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The Open Society and its Enemies #2
The Open Society and Its Enemies - Volume Two: Hegel and Marx
Written in political exile in New Zealand during the World War II and first published in two volumes in 1945, Karl Poppers The Open Society and its Enemies was hailed by Bertrand Russell as a vigorous and profound defence of democracy. Its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx prophesied the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and exposed the fatal flaws of socially engineered political systems.
470 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1945
About the author
Karl Popper
272 books1,529 followersSir Karl Raimund Popper, FRS, rose from a modest background as an assistant cabinet maker and school teacher to become one of the most influential theorists and leading philosophers. Popper commanded international audiences and conversation with him was an intellectual adventure—even if a little rough—animated by a myriad of philosophical problems. He contributed to a field of thought encompassing (among others) political theory, quantum mechanics, logic, scientific method and evolutionary theory.
Popper challenged some of the ruling orthodoxies of philosophy: logical positivism, Marxism, determinism and linguistic philosophy. He argued that there are no subject matters but only problems and our desire to solve them. He said that scientific theories cannot be verified but only tentatively refuted, and that the best philosophy is about profound problems, not word meanings. Isaiah Berlin rightly said that Popper produced one of the most devastating refutations of Marxism. Through his ideas Popper promoted a critical ethos, a world in which the give and take of debate is highly esteemed in the precept that we are all infinitely ignorant, that we differ only in the little bits of knowledge that we do have, and that with some co-operative effort we may get nearer to the truth.
Nearly every first-year philosophy student knows that Popper regarded his solutions to the problems of induction and the demarcation of science from pseudo-science as his greatest contributions. He is less known for the problems of verisimilitude, of probability (a life-long love of his), and of the relationship between the mind and body.
Popper was a Fellow of the Royal Society, Fellow of the British Academy, and Membre de I'Institute de France. He was an Honorary member of the Harvard Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa, and an Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics, King's College London, and of Darwin College Cambridge. He was awarded prizes and honours throughout the world, including the Austrian Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold, the Lippincott Award of the American Political Science Association, and the Sonning Prize for merit in work which had furthered European civilization.
Karl Popper was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1965 and invested by her with the Insignia of a Companion of Honour in 1982.
(edited from http://www.tkpw.net/intro_popper/intr...)
Popper challenged some of the ruling orthodoxies of philosophy: logical positivism, Marxism, determinism and linguistic philosophy. He argued that there are no subject matters but only problems and our desire to solve them. He said that scientific theories cannot be verified but only tentatively refuted, and that the best philosophy is about profound problems, not word meanings. Isaiah Berlin rightly said that Popper produced one of the most devastating refutations of Marxism. Through his ideas Popper promoted a critical ethos, a world in which the give and take of debate is highly esteemed in the precept that we are all infinitely ignorant, that we differ only in the little bits of knowledge that we do have, and that with some co-operative effort we may get nearer to the truth.
Nearly every first-year philosophy student knows that Popper regarded his solutions to the problems of induction and the demarcation of science from pseudo-science as his greatest contributions. He is less known for the problems of verisimilitude, of probability (a life-long love of his), and of the relationship between the mind and body.
Popper was a Fellow of the Royal Society, Fellow of the British Academy, and Membre de I'Institute de France. He was an Honorary member of the Harvard Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa, and an Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics, King's College London, and of Darwin College Cambridge. He was awarded prizes and honours throughout the world, including the Austrian Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold, the Lippincott Award of the American Political Science Association, and the Sonning Prize for merit in work which had furthered European civilization.
Karl Popper was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1965 and invested by her with the Insignia of a Companion of Honour in 1982.
(edited from http://www.tkpw.net/intro_popper/intr...)
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October 11, 2017
This is the second volume of Popper's work that warns of the great influence of thinkers who were no friends of the open society, a society in which the rights of the individual are valued over the glory of the state.
In volume one, Popper uses Plato's writings, quoted extensively, to indict Plato very effectively as an advocate of totalitarianism. In this volume, it is Hegel and Marx that are up on charges of abandoning reason for historicism, Popper's term for a mythological belief that there is a force directing the course of societies that dictates their fate and, by extension, allows prophecy about what societies will come.
Historicism defeats effort. Why should you and I do anything when the lessons of the past dictate an inevitable future, for better or worse? The future will be inevitably worse, part of the predictable degeneration from the original ideal thought Plato, a pessimist, while Hegel and Marx, optimists, thought improvement was the rule.
Hegel is all but entirely dismissed by Popper as a pretentious windbag writing difficult if not unintelligible prose about a world spirit moving through the ages coming to fruition in the the glorious Prussian monarchy by which Hegel was employed to philosophize for the state. For him, there is no higher calling for the individual than to be of service to the state.
Marx, on the other hand, is given a significant amount of credit by Popper for being a very observant, insightful analyst of capitalism as it had developed up to the time at which Marx wrote his magnum opus, Capital (1867). Where Marx falls down, Popper writes, is in his prediction of the inevitable demise of capitalism at the feet of the proletariat (the working people) and his far too simplistic view of society as composed of only two classes, the workers and the bourgeoisie (the employers/capitalists). This mystical view of the future turned out to be wrong. The most obvious reason for the error is that Marx could not foresee the power of labor, through democracy, to impose restrictions on capitalism, taming it for a while.
Popper's reasoning here, written in 1962, fails to see the power of capitalism to come roaring back in our time to essentially dismantle all of the reforms (and the unions) that restrained it, doing so through the corruption of democracy by unrestricted campaign funding that empowers the corporate lobbies. But this doesn't detract from Popper's argument, he would never claim to be able to predict the future.
As powerful as volume 1 was in explaining the writing of Plato for the layman, volume 2 is even more powerful in explaining the voluminous writing of Marx, not in detail but in the fundamental ideas that Marx was attempting to relate to his readers. Thanks to Popper, I have never understood the basis of Marx' work as well as I do now, nor the atmosphere of the time in which Marx wrote that so forcefully directed his thoughts.
This book is well worth reading for two reasons.
The first is that Popper demonstrates the power of reason in the careful way he writes and the distance he goes to provide evidence for his thinking. This work is most of all a defense of reason. Popper is adamant that for reason to work, ideas must be able to contend for approval. Argument is vital. Advance comes only out of disputes that are resolved on evidence, concerning society this means the evidence found from "piecemeal engineering" where society is exposed to change in one small area at a time and the result is seen to be beneficial or not. Never will some grand plan for a new society work because it can never account for the many errors in detail and the internal contradictions that will defeat it. In the face of unavoidable problems with a grand plan, it will end up imposed no matter what, meaning heads will roll to take care of opposition (see the French Revolution). This is exactly the opposite of a just society that values the individual.
The second reason to read this book is to get a solid grip on Marx, a man Popper feels was a humanitarian at heart, honestly eager to advance the cause of the virtually helpless multitudes of the mid 19th century. Though Marx was a believer in reason he was unable to hold to it, falling victim to a view of inevitable social change in a specific way that would follow his prophesy. That prophesy, thoroughly discredited by events since his time, has unfortunately led most to make the error of dismissing his work entirely.
As for Popper's writing, a high school student would have no trouble following the logic and just might learn the power of logic in the process.
In volume one, Popper uses Plato's writings, quoted extensively, to indict Plato very effectively as an advocate of totalitarianism. In this volume, it is Hegel and Marx that are up on charges of abandoning reason for historicism, Popper's term for a mythological belief that there is a force directing the course of societies that dictates their fate and, by extension, allows prophecy about what societies will come.
Historicism defeats effort. Why should you and I do anything when the lessons of the past dictate an inevitable future, for better or worse? The future will be inevitably worse, part of the predictable degeneration from the original ideal thought Plato, a pessimist, while Hegel and Marx, optimists, thought improvement was the rule.
Hegel is all but entirely dismissed by Popper as a pretentious windbag writing difficult if not unintelligible prose about a world spirit moving through the ages coming to fruition in the the glorious Prussian monarchy by which Hegel was employed to philosophize for the state. For him, there is no higher calling for the individual than to be of service to the state.
Marx, on the other hand, is given a significant amount of credit by Popper for being a very observant, insightful analyst of capitalism as it had developed up to the time at which Marx wrote his magnum opus, Capital (1867). Where Marx falls down, Popper writes, is in his prediction of the inevitable demise of capitalism at the feet of the proletariat (the working people) and his far too simplistic view of society as composed of only two classes, the workers and the bourgeoisie (the employers/capitalists). This mystical view of the future turned out to be wrong. The most obvious reason for the error is that Marx could not foresee the power of labor, through democracy, to impose restrictions on capitalism, taming it for a while.
Popper's reasoning here, written in 1962, fails to see the power of capitalism to come roaring back in our time to essentially dismantle all of the reforms (and the unions) that restrained it, doing so through the corruption of democracy by unrestricted campaign funding that empowers the corporate lobbies. But this doesn't detract from Popper's argument, he would never claim to be able to predict the future.
As powerful as volume 1 was in explaining the writing of Plato for the layman, volume 2 is even more powerful in explaining the voluminous writing of Marx, not in detail but in the fundamental ideas that Marx was attempting to relate to his readers. Thanks to Popper, I have never understood the basis of Marx' work as well as I do now, nor the atmosphere of the time in which Marx wrote that so forcefully directed his thoughts.
This book is well worth reading for two reasons.
The first is that Popper demonstrates the power of reason in the careful way he writes and the distance he goes to provide evidence for his thinking. This work is most of all a defense of reason. Popper is adamant that for reason to work, ideas must be able to contend for approval. Argument is vital. Advance comes only out of disputes that are resolved on evidence, concerning society this means the evidence found from "piecemeal engineering" where society is exposed to change in one small area at a time and the result is seen to be beneficial or not. Never will some grand plan for a new society work because it can never account for the many errors in detail and the internal contradictions that will defeat it. In the face of unavoidable problems with a grand plan, it will end up imposed no matter what, meaning heads will roll to take care of opposition (see the French Revolution). This is exactly the opposite of a just society that values the individual.
The second reason to read this book is to get a solid grip on Marx, a man Popper feels was a humanitarian at heart, honestly eager to advance the cause of the virtually helpless multitudes of the mid 19th century. Though Marx was a believer in reason he was unable to hold to it, falling victim to a view of inevitable social change in a specific way that would follow his prophesy. That prophesy, thoroughly discredited by events since his time, has unfortunately led most to make the error of dismissing his work entirely.
As for Popper's writing, a high school student would have no trouble following the logic and just might learn the power of logic in the process.
August 21, 2007
I don't know what I would do without this book.
Popper fled the Nazi takeover of Austria, and set out to write a book that would somehow fight bad ideologies. He succeeded. If only anyone actually read it.
Open Society begins with an attack on Plato. Popper argues that we need to realize that Plato chose Sparta over Athens, and every other vaguely cosmopolitan city. He spends time describing just how controlled, misogynistic, and totalitarian Spartan life really was. Popper then moves on to show Plato worshiping that lifestyle in The Republic. Plato based his political theory on his belief in forms (perfect concepts outside of time of which all our ideas and creations are mere shadows), and so the political system which best resembled a form (unchanging) was the best system. This best system was a totalitarian city ruled by corrupt philosophers who taught lies. Popper links this belief of Plato
The heart of Open Society is the criticism of any philosophy or theory of history that claims to know the future. Branding these philosophies ‘Historicism,’ he argues that Marxism by arguing that history moves in stages (feudal, capitalist, communist) makes itself unable to choose a better world. By accepting that history is an inevitable march of economic forms, socialists become unable to work in the now.
Popper blames this aspect of Marxism for allowing fascism to rise in Europe. He believed that if Austrian socialists had been more willing (and less confident in History’s march) to ally with moderates they could have stop the rise of fascist and rightist parties.
This is truly one of my favorite books, and there’s a good chance I’ll pick it up and write a proper review with citation and deep thoughts one of these days.
Popper fled the Nazi takeover of Austria, and set out to write a book that would somehow fight bad ideologies. He succeeded. If only anyone actually read it.
Open Society begins with an attack on Plato. Popper argues that we need to realize that Plato chose Sparta over Athens, and every other vaguely cosmopolitan city. He spends time describing just how controlled, misogynistic, and totalitarian Spartan life really was. Popper then moves on to show Plato worshiping that lifestyle in The Republic. Plato based his political theory on his belief in forms (perfect concepts outside of time of which all our ideas and creations are mere shadows), and so the political system which best resembled a form (unchanging) was the best system. This best system was a totalitarian city ruled by corrupt philosophers who taught lies. Popper links this belief of Plato
The heart of Open Society is the criticism of any philosophy or theory of history that claims to know the future. Branding these philosophies ‘Historicism,’ he argues that Marxism by arguing that history moves in stages (feudal, capitalist, communist) makes itself unable to choose a better world. By accepting that history is an inevitable march of economic forms, socialists become unable to work in the now.
Popper blames this aspect of Marxism for allowing fascism to rise in Europe. He believed that if Austrian socialists had been more willing (and less confident in History’s march) to ally with moderates they could have stop the rise of fascist and rightist parties.
This is truly one of my favorite books, and there’s a good chance I’ll pick it up and write a proper review with citation and deep thoughts one of these days.
November 13, 2014
very plausibly skips over 25 centuries to tie marxism directly into plato.
November 24, 2020
Não percebo a polémica que esta obra provoca em certos círculos. Nem sequer consegui encontrar a tal polarização que Popper teria feito acerca da liberdade da expressão, por exemplo. Talvez a obra não caia bem aos platonistas, hegelianos e marxistas. Talvez seja isso. Popper, a meu ver, é um dos melhores autores contemporâneos. Munido de um ceptismo razoável [nos antípodas do de Paul Feyerabend], foi um grande crítico das ideologias. Esta obra composta por dois volumes aborda de forma bastante crítica, imparcial e rigorosa as raízes de certos despotismos. De Platão à contemporaneidade há uma clara denúncia da linguagem e dos modos de agir dos inimigos da sociedade aberta [uma espécie de "assim começa o mal" em termos shakespearianos]. Popper não revela verdades apócrifas. Platão radica muito do seu pensamento em ideias despóticas. Hegel constrói um sistema quase [apesar da grandiosidade de algumas ideias, uma vez que conseguia "extrair coelhos fisicamente vivos das cartolas da metafísica] ininteligível e cuidadosamente tecido com as malhas de um sistema político que visava preservar [e em parte denunciado por Schopenhauer]. Aborda também, por exemplo, as vias que o pensamento marxista seguiu desde que se emancipou do hegelianismo. [Isaiah Berlin considerou que esta obra era uma das mais críticas do marxismo].
A obra é muito boa. Muito crítica. A escrita de Popper não é sequer pretensiosa. Há margem para concordar ou discordar. A obra acrescenta.
É uma ode à sociedade aberta. O diagnóstico da tirania. A apologia da liberdade da história e do Homem.
A obra é muito boa. Muito crítica. A escrita de Popper não é sequer pretensiosa. Há margem para concordar ou discordar. A obra acrescenta.
É uma ode à sociedade aberta. O diagnóstico da tirania. A apologia da liberdade da história e do Homem.
June 16, 2012
While Popper's critiques on the dangers of total ideas can be helpful, but ultimately this is a fairly vapid critique.
May 17, 2017
In Vol 2 of The Open Society, Popper describes how the historicist approach of Hegel forms the foundation of facism and how the historicist approach of Marx - never mind its good intentions - led to immense suffering. His treatment of Hegel's philosophy is somewhat irritating, due to the long list of witty comments on how corrupted and wrong Hegel was. (Nonetheless, I completely agree with Popper on this).
Hegel, according to Popper, was a scam. He developed a collectivist, historicist philosophy of history. History is a grand stage where collectives (nation states) fight against each other and the succesful ones are good, the losing nation states are bad. This binds ethics to historical succes and offers a huge incentive for war. The individual is nothing, the collective is everything; war is good; reason is nothing. One can easily see how these ideas are the foundations of the later nationalism, facism and the two world wars.
After treating Hegel in just 2 chapters, Popper uses the rest of the book to first explain and then to criticize the scientific method and historicist apporach of Karl Marx. Popper's treatment of Marx is much more fair and honest than his treatment of Hegel. He credits Marx for his motives (uplifting the oppressed people in systems of laissez faire-capitalism) and even subscribes to some of his economic theories - at the least admitting they are interesting theories in their own right.
Where Marx goes on the wrong path - according to Popper - is his belief in historicism. History is a class struggle; the end of history will be a socialist world society; the means to get there a social revolution. This revolution will happen - it is inevitable - because capitalism will collapse in on itself due to its internal contradications.
According to Popper, Marx makes two mistakes: (1) the revolution hasn't come to pass and it is perfectly possible to alleviate the sufferings of the poor by social piecemeal engineering (creating rational, fair institutions) instead of violent revolutions that will lead to new oppression. (2) By postulating an inevitable future, Marx is guilty of future moralism. It doesn't matter what you do, you just have to pick the right side of history (so to speak). This is a dangerous ethics, because it puts historic succes over responsiblity for one's own actions.
To summarize: Popper's two volumes are one plea for humanitarianism, democracy and critical rationalism. One should always seek criticism to expose false presuppositions; thereby respecting each human being as a rational person. It is important that institutions are rational and aimed at destroying suffering, unfairness and exploitation. It is equally important that institutions are not aimed at providing a better life for people - this leads inevitably to enforcing one's view of "what is good?" on society as a whole (i.e. totalitarianism). Human beings are responsible for their own happiness and the happiness of their fellow human beings - institutions should provide the preconditions to get there.
There are no historic laws, predictions of the future are therefore not possible: historicism is a dangerous fallacy. The best we can do is change society piece by piece by employing rational institutions - no revolutions, no 'blank canvas' approaches. Popper's message: Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx all made the same mistake (knowing what's best for mankind because they kneww what the future holds) let's not make them again.
These two books are definitely two of the most important and influential books I have read in my life. Especially in our times - where the two world wars and the totalitarian ideologies are far behind us - it is important to remind ourselves of Popper's message and to take care not to make the same mistakes again.
Hegel, according to Popper, was a scam. He developed a collectivist, historicist philosophy of history. History is a grand stage where collectives (nation states) fight against each other and the succesful ones are good, the losing nation states are bad. This binds ethics to historical succes and offers a huge incentive for war. The individual is nothing, the collective is everything; war is good; reason is nothing. One can easily see how these ideas are the foundations of the later nationalism, facism and the two world wars.
After treating Hegel in just 2 chapters, Popper uses the rest of the book to first explain and then to criticize the scientific method and historicist apporach of Karl Marx. Popper's treatment of Marx is much more fair and honest than his treatment of Hegel. He credits Marx for his motives (uplifting the oppressed people in systems of laissez faire-capitalism) and even subscribes to some of his economic theories - at the least admitting they are interesting theories in their own right.
Where Marx goes on the wrong path - according to Popper - is his belief in historicism. History is a class struggle; the end of history will be a socialist world society; the means to get there a social revolution. This revolution will happen - it is inevitable - because capitalism will collapse in on itself due to its internal contradications.
According to Popper, Marx makes two mistakes: (1) the revolution hasn't come to pass and it is perfectly possible to alleviate the sufferings of the poor by social piecemeal engineering (creating rational, fair institutions) instead of violent revolutions that will lead to new oppression. (2) By postulating an inevitable future, Marx is guilty of future moralism. It doesn't matter what you do, you just have to pick the right side of history (so to speak). This is a dangerous ethics, because it puts historic succes over responsiblity for one's own actions.
To summarize: Popper's two volumes are one plea for humanitarianism, democracy and critical rationalism. One should always seek criticism to expose false presuppositions; thereby respecting each human being as a rational person. It is important that institutions are rational and aimed at destroying suffering, unfairness and exploitation. It is equally important that institutions are not aimed at providing a better life for people - this leads inevitably to enforcing one's view of "what is good?" on society as a whole (i.e. totalitarianism). Human beings are responsible for their own happiness and the happiness of their fellow human beings - institutions should provide the preconditions to get there.
There are no historic laws, predictions of the future are therefore not possible: historicism is a dangerous fallacy. The best we can do is change society piece by piece by employing rational institutions - no revolutions, no 'blank canvas' approaches. Popper's message: Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx all made the same mistake (knowing what's best for mankind because they kneww what the future holds) let's not make them again.
These two books are definitely two of the most important and influential books I have read in my life. Especially in our times - where the two world wars and the totalitarian ideologies are far behind us - it is important to remind ourselves of Popper's message and to take care not to make the same mistakes again.
March 31, 2016
في هذا الجزء يستمر بوبر في نقده القاسي واللاذع ، ل-الفكرين القومي والاشتراكي
اللذان يدعوان إلى أنظمة شمولية تمجد الأفكار اليوتوبية ، والمتمثلة في هذا الجزء بالمدرستين الماركسية والهيغلية.
*كان ماركس رغم مزاياه نبياً زائفاً.لقد كان نبي مسيرة التاريخ، ولم تتحق نبوءاته.
لعبت أفكاره دورًا هامًّا في تأسيس علم الاجتماع وفي تطوير الحركات الاشتراكية. واعتبر ماركس أحد أعظم الاقتصاديين في التاريخ.
كما كان ماركس، يعتقد بأن النبوءة التاريخية هي الطريقة العلمية لمعالجة المشكلات الاجتماعية وهو ما ينتقده بوبر.
هو أحد رواد حلقات عصبة الهيغليين التي انشق عنها فيما بعد مؤلفاً فلسفته الخاصة به.
ماركس الذي لا يرى وجوداً للدولة بل يؤسس لزوالها.
* هيغل هو أحد أهم الفلاسفة الألمان، حيث يعتبر أهم مؤسسي حركة الفلسفة المثالية الألمانية في أوائل القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي. اهتم بالتحليل الفلسفي العقلي لمؤسسات المجتمع .
يرى هيغل بأن العقل نتاجاً إجتماعياً�� بل رحلة نفس-أو روح- المجتمع ( مثلاً، روح الأمة أو الطبقة.) ومادمنا مدينين بعقلنا ل- المجتمع - أو لمجتمع بعينه كالأمة- كما يذكر، فالمجتمع هو كل شيء أما الفرد فلاشيء، أو أنه مهما كان مايحوزه الفرد من قيمة فهي مستندة من الجمعي حامل كل القيم الحقيقي ( نزعة الاستبداد المرجعي ) هذه النزعة العقلية الاستبدادية التي تبجل وجود سلطة مرجعية؛ العاجزة عن التمييز بين قدرات الإنسان العقلية ومديونيته للآخرين بكل ما أمكنه معرفته أو فهمه؛ (فالبنسبة إلى هيغل فالدولة هي التحقق الفعلي للفكرة الأخلاقية، انها العقل الأخلاقي بصفته إرادة جوهرية تظهر وتتجلى أمام ذاتها. وتعرف نفسها وتعقل نفسها أيضاً.)
فهيغل يرى الفرد تابعاً مملوكاً لها ل-( الدولة) لا جزء حي من كيانها.
عقلانية هيغل كما يراها بوبر عقلانية كاذبة!
"المكون العاطفي للإنسان وليس عقله هو الذي يحدد موقفه. الأكثر من هذا، حدسه وبصيرته الباطنية بطبيعة الأشياء وليس تعقلها، هو الذي يجعل منه عالماً عظيما ً."
-كارل بوبر
ختاماً:
يؤكد بوبر في ( المجتمع المفتوح وأعداؤه) على مدى بؤس الفلسفة التاريخانية التي تدعي أنها تمتلك مفاتيح التاريخ أو ما سيؤول له.
كذا أراد من خلال الكتاب إبراز حق الفرد أمام حق الدولة، والتأكيد على حقوقه كفرد واعٍ مستقل ومتحرر من كل تبعية قصرية أو عمياء . سعى لبناء مجتمع خالٍ من الفكر الشمولي، و يعتمد في هيكله على المواطنة الكاملة الحقة لأفراده بمختلف أعراقهم و أقلياتهم دون تمييز أو استثناء.
وأختم بما قالته " فيلسوفة تفكيك الشمولية "
حنة أرندت:
"الحريه : هي التحرر من الكبح الذي لا مبرر له "
اللذان يدعوان إلى أنظمة شمولية تمجد الأفكار اليوتوبية ، والمتمثلة في هذا الجزء بالمدرستين الماركسية والهيغلية.
*كان ماركس رغم مزاياه نبياً زائفاً.لقد كان نبي مسيرة التاريخ، ولم تتحق نبوءاته.
لعبت أفكاره دورًا هامًّا في تأسيس علم الاجتماع وفي تطوير الحركات الاشتراكية. واعتبر ماركس أحد أعظم الاقتصاديين في التاريخ.
كما كان ماركس، يعتقد بأن النبوءة التاريخية هي الطريقة العلمية لمعالجة المشكلات الاجتماعية وهو ما ينتقده بوبر.
هو أحد رواد حلقات عصبة الهيغليين التي انشق عنها فيما بعد مؤلفاً فلسفته الخاصة به.
ماركس الذي لا يرى وجوداً للدولة بل يؤسس لزوالها.
* هيغل هو أحد أهم الفلاسفة الألمان، حيث يعتبر أهم مؤسسي حركة الفلسفة المثالية الألمانية في أوائل القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي. اهتم بالتحليل الفلسفي العقلي لمؤسسات المجتمع .
يرى هيغل بأن العقل نتاجاً إجتماعياً�� بل رحلة نفس-أو روح- المجتمع ( مثلاً، روح الأمة أو الطبقة.) ومادمنا مدينين بعقلنا ل- المجتمع - أو لمجتمع بعينه كالأمة- كما يذكر، فالمجتمع هو كل شيء أما الفرد فلاشيء، أو أنه مهما كان مايحوزه الفرد من قيمة فهي مستندة من الجمعي حامل كل القيم الحقيقي ( نزعة الاستبداد المرجعي ) هذه النزعة العقلية الاستبدادية التي تبجل وجود سلطة مرجعية؛ العاجزة عن التمييز بين قدرات الإنسان العقلية ومديونيته للآخرين بكل ما أمكنه معرفته أو فهمه؛ (فالبنسبة إلى هيغل فالدولة هي التحقق الفعلي للفكرة الأخلاقية، انها العقل الأخلاقي بصفته إرادة جوهرية تظهر وتتجلى أمام ذاتها. وتعرف نفسها وتعقل نفسها أيضاً.)
فهيغل يرى الفرد تابعاً مملوكاً لها ل-( الدولة) لا جزء حي من كيانها.
عقلانية هيغل كما يراها بوبر عقلانية كاذبة!
"المكون العاطفي للإنسان وليس عقله هو الذي يحدد موقفه. الأكثر من هذا، حدسه وبصيرته الباطنية بطبيعة الأشياء وليس تعقلها، هو الذي يجعل منه عالماً عظيما ً."
-كارل بوبر
ختاماً:
يؤكد بوبر في ( المجتمع المفتوح وأعداؤه) على مدى بؤس الفلسفة التاريخانية التي تدعي أنها تمتلك مفاتيح التاريخ أو ما سيؤول له.
كذا أراد من خلال الكتاب إبراز حق الفرد أمام حق الدولة، والتأكيد على حقوقه كفرد واعٍ مستقل ومتحرر من كل تبعية قصرية أو عمياء . سعى لبناء مجتمع خالٍ من الفكر الشمولي، و يعتمد في هيكله على المواطنة الكاملة الحقة لأفراده بمختلف أعراقهم و أقلياتهم دون تمييز أو استثناء.
وأختم بما قالته " فيلسوفة تفكيك الشمولية "
حنة أرندت:
"الحريه : هي التحرر من الكبح الذي لا مبرر له "
August 16, 2015
Well written, and some interesting insights, but generally disingenuous towards Hegel and Marx, and I think unfairly and quite incorrectly attributes 'methods' to them that are not quite right, but which become convenient anchors for Popper to "deconstruct" them and show their inherrant weaknesses.In this regard he is dishonest and disappointing. But like many conservatives, his criticisms do apply to a certain clique within the left, and no doubt has won him many admirers.
May 29, 2022
Popper's analysis, again, is full of excellent insights that cut through bad and dubious theories in history, sociology, and philosophy. However, substantively, the book leaves something to be desired, as I shall explain below. And stylistically, similar to volume one, Popper's essayistic, subjective, sarcastic, and moralizing tone of writing is a bit too much. His attacks on Hegel, like Plato in the previous volume, are strident and merciless. His mercilessness is mostly justified in the context of the fawning adoration targeted, at the time, towards Hegel by many socialist intellectuals but also by many liberals and conservatives. This contextual defence is the same that mostly justifies his harsh treatment of Plato in volume one. But since we live in different times now, we can afford more generous and level-headed readings of Hegel (and Plato) without fearing that we are thereby giving solace to the enemies of reason. So, I think that Popper's analysis of Hegel is worthwhile and sometimes illuminating but not very serious or comprehensive. And while his analysis of Marxian historicism is much better, since he is willing to treat Marx with respect, he is distressingly bad on Marxian economics. He fails to engage with ANY of the mainstream criticisms of the basic tenets of Marxist theory. To Popper's credit, he at least dismisses some of the more obviously false facets of Marxist theory, like the fallen rate of profit, but he nonetheless gives too much credit to Marx's other economic theories, such as his disproven theory of the trade cycle. In other words, his reading of Marx alternates between too much lenience (towards his various economic arguments and theories) and just the right amount of intellectual generosity (towards his humanitarian and moralizing impulses as found in his class analysis and the theory of exploitation). Curiously, Popper gives Marx the kind of sympathetic reading (even to the point of excessive generosity!) that he refuses to give to either Plato or Hegel. Whether this is fair or not is up for debate. But it is certainly a curious book that is a product of its time. Similar to my review of Volume One, I am torn on this volume. In many ways, this is a masterpiece that every student of modern history of ideas should study. The positive vision of an Open Society is only articulated "between the lines", as it were, but it is a powerful vision indeed. And almost every chapter is full of philosophical nuggets, paradoxes, and arguments that stimulate the mind. However, he is too harsh on Hegel and Plato, often to the point of blinding hostility, while he curiously understates Marx's failures as an economic, historical, and moral thinker. There is nonetheless a lot to love here. I would say Popper's work is a flawed masterpiece - equally brilliant, creative, and vindictive.
April 1, 2009
From Plato to Hegel, the philosopher king is the summit of socialism everywhere, a system in which the "good" thinker knows what is best for all individuals. Karl Popper prefers the free society and counts neo-Platonism among his enemies.
Having been raised in an authoritarian Communist culture in Austria, Popper rejected "historicism" in ascertaining that the growth of human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history, and since "no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge", it follows, he argued, that there can be no predictive science of human history. For Popper, metaphysical and historical indeterminism go hand in hand.
February 1, 2018
Just a quote:
"It should perhaps be admitted that the Heraclitean ethics, the doctrine that the higher reward is that which only posterity can offer, may in some way perhaps be slightly superior to an ethical doctrine which teaches us to look out for reward now. But it is not what we need. We need an ethics which defies success and reward. And such an ethics need not be invented. It is not new. It has been taught by Christianity, at least in its beginnings. It is, again, taught by the industrial as well as by the scientific co-operation day. The romantic historicist morality of fame, fortunately, seems to be on the decline. The Unknown Soldier shows it. We are beginning to realize that sacrifice may mean just as much, or even more, when it is made anonymously. Our ethical education must follow suit. We must be taught to do our work; to make our sacrifice for the sake of this work, and not for praise or the avoidance of blame. (The fact that we all need some encouragement, hope, praise, and even blame, is another matter altogether.) We must find our justification in our work, in what we are doing ourselves, and not in a fictitious ‘meaning of history’.
History has no meaning"
"It should perhaps be admitted that the Heraclitean ethics, the doctrine that the higher reward is that which only posterity can offer, may in some way perhaps be slightly superior to an ethical doctrine which teaches us to look out for reward now. But it is not what we need. We need an ethics which defies success and reward. And such an ethics need not be invented. It is not new. It has been taught by Christianity, at least in its beginnings. It is, again, taught by the industrial as well as by the scientific co-operation day. The romantic historicist morality of fame, fortunately, seems to be on the decline. The Unknown Soldier shows it. We are beginning to realize that sacrifice may mean just as much, or even more, when it is made anonymously. Our ethical education must follow suit. We must be taught to do our work; to make our sacrifice for the sake of this work, and not for praise or the avoidance of blame. (The fact that we all need some encouragement, hope, praise, and even blame, is another matter altogether.) We must find our justification in our work, in what we are doing ourselves, and not in a fictitious ‘meaning of history’.
History has no meaning"
April 20, 2018
"إن الأصرار على أقامة الجنة على الأرض لم ينتج سوى الجحيم"
في ظني أن العنوان الأدق للكتاب هو"أعداء المجتمع المفتوح"،كون الكتاب قائم على تخليل أبرز الفلسفات التاريخانية(أفلاطون في الجزء الأول،هيجل وماركس هنا) وبيان تهافت بناءها المنطقي واللذي هدد مشروعها كله ليس فقط بالأنهيار بل بالضد التام لنتائجه.
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قضايا مبدئية لفهم مجمل الكتاب:
١\الفردية لا تساوي الأنانية والجمعية لا تساوي الأيثار،يشرح بوبر تلك الفروق في بدا��ة نقده لأفلاطون ومدينته الفاضلة،ويبين أن الفيلسوف العظيم قد خلط بين تلك المصطلحات(عن عمد من وجهة نظر بوبر) لتبرير تصوره لمدينته الفاضلة،بفك هذا الألتباس سينكشف الغشاء البراق الزائف عن تلك المدينة لتظهر على حقيقتها تحت الشمس:مجتمع شمولي متسلط يسحق حقوق الغالبية لصالح طغمة حاكمة منتقاة ومؤدلجة في أحسن الأحوال أو لصالح فكرة وهمية عن الخير والعدل والحرية في أسوءها...ككل مجتمع شمولي.
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٢\التاريخانية:هي خرافة فلسفية تعني وجود قوى لاعقلانية(أحيانا ميتافيزيقية) تقود مسار المجتمعات وتسمح(بالتبعية لكشفنا لها) بالتبوء بمستقبل المجتمع،وهنا يبرز سؤالان:
أ)ما هي تلك القوى؟
تعددت الأجابات،ولهذا السبب لدينا فلسفات تاريخانية وليست فلسفة واحدة،فقد تكون تلك قوى فساد مغروسة في تكوين الوجود نفسه وتقود المجتمعات نحو التحلل كما عند أفلاطون(وقد أضيف أنا الديانات الإبراهيمية"خير الناس قرني،ثم اللذين يلونهم،ثم اللذين يلونهم...")*،وقد تكون أيمان ميتافيزيقي بالوضعية التاريخية وروح الأمة كما عند هيجل ومتابعيه الرومانسيين الألمان،أو أيمان زائد بتأثير العوامل الأقتصادية كمحدد أوحد للسياسة والأجتماع معاً كما عند ماركس،وقد أضيف أنا أيمان ميتافيزيقي-علمي بتفوق العنصر الأري كما في النازية وكذلك بعض صور الأيمان بالتقدم ككتاب"نهاية التاريخ"مثلا...وهلم جرا.
ب)أذا كانت القوانين حتمية وأذا كنا قادرين على التنبؤ الدقيق بالمستقبل فما هو دورنا؟
الأجابة البديهية هي:نسكت ونتابع وندع القوى تفعل فعلها.
لكن ليست تلك الأجابة بالصحيحة دائماً،فماركس مثلاً قال أن الثورة الأشتراكية وجنة المجتمع أحادي الطبقة حتمية وما على الطليعة غير محاولة تقصير ألام المخاض،بينما أفلاطون قرر الوقوف في وجه الطوفان وصمم مدينته الفاضلة كنظام سياسي أجتماعي ألي دقيق ثابت يحارب الأبداع (صراحةً) ويقف بالمرصاد لأليات التغيير،والغرض النهائي هو أيقاف محاولات التغير الأجتماعي مهما كانت لأن كل تغيير سينجرف حتما (بحسبه) في تيار قوى الفساد والفوضى الموجودة في صميم الوجود.
وسنضيف 3 أسئلة:
ج)هل من رابط بين تلك الفلسفات التاريخانية النبوئية وبين واقع واضعيها؟
نعم،روابط قوية،فأفلاطون وسلفه في كراهية التغيير هيراقليطيس** عاشوا عصور أضطراب سياسي وتقلبات عنيفة في أثينا لم تكن مسبوقة ،وهيجل كان أشبه ببوق دعائي للأمبراطورية البروسية العسكرية، وماركس شهد الرأسمالية الفتية المنفلتة(كما وصفها) وحللها بعبقرية مدهشة(بشهادة نقاده بمن فيهم كارل بوبر) وبنى فلسفته التاريخانية الحتمية ونبوئته الأشتراكية على أفتراض أن تلك الحال ستدوم للأبد.***،وأضيف السعي الصهيوني لأقامة الهيكل(برغم وجود رأي مضاد يرى في ذلك أعتراض على المشيئة الإلهية،وكذلك الرؤى الأسلامية المتباينة عن"المهدي المنتظر".
د)هل كانت تلك "الجنات الأرضية" دائماً أصيلة؟
ليس دائماً،فمدينة أفلاطون كانت مستوحاة في كثير من جوانبها من نموذج أسبرطة(القبلي)،وماركس أشار كثيرا إلى"الحياة الشيوعية الأولى" قبل الحضارة وأن لم يكن يعول عليها كثيرا في تصوراته****،وأضيف هنا هيكل سليمان و"الخلافة الراشدة" الأسلامية.
ه)لماذا تنقلب مشاريع"الجنات الأرضية الموعودة"لجحيم؟
أولاً أنظر النقطة(١) وستستنتج كيف تحط تلك الفلسفات من قيمة الفرد في مقابل المجموع("يجب أن نكسر بعض البيض كي نصنع بعض العجة" كما قال لينين)
ثانيا تسرع و راديكالية تلك البرامج والتي تستلزم فك النسيج القديم من أجل أعادة تشكيله(كما قال أفلاطون وكما فعل السوفيت والنازي مثلا).
ثالثا الغرور اللذي يتلبس المنفذين بسبب أيمانهم الدوجمائي بالحتمية التاريخية،الغرور اللذي يعميهم عن نتائج أفعالهم وعن فشل خططهم فيمضون فيها قدما دون تراجع.
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٣\واحدة من مشكلات تلك الفلسفات التاريخانية هي أنها جعلت السؤال المركزي في الحكم هو"من له حق الحكم؟" بينما الأصح هو"كيف يكون الحكم؟".
وتلك النقطة تمثل مدخل هام لتصور بوبر عن"المجتمع المفتوح" اللذي سطر ذلك السفر الضخم في نقد"أعداؤه"،ففي ظل الديموقراطية تتوفر أليات قوية تتولى مراجعة قرارات الحاكم،وتضع العراقيل في وجه سلطته وتحرمه من"التسرع" و"الراديكالية"،مما يعني وجود هامش معقول للخطأ يقلل من الخسائر المتوقعة ويتيح أمكانية "التراجع" وتعديل الخطأ ،Trial & error strategyنظام يسمح ب"هندسة أجتماعية متدرجة" تتعلم من تجاربها وتتفاعل بوعي مع التغييرات...ولا ننسى كذلك أن الديموقراطية كقيمة تعلي من شأن"الفرد" وترسخ قيم المساواة.
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كانت صحبة كارل بوبر ممتعة جداً،وسأقرأ قريباً كتابه The poverty of historicism لأستوضح أكثر نقده للنزعة التاريخية.
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ملاحظات/
ملاحظة عامة:سعيت في مراجعتي على تأمين مداخل واضحة وسهلة للكتاب دون محاولة تلخيصه،فالكتاب ضخم وثري بالمعلومات والجدالات التي لم تجد مكانها في مراجعتي كدفاعه المطول عن العقلانية ومفهومه عنها ونقده للسوسولوحيا المعرفة(واللذي اظنني سأزوره مرة أخرى قريباً).
*يرجى ملاحظة أني أتناول الدين هنا بمعناه الأجتماعي،فلا أهمية هنا للدخول في جدل حول صحة أفكار"المهدي المنتظر" او كون حديث"خير الناس قرني.." غير صحيح بالمعايير الحديثية طالما الناس تؤمن به.
**هيراقليطيس فيلسوف التغيير"لا يمكن أن تنزل النهر نفسه مرتين" كان يرى في التغيير شرا مطبق وعامل فوضى يقود الطبيعة والمجتمع للفساد بعيدا عن "أصوله"،وعند تناول أفلاطون لتلك الفكرة سيعتبر تلك الأصول هي جوهر الأشياء(راجع مثال الكهف)،وبالحديث عن معلمي أفلاطون:سيناقش بوبر كيف أن أفلاطون هو أعدى أعداء أستاذه سقراط في الواقع،وتلك المناقشة هي من أمتع صفحات الكتاب.
***وهو الأفتراض اللذي ظهرت بشائر عواره في حياة ماركس في بريطانيا بشكل خاص مع قوانين العمل التي قللت ساعات العمل ومنعت عمالة الأطفال،بصيغة أخرى:لم تعد الرأسمالية منفلتة تماما كما وصفها ماركس...من المحبط أن ماركس لم يعط تلك الدلالات حقها وأعتبرها عابرة ومرحلية.
****أسجل هنا تعجبي من أهمال بوبر تلك التفصيلة وإن كان قد أبدى معرفةً بها في مناقشته السريعة لرأي توينبي في ماركس.
في ظني أن العنوان الأدق للكتاب هو"أعداء المجتمع المفتوح"،كون الكتاب قائم على تخليل أبرز الفلسفات التاريخانية(أفلاطون في الجزء الأول،هيجل وماركس هنا) وبيان تهافت بناءها المنطقي واللذي هدد مشروعها كله ليس فقط بالأنهيار بل بالضد التام لنتائجه.
....
قضايا مبدئية لفهم مجمل الكتاب:
١\الفردية لا تساوي الأنانية والجمعية لا تساوي الأيثار،يشرح بوبر تلك الفروق في بدا��ة نقده لأفلاطون ومدينته الفاضلة،ويبين أن الفيلسوف العظيم قد خلط بين تلك المصطلحات(عن عمد من وجهة نظر بوبر) لتبرير تصوره لمدينته الفاضلة،بفك هذا الألتباس سينكشف الغشاء البراق الزائف عن تلك المدينة لتظهر على حقيقتها تحت الشمس:مجتمع شمولي متسلط يسحق حقوق الغالبية لصالح طغمة حاكمة منتقاة ومؤدلجة في أحسن الأحوال أو لصالح فكرة وهمية عن الخير والعدل والحرية في أسوءها...ككل مجتمع شمولي.
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٢\التاريخانية:هي خرافة فلسفية تعني وجود قوى لاعقلانية(أحيانا ميتافيزيقية) تقود مسار المجتمعات وتسمح(بالتبعية لكشفنا لها) بالتبوء بمستقبل المجتمع،وهنا يبرز سؤالان:
أ)ما هي تلك القوى؟
تعددت الأجابات،ولهذا السبب لدينا فلسفات تاريخانية وليست فلسفة واحدة،فقد تكون تلك قوى فساد مغروسة في تكوين الوجود نفسه وتقود المجتمعات نحو التحلل كما عند أفلاطون(وقد أضيف أنا الديانات الإبراهيمية"خير الناس قرني،ثم اللذين يلونهم،ثم اللذين يلونهم...")*،وقد تكون أيمان ميتافيزيقي بالوضعية التاريخية وروح الأمة كما عند هيجل ومتابعيه الرومانسيين الألمان،أو أيمان زائد بتأثير العوامل الأقتصادية كمحدد أوحد للسياسة والأجتماع معاً كما عند ماركس،وقد أضيف أنا أيمان ميتافيزيقي-علمي بتفوق العنصر الأري كما في النازية وكذلك بعض صور الأيمان بالتقدم ككتاب"نهاية التاريخ"مثلا...وهلم جرا.
ب)أذا كانت القوانين حتمية وأذا كنا قادرين على التنبؤ الدقيق بالمستقبل فما هو دورنا؟
الأجابة البديهية هي:نسكت ونتابع وندع القوى تفعل فعلها.
لكن ليست تلك الأجابة بالصحيحة دائماً،فماركس مثلاً قال أن الثورة الأشتراكية وجنة المجتمع أحادي الطبقة حتمية وما على الطليعة غير محاولة تقصير ألام المخاض،بينما أفلاطون قرر الوقوف في وجه الطوفان وصمم مدينته الفاضلة كنظام سياسي أجتماعي ألي دقيق ثابت يحارب الأبداع (صراحةً) ويقف بالمرصاد لأليات التغيير،والغرض النهائي هو أيقاف محاولات التغير الأجتماعي مهما كانت لأن كل تغيير سينجرف حتما (بحسبه) في تيار قوى الفساد والفوضى الموجودة في صميم الوجود.
وسنضيف 3 أسئلة:
ج)هل من رابط بين تلك الفلسفات التاريخانية النبوئية وبين واقع واضعيها؟
نعم،روابط قوية،فأفلاطون وسلفه في كراهية التغيير هيراقليطيس** عاشوا عصور أضطراب سياسي وتقلبات عنيفة في أثينا لم تكن مسبوقة ،وهيجل كان أشبه ببوق دعائي للأمبراطورية البروسية العسكرية، وماركس شهد الرأسمالية الفتية المنفلتة(كما وصفها) وحللها بعبقرية مدهشة(بشهادة نقاده بمن فيهم كارل بوبر) وبنى فلسفته التاريخانية الحتمية ونبوئته الأشتراكية على أفتراض أن تلك الحال ستدوم للأبد.***،وأضيف السعي الصهيوني لأقامة الهيكل(برغم وجود رأي مضاد يرى في ذلك أعتراض على المشيئة الإلهية،وكذلك الرؤى الأسلامية المتباينة عن"المهدي المنتظر".
د)هل كانت تلك "الجنات الأرضية" دائماً أصيلة؟
ليس دائماً،فمدينة أفلاطون كانت مستوحاة في كثير من جوانبها من نموذج أسبرطة(القبلي)،وماركس أشار كثيرا إلى"الحياة الشيوعية الأولى" قبل الحضارة وأن لم يكن يعول عليها كثيرا في تصوراته****،وأضيف هنا هيكل سليمان و"الخلافة الراشدة" الأسلامية.
ه)لماذا تنقلب مشاريع"الجنات الأرضية الموعودة"لجحيم؟
أولاً أنظر النقطة(١) وستستنتج كيف تحط تلك الفلسفات من قيمة الفرد في مقابل المجموع("يجب أن نكسر بعض البيض كي نصنع بعض العجة" كما قال لينين)
ثانيا تسرع و راديكالية تلك البرامج والتي تستلزم فك النسيج القديم من أجل أعادة تشكيله(كما قال أفلاطون وكما فعل السوفيت والنازي مثلا).
ثالثا الغرور اللذي يتلبس المنفذين بسبب أيمانهم الدوجمائي بالحتمية التاريخية،الغرور اللذي يعميهم عن نتائج أفعالهم وعن فشل خططهم فيمضون فيها قدما دون تراجع.
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٣\واحدة من مشكلات تلك الفلسفات التاريخانية هي أنها جعلت السؤال المركزي في الحكم هو"من له حق الحكم؟" بينما الأصح هو"كيف يكون الحكم؟".
وتلك النقطة تمثل مدخل هام لتصور بوبر عن"المجتمع المفتوح" اللذي سطر ذلك السفر الضخم في نقد"أعداؤه"،ففي ظل الديموقراطية تتوفر أليات قوية تتولى مراجعة قرارات الحاكم،وتضع العراقيل في وجه سلطته وتحرمه من"التسرع" و"الراديكالية"،مما يعني وجود هامش معقول للخطأ يقلل من الخسائر المتوقعة ويتيح أمكانية "التراجع" وتعديل الخطأ ،Trial & error strategyنظام يسمح ب"هندسة أجتماعية متدرجة" تتعلم من تجاربها وتتفاعل بوعي مع التغييرات...ولا ننسى كذلك أن الديموقراطية كقيمة تعلي من شأن"الفرد" وترسخ قيم المساواة.
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كانت صحبة كارل بوبر ممتعة جداً،وسأقرأ قريباً كتابه The poverty of historicism لأستوضح أكثر نقده للنزعة التاريخية.
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ملاحظات/
ملاحظة عامة:سعيت في مراجعتي على تأمين مداخل واضحة وسهلة للكتاب دون محاولة تلخيصه،فالكتاب ضخم وثري بالمعلومات والجدالات التي لم تجد مكانها في مراجعتي كدفاعه المطول عن العقلانية ومفهومه عنها ونقده للسوسولوحيا المعرفة(واللذي اظنني سأزوره مرة أخرى قريباً).
*يرجى ملاحظة أني أتناول الدين هنا بمعناه الأجتماعي،فلا أهمية هنا للدخول في جدل حول صحة أفكار"المهدي المنتظر" او كون حديث"خير الناس قرني.." غير صحيح بالمعايير الحديثية طالما الناس تؤمن به.
**هيراقليطيس فيلسوف التغيير"لا يمكن أن تنزل النهر نفسه مرتين" كان يرى في التغيير شرا مطبق وعامل فوضى يقود الطبيعة والمجتمع للفساد بعيدا عن "أصوله"،وعند تناول أفلاطون لتلك الفكرة سيعتبر تلك الأصول هي جوهر الأشياء(راجع مثال الكهف)،وبالحديث عن معلمي أفلاطون:سيناقش بوبر كيف أن أفلاطون هو أعدى أعداء أستاذه سقراط في الواقع،وتلك المناقشة هي من أمتع صفحات الكتاب.
***وهو الأفتراض اللذي ظهرت بشائر عواره في حياة ماركس في بريطانيا بشكل خاص مع قوانين العمل التي قللت ساعات العمل ومنعت عمالة الأطفال،بصيغة أخرى:لم تعد الرأسمالية منفلتة تماما كما وصفها ماركس...من المحبط أن ماركس لم يعط تلك الدلالات حقها وأعتبرها عابرة ومرحلية.
****أسجل هنا تعجبي من أهمال بوبر تلك التفصيلة وإن كان قد أبدى معرفةً بها في مناقشته السريعة لرأي توينبي في ماركس.
December 24, 2020
Not nearly as engaging as Volume I. It might be because the material of Hegel's and Marx's philosophies are necessarily more complex than that of Plato and Aristotle. But I also got the impression that Popper, through a large part of the volume, left the discussion of an "open society" off to the side while he treated his preferred topic of historicism, along with other, less relevant tangents (many having to do with Marx's economic theories). The result was a book that I labored to get through, as opposed to Vol. I, which I was consistently thrilled to pick up.
Although not an integral part of his criticism, Popper's treatment of Hegel's dialectic theory left me scratching my head. I'm not a Hegel expert, but I know enough to understand that his model of dialectics is considered perhaps his greatest achievement. Popper devoted a whopping three paragraphs to the discussion before discarding the idea out of hand, the result of a logical progression that needed better development.
Popper's views on democracy, science and technology continued to trouble me as well. A short passage will help illustrate:
The best example is with his rationalism (the faith in reason that I just mentioned). Besides the fact that Popper admits it is logically unsustainable (requiring a leap of faith in order to believe in reason at the outset), and that this initial leap of faith requires that Popper then allow other uses of faith and irrationality in order to maintain consistency (which he neglects to do), the rationalism itself has some disturbing trends. Throughout the book, Popper uses language that implies an act of violence toward the natural world. Something that is inherently unnatural must be "subjected" or "submitted" to our reason, in our effort to control it. I enjoy using reason and logic as much as the next guy, but I wonder if a better approach toward something outside of our control and understanding might be a role of cooperation, and coordination, in order to more healthily interact with our surrounding environment. This is, after all, one of the main points of his rationalism, that we use reason to cooperate with our fellow humans. Why not extend that idea to the natural world?
Not Bad Reviews
@pointblaek
Although not an integral part of his criticism, Popper's treatment of Hegel's dialectic theory left me scratching my head. I'm not a Hegel expert, but I know enough to understand that his model of dialectics is considered perhaps his greatest achievement. Popper devoted a whopping three paragraphs to the discussion before discarding the idea out of hand, the result of a logical progression that needed better development.
Popper's views on democracy, science and technology continued to trouble me as well. A short passage will help illustrate:
I do not intend to belittle the very serious problem of purely mechanical work, of a drudgery which is felt to be meaningless, and which destroys the creative power of the workers; but the only practical hope lies, not in a return to slavery and serfdom, but in an attempt to make machinery take over this mechanical drudgery. Marx was right in insisting that increased productivity is the only reasonable hope of humanizing labour, and of further shortening the labour day. Ch. 24, Sec. IV, 2nd paragraphExcuse me? Yes machines can have all the labour, thereby freeing the labourers to. . . do what, exactly (besides lose their jobs)? Shortening the work day will solve all of our problems? And people will earn money how? I am sure that Popper would have a ready reply to this criticism (as he appears to have for every other), but the apparent lack of foresight in this comment was shocking. Maybe a smarter person can help me out here. Besides this particular passage, Popper demonstrates throughout the book an unwavering faith in science, technology, reason and the democratic process that at times seems delusional.
The best example is with his rationalism (the faith in reason that I just mentioned). Besides the fact that Popper admits it is logically unsustainable (requiring a leap of faith in order to believe in reason at the outset), and that this initial leap of faith requires that Popper then allow other uses of faith and irrationality in order to maintain consistency (which he neglects to do), the rationalism itself has some disturbing trends. Throughout the book, Popper uses language that implies an act of violence toward the natural world. Something that is inherently unnatural must be "subjected" or "submitted" to our reason, in our effort to control it. I enjoy using reason and logic as much as the next guy, but I wonder if a better approach toward something outside of our control and understanding might be a role of cooperation, and coordination, in order to more healthily interact with our surrounding environment. This is, after all, one of the main points of his rationalism, that we use reason to cooperate with our fellow humans. Why not extend that idea to the natural world?
Not Bad Reviews
@pointblaek
November 19, 2019
Striking in its main ideas, but largely unpleasant to read in comparison to the shorter and more focused first volume. Popper jumps around a lot in his book, and occasionally it is hard to tell where he is going. The main thrust of the book is the case against Hegelian and Marxist historicism, or the belief that one can intuit and predict a larger purpose to history and then design a political program to further the inevitable. He sees historicism as a key root of totalitarian ideologies, and in this volume he puts a ton of blame on Hegel for the rise of these ideologies. He basically treats the Hegelian theory of the path of history leading toward the end point of the Prussian state as pure propaganda for the Prussian regime. He is more sympathetic to Marx, whom he sees as genuinely outraged by the abuse of working people in industrialism but nonetheless another thinker who fell into the lure of prophecy and historicism. Popper's discussion of Marx is fascinating and enlightening, probably the strong suit of the book. HIs criticism of Marx is largely the New Deal critique that capitalism can be adjusted and regulated as long as economic systems are open to democratic political change and control (something that cannot happen in authoritarian or totalitarian societies."
Overall I found myself agreeing strongly with Popper and enjoying his final point that while history lacks any internal meaning or logic we can still give it meaning (a key tenet of liberal humanism). However, I found this volume to be more scattered and less profound about the nature of a free society. I think it needed a stronger editor to weed out some of the odd points of focus and beefs with individual scholars of his generation to really maintain the punch of the first volume.
Overall I found myself agreeing strongly with Popper and enjoying his final point that while history lacks any internal meaning or logic we can still give it meaning (a key tenet of liberal humanism). However, I found this volume to be more scattered and less profound about the nature of a free society. I think it needed a stronger editor to weed out some of the odd points of focus and beefs with individual scholars of his generation to really maintain the punch of the first volume.
April 17, 2019
I personally found it more intriguing to read than the previous volume, part of the reason is I'm not familiar with Plato and Aristotle than that of Karl Max and Hegal. It's perhaps either incorrect notions of representation has existed over our culture like their hardliners used to say about it. Nevertheless, the ideas and concepts are distributed via various media outlets after all.
I still feel that His attack on the particular concept is not always rigorous but occasionally the other are pretty absorbing. I like the way he depicts the similarily between right-winded nazism and communists and both are derived from the idea of Hegel. I also discovered that some others got the same conclusion even they don't read the same book. For example
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlXqF...
I still feel that His attack on the particular concept is not always rigorous but occasionally the other are pretty absorbing. I like the way he depicts the similarily between right-winded nazism and communists and both are derived from the idea of Hegel. I also discovered that some others got the same conclusion even they don't read the same book. For example
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlXqF...
November 27, 2021
اثر جامعهٔ باز و دشمنان آن در دو مجلد به چاپ رسیده است. پژوهش مفیدی در باب محدودیتهای فکری اندیشمندان بزرگی که اینبار هدفش هگل و مارکس است. گرچه، پژوهشهای پوپر خالی از اشکال نیست.
March 27, 2012
4 1/2 stars. This is a pretty extensive refutation of Marx's (inspired by Hegel's) historicism. "Scientific Marxism is dead," Popper claims, and that's also an apt summary of the work as a whole. I think that he is undoubtedly right in the main in his treatment of Marx, and I'm obviously not going to go through the arguments he proffers against Marx's historicism, but I'll just provide some general remarks and one criticism.
First, although it's clear that Popper abhors historicism, his treatment of Marx is refreshingly fair. He takes great pains to emphasize the aspects of Marx's work he finds commendable (his humanitarianism, rationalism, sociological analyses, etc.). It's very satisfying to read an author who doesn't turn his criticisms into an outright vitriolic polemic.
His treatment of Hegel (confined largely to one chapter) is pretty hilarious. He ridicules most of his philosophy and links it to totalitarianism. He's much harsher on Hegel than Marx. I know that many people have taken issue with Popper's treatment of Hegel, but from the (admittedly little) familiarity I have with Hegel's philosophy my sympathies would have to lie with Popper.
Popper also provides an excellent and lengthy addendum detailing his theory of knowledge, which was an unexpected but welcomed addition.
My one criticism is that Popper praises Marx's anti-psychologism in sociology as one of his greatest contributions to modern social theory (that is, the position that sociology is not ultimately reducible to psychology). Apart from the fact that I disagree with Marx and Popper here, it's a little baffling that Popper would consider this one of his greatest achievements. Marx's greatest achievements lay in unveiling the dangers of "unrestrained" capitalism, as Popper calls it. Of course, Popper does mention this as one of his significant contributions, but to put anti-psychologism in the same breath devalues it immensely. It doesn't help that psychologism (a word I don't really care for) has established itself as the most likely correct position, either.
I would advise all Marxists to read this. All libertarians, or classical liberals, as well. Both positions are critiqued, and one is the better for reading Popper's excellent work.
First, although it's clear that Popper abhors historicism, his treatment of Marx is refreshingly fair. He takes great pains to emphasize the aspects of Marx's work he finds commendable (his humanitarianism, rationalism, sociological analyses, etc.). It's very satisfying to read an author who doesn't turn his criticisms into an outright vitriolic polemic.
His treatment of Hegel (confined largely to one chapter) is pretty hilarious. He ridicules most of his philosophy and links it to totalitarianism. He's much harsher on Hegel than Marx. I know that many people have taken issue with Popper's treatment of Hegel, but from the (admittedly little) familiarity I have with Hegel's philosophy my sympathies would have to lie with Popper.
Popper also provides an excellent and lengthy addendum detailing his theory of knowledge, which was an unexpected but welcomed addition.
My one criticism is that Popper praises Marx's anti-psychologism in sociology as one of his greatest contributions to modern social theory (that is, the position that sociology is not ultimately reducible to psychology). Apart from the fact that I disagree with Marx and Popper here, it's a little baffling that Popper would consider this one of his greatest achievements. Marx's greatest achievements lay in unveiling the dangers of "unrestrained" capitalism, as Popper calls it. Of course, Popper does mention this as one of his significant contributions, but to put anti-psychologism in the same breath devalues it immensely. It doesn't help that psychologism (a word I don't really care for) has established itself as the most likely correct position, either.
I would advise all Marxists to read this. All libertarians, or classical liberals, as well. Both positions are critiqued, and one is the better for reading Popper's excellent work.
August 9, 2007
I had never heard of Popper until Ligeti used a title of his for his pieces "Clouds and Clouds". So when in a book store, i search it out but ended up buying this one . Now here was a philosopher who didn't need to use big terms to impress you. His language is as simple as he could make it. And he ask the really important question-how open in terms of individual rights does a citizen have within a society. He takes Plato as a starting point and shows how much he was against such an idea and how as the fountainhead of so much philosophy infected so much of it's thought. When he gets to Marx it is almost humorous how he does maybe a 40 page disclaimer that he is really on his side, but couldn't predict allot of things that might have shaped his thinking. I have since read a couple of his books and always walk away thinking better than when i went in. Now how many writers manage that
October 11, 2022
In dit tweede deel van ‘de open samenleving en haar vijanden’ verlegt Popper zijn aandacht van de klassieke Griekse filosofen naar negentiende-eeuwse westerse filosofen die in zijn ogen verantwoordelijk zijn voor een anti-liberale ideologie. Hij behandelt met name Hegel en Marx, die een deterministische opvatting van de geschiedenis hadden. Het werk van Popper is vooral gericht tegen totalitarisme en de rechtvaardigingen daarvan. Elke keer duiken er weer valse profeten op. Het werk van Popper moet je vooral ook begrijpen vanuit zijn diepgewortelde hekel aan nazisme en autoritair communisme. Voor de sociale bewogenheid van Marx toont Popper wel waardering.
October 6, 2007
- thinking in the solving problems need logics or an experience?
- are we should trade one way?
- are we all search for many answers at same time?
- is there an answer without a question?
- are we should trade one way?
- are we all search for many answers at same time?
- is there an answer without a question?
July 24, 2014
Popper birinci ciltte Platon'un Devlet ve Yasalar'ını çözümlüyor ve eleştiriyor. Herakleitos etkisinde kalan Platon onun gibi elit bir zümrenin iktidarını tasarlıyor. Platon'a göre insanlar farklı kalitelerde doğarlar ve devletteki görevleri de bu kalitelere göre belirlenmelidir. Platon üç sınıfa karşılık üç kalitede insan çeşidi tanımlar. Popper bunun ırkçı bir yaklaşım olduğunu söylese de orta çağın soylu-ruhban-köylü ayrımına veya kast sistemine daha çok benzer. Platon'un tasarladığı devlet bir makinedir ve birey bu makinenin çarklarından biridir. Platon'un ahlak sistemi de bu temel üzerine bina edilmiştir. Devlette bireyin erdemi yerini bilmek ve görevini yerine getirmekten ibarettir. (Bu Hegel'in ahlak anlayışına oldukça benzer.)
Platon ortada bulunan bir soruna bir çözüm üretme amacındadır. Platon'un yaşadığı dönemde Yunan dünyası büyük bir dönüşüm içindedir, kapalı toplumdan açık topluma geçmektedir. Yunan emperyalizmiyle kabileler birleşmekte, dünyasının sınırı şehri/köyü/kabilesi olan insan bambaşka kültürlerle karşılaşınca geleneklerine ve mutlak olarak doğru bildiği her şeye olan inancını kaybetmektedir. Platon bu hızlı değişim döneminde insanların yaşadığı bunalımı görmüş ve bir çözüm üretmek istemiştir. Bulduğu çözüm değişimi durdurmaktır. Bunu da geriye dönerek, devleti koca bir kabileye çevirerek yapacaktır.
Popper sıfırdan bir düzen tasarlamaya karşı olduğu gibi devleti bir makine ve bireyi bunun dişlisi olarak gören sisteme de karşı. Popper'a ve Hobbes gibi aynı geleneği takip eden filozoflara göre devlet, bireyler arasında bir anlaşma olmalıdır. Değişim ise topyekün değil, parça parça yapılmalıdır. Siyasetin amacı düzeni değiştirmek değil aksayan kısımları düzeltmek olmalıdır. İnsanlığın binlerce yıldır tecrübesine dayanan siyasal düzeni bir kalemde silerek sıfırdan bir düzen yaratıp bunun mükemmel çalışacağını ummak Popper'a göre fazla iyimser olmakla kalmayıp akıl dışıdır da.
Popper ikinci ciltte Hegel ile başlayan "tarihsicilik" anlayışına karşı bir savaş veriyor. Popper'ın tarihsicilik adını verdiği anlayış kısaca tarihin bir akışı olduğu ve bunun öngörülebileceği anlamına geliyor. Marx'ı ve pek çok 19. yüzyıl filozofunu etkisine alan bu diyalektik tarih yaklaşımının Popper'a göre akılcı bir tarafı yok ve son derece tehlikeli.
Hegel, tarihi ulusların mücadelesi olarak ele alır. Hegel'e göre her ulus potansiyelini ancak savaşarak ortaya koyabilir ve tarihin onun için belirlediği kaderi bu şekilde elde edebilir. Bu mücadelenin sonunda bir ulus tüm ulusları ezecek ve dünyaya hükmedecektir, böylece en üstün ulus olduğunu ortaya koyacak ve kaderine ulaşacaktır. Bu fikrin Avrupadaki etkileri hafife alınacak gibi değildir. Özellikle Nazi Almanyasının dayandığı ideolojinin bu olduğu çok açıktır. Bu anlayışla hareket eden ulusların olduğu bir dünyada hiçbir zaman barış ve huzur olamayacağı da açıktır.
Büyük ölçüde Hegel etkisinde kalan Marx ise tarihi bir sınıflar mücadelesi olarak ele alır. Marx'a göre kapitalizm sefaleti artırmaktadır. Bunun sonucu olarak burjuvalar git gide zenginleşmekte, proleterler git gide fakirleşmektedir. Bu gidişle orta sınıf tümüyle eriyecek, tüm zenginlik çok az sayıda kapitalistin elinde toplanacak, çoğunluğu oluşturan proloterler ise yönetimi ele geçirecek ve burjuva sınıfını yok edecek. İlk başta bir işçi diktatörlüğü kurulacak, fakat sonuç olarak devletin var oluş amacı elit kesimi halktan korumak ve sömürüyü sürdürmek olduğundan bir süre sonra devlet kendi kendine yok olup gidecektir, çünkü tek sınıf olan toplumda sömürü olmadığından devlete ihtiyaç kalmayacaktır. Marx'ın kehaneti aşağı yukarı budur.
Marx da Platon gibi var olan bir soruna çözüm üretmek amacındadır. Sorun işçilerin sefaletidir. Dizginsiz kapitalizmin bulunduğu 19. yüzyıl Avrupasında işçiler karın tokluğuna insanlık dışı koşullarda, insanlık dışı iş saatlerince çalıştırılmaktadır. Marx'a göre demokrasi halkı uyutmak ve umut vermek için uydurulmuş bir düzendir. Bu yüzden işçilerin özgürleşmesi ancak bir devrimle işçilerin yönetimi ele almasıyla gerçekleşebilir. Marx'ın "tüm işçiler birleşin" çağrısı gerçekten etkili olur, fakat Marx'ın öngördüğü anlamda değil. Sendikalar ve sosyalist partiler devletten işçilerin çalışma koşullarının iyileştirilmesini isterler ve bu talepler kabul edilir. İşçilerin çalışma saatleri düşürülür, çocuk işçiler yasaklanır, çalışma koşulları, güvenlik vb talepler devletin araya girmesiyle bir bir yerine getirilir. Böylece Marx'ın veya Platon'un tasarladığı gibi topyekün bir devrimle değil, Popper'ın dediği gibi bölük pörçük değişimlerle, aksayan kısımların teker teker düzeltilmesiyle toplumun sıkıntıları giderilebilmektedir.
Kitabın devamında Popper tarihin ne olduğunu, neden öngörülemeyeceğini, akılcılık ve akıldışıcılığı tartışır. Siyaset felsefesiyle ilgilenen herkesin okuması şart olan bir kitap.
Platon ortada bulunan bir soruna bir çözüm üretme amacındadır. Platon'un yaşadığı dönemde Yunan dünyası büyük bir dönüşüm içindedir, kapalı toplumdan açık topluma geçmektedir. Yunan emperyalizmiyle kabileler birleşmekte, dünyasının sınırı şehri/köyü/kabilesi olan insan bambaşka kültürlerle karşılaşınca geleneklerine ve mutlak olarak doğru bildiği her şeye olan inancını kaybetmektedir. Platon bu hızlı değişim döneminde insanların yaşadığı bunalımı görmüş ve bir çözüm üretmek istemiştir. Bulduğu çözüm değişimi durdurmaktır. Bunu da geriye dönerek, devleti koca bir kabileye çevirerek yapacaktır.
Popper sıfırdan bir düzen tasarlamaya karşı olduğu gibi devleti bir makine ve bireyi bunun dişlisi olarak gören sisteme de karşı. Popper'a ve Hobbes gibi aynı geleneği takip eden filozoflara göre devlet, bireyler arasında bir anlaşma olmalıdır. Değişim ise topyekün değil, parça parça yapılmalıdır. Siyasetin amacı düzeni değiştirmek değil aksayan kısımları düzeltmek olmalıdır. İnsanlığın binlerce yıldır tecrübesine dayanan siyasal düzeni bir kalemde silerek sıfırdan bir düzen yaratıp bunun mükemmel çalışacağını ummak Popper'a göre fazla iyimser olmakla kalmayıp akıl dışıdır da.
Popper ikinci ciltte Hegel ile başlayan "tarihsicilik" anlayışına karşı bir savaş veriyor. Popper'ın tarihsicilik adını verdiği anlayış kısaca tarihin bir akışı olduğu ve bunun öngörülebileceği anlamına geliyor. Marx'ı ve pek çok 19. yüzyıl filozofunu etkisine alan bu diyalektik tarih yaklaşımının Popper'a göre akılcı bir tarafı yok ve son derece tehlikeli.
Hegel, tarihi ulusların mücadelesi olarak ele alır. Hegel'e göre her ulus potansiyelini ancak savaşarak ortaya koyabilir ve tarihin onun için belirlediği kaderi bu şekilde elde edebilir. Bu mücadelenin sonunda bir ulus tüm ulusları ezecek ve dünyaya hükmedecektir, böylece en üstün ulus olduğunu ortaya koyacak ve kaderine ulaşacaktır. Bu fikrin Avrupadaki etkileri hafife alınacak gibi değildir. Özellikle Nazi Almanyasının dayandığı ideolojinin bu olduğu çok açıktır. Bu anlayışla hareket eden ulusların olduğu bir dünyada hiçbir zaman barış ve huzur olamayacağı da açıktır.
Büyük ölçüde Hegel etkisinde kalan Marx ise tarihi bir sınıflar mücadelesi olarak ele alır. Marx'a göre kapitalizm sefaleti artırmaktadır. Bunun sonucu olarak burjuvalar git gide zenginleşmekte, proleterler git gide fakirleşmektedir. Bu gidişle orta sınıf tümüyle eriyecek, tüm zenginlik çok az sayıda kapitalistin elinde toplanacak, çoğunluğu oluşturan proloterler ise yönetimi ele geçirecek ve burjuva sınıfını yok edecek. İlk başta bir işçi diktatörlüğü kurulacak, fakat sonuç olarak devletin var oluş amacı elit kesimi halktan korumak ve sömürüyü sürdürmek olduğundan bir süre sonra devlet kendi kendine yok olup gidecektir, çünkü tek sınıf olan toplumda sömürü olmadığından devlete ihtiyaç kalmayacaktır. Marx'ın kehaneti aşağı yukarı budur.
Marx da Platon gibi var olan bir soruna çözüm üretmek amacındadır. Sorun işçilerin sefaletidir. Dizginsiz kapitalizmin bulunduğu 19. yüzyıl Avrupasında işçiler karın tokluğuna insanlık dışı koşullarda, insanlık dışı iş saatlerince çalıştırılmaktadır. Marx'a göre demokrasi halkı uyutmak ve umut vermek için uydurulmuş bir düzendir. Bu yüzden işçilerin özgürleşmesi ancak bir devrimle işçilerin yönetimi ele almasıyla gerçekleşebilir. Marx'ın "tüm işçiler birleşin" çağrısı gerçekten etkili olur, fakat Marx'ın öngördüğü anlamda değil. Sendikalar ve sosyalist partiler devletten işçilerin çalışma koşullarının iyileştirilmesini isterler ve bu talepler kabul edilir. İşçilerin çalışma saatleri düşürülür, çocuk işçiler yasaklanır, çalışma koşulları, güvenlik vb talepler devletin araya girmesiyle bir bir yerine getirilir. Böylece Marx'ın veya Platon'un tasarladığı gibi topyekün bir devrimle değil, Popper'ın dediği gibi bölük pörçük değişimlerle, aksayan kısımların teker teker düzeltilmesiyle toplumun sıkıntıları giderilebilmektedir.
Kitabın devamında Popper tarihin ne olduğunu, neden öngörülemeyeceğini, akılcılık ve akıldışıcılığı tartışır. Siyaset felsefesiyle ilgilenen herkesin okuması şart olan bir kitap.
September 26, 2019
It is a great shame that my local library system does not have the first volume of this collection stocked but only the second, but as someone who finds much to enjoy in reading Popper, this book is certainly a thoughtful and provocative read that has a lot to say against the sort of prophetic culture that has become increasingly popular in Western Civilization from the 19th century onward. Given the malign influence of Hagel on both Nazis and socialists and communists, this book was helpful not only in demolishing the ideological support for the Nazis who made Popper an exile from his native Austria but also made him a hero to anti-Communist figures who saw in his discussion of the problems of prophetic intellectual culture a way to discredit the claims of Communists to be destined for historical success. Ultimately, the success of the efforts against Communism made this book somewhat forgotten, although the reliance on prophetic approaches by the left ought to make this book increasingly relevant where people rely on bogus and fraudulent means to argue that they are on the right side of history when it comes to a wide variety of political and social issues.
This particular volume is about 300 pages worth of material in fifteen chapters, chapters 11-25 of a longer work. The author begins this part of his work by discussing the rise of oracular philosophy by examining the Aristotelian roots of Hagel's thinking (11) as well as the way that Hagel sought to encourage and inflame a new tribalism (12) which was supported by the Prussian state because of its usefulness to them. After that the author spends five chapters discussing Marx's methods of sociological determinism (13), the argument for the autonomy of sociology (14), economic historicism (15), his view of classes (16), which has been repeated to the present-day by many ignorant and misguided writers, and Marx's views of the legal and social system (17). After that the author spends four chapters examining the failure of Marx's prophecies concerning the coming of socialism (18), the inevitability of the social revolution (19), the fate of capitalism (20), all of which the author ties up nicely in an evaluation of Marx's thinking and where it went wrong (21). After that the author discusses the moral theory of Marx's historicism (22) and the aftermath with a look of the sociology of knowledge (23) and the problems of the revolt against reason that Marx and Hagel's disciples showed (24). Finally, the book ends with a discussion of the meaning of history (25) as well as notes, addenda, an index of names, and an index of subjects in the book as a whole.
Popper may have been an enemy of the open state himself, but at least he wrote about the sort of things that an open state needs in order to survive. It seems likely that Popper's desire to preserve an open society had nothing to do about whether he personally was open to the thinking and opinions of those whom he disagreed with, but rather that as a Vienna Jew who had seen the writing on the wall when it came to the lack of openness in both Nazism and Marxism recognized that the ideological root and justification of closed societies needed to be addressed. Popper took a dim view of historicism in general and that can definitely be found here, and Popper's takedown of Hagel and the corruption of philosophy by the German state is well worth paying attention to when we reflect upon the failure of German politics not only with Hitler but even in the contemporary issue with the corruption of "climate science." This book has some memorable and snappy and witty comments against some of the most notable philosophical frauds of the post-Enlightenment period and is well worth an appreciative read.
This particular volume is about 300 pages worth of material in fifteen chapters, chapters 11-25 of a longer work. The author begins this part of his work by discussing the rise of oracular philosophy by examining the Aristotelian roots of Hagel's thinking (11) as well as the way that Hagel sought to encourage and inflame a new tribalism (12) which was supported by the Prussian state because of its usefulness to them. After that the author spends five chapters discussing Marx's methods of sociological determinism (13), the argument for the autonomy of sociology (14), economic historicism (15), his view of classes (16), which has been repeated to the present-day by many ignorant and misguided writers, and Marx's views of the legal and social system (17). After that the author spends four chapters examining the failure of Marx's prophecies concerning the coming of socialism (18), the inevitability of the social revolution (19), the fate of capitalism (20), all of which the author ties up nicely in an evaluation of Marx's thinking and where it went wrong (21). After that the author discusses the moral theory of Marx's historicism (22) and the aftermath with a look of the sociology of knowledge (23) and the problems of the revolt against reason that Marx and Hagel's disciples showed (24). Finally, the book ends with a discussion of the meaning of history (25) as well as notes, addenda, an index of names, and an index of subjects in the book as a whole.
Popper may have been an enemy of the open state himself, but at least he wrote about the sort of things that an open state needs in order to survive. It seems likely that Popper's desire to preserve an open society had nothing to do about whether he personally was open to the thinking and opinions of those whom he disagreed with, but rather that as a Vienna Jew who had seen the writing on the wall when it came to the lack of openness in both Nazism and Marxism recognized that the ideological root and justification of closed societies needed to be addressed. Popper took a dim view of historicism in general and that can definitely be found here, and Popper's takedown of Hagel and the corruption of philosophy by the German state is well worth paying attention to when we reflect upon the failure of German politics not only with Hitler but even in the contemporary issue with the corruption of "climate science." This book has some memorable and snappy and witty comments against some of the most notable philosophical frauds of the post-Enlightenment period and is well worth an appreciative read.
December 16, 2016
گزیده ای از ضمیمه کتاب تحت عنوان "واقعیتها و شاخصها و صدق: انتقادی دیگر از نسبیگرایی" که در سال 1961 توسط پوپر افزوده شده است:
ممکن است اعتراض شود که صرف نظر از اینکه آراء من درباره ی ماهیت معرفت اخلاقی و وجدانیات اخلاقی پذیرفتنی باشد یا نه، به هر حال نسبی یا ذهنی است، زیرا هیچ شاخص مطلقی را در اخلاق تسجیل نمی کند و فقط نشان می دهد که تصور شاخص مطلق، تصوری تنظیمی است و تنها به کار کسانی می آید که قبلا به این عقیده گرویده اند و حال می خواهند درباره ی شاخص های اخلاقی خوب یا حقیقی یا صحیح بیشتر بدانند یا به جستجوی چنین شاخص ها برخیزند. پاسخ من این است که هیچ شاخص مطلق یا مجموعه دستورهای اخلاقیی نیست که حتی تسجیل آن -مثلا بر پایه منطق محض- تفاوتی از این جهت ایجاد کند. بفرض هم که توانسته باشیم منطقا صحت فلان شاخص مطلق یا مجموعه دستورهای اخلاقی را مبرهن سازیم به نحوی که بر مبنای منطق بتوانیم به دیگری ثابت کنیم که چگونه باید رفتار کند، باز هم او ممکن است اعتنایی نکند یا در جواب بگوید: ((من کوچکترین علاقه ای به بایدها یا قواعد اخلاقی شما ندارم، کما اینکه براهین منطقی یا نظریات شما در ریاضیات پیشرفته کمترین تفاوتی به حال من ایجاد نمی کند.)) بنابراین، حتی برهان منطقی نیز تغییری در این وضع نمی دهد که فقط کسی تحت تاثیر دلایل اخلاقی (یا هر دلیل دیگری) قرار می گیرد که حاضر باشد اینگونه امور را جدی تلقی کند و چیز تازه ای در این باره بیاموزد. شما نمی توانید با استدلال کسی را مجبور به جدی گرفتن استدلال یا احترام گذاشتن به عقل خودش کنید.
گزیده ای از تکمله (گفتگوی برایان مگی و پوپر در 1986) اضافه شده توسط مترجم (عزت الله فولادوند) :
مگی : با این وصف، این روزها می بینیم که جوانها باز به همان مکتبها و نویسندگانی -مثل هگل و مارکس و روانکاوی و اگزیستانسیالیسم- علاقه نشان می دهند که در گذشته مورد حمله ی شما بوده اند. توجیه شما برای این قضیه چیست؟
پوپر: در مردم همیشه تمایلی وجود داشته که دنبال حجرالفلاسفه (یا اکسیر) بروند و نسخه ای برای همه ی دردها مطالبه کنند. وضع فعلی تازگی ندارد - البته به استثنای کاهش غم انگیز علاقه به مباحثه عقلی. یکی از دلایلش بی صبری است؛ دلیل دیگرش این احساس است که اینهمه حرف بالاخره به جایی نرسیده است. بنابراین، بحث کردن با مخالفان، دیگر مورد پسند نیست. دیگر کسی در صدد این بر نمی آید که ببیند چه عیب و خطایی در دلایل طرف وجود دارد؛ در عوض، دربست پیرو فلان نظریه ی با ابهت می شود. البته این گرایش قابل درک است ولی اگر به صورت ویژگی روشنفکرهای جوان دربیاید، اسباب تاسف است و نشانه ی اضمحلال ملاکهای فکری و زوال حس مسئولیت عقلی خواهد بود ...
ممکن است اعتراض شود که صرف نظر از اینکه آراء من درباره ی ماهیت معرفت اخلاقی و وجدانیات اخلاقی پذیرفتنی باشد یا نه، به هر حال نسبی یا ذهنی است، زیرا هیچ شاخص مطلقی را در اخلاق تسجیل نمی کند و فقط نشان می دهد که تصور شاخص مطلق، تصوری تنظیمی است و تنها به کار کسانی می آید که قبلا به این عقیده گرویده اند و حال می خواهند درباره ی شاخص های اخلاقی خوب یا حقیقی یا صحیح بیشتر بدانند یا به جستجوی چنین شاخص ها برخیزند. پاسخ من این است که هیچ شاخص مطلق یا مجموعه دستورهای اخلاقیی نیست که حتی تسجیل آن -مثلا بر پایه منطق محض- تفاوتی از این جهت ایجاد کند. بفرض هم که توانسته باشیم منطقا صحت فلان شاخص مطلق یا مجموعه دستورهای اخلاقی را مبرهن سازیم به نحوی که بر مبنای منطق بتوانیم به دیگری ثابت کنیم که چگونه باید رفتار کند، باز هم او ممکن است اعتنایی نکند یا در جواب بگوید: ((من کوچکترین علاقه ای به بایدها یا قواعد اخلاقی شما ندارم، کما اینکه براهین منطقی یا نظریات شما در ریاضیات پیشرفته کمترین تفاوتی به حال من ایجاد نمی کند.)) بنابراین، حتی برهان منطقی نیز تغییری در این وضع نمی دهد که فقط کسی تحت تاثیر دلایل اخلاقی (یا هر دلیل دیگری) قرار می گیرد که حاضر باشد اینگونه امور را جدی تلقی کند و چیز تازه ای در این باره بیاموزد. شما نمی توانید با استدلال کسی را مجبور به جدی گرفتن استدلال یا احترام گذاشتن به عقل خودش کنید.
گزیده ای از تکمله (گفتگوی برایان مگی و پوپر در 1986) اضافه شده توسط مترجم (عزت الله فولادوند) :
مگی : با این وصف، این روزها می بینیم که جوانها باز به همان مکتبها و نویسندگانی -مثل هگل و مارکس و روانکاوی و اگزیستانسیالیسم- علاقه نشان می دهند که در گذشته مورد حمله ی شما بوده اند. توجیه شما برای این قضیه چیست؟
پوپر: در مردم همیشه تمایلی وجود داشته که دنبال حجرالفلاسفه (یا اکسیر) بروند و نسخه ای برای همه ی دردها مطالبه کنند. وضع فعلی تازگی ندارد - البته به استثنای کاهش غم انگیز علاقه به مباحثه عقلی. یکی از دلایلش بی صبری است؛ دلیل دیگرش این احساس است که اینهمه حرف بالاخره به جایی نرسیده است. بنابراین، بحث کردن با مخالفان، دیگر مورد پسند نیست. دیگر کسی در صدد این بر نمی آید که ببیند چه عیب و خطایی در دلایل طرف وجود دارد؛ در عوض، دربست پیرو فلان نظریه ی با ابهت می شود. البته این گرایش قابل درک است ولی اگر به صورت ویژگی روشنفکرهای جوان دربیاید، اسباب تاسف است و نشانه ی اضمحلال ملاکهای فکری و زوال حس مسئولیت عقلی خواهد بود ...
August 15, 2018
Partea a 2-a a cărții "Societatea deschisă și dușmanii ei" continuă analiza ideilor care au marcat societatea modernă, de data aceasta Popper aduce în analiză ideile lui Aristotel, Hegel și Marx combinate cu critica împotriva idolatrizării istoricismului (diferit de istorism - http://ginat-filosofie.blogspot.com/2...).
Analizele sale urmăresc îndeaproape cum ecourile idealismului hegelian se resimt destul de puternic în Europa lui Karl Marx; atacând dialectica lui Hegel, K. Popper atacă o bază de credințe a marxismului cu rădăcini adânci în scrierile hegeliene, anume credința în puterea sa profetică dar și propunerea unei inginerii sociale menită să prestabilească evoluția societății combinată cu impetuozitatea revoluției ca țel suprem de răsturnare a claselor politice. Atacând aceste "profeții" marxiste, Karl Popper denaturează doar o parte a acestei complexe mașinării sociale, căci în ciuda revoltei sale împotriva punctelor slabe, acesta evocă și unele puncte forte ale lui Marx dând exemple cum o parte din ideile sale se regăsesc la baza societăților moderne.
Punctul de convergență al acestor analize în constituie revolta sa împotriva iraționalului care este baza acestor credințe impulsive, dorința, cum ar spune autorul, copilărească de a ne reîntoarce mereu în trecut la o stare de lucruri neschimbătoare, la o societate cum Platon visa, în care totul este predefinit și bine ancorat.
Cartea sa a constituit un element edificator în mentalitatea mea în ceea ce înseamnă istoria, dar cel mai mult m-a frapat stilul său simplist și curajul (cu riscul asumat de a se expune multor critici) de a pune la îndoială filozofiile "tari" al căror spectru este îndeajuns de puternic pentru a nega orice idee de atac împotriva lor, devenind practic niște autorități epistemice.
Karl Popper merită citit nu pentru a căuta răspunsuri stabile ci pentru a căuta modalități de supune criticii ceea ce se acceptă de la sine, ideile platonice, aristotelice, hegeliene și marxiste au fost în cea mai mare parte a derulării istoriei niște idei larg acceptate fără fărâmă de îndoiala asupra adevărului lor.
Analizele sale urmăresc îndeaproape cum ecourile idealismului hegelian se resimt destul de puternic în Europa lui Karl Marx; atacând dialectica lui Hegel, K. Popper atacă o bază de credințe a marxismului cu rădăcini adânci în scrierile hegeliene, anume credința în puterea sa profetică dar și propunerea unei inginerii sociale menită să prestabilească evoluția societății combinată cu impetuozitatea revoluției ca țel suprem de răsturnare a claselor politice. Atacând aceste "profeții" marxiste, Karl Popper denaturează doar o parte a acestei complexe mașinării sociale, căci în ciuda revoltei sale împotriva punctelor slabe, acesta evocă și unele puncte forte ale lui Marx dând exemple cum o parte din ideile sale se regăsesc la baza societăților moderne.
Punctul de convergență al acestor analize în constituie revolta sa împotriva iraționalului care este baza acestor credințe impulsive, dorința, cum ar spune autorul, copilărească de a ne reîntoarce mereu în trecut la o stare de lucruri neschimbătoare, la o societate cum Platon visa, în care totul este predefinit și bine ancorat.
Cartea sa a constituit un element edificator în mentalitatea mea în ceea ce înseamnă istoria, dar cel mai mult m-a frapat stilul său simplist și curajul (cu riscul asumat de a se expune multor critici) de a pune la îndoială filozofiile "tari" al căror spectru este îndeajuns de puternic pentru a nega orice idee de atac împotriva lor, devenind practic niște autorități epistemice.
Karl Popper merită citit nu pentru a căuta răspunsuri stabile ci pentru a căuta modalități de supune criticii ceea ce se acceptă de la sine, ideile platonice, aristotelice, hegeliene și marxiste au fost în cea mai mare parte a derulării istoriei niște idei larg acceptate fără fărâmă de îndoiala asupra adevărului lor.
November 25, 2013
Well, that was a let down. The cranks on Hegel are worth the while, as is the question of the use of history in the last chapter, but everything else...meh. Popper's thoughts on Marx are like a new invention that protects you against spears: not particularly important anymore, because I can't recall the last time I met a legitimate Marxist. Communists, sure, but out and out Marxists? A thing of the past.
Ironically, Popper spends a great deal of time justifying what I see to be the largest threat to society today, the intervention of government to "fix" society by piecemeal changes. I will give Popper credit for recognizing the threat of turning into an all consuming bureaucracy, but he never shows how we'll prevent that.
"But I believe that once the danger is faced squarely, it should be possible to master it [state interventionism]. For this is again merely a problem of social technology and of social piecemeal engineering." To which I noted in the margin, "I don't." Lord Acton put it best: power corrupts. The larger the machinery of state, the less people know and the less precise elections become in preventing and correcting abuses. Eventually, government becomes a black hole of information and accountability.
Time for The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume Three: Popper.
Ironically, Popper spends a great deal of time justifying what I see to be the largest threat to society today, the intervention of government to "fix" society by piecemeal changes. I will give Popper credit for recognizing the threat of turning into an all consuming bureaucracy, but he never shows how we'll prevent that.
"But I believe that once the danger is faced squarely, it should be possible to master it [state interventionism]. For this is again merely a problem of social technology and of social piecemeal engineering." To which I noted in the margin, "I don't." Lord Acton put it best: power corrupts. The larger the machinery of state, the less people know and the less precise elections become in preventing and correcting abuses. Eventually, government becomes a black hole of information and accountability.
Time for The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume Three: Popper.
June 23, 2018
يستأنف بوبر في هذا الجزء ما بدأه في الجزء الأول من نقد النزعة التاريخانية ومنهاجها ومخرجاتها
وهو هنا ينقضّ على هيجل وفلسفته في التاريخ انقضاضا شرسا في حين ينقد ماركس ومذهبه نقدا هادئا أقرب للتصويب والتنقيح منه إلى التقويض
وغاية المؤلف هنا كما ذكرناه في مقالات "صراع النبوءات" هو إقفال فضاء النبوءات التاريخية وإغلاقه تماما بأن ينفي كون التاريخ يمشي وفق نمط متكرر عام شامل، وبنفي ثبات هذا النمط وثبات الطبيعة البشرية.
فكل مساعي المؤلف هنا هي في تعزيز هذا الإقفال وإحكام هذا الختم، وبذلك فآرائه تتخير ما تتبناه من ماركس وأفلاطون وأرسطو وهيجل، وتتخير ما تنقض عليه وتوهنه، والغاية واضحة في كل ذلك وهي إلغاء أي إمكان لوجود معرفة حقيقية في العلم أو غاية منشودة في التاريخ
ومنهج بوبر المعرفي يتقاطع هنا مع نقده للتاريخانية - بل أزعم أن نظريته في المعرفة جاءت خادمة لغايته في التاريخ والسياسة.
والطريف أنه يفصح - واعيا بإفصاحه- من أن الغاية المنشودة للبشرية هي الوصول إلى المجتمع المفتوح الذي يلغي أي غاية للبشرية، وهو تناقض يعتز به بوبر بحيث يذكره في آخر نقده للتاريخانية ونبوءاتها ذكرا واضحا ...
وهو هنا ينقضّ على هيجل وفلسفته في التاريخ انقضاضا شرسا في حين ينقد ماركس ومذهبه نقدا هادئا أقرب للتصويب والتنقيح منه إلى التقويض
وغاية المؤلف هنا كما ذكرناه في مقالات "صراع النبوءات" هو إقفال فضاء النبوءات التاريخية وإغلاقه تماما بأن ينفي كون التاريخ يمشي وفق نمط متكرر عام شامل، وبنفي ثبات هذا النمط وثبات الطبيعة البشرية.
فكل مساعي المؤلف هنا هي في تعزيز هذا الإقفال وإحكام هذا الختم، وبذلك فآرائه تتخير ما تتبناه من ماركس وأفلاطون وأرسطو وهيجل، وتتخير ما تنقض عليه وتوهنه، والغاية واضحة في كل ذلك وهي إلغاء أي إمكان لوجود معرفة حقيقية في العلم أو غاية منشودة في التاريخ
ومنهج بوبر المعرفي يتقاطع هنا مع نقده للتاريخانية - بل أزعم أن نظريته في المعرفة جاءت خادمة لغايته في التاريخ والسياسة.
والطريف أنه يفصح - واعيا بإفصاحه- من أن الغاية المنشودة للبشرية هي الوصول إلى المجتمع المفتوح الذي يلغي أي غاية للبشرية، وهو تناقض يعتز به بوبر بحيث يذكره في آخر نقده للتاريخانية ونبوءاتها ذكرا واضحا ...
Shelved as 'read-in-part'
June 28, 2016…no sólo es imposible evitar un punto de vista selectivo, sino también que toda tentativa de hacerlo es indeseable, pues de lograrlo, no obtendríamos una descripción más “objetiva” sino tan sólo un mero cúmulo de enunciados totalmente inconexos.
Prognosis: enunciado que describe un suceso, explicación causal
Prognosis específica: conclusión
Ciencias históricas: ciencias que se interesan en hechos específicos y en su ‘explicación, en contraposición a las ciencias generalizadoras.
Lógica de la situación: las personas cuerdas actúan, por lo común, en forma más o menos racional.
no puede haber historia de “el pasado tal como ocurrió en la realidad”; sólo puede haber interpretaciones históricas y ninguna de ellas definitiva.
Los hechos, como tales, carecen de significado; sólo pueden adquirirlo a través de nuestras decisiones.
Filosofía de la Historia. Capítulo 25.
Prognosis: enunciado que describe un suceso, explicación causal
Prognosis específica: conclusión
Ciencias históricas: ciencias que se interesan en hechos específicos y en su ‘explicación, en contraposición a las ciencias generalizadoras.
Lógica de la situación: las personas cuerdas actúan, por lo común, en forma más o menos racional.
no puede haber historia de “el pasado tal como ocurrió en la realidad”; sólo puede haber interpretaciones históricas y ninguna de ellas definitiva.
Los hechos, como tales, carecen de significado; sólo pueden adquirirlo a través de nuestras decisiones.
Filosofía de la Historia. Capítulo 25.
June 27, 2014
If readers would also read this, in advance or after reading Popper, they would ultimately conclude that this critique is a hatchet job:
[Walter Kaufmann, Beacon Press, Boston 1959, page 88-119, Chapter 7: The Hegel Myth and Its Method]
http://www.marxists.org/reference/sub...
Popper completely misunderstands Hegel, and if you want a serious criticism of Marx, you should look to Leszek Kołakowski - a far better and more reasonable criticism of the communist logic.
[Walter Kaufmann, Beacon Press, Boston 1959, page 88-119, Chapter 7: The Hegel Myth and Its Method]
http://www.marxists.org/reference/sub...
Popper completely misunderstands Hegel, and if you want a serious criticism of Marx, you should look to Leszek Kołakowski - a far better and more reasonable criticism of the communist logic.
October 16, 2007
Still reading currently. Will definitely have more to say about it when I'm done. Given the time frame this is written in, Popper is talking about issues between liberal democracy and the communism-based totalitarian states. But really, a lot of what he's talking about is also applicable to religion and tribalism-based totalitarianism and is, thus, still pretty relevant today.
May 29, 2008
I thought that this book was great (both Volume 1 and 2, although people more frequently refer to Volume 2, likely since it discusses Marxism which seems to be more near and dear to people's hearts). Popper wrote The Open Society during World War II when he thought that Europe might soon be under a totalitarian regime.
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