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The Art of War in the Middle Ages
Sir Charles William Chadwick Oman, KBE (1860 – 1946) was a British military historian of the early 20th century. His reconstructions of medieval battles from the fragmentary and distorted accounts left by chroniclers were pioneering. His style is an appealing mixture of astute analysis and dramatic narrative. He was born in Muzaffarpur district, India, the son of a British planter, and was educated at Oxford University. In 1881 he was elected to a Prize Fellowship at All Souls College, where he would remain for the rest of his career. He was elected the Chichele Professor of modern history at Oxford in 1905, serving as President of the Royal Historical Society (1917–1921), the Numismatic Society and the Royal Archaeological Institute.Oman was a Conservative member of Parliament for the University of Oxford constituency from 1919 to 1935, and was knighted in 1920.This work, published in 1885, is a perceptive study of the battle tactics that prevailed during the Middle Ages in the later Roman empire, the Byzantine empire, the Swiss confederation, Spain, England, France and Bohemia.
177 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1884
About the author
Charles Oman
376 books41 followersSir Charles William Chadwick Oman was a British military historian of the early 20th century. His reconstructions of medieval battles from the fragmentary and distorted accounts left by chroniclers were pioneering. His style is an invigorating mixture of historical accuracy and emotional highlights, and it makes his narratives, though founded on deep research, often read as smoothly as fiction, especially in his History of the Peninsular War. Occasionally, his interpretations have been challenged, especially his widely copied thesis that British troops defeated their Napoleonic opponents by firepower alone. Paddy Griffith, among modern historians, claims the British infantry's discipline and willingness to attack were equally important.
He was born in India, the son of a British planter, and was educated at Oxford University, where he studied under William Stubbs. In 1881 he was elected to a Prize Fellowship at All Souls College, where he would remain for the rest of his career.
He was elected the Chichele Professor of modern history at Oxford in 1905, in succession to Montagu Burrows. He was also elected to the FBA that year, serving as President of the Royal Historical and Numismatic societies, and of the Royal Archaeological Institute.
His academic career was interrupted by the First World War, during which he was employed by the government Press Bureau and Foreign Office.
Oman was a Conservative member of Parliament for the University of Oxford constituency from 1919 to 1935, and was knighted in 1920.
He became an honorary fellow of New College in 1936 and received the honorary degrees of DCL (Oxford, 1926) and LL.D (Edinburgh, 1911 and Cambridge, 1927). He died at Oxford.
Two of his children became authors. Son Charles wrote several volumes on British silverware and similar housewares. Daughter Carola was notable for her biographies, especially that of Nelson.
He was born in India, the son of a British planter, and was educated at Oxford University, where he studied under William Stubbs. In 1881 he was elected to a Prize Fellowship at All Souls College, where he would remain for the rest of his career.
He was elected the Chichele Professor of modern history at Oxford in 1905, in succession to Montagu Burrows. He was also elected to the FBA that year, serving as President of the Royal Historical and Numismatic societies, and of the Royal Archaeological Institute.
His academic career was interrupted by the First World War, during which he was employed by the government Press Bureau and Foreign Office.
Oman was a Conservative member of Parliament for the University of Oxford constituency from 1919 to 1935, and was knighted in 1920.
He became an honorary fellow of New College in 1936 and received the honorary degrees of DCL (Oxford, 1926) and LL.D (Edinburgh, 1911 and Cambridge, 1927). He died at Oxford.
Two of his children became authors. Son Charles wrote several volumes on British silverware and similar housewares. Daughter Carola was notable for her biographies, especially that of Nelson.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
July 5, 2012
Proof that the rating system here is rubbish.
Check this out, this is Sir Oman's FULL book, with the absolutely brilliant chapter on the Swiss, their pikemen and Ascendancy etc., but this gets a 3.8 rating while the INCOMPLETE book without the analysis of rapid light infantry pike and the tactics of Leo and the Strategicon of Maurice scores over a 4.2
Sir Charles Oman writes some of the best English language paragraphs to date, any date. Check this one out:
"The strength of the armies of Philip and John of Valois was composed of a fiery and undisciplined aristocracy, which imagined itself to be the most efficient military force in the world, but was in reality little removed from an armed mob. A system which reproduced on the battlefield the distinctions of feudal society, was considered by the French noble to represent the ideal form of warlike organization. He firmly believed that, since he was infinitely superior to any peasant in the social scale, he must consequently excel, him to the same extent in military value. He was, therefore, prone not only to despise all descriptions of infantry, but to regard their appearance on the field against him as a species of insult to his class-pride. The self-confidence of the French nobility -- shaken for the moment by the result of Courtray -- had reasserted itself after the bloody days of Mons-en-Puelle and Cassel. The fate which had on those occasions befallen the gallant but ill-trained burghers of Flanders, was believed to be only typical of that which awaited any foot-soldier who dared to match himself against the chivalry of the most warlike aristocracy in Christendom. Pride goes before a fall, and the French noble was now to meet infantry of a quality such as he had never supposed to exist."
Whew, an astounding wordsmith, as informative as it is interesting.
This is the sort of war manual I wish I had as a kid, would have answered many of my silly military scenario questions.
Check this out, this is Sir Oman's FULL book, with the absolutely brilliant chapter on the Swiss, their pikemen and Ascendancy etc., but this gets a 3.8 rating while the INCOMPLETE book without the analysis of rapid light infantry pike and the tactics of Leo and the Strategicon of Maurice scores over a 4.2
Sir Charles Oman writes some of the best English language paragraphs to date, any date. Check this one out:
"The strength of the armies of Philip and John of Valois was composed of a fiery and undisciplined aristocracy, which imagined itself to be the most efficient military force in the world, but was in reality little removed from an armed mob. A system which reproduced on the battlefield the distinctions of feudal society, was considered by the French noble to represent the ideal form of warlike organization. He firmly believed that, since he was infinitely superior to any peasant in the social scale, he must consequently excel, him to the same extent in military value. He was, therefore, prone not only to despise all descriptions of infantry, but to regard their appearance on the field against him as a species of insult to his class-pride. The self-confidence of the French nobility -- shaken for the moment by the result of Courtray -- had reasserted itself after the bloody days of Mons-en-Puelle and Cassel. The fate which had on those occasions befallen the gallant but ill-trained burghers of Flanders, was believed to be only typical of that which awaited any foot-soldier who dared to match himself against the chivalry of the most warlike aristocracy in Christendom. Pride goes before a fall, and the French noble was now to meet infantry of a quality such as he had never supposed to exist."
Whew, an astounding wordsmith, as informative as it is interesting.
This is the sort of war manual I wish I had as a kid, would have answered many of my silly military scenario questions.
Read
October 3, 2021Though Oman gives it a good try. There simply may not be room to give someone used to modern armies any idea of how completely amateur a mess antique and medieval ones were by comparison. He may point out how useless 10,000 burghers may be, except to form a wall of flesh, but he forgets to note that they are a positive burden the second they are out of sight from home because you have to come up with food for them. So this is not thick with the fictitious European "peasant levies" that never existed, except as a fossil of law that created a means to tax peasants to support a war when legal systems of taxation barely existed.
On the whole, a goodish introduction to the subject, after which you can get hold of Hans Delbrueck on the subject. Most modern writers, being stuffed full of legalisms with no real idea of the logistics of a pre-mechanized army or navy, are not as good. As well, his writing is clear, not out to impress you but inform you, with an appreciation for the grim humour of some situations.
"Nothing could show the primitive state of the military art better than the fact that generals solemnly sent and accepted challenges to meet in battle at a given place and on a given day. Without such precautions there was apparently a danger lest the armies should lose sight of each other, and stray away in different directions. When maps were non-existent, and geographical knowledge both scanty and inaccurate, this was no inconceivable event. Even when two forces were actually in presence, it sometimes required more skill than the commanders owned to bring on a battle."
If you don't want to wait for the "read on-line" page to load, here's the TOC:
CHAPTER I. THE TRANSITION FROM ROMAN TO MEDIAEVAL FORMS IN WAR (A.D. 378-582).
Disappearance of the Legion. Constantine's reorganization. The German tribes. Battle of Adrianople. Theodosius accepts its teaching. Vegetius and the army at the end of the fourth century. The Goths and the Huns. Army of the Eastern Empire. Cavalry all-important . . . 3-14
CHAPTER II. THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (A.D. 476-1066).
Paucity of Data for the period. The Franks in the sixth century. Battle of Tours. Armies of Charles the Great. The Franks become horsemen. The Northman and the Magyar. Rise of Feudalism. The Anglo-Saxons and their wars. The Danes and the Fyrd. Military importance of the Thegnhood. The House- Carles. Battle of Hastings. Battle of Durazzo 15-27
CHAPTER III. THE BYZANTINES AND THEIR ENEMIES (A.D. 582-1071).
1. Character of Byzantine Strategy.
Excellence of the Byzantine Army. Scientific study of the art of war. Leo's ' Tactica.' Wars with the Frank. With the Turk. With the Slav. With the Saracen. Border warfare of Christendom and Islam. Defence of the Anatolic Themes. Cavalry as a defensive force. Professional and unchivalrous character of Byzantine officers . . 28-38
2. Arms, Organization, and Tactics of the Byzantines.
Reorganization of the Army of the Eastern Empire By Maurice. Its composition. Armament of the Horseman, A.D. 600-l000. Armament of the Infantry. Military Train and Engineers. The Officers. Cavalry tactics. Leo's ideal line of battle. Military Machines and their importance . . 38-48
CHAPTER IV.THE SUPREMACY OF FEUDAL CAVALRY (A.D. 1066-1346).
Unscientific nature of feudal warfare. Consequences of head-long charges. Tactical arrangements. Their primitive nature. Non-existence of strategy. Weakness of Infantry. Attempts to introduce discipline. Rise of Mercenaries. Supreme importance of fortified places. Ascendency of the defensive. The Mediaeval siege. Improvement of the Arts of Attack and Defence of fortified places. General character. The Crusades ... . 49-61
CHAPTER V. THE SWISS (A.D. 1315-1515).
i. Their Character, Arms, and Organization.
The Swiss and the Ancient Romans. Excellence of system more important than excellence of generals. The column of pikemen. The halberdier. Rapidity of the movements of the Swiss. Defensive armour. Character of Swiss armies 62-69
2. Tactics and Strategy.
The 'Captains' of the Confederates. The Echelon of three columns. The 'Wedge' and the 'Hedgehog' formations 70-73
3. Development of Swiss Military Supremacy.
Battle of Morgarten. Battle of Laupen. Battle of Sempach. Battle of Arbedo. Moral ascendency of the Swiss. Battle of Granson. Battle of Morat. Wars of the last years of the fifteenth century 73-87
4. Causes of the Decline of Swiss Ascendency.
The tactics of the Swiss become stereotyped. The Landsknechts and their rivalry with the Swiss. The Spanish Infantry and the short sword. Battle of Ravenna. Fortified Positions. Battle of Bicocca. Increased use of Artillery. Battle of Marignano. Decay of discipline in the Swiss Armies and its consequences 87-95
CHAPTER VI. THE ENGLISH AND THEIR ENEMIES (A.D. 1272-1485).
The Long-bow and its origin, Welsh rather than Norman. Its rivalry with the Cross-bow. Edward I and the Battle of Falkirk. The bow and the pike. Battle of Bannockburn and its lessons. The_French Knighthood and the English Archery. Battle of Cressy Battle of Poictiers. Du Guesclin and the English reverses. Battle of Agincourt. The French wars, 1415-1453. Battle of Formigny. Wars of the Roses. King Edward IV and his generalship. Barnet and Tewkesbury. Towton and Ferrybridge . 96-123
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION.
Zisca and the Hussites. The Waggon-fortress and the tactics depending on it. Ascendency and decline of the Hussites. Battle of Lipan. The Ottomans. Organization and equipment of the Janissaries. The Timariot cavalry. The other nations of Europe. Concluding remarks . . 124-134
On the whole, a goodish introduction to the subject, after which you can get hold of Hans Delbrueck on the subject. Most modern writers, being stuffed full of legalisms with no real idea of the logistics of a pre-mechanized army or navy, are not as good. As well, his writing is clear, not out to impress you but inform you, with an appreciation for the grim humour of some situations.
"Nothing could show the primitive state of the military art better than the fact that generals solemnly sent and accepted challenges to meet in battle at a given place and on a given day. Without such precautions there was apparently a danger lest the armies should lose sight of each other, and stray away in different directions. When maps were non-existent, and geographical knowledge both scanty and inaccurate, this was no inconceivable event. Even when two forces were actually in presence, it sometimes required more skill than the commanders owned to bring on a battle."
If you don't want to wait for the "read on-line" page to load, here's the TOC:
CHAPTER I. THE TRANSITION FROM ROMAN TO MEDIAEVAL FORMS IN WAR (A.D. 378-582).
Disappearance of the Legion. Constantine's reorganization. The German tribes. Battle of Adrianople. Theodosius accepts its teaching. Vegetius and the army at the end of the fourth century. The Goths and the Huns. Army of the Eastern Empire. Cavalry all-important . . . 3-14
CHAPTER II. THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (A.D. 476-1066).
Paucity of Data for the period. The Franks in the sixth century. Battle of Tours. Armies of Charles the Great. The Franks become horsemen. The Northman and the Magyar. Rise of Feudalism. The Anglo-Saxons and their wars. The Danes and the Fyrd. Military importance of the Thegnhood. The House- Carles. Battle of Hastings. Battle of Durazzo 15-27
CHAPTER III. THE BYZANTINES AND THEIR ENEMIES (A.D. 582-1071).
1. Character of Byzantine Strategy.
Excellence of the Byzantine Army. Scientific study of the art of war. Leo's ' Tactica.' Wars with the Frank. With the Turk. With the Slav. With the Saracen. Border warfare of Christendom and Islam. Defence of the Anatolic Themes. Cavalry as a defensive force. Professional and unchivalrous character of Byzantine officers . . 28-38
2. Arms, Organization, and Tactics of the Byzantines.
Reorganization of the Army of the Eastern Empire By Maurice. Its composition. Armament of the Horseman, A.D. 600-l000. Armament of the Infantry. Military Train and Engineers. The Officers. Cavalry tactics. Leo's ideal line of battle. Military Machines and their importance . . 38-48
CHAPTER IV.THE SUPREMACY OF FEUDAL CAVALRY (A.D. 1066-1346).
Unscientific nature of feudal warfare. Consequences of head-long charges. Tactical arrangements. Their primitive nature. Non-existence of strategy. Weakness of Infantry. Attempts to introduce discipline. Rise of Mercenaries. Supreme importance of fortified places. Ascendency of the defensive. The Mediaeval siege. Improvement of the Arts of Attack and Defence of fortified places. General character. The Crusades ... . 49-61
CHAPTER V. THE SWISS (A.D. 1315-1515).
i. Their Character, Arms, and Organization.
The Swiss and the Ancient Romans. Excellence of system more important than excellence of generals. The column of pikemen. The halberdier. Rapidity of the movements of the Swiss. Defensive armour. Character of Swiss armies 62-69
2. Tactics and Strategy.
The 'Captains' of the Confederates. The Echelon of three columns. The 'Wedge' and the 'Hedgehog' formations 70-73
3. Development of Swiss Military Supremacy.
Battle of Morgarten. Battle of Laupen. Battle of Sempach. Battle of Arbedo. Moral ascendency of the Swiss. Battle of Granson. Battle of Morat. Wars of the last years of the fifteenth century 73-87
4. Causes of the Decline of Swiss Ascendency.
The tactics of the Swiss become stereotyped. The Landsknechts and their rivalry with the Swiss. The Spanish Infantry and the short sword. Battle of Ravenna. Fortified Positions. Battle of Bicocca. Increased use of Artillery. Battle of Marignano. Decay of discipline in the Swiss Armies and its consequences 87-95
CHAPTER VI. THE ENGLISH AND THEIR ENEMIES (A.D. 1272-1485).
The Long-bow and its origin, Welsh rather than Norman. Its rivalry with the Cross-bow. Edward I and the Battle of Falkirk. The bow and the pike. Battle of Bannockburn and its lessons. The_French Knighthood and the English Archery. Battle of Cressy Battle of Poictiers. Du Guesclin and the English reverses. Battle of Agincourt. The French wars, 1415-1453. Battle of Formigny. Wars of the Roses. King Edward IV and his generalship. Barnet and Tewkesbury. Towton and Ferrybridge . 96-123
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION.
Zisca and the Hussites. The Waggon-fortress and the tactics depending on it. Ascendency and decline of the Hussites. Battle of Lipan. The Ottomans. Organization and equipment of the Janissaries. The Timariot cavalry. The other nations of Europe. Concluding remarks . . 124-134
January 14, 2023
This little book, originally written in 1885, is the one that started it all for me. In 2009, I was in my senior year as a Communications student at UT and signed up for a class on the history of medieval warfare on a whim. That class and this book lit a fire for history that’s become a lifelong passion for me. For that reason, Oman’s book and Professor Villalon will always have a special place in my heart.
January 26, 2016
One of, if not the best, book on medieval military history ever written. The destruction of the widely accepted idea that Europe's knights being just rich kids on horseback is worth the price of the book. The keen analysis of the downfall of the mounted knight and the rise of the longbow and the Swiss pike a glorious bonus.
Buy and read it immediately if you consider yourself even vaguely interested in medieval military history (or medieval military fantasy).
Buy and read it immediately if you consider yourself even vaguely interested in medieval military history (or medieval military fantasy).
May 31, 2012
We all know the what war was like in the Middle Ages, right? A bunch of rich guys get on horses and run into each other with lances, swords, and axes until one of them can't any more. And... that's pretty much spot on. But! How did the world (or at least the West, but come on, that's the important part of the world, right?) come to that state of affairs? How did we get from the Roman army -one of the most well-trained, well-equipped, and efficient killing machines ever- to an "army" consisting of a few hundred individuals trying to run over each other with horses? The answer to that question is the subject of C.W.C. Oman's classic The Art of War in the Middle Ages.
And it is deservedly a classic. Despite only being 165 pages long, Oman packs in both a relatively fast-paced narrative (he does cover almost 1200 years, after all) and lots of interesting details. Also impressive: he wrote what has become the definitive text while an undergrad at Oxford in 1885. [Sigh] I've wasted my life...
As mentioned, the book covers a 1200-year stretch, ranging from destruction of the last "real" Roman army by heavy cavalry at the Battle of Adrianople (378 A.D.) to the last major victory of heavy cavalry at the battle of Marignano (1515 A.D.). The stretch of time between these two battles saw the rise, dominance, decline, and collapse of armored horsemen on the battlefield. Through these centuries developed not only a style of warfare, but an entire way of life entirely focused around the idea that cavalry was supreme in the art of war.
How did this happen? It began with the size of the Roman Empire and the series of Civil Wars that plagued the Empire at the end of the Third and beginning of the Fourth centuries A.D. For nearly 600 years, the Roman legion (infantry) had been the dominant military force in the world. A series of civil wars (which Oman does not discuss) depleted the Roman legions, forcing each successive Emperor (and their challengers) to rely increasingly on barbarian mercenaries (usually cavalry) to fill out the shrinking ranks. This meant that money and training were flowing at a steady pace from Rome to tribes outside its own borders. When the Civil Wars came to a (temporary) end with the accession of Constantine (303 A.D.), there was so little left of the old legions that Constantine simply reshaped the army around cavalry. This had the dual benefit of utilizing forces already employed by the Empire (though not native Romans) and giving the new army sufficient speed that it could reply to barbarian incursions anywhere in Europe much faster than the old infantry-based legions. On the other hand, it meant that 1) Roman citizens no longer filled the ranks of the military, and the loyalty of the army was now only the loyalty of paid mercenaries; 2) even as the barbarian cavalry became increasingly important and the remaining Roman legions increasingly ignored, ill-trained, and ill-equipped, tactics did not change. So when the Emperor Valens led the remnants of the Roman army (~25,000 men) against the Gothic cavalry, he did it as if he were leading the same trim and well-fed legions that Caesar had led against the virtually naked barbarian horsemen of four hundred years earlier. The result was the utter destruction of the Roman Army, the opening of the way for the barbarians into the heart of the Western Empire, and the establishment of cavalry as the force to be reckoned with on the battlefield for over a millennium.
Oman gives three quick surveys of the development of warfare. In the first, he talks about the rise of the military class (knights, chivalry, and all that) and the final destruction of the infantry holdouts in the West (mostly in England and Viking nations, all of whom eventually "converted" to cavalry). Two of the common assumptions of this time are that 1) war is a matter of hard work and courage, not of any kind of tactics or skill. That is, a single knight with enough boldness can only be stopped by another knight with equal or greater boldness. No foot soldier will ever stand against a charging armored horseman; 2) those who meet the conditions of 1) are better (both morally and socially) than those who do not, especially than those who do not even try. So we see in warfare a microcosm of the principles of feudalism (or perhaps vice-versa).
In the second survey he discusses the development of war in the Byzantine Empire (on which he has a whole book). Only in this remnant of the Eastern Roman Empire does war survive as an "art", where it is studied, practiced, and engaged in by professional generals and professional armies. Yet, even here the transition to cavalry is made, though in a more limited and mixed way (the Byzantines keep the old Roman artillery, for example, and even expand on it with the invention of Greek fire...).
In the third survey, Oman explores the centuries of the dominance of heavy cavalry (roughly 1066-1346). In this time in the West, tactics, organization, and cohesion of large armies are virtually unknown. "Battle" consists of two armies of heavily armored nobles (and their feudal hangers-on) smashing into each other until one side quits and goes home. Endurance and courage become the virtues necessary to win battles. Which means that 1) any use of even the most rudimentary tactics usually defeats these Medieval "armies"; 2) if there is any chance that sheer hard fighting will win the day, these Medieval "armies" will usually overcome. The Crusades -aberrations in Medieval warfare though they are- are remarkable examples of both of these points. Whenever the Muslims had qualified leadership, they won. Whenever it came down to who could fight harder or longer, the Crusaders won.
In the last chapters, Oman discusses how the dominance of cavalry in the Middle Ages came to an end. Namely, through the return of infantry. In Switzerland and England two styles of combat arose which utterly defeated the usefulness of the heavily armoured horse on the battlefield (Bohemia and the Ottoman armies are briefly discussed as well). The use of the pike and halberd in Switzerland and the use of the longbow in England (and the war wagon in Bohemia and gunpowder in the Ottoman army) unhorsed the cavalrymen so severely that he has never made a comeback. Oman then discusses how these innovations were themselves made obsolete by the rise of combined arms and new technologies at the beginning of the Early Modern Era.
Really, this book was just a delight to read. While it may not be for those who aren't interested in military history or the Medieval world, I found it fascinating and worth a second look (the first being in undergrad, where I may have just skimmed it...). In fact, it's good enough that I'm going to keep my eyes open for his longer and more mature two volume edition.
In addition to recommending this to Medievalists and military historians, I'd recommend this to anyone who wants to write history. Oman's style is short, full, and readable. He conveys a lot of information in a few words without being boring. If more history books were written like this, we'd have more people interested in history.
Highly recommended.
And it is deservedly a classic. Despite only being 165 pages long, Oman packs in both a relatively fast-paced narrative (he does cover almost 1200 years, after all) and lots of interesting details. Also impressive: he wrote what has become the definitive text while an undergrad at Oxford in 1885. [Sigh] I've wasted my life...
As mentioned, the book covers a 1200-year stretch, ranging from destruction of the last "real" Roman army by heavy cavalry at the Battle of Adrianople (378 A.D.) to the last major victory of heavy cavalry at the battle of Marignano (1515 A.D.). The stretch of time between these two battles saw the rise, dominance, decline, and collapse of armored horsemen on the battlefield. Through these centuries developed not only a style of warfare, but an entire way of life entirely focused around the idea that cavalry was supreme in the art of war.
How did this happen? It began with the size of the Roman Empire and the series of Civil Wars that plagued the Empire at the end of the Third and beginning of the Fourth centuries A.D. For nearly 600 years, the Roman legion (infantry) had been the dominant military force in the world. A series of civil wars (which Oman does not discuss) depleted the Roman legions, forcing each successive Emperor (and their challengers) to rely increasingly on barbarian mercenaries (usually cavalry) to fill out the shrinking ranks. This meant that money and training were flowing at a steady pace from Rome to tribes outside its own borders. When the Civil Wars came to a (temporary) end with the accession of Constantine (303 A.D.), there was so little left of the old legions that Constantine simply reshaped the army around cavalry. This had the dual benefit of utilizing forces already employed by the Empire (though not native Romans) and giving the new army sufficient speed that it could reply to barbarian incursions anywhere in Europe much faster than the old infantry-based legions. On the other hand, it meant that 1) Roman citizens no longer filled the ranks of the military, and the loyalty of the army was now only the loyalty of paid mercenaries; 2) even as the barbarian cavalry became increasingly important and the remaining Roman legions increasingly ignored, ill-trained, and ill-equipped, tactics did not change. So when the Emperor Valens led the remnants of the Roman army (~25,000 men) against the Gothic cavalry, he did it as if he were leading the same trim and well-fed legions that Caesar had led against the virtually naked barbarian horsemen of four hundred years earlier. The result was the utter destruction of the Roman Army, the opening of the way for the barbarians into the heart of the Western Empire, and the establishment of cavalry as the force to be reckoned with on the battlefield for over a millennium.
Oman gives three quick surveys of the development of warfare. In the first, he talks about the rise of the military class (knights, chivalry, and all that) and the final destruction of the infantry holdouts in the West (mostly in England and Viking nations, all of whom eventually "converted" to cavalry). Two of the common assumptions of this time are that 1) war is a matter of hard work and courage, not of any kind of tactics or skill. That is, a single knight with enough boldness can only be stopped by another knight with equal or greater boldness. No foot soldier will ever stand against a charging armored horseman; 2) those who meet the conditions of 1) are better (both morally and socially) than those who do not, especially than those who do not even try. So we see in warfare a microcosm of the principles of feudalism (or perhaps vice-versa).
In the second survey he discusses the development of war in the Byzantine Empire (on which he has a whole book). Only in this remnant of the Eastern Roman Empire does war survive as an "art", where it is studied, practiced, and engaged in by professional generals and professional armies. Yet, even here the transition to cavalry is made, though in a more limited and mixed way (the Byzantines keep the old Roman artillery, for example, and even expand on it with the invention of Greek fire...).
In the third survey, Oman explores the centuries of the dominance of heavy cavalry (roughly 1066-1346). In this time in the West, tactics, organization, and cohesion of large armies are virtually unknown. "Battle" consists of two armies of heavily armored nobles (and their feudal hangers-on) smashing into each other until one side quits and goes home. Endurance and courage become the virtues necessary to win battles. Which means that 1) any use of even the most rudimentary tactics usually defeats these Medieval "armies"; 2) if there is any chance that sheer hard fighting will win the day, these Medieval "armies" will usually overcome. The Crusades -aberrations in Medieval warfare though they are- are remarkable examples of both of these points. Whenever the Muslims had qualified leadership, they won. Whenever it came down to who could fight harder or longer, the Crusaders won.
In the last chapters, Oman discusses how the dominance of cavalry in the Middle Ages came to an end. Namely, through the return of infantry. In Switzerland and England two styles of combat arose which utterly defeated the usefulness of the heavily armoured horse on the battlefield (Bohemia and the Ottoman armies are briefly discussed as well). The use of the pike and halberd in Switzerland and the use of the longbow in England (and the war wagon in Bohemia and gunpowder in the Ottoman army) unhorsed the cavalrymen so severely that he has never made a comeback. Oman then discusses how these innovations were themselves made obsolete by the rise of combined arms and new technologies at the beginning of the Early Modern Era.
Really, this book was just a delight to read. While it may not be for those who aren't interested in military history or the Medieval world, I found it fascinating and worth a second look (the first being in undergrad, where I may have just skimmed it...). In fact, it's good enough that I'm going to keep my eyes open for his longer and more mature two volume edition.
In addition to recommending this to Medievalists and military historians, I'd recommend this to anyone who wants to write history. Oman's style is short, full, and readable. He conveys a lot of information in a few words without being boring. If more history books were written like this, we'd have more people interested in history.
Highly recommended.
May 2, 2020
An excellent introduction to medieval military history despite its age. I'm providing a breakdown of Oman's work on the subject, since there are books with similar titles:
The Art of War in the Middle Ages - Oman's first book is much shorter than the later one (around 200 pages vs 700). It covers some of the same material as the later version, but it has sections on the Swiss and the Hussite wars that the later version lacks.
A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages - I read the first edition of this book which covers the 3rd century to the 14th. There are later editions that were revised by Oman in the 1920s and other scholars in the 50s and 70s. These include a lot more content about the late middle ages such as coverage for Eastern Europe, the Ottomans, gunpowder weapons, and the Wars of the Roses, etc.
The Art of War in the Middle Ages - Oman's first book is much shorter than the later one (around 200 pages vs 700). It covers some of the same material as the later version, but it has sections on the Swiss and the Hussite wars that the later version lacks.
A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages - I read the first edition of this book which covers the 3rd century to the 14th. There are later editions that were revised by Oman in the 1920s and other scholars in the 50s and 70s. These include a lot more content about the late middle ages such as coverage for Eastern Europe, the Ottomans, gunpowder weapons, and the Wars of the Roses, etc.
April 15, 2019
Classic work on the weapons, tactics, and strategy (or lack thereof) of the Middle Ages in Europe. The narrative runs from the battle of Adrianople in 378 A.D. to the battles of the early 16th Century. Transitions from the infantry of the Roman world to feudal cavalry to Swiss phalanx to longbows to gunpowder & fortifications.
Language takes some getting used to and Google is handy for Latin and French translations.
Language takes some getting used to and Google is handy for Latin and French translations.
July 18, 2020
An incredible work, especially considering that the author was and undergrad when he wrote it. Oman’s work shows the prejudices of his time, and the book’s constant refrain of the ineptitude of medieval knights is the most prominent example. (They were often inept but this is far from universal.)
Despite this, it is an enjoyable read and a worthwhile one, despite the time that has lapsed since its publishing.
Despite this, it is an enjoyable read and a worthwhile one, despite the time that has lapsed since its publishing.
August 5, 2020
A quick primer on warfare in Europe from 350 AD to 1400 AD. covering all the major changes in Europe from Spanish infantry and gunners to the Swiss pike men and the English long bow. Also a brief section on the Ottoman Turks And the Czech's. All in all a interesting read, but not extraordinarily special.
August 16, 2022
A good overview of evolution of war in the Middle Ages. Technology and history changed how armies were recruited, trained and equipped. From volunteer militias, to paid mercenaries to professional soldiers. These political changes were driven by new technology, threats and economic realities.
February 20, 2019
Factual. Answered every question I had.
February 6, 2020
NICE BOOK.
November 10, 2020
A VERY INTERESTING BOOK. AUTHOR.
March 11, 2022
I could FEEL the author sighing in frustration at what absolute fuckups composed so many medieval militaries, which was hilarious and interesting
September 24, 2022
Good historiography and gave me some great ideas of where to look for research.
January 16, 2023
Funny stories, very dense. Swiss are mean. Longbows.
Want to read
January 20, 2023Paul graham rec, “what should I read to learn more about history”, sam altman rec
November 18, 2013
For the amount of data, battle review, sheer information, this book deserve 5 stars, no doubt. Sir Oman covered many middle age battles in a quite short book, in itself quite an accomplishment. There are also a few battle's illustration, something missing from many military books even today.
But I gave it only 3 stars because I felt throughout it that the author tried not to expose his knowledge on the matter but to prove his points, namely that the French suck, that cavalry was the main force that decided battles, that the Romans were not as great as the English (really!) and that the people living in Britain during Middle Ages have made more contribution to the art of war than anybody else in Europe. It is a very opinionated book. It is still very interesting for the clear descriptions of many battles and the illustrations in it. But be prepared to be repeated at each chapter how much the French were bad, not only militarily, and that some of his theories have been disproved.
But I gave it only 3 stars because I felt throughout it that the author tried not to expose his knowledge on the matter but to prove his points, namely that the French suck, that cavalry was the main force that decided battles, that the Romans were not as great as the English (really!) and that the people living in Britain during Middle Ages have made more contribution to the art of war than anybody else in Europe. It is a very opinionated book. It is still very interesting for the clear descriptions of many battles and the illustrations in it. But be prepared to be repeated at each chapter how much the French were bad, not only militarily, and that some of his theories have been disproved.
May 3, 2015
Interessante resoconto sulle strategie di guerra del medioevo. Purtroppo però si parla troppo di strategia e tattica, tralasciando completamente gli effetti della guerra sulla popolazione e sulle città. inoltre l'autore sembra eccessivamente ancorato ad idee che, a mio modestissimo parere, sembrano un pò azzardate (i cavalieri medievali ed i loro comandanti erano tutti degli imbecille che caricavano sempre in modo insensato, per dire).
Un buon testo per farsi un'idea sui passaggi fondamentali delle tattiche di guerra durante l'Età Media.
Un buon testo per farsi un'idea sui passaggi fondamentali delle tattiche di guerra durante l'Età Media.
December 6, 2014
Written 130 years ago, this book is a great handbook for understanding the wars and battles of medieval history as you read about them in other books. The author covers strategy and tactics, weapons and weapon systems, the raising and equipping of armies and the use of mercenaries such as the famed and feared Swiss pikemen. Changing technology results in changing strategy and tactics, with the advent of firearms the most significant of all.
January 26, 2008
This is the book that got me into military history. Its a fun and easy read that gives a good survey of military conflict throughout Europe from the dark ages to the renaissance. Its far from the perfect historical document and has been challenged in some circles but all the same, its a fine piece of work worth the read.
Want to read
November 8, 2009Note: Added to my to-read shelf not because this is a recommended history, but because it's not. Apparently he let his pet theories get in the way of the historical record. I'm still interested because he's a source for some science fiction writers who wrote a lot of alternate history.
July 28, 2011
The short version, still very interesting view on late Romans and the question on the infantry in late Middle Ages, and surprisingly arrogant towards the French. Worth to have it combined with Hans Delbruck.
May 18, 2012
An excellent book, I gave it a low ranking because it is dated.
November 17, 2009
Mounted cavalry can be defeated by pikemen.
April 2, 2012
The history of warfare is the history of mankind. This one is concise and well written.
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