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Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will
An evolutionary case for the existence of free willScientists are learning more and more about how brain activity controls behavior and how neural circuits weigh alternatives and initiate actions. As we probe ever deeper into the mechanics of decision making, many conclude that agency—or free will—is an illusion. In Free Agents, leading neuroscientist Kevin Mitchell presents a wealth of evidence to the contrary, arguing that we are not mere machines responding to physical forces but agents acting with purpose.Traversing billions of years of evolution, Mitchell tells the remarkable story of how living beings capable of choice arose from lifeless matter. He explains how the emergence of nervous systems provided a means to learn about the world, granting sentient animals the capacity to model, predict, and simulate. Mitchell reveals how these faculties reached their peak in humans with our abilities to imagine and to be introspective, to reason in the moment, and to shape our possible futures through the exercise of our individual agency. Mitchell’s argument has important implications—for how we understand decision making, for how our individual agency can be enhanced or infringed, for how we think about collective agency in the face of global crises, and for how we consider the limitations and future of artificial intelligence.An astonishing journey of discovery, Free Agents offers a new framework for understanding how, across a billion years of Earth history, life evolved the power to choose, and why it matters.
342 pages, Kindle Edition
Published October 3, 2023
About the author
Kevin J. Mitchell
6 books49 followersKevin J. Mitchell is associate professor at the Smurfit Institute of Genetics and the Institute of Neuroscience at Trinity College Dublin. He is a graduate of the Genetics Department, Trinity College Dublin and received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 45 reviews
November 6, 2023
It appears that late 2023 is a particularly active time in debates about consciousness and free will. Recently, eminent proponents of free will and determinism like Erik Hoel and Robert Sapolsky, respectively, have made their cases in recent books, The World Behind the World and Determined. And a collection of consciousness researchers have publicly inveighed against a theory of consciousness, integrated information theory, that has been invoked to make arguments for free will. This free-will-discourse tinderbox seems to have been lit by recent developments in AI along with the increasingly hegemonic presence of scientific and technological innovation in our daily lives. Our technological age seems almost naturally to suggest that we ourselves are machines of flesh and blood.
But Kevin J. Mitchell would like a word. His latest book, Free Agents, is "a naturalistic framework for thinking about agency and free will." In concise and clear fashion, Mitchell walks readers through millennia of evolution, the physiology of the brain, and myriad philosophical ideas about agency in order to illustrate just how said agency emerged in complex organisms. His model is persuasive, although unfortunately incomplete. Of course, there would be no fruitful debate to be had if significant ambiguity wasn't extant.
Mitchell argues that organisms "cannot be understood as static machines or instantaneous arrangements of matter: instead, they are patterns of interlocking dynamical processes that actively persist through time." The pressures to persist and reproduce (natural selection) drove unfeeling and undirected processes that increased the complexity of life over time. With this complexity came the coding of stimuli into good and bad boxes (valence), the integration of many environmental stimuli in a control system (a central nervous system), the specialization of cells and cell states, the representation of the environment within organisms, simulation of possible events in a mapped environment, and eventually an abstract and recursive map of mental experience itself. Mitchell argues this final step of reasoning about reasons along with the indefiniteness of the basic rules of matter allow agency to facilitate through physical mechanisms. We act for reasons, and these reasons emerge from the collection of our experiences, the goals we've set (via metacognition), our innate proclivities, and the set of choices available to us in any situation.
There's ostensibly a great deal of scientific and philosophical merit to Mitchell's thesis. It is truly a scientific defense of free will, which was something particularly difficult to pull off (with a scientific audience) a decade ago. The erudition and clarity with which Mitchell handles complex concepts is praise worthy. However, there is also a nagging measure of incompleteness to the work, including the partial vulnerability of Mitchell's argument to future discovery.
What if there are fields of science that can reliably predict complex behavioral and social outcomes in humans? What if general intelligence and consciousness is achieved artificially and those entities are clearly without agency? What if the mechanisms of consciousness and metacognition are entirely illuminated and shown to be entirely outside of conscious control? Now, I think definitive answers to the questions above are unlikely, but they can't entirely be ruled out either. However, it is also possible many of Mitchell's claims would survive such developments (I think to some extent his case anticipates these issues just doesn't quite respond completely). Nonetheless, Free Agent is a provocative and special contribution to the discourse on free will. And it is certainly also a balm of sorts to the human condition to be reminded of the power and importance of will.
Extended review on Substack
But Kevin J. Mitchell would like a word. His latest book, Free Agents, is "a naturalistic framework for thinking about agency and free will." In concise and clear fashion, Mitchell walks readers through millennia of evolution, the physiology of the brain, and myriad philosophical ideas about agency in order to illustrate just how said agency emerged in complex organisms. His model is persuasive, although unfortunately incomplete. Of course, there would be no fruitful debate to be had if significant ambiguity wasn't extant.
Mitchell argues that organisms "cannot be understood as static machines or instantaneous arrangements of matter: instead, they are patterns of interlocking dynamical processes that actively persist through time." The pressures to persist and reproduce (natural selection) drove unfeeling and undirected processes that increased the complexity of life over time. With this complexity came the coding of stimuli into good and bad boxes (valence), the integration of many environmental stimuli in a control system (a central nervous system), the specialization of cells and cell states, the representation of the environment within organisms, simulation of possible events in a mapped environment, and eventually an abstract and recursive map of mental experience itself. Mitchell argues this final step of reasoning about reasons along with the indefiniteness of the basic rules of matter allow agency to facilitate through physical mechanisms. We act for reasons, and these reasons emerge from the collection of our experiences, the goals we've set (via metacognition), our innate proclivities, and the set of choices available to us in any situation.
There's ostensibly a great deal of scientific and philosophical merit to Mitchell's thesis. It is truly a scientific defense of free will, which was something particularly difficult to pull off (with a scientific audience) a decade ago. The erudition and clarity with which Mitchell handles complex concepts is praise worthy. However, there is also a nagging measure of incompleteness to the work, including the partial vulnerability of Mitchell's argument to future discovery.
What if there are fields of science that can reliably predict complex behavioral and social outcomes in humans? What if general intelligence and consciousness is achieved artificially and those entities are clearly without agency? What if the mechanisms of consciousness and metacognition are entirely illuminated and shown to be entirely outside of conscious control? Now, I think definitive answers to the questions above are unlikely, but they can't entirely be ruled out either. However, it is also possible many of Mitchell's claims would survive such developments (I think to some extent his case anticipates these issues just doesn't quite respond completely). Nonetheless, Free Agent is a provocative and special contribution to the discourse on free will. And it is certainly also a balm of sorts to the human condition to be reminded of the power and importance of will.
Extended review on Substack
November 25, 2023
Whether we have free will is one of those thorny, endlessly debated philosophical questions. The author’s perspective is that not only we do have free will, but there’s an obvious evolutionary path to free will. If the world is deterministic, then of course, everything is preordained. But quantum mechanics already showed that nature is fundamentally probabilistic. And this was intuited as far back as Epicurus who claims atoms have to “swerve” in their path. To obtain certain reward in a probabilistic environment requires some algorithm (e.g., “if unsuccessful try again”). The book charted the path of how cells, sensors, neurons, and concept of self were all advantageous to the persistence of organisms and thus evolutionarily selected. Subsequently, a decision making process that can simulate the risk and reward of actions also evolved. Coupled with memory and long-term reinforcement learning, this decision making process becomes, in a nutshell, our free will.
Good story telling all around. Of course, this will probably not end the debate of whether we have free will. But I’m sold.
Good story telling all around. Of course, this will probably not end the debate of whether we have free will. But I’m sold.
December 30, 2023
Este ano foi fértil na luta entre os defensores do determinismo e os do livre-arbítrio, com o livro "Determined" (2023) de Sapolsky a defender o primeiro, e o livro de Kevin Mitchell, "Free Agents" (2023), o segundo. Ambos são neurocientistas, Sapolsky na Universidade de Stanford, Mitchell no Trinity College de Dublin. Sobre o primeiro livro, já aqui dei conta, sobre o segundo, aconselho a leiturada da síntese de Bailey para a Reason. A meio de "Free Agents", cansei-me totalmente desta discussão. Já me tinha saturado com Sapolsky, mas agora decidi mesmo não voltar tão depressa a este tema. Cada lado dedica-se apenas e só a listar exaustivamente pontos que consideram essenciais e que demonstram como a razão está do seu lado. Contudo, a culpa não é deles, é do debate, do quão desprovido de sentido está.
O texto continua no blog: https://narrativax.blogspot.com/2023/...
O texto continua no blog: https://narrativax.blogspot.com/2023/...
November 16, 2023
My review can be found here: http://www.mathemafrica.org/?p=17167
January 19, 2024
I liked the book, there was a lot of interesting stuff about the evolution of cognition and consciousness starting from single-celled creatures. The main point of the book, I guess, is re-hashing the battle over Free Will. (His position is pro Free Will.) Some of his points are interesting but I’m not convinced and I’m getting increasingly certain that the whole conflict is useless and that nobody’s definition of “Free Will” is really the same anyway. But despite that the book was enjoyable and educational.
I liked the author’s first book “Innate” even more - it explains the process of how identical twins grow up to be different from each other, even though their DNA is identical and even if their upbringing and childhood experiences are very similar.
I liked the author’s first book “Innate” even more - it explains the process of how identical twins grow up to be different from each other, even though their DNA is identical and even if their upbringing and childhood experiences are very similar.
February 14, 2024
I read this as a counterpoint to Sapolsky's Determined which takes the opposite point of view, as a response to a kinda-sorta challenge from my brother in law.
The best thing about the book is it starts with the big issue I thought Sapolsky overlooked--what is free will, and what is meant by an agent that has free will. That's hugely helpful and produces interesting insights along the way--such as, it's hard to talk about an action if you don't have an agent causing that action. Without that, you just have rocks banging into each other. When we talk about an action we assume intent and purpose.
For that, Mitchell defines an organism not as a physical entity--because the physical elements can and do get swapped out over time--but as a collection of coordinated processes that perpetuate themselves over time, keeping themselves separate from the universe at large. That then gives us a locus for intent--the organism wants to perpetuate itself, and ultimately, can make decisions about how best to do so.
Mitchell reviews the evolutionary process from single-cell organisms through the development of nervous systems and eventually the human brain. This is long but interesting in itself and, more important for his argument, is useful to show in some detail how choice and decision-making are instantiated in the meatware of the brain. He's also got a good bit about how choice and creativity can come out of this meatware, through elements that propose choices semi-randomly and other elements that evaluate and choose--rather like how random mutation and natural selection work together in evolution itself.
This also creates a use for the concepts of randomness at the quantum level and of chaotic systems. Fundamental randomness means the system isn't predictable, even in theory; and the brain being a chaotic system means even without the randomness we wouldn't be able to predict any particular outcome. Because he considers the organism to be exactly the emergent, interacting processes rather than the physical neurons, this provides a way to talk about choice and free will that's based on the material brain without being bound by it.
But his weakest argument, I think, is when he talks about those elements as providing "space for" free will even within a system bound by physical laws. I don't know what that's supposed to mean. Randomness is still randomness, and doesn't make for will of any sort. Randomness feeding a decision-making apparatus still produces a result based on that apparatus which, predictable or not, doesn't obviously mean it is capable of choosing differently than it did.
He does make a convincing argument that all these mechanisms, as a complex, chaotic system in the technical sense, produce an organism whose behavior can't be predicted. The only way to know what it will do is to let it go and see what it did do. Is that free will? Maybe?
It's similar to an argument CS Lewis (and Milton) made about God's foreknowledge. If God foresees all, does that eliminate free will? No, says Lewis. To see someone do something is not to make them do it, even if you see it in advance. Even if time is laid out like the Bayeux Tapestry, God is just looking at it, not making all the decisions along the way.
Maybe deterministic reality is like that--yeah, it could be laid out like the tapestry, every event fixed in eternity. But every event only happens as it did/does/will because of the choices made by the causal agents along the way, and those choices were the embodiment of their will. To see something happen is not to make it happen.
The best thing about the book is it starts with the big issue I thought Sapolsky overlooked--what is free will, and what is meant by an agent that has free will. That's hugely helpful and produces interesting insights along the way--such as, it's hard to talk about an action if you don't have an agent causing that action. Without that, you just have rocks banging into each other. When we talk about an action we assume intent and purpose.
For that, Mitchell defines an organism not as a physical entity--because the physical elements can and do get swapped out over time--but as a collection of coordinated processes that perpetuate themselves over time, keeping themselves separate from the universe at large. That then gives us a locus for intent--the organism wants to perpetuate itself, and ultimately, can make decisions about how best to do so.
Mitchell reviews the evolutionary process from single-cell organisms through the development of nervous systems and eventually the human brain. This is long but interesting in itself and, more important for his argument, is useful to show in some detail how choice and decision-making are instantiated in the meatware of the brain. He's also got a good bit about how choice and creativity can come out of this meatware, through elements that propose choices semi-randomly and other elements that evaluate and choose--rather like how random mutation and natural selection work together in evolution itself.
This also creates a use for the concepts of randomness at the quantum level and of chaotic systems. Fundamental randomness means the system isn't predictable, even in theory; and the brain being a chaotic system means even without the randomness we wouldn't be able to predict any particular outcome. Because he considers the organism to be exactly the emergent, interacting processes rather than the physical neurons, this provides a way to talk about choice and free will that's based on the material brain without being bound by it.
But his weakest argument, I think, is when he talks about those elements as providing "space for" free will even within a system bound by physical laws. I don't know what that's supposed to mean. Randomness is still randomness, and doesn't make for will of any sort. Randomness feeding a decision-making apparatus still produces a result based on that apparatus which, predictable or not, doesn't obviously mean it is capable of choosing differently than it did.
He does make a convincing argument that all these mechanisms, as a complex, chaotic system in the technical sense, produce an organism whose behavior can't be predicted. The only way to know what it will do is to let it go and see what it did do. Is that free will? Maybe?
It's similar to an argument CS Lewis (and Milton) made about God's foreknowledge. If God foresees all, does that eliminate free will? No, says Lewis. To see someone do something is not to make them do it, even if you see it in advance. Even if time is laid out like the Bayeux Tapestry, God is just looking at it, not making all the decisions along the way.
Maybe deterministic reality is like that--yeah, it could be laid out like the tapestry, every event fixed in eternity. But every event only happens as it did/does/will because of the choices made by the causal agents along the way, and those choices were the embodiment of their will. To see something happen is not to make it happen.
October 18, 2023
Una buena lectura complementaria es The Evolution of Agency: Behavioral Organization from Lizards to Humans de Michael Tomasello.
April 25, 2024
Immediately after reading Robert Sapolsky’s
Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will
I was interested in hearing the “opposite” perspective on the topic, ideally, from the point of view of another neurobiologist. Enter: Kevin J. Mitchell, whose book came out the same month as Sapolsky’s and for anyone interested, he debated both Sapolsky and Susan Blackmore on the issue.
Short version: “Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Will”
Kevin Mitchell sets out to “naturalize” the concept of Free Will. He rejects Dualism and Libertarian Free Will and begins by re-defining Free Will to essentially mean the capacity of the organism “as a whole” for self-control and rational deliberation. He grounds the emergency of such agency on an evolutionary narrative, evocative of Daniel Dennett’s approach in “Freedom Evolves”. So far so good.
Well, actually, Mitchell wants a bit more than that. He wants to break from Compatibilist notions – which he considered to be incoherent – and instead, establish a type of “could have done otherwise” Free Will. To this end, he challenges Determinism by primarily invoking Quantum Mechanics and arguing that the universe is under-determined at any given time and that this provides the “causal slack” necessary for the evolution of Free Will. In the process, he conflates Causal Determinism with Predeterminism and does not provide a convincing account of how indeterminacy makes room for Free Will nor does he provide an account on how biological organisms could escape Causality, which is arguably the main question at hand, especially if “Determinism is false” and “Compatibilism is incoherent”.
For this reason, Mitchell proposes a two-stage model based on “conscious cognitive control”, “top-down” or “mental” causation and adds some “random noise” in the mix that can give rise to novel thoughts or break habitual patterns when necessary. Ultimately, I do not think that his model gives us the “could have done otherwise” Free Will that he wants. In short,: 1) he conflates “would have done otherwise” with “could have done otherwise”. 2) Top-down causation does not mean the “I”, the “conscious Self”, do the “causing”. 3) More importantly “Conscious cognitive control” is asserted without enough evidence to back it up, while opposing evidence – for instance Daniel Wegner’s “The Illusion of Conscious Will” – are not seriously considered.
Kevin Mitchel gathers the pieces but does not put them together. There are missing parts so that the reader can fill a belief in Free Will. Unfortunately, these gaps rely on conflation, internal contradictions and ignoring opposing evidence. For a naturalistic defense of free will, maybe you’d be better off reading Dennett’s “Freedom Evolves” or “Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting”.
For a longer version, feel free to read my semi-organised notes and thoughts below.
The evolution of agency
Keving Mitchell begins with the beginning of life on Earth. From the first simple replicators, the first living organisms, the first neurons, all the way up to human beings. Living organisms are not passive entities, pushed around by external stimuli. Even the simplests living organisms require energy to fuel their existence and battle against entropy. The world is complicated and in perpetual flux. This necessitates some means to sense their surroundings in order to respond appropriately to dynamic situations. Even simple organisms have to derive behaviors driven by their intrinsic motivations (e.g., eat, survive, propagate). If they did not, they couldn’t survive and propagate. Organisms that can not persist, do not. Thus, even the simplest organisms exhibit rudimentary decision-making capabilities and agency.
Furthermore, neural systems have the advantage of learning from experience, what are some useful strategies for surviving, mating and even living in groups. On top of that, cognition, the ability to deliberate or meta-cognition, having thoughts about thoughts, can help organisms navigate and adapt to even more complicated, natural and social, environments.
Thoughts are not “mere” neural firings, but meaningful patterns of neural activity that can have causal effect onto the organism and onto the world. Furthermore, brains evolved with the ability to even make long term plans and have the necessary self-control to carry them through. Mitchell provides a plausible evolutionary account of agency and how these mechanisms could have emerged through the process of natural selection.
Naturalizing Free Will
That is all well and good! But Mitchell doesn’t stop there. That’s not the goal of the book. Instead, he argues that we are FREE agents and that through evolution we gained the ability of Free Will. Not libertarian Free Will. Mitchell wants to “naturalize” the Self and Free Will, aka reject Dualism (there is no immaterial soul thinking the thoughts and making the decisions) and instead provide naturalistic accounts for these concepts. Instead, “I” as a whole organism, as an embodied brain, make decisions.
This argument should sound very familiar to anyone who has read Compatibilists, especially Daniel Dennet. In Freedom Evolves (2003), Dennett provides a similar account of how evolution creates little controllers. Dennett “notoriously” (for some) redefines Free Will to mean essentially the ability of self-control and rational deliberation. If an agent’s intentions align with their will and there is no external coercion or internal pathologies and if the agent has the ability to control their will and deliberate and reason over alternatives, we can speak of free will in a pragmatic sense required for moral responsibility. This type of free will comes in various degrees according to Dennett.
However, Mitchell considers this line of thinking to be incoherent. We can’t hold people responsible if they “could not have done otherwise”. Thus, he wants to dispute Determinism and maintain a sort of “could have done otherwise” free will while maintaining a naturalistic/materialist framework.
Determinism vs Indeterminism
For Mitchell there is no reason to accept that the Universe is deterministic. Quantum randomness and Chaos Theory show that the universe is under-determined at any given time. He does not make the naive claim that “quantum randomness = free will”. If quantum effects bubble up and affect my behavior, this would not be “free and willed choice”.
Instead, Mitchell contends that randomness provides some “causal slack” in the system that is necessary for Free Will. He claims that this “flips the script”. “We don’t need to ask where freedom comes from. Freedom comes for free. It’s just in the universe. But now we have to ask something else… How can an organism control what happens? Of all these possibilities, how can it make what it wants to happen?”
Mitchell’s claim about indeterminism is debatable. It depends on specific interpretations of quantum mechanics, and assumptions that these effects appear and have effects at the macro-level. But let’s grant them for the moment. Ultimately, I don't think that the “Determinism vs Indeterminism” debate has much bearing on Free Will. The real question is about Causality. If biological, human brains could escape Causality (including random causes). And I doubt that they can.
Two-stage model + Indeterminism = Free Will?
Mitchell supports a Two stage model, when faced with an important decision, various alternatives are generated, filtered through various mechanisms (stage one) and afterwards the agent can deliberate over these possibilities and choose (stage two).
During the first stage, the agent may have no direct control over the generated alternatives. Alternatives arise in combination given the current circumstances Randomness or noise in the brain can affect the generation. Some of these alternatives may be filtered out given the agent’s past (e.g., personality). During the second stage, the agent can deliberate, reason for and against each alternative, weigh their pros and cons and make a decision. For Mitchell, randomness and “noise” in the brain can help the system break from habitual neural pathways and lead to novel thoughts.
Let’s consider the Quintessential philosophical question: Coffee or Tea?. Let’s imagine that I have formed a daily habit. Each morning, I wake up and go to the nearest coffee shop to grab an espresso. However, this morning, while going to the coffee shop, I recalled an article that I read last night about some supposed negative side effects of drinking coffee. So now I have to make a decision. Should I grab an espresso or something else?
[Stage 1] Generation of alternatives: [Coffee, Black Tea, Green Tea]
Given the circumstances and my prior experience and preferences, the brain does not even consider choices such as Beer, Kombucha, Mate or Cocoa with dairy milk. It’s early in the morning so i wouldn’t choose Beer.The store doesn’t provide Kombucha or Mate. Nor do I really like them. Being Vegan for 10+ years, the brain does not even consider a dairy-based option as a candidate. So here I am. Three alternatives enter conscious experience and I deliberate over them. E.g.:
“Well I like the taste of coffee but it makes me jittery sometimes”
…
“Green tea is ok but i’d like something to wake me up a bit”
…
“Let’s have a black tea” (Stage 2).
So, I enter the coffee shop. The barista asks me “what would you like?”. I reply: “I’ll have a black tea” .
A Determinist would say that, if we rolled back the tape of life, the outcome would not change. If we could go back to the moment that I started from my home with the intention to grab a coffee while maintaining ALL factors the same, every atom in the universe is exactly as it was, then the exact thing will happen, a million times over. I will have the same candidate options, the same thoughts will arise in my brain and I will choose to buy a black team every single time.
The indeterminist would say: “Aha! But there are random quantum fluctuations bubbling up to the macro scale. There is “random noise” in the brain. The universe is “chaotic” and complex.” Does this give us Free Will? Well! Let’s say that while walking some random event causes a novel thought to arise in my brain and I end up with a different choice. A flicker of light hits my retina, I notice that a new option has been added to the menu, Chai Latte with oat milk. “Great! I want to change things up. I’ll have that!”. So in this case: I did otherwise. And I would do otherwise many times over. But what does this have to do with Free Will? In all scenarios, I did not have control over the random events that altered my behavior, nor about the thoughts that arose as a result.
I know such examples seem inconsequential but I think they are illustrative and the same logic can be applied to truly meaningful decisions. “Would do otherwise” is different from “could do otherwise” and the former is not really an indication of Free Will and ”Really Free Choices”. Unless thought processes can be shown to somehow be independent of the chain of Causality, I do not see how any such Two Stage model can give us the type of Free Will. Only if we were talking about a Compatibilist definition, which Mitchell explicitly denies.
Time + Self Control = Free Will? Or, “On Building Character”
Okay, so maybe we do not have “true” control at any given moment. But how about over time? Let’s consider habits. For Mitchell, habits are learned adaptations to our environment. They can be very useful in guiding behavior. I’ve built good habits since childhood of having a nutritious breakfast each morning and brushing my teeth. Now, I don’t have to deliberate each day on these issues and I can spend my time on other more important things. But of course, some habits are not as useful or can be destructive. Human beings, or atleast many of us, have the ability to recognise bad habits and work to overcome them and replace them with better habits. To some extent at least. Breaking habits require continuous and repeated effort. For Mitchell, we may be biological organisms who are shaped by our biology, environment and our past experience, but we also have the ability to shape and change our habits and shape our Character to some extent. By extension, our Character will shape and influence our future decisions.
Mitchell acknowledges that some people may be better than others at that and some may not have that ability at all. But if we accept the previous argument, that we can’t make “Really Free Choice” in the moment, aka our choices can not escape causality, then how can we speak about making choices over time and be responsible for building our Character?
Moreover, this type of self-control can be affected by multiple factors including being hungry, lacking sleep, hormonal levels etc, it can be depleted and manipulated and we can not “will” to have more self-control in any given moment. It is a matter of “Moral Luck”: to have had the appropriate genetic material, brain anatomy, upbringing, etc in order to develop the ability of self-control and to make “good decisions” that will contribute to building a “better” Character.
“Willing what we will”
Mitchell also criticizes the famous Arthur Schopenhauer quote: “Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills”. Instead, Mitchell posits that we change our will and motivations all the time. We can deliberate, “do I want to be this sort of person?” and we can change course of action. For instance: I am hungry. I want to order a burger. But then I contend: “Do I want to be this person?”. “I should eat something more healthy” and “I should save money” -> “Let’s cook something healthy and inexpensive”. But isn’t that just another “will”? How was that “will” selected and prevailed over the others? I would contend that it just arose as all the other “wills”, based on prior causes.
Top-down Causation and Conscious Cognitive Control
So far my criticism of Mitchell’s argument may sound overly critical. My criticism relies on the idea that “Really Free Choice” does not make sense under a non-dualist and naturalistic framework. Mitchell could consider a Compatibilist account of agency, but he considers it incoherent and wants a naturalistic version of “could have done otherwise” Free WIll. That’s why I insist on the incoherence of “Really Free Choice” in Mithcell’s account. His last resort is “conscious cognitive control” and top-down causation. He says (46:00): “I am consciously deciding what I am going to say, lifting my hand up and putting it down, and I know that I am conscious of my reasons for doing these things because I can articulate them. So, we have this meta-cognition which allows us to reason about our reasons …”
So Mitchell sets out to naturalize the Self and Free Will. To conceptualize Free Will as a characteristic that the human being, as a total organism, possesses. But he wants more. He says that Free Will is “Conscious Cognitive Control” or “Conscious Rational Control” but this is just asserted. No evidence provided. And evidence negating his position are not seriously considered. There is no serious discussion on the experiments that would show the problems with the idea of the conscious will. For instance, Daniel Wegner, in “The illusion of conscious will” draws from various experiments, from Ramachandran, Penfield, Delgado and others, to show how we produce post-hoc rationalizations to justify our behavior while maintaining the sense of ownership.
Mitchell makes a big deal of “top-down” or “mental” causation. I hear in the news about a terrible accident, the information is propagated, deciphered and interpreted by the brain and causes an emotional reaction. In this sense, the “top” (meaning) caused the “down” (emotional response). But, firstly I had no control over this process. The “conscious self” did not make the choice to have an emotional response. The emotional response was caused by the interpretation of information and its associated neural activity. Similarly, the conscious experience and the emotional response could be mere correlations and that the former is not necessary for the latter. For instance, consider how sub-liminal or implicit biases can arise that can cause emotional responses even without conscious awareness. But there is no explanation how the conscious experience produced by a mechanical brain, could have itself causal power, somehow independent of these processes.
I mean, Mitchell could be right. There may be some central Self that we’ve missed which exhibits actual conscious control of our thoughts and actions. But that should be somehow demonstrated. It can not simply be asserted and assumed true - if we want a scientific account for Free Will. However, if we deny Dualism and the materialist Cartesian Theater, I'd say that “conscious cognitive control” may be rather limited, unless we can demonstrate some type of “strong emergence” which also sounds somewhat unlikely to me.
(Continues Below)
Short version: “Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Will”
Kevin Mitchell sets out to “naturalize” the concept of Free Will. He rejects Dualism and Libertarian Free Will and begins by re-defining Free Will to essentially mean the capacity of the organism “as a whole” for self-control and rational deliberation. He grounds the emergency of such agency on an evolutionary narrative, evocative of Daniel Dennett’s approach in “Freedom Evolves”. So far so good.
Well, actually, Mitchell wants a bit more than that. He wants to break from Compatibilist notions – which he considered to be incoherent – and instead, establish a type of “could have done otherwise” Free Will. To this end, he challenges Determinism by primarily invoking Quantum Mechanics and arguing that the universe is under-determined at any given time and that this provides the “causal slack” necessary for the evolution of Free Will. In the process, he conflates Causal Determinism with Predeterminism and does not provide a convincing account of how indeterminacy makes room for Free Will nor does he provide an account on how biological organisms could escape Causality, which is arguably the main question at hand, especially if “Determinism is false” and “Compatibilism is incoherent”.
For this reason, Mitchell proposes a two-stage model based on “conscious cognitive control”, “top-down” or “mental” causation and adds some “random noise” in the mix that can give rise to novel thoughts or break habitual patterns when necessary. Ultimately, I do not think that his model gives us the “could have done otherwise” Free Will that he wants. In short,: 1) he conflates “would have done otherwise” with “could have done otherwise”. 2) Top-down causation does not mean the “I”, the “conscious Self”, do the “causing”. 3) More importantly “Conscious cognitive control” is asserted without enough evidence to back it up, while opposing evidence – for instance Daniel Wegner’s “The Illusion of Conscious Will” – are not seriously considered.
Kevin Mitchel gathers the pieces but does not put them together. There are missing parts so that the reader can fill a belief in Free Will. Unfortunately, these gaps rely on conflation, internal contradictions and ignoring opposing evidence. For a naturalistic defense of free will, maybe you’d be better off reading Dennett’s “Freedom Evolves” or “Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting”.
For a longer version, feel free to read my semi-organised notes and thoughts below.
The evolution of agency
Keving Mitchell begins with the beginning of life on Earth. From the first simple replicators, the first living organisms, the first neurons, all the way up to human beings. Living organisms are not passive entities, pushed around by external stimuli. Even the simplests living organisms require energy to fuel their existence and battle against entropy. The world is complicated and in perpetual flux. This necessitates some means to sense their surroundings in order to respond appropriately to dynamic situations. Even simple organisms have to derive behaviors driven by their intrinsic motivations (e.g., eat, survive, propagate). If they did not, they couldn’t survive and propagate. Organisms that can not persist, do not. Thus, even the simplest organisms exhibit rudimentary decision-making capabilities and agency.
Furthermore, neural systems have the advantage of learning from experience, what are some useful strategies for surviving, mating and even living in groups. On top of that, cognition, the ability to deliberate or meta-cognition, having thoughts about thoughts, can help organisms navigate and adapt to even more complicated, natural and social, environments.
Thoughts are not “mere” neural firings, but meaningful patterns of neural activity that can have causal effect onto the organism and onto the world. Furthermore, brains evolved with the ability to even make long term plans and have the necessary self-control to carry them through. Mitchell provides a plausible evolutionary account of agency and how these mechanisms could have emerged through the process of natural selection.
Naturalizing Free Will
That is all well and good! But Mitchell doesn’t stop there. That’s not the goal of the book. Instead, he argues that we are FREE agents and that through evolution we gained the ability of Free Will. Not libertarian Free Will. Mitchell wants to “naturalize” the Self and Free Will, aka reject Dualism (there is no immaterial soul thinking the thoughts and making the decisions) and instead provide naturalistic accounts for these concepts. Instead, “I” as a whole organism, as an embodied brain, make decisions.
This argument should sound very familiar to anyone who has read Compatibilists, especially Daniel Dennet. In Freedom Evolves (2003), Dennett provides a similar account of how evolution creates little controllers. Dennett “notoriously” (for some) redefines Free Will to mean essentially the ability of self-control and rational deliberation. If an agent’s intentions align with their will and there is no external coercion or internal pathologies and if the agent has the ability to control their will and deliberate and reason over alternatives, we can speak of free will in a pragmatic sense required for moral responsibility. This type of free will comes in various degrees according to Dennett.
However, Mitchell considers this line of thinking to be incoherent. We can’t hold people responsible if they “could not have done otherwise”. Thus, he wants to dispute Determinism and maintain a sort of “could have done otherwise” free will while maintaining a naturalistic/materialist framework.
Determinism vs Indeterminism
For Mitchell there is no reason to accept that the Universe is deterministic. Quantum randomness and Chaos Theory show that the universe is under-determined at any given time. He does not make the naive claim that “quantum randomness = free will”. If quantum effects bubble up and affect my behavior, this would not be “free and willed choice”.
Instead, Mitchell contends that randomness provides some “causal slack” in the system that is necessary for Free Will. He claims that this “flips the script”. “We don’t need to ask where freedom comes from. Freedom comes for free. It’s just in the universe. But now we have to ask something else… How can an organism control what happens? Of all these possibilities, how can it make what it wants to happen?”
Mitchell’s claim about indeterminism is debatable. It depends on specific interpretations of quantum mechanics, and assumptions that these effects appear and have effects at the macro-level. But let’s grant them for the moment. Ultimately, I don't think that the “Determinism vs Indeterminism” debate has much bearing on Free Will. The real question is about Causality. If biological, human brains could escape Causality (including random causes). And I doubt that they can.
Two-stage model + Indeterminism = Free Will?
Mitchell supports a Two stage model, when faced with an important decision, various alternatives are generated, filtered through various mechanisms (stage one) and afterwards the agent can deliberate over these possibilities and choose (stage two).
During the first stage, the agent may have no direct control over the generated alternatives. Alternatives arise in combination given the current circumstances Randomness or noise in the brain can affect the generation. Some of these alternatives may be filtered out given the agent’s past (e.g., personality). During the second stage, the agent can deliberate, reason for and against each alternative, weigh their pros and cons and make a decision. For Mitchell, randomness and “noise” in the brain can help the system break from habitual neural pathways and lead to novel thoughts.
Let’s consider the Quintessential philosophical question: Coffee or Tea?. Let’s imagine that I have formed a daily habit. Each morning, I wake up and go to the nearest coffee shop to grab an espresso. However, this morning, while going to the coffee shop, I recalled an article that I read last night about some supposed negative side effects of drinking coffee. So now I have to make a decision. Should I grab an espresso or something else?
[Stage 1] Generation of alternatives: [Coffee, Black Tea, Green Tea]
Given the circumstances and my prior experience and preferences, the brain does not even consider choices such as Beer, Kombucha, Mate or Cocoa with dairy milk. It’s early in the morning so i wouldn’t choose Beer.The store doesn’t provide Kombucha or Mate. Nor do I really like them. Being Vegan for 10+ years, the brain does not even consider a dairy-based option as a candidate. So here I am. Three alternatives enter conscious experience and I deliberate over them. E.g.:
“Well I like the taste of coffee but it makes me jittery sometimes”
…
“Green tea is ok but i’d like something to wake me up a bit”
…
“Let’s have a black tea” (Stage 2).
So, I enter the coffee shop. The barista asks me “what would you like?”. I reply: “I’ll have a black tea” .
A Determinist would say that, if we rolled back the tape of life, the outcome would not change. If we could go back to the moment that I started from my home with the intention to grab a coffee while maintaining ALL factors the same, every atom in the universe is exactly as it was, then the exact thing will happen, a million times over. I will have the same candidate options, the same thoughts will arise in my brain and I will choose to buy a black team every single time.
The indeterminist would say: “Aha! But there are random quantum fluctuations bubbling up to the macro scale. There is “random noise” in the brain. The universe is “chaotic” and complex.” Does this give us Free Will? Well! Let’s say that while walking some random event causes a novel thought to arise in my brain and I end up with a different choice. A flicker of light hits my retina, I notice that a new option has been added to the menu, Chai Latte with oat milk. “Great! I want to change things up. I’ll have that!”. So in this case: I did otherwise. And I would do otherwise many times over. But what does this have to do with Free Will? In all scenarios, I did not have control over the random events that altered my behavior, nor about the thoughts that arose as a result.
I know such examples seem inconsequential but I think they are illustrative and the same logic can be applied to truly meaningful decisions. “Would do otherwise” is different from “could do otherwise” and the former is not really an indication of Free Will and ”Really Free Choices”. Unless thought processes can be shown to somehow be independent of the chain of Causality, I do not see how any such Two Stage model can give us the type of Free Will. Only if we were talking about a Compatibilist definition, which Mitchell explicitly denies.
Time + Self Control = Free Will? Or, “On Building Character”
Okay, so maybe we do not have “true” control at any given moment. But how about over time? Let’s consider habits. For Mitchell, habits are learned adaptations to our environment. They can be very useful in guiding behavior. I’ve built good habits since childhood of having a nutritious breakfast each morning and brushing my teeth. Now, I don’t have to deliberate each day on these issues and I can spend my time on other more important things. But of course, some habits are not as useful or can be destructive. Human beings, or atleast many of us, have the ability to recognise bad habits and work to overcome them and replace them with better habits. To some extent at least. Breaking habits require continuous and repeated effort. For Mitchell, we may be biological organisms who are shaped by our biology, environment and our past experience, but we also have the ability to shape and change our habits and shape our Character to some extent. By extension, our Character will shape and influence our future decisions.
Mitchell acknowledges that some people may be better than others at that and some may not have that ability at all. But if we accept the previous argument, that we can’t make “Really Free Choice” in the moment, aka our choices can not escape causality, then how can we speak about making choices over time and be responsible for building our Character?
Moreover, this type of self-control can be affected by multiple factors including being hungry, lacking sleep, hormonal levels etc, it can be depleted and manipulated and we can not “will” to have more self-control in any given moment. It is a matter of “Moral Luck”: to have had the appropriate genetic material, brain anatomy, upbringing, etc in order to develop the ability of self-control and to make “good decisions” that will contribute to building a “better” Character.
“Willing what we will”
Mitchell also criticizes the famous Arthur Schopenhauer quote: “Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills”. Instead, Mitchell posits that we change our will and motivations all the time. We can deliberate, “do I want to be this sort of person?” and we can change course of action. For instance: I am hungry. I want to order a burger. But then I contend: “Do I want to be this person?”. “I should eat something more healthy” and “I should save money” -> “Let’s cook something healthy and inexpensive”. But isn’t that just another “will”? How was that “will” selected and prevailed over the others? I would contend that it just arose as all the other “wills”, based on prior causes.
Top-down Causation and Conscious Cognitive Control
So far my criticism of Mitchell’s argument may sound overly critical. My criticism relies on the idea that “Really Free Choice” does not make sense under a non-dualist and naturalistic framework. Mitchell could consider a Compatibilist account of agency, but he considers it incoherent and wants a naturalistic version of “could have done otherwise” Free WIll. That’s why I insist on the incoherence of “Really Free Choice” in Mithcell’s account. His last resort is “conscious cognitive control” and top-down causation. He says (46:00): “I am consciously deciding what I am going to say, lifting my hand up and putting it down, and I know that I am conscious of my reasons for doing these things because I can articulate them. So, we have this meta-cognition which allows us to reason about our reasons …”
So Mitchell sets out to naturalize the Self and Free Will. To conceptualize Free Will as a characteristic that the human being, as a total organism, possesses. But he wants more. He says that Free Will is “Conscious Cognitive Control” or “Conscious Rational Control” but this is just asserted. No evidence provided. And evidence negating his position are not seriously considered. There is no serious discussion on the experiments that would show the problems with the idea of the conscious will. For instance, Daniel Wegner, in “The illusion of conscious will” draws from various experiments, from Ramachandran, Penfield, Delgado and others, to show how we produce post-hoc rationalizations to justify our behavior while maintaining the sense of ownership.
Mitchell makes a big deal of “top-down” or “mental” causation. I hear in the news about a terrible accident, the information is propagated, deciphered and interpreted by the brain and causes an emotional reaction. In this sense, the “top” (meaning) caused the “down” (emotional response). But, firstly I had no control over this process. The “conscious self” did not make the choice to have an emotional response. The emotional response was caused by the interpretation of information and its associated neural activity. Similarly, the conscious experience and the emotional response could be mere correlations and that the former is not necessary for the latter. For instance, consider how sub-liminal or implicit biases can arise that can cause emotional responses even without conscious awareness. But there is no explanation how the conscious experience produced by a mechanical brain, could have itself causal power, somehow independent of these processes.
I mean, Mitchell could be right. There may be some central Self that we’ve missed which exhibits actual conscious control of our thoughts and actions. But that should be somehow demonstrated. It can not simply be asserted and assumed true - if we want a scientific account for Free Will. However, if we deny Dualism and the materialist Cartesian Theater, I'd say that “conscious cognitive control” may be rather limited, unless we can demonstrate some type of “strong emergence” which also sounds somewhat unlikely to me.
(Continues Below)
January 31, 2024
My main issue with this book is that it doesn't really deliver on the thesis. It is mostly just an intro to evolutionary biology with an invitation to reframe some causes as free will. If you do not believe in free will already, this book is very unlikely to persuade you
November 27, 2023
Contra la concepción dominante, un reputado hombre de ciencia acaba de defender el libre albedrío en clave darwinista en un libro tan heterodoxo como fascinante. Así lo proclama Kevin J. Mitchell en Free agents: "Para mí, se trata de una idea no sólo errónea, sino también equivocada. Un enfoque de la vida puramente reduccionista y mecanicista pierde por completo la perspectiva".
Y prosigue: "Al contrario, las leyes básicas de la física que tratan sólo de la energía, la materia y las fuerzas fundamentales no pueden explicar qué es la vida o su propiedad definitoria: los organismos vivos hacen cosas por razones, como agentes causales por derecho propio. No los impulsa la energía sino la información. Mi objetivo es explorar cómo los seres vivos llegan a tener esta capacidad de elegir, de controlar de forma autónoma su propio comportamiento y de actuar como causas en el mundo. La clave de este esfuerzo, en mi opinión, es adoptar una perspectiva evolutiva".
Mitchell guía a los lectores a través de milenios de evolución, de la fisiología del cerebro y de una miríada de ideas filosóficas sobre la agencia humana para ilustrar cómo surgió en organismos complejos. "No pueden entenderse como máquinas estáticas o disposiciones instantáneas de materia", afirma. "Más bien, son patrones de procesos dinámicos entrelazados que persisten activamente a través del tiempo".
Según su libro, las presiones de la selección natural para sobrevivir y reproducirse impulsaron procesos insensibles y no dirigidos que aumentaron la complejidad de la vida. Así, la agencia se facilita a través de mecanismos físicos: actuamos por razones, y estas razones surgen del conjunto de nuestras experiencias, de los fines que nos hemos fijado a través de la metacognición, de nuestras inclinaciones innatas y del conjunto de opciones disponibles para nosotros en cualquier situación.
https://www.elmundo.es/papel/historia...
Y prosigue: "Al contrario, las leyes básicas de la física que tratan sólo de la energía, la materia y las fuerzas fundamentales no pueden explicar qué es la vida o su propiedad definitoria: los organismos vivos hacen cosas por razones, como agentes causales por derecho propio. No los impulsa la energía sino la información. Mi objetivo es explorar cómo los seres vivos llegan a tener esta capacidad de elegir, de controlar de forma autónoma su propio comportamiento y de actuar como causas en el mundo. La clave de este esfuerzo, en mi opinión, es adoptar una perspectiva evolutiva".
Mitchell guía a los lectores a través de milenios de evolución, de la fisiología del cerebro y de una miríada de ideas filosóficas sobre la agencia humana para ilustrar cómo surgió en organismos complejos. "No pueden entenderse como máquinas estáticas o disposiciones instantáneas de materia", afirma. "Más bien, son patrones de procesos dinámicos entrelazados que persisten activamente a través del tiempo".
Según su libro, las presiones de la selección natural para sobrevivir y reproducirse impulsaron procesos insensibles y no dirigidos que aumentaron la complejidad de la vida. Así, la agencia se facilita a través de mecanismos físicos: actuamos por razones, y estas razones surgen del conjunto de nuestras experiencias, de los fines que nos hemos fijado a través de la metacognición, de nuestras inclinaciones innatas y del conjunto de opciones disponibles para nosotros en cualquier situación.
https://www.elmundo.es/papel/historia...
September 16, 2023
3+/4-
Author Kevin Mitchell defines his goal for Free Agents twice, and these are very different expressions. In the Preface he rejects a mechanistic approach and asserts that living organisms do things as causal agents driven by information, and he aims to “explore how living things come to have this ability to choose, to autonomously control their own behavior, to act as causes in the world.” In the final chapter, he says his goal is “to present a naturalistic framework for thinking about agency and free will”, which involves “a reframing of some fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of causation, time, information, meaning, purpose, and selfhood.”
As a professor of genetics and neuroscience, Mitchell is well equipped to take on this difficult question. The book acknowledges and builds on the work of many others in the cognitive and philosophical realms, like Steve Pinker, Daniel Dennett, and Antonio Damasio as well as numerous biologists and physicists like Erwin Schrodinger and Sean Carroll.
Mitchell’s exploration of the source of free will goes back to the very beginnings of life and includes some rather deep science that will make it more appropriate for the science lover than the philosophy fan. If your eyes glaze over when you read, “ Simple life forms like bacteria have a protein… called ATP synthase…. It acts as a channel through which H+ ions from the outside can pass to the inside. As they pass through, they power the mechanism of the ATP synthase, which takes a molecule of adenosine with only two phosphate groups attached to it (ADP) and adds a third (to make ATP)”, this book might not be right for you or at least you might want to skip to the final chapters on Thinking about Thinking and Free Will or the epilog on Artificial Agents. These are thoughtful and stimulating but not so heavy on the biological science.
For the right audience it is a fascinating read.
I received an advance review copy of this book from Edelweiss and Princeton University Press.
Author Kevin Mitchell defines his goal for Free Agents twice, and these are very different expressions. In the Preface he rejects a mechanistic approach and asserts that living organisms do things as causal agents driven by information, and he aims to “explore how living things come to have this ability to choose, to autonomously control their own behavior, to act as causes in the world.” In the final chapter, he says his goal is “to present a naturalistic framework for thinking about agency and free will”, which involves “a reframing of some fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of causation, time, information, meaning, purpose, and selfhood.”
As a professor of genetics and neuroscience, Mitchell is well equipped to take on this difficult question. The book acknowledges and builds on the work of many others in the cognitive and philosophical realms, like Steve Pinker, Daniel Dennett, and Antonio Damasio as well as numerous biologists and physicists like Erwin Schrodinger and Sean Carroll.
Mitchell’s exploration of the source of free will goes back to the very beginnings of life and includes some rather deep science that will make it more appropriate for the science lover than the philosophy fan. If your eyes glaze over when you read, “ Simple life forms like bacteria have a protein… called ATP synthase…. It acts as a channel through which H+ ions from the outside can pass to the inside. As they pass through, they power the mechanism of the ATP synthase, which takes a molecule of adenosine with only two phosphate groups attached to it (ADP) and adds a third (to make ATP)”, this book might not be right for you or at least you might want to skip to the final chapters on Thinking about Thinking and Free Will or the epilog on Artificial Agents. These are thoughtful and stimulating but not so heavy on the biological science.
For the right audience it is a fascinating read.
I received an advance review copy of this book from Edelweiss and Princeton University Press.
October 18, 2023
While maybe the most exhaustive defense of free will that I’ve ever read, I found his argument ultimately unconvincing. Although the author states that this was written with a layperson in mind, I don’t think the end result hits that mark.
November 13, 2023
I'm unsure why, but I've long been interested in the topic of free will. I made one of my rare suggestions that Portsmouth (NH) Public Library buy this book, and they acceded. As you can tell from the title, it's pro-free will. (But to be fair, I also have Robert Sapolsky's recent anti-free will book Determined on my "get" list.)
There's a blurb on the back from Steven Pinker:
Kevin Mitchell brings clear thinking and scientific rigor to a vital topic that leaves many people confused, caught between the preposterous alternatives that either humans are robots or that every time we make a decision, a miracle occurs.
That's a pretty good summary. Mitchell is a professor at Trinity College (Dublin) in the Genetics and Neuroscience department. Much of the book is devoted to exploring the long and tedious process by which evolution developed ever-increasingly complex neural systems for survival advantage. To be honest, my eyes glazed over in a number of spots. (Page 73: "We already saw transient multicellular behavior in the slugs and fruiting bodies formed by the aggregation of individual Dictyostelium amoebas. This kind of aggregative multicellularity is observed in many other species, across diverse groups of eukaryotes, and even in some bacteria called myxobacteria." OK, if you say so.)
I confess that pro-free will authors are pushing on an open door in my case. But Mitchell's argument here is careful and (seemingly) fair to the other side. He's even reluctant to provide his Official Definition of free will; I think the closest he gets is (page 282): "If free will is the capacity for conscious, rational, control of our actions, then I am happy in saying we have it." That works for me.
I believe Mitchell is making a strong science-justified claim roughly similar to the psychological argument made by Ken Sheldon in Freely Determined; there's a "hierarchy of human reality". At the lowest level, there's the physics and chemistry of interacting atoms and molecules; moving up, there's increasing complexity in cells, organs, and "systems". And it proceeds upward into relationships, society, and culture. Determinists only see causality working bottom-up: it's just those atoms bumping into each other that cause everything else. Mitchell and Sheldon say no: causality works top-down too. Specifically, your cognitive functions can work their will on the lower level too. And that means (ta-da) free will.
The usual disclaimer: ardent determinists and zealous free-willers (I'm pretty sure) are united in their beliefs having absolutely no effect in how they run their everyday lives. To use a common example: they pick out which shirt to wear in the morning, neither thinking too much about it, nor waiting until the molecules in their body do whatever they were predestined to do anyway.
Minor nit: Mitchell says (page 29) that the hydrogen nucleus "comprises a single proton and a single neutron." Ack, no: it's just a proton. (I assume he's right about everything else, though.)
January 17, 2024
I really enjoyed this book AND I have a complaint about it. It presents an interesting and coherent view of life's evolutionary history through the lens of living things as "agents", autonomous goal-directed actors. It's a strong rebuke to the reductionist view of life where living things are driven by their smallest or component parts, dominated by the bottom-up causation of biochemistry, of genes, etc. An analogy might be made to the absurdity of trying to explain an economy in terms of the physics of the atoms on cargo ships. You don't get the *meaning* of the cargo by just looking at the atoms -- or the meaning of animal behavior or intelligence by just looking at the neurochemistry. So, not a revolutionary idea, but I don't think I've read it laid out quite this neatly or understandably. Or so well connected to evolutionary biology.
My complaint is that the central argument against many concepts of free will is insufficiently addressed. There are sections on free will, but if I read it correctly they boil down to "if you accept the X interpretation of quantum mechanics, then the universe has true randomness, therefore determinism is false". Which ok, but A) why accept that interpretation and B) how does randomness at the quantum level impart a concept of free will to one's neurochemistry? A second bolstering argument is presented along information-theoretical lines, that information about the world has finite precision which necessarily leaves room for the future to be truly unknowable. But like -- the concept of "precision" in the sense used is a *model* we use to describe things right? We don't think there are actually bits out there representing an atom's velocity do we? I am continually hopeful to be convinced that free will exists because of some aspect of at the smallest level but this book did not deliver that convincingly to me. I'd love to hear the author expound on that topic at greater length!
The last chapter of the book was a really good one. It's interesting to hear what evolutionary biology has to say about AI, which could be quite a lot.
My complaint is that the central argument against many concepts of free will is insufficiently addressed. There are sections on free will, but if I read it correctly they boil down to "if you accept the X interpretation of quantum mechanics, then the universe has true randomness, therefore determinism is false". Which ok, but A) why accept that interpretation and B) how does randomness at the quantum level impart a concept of free will to one's neurochemistry? A second bolstering argument is presented along information-theoretical lines, that information about the world has finite precision which necessarily leaves room for the future to be truly unknowable. But like -- the concept of "precision" in the sense used is a *model* we use to describe things right? We don't think there are actually bits out there representing an atom's velocity do we? I am continually hopeful to be convinced that free will exists because of some aspect of at the smallest level but this book did not deliver that convincingly to me. I'd love to hear the author expound on that topic at greater length!
The last chapter of the book was a really good one. It's interesting to hear what evolutionary biology has to say about AI, which could be quite a lot.
January 24, 2024
"Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will" by Kevin J. Mitchell explores the intriguing questions surrounding human autonomy and the existence of free will. The book takes readers on a knowledge-rich journey, prompting contemplation on the factors that influence beliefs, decisions, and the capacity for change over time.
The discussion begins by addressing the age-old debate of determinism versus free will, drawing parallels from video games where characters make choices within preprogrammed scenarios. The author introduces the concept of determinism, suggesting that the laws of physics govern our choices, raising questions about whether humans are mere puppets in a pre-written future.
The exploration delves into the complexity of defining free will, acknowledging the challenge of grasping its essence. The debate surrounding free will often intertwines with religious and moral motivations, emphasizing the need to approach the topic with an awareness of diverse perspectives and biases.
The narrative shifts to the fundamental question of life and the blurred boundary between life and non-life. Physicists define life as an ongoing process of maintaining order against entropy. The book describes the evolution of life from molecules near geothermal vents to the emergence of complex biomolecules like RNA and DNA. This journey sets the stage for understanding the goals, values, and interests that emerge in living organisms, hinting at the roots of agency.
Organisms, even simple ones, exhibit a basic form of agency by responding to environmental stimuli. The narrative traces the evolutionary path from sensing the environment to purposeful responses, emphasizing survival instincts. The concept of information exchange among organisms, seen even in bacteria, lays the groundwork for rudimentary agency.
The evolution of cognition becomes a focal point, with the emergence of neurons coordinating sensory information. The book explores the development of reflexes, mediating neurons, and the ability to simulate potential outcomes. The integration of past learning and the projection into the future set the stage for intentional decision-making, suggesting a progression from reactive agency to deliberate volition.
The narrative takes a fascinating turn into the world of quantum physics, challenging strict determinism by introducing intrinsic uncertainties. The two-stage model of action selection is discussed, where initial automated phases are followed by secondary rational phases. This model implies that individuals can harness randomness for arbitrary decisions, providing a glimpse into the existence of free will.
The book concludes by addressing the influence of nature and nurture on personality and character. It acknowledges the constraints imposed by genetics and neurobiology but emphasizes that individuals have the capacity to shape their narratives and influence their own personalities and characters.
In summary, "Free Agents" navigates through the intricate realms of determinism, evolution, cognition, and quantum physics to unravel the mysteries of free will. The narrative suggests that free will is a product of an evolutionary chain, from basic agency to consciousness and selfhood, challenging the notion of a predetermined future. The author contends that human thought and behavior, guided by an inner sense of identity, cannot be fully explained by determinism alone. The book leaves readers with the provocative notion that the future of free will as a species is yet to be determined.
The discussion begins by addressing the age-old debate of determinism versus free will, drawing parallels from video games where characters make choices within preprogrammed scenarios. The author introduces the concept of determinism, suggesting that the laws of physics govern our choices, raising questions about whether humans are mere puppets in a pre-written future.
The exploration delves into the complexity of defining free will, acknowledging the challenge of grasping its essence. The debate surrounding free will often intertwines with religious and moral motivations, emphasizing the need to approach the topic with an awareness of diverse perspectives and biases.
The narrative shifts to the fundamental question of life and the blurred boundary between life and non-life. Physicists define life as an ongoing process of maintaining order against entropy. The book describes the evolution of life from molecules near geothermal vents to the emergence of complex biomolecules like RNA and DNA. This journey sets the stage for understanding the goals, values, and interests that emerge in living organisms, hinting at the roots of agency.
Organisms, even simple ones, exhibit a basic form of agency by responding to environmental stimuli. The narrative traces the evolutionary path from sensing the environment to purposeful responses, emphasizing survival instincts. The concept of information exchange among organisms, seen even in bacteria, lays the groundwork for rudimentary agency.
The evolution of cognition becomes a focal point, with the emergence of neurons coordinating sensory information. The book explores the development of reflexes, mediating neurons, and the ability to simulate potential outcomes. The integration of past learning and the projection into the future set the stage for intentional decision-making, suggesting a progression from reactive agency to deliberate volition.
The narrative takes a fascinating turn into the world of quantum physics, challenging strict determinism by introducing intrinsic uncertainties. The two-stage model of action selection is discussed, where initial automated phases are followed by secondary rational phases. This model implies that individuals can harness randomness for arbitrary decisions, providing a glimpse into the existence of free will.
The book concludes by addressing the influence of nature and nurture on personality and character. It acknowledges the constraints imposed by genetics and neurobiology but emphasizes that individuals have the capacity to shape their narratives and influence their own personalities and characters.
In summary, "Free Agents" navigates through the intricate realms of determinism, evolution, cognition, and quantum physics to unravel the mysteries of free will. The narrative suggests that free will is a product of an evolutionary chain, from basic agency to consciousness and selfhood, challenging the notion of a predetermined future. The author contends that human thought and behavior, guided by an inner sense of identity, cannot be fully explained by determinism alone. The book leaves readers with the provocative notion that the future of free will as a species is yet to be determined.
March 15, 2024
This gets five stars for its amazingly clear exposition of what's been going on in neuroscience. That said, it mostly misfires in trying to make its point about free will.
Mitchell is incongruous in how he opposes physical reductionism in trying to create some space for free will. He rightly points out that particles and fields know nothing about most things we think about. But on the other hand, he touts evolution as the force that "gave us" free will, when DNA doesn't know anything about most things we think about either.
Also, Mitchell almost completely avoids the role of consciousness in free will and the "hard problem" of how physical nerve networks can give rise to it. Most examples of what he uses to illustrate free will are conscious actions and behaviors. Evolutionists can argue sweepingly about how consciousness is probably good for survival via natural selection, but that argument is feeble given the great extent to which human consciousness goes beyond mere survival issues. Did Picasso have to paint quite so well to survive, or to help the species survive?
There's a deep irony here. The fossil-fuel-based global economic system, for instance, which goes far beyond issues of relative survivability of individuals, is leading not to global survival but actually to a great extinction event threatening the very life of the planet. Could a pre-conscious species have created Big Oil and electrical grids? Consciousness vis-a-vis survival has evidently proved a two-edged sword. What it has delivered far outstrips what the workings of natural selection could ever have promised.
Furthermore, neuroscience seems ill-suited to adjudications of free will. Neuroscience is all about correlations of nervous phenomena and human behavior and experience; and as we all know, correlation is not causation. Mitchell's free will claims ultimately rest on humanistic reflection rather than EEG-prompted scientific theorizing.
The brain is like a piano. A piano is absolutely essential for playing piano music. But qua mere instrument, it can't explain music, much less music theory or composition. That distinction is the takeaway from Mitchell's book. But we already knew that.
Mitchell is incongruous in how he opposes physical reductionism in trying to create some space for free will. He rightly points out that particles and fields know nothing about most things we think about. But on the other hand, he touts evolution as the force that "gave us" free will, when DNA doesn't know anything about most things we think about either.
Also, Mitchell almost completely avoids the role of consciousness in free will and the "hard problem" of how physical nerve networks can give rise to it. Most examples of what he uses to illustrate free will are conscious actions and behaviors. Evolutionists can argue sweepingly about how consciousness is probably good for survival via natural selection, but that argument is feeble given the great extent to which human consciousness goes beyond mere survival issues. Did Picasso have to paint quite so well to survive, or to help the species survive?
There's a deep irony here. The fossil-fuel-based global economic system, for instance, which goes far beyond issues of relative survivability of individuals, is leading not to global survival but actually to a great extinction event threatening the very life of the planet. Could a pre-conscious species have created Big Oil and electrical grids? Consciousness vis-a-vis survival has evidently proved a two-edged sword. What it has delivered far outstrips what the workings of natural selection could ever have promised.
Furthermore, neuroscience seems ill-suited to adjudications of free will. Neuroscience is all about correlations of nervous phenomena and human behavior and experience; and as we all know, correlation is not causation. Mitchell's free will claims ultimately rest on humanistic reflection rather than EEG-prompted scientific theorizing.
The brain is like a piano. A piano is absolutely essential for playing piano music. But qua mere instrument, it can't explain music, much less music theory or composition. That distinction is the takeaway from Mitchell's book. But we already knew that.
January 24, 2024
Essentially explores a host of philosophical puzzles and scientific insights to better understand human volition and agency. Determinism alone cannot fully predict or explain this. Gets an extra star for the month python reference.
Determinism vs. free will
- The actions of the bartender are determined by your choice. In short, you have free will, but he doesn’t.
- Many seek to validate their religion or morality using free will as a cornerstone.
What is life?
- In the classic Monty Python "Dead Parrot" sketch, John Cleese insists to a shopkeeper that a clearly lifeless parrot is dead, while the shopkeeper vehemently claims it’s still alive. It's a hilarious scene that hints at a more profound point: The boundary between life and non-life isn't always crystal clear.
Sensing, analysing, and deciding
- What began as undirected movements evolved into taxis behaviors – oriented, purposeful responses to stimuli. The question arises: Does directed motion imply conscious choice, or is it merely a result of mechanistic reactions? Could awareness or intention have evolved from the simple sensing of and response to information?
The evolution of cognition
- In the evolutionary saga, the first neurons likely emerged in eukaryotic organisms.
- mediating neurons slow down reactions, allowing for the integration of more perceptual data, and enabling more considered actions. Instead of reacting to each sensory input in isolation, organisms take a step back and examine the whole scenario.
Random decision-making
- Quantum physics throws a curveball at physical predeterminism – the idea that there's only one timeline. It introduces intrinsic uncertainties, challenging the notion of a strictly predefined future. You’re likely aware of Schrödinger's cat. The moral of that story is that many or all states exist until the point at which they are measured, or the point of decision making. Then they collapse into a single reality.
- In several studies, electroencephalograms, which measure electrical activity in the brain, reveal that the moment of decision happens just before we're consciously aware of it.
Determinism vs. free will
- The actions of the bartender are determined by your choice. In short, you have free will, but he doesn’t.
- Many seek to validate their religion or morality using free will as a cornerstone.
What is life?
- In the classic Monty Python "Dead Parrot" sketch, John Cleese insists to a shopkeeper that a clearly lifeless parrot is dead, while the shopkeeper vehemently claims it’s still alive. It's a hilarious scene that hints at a more profound point: The boundary between life and non-life isn't always crystal clear.
Sensing, analysing, and deciding
- What began as undirected movements evolved into taxis behaviors – oriented, purposeful responses to stimuli. The question arises: Does directed motion imply conscious choice, or is it merely a result of mechanistic reactions? Could awareness or intention have evolved from the simple sensing of and response to information?
The evolution of cognition
- In the evolutionary saga, the first neurons likely emerged in eukaryotic organisms.
- mediating neurons slow down reactions, allowing for the integration of more perceptual data, and enabling more considered actions. Instead of reacting to each sensory input in isolation, organisms take a step back and examine the whole scenario.
Random decision-making
- Quantum physics throws a curveball at physical predeterminism – the idea that there's only one timeline. It introduces intrinsic uncertainties, challenging the notion of a strictly predefined future. You’re likely aware of Schrödinger's cat. The moral of that story is that many or all states exist until the point at which they are measured, or the point of decision making. Then they collapse into a single reality.
- In several studies, electroencephalograms, which measure electrical activity in the brain, reveal that the moment of decision happens just before we're consciously aware of it.
Read
April 4, 2024OK, maybe this is just me; but I came out of this book more convinced to the argument contrary to what it wants to make. I picked up this book to hopefully help pull myself out of the pit of the existential angst I found myself in after learning about the determinist's argument. By explaining the nitty-gritty of how life came to be in the first place, it succeeded in showing how mechanistic life really is, though not in a way which was unexpected by an author pursuing to come at this account from a purely materialistic view.
I learned more from this book about evolution than I initially expected to. The explanation on how our thinking isn't predetermined, but nevertheless predisposed, was wholly interesting to read, and something I'm sure is elaborated in his other book Innate, which I'll be sure to read through as well.
My favourite part of this book was the implications of the author's view to Artificial Intelligence. He started this book off with a sub-title named 'Robots with Personality' that was seemingly a mere analogy to what he was trying to explain. He said that if everyone made a robot with the same goals of survival and reproduction, that we would all still make radically different robot brains. This concept came to a cathartic ending with the epilogue 'Artificial Agents' where the framework outlined in the rest of the book comes to fruition in trying to understand how it could help with volition in our very technology; the last line of which will stick with me for a pretty long time.
Ultimately, I feel like I haven't comprehended the book as well as it was intended to be, and I won't pretend I did. I might have bit off a little more than I can chew with this one, and overestimated my intelligence. This is all to say that, yes, this is a deeply complex, philosophical, and technical read. One I find myself not competent enough or well read enough on the topic to be giving an out-of-5-stars rating on.
I learned more from this book about evolution than I initially expected to. The explanation on how our thinking isn't predetermined, but nevertheless predisposed, was wholly interesting to read, and something I'm sure is elaborated in his other book Innate, which I'll be sure to read through as well.
My favourite part of this book was the implications of the author's view to Artificial Intelligence. He started this book off with a sub-title named 'Robots with Personality' that was seemingly a mere analogy to what he was trying to explain. He said that if everyone made a robot with the same goals of survival and reproduction, that we would all still make radically different robot brains. This concept came to a cathartic ending with the epilogue 'Artificial Agents' where the framework outlined in the rest of the book comes to fruition in trying to understand how it could help with volition in our very technology; the last line of which will stick with me for a pretty long time.
Ultimately, I feel like I haven't comprehended the book as well as it was intended to be, and I won't pretend I did. I might have bit off a little more than I can chew with this one, and overestimated my intelligence. This is all to say that, yes, this is a deeply complex, philosophical, and technical read. One I find myself not competent enough or well read enough on the topic to be giving an out-of-5-stars rating on.
January 25, 2024
According to physicist Brian Greene, free will might all be a grand illusion – it’s really just the sensation of making a choice. Though the sensation is real, the choice itself is governed by the laws of physics, not by our own agency.
This grand illusion has a name: determinism. Determinism can be described in many ways – whether it's the rigid physical laws governing particles and energy, the cascading of events like falling dominoes, or the intricate dance of genes and biology. But they all suggest that the future is already written, like a puppeteer pulling the strings of our existence.
Once the text got into the evolution of cognition
The sense of self and choice
I struggled to remain interested
My would be 3 star rating fell to 2
I gained interest again around, “Whenever we overrule emotions, habits, biases, and randomness with our higher-order thinking, simulation, and logical deliberation, we exercise our free will. We consciously examine the roots of feelings and may choose to alter our reactions by reframing the subconscious narratives that guide us.”
So 2.5=3
Overall, free will depends on an evolutionary chain from metabolism and agency up to consciousness and selfhood. While some argue that our choices are merely results of sensory inputs mechanically driving our behaviors, the story is more complex. As we evolved more and more sophisticated methods of sensing, processing, choosing, reflecting, and acting in adaptive goal-directed ways, we developed newer, higher-order faculties like simulation and self-awareness, which is difficult to account for without a notion of free will. Human thought and behavior bridle randomness to sculpt character and direct actions from an inner sense of identity. Determinism alone cannot fully predict or explain this.
This grand illusion has a name: determinism. Determinism can be described in many ways – whether it's the rigid physical laws governing particles and energy, the cascading of events like falling dominoes, or the intricate dance of genes and biology. But they all suggest that the future is already written, like a puppeteer pulling the strings of our existence.
Once the text got into the evolution of cognition
The sense of self and choice
I struggled to remain interested
My would be 3 star rating fell to 2
I gained interest again around, “Whenever we overrule emotions, habits, biases, and randomness with our higher-order thinking, simulation, and logical deliberation, we exercise our free will. We consciously examine the roots of feelings and may choose to alter our reactions by reframing the subconscious narratives that guide us.”
So 2.5=3
Overall, free will depends on an evolutionary chain from metabolism and agency up to consciousness and selfhood. While some argue that our choices are merely results of sensory inputs mechanically driving our behaviors, the story is more complex. As we evolved more and more sophisticated methods of sensing, processing, choosing, reflecting, and acting in adaptive goal-directed ways, we developed newer, higher-order faculties like simulation and self-awareness, which is difficult to account for without a notion of free will. Human thought and behavior bridle randomness to sculpt character and direct actions from an inner sense of identity. Determinism alone cannot fully predict or explain this.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 26, 2024
Review of “Free agents: how evolution gave us free will” Mitchell 2023
This is a wonderful book that covers many difficult areas relating to the human brain using language that is understandable by ordinary mortals. The author covers a huge amount of useful background in leading up to the titular subject of free will, but almost all of it is required (with perhaps one exception of the discussion in chapter 10 on psychological personality traits). But I do have a number of criticisms:
1) There are very few references. There is a bibliography of suggested sources of more information for each chapter at the end of the book, but only a small number of these are specifically referenced with footnotes in the text. There were quite a few places where I would like to have known the source of the information the author was quoting, but there was no reference given.
2) There is no specific mention of different “levels of description” of functionality in the brain. The topic is discussed indirectly in a number of places, and the impression strongly given that the author believes that there are different levels at which the functioning of the brain can be described, but I found it frustrating that there was no specific delineation of levels.
3) Consciousness was glossed over rather rapidly. There are several places in the early parts of the book that say that the distinction between conscious and subconscious processes will be covered later, but when the section on consciousness is finally reached in chapter 11, all it says is that “We are configured so that most of our cognitive processes operate subconsciously, with only certain types of information bubbling up to consciousness on a need-to-know basis.”
I have created a new website that contains proposals that cover these last two issues – see hierarchicalbrain.com
This is a wonderful book that covers many difficult areas relating to the human brain using language that is understandable by ordinary mortals. The author covers a huge amount of useful background in leading up to the titular subject of free will, but almost all of it is required (with perhaps one exception of the discussion in chapter 10 on psychological personality traits). But I do have a number of criticisms:
1) There are very few references. There is a bibliography of suggested sources of more information for each chapter at the end of the book, but only a small number of these are specifically referenced with footnotes in the text. There were quite a few places where I would like to have known the source of the information the author was quoting, but there was no reference given.
2) There is no specific mention of different “levels of description” of functionality in the brain. The topic is discussed indirectly in a number of places, and the impression strongly given that the author believes that there are different levels at which the functioning of the brain can be described, but I found it frustrating that there was no specific delineation of levels.
3) Consciousness was glossed over rather rapidly. There are several places in the early parts of the book that say that the distinction between conscious and subconscious processes will be covered later, but when the section on consciousness is finally reached in chapter 11, all it says is that “We are configured so that most of our cognitive processes operate subconsciously, with only certain types of information bubbling up to consciousness on a need-to-know basis.”
I have created a new website that contains proposals that cover these last two issues – see hierarchicalbrain.com
January 24, 2024
"Free Agents" by Kevin Mitchell is like a captivating story about how we humans got the power to make choices. Kevin Mitchell, a smart scientist, takes us on a journey through time to show how our special abilities, like thinking and imagining, developed over a really, really long time—billions of years!
This book isn't just for super-smart people; it's for anyone who wonders about why we can decide things. As you read, you'll think about what we can control and what we can't, what makes us different from other creatures, and if the choices we make are really ours.
Imagine playing a video game where you decide what happens next. Mitchell uses this idea to talk about a big question: do we control our own destiny, or are we like characters in a game following a set plan? It's like a puzzle he helps us solve.
The book also talks about life—how living things are different from non-living things. It's like a beautiful dance where living things try to stay organized and fight against disorder. Mitchell shows us how we went from simple beings to complex creatures who can make choices.
"Free Agents" is not just about science; it's like a poem about who we are. Mitchell makes us think about what we believe, what's important to us, and if we can change over time. He tells us that, despite all the rules around us, we have a special kind of power—the power to decide our own future and make real choices.
In the end, "Free Agents" is like a magical journey into our past and how we became who we are. It's like an invitation to appreciate our existence, understand how we can make choices, and see the special kind of power we have.
This book isn't just for super-smart people; it's for anyone who wonders about why we can decide things. As you read, you'll think about what we can control and what we can't, what makes us different from other creatures, and if the choices we make are really ours.
Imagine playing a video game where you decide what happens next. Mitchell uses this idea to talk about a big question: do we control our own destiny, or are we like characters in a game following a set plan? It's like a puzzle he helps us solve.
The book also talks about life—how living things are different from non-living things. It's like a beautiful dance where living things try to stay organized and fight against disorder. Mitchell shows us how we went from simple beings to complex creatures who can make choices.
"Free Agents" is not just about science; it's like a poem about who we are. Mitchell makes us think about what we believe, what's important to us, and if we can change over time. He tells us that, despite all the rules around us, we have a special kind of power—the power to decide our own future and make real choices.
In the end, "Free Agents" is like a magical journey into our past and how we became who we are. It's like an invitation to appreciate our existence, understand how we can make choices, and see the special kind of power we have.
March 22, 2024
I think it's as good an attempt to showcase free will as there could be, and it's not poorly written or anything, and Mitchell writes interestingly and knowledgable about evolutionary theory, but I think his argument fails in what it attempts to prove. Namely that "free will" exists in humans.
Sure, there's an argument that through an evolutionary process human consciousness rose up and far above all the other animals, and put humans in a unique place in the animal kingdom. Humans are more introspective and can much make complex choices most animals can, so to say free will "evolved" at least on the surface seems like a plausible theory. Still, if one put a magnifying glass into all matters that doesn't mean our choices are more "uncaused" than anything else in the universe, or that our intentions or desires came from inside us or free from anything outside our mind, nor that we have any fixed "self" somewhere in the brain, which Mitchell also seems to allude to. I think the issue is that people accept when they can see the threads for what caused their wishes, choices and desires, and they often to on reflection, but when they can't see the causal chains they seem to think it comes from themselves and credit themselves. However, just because you can't see the threads or the causes doesn't mean they're not there. It certainly doesn't feel intuitive, but more and more things point to us not having free will.
Sure, there's an argument that through an evolutionary process human consciousness rose up and far above all the other animals, and put humans in a unique place in the animal kingdom. Humans are more introspective and can much make complex choices most animals can, so to say free will "evolved" at least on the surface seems like a plausible theory. Still, if one put a magnifying glass into all matters that doesn't mean our choices are more "uncaused" than anything else in the universe, or that our intentions or desires came from inside us or free from anything outside our mind, nor that we have any fixed "self" somewhere in the brain, which Mitchell also seems to allude to. I think the issue is that people accept when they can see the threads for what caused their wishes, choices and desires, and they often to on reflection, but when they can't see the causal chains they seem to think it comes from themselves and credit themselves. However, just because you can't see the threads or the causes doesn't mean they're not there. It certainly doesn't feel intuitive, but more and more things point to us not having free will.
January 9, 2024
I was already very interested in the topic of biological agency, so I was excited to read Kevin Mitchell’s book—Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will—which develops this notion and connects it to the debate over human free will. Mitchell is a neurogeneticist at Trinity College (Dublin).
This is an fairly accessible and highly engaging book that I recommend to anyone interested in this subject. Mitchell brings a wealth of information about biology and neuroscience, along with a dose of philosophy, to his exposition. His goal is to show that humans can fairly be said to have free will, given a careful look at the capabilities endowed by our biological inheritance.
It is a detailed and compelling case, and I found myself mostly nodding in agreement. My only real worry is that he was trying to0 hard to accomodate our pre-theoretical notion of free will, when the truth is a bit more revisionary. More here: https://stephenesser.com/biological-a...
This is an fairly accessible and highly engaging book that I recommend to anyone interested in this subject. Mitchell brings a wealth of information about biology and neuroscience, along with a dose of philosophy, to his exposition. His goal is to show that humans can fairly be said to have free will, given a careful look at the capabilities endowed by our biological inheritance.
It is a detailed and compelling case, and I found myself mostly nodding in agreement. My only real worry is that he was trying to0 hard to accomodate our pre-theoretical notion of free will, when the truth is a bit more revisionary. More here: https://stephenesser.com/biological-a...
January 24, 2024
Summary:
Free will depends on an evolutionary chain from metabolism and agency up to consciousness and selfhood. While some argue that our choices are merely results of sensory inputs mechanically driving our behaviors, the story is more complex. As we evolved more and more sophisticated methods of sensing, processing, choosing, reflecting, and acting in adaptive goal-directed ways, we developed newer, higher-order faculties like simulation and self-awareness, which is difficult to account for without a notion of free will. Human thought and behavior bridle randomness to sculpt character and direct actions from an inner sense of identity. Determinism alone cannot fully predict or explain this.
Free will depends on an evolutionary chain from metabolism and agency up to consciousness and selfhood. While some argue that our choices are merely results of sensory inputs mechanically driving our behaviors, the story is more complex. As we evolved more and more sophisticated methods of sensing, processing, choosing, reflecting, and acting in adaptive goal-directed ways, we developed newer, higher-order faculties like simulation and self-awareness, which is difficult to account for without a notion of free will. Human thought and behavior bridle randomness to sculpt character and direct actions from an inner sense of identity. Determinism alone cannot fully predict or explain this.
February 22, 2024
i’m not a fan of declaring any opposing views/findings/facts as wrong without some sort of objective views/findings/facts that supports such disagreement.
to do so, blatantly, repeatedly before even finishing chapter 1 while conspicuously doing so in a quasi passive-aggressive manner as well kinda turns me off.
it comes across as a childish rebuttal like
“i know you are but what am i?”
this book, to me and/or in my opinion, does both in various combinations throughout the book.
i was hoping to read 2 books on the opposite sides of the spectrum regarding “free will” or determinism with this book being on one side.
unfortunately, i will continue my search for elsewhere for that side of the spectrum 😕
to do so, blatantly, repeatedly before even finishing chapter 1 while conspicuously doing so in a quasi passive-aggressive manner as well kinda turns me off.
it comes across as a childish rebuttal like
“i know you are but what am i?”
this book, to me and/or in my opinion, does both in various combinations throughout the book.
i was hoping to read 2 books on the opposite sides of the spectrum regarding “free will” or determinism with this book being on one side.
unfortunately, i will continue my search for elsewhere for that side of the spectrum 😕
November 3, 2023
The author does an incredible job taking us through the journey of evolution , from a single celled organisms to organisms with neurons to where we are as Humans. In this journey he wonderfully connects various aspects (genetics, biochemistry, psychology, etc) and takes a 360 view on the process.
However, on the key premise of the book, which is us having free will, I don't think he is able to make a convincing argument. Towards the end he states with all the discussion in various chapters it should be obvious by now that we have free will. It was not obvious to me though. Maybe that's just me
However, on the key premise of the book, which is us having free will, I don't think he is able to make a convincing argument. Towards the end he states with all the discussion in various chapters it should be obvious by now that we have free will. It was not obvious to me though. Maybe that's just me
January 13, 2024
This book uses many of my preferred concepts including constraints, patterns, and evolution. By tracing the evolutionary trail leading up to humans, Mitchell argues that "the functional organization of a system can have causal power" and in a way sums things up like this: "We recognize that top-down organization can impose useful constraints that enable functions not achievable by disorganized parts."
In the end 'free will' is still a vexing concept (and Mitchell is well aware of the many limitations), but this book provides a deep look at causality in living beings, and works hard to avoid dualistic accounts and simple reductionist theories.
In the end 'free will' is still a vexing concept (and Mitchell is well aware of the many limitations), but this book provides a deep look at causality in living beings, and works hard to avoid dualistic accounts and simple reductionist theories.
January 24, 2024
Free will depends on an evolutionary chain from metabolism and agency up to consciousness and selfhood. While some argue that our choices are merely results of sensory inputs mechanically driving our behaviors, the story is more complex. As we evolved more and more sophisticated methods of sensing, processing, choosing, reflecting, and acting in adaptive goal-directed ways, we developed newer, higher-order faculties like simulation and self-awareness, which is difficult to account for without a notion of free will. Human thought and behavior bridle randomness to sculpt character and direct actions from an inner sense of identity. Determinism alone cannot fully predict or explain this.
November 6, 2023
A brilliant account of the evolutionary history and biological mechanisms behind things like agency and free will. I cannot in good conscience rate this higher than 1-star though because of the poor scholarly standards when it comes to discussing free will and agency conceptually. It is as though he did not consult a single colleague in philosophy or cognitive science to sharpen his use of language around the subject.
Feel free to read the book of you have a curiosity in how agency, decision making works in humans, but don’t expect to learn anything new about free will.
Feel free to read the book of you have a curiosity in how agency, decision making works in humans, but don’t expect to learn anything new about free will.
March 26, 2024
No where in the book is there any explanation for "how evolution gave us 'free will.'"
The writer pointed out several times that evolution is not directed towards any goal other than momentary, temporary survival of the barely fit--- as everyone since Charles Darwin has already explained. Yet no where in the book is there suggested a possible mechanism for how "free will" can happen.
For "free will" to happen, magic must exist. Is this fact really too difficult for some people to understand?
The writer pointed out several times that evolution is not directed towards any goal other than momentary, temporary survival of the barely fit--- as everyone since Charles Darwin has already explained. Yet no where in the book is there suggested a possible mechanism for how "free will" can happen.
For "free will" to happen, magic must exist. Is this fact really too difficult for some people to understand?
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