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The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science

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• Why is science so powerful?
• Why did it take so long—two thousand years after the invention of philosophy and mathematics—for the human race to start using science to learn the secrets of the universe?

In a groundbreaking work that blends science, philosophy, and history, leading philosopher of science Michael Strevens answers these challenging questions, showing how science came about only once thinkers stumbled upon the astonishing idea that scientific breakthroughs could be accomplished by breaking the rules of logical argument.

Like such classic works as Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery and Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The Knowledge Machine grapples with the meaning and origins of science, using a plethora of vivid historical examples to demonstrate that scientists willfully ignore religion, theoretical beauty, and even philosophy to embrace a constricted code of argument whose very narrowness channels unprecedented energy into empirical observation and experimentation. Strevens calls this scientific code the iron rule of explanation, and reveals the way in which the rule, precisely because it is unreasonably close-minded, overcomes individual prejudices to lead humanity inexorably toward the secrets of nature.

“With a mixture of philosophical and historical argument, and written in an engrossing style” (Alan Ryan), The Knowledge Machine provides captivating portraits of some of the greatest luminaries in science’s history, including Isaac Newton, the chief architect of modern science and its foundational theories of motion and gravitation; William Whewell, perhaps the greatest philosopher-scientist of the early nineteenth century; and Murray Gell-Mann, discoverer of the quark. Today, Strevens argues, in the face of threats from a changing climate and global pandemics, the idiosyncratic but highly effective scientific knowledge machine must be protected from politicians, commercial interests, and even scientists themselves who seek to open it up, to make it less narrow and more rational—and thus to undermine its devotedly empirical search for truth.

Rich with illuminating and often delightfully quirky illustrations, The Knowledge Machine, written in a winningly accessible style that belies the import of its revisionist and groundbreaking concepts, radically reframes much of what we thought we knew about the origins of the modern world.

368 pages, Hardcover

First published October 13, 2020

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Michael Strevens

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Displaying 1 - 30 of 108 reviews
295 reviews6 followers
October 28, 2020
This book is maddingly repetitious, but as a retired research biologist of 45 years, it captures the reality of doing science. Once upon a time, I taught a freshman seminar called “Biological Headlines: the science behind the stories”. One group of seminars was based on the idea that science is an unnatural way of thinking. People often draw some “conclusion” from a chance observation or a case history or a correlation, but for science, that “conclusion” has to be empirically tested by “unnatural” means. Science demands repetition, empirical testing from as many directions as possible, probability and statistical measures, percentages and denominators. As Strevens states, “…science is an alien thought form” (p.4).

The oft-repeated essence of Strevens’s discussion is that in science, “Only empirical testing counts”. There can be no appeal to philosophy, religion, beauty, or other non-empirical source. Scientists are free to use those inputs in formulating or discussing ideas, but the only thing that ultimately matters in science is empirical testing.

I began my scientific training a decade after publication of two influential books on the philosophy of science: Karl Popper’s “The Logic of Scientific Discovery” (1959) and Thomas Kuhn’s “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962). These are Strevers's straw men. I do not remember ever reading those books, but I knew a soundbite for each. For Popper, a hypothesis had to be falsifiable to be a worthy hypothesis. For Kuhn, great advances in science were when a paradigm shift occurred and the entire scientific activity in an area was reformulated. Looking back on my career, neither of these ideas had any influence, and that agrees with Strevens’s thrust that the nub of science is generating empirical results that best explain observations.

If a scientist thinks something is the case, he or she tries to subject it to as many tests as possible. That is not really Popper’s falsification. It is rather the necessity to make as sure as possible that any empirical result will hold up to future scrutiny. As to Kuhn’s paradigm shifts, I do not know what it is like to experience one. In physics, the move from the ether to Einstein’s relativity and on to quantum mechanics is usually cited. In biology, Darwin’s theory of natural selection is cited. Are those the only ones? Have there been any paradigm shifts beyond quantum mechanics in the last century?

I cannot speak to physics. In biology, there have been major discoveries, but do they qualify as paradigm shifts? Even if they did, what of it? Did it matter to the individual investigator? Two major discoveries were Mendel’s inheritance of discrete traits and recognition of DNA as the genetic material. To be sure, investigators asked different questions, but was that a revolution?

My own specialty was developmental biology – how an embryo develops. Major advances were made in the 1980’s when genetics and molecular biology were used to attack long-standing embryological questions. The unexpected result was that animals as diverse as worms, fruit flies, frogs, mice and humans used the same genes to direct the building of their bodies. Once this idea took hold, it became possible to move freely between organisms. Was that a paradigm shift from an earlier expectation that the diversity of animal forms would be reflected by a diversity of genes important in their construction? The result of a common “molecular toolbox” was exciting, but I would not call it a paradigm shift. It felt more like a logical series of steps made possible by new technologies.

The weakness of Strevens’s book is the repetition. It would be nice to see his “iron rule” of empiricism be discussed with more examples, particularly of the last century. This criticism is far outweighed by the strength of Strevens’s analysis. He captures more than Popper or Kuhn the feeling of doing science.
Profile Image for Ryan Boissonneault.
201 reviews2,150 followers
November 1, 2020
Unlike the humanities, including philosophy—where the idea of progress is a controversial topic—it is an essentially indisputable fact that science makes considerable progress over time. Why this is the case—and how science actually works—is what Michael Strevens seeks to explain in The Knowledge Machine.

The basic argument is that scientific knowledge grows through the application of the “iron rule of explanation,” as Strevens calls it, that demands that all scientific argument be settled by empirical testing alone, and that the results of empirical testing are to be recorded in formal scientific journals for future reference and use.

The iron rule is peculiar in the sense that it demands adherence to empirical testing and does not consider the relevance or significance of any non-empirical knowledge, whether philosophical, religious, spiritual, or aesthetic. While individual scientists are free to theorize in whatever manner they like—and are swayed by the same philosophical, moral, and political influences and biases as everyone else—the iron rule of explanation guarantees that formal arguments are presented without reference to any of these ancillary considerations.

The net effect of this “procedural consensus,” over time, is what Strevens refers to as “Baconian convergence,” or the idea that repeated empirical testing over time converges on the one theory that best explains all the accumulated data. This is why physicists, over time, have eventually come to accept the legitimacy of the general theory of relativity, for example, whereas a religion like Christianty schisms permanently into a thousand different parts.

The reason for this is that philosophical and theological reasoning, while attempting to be more ambitious and all-encompassing, has no ultimate method of verification or falsification through testing. If I think, as Isaac Newton did, that Jesus was created by God and subordinate to God, whereas you think that Jesus and God are one and the same, how are we supposed to resolve this philosophical difference? I can provide my logical and coherent reasons and you can provide yours—along with our respective interpretations of the relevant scripture—but without a procedural consensus whereby we can ascertain the truth beyond mere logic, there is no way to settle the argument.

On the other hand, if I believe the Newtonian theory of gravity is correct and you believe the Einsteinian theory is correct, we can (if we were capable) settle the dispute by measuring the angle that light is bent by the sun’s gravity during a total solar eclipse, as Arthur Eddington and others did. Newton’s theory predicts one measure; Einstein’s predicts the other. We can both agree to what the measurements will tell us beforehand; then, after the experiment is conducted and the measurements are verified, we can settle the dispute.

Of course, as Strevens points out, it’s not exactly this simple. An individual scientist must still engage in “plausibility rankings” and determine how to weigh conflicting evidence. There is a strong element of subjectivity in the interpretation of evidence and the process is far from completely objective. But the main reason why science is effective is not due to the unwavering rationality of any individual scientist; rather, it is attributable to the process of several scientists over time abiding to the iron rule of explanation—and publishing detailed empirical findings—that allows the process of convergence to occur over time and the correct theory to materialize. This is why science advances, and why we are now able to launch satellites into space and communicate with each other around the globe electronically at the speed of light.

So far, so good, but why did the iron rule of explanation—which has proven to be so effective—take humanity so long to develop? Why did it develop in 17th-century Europe and not, for example, in ancient Greece or China? The reason is, according to Strevens, that the iron rule is, at bottom, irrational. It asks the practicing scientist to effectively ignore all other forms of human inquiry that is not strictly empirical. This would have seemed absurd, especially in ancient Greece, the birthplace of philosophy, or in Medieval Europe, obsessed with theology as it was. To give up all philosophical and theological reasoning in the attempt to explain how the world works was too radical an idea for most times and places.

This is why science had to wait for the peculiar historical and cultural circumstances of early modern Europe. Only then, and only over time, did it begin to make paradoxical sense that knowledge of the world can only grow by significantly limiting its scope to empirical testing and data alone. Since then, the iron rule of explanation and its procedural consensus has resulted in Baconian convergence and a growing and sophisticated understanding of the workings of the world.

Strevens, I think, has hit on something profound in this book, and his explanation for how science works is ultimately convincing. However, I take some issue with the title of the book and on his calling the process of scientific discovery irrational.

The iron rule is not, in itself, irrational; its tremendous success over the last few hundred years should attest to that. By limiting scientific argument to empirical data alone, our knowledge of the world has increased astronomically in a short period of time.

The irrationality, then, does not lie in the iron rule itself; rather, it lies in the belief that the iron rule applies to problems outside the realm of science. If you believe that philosophical, ethical, and political problems can be solved with empirical argument alone, then yes, your overextension of the iron rule is indeed irrational.

But if you limit the scope of the iron rule to scientific, empirical problems, then there is nothing irrational about the rule because there is nothing in the rule that says you cannot compartmentalize scientific problems. Isaac Newton should have demonstrated this; he abided by the iron rule in his scientific work while simultaneously pursuing other philosophical and mystical pursuits. There is nothing irrational about this. The irrationality, rather, comes from someone like Stephen Hawking, who said that “philosophy is dead” because he couldn’t apply the iron rule to philosophical problems—problems it is not meant to address.

There is no “theory of everything”; reality is complex, like a six-sided cube you cannot view all from the same perspective. Different problem types require different approaches, and science has developed, according to the iron rule, its own successful approach. Philosophical, historical, ethical, legal, and political problems all have their approaches as well, and, while they all influence each other, no single domain has authority over all the others.

Science has simply limited its scope to empirical testing to solve certain kinds of problems. While the scientist that thinks this particular approach can solve all types of problems is certainly irrational, scientific problem solving, led by the iron rule, is not.
Profile Image for Erik Graff.
5,060 reviews1,223 followers
January 25, 2021
Author Strevens is an academic philosopher of science. In this book he takes on Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn as regards our understanding of 'science', as it is actually practiced versus how such as they have conceptualized it. Here one might simplifyingly characterize Popper as tending towards idealization, Kuhn towards criticism. Strevens' own approach is to focus on the scientific practices that have actually increased human understanding and achievement, science that works, and, so doing, to recognize its essential character as narrowly and painstakingly empirical, eschewing ideologies and philosophies, ethics and aesthetics--at least in the domain of professional communications. This is the 'irrationality' of the book's subtitle.

My own take on all of this is to agree that modern science, so conceived, is, like he writes, 'a knowledge machine', just like modern capitalism is a wealth-generating machine--and that both of them are monstrously powerful. Strevens acknowledges this, recognizing that we're on a path to utter destruction while hoping that the 'golem' of modern science may afford the means to preserve civilization. However, he does not much discuss how many of the problems we face are themselves consequences of the sciences we practice.

Other than that I found the book to be very repetitive. Perhaps, not being a philosopher of science, I missed a lot of his subtle references. I've only read one book apiece of Popper and of Kuhn, and those long ago. In any case, his main point might have been handled far more concisely. Still, it was an easy, though somewhat boring after a while, read.
Profile Image for Clif Hostetler.
1,139 reviews853 followers
September 8, 2023
The subject of this book is the philosophy of science, and it goes on to try to explain why it took so long for human civilization to develop the “iron rule” that made it possible. The iron rule is the requirement that all scientific arguments be settled by empirical testing. But in addition to the empirical testing it is also required that any discussion of causal reasoning or scientific argument be free of all subjective considerations and non empirical considerations (philosophical, religious, aesthetic).

It is this secondary requirement in addition to the requirement of empirical testing that goes against human nature, and is the irrationality referenced in the book’s subtitle. The human mind naturally wants to use its reasoning to make sense of the world, but science forbids trying to use logic to explain why.

Also part of the scientific process is the sharing of the results of empirical testing for others to check or falsify. Along the way theories and hypotheses may be proposed and will eventually converge to a general consensus. This convergence is referred to in this book as the Baconian convergence. Francis Bacon in his seminal work Novum Organum set out the basis of the scientific method.

As this book elaborates on the philosophy of science it covers and describes considerable science history. As far as the philosophy part goes, this author claims to be presenting a new—even revolutionary—philosophy that steers a course somewhere between that of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. The author wraps things up as follows:
SO MUCH FOR THE old methodists, Popper and Kuhn. The new methodism proposed in “The Knowledge Machine” suggests three essential ingredients for a thriving science.

The first is fighting spirit. I don't mean Popper's critical spirit, scrutinizing the theoretical landscape from disinterested logical heights. What I have in mind is in far more plentiful supply: partial, self-interested ambition. Such ambition need not be low-minded; its interest in seeking out the truth and advancing human happiness may well be sincere. Nor need it be combative or mean—a great athlete can be full of grace. But it must be ready to play the game to win.

The fighting spirit must then be caged within the iron rule. The nature of the game is thus defined: from its players it will elicit the kind of evidence—arduous and expensive to produce—that hones the knowledge machine's sharp edge, and it will store that evidence securely for thinkers in the centuries ahead. The human race provides fighting spirit in abundance; the iron rule, by contrast, was hard to come by, because its demands are to all appearances contrary to reason. Indeed, as revealed by its war on theoretical beauty, they are in the fullest sense irrational. Nevertheless, the rule's dominion over all forms of inquiry into nature is now well established. "Only empirical tenting count." has come to feel normal, even rather boring.

Perhaps a little too boring. Thus, the third and last of the knowledge machine's needs, which might also be the most difficult, in our day, to satisfy. It is to leave science alone, that is, to resist the urge to tinker, to make science more current, more flexible, or, for that matter, more sensible. (p.283-284)
In the following excerpt the author comes close to being poetic in describing the slow adoption by human civilization of science.
The Knowledge Machine opened in the darkness of prehistory. Civilization’s sun rose, bringing literature and law, temple domes and proscenium arches, and the more abstract pleasures of mathematics and philosophy. Science's sun, meanwhile, remained deep below the horizon. To one surveying the cultures of the ancient world, there was no glimmer to suggest that anything like modern science would arise. So it continued for centuries, millennia. Empires came and went; each left its enduring aesthetic and intellectual gifts to humankind, but there was no science.

At a stroke, the Scientific Revolution changed everything. Science's sun seemed to have appeared, not on the horizon, but at its zenith, as the fierce genius of Newton and his lieutenants glistered in the heavens. It burned far hotter than had even the sun of civilization. Our sultry, teeming, denatured planet is its consequence—as are our increasingly long, comfortable, amusing lives. (p.289-290)
Profile Image for Allen Roberts.
95 reviews9 followers
January 10, 2023
This is a passionate, convincing defense of the scientific method, or more specifically what Strevens calls the “iron rule,” defined operationally as a rule which “directs scientists to resolve their differences of opinion by conducting empirical tests rather than by shouting or fighting or philosophizing or moralizing or marrying or calling on a higher power.” p.88

Stevens provides an examination of the origin and historical development of the “iron rule” as well as explaining its crucial importance to the advancement of knowledge. The double-edged nature of the scientific method (as both the bane as well as the savior of humanity) is acknowledged and discussed.

In sum, this is a well-written book—although Strevens is preaching to the choir. If you are already an advocate of the practice of evidence-based science, you will find little to disagree with here.
1,864 reviews2 followers
February 25, 2021
Not good. He attempts to talk about the scientific revolution and scientific method with intelligence, but he only talks about it. He starts by talking about the different ideas of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, but he then quickly messes up by trying to apply both of them to the full area of science discovery and explanation rather than admitting it really is two haves.

The working of the scientific method is about looking at a theory, trying to disprove it, and using evidence to show if there's a failure. Evidence is all that matters. Explaining the results is where opinion impacts things, since scientists are also human. The two halves are clearly marked. It's why, in this pandemic time, Astra-Zeneka can make a claim, but they had to provide all the data and other folks found problems with the opinion about the result.

As long as we understand people are people (and that shouldn't be difficult), and as long as the data is always open to review, there's no need to claim the scientific method is a failure because of the second half.

I think it ignorance is best shown when he's muttering about philosophies towards the end. While talking about how scientists mostly think philosophy has no place in science, he types "An inability to think outside the box funnels all of a scientist's mental and physical and emotional energy into the box itself." How moronic.

First, scientists think outside the box. That's how they are able to create specific hypothesis to check to see if a theory is valid. Second, that they only look at empirical evidence during the research doesn't obviate an opportunity to invent reasons, or even excuses, for evidence they like or dislike. Third, that a scientist is rigid during experimentation says nothing about their lives outside the experiment, and "inability" is insulting and ignorant.

Finally, he seems to be stating that it's irrational to ignore the irrationality of religion and non-experimental reasoning of philosophy when experimenting. What a surprise, he has it backwards.

Avoid this book
Profile Image for Steve.
1,035 reviews59 followers
April 29, 2021
Good explanation of what science *is* and is *not* and speculations about why it developed in Europe 500 years ago and not some other place or time. He talks about Kuhn and Popper, agrees with some of their theories and disputes others. For a book about science it’s pretty flowery and poetic - well done but sometimes I wished he were a little more direct.
Profile Image for Richard Thompson.
2,190 reviews106 followers
February 13, 2022
I have read Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend and thought all of them were brilliant, with each of them having deep insights about the process and development of science but somehow with each of them missing something. Popper's ideas seemed to be too neat and simple. Kuhn was imposing an overall structure that seemed to ignore a lot of messy details, and Feyerabend was so caught up in the messiness of the details that it no longer felt like a good explanation of why science has worked so well for the past few centuries. Mr. Strevens takes us another step forward, though I'm not sure that he has enough of a synthesis to bring us to a complete theory.

I liked his idea of the "Iron Rule" that disagreements are addressed by experimentation designed to show which approach to a problem is correct. And even more I liked the idea that much of the success of science comes from focusing on simple explanations that are considered sufficient if they work without regard to the deep underlying mechanisms or causes. This allows the scientist to put aside religion and philosophy as realms that pose questions that science does not purport to answer, so science can advance based on ever better theories that correspond to observation. As Mr. Strevens points out this is actually a dumbing down of explanatory tools, a conscious decision to reject the methods of analysis that scientists, theologists and philosophers had found to be essential for two thousand years. Another thing I liked was the idea that much of great science comes from people who ignore these "rules," who fudge their data or have interpretive biases that don't correspond to reason or who develop theories based on philosophical or religious ideas that supposedly have been eliminated from the scientific method. The salvation of science comes from repeated testing over time with better and better experiments and in putting theories that have an irrational basis into the meat grinder of experimentation until they are accepted on account of repeated supporting evidence and predictive success or are proved false.

So there is a lot of smart stuff here, but lots left to think about and much more to be revealed in the philosophy and history of science.
Profile Image for Mansoor.
674 reviews12 followers
December 9, 2022
نویسنده حرفهای نامربوط زیادی زده که البته بر او حرجی نیست. او فلسفه‌خوانده‌ای است که با علوم طبیعی آشنایی ندارد و تنها چیزکی که از متدولوژی این علوم می‌داند، از پوپر و کوئن یاد گرفته و خب به سیاق آکادمیسین‌های فلسفه‌ی علم در باتلاق مهمل‌بافی‌های فایرابند هم زیاد دست‌وپا زده. در نهایت تنها حرف درستی که زده هم چیز جدیدی نیست: فرانسوا جیکب، بیولوژیست و نوبلیست فرانسوی، خیلی پیشتر با مفهوم "علم شبانه" و "علم روزانه" کشف کشاف نویسنده را به شکل تمیزتری بیان کرده بود
Profile Image for Katie.
1,117 reviews239 followers
August 5, 2021
Summary: Mostly useful for scientists as a great starting point for thinking explicitly about why we do science the way we do.

This book sets out to answer two questions - why does science work? and why did it take people so long to start using the current scientific method? I wasn't thrilled by this pick from my science nonfiction book club. I love learning new scientific information and this meta approach to the topic didn't appeal to me. Although I still certainly don't agree with everything the author had to say, I ended up enjoying the book a lot. As a scientist, I found it a useful prompt to evaluate how I approach my work.



I thought the most interesting question the author asked was about why science works at all. Theoretically, scientists are supposed to objective. Realistically, it's impossible for people to set aside all subjectivity in their work. He makes explicit that where objectivity is truly required is in professional communication. He makes a great analogy between science and a coral reef. In this analogy, the living, messy surface is the science being done now. The skeleton of the reef is all that objective data we record and leave behind for future generations to build on. Science can then converge on the right answer through this slow accretion of knowledge.

Other parts of the book felt obvious to me, such as the author's definition of science as an evidence-based pursuit. He tried to set this up as a brilliant new idea, but I think this is how most scientists would define what we do. Although he tries to make this book general enough to capture all fields of science, he's clearly focused primarily on physics. In particular, he places a real emphasis on the goal of deriving models and equations that are consistent with existing data. He insists that having an explanation or mechanism for why something happens isn't important. This view doesn't apply as well to biology. For example, Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier are the ones who got the Noble Prize for CIRSPR because they're the ones who showed how it worked. Last but not least, as a scientist, his final section about how scientists these days don't know anything about the humanities was kind of offensive. I took art, philosophy, and literature classes in under grad and I'm one of many scientists I know with a humanities based hobby.

Despite some limitations, this book was really thought provoking. I think the author correctly identifies enough fundamental aspects of how science works that it could be of interest to a general audience. However, I definitely found it most useful as a prompt to consider how I do science, so I'd primarily recommend it to other scientists.This review was originally posted on Doing Dewey
Profile Image for Arevik  Heboyan.
146 reviews1 follower
September 16, 2020
Thanks, NetGalley, authors, and publishers, for the opportunity to review this work of art on science history, philosophy, and, as a matter of fact, knowledge generation principles.

This is a fundamental work on science philosophy & history, providing insights on powers propelling & determining scientific research and scientific idea generation, as well as powers that are challenging and stopping us, human scientists ( with all our human flows and ways of thinking).
In this work, the author presents the main and widely accepted scientific rules that are used for falsification and/or acceptance of the hypothesis, represents two main ways of scientific thinking and roles, that scientists ( and their minds) play in global academia, and does an amazing job equally accepting and rejecting both.

Science, being a "brainchild" of certain people, is certainly influenced by the era when it is conducted, by social, economical, political, intellectual, moral views and ideas of the era, and, certainly, by moral, social, and very personal desires of scientists.

Science is never in the vacuum, it is very much influenced by social and (very) personal factors, and these social and personal powers can greatly propel and at the same time just stop the progress of science, even for millennia...

As scientists, we need to accept and objectify science as much as possible, our personal feelings, hence ideas towards certain outcomes can make us very biased and imagine all scientists just follow one paradigm and be closed to an alternate idea, only because it is not yet giving all the explanation we want. On the other hand, we may waste a huge amount of time and resources researching hypotheses that may answer one question and yet leave all the others open...

Science is very human and follows the same principles, as human behavior.
It is biased, it may be very irrational at times, but it is the only way for us to generate knowledge.

Needless to say, this is a definitely 5-star read for me. The amount of research and accessibility for the researches in all academical fields, language, and logical reasoning and transitions, humor (the proposal image of two scientists ) made this book an exceptional material for both students of academia, who are doing their first steps in the research world, as well as established researches, as a kind reminder to look on their work from above. I am going to use this in my classes of history of psychological research as a mandatory read, as well as my small research group.

If possible, please share a copy of this book upon printing, I'd definitely treasure it in my library.
Profile Image for Todd.
160 reviews9 followers
November 5, 2020
A fantastic account of the philosophical luminaries in science updated for the 21st century. With Popper and Kuhn as his starting points, Strevens then goes back to Aristotle, Descartes, and Newton to fashion an origin story for the explanatory power and progress made by science. For Strevens, these features arise from an irrational but entirely necessary dedication to empirical observation (referred to as science’s iron rule), and an insistence that explanations, free of philosophical “ultimate causes”, need only accurately describe the observables. While something like beauty can motivate and inspire individual scientists, such subjectivity has no explanatory power and is rightly left out of the public conversations conducted by scientists at meetings and in the pages of niche journals. All told, there may be a poverty within scientific thought if we take Strevens’s analysis seriously. However, this poverty is the source of its effectiveness without which we would not be able to comfortably enjoy the fruits of the fuller, but rather impotent, world of humanistic thought. In Strevens, science has the best kind of advocate - full throated but realistic and not the least bit sycophantic. Easily short listed for best of 2020.
Profile Image for S.
28 reviews7 followers
July 25, 2023
3.5/5

Many compelling points and historical anecdotes, however I cannot shake the feeling that A) the radical subjectivists make equally compelling points and B) the best science plays at an intimate, empathetic, and animistic tempo.

Science authors such as Robin Wall-Kimmerer or Merlin Sheldrake do an excellent job exposing the intellectual blindness of “the knowledge machine's” cold detachment. One could say these are not “real scientists” on the cutting edge of rigorous empirical study, nevertheless, they recall a long tradition of mysticism and magic Streven’s asserts is an impossibility in modern science.
Profile Image for India.
120 reviews6 followers
March 8, 2022
read this book for a class i’m not crazy about. prob would’ve been better if it weren’t for class but if i’m honest i fell asleep reading this more than once. at first i blamed that on it being hot in the tower room but then i fell asleep in bvac so clearly that wasn’t the issue.
Profile Image for David C Ward.
1,613 reviews35 followers
December 12, 2020
An accessible - but occasionally too breezy (it’s irritating when a writer shows that he thinks he’s clever) - interpretation of the rise and triumph of modern science. Strevens wonders why science, as we know it anyway, took so long to arrive (around 1620; 2pm). He does a good job debunking the idea that science is immune from worldly corruptions, from personal differences to interference by governments, religions etc. He locates science’s rise and indeed its coherence as a “thing” in the agreement on a consensus (Baconian Convergence) on the basic rules of the game: science would proceed by continual inquiry regardless of other differences. (The analogy is with games: chess players play chess.) Implicitly this is a celebration of the Enlightenment Project, including its basis in the political economy, now much maligned because it didn’t fulfill all of its transcendent (even utopian) premises and some of its practitioners were not as fastidious as we are. Or as Marx put it, “History sets itself no problems it cannot solve.” It’s not “irrational” at all.
46 reviews
December 31, 2020
I don't know about this one: it's a counter-intuitive history of science that argues that Western science has been successful by being "irrational," that is by narrowly focusing only on evidence, or what he calls the "iron rule of explanation." To call this "irrational," I think, sets up a false expectation (I was thinking about another kind of irrationality that I am familiar with from premodern science). But it's still a interesting account of how the history of science has been told, and what constitutes the nature of science today.
Profile Image for Sharad Pandian.
411 reviews151 followers
January 14, 2023
“I have dismantled the iron rule, over the last few chapters, to analyze each of its four innovations. Now I need to reassemble the parts, showing how the innovations work together to power and steer the knowledge machine.

The iron rule demands that scientific arguments consider only the explanatory power of contending theories. The positive core of the rule is a shallow, permissive conception of explanatory power, on which a phenomenon is explained by deriving it from a theory’s causal principles. The principles need not pass any philosophical test or even be fully understood—thus, Newton considered himself to have explained the motions of the planets and the tides using his theory of gravity, although he offered no explanation of the causes of gravity itself.

The negative side of the rule forbids scientists, when making their case in official venues such as scientific journals, to assess theories using anything other than explanatory power. Philosophical and religious arguments in particular are out of bounds, no matter how compelling they may seem to scientists and to society at large. Likewise, scientists may not bring personal or cultural or other parochial considerations to bear in making their case; the iron rule requires that everything subjective be removed from scientific argument.

The Scientific Revolution, then, accomplished by way of the iron rule both a shallowing and a narrowing of the old forms of deliberation: post-Revolutionary argument is shallower in its conception of explanatory power, and it is narrower in its range of reasons for accepting and rejecting hypotheses and theories. Although such constrictions have little intuitive appeal, they have turned out to provide the superstructure for an extraordinarily effective engine of inquiry.

We live in a Tychonic world—a world in which great competing stories about the underlying nature of things can be distinguished by, and only by, scrutinizing subtle intricacies and minute differences. Humans in their natural state are not much disposed to attend to such trifles. But they love to win. The procedural consensus imposed by the iron rule creates a dramatic contest within which the trifles acquire an unnatural luster, becoming, for their tactical worth, objects of fierce desire. The rule in this way redirects great quantities of energy that might have gone toward philosophical or other forms of argument into empirical testing. Modern science’s human raw material is molded into a strike force of unnervingly single-minded observers, measurers, and experimenters, generating a vast, detailed, varied, discriminating stock of evidence.

At the same time, the iron rule preserves this evidence, maintaining a craft tradition of “sterilization” that archives observed phenomena in a form that is distorted as little as possible by interpretation and other consequences of plausibility rankings.

The thinking of each generation of scientists is, and is permitted by the iron rule to be, essentially subjective. But that subjectivity does not matter in the long run. As thinkers come and go, observations accrue, revealing in time which theories are better explainers and which are worse. The eventual consequence is Baconian convergence on the truth: informed opinion increasingly favors the one theory, the correct theory, that accounts for every aspect of the accumulated evidence.

Science, then, is built up like a coral reef. Individual scientists are the polyps, secreting a shelly carapace that they bequeath to the reef upon their departure. That carapace is the sterilized public record of their research, a compilation of observation or experimentation and the explanatory derivation, where possible, of the data from known theories and auxiliary assumptions. The scientist, like a polyp, is a complete living thing, all too human in just the ways that the historians and sociologists of science have described. When the organism goes, however, its humanity goes with it. What is left is the evidential exoskeleton of a scientific career. You can see the bare bones laid down by Eddington’s eclipse expedition, for example, in the black-and-white rows of numbers that represent stars’ photographed positions and the mathematical calculations that yield the sun’s implied bending of starlight.

The intellectual edifice that is scientific knowledge is composed largely of these exoskeletal remains. It is held together, like a reef, not by living things, but by the evidence and argument that living things produce, assembled according to a strict architectural plan ordained by the iron rule.” (195-7)
Profile Image for Tiago Faleiro.
358 reviews128 followers
August 18, 2021
Science is such a big force in our world, but a lot of people take it for granted. What exactly makes science so special? And if it's so special, why did it take humanity so long to develop it? The latter being particularly important and not a perspective I see often. The emergence of science is often told through the scientific revolution, but few bother to ask what made that revolution happen. Why not before? This is one of the main questions of the book.

It was one of my favourite books this year and I devoured it as quickly as I could. I love both philosophy and science, and this book combines both beautifully in addition to being rich in history. It is the more nuanced and careful investigation I have seen, and what I have always craved when studying the topic. It goes well beyond the basic thesis of Kuhn and Kopper, and more impressively, it doesn't settle for its purely philosophical claims but makes them stand against historical and sociological evidence, which both makes their theories reductionist of how science actually operates.

Strevens' main point is that science took so long because it is an unnatural way of looking at the world. Not unnatural doesn't quite capture it, it is almost irrational. It is a rich point that isn't easy to explain in a couple of sentences but he builds his argument well, especially by putting on the lenses of specific historical periods and making thought experiments of how one ought to think. Even with our current knowledge, it would be incredibly hard to convince someone in the past why the scientific method is superior.

The rich history was what really made the book powerful for me. Countless examples are given which strengthen his point. This what also something that made Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions very strong, but it's even better made here. And some of the history I was honestly appealed at how I never encountered it before. Most mind-blowing is how often science was badly done. This isn't too surprising if we think of individual studies in modernity, but I am talking about the very foundations of the most important scientific discoveries ever made, from Einstein's relativity and its confirmation with the 1919 eclipse to Mendel's statistics on inheritance and Newton's experiments. I honestly cannot comprehend how much I have studied philosophy and science and I never once heard about this.

These historical cases really highlight the messy nature of science, and many more are given. How it can be flawed, and how its roots go well beyond pure data or even rationality. Yet, how why it still works besides all of that. What he argues is that what makes science special is that it creates a game where everyone knows the rules and has to play by the rules. And the rule is that empirical evidence is what counts, and nothing else. What he calls “iron rule of explanation".

Scientists never actually work like this. It is impossible to work with evidence alone because it always requires auxiliary assumptions. Yet by playing the game nevertheless, the truth eventually emerges. Or it is the game that has the highest likelihood of that happening. The science itself never says which theory to believe. It is only a process, a shared game. It is also an open-ended game, one side can always come up with a new interpretation and a new experiment to try to support it.

What people fail to appreciate is that observation isn't new. Even Aristotle relied on observation, and there are examples of him using it to completely disprove a hypothesis even if counter-intuitive. What is unique to modern science, however, is that only observation counts, even at the expense of any philosophical, religious, spiritual, or aesthetic considerations. Philosophers before the scientific revolution used observation, but they also used everything else at their disposal. If you have many different tools in your toolbox, it is incredibly odd to think that you're better off throwing all of them except one and use it for everything. It's not so much that the main idea of science didn't occur to previous generations, but more so that that idea seemed preposterous and dumb.

What is curious is that while science works like that, scientists don't. In their private lives, they are still motivated by beauty, harmony, and reason, like every other human being and just like Aristotle was. The difference is a split between what motivates the scientist and what counts as proof for his claims. And without these motivations, modern science would not exist since almost all major discoveries were made because of them.

The whole book was beautifully written. It seemed to nail every aspect I ever wondered about, and explore paths that I never thought possible. I feel bad for my review because it seems overly abstract, and perhaps not so different from the idea of science you may have. But I believe it is fairly different, but hard to explain in a few words. The countless historical examples are needed to truly encapsulate the vision of science that Strevens shines forth. The ending of the book also contains a fair criticism of science and how it is conducted. The details of which I shall omit in order to give you the pleasure of reading it unspoiled.

If you have any interest in science, read this. The only criticism I have is that it is at times repetitive. And with some historical examples, perhaps too many technical details were given. Yet, it is well worth it. If you have experience with philosophy of science, I believe that you will find some extra depth and insight compared to what you have read. And if you're interested in science but never even touched philosophy of science, you will expand your worldview manyfold.
Profile Image for Ginger Griffin.
128 reviews7 followers
October 1, 2023
Show your work. Especially your data. That's basically the author's "iron rule" of science. Facts count (in the form of empirical data), nothing else does.

He then goes on to qualify the rule, noting that facts have to be processed by human minds, so subjectivity is never far away. But that subjectivity usually just leads to further research, until more facts pile up, eventually settling the question (and leaving little room for further subjectivity). Then scientists move on to the next problem.

So what about the subtitle to the book? Did "irrationality" really create modern science? Um, no. Substitute "unnatural" for "irrational" and you'll get closer to the case. Pre-modern thinkers tended to assume that their scientific findings should slot easily into their overall views -- that philosophy, theology, even politics should mesh with what they discovered about the natural world. That's not how it turned out, of course.

When modern science began in the 17th century, many of its practitioners (including Isaac Newton) were alchemists on the side. Which made sense because, at the time, who knew? Maybe the world was 6000 years old, as the Bible suggested. Maybe you really could turn lead into gold with mysterious formulas. It took long years (centuries in fact) of hard, slogging research to discover otherwise.

There's a thread of anxiety (even anger) running through the book, especially when the author describes what he imagines to be the narrowness of science education. Why the angst? Probably because science has become so important. As the author notes, it really is a knowledge machine, one that can engulf everything in its path.

So it's a bit surprising that, at the end of the book, the author advises that we "Point science in the right direction and let it go." Which is probably good advice. Especially the part about pointing it in the right direction (we don't need more nuclear weapons, but could really use better ways to combat climate change and pandemics).
246 reviews39 followers
Shelved as 'lv-0-чух-основите-няма-да-чета'
June 25, 2022
Страхотно заглавие. Грабва. Но всъщност дори заглавието е зле, щото науката не дава знание, знанието идва от личен опит, науката ни дава карти за реалността, които да обяснят знания които имаме.


Най-вероятно няма да я прочета. Бих прегледал първите глави за Аристотел.

Бях се надъхал, заради подвеждащо то заглавие и особено подзаглавието, но един час и 30 Мин подкаст на автора с М��йкъл Шурмър ме отказа.


Авторът е клише материалист.

При все, че за същото време мога да прочета с уши Структура на научните революции на Кун, или Против метода на Файеребанд, или дори за втори път ХУБАВАТА книга въведение във философия на науката Теория и Реалност на не му запомних името

Опортюнити костът просто не си струва.

За същото време мога и да прочета два пъти набързо или един път бавно с разбиране най-интересните научна книга, на която съм попадал от Паралелни светове на Мичио Каку (или Какво е живота на Шрьодингер - до сега) - а именно книгата Аргументът против реалността - как еволюцията скри реалността от нашите очи (the case against reality) на Доналд Хофман.


Страхувам се, че американския елит страда от хронична посредственост изглежда във всякое едно отношение, което е тъжно.

Ще ме принудят да почна да чета европейски автори накрая.
Profile Image for Josh.
139 reviews29 followers
February 2, 2021
The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science by Michael Strevens covers the development of the scientific method through the lens of philosophy. Strevens frames his analysis between the pillars of Thomas Kuhn, scientists establish and follow a paradigm or common method, and Karl Popper, theories can never be proved but only disproved, or "falsified." The best part about the book is Strevens treatment of scientists as human: petty, fame-seeking and hubristic. Anyone questioning Strevens viewpoint will find their doubts removed after attending a university department meeting. The Knowledge Machine also points out interesting questions. It is a surprise that the scientific method too so long to develop? Or is it a surprise that the scientific method developed at all? The weakness of The Knowledge Machine is that it constrains its analysis to philosophical matters. There are a number of practical developments, namely Universities giving scientists employment dedicated to scientific research, that lead to the scientific method as we know it today. The Knowledge Machine is a solid addition to the philosophical discourse on the scientific method.
Profile Image for Mark.
215 reviews9 followers
December 12, 2022
How does science really work? Strevens surveys the evolution of science as a machine that generates, (in)validates, and systematizes knowledge claims. He explores the question of how the iron rule (all disputes are to be settled by empirical data) achieved universal acceptance in a population comprised largely or entirely of magical thinkers, such as Isaac Newton, who compartmentalized his mind and time between empirical (scientific) and magical (alchemy) pursuits. Strevens also explores the dynamic relationship between imaginative and evidence-based thinking. How to they oppose and complement each other? It's a very rich exploration. I will have to re-read more closely. After a first read, I feel I've sprinted past a stadium-long table of delicacies. Now I want to trawl the table more deliberatively, savoring more fully.
Profile Image for Olivia Conway.
20 reviews
January 25, 2024
I understand his point that science has been so incredibly productive because it has been kept separate from other areas of inquiry, but this has also enabled some of the most horrific ethical atrocities of the past few centuries. I think we need to include humanism in scientific training and scientific research to ensure that science is actually serving the communities it claims to benefit. That being said, I appreciated the opportunity this book provided to think about how and why science is conducted.
However, Strevens repeatedly discusses how excruciating it is to devote your life to the daily tasks of scientific research, and this seems like a pessimistic generalization. Scientific experimentation, while exhausting, can be incredibly soothing and meditative. It is frustrating, but I think science is enduring in part because many of us actually like being in a lab and doing experiments.
Profile Image for Adam Carter.
55 reviews
March 13, 2021
What is science? And why did it take so long to emerge? These are super interesting questions and Strevens presents them in a clear and captivating way. Science is a method of arguing on the basis of empirical observations but is observed by individual scientists in all their idiosyncrasies. Science took so long because “who in their right mind would abandon philosophy, religion and aesthetic, these profound sources of knowledge, and focus on observation alone?” Only three stars because Strevens went a bit overboard on the metaphors and I wanted him to explain more about what was so seductive about science’s method to its founders, such as Newton? Was it a kind of challenge to explain as much as they could with as little as they could?
57 reviews
Want to read
December 24, 2020
I watched the author summarize this book here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PA-55...

Then I realized... I don't care enough to read this book. TECHNICALLY, if you are an analytic philosopher using a narrow definition of rationality, the definition of rationality includes considering EVERYTHING in your argument, not just the narrow focus of evidence in science. Ok... Do I need a really really long book about that? I'll pass! What difference does this actually make for our lives? Science is important for understanding the world, making decisions and understanding ourselves. Is it everything in itself? No. However, if we act like, say, religion is just about exploring different aspects of life, that is ridiculous. It isn't THAT separate (religion is also hard to define... probably harder to define than science). To be fair, I could see how part of his thesis could be useful for defending science from people like critical race theorists who want to somehow claim we can/should have "black physics" or some BS like that. But only if it was a way shorter book would it be at all useful for such a purpose. Maybe more of a pamphlet or article. That could make it maybe useful in such a case.
Profile Image for Vahid Askarpour.
86 reviews7 followers
October 3, 2021
مایکل استریونز در کتاب ماشین دانش؛ نابخردی چطور علم مدرن را به بار آورد می‌گوید، «ماشین دانش در تحقق کنونی خود ثمربخشی والایی را در پیشرفت کالاهای انسانی از خود نشان می‌دهد، اما تجلی والای خیر انسانی نیست.» کمی قبل از آنکه شروع به نوشتن این یادداشت کنم، شاخص‌های عددی میزان آلودگی هوا را چک می‌کردم. اعداد بالا بود! این را روی صفحه نمایش لپ‌تاب خود دیدم؛ کالای گرانقدری که زندگی کنونی را به طور کامل دگرگون کرده است و جز از طریق همان محاسبات عددی، ممکن نبود که بتوان آن را اختراع کرد. حالا اعداد روی صفحه نمایش آن خبر از فاجعه می‌دهند؛ آدم‌های حساس و دارای بیماری‌های تنفسی توی این هوای آلوده به سادگی می‌میرند. آیا مرگ آنها تأسف ماشین‌های آب‌وهواشناسی و دانشمندانی که آن دستگاه‌های محاسباتی و سنجشی را به کار می‌اندازند، برخواهد انگیخت؟ دانشمند-اپراتوری را دیده‌ای که توی اتاقک هواشناسی، زل زده باشد به مانیتور و با دیدن عدد ۵۰۰ برای ایستگاه امام خمینی تهران (عددی که چند لحظه پیش هوش از سرم پراند)، به حال آدم‌هایی که ممکن است به هر طریقی با محتوای این شاخص عددی زندگی و سلامت‌شان به خطر افتاده باشد دلسوزی کنند و اشک از چشمان‌شان جاری بشود؟ نه! جای آن آدم‌های شاعرپیشه، فیلسوف یا رمانتیک در اتاقک اندازه‌گیری نیست. سرپرست آزمایشگاه با دیدن کوچکترین صحنه تأثر عاطفی، سرد و خشک بالای چنین شخصی حاضر می‌شود و با لحنی محکم و قاطع می‌گوید، «دهانت را ببند و محاسبه‌ات را بکن.»
این عدد از کجا اینقدر بالا رفته است؟ به سیم لپتابم زل می‌زنم. به منبع برقی متصل است که کربن را می‌سوزاند تا شهرها و ماشین‌های اندازه‌گیری‌مان روشن بماند. به اتومبیل‌ها، مترو، و به همه دانشمندان فیزی�� و شیمی و مکانیک فکر می‌کنم که هدف‌شان افزایش آسایش در زندگی همراه با ارتقاءبخشی به سود و سرمایه است. به ماشین‌های سنگین که سطح زمین را جراحی می‌کنند تا فلزات و سنگ‌ها و مواد معدنی دیگر را بیرون بکشند؛ همه آن ترکیباتی که لپ‌تاب من را تا اتومبیل توی خیابان مقابل خانه‌ام ”وحدت“ می‌بخشند. مهندس معدن توی اتاقک میدانی‌اش نشسته پشت میز و سرگرم انجام محاسبات و ترسیم نقشه‌های معدن‌کاوی است. اشک در چشم‌هایش جمع می‌شود و از خود می‌پرسد این چه کاری‌ست که با خانه عتیق خدایان می‌کنم؟ سرپرست آزمایشگاه، سرد و خشک بالای چنین شخصی حاضر می‌شود و با لحنی محکم و قاطع می��گوید، «دهانت را ببند و محاسبه‌ات را بکن.»
استریونز در این کتاب می‌خواهد ریشه و منشأ همین یک جمله را واکاوی کند. خودت را جای آن محاسبه‌کننده بگذار که روپوشی سفید به تن کرده و میان ابزارهای آزمایشگاه‌اش عاداتی روزمره را چونان مناسکی مقدس و خدشه‌ناپذیر به اجرا می‌گذارد. همه تلاشش را می‌کند تا دهانش بی‌مورد باز نشود و فکرش بی‌دلیل درگیر هرچیزی غیر از نتایج آزمون‌ها و اندازه‌گیری‌هایش نباشد. چنین موجودی خیلی معقول و موجه به نظر می‌رسد لابد؟ نمادِ والای معرفت راستین. اما اگر ارسطو، فیلسوف رسمی کلیسای کاتولیک در سده‌های میانه و پس از آن، روزی با چنین موجودی برخورد کند چه واکنشی نشان خواهد داد؟ استریونز حدس‌اش این است؛ ارسطو او را نادان‌تر از نادان، بی‌خردتر از بی‌خرد و عجیب‌تر از هر دیوانه‌ای خواهد یافت! چه شد که او و روپوش سفیدش وارد میدان شد؟ مورخان علم، به‌خصوص دربحبوحة فجایع سدة بیستم (که صدالبته خودشان محصول همین محاسبه‌ها و اندازه‌گیری‌های از نگاه ارسطو نابخردانه‌اند)، خیلی امیدوارانه به چنین موجود نو-زاده‌ای چشم می‌دوختند. کارل پوپر می‌گفت، برای اولین بار در طول تاریخ، علم مدرن ابزاری را برای تکذیب ادعاها در اختیارمان گذاشته است. علم مدرن تنها نوع دانشی است که کار خود را از نپذیرفتن نظریه‌هایی آغاز می‌کند که از پس پیشبینی امور واقعی برنیایند. چه دنیایی خواهد شد، آن دنیا که سیاست و حقوق و امر اجتماعی‌اش روی نظریه‌های پیشبینی‌پذیر بنیان یابد. دانشمندان، درعین‌حال آفریننده و ویران‌گرند و داشتن این دو ویژگی در کنار هم، در آینده برای کلیت بشر سودمند خواهد بود! توماس کوهن، فیلسوف-مورخ دیگر علم اما کمی شکاک‌تر بود. او هر فرد دانشمند را دست و چشم بسته پارادایمی می‌دید که نهاد اجتماعی علم را برپا می‌داشت و او صرفاً مستخدم‌اش بود. اما او نیز به رستگاری انسان به واسطه علم مدرن باور داشت؛ چون می‌دید که از پس هر انقلاب علمی، پارادایمی نمایان می‌شود که نسبت به پارادایم پیشین قدرت پیش‌بینی‌��ذیری بهتری دارد. آینده از آن علم است؛ چراکه نه؟
عده‌ای ایزاک نیوتن را واپسین جادوگر-شعبده‌باز جهان قدیم می‌دانند و درعین‌حال، او را می‌توان نقطه آغاز سدة هفدهمی علم مدرن به شمار آورد. همراه با او بود که دپارتمان‌ها به معنای واقعی کلمه شکل گرفتند. او کیمیا می‌کرد، ستاره‌شناس بود، متون مقدس را شرح و تفسیر می‌کرد، محاسبات ابجد انجام می‌داد، طالع‌بینی را هم به‌وفور انجام می‌داد. همه عالمان هم‌عصر و پیشین وی چنین بودند. اما او چیزی غیر از همه اینها کرد؛ او میان هر کدام از این دلمشغولی‌ها مرز کشید و هر کدام را درون دپارتمانی جدا قرار داد. نیروی گرانش وجود دارد و نظریه مادر فیزیک است، اما فقط همین! وقتی نیوتن در حال محاسبات فیزیکی است، توصیف‌هایی درست و دقیق از پدیده‌های مورد مشاهده به دست می‌دهد و اصول علّی نظریه گرانش خود را بیان می‌کند، بدون توجه به ماهیت نهایی آن پدیده‌ها و در واقع بدون توجه به اینکه بتوان آنها را حتی فهمید یا نه! تبعات نظریه گرانش برای خداشناسی چیست؟ از نیوتن بپرسی به تو می‌گوید، مگر توفیری هم دارد؛ یا اصلاً چه ربطی دارد؟ او یکی از نخستین کسانی بود که مطلقاً به این کار نداشت که اصول علّی‌اش چه پیامدهایی برای مبنای متافیزیکی جهان دارد؛ چون متافیزیک را در دپارتمانی جدا سراغ می‌گرفت! دانشگاه نیوتونی، به قول نویسنده این کتاب، متشکل از دپارتمان‌هایی ساکت است که هر کس درون هر کدام از آنها سرگرم کار خود است و راهروها و محوطه‌های پیرامونی از هر بحث و فحص مشترکی خالی و انباشته از گرد و غبار است! جادوی علم مدرن، اگر جادویی در کار باشد، دقیقاً همین است.
کدام؟ نیوتن ابزارها و شیوه‌هایی را برای توصیف و شرح علی‌معلولی واقعیت‌هایی کشف می‌کند و می‌سازد که لازم نیست قابل فهم باشند، بلکه تنها کافی‌ست نشان داده شوند و بتوان سازوکارهای آنها را رام کرد. نمونه امروزین چنین منطقی را فیزیک کوآنتومی شکل می‌دهد. هیچ‌کس نمی‌داند چه چیزی در بطن آن واقع است و حتی از این بدتر، هیچ‌کس نمی‌تواند آن را بفهمد. اما در هر آزمایشگاهی می‌توان پدیداری آن را نشان داد، توصیف کرد و شرحی بر آن ارائه داد. بله! «دهانت را ببند و محاسبه‌ات را انجام بده»! سوبژکتیویته انسان برای اولین بار مقابل یک سری پدیده‌های ملموس و واقعی، اما عمیقاً غیرقابل درک حیران و سرگردان می‌ماند. نیرویی شرور از روی میز تحقیق فیزیکی نیوتونی آزاد می‌شود که هرگونه متافیزیکی را دود می‌کند و به هوا می‌فرستد. اما به‌شکلی عجیب و غیرعادی، عمیقاً هم سودمند است؛ از سده هفدهم تا همین امروز، کالاها و ابزارها و اشیاء حیرت‌انگیزی را به بار آورده است. شکل و حالت مادی جهان را تنها در سه سده، به اندازه کل تاریخ کیهانی کن‌فیکون کرده است!
علم مدرن روی یک قاعده آهنی استوار است که از چهار اصل نوآورانه برخوردار است:
- همه دانشمندان روی قدرت تشریحی اتفاق نظر دارند؛ ممکن است در یک زمینه خاص مخالف یکدیگر باشند، اما توصیف و شرح پدیده‌ها را به عنوان تنها ابزار متقاعدساختن هم می‌پذیرند. دیگر خبری از درگیری‌های فرقه‌ای برای از میان بردن مخالف یا گردن‌زدن بدعت‌گذار نیست!
- میان بحث عمومی و فکر خصوصی تمایزگذاری می‌شود. دانشمند می‌تواند در خلوت خود هر آسمانی را به هر ریسمانی ببافد، اما هنگام بحث عمومی، خواه روی اسلایدها، خواه میان صفحات مقاله و یا فصول کتاب، موظف است روی اصل توصیف و شرح علّی پدیده‌های آزموده تمرکز کند و پا را از حد مشاهدات مورد شرح فراتر نگذارد. (و از اتفاق این، از منظر ارسطویی یکی از کودکانه‌ترین و نابخردانه‌ترین کارهایی است که می‌توان انجام داد.)
- در هر بحث علمی باید به عینیت متعهد و ملزم ماند.
- ضروری است که در هر بحث علمی تنها بر نتایج آزمون‌های تجربی توسل جست.
اینها اصول قاعده آهنی علم مدرن‌اند. قاعده‌ای که به اندازه آهن خلوص دارد، اما به همان اندازه هم شکننده و تخریب‌پذیر است. اینکه به قول دکارت، هر آنچه تا امروز به ما رسیده را دور بریزیم و از همان پایه شروع کنیم، آنهم برمبنای همین اصول تجربی، کار آسانی نیست! برای همین تا پیش از سده هفدهم و آنهم تنها محدود به اروپای شمال‌غربی، خبری از انسان‌هایی نبود که به طور کامل خود را ملزم و متعهد به تنها همین اصول چهارگانه بدانند. برای عالمان و اندیشمندان و متفکران جهان باستان و میانه، سرسپاری به این اصول و تنها به همین‌ها برای کشف حقایق به قدری کودکانه، نامعقول و غیرممکن بود که حتی تصورش را هم دردناک می‌دانستند. معنای متافیزیکی آن چیزی بود که حقیقت را می‌ساخت و این معنا، به نوبه خود نیاز چندانی به میکروسکوپ نداشت. فیزیک نیوتونی را می‌توان نخستین رویکرد فکری در جهان انسان دانست که از آن معنای متافیزیکی زدایش می‌یابد و نشان می‌دهد که حقایقی وجود دارند که تنها می‌توان آنها را برمبنای محاسبات ریاضی نشان داد، اما نمی‌توان کتمان‌شان کرد. نه اینکه فقط نتوان کتمان‌شان کرد، از آن بدتر، نمی‌توان به سادگی فهم و تفسیری متافیزیکی را بدان‌ها الصاق نمود. حتی بارها پیش آمده که می‌توان آنها را از یک استاد آموخت و به خاطر سپرد، بدون آنکه فهم و درکی بتوان از آنها حاصل کرد.
علم مدرن نه آزمون است و نه تجربه؛ علم مدرن دقیقاً همین معطل‌گذاشتن س��ژه شناسا در مقابل امور واقعی است که می‌توان با انجام مشاهده‌ها و ترتیب‌دادن آزمون‌های جان‌فرسا آنها را دانست، اما فهم معنا یا تفسیر سوبژکتیوشان بارها یا ممکن نیست، و یا علی‌السویه و حتی بی‌ربط است! حالا، نظام آکادمیک به خصوص در دپارتمان‌های علوم، دقیقاً آدم‌های علم مدرن را تربیت می‌کند که به قاعده آهنی مذکور سوگند وفاداری خورده‌اند؛ اول، معنا و تفسیر و متافیزیک را کلاً یاد نگیرید؛ دوم، حتی در تفکرات خصوصی خودتان هم آن قاعده آهنی را زیر پا نگذارید.
تسرّی این قاعده به علوم انسانی، مثلاً باستان‌شناسی، اتفاقات بامزه‌ای را به بار آورده‌است. علمای اعصار رنسانس و کلاسیک و عتیقه‌شناسان نخستین، با رجوع به متون ادبی و اسطوره‌ای و حتی بیان‌های شفاهی، پیکرک‌های زنانه را بی‌بروبرگرد ”الهه‌های مادر“ به شمار می‌آوردند. باستان‌شناسان نو و علمی، آنها را به طور کل به عنوان اشیائی که به افکار مردمان پیش‌ازتاریخ تعلق دارند و نمی‌توانند مورد معناکاوی قرار بگیرند، از میان مطالعات باستان‌شناسیِ علمی خودشان بیرون راندند؛ مگر در زمینه اندازه‌گیری‌ها و محاسبات فرمی و در نسبت با بدنِ انسان‌های واقعی، یا اندازه‌گیری و شناسایی مواد خام و شیوه‌های فنی ساخت‌شان! اما این علمِ باستان‌شناختی بر پیکرک‌ها که به تبعیت از قاعده آهنیِ علم مدرن حاصل می‌شود، دقیقاً چه چیزی را درباره این اشیاء به ما می‌آموزد؟ ساعت‌ها وسواس برای اندازه‌گیری ابعاد میلیمتری سرِ یک پیکرک را تصور کنید که از توی آن کلی جدول بیرون بیاید. این می‌شود علم مدرن و نتیجه و حاصل آن. اما مطمئنم حتی همان شخصی که این محاسبات را انجام داده، در خلوت خودش مخفیانه مسحور آن پیکرک و روح حاکم بر آن می‌شود و حتی ممکن است وسوسه شود و آن را تجسم الهه مادر یا باروری به شمار بیاورد! غیر از این باشد، آن همه محاسبه و ایجاد جدول، چه فهمی را درباره این اشیاء به بار آورده‌است که در خور توجه باشد؟ جوابش با خودتان!
قاعده آهنی علم مدرن در همة جنبه‌های فکر آکادمیک، از کادرهای پروپوزال گرفته تا تدوین گزارش نهایی و مقاله و کتاب حاصل از آن رخنه کرده است و به‌خصوص، در علومی که آنها را انسانی تلقی می‌کنیم، مثل نمونه مذکور پارادوکس‌ها و سردرگمی‌های گاه حیرت‌انگیزی را به بار آورده است. این پارادوکس‌ها را باید به طور جدی موضوع مطالعات معرفت‌شناختی علوم انسانی، و به طور کل همه شاخه‌های علمی مدرن ساخت. اما خلاف سوبژکتیویست‌های افراطی نظیر افکار مریضی مثل فرایابند، نمی‌توان و نباید فراموش کرد که علم مدرن با حضور خویش دروازه‌های بی‌سابقه و درخشانی را برای کسب معارفی بی‌سابقه گشوده است. خلاف لاطاعلات فرایابندی، دانشمندان علوم مدرن دو کار را انجام می‌دهند که در کل نظام‌های معرفتی دیگر بی‌سابقه است؛ اول اینکه یکدیگر را تکفیر نمی‌کنند، بلکه یک چارچوب ارائه مباحث علمی را به شکل عمومی ایجاد می‌کنند (از طریق کنفرانس‌ها، مجلات و نشریات دیگر) و رقابت‌ها و تضارب آراء خویش را روی آن چارچوب جهت می‌دهند؛ دوم اینکه، همین اشکال عمومی انتشار، خودشان به آرشیوی از تصاویر، اشکال، مدل‌ها، فرمول‌ها و عینیات قابل تجربه و مشاهده و آزمون تبدیل می‌شود که در طول زمان نیز برحجم آنها افزوده می‌گردد و بدین‌شکل، یک فضای عمیقاً غیر و حتی ضد شخصی، ضد ایدئولوژیک و ضد باور به معنای رایج آن ایجاد می‌کند. قاعده آهنی علم مدرن، حتی درباره انسان و جنبه‌های گوناگون او نیز منجر به کشف پدیده‌ها، امور واقع و قواعدی شده است که به همان اندازه گرانش و فیزیک کوآنتومی می‌توان آنها را دانست، اما نمی‌توان چرایی و معنا و تفسیر متافیزیکی برای آن قائل شد. اما آیا همین به خودی خود گشاینده راهی به روی انسانیتی هر چه مطلوبتر و طراحی سیستم‌های حقوقی، سیاسی و اجتماعی هر چه بهتر نیست؟
قاعده آهنی علم مدرن را باید جدی گرفت. درست است که بمب‌های اتمی و حجم بالای کربن‌های معلق در هوا محصولات همان قاعده به شمار می‌آیند، اما اصلاحات اجتماعی-انسانی، پدیده‌های مربوط به بهداشت و سلامت و بسیاری از راه‌حل‌های دیگر برای اوضاع دشوار کنونی‌مان، به همان اندازه تنها می‌تواند از بطن همان قاعده بیرون بیاید. عظمت این قاعده به یک چیز است: امور واقع و پدیدارهایی در جهان وجود دارند که می‌توان آنها را دانست و از آنها الهام گرفت و بکارشان بست، حتی اگر نتوان آنها را فهمید و مورد تفاسیر معناشناختی و متافیزیکی قرار داد. آنها آن بیرون‌اند و منتظر که بکار آیند؛ اما این به ما بستگی دارد که از طریق‌شان خود و جهان‌مان را به لبه پرتگاه هدایت کنیم، یا با استفاده از آنها جهان مطلوبتری برای خود و موجودات دیگر بسازیم.
Profile Image for Timoer Frelink.
39 reviews3 followers
December 17, 2021
If you want to understand how science works: read this book. I agree with others that it is repetitious, but that only strengthens the message. An excellent book!
Profile Image for Andrew Carr.
478 reviews103 followers
June 6, 2021
"The Knowledge Machine" is perhaps the clearest explanation I have yet read of how scientists think. Or at least, how they think they think. It is both a celebration of science and a demonstration of the mental frameworks and guiding ethos of scientists. As such, it is a book I wish I had encountered long ago at the beginning of my research career.

Nominally, I am a ‘Political Scientist’, and while I pride myself on my understanding of politics, this is the first book that has really clarified for me what that second word, ‘scientist’ actually implies. While I remain dismissive of the idea of social science and still dubious about the escape from subjectivity scientists claim for themselves, through this engaging read I at least better understand the – quite admirable - mindset of scientists.

Strevens proposes that science is defined not by Popperian falsification method nor Kuhnian paradigms. After a quick description of these approaches he proposes a two-part iron rule that guides scientific process. First, arguments should be settled through empirical testing, second, seek tests in which only one of the competing hypotheses can be validated. This reflects the ‘rules of the game’ which enables scientists however motivated, biased, and ultimately human to identify and settle their disputes.

We normally think that for intellectual work, “garbage in [meaning human biases] = garbage out”. As such, we focus on how to improve the quality of input, developing more refined, objective, noble minds. Strevens argues this is not how science actually works. Rather, because there is agreement about what constitutes communication and evidence, the process can, indeed must involve garbage in. Following Kuhn, he argues it is only the passions and personal factors can explain the extreme dedication to tedious lab work upon which scientific discoveries are built. But since these factors are mutually put aside to both argue and judge results, they are complements rather than blinders on the progress of work.

At its best, this is a book which embraces the absurdity of humanity. Indeed Strevens seems to both identify and embody it. For instance, there are long sections where he approvingly quotes scientists rubbishing philosophy as it is a discipline not strictly within the confines of the iron rule, and thus irrelevant. Later on, he mounts an argument on behalf of aesthetic notions of order (a philosophical position) as a necessary element of science, and finally near the conclusion he notes how much of the scientific hostility towards philosophy is a self-imposed narrowness in order to help bind the scientific tribe and inculcate the next generation. What to make of three such diverse positions? And yet, it all relatively works, reflecting his broad view that however irrational and subjective the humans doing science are, by having a clear method of application and communication, it will still meaningfully contribute to the progress of science.

There are costs to this approach. Science works, in Strevens view, because of the deliberate embrace of limits. It focuses on a method at the cost of all else. It focuses on narrow casual explanations rather than the broader characteristics of phenomena. And as a discipline it is motivated by ‘dogma’ and led by ‘holy men’ who seek to champion its work, revile its opponents (such as philosophy) and inculcate the next generation to endure the tedium. Strevens quotes the American biologist EO Wilson, ‘So many scientists are narrow, foolish people”, then adds “as he does not remark, that is the secret to their success”.

One of the most foolish things we hear these days is the argument we must “listen to the science”. Anyone who says this, I believe, does not understand what science is. Nor respect its ability or limits. Streven’s picture of science is something akin to a goldfish that has evolved into a shark. Science is now the apex predator when it comes to developing knowledge. Clearly humanity needs science. But how can we avoid the beast turning on us? One path might be to try and better train the offspring. To ensure that the next generation of scientists are not as profoundly ignorant of people, politics and morality as those who rule silicon valley and similar places are today. Streven’s warns against this, rightly suggesting that to do so might fail, or if it did work, impose too high a cost on the beast’s capacity. A better path is for the rest of society to become more responsible pet owners. To learn how and when we must put a leash on it, how and when we should listen to it and feed it appropriately.

As this long review indicates, this is a thought provoking and engaging book. I am still more on the side of Paul Feyerabend and Kuhn, but Streven’s has made an important contribution to how we think about how we think.
Profile Image for Raghu.
407 reviews77 followers
May 13, 2022
Science is the most powerful tool of humankind. When Covid-19 struck the world, religion and philosophy did not rescue the world. It was science that produced the effective mRNA vaccines and enabled us to get back to some level of normalcy. Unlike the past, science and technology play a considerable role in creating weapons today, which can be the difference between winning and losing. Today, we see a mighty nation like Russia staring at a humiliating defeat in its war against a much weaker Ukraine because of the superior weapons of NATO. History tells us that a scientific revolution occurred in Europe in the seventeenth century. Three centuries later, in the twentieth century, philosophers, historians and scientists tried to understand the essence of the scientific process and why it happened so late in human civilization. This book by Michael Strevens is yet another attempt in this effort.

Michael Strevens is the professor of philosophy in the NYU. He begins with Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn as the two philosophers whose insights on scientific progress have dominated the scientific community. Karl Popper, the Austrian philosopher of the early twentieth century, proposed that we cannot prove a theory in the empirical sciences by experiments. However, we can falsify them by scrutinizing the theories with decisive experiments. Popper believed that science progresses by scientists committing themselves to this endeavor of refuting theories. Thomas Kuhn was an American philosopher of the mid-twentieth century. He explained the scientific process by coining the term “paradigm shift”. In scientific work, scientists do their research within an existing framework, called a paradigm. Contrary to general belief, scientists try as much as possible to work within the current paradigm and resist seeking a new one. However, when the dominant framework becomes less and less compatible with new data or phenomena, they embrace a new paradigm that explains all the observed phenomena. This is what he calls ‘paradigm shift’. Newton’s principia, Einstein’s Relativity and Quantum Physics are examples of paradigm shifts in physics.

Most scientists prefer Popper’s explanation of their work. Strevens believes Popper and Kuhn do not capture the scientific process in full regarding its strength and uniqueness. He proposes his own evaluation of the scientific method. Strevens believes scientists are morally and intellectually as brittle as the rest of the community. Their craft makes them contentious. Contrary to prevailing belief, Strevens says the logic of scientific reasoning is subjective. When you combine this with the inherent human frailty, it makes the scientific process far from objective, dispassionate, and rational. They are not in pursuit of truth as the sole objective. So, how does science achieve the splendid string of successes in explaining nature? Strevens says the answer is in the “Iron Rule of explanation”. He defines the iron rule as comprising two components. First, strive to settle all arguments by empirical testing. Next, to conduct an empirical test between a pair of hypotheses, perform an experiment or measurement. Only one hypothesis should be able to explain all the outcomes. The author provides historical examples to substantiate his approach and claims. We can see that the iron rule requires that scientific argument should appeal only to the results of empirical tests and not philosophical coherence, theoretical beauty, etc. However, the author concedes that the ban on beauty amounts to an attack on reason. Elegance often points the way to the truth.

The last section of the book explains why the scientific revolution arrived in Western Europe in the seventeenth century and not elsewhere in some other time in history. In 1618, the Thirty-year war started out between the Catholics and Protestants in Central Europe. In the next decades, religious, dynastic, territorial, and commercial rivalries enlarged the conflict to most of Europe. The wars ended in 1648 with the treaty of Westphalia. The Thirty-year-war weakened religion’s hold over society and strengthened the state’s power. Hence, two centers of power rose after the war. In the spiritual realm, the church held sway, but in civil society, the state became supreme. Strevens says that this made it acceptable for science to make the pitch for a third center of influence and power, where the iron rule was supreme.

For those of us who understand the scientific method as one where observations and empirical proof are the deciders of scientific theories, the ‘iron rule’ only confirms that view. It does not strike one as a new insight. I had expected much more than just the iron rule from this book. Besides, the argument about why the scientific revolution happened in Western Europe in the seventeenth century sounds incomplete and unconvincing. Separating the church and the state’s domains of authority became the catalyst to accept science as yet another sphere of authority outside these two. There is no discussion about why science could not have arisen under other circumstances. Or whether similar circumstances prevailed elsewhere in the world but failed to give rise to science. However, I would agree that the book’s main thrust is on the iron rule and not on why it rose in Europe in the seventeenth century.

There are other viewpoints in history on how the scientific revolution emerged. The French philosopher Alexandre Koyre claimed that the “mathematization of nature” rather than the experimental method brought about the scientific revolution. Others believe it was the birth of modern physics that happened in the seventeenth century rather than a scientific revolution. Joseph Needham believed that Science, as a method of understanding nature, has no certain date and place of birth. For millennia, humankind fused it with practical technology. However, as far as physics is concerned, there is a consensus that something important happened in the 17th century that deserves to be called the birth of modern physics. The Russian physicist, Boris Hessen, founded the historiography of science, saying modern physics arose from a social context to meet the practical demands of the capitalist economy.

Those of us interested in theoretical physics would feel that the iron rule is not strictly in evidence in recent decades. String theory has survived in theoretical physics for over four decades without satisfying the iron rule. Its main claim as a scientific theory rests on its unity, beauty and coherence. String theorists claim its equations are beautiful and it is rich in symmetry. They say this mathematical beauty is enough to call it a scientific theory, though it is not empirically verifiable. While discussing String theory, Strevens sounds ambiguous and less forthcoming in allowing aesthetics in science, in addition to the iron rule. Though the author is unsure whether allowing aesthetics into science will lead to disaster, he decides we should not allow aesthetics into science in place of the iron rule. Students of history would remember Paul Dirac’s relativistic electron theory in the 1930s, which he pursued because it was beautiful. It had a lovely fall-out, predicting the positron. Dirac said that the researcher, in his efforts to express the fundamental laws of nature in mathematical form, should strive for mathematical beauty.

I would have liked the author to discuss climate science too and deal with how it violates the iron rule and Popper’s falsification theory. He is ambiguous here too, by repeating the claim that 300 million coastal dwellers would have to abandon their homes by 2050 because of rising sea levels. But this is only a speculation derived from computer models. Fifty to sixty years ago, scientists made similar claims about population explosion and how key resources of the world would get depleted by the 1990s. They did not come true. Strevens concedes that the IPCC (Inter-governmental Panel for Climate Change) reports are subjective assessments of the future, not scientific truths like Newton’s laws. But he says that we have to engage with subjective analyses if we care about the future. This is a West-centric view. The demands being made on developing countries based on such subjectivity stunt their growth and poverty alleviation. We should not make drastic and far-reaching decisions on energy based on the subjectivity of climate models. It would violate the author’s own call to not meddle with the iron rule and tamper with the workings of the knowledge machine.

One problem with the book is that it is repetitive as the author keeps stressing why empirical testing alone is important. The most interesting parts of the book for me are the early chapters on ‘Human Frailty’ and the “subjectivity of science”. Strevens shows that even eminent scientists have deliberately gamed and flouted the rules and cherry-picked data in favor of proving theories. He cites the examples of Isaac Newton, Louis Pasteur, Gregor Mendel, Ernst Haeckel, Robert Millikan and Arthur Eddington. For example, Eddington, in his quest to prove Einstein’s General Relativity theory more accurate than Newton’s laws, discarded some observations which were closer to Isaac Newton’s contentions. The iron rule provides a self-correcting mechanism and so it did not matter. However, I had never known that these luminaries fudged with the rules and doctored observations to get acceptance for their theories.

The book is a good introduction to the philosophy of science and what makes science successful.
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