In the second decade of the twenty-first century, we have seen several democracies elect right-wing political parties to power through the democratic process. The US, India, Brazil, Hungary, and Poland are examples. Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, Jair Bolsonaro, and Viktor Orbán acquired power with decisive mandates from the people. Modi and Orbán got re-elected after their term. The author of this book, Moisés Naím, says this is an alarming trend for democracies because these are authoritarian leaders. He points to the causes behind their rise in democracies and how they use democratic freedoms to attain power and then hold on to power by undermining it. The book makes its case through case studies of Donald Trump, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, among others.
The book’s central thesis is that leaders with an autocratic outlook have found ways to positions of power in democracies by using the 3Ps, called populism, polarization and post-truth. Populism is not an ‘ism’ like socialism or liberalism. It is a strategy to win and wield power. It paints the authoritarian leader’s cause as the people’s cause and his opponent as belonging to the corrupt elite that stands in the way. Populism works by criminalizing its political rivals, using external threats, denigrating experts, attacking unfriendly media and undermining checks and balances. Polarization works by emphasizing differences rather than unity, eliminating the possibility of a middle ground, and pushing every person and organization to take sides. It works to marginalize immigrants and minorities. Post-truth is doing away with shared, independent standards for truth. It is a condition when facts and knowledge get blurred by belief and opinion. Unlike lying, post-truth is not an individual moral failing. It is a feature of the communications infrastructure of politics and power in today’s world. Rumors about President Obama being a Muslim or not US-born are recent examples.
Using these techniques, the author argues, leaders like Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, and Vladimir Putin have brought about undemocratic regimes in their respective countries. They wield and maintain immense power in a world that doesn’t recognize that kind of power as legitimate. They do this by faking loyalty to the democratic consensus even as they work to undermine democratic checks and balances in their countries. Sensing the success of this approach in strong democratic nations like the US, India and the Philippines, leaders in several countries are trending towards what the author calls ‘kakistocracy’. Kakistocracy is a state or society governed by its least suitable or competent citizens. Then, he contemplates on what it portends for the future of our democracies and freedom itself.
The book has a strong liberal bias and hence is partisan in content. One glaring shortcoming of the book is that it does not consider the possibility that people could have elected Trump, Modi, or Erdogan for justifiable reasons. Populism, polarization and post-truth may not have played a leading role. It is an untenable argument that says people got deluded when they elect a political party or leader we do not approve. Respect for democracy demands respect for the mandate of the people. The decision to choose a right-wing government does not signify that people lost faith in liberal democracy or its institutions. The people of India, the US, the UK, etc, still believe in an independent judiciary, a free press, human rights, and individual freedom. Their choice of right-wing leaders means the left and the centrist parties failed to acknowledge the legitimate aspirations and fears of a sizable part of their population. Choosing Donald Trump or Narendra Modi is not choosing an authoritarian political order like China, Russia or Turkey. It is a people's protest. As a counter to 3P, let us examine other explanations for Donald Trump’s victory in the US and Brexit’s win in the UK.
Political scientist Diana C. Mutz of the University of Pennsylvania analyzed in-depth survey data of voters belonging to key categories in the 2012 and 2016 Presidential polls. Those whose incomes declined, whose incomes increased little, who lost their jobs, who were concerned about expenses, and who thought free trade affected their lives, were some of them. Dr. Mutz found that none of these effects motivated people to switch from voting for Obama in 2012 to supporting Trump in 2016. Another analyst, Adam Serwer, has pointed out that Hillary Clinton defeated Trump among Americans making less than $50,000 a year. They dispel the notion that Globalization’s cruelties disenfranchised most Trump supporters. If Trump voters weren’t losing income or jobs, why did they vote for Trump? Dr. Mutz says they were concerned about their place in their societies. Let us explore this further.
When members of a hitherto long-dominant group feel threatened, they get nostalgic and try to protect the ‘status quo’ in whatever way they can. Almost 80 percent of white working-class voters who had anxieties about the “American way of life”, chose Trump over Clinton. Half of all Americans view globalized trade as something that benefits other countries at the expense of jobs for Americans. White Evangelicals see more discrimination against Christians than Muslims in the United States. All this suggests acute identity anxiety. The 1979 Khomeini revolution in Iran had similar overtones. For decades, the Shah of Iran destabilized the lives of ordinary Iranians through his ‘modernization’ programs. It resulted in the Khomeini revolution, which promised a return to the ‘Islamic way of life’ - familiar and pacifying to the majority. Dismissing this anxiety as the outcome of populism, post-truth and polarization is insensitive.
Identity anxiety is harder for politicians and policymakers to address than a straight-forward economic slump. It does not respond to disability checks or universal basic incomes. Alleviating resentment of demographic changes or convincing people to embrace changing racial and gender norms are difficult tasks. It is possible that Trump supporters elected him because they felt threatened and marginalized, not on an economic, but an existential level. Liberals may feel it is irrational, but they need to show compassion to this fear. So, Trump might have won irrespective of populism, polarization and post-truth. Perhaps the 3Ps could have helped Trump win more comfortably than otherwise.
Next, we look at explanations for Brexit other than the 3Ps. According to the BBC, immigration and ceding sovereignty to the EU were the two key issues in the Brexit vote. Various experts warned Britons about the economic chaos that can ensue because of Brexit. But it found no resonance among half the citizens. On the Brexit vote, 78% of those 65 or over voted in the Brexit election, compared with 43% of 18 to 24-year-olds and 54% of 25 to 34-year-olds. Surveys revealed much higher support for Brexit among those aged 55 and over than among younger age groups. Three out of five voters aged 65 or over wanted to leave the EU.
Author and journalist David Goodhart says we must get beyond traditional dichotomies based on Left and Right to understand the Brexit vote. We can understand the new fault line in Brexit or the Trump earthquake better through a category called ‘the Somewheres’. The ‘Somewheres’ are UK citizens, less-educated and having few skills to compete in the EU job market. They feel comfortable with ‘the English way of life’ and often live within comfortable reach of where they were born or grew up. Increasing immigration makes the UK feel less like their native country. They are more rooted and prioritize local group attachments and security. According to Goodhart, fifty percent of the UK belong in the category ‘Somewheres’.
Goodheart says we should see Brexit as a protest by the ‘Somewheres’. It is against the generous opening of UK’s borders to East Europeans during Tony Blair’s tenure, and the neighborhoods fast becoming more diverse and hence ‘foreign’. It is against an economy that wants only University-educated people and a society whose social norms favor liberal contracts like gay marriage, multiculturalism, and the Global village. The ‘Somewheres’ are protesting more than jobs. They value more non-material things of the past, which are lost. It is not the foolishness of turning the clock back. Brexit is a statement about the country’s national identity as it is about its economic and political future. Hence, like the US, Britain also has swung right, because of identity anxiety.
Using populism, polarization and post-truth is not new in democracies. The author talks about right-wing populism but ignores populism of the Left. Defunding the police, abolishing immigration and Customs enforcement (ICE), labeling women as ‘birthing people’ and injecting anti-racism into classrooms are examples of left-wing populism. All political parties have their populists. Sarah Palin, Donald Trump, Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren pander to populism. Greta Thunberg is an environmental populist. Communism, war on drugs, immigration and Islamic terrorism have played their part in polarization. ‘Missile gap with the USSR’ in 1958 and ‘Saddam Hussein has WMDs’ in 2003 demonstrate post-truth is not a recent invention. The ‘3Ps’ explain the right-wing tilt in democracies only partially. Our task is not countering the 3Ps, but fathoming why it has such powerful appeal. The book does not enlighten on this.