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Parmenides
This is an English translation of one of the more challenging and enigmatic of Plato's dialogues between Socrates and Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, that begins with Zeno defending his treatise of Parmenidean monism against those partisans of plurality.
Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato’s immediate audience.
Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato’s immediate audience.
96 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 341
About the author
Plato
5,149 books7,382 followersPlato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 202 reviews
July 28, 2016
I am interested to discover that the doctrine of the One is still alive. It is now going by the name of blobjectivism, and is being met with the usual uninformed derision. Only fifteen minutes ago, Matt cruelly dismissed it in the following terms:
I opened the link and closed it right away. I mostly saw ����������� Is this blobjectivism?Ah, Matt, if only Parmenides of Elea were still with us! He'd put you in your place and tell you that all you need to do is switch the coding to Windows-1252. You can find his sage advice near the end of the famous dialogue with Aristoteles (no relation), but for some reason very few people read that far.
May 26, 2019
In part, this dialogue was simply too hard for me. I find I quickly get lost with many philosophical arguments – Sartre does this to me too, which is annoying, because other things he writes make complete sense to me. This one is again one of those dialogues that is reported from a long time before – much like The Symposium – but this one goes right back to when Socrates was a very young man. It challenges many of the assumptions associated with Plato’s view of the nature of his ‘forms’ – and so, given Socrates went on to continue to support his view on these forms, I assume Socrates wasn’t ultimately convinced by the arguments Parmenides gives – even if he seems to accept them in this dialogue.
My understanding of all this is that Socrates believes that the world we live in is basically ‘unreal’ – that is, because it changes, and change invariably involves a contradiction (things are and are not at the same time) and because the true cannot involve a contradiction, then the world we live in can’t be the really real world. That 'real' world would be without contradiction and it would therefore be composed of perfect (that is, unchanging) forms. The problem is just what would those forms be? Would there be, for instance, only perfect forms for abstract concepts, like beauty, truth, honour, justice, knowledge? Or would there also be perfect forms for objects in the world – the prefect table, chair, and so on? And what about measures, like big or small? And so it goes. Much of this dialogue involves discussions showing that even in the abstract world of the world of forms, the paradoxes involved in thinking about things don’t go away. Things can be both smaller and bigger (when compared to different things – I’m bigger than a cat, smaller than an elephant) and so is the form of ‘smaller’ and the form of ‘bigger’ put into a kind of contradiction here?
The point being, I think, that if the escape to the world of forms was to get away from paradoxes and contradictions, then Parmenides is saying that it isn’t much of an escape route.
In the Theaetetus, a dialogue that consciously places itself right before the trial of Socrates and therefore right at the end of his life (so that that dialogue and this one bookend Socrates’ life) the discussion is also on Parmenides and in that dialogue Socrates also mentions that as a young man he spoke with Parmenides and respected his views. This is complex, since it isn’t at all clear how Socrates can resolve the problems Parmenides is presenting him on his own world view – based in part on the real existence of these forms. He seems to be trapped.
Hegel is perhaps a solution here – that is, to think of the world as being about change and to see change as necessary in its movement – that is, rather than being afraid of the paradoxes and contradictions that are inevitably a part of accepting that things are in motion, to accept this as the essence of becoming and therefore the truth of our world. Something impossible, of course, for either Socrates or Parmenides to believe.
Like I said at the very beginning, I didn’t really understand all that much of this one – I suspect I would need to sit with it and perhaps a commentary, and a pencil, and maybe a philosopher too – to really follow it all. But, onward and upward…
My understanding of all this is that Socrates believes that the world we live in is basically ‘unreal’ – that is, because it changes, and change invariably involves a contradiction (things are and are not at the same time) and because the true cannot involve a contradiction, then the world we live in can’t be the really real world. That 'real' world would be without contradiction and it would therefore be composed of perfect (that is, unchanging) forms. The problem is just what would those forms be? Would there be, for instance, only perfect forms for abstract concepts, like beauty, truth, honour, justice, knowledge? Or would there also be perfect forms for objects in the world – the prefect table, chair, and so on? And what about measures, like big or small? And so it goes. Much of this dialogue involves discussions showing that even in the abstract world of the world of forms, the paradoxes involved in thinking about things don’t go away. Things can be both smaller and bigger (when compared to different things – I’m bigger than a cat, smaller than an elephant) and so is the form of ‘smaller’ and the form of ‘bigger’ put into a kind of contradiction here?
The point being, I think, that if the escape to the world of forms was to get away from paradoxes and contradictions, then Parmenides is saying that it isn’t much of an escape route.
In the Theaetetus, a dialogue that consciously places itself right before the trial of Socrates and therefore right at the end of his life (so that that dialogue and this one bookend Socrates’ life) the discussion is also on Parmenides and in that dialogue Socrates also mentions that as a young man he spoke with Parmenides and respected his views. This is complex, since it isn’t at all clear how Socrates can resolve the problems Parmenides is presenting him on his own world view – based in part on the real existence of these forms. He seems to be trapped.
Hegel is perhaps a solution here – that is, to think of the world as being about change and to see change as necessary in its movement – that is, rather than being afraid of the paradoxes and contradictions that are inevitably a part of accepting that things are in motion, to accept this as the essence of becoming and therefore the truth of our world. Something impossible, of course, for either Socrates or Parmenides to believe.
Like I said at the very beginning, I didn’t really understand all that much of this one – I suspect I would need to sit with it and perhaps a commentary, and a pencil, and maybe a philosopher too – to really follow it all. But, onward and upward…
May 9, 2012
I read this dialogue and was exhausted by its repetitive and confusing arguments. Only now that I've had time to step away from it and discuss it with others has the true beauty of The Parmenides' message struck me. This book allowed me to see everything as unified in a way I could never conceive of before. Everything: humans, love, mud, table, and injustice are one. It is only because of this connection that we can afford to think of ourselves as separate entities; I can call myself "I" in a conversation because I know that in our interaction we exist as a whole "we" that gives us common ground to understand one another.
For some reason, I really love this idea that all people and things are connected, whether we acknowledge it or not.
For some reason, I really love this idea that all people and things are connected, whether we acknowledge it or not.
July 4, 2017
ألا تعتقد بأن هناك مثالًا للمشابهة قائمًا بذاته وآخر مقابلًا له هو ماهية المشابهة؟ وأن هذه الازدواجية في المثل نشارك فيها أنا وأنت وجميع الأشياء الأخرى التي نطلق عليها كثرة؟ أو أن الأشياء بقدر ما تشارك وعلى نحو ما تشارك تكون متشابهة إذا شاركت في التشابه، وتكون غير متشابهة إذا شاركت في اللاتشابه، وتكون متشابهة وغير متشابهة معًا إذا شاركت في الاثنين؟ وإذا كانت الأشياء تشترك في هذين المثالين المتعارضين، فماذا يثير التعجب في هذه المشاركة المزدوجة مع المشابهة وغير المشابهة معًا؟ وبالعكس، إذا قيل لنا إن المتشابهات في ذاتها تصبح غير متشابهة، أو أن غير المتشابهات تصبح متشابهة، فإني أرى في ذلك أعجوبة!
October 21, 2018
The Parmenides of Plato
By Anonymus
Flower in a crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.
These are the only enjoyable lines I read in this book.
It is not the edition on the header, but I could not find this one on Goodreads.
It is not really a book, rather pamphlet.
It slipped unnoticed onto my shelves. I like ancient history. Plato may have caught my eye.
However, the first pages are on the subject of philosophy. From the time of Plato, Aristoteles to Berkeley, Locke, Kant and Hegel, Descartes and others. What is philosophy and what is not philosophy.
Is philosophy the explicitness of universal thought?
The instrument of thought is thought only; we analyse and reconstruct a synthesis out of our analysis. We do nothing more.
Atomic theories cannot be philosophy.
Molecular theories cannot be philosophy.
Evolution is not philosophy.
Physical science is not philosophy. And so on.
The business of philosophy must be Analysis.
The analysis, therefore, is the supreme organon.
Taking analysis as the instrument of thought, Plato in the Parmenides analyses the Univers into the position of explaining everything, and its negation nullifying everything.
This is as far as I could read.
The rest of the book is written in Ancient Greek which I cannot read.
Also, I have come to the limit of my intellectual curiosity and would not enjoy further reading of this Metaphysical subject.
Another reader might be interested.
By Anonymus
Flower in a crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.
These are the only enjoyable lines I read in this book.
It is not the edition on the header, but I could not find this one on Goodreads.
It is not really a book, rather pamphlet.
It slipped unnoticed onto my shelves. I like ancient history. Plato may have caught my eye.
However, the first pages are on the subject of philosophy. From the time of Plato, Aristoteles to Berkeley, Locke, Kant and Hegel, Descartes and others. What is philosophy and what is not philosophy.
Is philosophy the explicitness of universal thought?
The instrument of thought is thought only; we analyse and reconstruct a synthesis out of our analysis. We do nothing more.
Atomic theories cannot be philosophy.
Molecular theories cannot be philosophy.
Evolution is not philosophy.
Physical science is not philosophy. And so on.
The business of philosophy must be Analysis.
The analysis, therefore, is the supreme organon.
Taking analysis as the instrument of thought, Plato in the Parmenides analyses the Univers into the position of explaining everything, and its negation nullifying everything.
This is as far as I could read.
The rest of the book is written in Ancient Greek which I cannot read.
Also, I have come to the limit of my intellectual curiosity and would not enjoy further reading of this Metaphysical subject.
Another reader might be interested.
February 22, 2016
What the hell did I just read? I will give someone money if they can understand this:
"Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have
the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must
have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its
own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the
not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being,
and not of the being of not-being-that is, the perfection of being;
and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being
but of the being of not-being-that is the perfection of not-being."
"Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have
the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must
have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its
own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the
not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being,
and not of the being of not-being-that is, the perfection of being;
and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being
but of the being of not-being-that is the perfection of not-being."
November 27, 2011
After a long hiatus, I picked up Plato's dialogues again in 2005. No review or notes written at the time and I don't recall my thoughts. The only thing I did was quote the following on the Book Talk Forum at BookCrossing:
Glad that's cleared up.
Parmenides: Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being--that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being--that is the perfection of not-being.
Socrates: Most true.
Glad that's cleared up.
November 11, 2018
Extremely important dialogue. In some ways I think Plato is best understood as a response to Parmenides and Heraclitus. However, even having read Parmenides' fragments and listening to some lectures on this dialogue, I still must confess that the second half was much too obscure for me to comprehend well; hence I hope to listen to some more lectures and perhaps read some secondary literature on this profoundly impactful thinker.
It was also nice to see Socrates get owned for once.
It was also nice to see Socrates get owned for once.
May 29, 2019
Ex nihilo, nihil fit.
December 30, 2021
A good, though complex, work by Plato. This more so than any other dialogue demands critical active reading, which is always beneficial when reading Plato, though here it is necessary.
February 26, 2011
Maybe I should have just stuck with Green Eggs and Ham. I’m not really qualified to rate the book, and I didn’t try to struggle through many of the logic puzzles, though the Parmenides seems to be as much about ontology and to some extent language (or at least the verb “to be”) as it is about valid argument. And as is characteristic with Plato, it’s about considerably more, famously presenting serious and unresolved challenges to his Theory of Forms – part epistemology, part ontology, part everything else – after which it goes through a series of mazes about the One and the Many. Fun, fun, fun. Mary Louise Gill’s introduction is very good, but I have the nagging sense that she misses something. I sometimes wonder what Plato would have thought of Aristotle’s formal logic – certainly a great advance, and the Parmenides may be its most important forerunner, but Plato is almost Aristotle’s opposite in that he systematically avoids systematizing anything. In spite of his having a more mathematical mind than Aristotle, Plato seems so close to developing a formal logic here but refuses to do so. Maybe he’s unable to or just didn’t get there. But I tend to think he’s uninclined and not oriented towards formalizing logic as Aristotle does. Plato was also more of a mystic than Aristotle, which I think has some relevance to this question.
In Aristotle’s defense, his logic can be seen as serving his metaphysical vision about the essential comprehensibility of the cosmos, with man and his rationality being a product of that cosmos, and with man having an essential “desire to understand,” as he says at the beginning of his Metaphysics. Aristotle’s formal logic is both a means for investigating the comprehensible cosmos and a demonstration of the rationality of the cosmos. Whether he’s correct and whether (or to what extent) his logic succeeds are open questions. It seems Plato would have largely agreed with Aristotle’s metaphysical vision, at least as I’ve described it, but I suspect he might have considered Aristotle’s logic too reductive and exclusive. Our strengths are often also our weaknesses. One of Aristotle’s strengths is that he frequently doesn’t try to completely prove his point to the exclusion of all alternatives, but instead presents a case so compelling (he thinks) that he believes it will be thoroughly convincing, leaving alternatives to fend for themselves. Plato, on the other hand, sometimes tries to be comprehensive, but in those situations he’s typically too wise to try to be definitive using rational argument, relying on myth or analogy, or on the ambiguity that’s possible in the dialogue form, or leaving arguments incomplete or very likely knowing they have unresolved flaws. (Parmenides is the outstanding example of this, regarding the Theory of Forms. I don’t think Plato abandoned the theory as some have thought; it seems he honestly investigated it, exposed and analyzed difficulties, left problems open that he couldn’t solve, but continued holding to it. I believe his later works pretty strongly imply this.)
I suspect Plato would have been uncomfortable with an exclusive, definitive formal logic. It might not be possible for man to develop a perfect system of logic, and it seems to imply an unreal separation of the rational from other parts of the soul (as both Plato and Aristotle in general conceived the soul). And if this is unreal for the soul, it’s unreal for the cosmos (as Aristotle has the two intimately related and corresponding to one another). Can a statement about something that’s supposed to exist be dealt with properly using rationality alone? Can rationality alone ensure that a statement is valid, much less cogent? Are unqualified conclusions about validity and cogency legitimate? Is it appropriate and ultimately is it truly meaningful to isolate statements the way Aristotle does in his syllogisms? Do they accurately represent anything that exists? Formal logic is linear, pure, exact, reducible to very simple components, at times purportedly incontrovertible in its conclusions. Does this correspond with the human soul or the cosmos as they really are? Another possible problem is that Aristotle’s logic seems to operate contrary to Plato’s apparent conception of philosophy as necessarily and essentially dialectical – a search for truth involving two or more souls in an active relationship. (Whether this is a definite or complete doctrine of Plato’s is questionable; at a minimum he surely would have also included isolated individual contemplation. And though he clearly considers active dialectic to be very important, the late works seem to move away from this position.) Also, isn’t Aristotle’s metaphysical vision most fundamentally about an active and intimate relationship between man and the cosmos? I could be completely wrong suspecting Plato would have had serious reservations about Aristotle’s logic, though I can’t help thinking he would have at least sought to qualify it. Of course we’ll never hear Plato and Aristotle discuss the Parmenides and Aristotle’s logic, but wouldn’t it be fascinating? (Okay, maybe not for everybody.)
In Aristotle’s defense, his logic can be seen as serving his metaphysical vision about the essential comprehensibility of the cosmos, with man and his rationality being a product of that cosmos, and with man having an essential “desire to understand,” as he says at the beginning of his Metaphysics. Aristotle’s formal logic is both a means for investigating the comprehensible cosmos and a demonstration of the rationality of the cosmos. Whether he’s correct and whether (or to what extent) his logic succeeds are open questions. It seems Plato would have largely agreed with Aristotle’s metaphysical vision, at least as I’ve described it, but I suspect he might have considered Aristotle’s logic too reductive and exclusive. Our strengths are often also our weaknesses. One of Aristotle’s strengths is that he frequently doesn’t try to completely prove his point to the exclusion of all alternatives, but instead presents a case so compelling (he thinks) that he believes it will be thoroughly convincing, leaving alternatives to fend for themselves. Plato, on the other hand, sometimes tries to be comprehensive, but in those situations he’s typically too wise to try to be definitive using rational argument, relying on myth or analogy, or on the ambiguity that’s possible in the dialogue form, or leaving arguments incomplete or very likely knowing they have unresolved flaws. (Parmenides is the outstanding example of this, regarding the Theory of Forms. I don’t think Plato abandoned the theory as some have thought; it seems he honestly investigated it, exposed and analyzed difficulties, left problems open that he couldn’t solve, but continued holding to it. I believe his later works pretty strongly imply this.)
I suspect Plato would have been uncomfortable with an exclusive, definitive formal logic. It might not be possible for man to develop a perfect system of logic, and it seems to imply an unreal separation of the rational from other parts of the soul (as both Plato and Aristotle in general conceived the soul). And if this is unreal for the soul, it’s unreal for the cosmos (as Aristotle has the two intimately related and corresponding to one another). Can a statement about something that’s supposed to exist be dealt with properly using rationality alone? Can rationality alone ensure that a statement is valid, much less cogent? Are unqualified conclusions about validity and cogency legitimate? Is it appropriate and ultimately is it truly meaningful to isolate statements the way Aristotle does in his syllogisms? Do they accurately represent anything that exists? Formal logic is linear, pure, exact, reducible to very simple components, at times purportedly incontrovertible in its conclusions. Does this correspond with the human soul or the cosmos as they really are? Another possible problem is that Aristotle’s logic seems to operate contrary to Plato’s apparent conception of philosophy as necessarily and essentially dialectical – a search for truth involving two or more souls in an active relationship. (Whether this is a definite or complete doctrine of Plato’s is questionable; at a minimum he surely would have also included isolated individual contemplation. And though he clearly considers active dialectic to be very important, the late works seem to move away from this position.) Also, isn’t Aristotle’s metaphysical vision most fundamentally about an active and intimate relationship between man and the cosmos? I could be completely wrong suspecting Plato would have had serious reservations about Aristotle’s logic, though I can’t help thinking he would have at least sought to qualify it. Of course we’ll never hear Plato and Aristotle discuss the Parmenides and Aristotle’s logic, but wouldn’t it be fascinating? (Okay, maybe not for everybody.)
August 22, 2016
I think there are three ways to see "The One". The ultimate Good and the source of all reality, our consciousness for when we think, and literally the number '1', each are different ways for how we understand the nature of existence (being). We think about being either by our understanding, our experience, our ideas, our contemplation or our lack of contemplation (Heidegger, e.g.). Each is equally valid in its on way.
I've recently read Hegel's Phenomenology and that led me to his "Science of Logic" and that led me to this book. Hegel borrows heavily from this book. Hegel puts in his movement (dialectic) but he mostly insists that we need to understand the painting as the whole before we can understand the pieces of the painting just as Parmenides would say (actually as Parmenides does say in this dialog).
It is almost as if this book doesn't belong in the works of Plato's Socratic dialogs. So much really shouts out against what Socrates says elsewhere in Plato's dialogs. The 'forms' from our 'ideas' fall under assault by Parmenides. Opposites don't exist (proof by contradiction) are used without mercy against much of what Socrates held to be true. Socrates needs the absolute in order to defeat the sophisticated Sophists and therefore needs a starting point in order to get his negation (all determinations are negations), but he doesn't have it. Our being and becoming, the void and matter, motion and stillness, existence and nothing all need an absolute negation and Parmenides takes that away in this incredibly clever dialog. Kant has to have his intuition categories in order to get the universal. Parmenides gives only "the one".
Heidegger will start with Being (dasein, "understanding ones own understanding about ones understanding") and builds a complicated world structure (always in threes: past, present, and future) and ends in Temporarlity as if he wished to have started with time instead. What is the proper ontological foundation? Being or time? Parmenides will put 'The One" outside of time (temporally) just as the God of an Evangelical will most often be and in my opinion Spinoza does the same but many (if not most)readers of Spinoza seem to disagree.
This is an incredibly important little book which seems to relate to most of the books I've recently have been reading and I wish I had read it before reading some of the others I've recently read (Hegel, Heidegger, Spinoza, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Sartre). It's not a hard to follow book and I actually re-listened to parts of it to make sure I was understanding it correctly.
I've recently read Hegel's Phenomenology and that led me to his "Science of Logic" and that led me to this book. Hegel borrows heavily from this book. Hegel puts in his movement (dialectic) but he mostly insists that we need to understand the painting as the whole before we can understand the pieces of the painting just as Parmenides would say (actually as Parmenides does say in this dialog).
It is almost as if this book doesn't belong in the works of Plato's Socratic dialogs. So much really shouts out against what Socrates says elsewhere in Plato's dialogs. The 'forms' from our 'ideas' fall under assault by Parmenides. Opposites don't exist (proof by contradiction) are used without mercy against much of what Socrates held to be true. Socrates needs the absolute in order to defeat the sophisticated Sophists and therefore needs a starting point in order to get his negation (all determinations are negations), but he doesn't have it. Our being and becoming, the void and matter, motion and stillness, existence and nothing all need an absolute negation and Parmenides takes that away in this incredibly clever dialog. Kant has to have his intuition categories in order to get the universal. Parmenides gives only "the one".
Heidegger will start with Being (dasein, "understanding ones own understanding about ones understanding") and builds a complicated world structure (always in threes: past, present, and future) and ends in Temporarlity as if he wished to have started with time instead. What is the proper ontological foundation? Being or time? Parmenides will put 'The One" outside of time (temporally) just as the God of an Evangelical will most often be and in my opinion Spinoza does the same but many (if not most)readers of Spinoza seem to disagree.
This is an incredibly important little book which seems to relate to most of the books I've recently have been reading and I wish I had read it before reading some of the others I've recently read (Hegel, Heidegger, Spinoza, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Sartre). It's not a hard to follow book and I actually re-listened to parts of it to make sure I was understanding it correctly.
October 12, 2018
بارمنيدس: ومن ثمة فإن الجميل في ذاته، والخير في ذاته، وكل ما نعتبره مثلاً في ذاتها يمتنع علينا معرفته.
سقراط: أخشى أن يكون الأمر كذلك.
بارمنيدس: وثمة نتيجة أخرى أخطر من ذلك.
سقراط: ما هي؟
بارمنيدس: إذا كان ثمة جنس في ذاته للمعرفة، فهل يمكن القول بأنه يكون أصوب بكثير من المعرفة التي في عالمنا، وكذلك بالمثل يكون الجمال وكل جنس آخر؟
سقراط: نعم.
بارمنيدس: فإذا كان هناك من يشارك في المعرفة في ذاتها فلابد من أنك تعزو هذا الصواب المطلق للمعرفة إلى الله دون أي كائن آخر؟
سقراط: حتمًا.
بارمنيدس: فهل تتيح المعرفة في ذاتها لهذا الإله الحاصل عليها معرفة الأشياء التي في عالمنا؟
سقراط: ولم لا؟
بارمنيدس: لأن هناك مبدأ يا سقراط اتفقنا عليه، وهو أنه لا المثل في العالم العلوي يتعلق تأثيرها بالأشياء في عالمنا، ولا الأشياء في عالمنا يتعلق تأثيرها بالمثل، فالتأثير في كل من هذه العالمين ينحصر داخل كل عالم منهما على حدة.
سقراط: لقد اتفقنا بالفعل على ذلك.
***
بارمنيدس: ألسنا نقول الصدق بتلخيص كل شيء في الآتي: إذا كان الواحد ليس موجودًا فلا شيء يوجد؟ إذن نقول ذلك ونقول أيضًا سواء أكان الواحد موجودًا أم ليس موجودًا فإن جميع علاقات الواحد والآخرين فيما يبدو سواء بذاتهم أم في تبادلها ومن جميع وجهات النظر الممكنة، هذه العلاقات كلها تكون قائمة ولا تكون ويبدو أنها تكون قائمة ويبدو أنها لا تكون.
سقراط: أخشى أن يكون الأمر كذلك.
بارمنيدس: وثمة نتيجة أخرى أخطر من ذلك.
سقراط: ما هي؟
بارمنيدس: إذا كان ثمة جنس في ذاته للمعرفة، فهل يمكن القول بأنه يكون أصوب بكثير من المعرفة التي في عالمنا، وكذلك بالمثل يكون الجمال وكل جنس آخر؟
سقراط: نعم.
بارمنيدس: فإذا كان هناك من يشارك في المعرفة في ذاتها فلابد من أنك تعزو هذا الصواب المطلق للمعرفة إلى الله دون أي كائن آخر؟
سقراط: حتمًا.
بارمنيدس: فهل تتيح المعرفة في ذاتها لهذا الإله الحاصل عليها معرفة الأشياء التي في عالمنا؟
سقراط: ولم لا؟
بارمنيدس: لأن هناك مبدأ يا سقراط اتفقنا عليه، وهو أنه لا المثل في العالم العلوي يتعلق تأثيرها بالأشياء في عالمنا، ولا الأشياء في عالمنا يتعلق تأثيرها بالمثل، فالتأثير في كل من هذه العالمين ينحصر داخل كل عالم منهما على حدة.
سقراط: لقد اتفقنا بالفعل على ذلك.
***
بارمنيدس: ألسنا نقول الصدق بتلخيص كل شيء في الآتي: إذا كان الواحد ليس موجودًا فلا شيء يوجد؟ إذن نقول ذلك ونقول أيضًا سواء أكان الواحد موجودًا أم ليس موجودًا فإن جميع علاقات الواحد والآخرين فيما يبدو سواء بذاتهم أم في تبادلها ومن جميع وجهات النظر الممكنة، هذه العلاقات كلها تكون قائمة ولا تكون ويبدو أنها تكون قائمة ويبدو أنها لا تكون.
October 28, 2019
El principio parmediano se reduce a "todo es uno"
March 25, 2022
Many/One
August 16, 2019
Notes on Parménides
1. By Zeus, this one went completely over my head. Parménides has a reputation among the Platonic oeuvre of being rather obscure and confusing so I came to it with my intellectual weapons charged and ready; it wasn't enough. That reputation is well earned. In contrasting his beloved theory of Forms to Parménides' Monism, Platón creates a dense forest of impossible arguments, each one of them harder to follow than the previous one, until reducing the reader's brain to a pulp of paradoxes. I'm sure there is a point behind all that philosophical mumbo-jumbo. Me? I don't think I follow. This is the kind of book I dreaded: the philosophical work that makes you feel like you're an idiot.
2. But I did follow Parménides up to a point, despite its awkward wordiness and its abstractions up to eleven. The first part of the dialogue invites you to a philosophical all-stars meet-up: Parménides and Zenón of Elea, and the young Sócrates. The formers, particularly Parménides, debunk Sócrates' theory of Forms in what is the most interesting section of the dialogue. Is Platón doubting his own theory, in favor of monism? The arguments against the Forms are great and a refreshing new view for readers to examine Platonism. After that, however, the dialogue goes nuts.
3. The second part is entirely devoted to Parménides' hypothesis about the One and whether it is or it is not. The rest of the interlocutors virtually disappear and the text becomes harder to follow as his arguments are not only obscure as fuck, but also unclear as to their destination. It left me with a big headache and not much more. I'll just stick to the first section and its debunking of the Forms (the Third Man Argument is fantastic) and try to get a manual for the second one.
1. By Zeus, this one went completely over my head. Parménides has a reputation among the Platonic oeuvre of being rather obscure and confusing so I came to it with my intellectual weapons charged and ready; it wasn't enough. That reputation is well earned. In contrasting his beloved theory of Forms to Parménides' Monism, Platón creates a dense forest of impossible arguments, each one of them harder to follow than the previous one, until reducing the reader's brain to a pulp of paradoxes. I'm sure there is a point behind all that philosophical mumbo-jumbo. Me? I don't think I follow. This is the kind of book I dreaded: the philosophical work that makes you feel like you're an idiot.
2. But I did follow Parménides up to a point, despite its awkward wordiness and its abstractions up to eleven. The first part of the dialogue invites you to a philosophical all-stars meet-up: Parménides and Zenón of Elea, and the young Sócrates. The formers, particularly Parménides, debunk Sócrates' theory of Forms in what is the most interesting section of the dialogue. Is Platón doubting his own theory, in favor of monism? The arguments against the Forms are great and a refreshing new view for readers to examine Platonism. After that, however, the dialogue goes nuts.
3. The second part is entirely devoted to Parménides' hypothesis about the One and whether it is or it is not. The rest of the interlocutors virtually disappear and the text becomes harder to follow as his arguments are not only obscure as fuck, but also unclear as to their destination. It left me with a big headache and not much more. I'll just stick to the first section and its debunking of the Forms (the Third Man Argument is fantastic) and try to get a manual for the second one.
July 23, 2011
Ardu, je préfère Platon moraliste que métaphysicien.
May 7, 2019
What the what?!?
Either Plato was taking too many drugs or I am taking too few.
Either Plato was taking too many drugs or I am taking too few.
July 7, 2022
This is a difficult dialogue but one of my favorites. Naturally there's no point to debating the contents in a review format like this when the entire design of the work is to commentate on itself and lead to private reflection; I suggest reading it carefully and using Mitchell Miller's great secondary, Conversion of the Soul. What's special here is not only the rare moment where Socrates (here, in a flashback, as a very young man) is utterly defeated, but also that the metaphysical doctrine espoused by the great Parmenides is one of the least undermined conclusions of any Platonic work; that is, at least within the dialogue itself. The Eleatic trilogy, from my recent perusals, throws a great deal of this into question. Nevertheless, it remains perhaps the main hinge of the entire Platonic corpus, giving (in as close to explicit detail as Plato ever would) the proper doctrine of the Eide (the 'forms') that Socrates holds but does not espouse in so many of the other dialogues, and throwing into question the epistemological statuses of nearly all the other dialogues' conclusions.
Platonic works always come in pairs, and often many pairs; the Symposium matches with the Phaedrus but also with the Menexenus, for example. While the parallel metaphysical theory espoused by Socrates in the Republic is the most obvious one, comparing this dialogue to the very funny Euthydemus seems to me very profound: there, Socrates does battle with two athlete brothers, who perform a series of logical acrobatics around a couple of ontological and categorical errors refuted in the Parmenides. The question posed to the reader of the Euthydemus, then, becomes what to do with these types of midwits, those who can manoeuvre the metaphysical axes at stake but fail to see the proper order. If Plato's dialogues were meant to facilitate, sometimes conscientiously and sometimes as through a glass darkly, the education and life choices of young intellectuals, then this comic dialogue can only skyrocket in importance once we can appreciate the futility of arguing with such sots, and instead must turn to a question of how to handle them; yet, to me, the tacit conclusion there is perhaps one of the most striking and unsettling.
Platonic works always come in pairs, and often many pairs; the Symposium matches with the Phaedrus but also with the Menexenus, for example. While the parallel metaphysical theory espoused by Socrates in the Republic is the most obvious one, comparing this dialogue to the very funny Euthydemus seems to me very profound: there, Socrates does battle with two athlete brothers, who perform a series of logical acrobatics around a couple of ontological and categorical errors refuted in the Parmenides. The question posed to the reader of the Euthydemus, then, becomes what to do with these types of midwits, those who can manoeuvre the metaphysical axes at stake but fail to see the proper order. If Plato's dialogues were meant to facilitate, sometimes conscientiously and sometimes as through a glass darkly, the education and life choices of young intellectuals, then this comic dialogue can only skyrocket in importance once we can appreciate the futility of arguing with such sots, and instead must turn to a question of how to handle them; yet, to me, the tacit conclusion there is perhaps one of the most striking and unsettling.
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May 6, 2021An excellent book for those who wish to understand Plato's theory of Forms that goes beyond what you were taught in philosophy 101. I suggest that this book be read in concert with the 'Sophist.' If the 'Parmenides' presents the problem of the self-predication of the theory of Forms of Plato's middle period, the 'Sophist' provides answers to this very problem, permitting the blending of forms and their predication, indeed the predication of everything on Being. Here, a critique of Parmenides himself is launched, something which is only hinted at in other dialogues.
One thing, though—what to make of the bizarre and mind numbing "second half," the dialogue between Parmenides and Aristoteles? I wouldn't dare say anything definitive about that. Whether or not it contains some sort of theological doctrine (as the Neo-Platonists argued), is a useful example of the dialectic in action, or is an extended piece of satire of Parmenides... well, I can see a case for all, though option "2" seems to me most likely. Given Plato's critique of Parmenides in the 'Sophist', why would he have Parmenides be the mouthpiece for his theological doctrine? And if the whole thing is a joke, why does this joke take up half the dialogue, without a punchline? But don't take my word for it. Read it yourself, if you dare...
One thing, though—what to make of the bizarre and mind numbing "second half," the dialogue between Parmenides and Aristoteles? I wouldn't dare say anything definitive about that. Whether or not it contains some sort of theological doctrine (as the Neo-Platonists argued), is a useful example of the dialectic in action, or is an extended piece of satire of Parmenides... well, I can see a case for all, though option "2" seems to me most likely. Given Plato's critique of Parmenides in the 'Sophist', why would he have Parmenides be the mouthpiece for his theological doctrine? And if the whole thing is a joke, why does this joke take up half the dialogue, without a punchline? But don't take my word for it. Read it yourself, if you dare...
December 6, 2011
This in-depth study should dispel the misguided belief that Plato's "Parmenides" is an exercise in spinning aporiae, or intellectual puzzles. Scolincov's penetrating analysis and exegesis excavates the battle of wits going on between these seminal figures in western philosophy, and illuminates their competing conceptions of what it means for things to exist. The metaphysical and epistemological issues at stake raise important methodological considerations, and in this dialog we can clearly see the profound influence of Parmenides and Zeno on Socrates' dialectical method.
I am grateful for Scolnicov's magisterial guide work through this extremely difficult dialog - it has deepened my understanding and appreciation for Plato and Parmenides considerably.
I am grateful for Scolnicov's magisterial guide work through this extremely difficult dialog - it has deepened my understanding and appreciation for Plato and Parmenides considerably.
April 25, 2022
أكتر من 3 سنين علشان أقدر أقول «أنا قريت كتاب بارمنيدس»، أيوة فعلاً، 3 سنين علشان أقدر أقول إني قريت الكتاب ده وبعد 3 سنين مقدرش أقول بيقين إني فهمته أو إني إستوعبته.
الكتاب ككل محاورات أفلاطون لا ينتهي بنتيجة بسيطة أو رد بسيط تقدر توصل به لحاجه معينة، ولكن من وجهة نظري الكتاب عبقريته في إنه هيديك القدرة على النقاش وتحليل وتفكيك كل الإحتمالات لأي فكرة بيتم عرضها عليك. وهيعلمك إزاي قد إيه اننا -من أقل محاور أو مناقش فينا لأحسن محاور شفته في حياتك- عمرنا ما بنكمل تفكيك وتحليل أفكارنا لأقصى شكل واننا ديماً بنقف عند الحاجه اللي إحنا مؤمنين بها.
أنا قريت الكتاب ده في اكتر من 3 سنين وهفضل أقراه ممكن لمدة أكتر من كده في المستقبل؛ لأنه فعلاً عبقري وبيعلم حاجات كتير وكمان كل ما تقراه هتكتشف حاجه جديدة وهتنورلك حاجه أعظم وأقوى.
الكتاب ككل محاورات أفلاطون لا ينتهي بنتيجة بسيطة أو رد بسيط تقدر توصل به لحاجه معينة، ولكن من وجهة نظري الكتاب عبقريته في إنه هيديك القدرة على النقاش وتحليل وتفكيك كل الإحتمالات لأي فكرة بيتم عرضها عليك. وهيعلمك إزاي قد إيه اننا -من أقل محاور أو مناقش فينا لأحسن محاور شفته في حياتك- عمرنا ما بنكمل تفكيك وتحليل أفكارنا لأقصى شكل واننا ديماً بنقف عند الحاجه اللي إحنا مؤمنين بها.
أنا قريت الكتاب ده في اكتر من 3 سنين وهفضل أقراه ممكن لمدة أكتر من كده في المستقبل؛ لأنه فعلاً عبقري وبيعلم حاجات كتير وكمان كل ما تقراه هتكتشف حاجه جديدة وهتنورلك حاجه أعظم وأقوى.
October 26, 2021
On things, ideas, properties. Plato suggests monism and forms are cul-de-sacs. Where next? His method of division and, better, a rejection of forms?
August 14, 2020
ill sum up this in one sentence: The groundlessness at the heart of the empty form of determinacy is all encompassing
April 29, 2022
Какая-то зубодробительная диалектика и апофатическое богословие. Ясно одно - единое порождает структуру, и без единого нет и многого.
February 14, 2024
I really wish I had read this closely before I ever laid my hands on any Heidegger
March 13, 2024
By far the hardest platonic dialogue to read.
January 21, 2024
This book is incredibly confusing and it was a very difficult read. Super dense for how short it is but there were still a lot of parts that I understood and really rocked with
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August 23, 2022"Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must
have
the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as
being must
have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to
perfect its
own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and
of the
not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being
of being,
and not of the being of not-being-that is, the perfection of
being;
and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of
not-being
but of the being of not-being-that is the perfection of not-
being."
Kako kaj takega reviewam?
have
the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as
being must
have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to
perfect its
own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and
of the
not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being
of being,
and not of the being of not-being-that is, the perfection of
being;
and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of
not-being
but of the being of not-being-that is the perfection of not-
being."
Kako kaj takega reviewam?
May 2, 2019
Tricked myself into reading this.
I'd like to read Plotinus, because there is something mysterious and intoxicating in what little of him I've approached. It's not like philosophy as I've typically been interested in; it's quasi-religious, and quasi-religion is something that interests me at present also.
There's essentially no point in reading Plotinus without a strong grasp of, and relationship with, Plato's theory of forms.
Now, I studied the Republic back when I was a teenager. Come out of the cave, see the form of the good, tell people the truth even if they don't like it. Loved that whole concept. That was my first encounter with the forms, and now that I want to pursue philosophy more thoroughly, I've come to realise that encounter was inadequate. I can explain what the Form of the Good is in the context of answering an exam question on it, not in relation to the development of a genuine personal philosophy, an ethos, an understanding of reality. Indeed, Plato has very little bearing on how I approach the metaphysical in daily life - because I don't really think of it at all.
I am a temporarily embarrassed atheist; I'll never be Catholic again, but I still seek something. Science does not even humour questions I want to answer for myself. Having an intuition of the metaphysical is necessary for faith, and I am too muddied by an ignorant scientific-realism worldview to believe that strongly in anything. To get away from that, I must nurture a relationship with the metaphysical, entirely my own way. I have to return to Plato.
Now, I said I tricked myself into reading Parmenides, because I read Republic way back when, and the Symposium and Phaedrus more recently - those are three big texts when it comes to learning about the theory of forms. Parmenides itself is far too advanced for me, though. I haven't thought about these things nearly enough. Parmenides is a dismantling of the expressions of the Forms in those prior dialogues, followed by a tortuous back-and-forth between Parmenides and "Aristotle" in which the One is neither the many nor the one, nor is it motion nor rest, nor does it exist in time nor outside of it, nor...my eyes glazed over - I could not continue without a greater understanding of what is being said, which eluded me pretty much from the outset.
I'm giving this three stars because it was intellectually provocative and frustrating without being hopelessly obscure. I don't get it, by any stretch. But my assumptions have been challenged - I need to look at things in a new way. It could take a really long time, but my interest in philosophy is, at present, motivated by my desire to explore the nature of my being alive. It's personal; I don't have to worry about other people throwing rotten fruit at me in the street for having such an inferior knowledge of the Parmenides. I'll understand more in time.
On another level, I enjoyed this dialogue because Plato the artist is again making some sort of strange joke that overlies the philosophy. The dialogue is written from the perspective of a man named Cephalus meeting Adeimantus, and Cephalus asking Adeimantus if he can be re-introduced to Ademantus' half-brother Antiphon, who, it is said, met with a man named Pythodorus, who once witnessed a conversation between Socrates, Zeno and Parmenides; that which forms the basis of the dialogue. Antiphon can apparently recite from memory a 50-page conversation he was told about by Pythodorus, a conversation which is breathtakingly difficult to follow on paper. We learn about the philosophers' conversation through three intermediaries.
Is Plato offering me a way out for not understanding the dialogue? "Don't worry Jack, you're reading a translation of a text about a guy meeting a guy who knows a guy who once witnessed a conversation between philosophers, and the guy who met the guy who witnessed the conversation apparently can recite the conversation from memory, based on what the guy who was there told him. It's possible that things will be fraught." Very funny, Plato. Bit mean, but very funny.
I'd like to read Plotinus, because there is something mysterious and intoxicating in what little of him I've approached. It's not like philosophy as I've typically been interested in; it's quasi-religious, and quasi-religion is something that interests me at present also.
There's essentially no point in reading Plotinus without a strong grasp of, and relationship with, Plato's theory of forms.
Now, I studied the Republic back when I was a teenager. Come out of the cave, see the form of the good, tell people the truth even if they don't like it. Loved that whole concept. That was my first encounter with the forms, and now that I want to pursue philosophy more thoroughly, I've come to realise that encounter was inadequate. I can explain what the Form of the Good is in the context of answering an exam question on it, not in relation to the development of a genuine personal philosophy, an ethos, an understanding of reality. Indeed, Plato has very little bearing on how I approach the metaphysical in daily life - because I don't really think of it at all.
I am a temporarily embarrassed atheist; I'll never be Catholic again, but I still seek something. Science does not even humour questions I want to answer for myself. Having an intuition of the metaphysical is necessary for faith, and I am too muddied by an ignorant scientific-realism worldview to believe that strongly in anything. To get away from that, I must nurture a relationship with the metaphysical, entirely my own way. I have to return to Plato.
Now, I said I tricked myself into reading Parmenides, because I read Republic way back when, and the Symposium and Phaedrus more recently - those are three big texts when it comes to learning about the theory of forms. Parmenides itself is far too advanced for me, though. I haven't thought about these things nearly enough. Parmenides is a dismantling of the expressions of the Forms in those prior dialogues, followed by a tortuous back-and-forth between Parmenides and "Aristotle" in which the One is neither the many nor the one, nor is it motion nor rest, nor does it exist in time nor outside of it, nor...my eyes glazed over - I could not continue without a greater understanding of what is being said, which eluded me pretty much from the outset.
I'm giving this three stars because it was intellectually provocative and frustrating without being hopelessly obscure. I don't get it, by any stretch. But my assumptions have been challenged - I need to look at things in a new way. It could take a really long time, but my interest in philosophy is, at present, motivated by my desire to explore the nature of my being alive. It's personal; I don't have to worry about other people throwing rotten fruit at me in the street for having such an inferior knowledge of the Parmenides. I'll understand more in time.
On another level, I enjoyed this dialogue because Plato the artist is again making some sort of strange joke that overlies the philosophy. The dialogue is written from the perspective of a man named Cephalus meeting Adeimantus, and Cephalus asking Adeimantus if he can be re-introduced to Ademantus' half-brother Antiphon, who, it is said, met with a man named Pythodorus, who once witnessed a conversation between Socrates, Zeno and Parmenides; that which forms the basis of the dialogue. Antiphon can apparently recite from memory a 50-page conversation he was told about by Pythodorus, a conversation which is breathtakingly difficult to follow on paper. We learn about the philosophers' conversation through three intermediaries.
Is Plato offering me a way out for not understanding the dialogue? "Don't worry Jack, you're reading a translation of a text about a guy meeting a guy who knows a guy who once witnessed a conversation between philosophers, and the guy who met the guy who witnessed the conversation apparently can recite the conversation from memory, based on what the guy who was there told him. It's possible that things will be fraught." Very funny, Plato. Bit mean, but very funny.
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