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Three Days at Camp David: How a Secret Meeting in 1971 Transformed the Global Economy
The former dean of the Yale School of Management and Undersecretary of Commerce in the Clinton administration chronicles the 1971 August meeting at Camp David, where President Nixon unilaterally ended the last vestiges of the gold standard—breaking the link between gold and the dollar—transforming the entire global monetary system.
Over the course of three days—from August 13 to 15, 1971—at a secret meeting at Camp David, President Richard Nixon and his brain trust changed the course of history. Before that weekend, all national currencies were valued to the U.S. dollar, which was convertible to gold at a fixed rate. That system, established by the Bretton Woods Agreement at the end of World War II, was the foundation of the international monetary system that helped fuel the greatest expansion of middle-class prosperity the world has ever seen.
In making his decision, Nixon shocked world leaders, bankers, investors, traders and everyone involved in global finance. Jeffrey E. Garten argues that many of the roots of America’s dramatic retrenchment in world affairs began with that momentous event that was an admission that America could no longer afford to uphold the global monetary system. It opened the way for massive market instability and speculation that has plagued the world economy ever since, but at the same time it made possible the gigantic expansion of trade and investment across borders which created our modern era of once unimaginable progress.
Based on extensive historical research and interviews with several participants at Camp David, and informed by Garten’s own insights from positions in four presidential administrations and on Wall Street, Three Days at Camp David chronicles this critical turning point, analyzes its impact on the American economy and world markets, and explores its ramifications now and for the future.
Over the course of three days—from August 13 to 15, 1971—at a secret meeting at Camp David, President Richard Nixon and his brain trust changed the course of history. Before that weekend, all national currencies were valued to the U.S. dollar, which was convertible to gold at a fixed rate. That system, established by the Bretton Woods Agreement at the end of World War II, was the foundation of the international monetary system that helped fuel the greatest expansion of middle-class prosperity the world has ever seen.
In making his decision, Nixon shocked world leaders, bankers, investors, traders and everyone involved in global finance. Jeffrey E. Garten argues that many of the roots of America’s dramatic retrenchment in world affairs began with that momentous event that was an admission that America could no longer afford to uphold the global monetary system. It opened the way for massive market instability and speculation that has plagued the world economy ever since, but at the same time it made possible the gigantic expansion of trade and investment across borders which created our modern era of once unimaginable progress.
Based on extensive historical research and interviews with several participants at Camp David, and informed by Garten’s own insights from positions in four presidential administrations and on Wall Street, Three Days at Camp David chronicles this critical turning point, analyzes its impact on the American economy and world markets, and explores its ramifications now and for the future.
461 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2021
About the author
Jeffrey E. Garten
12 books31 followersJeffrey E. Garten teaches courses on the global economy at the Yale School of Management, where he was formerly the dean. He was the undersecretary of commerce for international trade in the Clinton administration, and before that a managing director of the Blackstone Group and Lehman Brothers on Wall Street.
His articles have appeared in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Newsweek, BusinessWeek, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the Harvard Business Review, and he is the author of five books on global economics and politics. He is has been a frequent speaker around the world on global politics, global economics, and global leadership.His new book, From Silk to Silicon: The Story of Globalization Through Ten Extraordinary Lives, will be available on March 1, 2016.
His articles have appeared in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Newsweek, BusinessWeek, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the Harvard Business Review, and he is the author of five books on global economics and politics. He is has been a frequent speaker around the world on global politics, global economics, and global leadership.His new book, From Silk to Silicon: The Story of Globalization Through Ten Extraordinary Lives, will be available on March 1, 2016.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 45 reviews
February 8, 2023
Credit Jeffrey E. Garten's Three Days at Camp David for spinning a highly readable account of a potentially tedious topic: the decision by Richard Nixon to take the US off the gold standard in August 1971, destroying the Bretton Woods System of monetary management and throwing the world economy into an uproar. With Nixon's presidency dominated by Vietnam and Watergate, it's important to recall that he also resided over a crucial hinge point in postwar economics. American inflation, an uncertain job market, the waning of American preeminence increasing independence and fussiness of economic partners in Europe and Asia and, more cynically, Nixon's hope for ensuring his reelection with a booming economy all played a role in the decision. Other historians like Allen Matusow have argued Nixon didn't really care about economics except as a political weapon; Garten concedes this may be true, but notes that any president would have been compelled to address the burgeoning crisis as Bretton Woods teetered on the verge of collapse. The book makes financial policy accessible to the lay reader, helped by pulling focus away from Nixon to the economic team who helped make the decision: flamboyant Treasury Secretary John Connally (who viewed the move as a way to strengthen rather than weaken America's economic situation), his aide Paul Volcker (who provided a geopolitical rationale for the move), the conservative Fed chair Arthur Burns (the sole skeptic in Nixon's inner circle), free trade zealot George Shultz (later Secretary of Treasury and State) and the pragmatic Pete Peterson (later Nixon's Commerce Secretary). Despite its short-term disruption of global markets, Garten views the Nixon Shock as a laudable achievement, both strengthening American economy by removing our reliance on the gold standard while also encouraging free trade, interdependence and globalization. Of course, such policies aren't without their drawbacks and criticisms, even decades later (as Garten notes, much of the current economic tension involves push back against Nixon's decision), and the undiplomatic way Nixon initiated the policy earns a harsh rebuke from Garten. On the whole though, the book makes a persuasive case that what seemed like opportunism from a cynical president was actually a well-considered policy which did more good than harm.
July 26, 2021
Making monetary policy accessible and easy to read is not easy, but this author accomplished it.
November 23, 2021
Although the book doesn't exactly set off fireworks, it is a workmanlike recapitulation of one of the most momentous periods of American economic history, culminating when President Richard Nixon, on August 15, 1971, took the US off the gold standard, imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze, and added a 10% surcharge to all imports. That late Sunday television announcement was proceeded by three hectic days at Camp David, where, as Garten shows, Nixon worked with his OMB chief George Schultz, his Treasury Secretary John Connally, his Fed Chair Arthur Burns, and others to craft a plan, but mainly to craft a suitable announcement.
The book shows that the plan had two, somewhat incongruous, drivers. The first was Paul Volcker, who as Undersecretary of the Treasury had long worked to improve the US balance of payments problems and who worked with the assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, former Bell & Howell CEO Pete Peterson, to help save the gold standard; Volcker through fiscal discipline, Peterson through industrial policy. Volcker's plans were grabbed, at one point physically out of his hands, by the charming and domineering Connally, the second main instigator of the announcement, who cared not a whit for international economic problems, but who had a masterly grasp of politics and negotiation. It was his idea to combine the sudden closing of the gold window with the import surcharge (to scare trading partners into negotiation) and the wage and price freeze (to enlist business support). Nixon had long decried price freezes from his time as a price controller in World War II, but he loved bold plans and quickly adopted this one, despite the anger of the free market Schultz, who wanted floating currencies but hated price controls too. Nixon also used the Camp David meeting to sell Burns, who loved price controls but who hated free floating currencies, which he, like Volcker, had struggled to save for most of his adult life. In a word, most of Nixon's advisors got something, that is, except for his international advisors, Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were almost completely excluded from the discussions.
The irony of the plan was that none of it worked. The US had hoped to temporarily devalue gold and then stay on new and fixed parities, but after the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971, no country made a real effort to do so, which they finally confirmed at the Jamaica agreement in 1976, which instituted free floating currencies once and for all. The wage and price controls last far beyond the 90 days, and into 1974, but were a complete fiasco that failed to staunch inflation. The import surcharge was removed without any change in foreign countries' trade barriers at the Smithsonian agreement.
Despite all the hullabaloo, then, the "Nixon Shock," as it was known, failed, but it marked the end of the reign of gold in international economics, and the beginning of a system of floating exchange rates and pure fiat currencies. That moment deserves such a dedicated journalistic account as is given here.
The book shows that the plan had two, somewhat incongruous, drivers. The first was Paul Volcker, who as Undersecretary of the Treasury had long worked to improve the US balance of payments problems and who worked with the assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, former Bell & Howell CEO Pete Peterson, to help save the gold standard; Volcker through fiscal discipline, Peterson through industrial policy. Volcker's plans were grabbed, at one point physically out of his hands, by the charming and domineering Connally, the second main instigator of the announcement, who cared not a whit for international economic problems, but who had a masterly grasp of politics and negotiation. It was his idea to combine the sudden closing of the gold window with the import surcharge (to scare trading partners into negotiation) and the wage and price freeze (to enlist business support). Nixon had long decried price freezes from his time as a price controller in World War II, but he loved bold plans and quickly adopted this one, despite the anger of the free market Schultz, who wanted floating currencies but hated price controls too. Nixon also used the Camp David meeting to sell Burns, who loved price controls but who hated free floating currencies, which he, like Volcker, had struggled to save for most of his adult life. In a word, most of Nixon's advisors got something, that is, except for his international advisors, Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were almost completely excluded from the discussions.
The irony of the plan was that none of it worked. The US had hoped to temporarily devalue gold and then stay on new and fixed parities, but after the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971, no country made a real effort to do so, which they finally confirmed at the Jamaica agreement in 1976, which instituted free floating currencies once and for all. The wage and price controls last far beyond the 90 days, and into 1974, but were a complete fiasco that failed to staunch inflation. The import surcharge was removed without any change in foreign countries' trade barriers at the Smithsonian agreement.
Despite all the hullabaloo, then, the "Nixon Shock," as it was known, failed, but it marked the end of the reign of gold in international economics, and the beginning of a system of floating exchange rates and pure fiat currencies. That moment deserves such a dedicated journalistic account as is given here.
July 29, 2021
Garten tells a great story. Richard Nixon is focused on winning re-election in 1972. John Connally, Nixon’s secretary of the treasury, is willing to upend the global economy to make it happen. And technocrats like Under Secretary Paul Volcker, Fed chair Arthur Burns, and OMB director George Shultz are each developing options for the president while trying to influence what will replace the Bretton Woods framework established after World War II. The drama slows in the book after the meeting, as it describes the many meetings of global leaders as they develop a new monetary system. That may be partly because we now know how it would end up: in two years the world would move to floating currencies. But overall, the scene-by-scene details Garten gives on the three days at Camp David remind us how big decisions are made by people with human emotions and ambition.
August 13, 2021
This book was more than I expected. I thought that the ideas were well stated and matter of fact. The insight and research was well done. It gave a sense of personality and the energy behind these events. I would recommend to anyone in the financial world or interested in U.S. History-particularly during such a tumultuous Presidency.
October 2, 2021
This is a fascinating account of the August 13-15 Camp David conference where it was decided to end the official convertibility of the dollar to gold at $35 per ounce. The United States, under the Nixon administration, decided to force their main trading partners (Western Europe and Japan) to negotiate new monetary and trading arrangements that will end up with more flexibility in the floating of the main currencies against each other (U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, Deutsche mark, French francs, and British pounds). After Camp David, fixed parities between currencies against the dollar/gold will be a thing of the past. The international monetary system will evolve towards a managed floating system that is more flexible than the fixed parities agreed upon at Bretton Woods in 1944.
Page 324 - "In essence, the August 13-15 weekend used what we would today call 'America First' tactics not to bring down the existing structures of international cooperation, but to rebalance power between them."
Page 324 - "In essence, the August 13-15 weekend used what we would today call 'America First' tactics not to bring down the existing structures of international cooperation, but to rebalance power between them."
January 22, 2023
An exceptionally well-written and informative book.
In August 1971, Nixon and a small group of policy makers drawn from the Treasury, Fed and other cabinet departments met to hammer out a policy package to address the unsustainable pressures building in the international monetary system. For one view of the background amongst many, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triffin.... From this forum came the US announcement, amongst other measures, to suspend USD / Gold convertibility, spelling the beginning of the end of post WWII Bretton Woods System. Later that same year, the Smithsonian Agreement would set out a new regime of fixed rate parities and the circumstances under which adjustments could be made. Within three years, through the 1976 Jamaica Accords, the global markets entered formally into a world of floating exchange rates.
The book is a wonderful example of allowing readers to be present and observing history in the making. Besides the entertaining theatre, the presentation deepens one's understanding of why and how the Camp David meetings erred and ushered in a period of global market instability and macroeconomic challenges that may have been inevitable, but were not helped by the US' arguably rash, unilateral actions.
In August 1971, Nixon and a small group of policy makers drawn from the Treasury, Fed and other cabinet departments met to hammer out a policy package to address the unsustainable pressures building in the international monetary system. For one view of the background amongst many, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triffin.... From this forum came the US announcement, amongst other measures, to suspend USD / Gold convertibility, spelling the beginning of the end of post WWII Bretton Woods System. Later that same year, the Smithsonian Agreement would set out a new regime of fixed rate parities and the circumstances under which adjustments could be made. Within three years, through the 1976 Jamaica Accords, the global markets entered formally into a world of floating exchange rates.
The book is a wonderful example of allowing readers to be present and observing history in the making. Besides the entertaining theatre, the presentation deepens one's understanding of why and how the Camp David meetings erred and ushered in a period of global market instability and macroeconomic challenges that may have been inevitable, but were not helped by the US' arguably rash, unilateral actions.
December 2, 2023
این کتاب درباره چیه؟
بنا بر تصمیمی که طی سه روز ۱۳ تا ۱۵ ماه اوت ۱۹۷۱ در کمپ دیوید آمریکا گرفته شد، دولت آمریکا تصمیم گرفت پایه طلا را از دلار بردارد و از معاهده برتون وودز (Bretton Woods) خارج شود. این تصمیم، انقلابی پولی را در بازار جهان ایجاد کرد. چرا نیکسون این تصمیم را گرفت و به بازار پولی و مالی جهان چنین شوک بزرگی را وارد کرد؟
جفری گارتن (Jeffrey E. Garten) استاد دانشگاه ییل (Yale)، در کتابی با عنوان «سه روز در کمپ دیوید: چگونه یک نشست محرمانه در سال ۱۹۷۱ اقتصاد جهانی را متحول کرد» به بررسی دلایل خروج آمریکا از برتون وودز پرداخته است.
بنا بر تصمیمی که طی سه روز ۱۳ تا ۱۵ ماه اوت ۱۹۷۱ در کمپ دیوید آمریکا گرفته شد، دولت آمریکا تصمیم گرفت پایه طلا را از دلار بردارد و از معاهده برتون وودز (Bretton Woods) خارج شود. این تصمیم، انقلابی پولی را در بازار جهان ایجاد کرد. چرا نیکسون این تصمیم را گرفت و به بازار پولی و مالی جهان چنین شوک بزرگی را وارد کرد؟
جفری گارتن (Jeffrey E. Garten) استاد دانشگاه ییل (Yale)، در کتابی با عنوان «سه روز در کمپ دیوید: چگونه یک نشست محرمانه در سال ۱۹۷۱ اقتصاد جهانی را متحول کرد» به بررسی دلایل خروج آمریکا از برتون وودز پرداخته است.
September 8, 2021
After reading this book:
- one can feel less bad things are not as well planned at work, even at this level of government, they want out with a bang, but they didn’t have a concrete plan what to do after that .
- it was literal lesson on the fact that money is really whatever we put faith that there is value in it . Once you see this point, you can kind of believe that there is a future in crypto currency.
- one can feel less bad things are not as well planned at work, even at this level of government, they want out with a bang, but they didn’t have a concrete plan what to do after that .
- it was literal lesson on the fact that money is really whatever we put faith that there is value in it . Once you see this point, you can kind of believe that there is a future in crypto currency.
December 9, 2021
In "Three Days at Camp David", Garten sets out to collect the body of evidence previously unaggregated to recount the events of one of the most important economic decisions in the last 100 years: Nixon disconnecting the US Dollar from the Gold standard - a decision which had global implications and was made over the course of a weekend. He succeeds in multiple seemingly impossible tasks: bringing humanity and narrative to a historical event (i.e. doesn't feel like a textbook), articulating exceedingly complicated monetary and macroeconomic principles in a digestible way, and potentially singlehandedly formalizing a major historical event. Phenomenal read, admittedly for a specific curiosity niche. If you're deep in the woods on history, finance, and economic policy then this is worth your time.
Jeffrey Garten is the real deal. I've had the pleasure of taking multiple classes with Garten at Yale, and I can attest he is equally as credible, thoughtful, and captivating on paper as in person.
Jeffrey Garten is the real deal. I've had the pleasure of taking multiple classes with Garten at Yale, and I can attest he is equally as credible, thoughtful, and captivating on paper as in person.
January 10, 2024
Very interesting!!
Without going into deep technical economic details, the writer showed how such hard decisions have been taken in these 3 days meetings. Decisions that have changed the global economic system.
By focusing on the decision makers personalities and backgrounds, he showed as he said how imperfect humans can act in imperfect world to find solutions for hard problem.
Without going into deep technical economic details, the writer showed how such hard decisions have been taken in these 3 days meetings. Decisions that have changed the global economic system.
By focusing on the decision makers personalities and backgrounds, he showed as he said how imperfect humans can act in imperfect world to find solutions for hard problem.
August 26, 2022
Meh... superficial - talks about what Nixon had for breakfast.
Doesn't unpack the role of oil in the 1970s - the "Petrodollar" deal with OPEC.
Also doesn't discuss the impact of unfettered fiat currency - https://wtfhappenedin1971.com/
Doesn't unpack the role of oil in the 1970s - the "Petrodollar" deal with OPEC.
Also doesn't discuss the impact of unfettered fiat currency - https://wtfhappenedin1971.com/
October 23, 2021
The was a really interesting book for an economist which I claim to be. It might be interesting for the non-economists as it is as much about people as it is economic policy. President Nixon knew the current global economic arrangements could not hold - the US had promised to pay $35/oz of gold since the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944. The problem was that its gold reserves were getting low and a potential run in the dollar was not out of the question. In addition the US dollar was valued more than it should have been against foreign currencies. As a result its exports were deemed too expensive by foreigners and imports were a bargain to Americans. This was causing balance of trade deficits which were politically toxic. Unemployment was getting high and inflation was getting out of control. The 1972 election wasn't far away. What to do?
Nixon's brain trust of his respected economists policy makers led by Treasury Secretary John Connally tried to forge a consensus. Some wanted to get off the gold standard and let exchange rates float; others want to get off the gold standard but set new fixed exchange rates; others did not want the US to break its word by abandoning the gold standard. Along the way many thought the US dollar needed to be devalued and some foreign currencies revalued.
On the inflation front, some argued for price and wage controls; to others these were anathema. To fix the balance 0f trade an import tax was considered. To push productivity an investment tax credit was on the table.
For some, like Connally and Nixon, the political perspective was very important; for others like George Schultz and Arthur Burns, economic perspectives ruled - even though they didn't agree on the solutions.
The book documents the agreements and arguments and compromises that culminated in a secret meeting of the major advisors at Camp David in August 1971. The changes were announced the Sunday evening of that weekend.
It also relates the anger created among the US's foreign allies who were kept in the dark about the changes and who had to work with the US and each other to changes in the world economic system.
Many of the changes developed at Camp David didn't last. But they started the process towards freer trade and floating exchange rates.
A great read. Not too technical.
Nixon's brain trust of his respected economists policy makers led by Treasury Secretary John Connally tried to forge a consensus. Some wanted to get off the gold standard and let exchange rates float; others want to get off the gold standard but set new fixed exchange rates; others did not want the US to break its word by abandoning the gold standard. Along the way many thought the US dollar needed to be devalued and some foreign currencies revalued.
On the inflation front, some argued for price and wage controls; to others these were anathema. To fix the balance 0f trade an import tax was considered. To push productivity an investment tax credit was on the table.
For some, like Connally and Nixon, the political perspective was very important; for others like George Schultz and Arthur Burns, economic perspectives ruled - even though they didn't agree on the solutions.
The book documents the agreements and arguments and compromises that culminated in a secret meeting of the major advisors at Camp David in August 1971. The changes were announced the Sunday evening of that weekend.
It also relates the anger created among the US's foreign allies who were kept in the dark about the changes and who had to work with the US and each other to changes in the world economic system.
Many of the changes developed at Camp David didn't last. But they started the process towards freer trade and floating exchange rates.
A great read. Not too technical.
January 3, 2022
The details of a watershed event are on full display. The book provides a valuable historical context on the closing of the gold window, and the consequent demise of Bretton woods system.
Truth to be told, before reading the book many people, including me, might not know that the 1971 Nixon shock is a two-parts package that also include a domestic policy component even more controversial that its international counterpart: wage & price freeze. In retrospect, this unorthodox policy revealed the desperation of Nixon administration in tackling the high inflation and the failure of such policy further cemented the dominance of Neoliberal-Monetarist theory in 1970s and 1980s.
For Nixon, when at odds, the domestic economy always commanded higher priority than American international obligations. Within domestic economic realm, every policy choice indicated his preference of full employment to the stabilization of the inflation. Volcker, along with other technocrats chose to play along and downplay the negative impacts of suspending the gold-dollar convertibility. It is also well known that Arthur Burns, then Fed chair also collaborated with Nixon in maintaining a loose-than-warranted monetary policy to support a full employment, which tipped the electoral scales in Nixon's favor. Both of those accommodations for political expediency come at a price and have huge impacts for the future: Bretton woods is gone and Fed becomes an independent institution from the presidential influences (mostly).
The Nixon shock preluded the dawn of the pure fiat currency and floating exchange rate regime. If we hark back to the collapse of the gold standard in early 20 centuries, it is easy to draw similarities. As Barry Eichengreen suggested, at the root, it is the domestic pressure to have an independent monetary policy in managing economic cycles that doomed the gold standard and fixed exchange rate arrangement.
People sometimes also tries to draw parallels between Nixon's nationalist trade policy (another components in the Nixon shock) and trump's trade war. To me, the similarity is superficial. At his core, Nixon is a internationalist who prides himself on his foreign policy achievements. His trade tariffs was only a bargaining leverage for his currency negotiation with Japan and Germany, not to mention the ultimate goal was actually to fend off the the protectionist pressure from Democrats-led congress. It is diametrically opposite to Trump's isolationist ideology and policy intentions.
Truth to be told, before reading the book many people, including me, might not know that the 1971 Nixon shock is a two-parts package that also include a domestic policy component even more controversial that its international counterpart: wage & price freeze. In retrospect, this unorthodox policy revealed the desperation of Nixon administration in tackling the high inflation and the failure of such policy further cemented the dominance of Neoliberal-Monetarist theory in 1970s and 1980s.
For Nixon, when at odds, the domestic economy always commanded higher priority than American international obligations. Within domestic economic realm, every policy choice indicated his preference of full employment to the stabilization of the inflation. Volcker, along with other technocrats chose to play along and downplay the negative impacts of suspending the gold-dollar convertibility. It is also well known that Arthur Burns, then Fed chair also collaborated with Nixon in maintaining a loose-than-warranted monetary policy to support a full employment, which tipped the electoral scales in Nixon's favor. Both of those accommodations for political expediency come at a price and have huge impacts for the future: Bretton woods is gone and Fed becomes an independent institution from the presidential influences (mostly).
The Nixon shock preluded the dawn of the pure fiat currency and floating exchange rate regime. If we hark back to the collapse of the gold standard in early 20 centuries, it is easy to draw similarities. As Barry Eichengreen suggested, at the root, it is the domestic pressure to have an independent monetary policy in managing economic cycles that doomed the gold standard and fixed exchange rate arrangement.
People sometimes also tries to draw parallels between Nixon's nationalist trade policy (another components in the Nixon shock) and trump's trade war. To me, the similarity is superficial. At his core, Nixon is a internationalist who prides himself on his foreign policy achievements. His trade tariffs was only a bargaining leverage for his currency negotiation with Japan and Germany, not to mention the ultimate goal was actually to fend off the the protectionist pressure from Democrats-led congress. It is diametrically opposite to Trump's isolationist ideology and policy intentions.
March 14, 2022
This was an incredibly insightful read, especially as the debate around Commodity-Linked Currencies has resurfaced in the post Great Recession economy. Many who argue for austerity through neoliberal ideals highlight the mass amounts of printing done post-2008 and argue that a Gold Standard could set a limiter on this “dangerous” practice. Whether or not you agree with this assumption, I feel it is important to immerse myself in literature discussing why the Gold Link was initially abandoned, and what the implications of returning to this policy would have in our modern climate.
This book, well lacking a formal debate on what returning to a Commodity-Linked currency would mean, highlights the important historical overlaps between our current and Nixon’s era. Through this, it helps the reader to better grasp the subject matter at hand. The succinct characterization of the major players helps to highlight how important it is to have quality driven men and women working on these important issues, while the masterful grasp of topics helps guide less informed readers through generally technical subject matter.
Well redundant, and less technical than I had hoped. I feel this is an important read for those looking to get an overview of the events that lead to our modern form of banking. It has both given me a more firm grasp of the financial situation that the world was facing in the late 60’s to 70’s, as well as a general overview of financial actors that I had previously not been exposed to. More reading is required on this subject matter, though this introduction is highly accessible and I would recommend it to readers of all levels.
This book, well lacking a formal debate on what returning to a Commodity-Linked currency would mean, highlights the important historical overlaps between our current and Nixon’s era. Through this, it helps the reader to better grasp the subject matter at hand. The succinct characterization of the major players helps to highlight how important it is to have quality driven men and women working on these important issues, while the masterful grasp of topics helps guide less informed readers through generally technical subject matter.
Well redundant, and less technical than I had hoped. I feel this is an important read for those looking to get an overview of the events that lead to our modern form of banking. It has both given me a more firm grasp of the financial situation that the world was facing in the late 60’s to 70’s, as well as a general overview of financial actors that I had previously not been exposed to. More reading is required on this subject matter, though this introduction is highly accessible and I would recommend it to readers of all levels.
December 19, 2023
This is a fast-moving, well-told, and surprisingly readable account of Richard Nixon's decision over a weekend at Camp David in August, 1971, to close the Gold window and adopt other measures to rebalance the global economic, trade, and currency system once the Bretton-Woods System of 1944 proved no longer tenable. .It had become unsustainable, given spending on Vietnam and the Great Society and the rise of post-war industrial Europe and Japan and US investment abroad.
While 1971 signaled a break from the dollar /Gold link (it had been $35/oz, with all the other leading economies tied in a fixed F/X rate to the USD), it was just a first-step devaluation (to $38/oz) Nobody knew what to expect and economic dislocations here and abroad continued after the change.
It was a few years later, January, 1976, when the Jamaica Accords settled on the free-floating system of currency F/X that we have today that has given international finance the flexibility to meet international challenges while leaving domestic national economies to their own devices, good or bad.
The author's writing is concise, precise, and absent the jargon that makes readers of works like this go glassy-eyed and fall asleep. Masterful storytelling on a somewhat complex story.
Recommended to my fellow geopolitical/economics/business nerds.
While 1971 signaled a break from the dollar /Gold link (it had been $35/oz, with all the other leading economies tied in a fixed F/X rate to the USD), it was just a first-step devaluation (to $38/oz) Nobody knew what to expect and economic dislocations here and abroad continued after the change.
It was a few years later, January, 1976, when the Jamaica Accords settled on the free-floating system of currency F/X that we have today that has given international finance the flexibility to meet international challenges while leaving domestic national economies to their own devices, good or bad.
The author's writing is concise, precise, and absent the jargon that makes readers of works like this go glassy-eyed and fall asleep. Masterful storytelling on a somewhat complex story.
Recommended to my fellow geopolitical/economics/business nerds.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 23, 2021
Jeffrey Garten writes a great book. As a student of Economics I have always wondered why there was not more attention paid to the day Nixon took the US off the Gold Standard and deconstructed the Bretton Wood agreement. 3 days in August traces all the pressures on the dollar, the economy and trade starting much earlier than 1971 but inherited by the Nixon administration. This book gives a thorough and yet just enough background to what should be famous day in history (unfortunately not many Americans seem to understand how important this day was and how it has influenced everything since).
In this book he has a chapter called Cast where he introduces the reader to each of the figures in this history, their backgrounds, often their futures after 1971 and their points of view and role in the dynamics of the days leading up August 15 1971.
Garten is an excellent writer, I intend to read another one of his book soon.
In this book he has a chapter called Cast where he introduces the reader to each of the figures in this history, their backgrounds, often their futures after 1971 and their points of view and role in the dynamics of the days leading up August 15 1971.
Garten is an excellent writer, I intend to read another one of his book soon.
January 28, 2022
Garten does an excellent job of highlighting the issues and controversies surrounding Nixon's decision to close the gold window at Treasury. He does a fairly good job describing the personal dynamics among the decisionmakers, Connolly, Schultz, Burns, et al. Be that as it may, I can't help feeling there was much more to this story than told. And, while I disagree with Garten as to some of his conclusions, i.e., delinking gold from the dollar only played a minor role in the runaway inflation of the 1970's, I think he deserves credit for tackling one of the most important (and, least understood) events in the late 20th Century. I think we would be living in a much different world had Arthur Burns moderately raised interest rates throughout 1972, and the gold window remained open. I think it likely and possible, the "Volker Shocks" of the early 80's would have been unnecessary. Finally, increasing productivity with stagnant wage growth in the 90's could have possibly been avoided as well. We will never know, but overall this book is a good start.
August 9, 2022
The topic is interesting and it is covered in a competent, if unspectacular, manner by Jeffrey E. Garten. The author himself served in a number of US governments, and has had careers in academia and Wall Street, but therein lies the problem. Technocrats are generally good at relaying the facts but not narration. The weekend and the main players are covered in detail, but in a mechanistic way which doesn't jump off the page in the way the best non-fiction books do. I was also expecting more coverage of the history of the gold standard, as well as the impact the decisions covered had on the de-regulation of financial markets in the 1980s. Garten instead spends too much time repeating the same issues again and again (yes we know that the US trade balance was lopsided in the 70s...). A ghost writer or co-author could have polished this up to a really good read, now it was merely ok.
October 18, 2022
A fascinating look into the decision President Nixon made to remove the US from the Bretton Woods agreement and take the US Dollar off the gold standard. Over the course of a weekend at Camp David Nixon and his top advisers (treasury secretary John Conally, under-secretary Paul Volker among others) not only took the dollar off the gold standards but imposed wage and price controls, cut the budget and informed the world (particularly Europe and Japan) that they would have to start contributing to their own defense. This was a dramatic shift in the US world view and caused repercussions that we still fee today. At times the book was a little too "inside baseball", but the author did a great job of explaining the difficult concepts of currency, monetary and fiscal policy. It also showed Nixon as a great leader and makes one wonder how history would have treated him if not for Watergate.
January 10, 2022
Author Jeffrey Garten has written a detailed and informative treatise on the August 1971 decision process that led to the US abandoning the Bretton Woods international financial agreement and getting off the gold standard for valuing international currencies. He explores in detail the insights, roles and influence of the primary players, led by President Nixon (pre-Watergate), John Connally, Arthur Burns, George Schultz, Paul Volcker and the other leading participants in this process which transformed the US role in the international economy. Recommended for those interested in political and financial history, and how the US government players have made critical and influential decisions.
October 5, 2021
I don’t have much more than a cursory understanding of monetary policy, but Garten writes about it in a way that makes it understandable and even interesting. But this is not really about monetary policy as much as it’s about how political ambition drives behavior and as a result starts a chain reaction that modifies the entire world economic structure.
I really enjoy books like this that provide insight into the behind the scenes activities of major events. This book shows that political ambition can drive behavior even more so than political or policy-based beliefs.
I really enjoy books like this that provide insight into the behind the scenes activities of major events. This book shows that political ambition can drive behavior even more so than political or policy-based beliefs.
January 17, 2022
This books details how the Nixon Administration came to make the most important change in the international monetary system since the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. The decision led to ending the fixed link between the value of gold and the US Dollar. Ultimately ut lead yo today's system of currencies floating in value, driven by a number of factors. Although monetary theory and international finance are complex and arcane subjects, the author does an excellent job of making sense of it all in terms understandable by non-economic majors.
November 5, 2021
Solid, in-depth recounting of events 50 years ago that completely reshaped international financial markets but today doesn't get much notice. The book goes as deep into the economic issues that forced the ditching of Bretton Woods as it does the people involved in the decision. It's gives a balanced view, giving equal time to all the differing opinions and straight treatment to the all the players (especially Nixon). The writing style is not the most fluid, but it gets the job done.
February 6, 2022
This is a must read for anyone who has any interest in the financial markets or United States history. This was one of the most formative decisions made about the monetary system not only of the United States, but the world as well and continues today. President Nixon is unfortunately remembered for his mistakes but there were moments of brilliance and this is one. I would highly recommend it.
December 21, 2023
Holy mother of God, what a colossal waste of time.
If you do read this, skip parts I and II. It’s as if the author thought before you get into what happened, you should read the Wikipedia page of every person involved, even people who only deserve a footnote.
What did Patrick Peterson do? Barely anything. The main characters are Nixon, Connolly, Burns, and Voelker. Everyone else is small potatoes.
Excellent premise, terrible book.
If you do read this, skip parts I and II. It’s as if the author thought before you get into what happened, you should read the Wikipedia page of every person involved, even people who only deserve a footnote.
What did Patrick Peterson do? Barely anything. The main characters are Nixon, Connolly, Burns, and Voelker. Everyone else is small potatoes.
Excellent premise, terrible book.
July 12, 2021
Good book. My only disappointment was a limited effort, on the author's part, to help us relate 1971 to today. There is no promise of such, of course, and the book admirably covers the events of August 1971, and the biographies of the players, very well.
February 11, 2022
I enjoyed this book all the way to the last chapter. I don't agree with the writers analysis that the government has done a good job not printing the US Dollar (or Euro) into devaluation of the currency.
February 17, 2022
Good history of the event. The three days were actually not that interesting in themselves, but the introductions of the players and the following interactions with other countries were well done. He doesn't get into the details of the economics, which would have made it a tougher read.
March 24, 2023
This book got too lost in the details of the economics of the activity at Camp David and was unable to convey the larger drama and meaning behind the activity. The people involved were well described and this is well written but it was about the details of the economics than the history.
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