark of a great philosopher.”―Journal of Philosophy
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- Publisher : Harvard University Press
- Publication date : June 6, 1986
- Edition : 2nd Revised ed.
- Language : English
- Print length : 122 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0674665635
- ISBN-13 : 978-0674665637
- Item Weight : 7.2 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.87 x 0.31 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,090,962 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #641 in Philosophy of Logic & Language
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- Reviewed in the United States on July 22, 2020Format: PaperbackVerified PurchaseWillard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) is widely considered to be the most influential American philosopher since WW II. He was born and raised in Akron, Ohio. His choice for undergraduate education was Oberlin College, one of Ohio's finest liberal arts colleges. Quine's primary interests at Oberlin were mathematics and philosophy, and he took his degree in the former in 1930. Along the way he developed a strong interest in mathematical philosophy (now called symbolic logic), and during his senior year he completed an honors thesis in this new and exciting field.
The brilliant young mathematician and budding philosopher was awarded a graduate scholarship to study philosophy at Harvard--then the premier program in the country for the study of logic. At this time Alfred North Whitehead taught in the department. He was of course famous for coauthoring Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell. Quine finished his Ph.D studies in just two years. His doctoral dissertation was a modification of the logic developed by Russell and Whitehead in the Principia.
The newly minted Doctor of Philosophy then had a stroke of amazingly good luck. He secured a travelling fellowship for the academic year 1932-1933. Now Harvard was excellent in logic, but the exciting, cutting-edge work in the subject was being done in Europe. In Vienna Quine attended meetings of the Vienna Circle--renowned philosophers making a name for themselves in the areas of epistemology and philosophy of science. He then spent six weeks in Prague. There he met and attended the lectures of Rudolf Carnap--surely the most outstanding thinker to impress the young Quine. This was followed by six weeks in Warsaw. There he attended the lectures of Lukasiewicz and Tarski. Returning to the U.S., the promising young academician had credentials in modern logic second to none.
Quine spent most of the 1930s at Harvard doing research in logic and mathematical set theory. His academic pursuits put him at the intersections of logic, ontology, and epistemology. He published books on Mathematical Logic (1940) and Elementary Logic (1941). In 1953 Quine published a collection of essays titled From a Logical Point of View. This influential work included his two most famous essays: (1) Two Dogmas of Empiricism, and (2) On What There Is.
At this point we must enter the philosophical forest in order to discern the import of Quine's Philosophy of Logic. The book is short, incisive, and opinionated. Readers should have a good background in symbolic logic to fully appreciate his presentation. Upper level philosophy majors and graduate students will profit most from Quine's arguments.
Quine defines logic as "the systematic study of the logical truths" (p. vii). Now "truth" is a contested concept in philosophy, and it will occupy a prominent place in much of the book. In the very next paragraph (ibid.) Quine fans the flames of controversy by identifying logic as consisting of two components--truth and grammar. And here is his zinger. "But I shall argue against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar, or because of language" (ibid.). Take that, Carnap and Wittgenstein!
Quine gives numerous definitions of a logical truth:
(1) A logically true (or false) sentence is a sentence whose truth (or falsity) is assured by its logical structure (p. 48).
(2) A sentence is logically true if all sentences are true that share its logical structure (p. 49).
(3) A sentence is logically true if it stays true under all changes of its predicates (p. 49).
(4) A logical truth is a sentence from which we get only truths when we substitute sentences for its simple sentences (p. 50).
(5) A logical truth is a truth that cannot be turned false by substituting for lexicon (p. 58).
(6) Logic is the resultant of two components: grammar and truth (p. 60).
And here are two more from other Quine sources:
(7) A statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles (Quintessence, p. 33).
(8) Logical truths are those true sentences which involve only logical words ESSENTIALLY (ibid., p. 66).
Now it is obvious that the most important element in these various definitions is STRUCTURE. And in analysis of language structure is called SYNTAX. Let us emphasize again (6) above. The two components of logic are grammar and truth. But what is grammar? Grammar = lexicon (words) + syntax (structure) (p. 16). But Quine clearly states in (5) above that lexicon has no bearing on logical truth. He seems a bit confused here. The issue is muddled further by the following comment: "...logic explores the truth conditions of sentences in the light of how the sentences are grammatically constructed. Logic chases truth up the tree of grammar" (p. 35). Is Quine saying "grammar" when he should be saying "syntax?"
I think his train of thought here is a bit misleading, but I understand where he is trying to go. He seems to agree with Wittgenstein that logical truth is just an empty tautology, but it has a vital role to play in science as an intellectual tool---a way to understand and promote REAL TRUTH, i.e., scientific truth. Quine is a realist and a naturalist, thus logic and philosophy, just like mathematics and physics, must fit in somewhere in the great edifice of modern science. Eventually we must emerge from our linguistic cave and confront nonlinguistic reality. "Truth should hinge on reality, not language" (p. 10).
There are several prominent theories of truth in philosophy. All are contested. While the coherence and pragmatic theories have their defenders, the most popular is the correspondence theory. It states that whatever we take to be true must correspond to the real world. Quine likes Tarski's version of the theory, often characterized as the "disquotational" theory of truth.
The gist of the theory can be shown by giving Tarski's famous example:
"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white.
The quoted sentence---the left side of the biconditional---is a statement of the metalanguage and refers only to a linguistic expression (hence the quotation marks). This expression is redeemed by the right side of the biconditional (the object language). This is accomplished through scientifically valid procedures such as observation, experimentation, etc.
The Tarskian theory of truth has been accused of being obvious and trivial. And so it seems to me. But my guess is that Quine uses it as a way to disarm the dreaded linguistic theory of truth. "As already hinted by the correspondence theory, the truth predicate is an intermediary between words and the world. What is true is the sentence, but its truth consists in the world's being as the sentence says" (Pursuit of Truth, p. 81). Enough with words. Let's talk about objects!
There are several more important logical concerns in the book that I have no time to discuss. A few remarks must suffice.
(A) Quine believes real logic should be confined to first-order predicate calculus with identity. He justifies this claim on the familiarity, convenience, simplicity, and beauty it exhibits (p. 87). I agree.
(B) Set theory is guilty of "ontological excesses" (p. 55) and thus is part of mathematics, not logic. I agree.
(C) Quine has disdain for modal concepts (p. 33). I agree.
(D) There are problems with synonymy (pp. 8-9), and this devalues the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quintessence, pp. 31-53). I disagree.
REFERENCES
(1) Quine, W.V.---Quintessence (Quine's most important essays are collected here. A required purchase for all Quine students.)
(2) Quine, W.V.--- Pursuit of Truth, Revised Edition (A late career work that sums up and clarifies Quine's substantial accomplishments.)
- Reviewed in the United States on January 4, 2014Format: PaperbackVerified PurchaseThere are many books available on the kinds, procedures, and formalism of logic. This book asks the questions 'What is logic?', 'What is logical truth?', 'How do we know the truth of logical truths?', and 'What is the relation of logic to logical truth--and knowledge to truth in general?'
Anyone who has thought on such questions must have wondered about the source of logical truth. It seems to not be empirical truth about the world in the way that science is empirically true. But the source of its truth is unclear. So we tend to think that the truth of logic is a priori to experience; or to think that logical truth is an artifact of language--particularly of grammar. These common responses still leave the origin of logic and the source of its truth a mystery.
The value of this book, in my opinion, is that it gives us answers to these questions and it does so precisely and concisely. It says, roughly, that grammar (including the lexicon) is what gives language the ability to refer to reality but that the actual and truthful reference to the real requires something more. In science such truth starts in experience but its conceptual systems must be confirmed by all relevant data. The Logical truths apply in all sciences--they must be true in all possible worlds. Therefore Logical truth can be invalidated and improved; in this sense logic is empirical. But where does logical truth come from? Practically, the logical truths are so general in application that they are given common assent as expressions in language of common behavioral experience. Therefore Logical truth is empirical; therefore it is revisable as is science; but therefore its revision will be (far) less frequent than revision in science.
The book is useful because while it gives a general background to grammar and language, it focuses on first order predicate logic which is sufficient to most of mathematics. To have focused on the propositional calculus would have robbed the development of its potency. To have considered higher order logics or to have focused on variant logics--which it does consider briefly--would likely have rendered the project impossible. Therefore the use of first order logic is wise. This takes the value of the book into the realm of the 'very significant' if not the 'great'.
By the way, the book contains an account of Quine's philosophies of meaning and of science. Given that he thinks of meaning as some kind of abstract object standing behind a sentence, his argument that there is no such thing makes sense but I don't find his arguments entirely convincing (this point does not adversely affect his philosophy of logic). His philosophy of science is roughly the farily standard view that science can be disconfirmed by disagreement with data but is never fully confirmed; and that scientific theories are underdetermined by the data; which is not so standard but Quine's argument is a good one. As explained above, Quine shows how science and logic mesh as a continuum and are not essentially distinct activities.
Quine's reasoning is sound: I mean that I did not find vitiating errors even though I had quibbles; and he has given answers to deep questions that are often considered un-answerable or that are given mystical answers (for example, 'logic is a priori to experience') or unclear ones (such as 'logic is built into language').
- Reviewed in the United States on January 20, 2014Format: PaperbackVerified PurchaseThe book is clear and really interesting.
Quine goes through classical aspetcs of logic, language and ontology enriching every explaination with very meaningful examples.
- Reviewed in the United States on October 28, 2018Excellent book