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Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity
Hilary Putnam's ever-evolving philosophical oeuvre has been called "the history of recent philosophy in outline"--an intellectual achievement, nearly seventy years in the making, that has shaped disciplinary fields from epistemology to ethics, metaphysics to the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of mathematics to the philosophy of mind. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity offers new avenues into the thought of one of the most influential minds in contemporary analytic philosophy.
The essays collected here cover a range of interconnected topics including naturalism, commonsense and scientific realism, ethics, perception, language and linguistics, and skepticism. Aptly illustrating Putnam's willingness to revisit and revise past arguments, they contain important new insights and freshly illuminate formulations that will be familiar to students of his work: his rejection of the idea that an absolute conception of the world is obtainable; his criticism of a nihilistic view of ethics that claims to be scientifically based; his pathbreaking distinction between sensations and apperceptions; and his use of externalist semantics to invalidate certain forms of skepticism. Above all, Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity reflects Putnam's thinking on how to articulate a theory of naturalism which acknowledges that normative phenomena form an ineluctable part of human experience, thereby reconciling scientific and humanistic views of the world that have long appeared incompatible.
The essays collected here cover a range of interconnected topics including naturalism, commonsense and scientific realism, ethics, perception, language and linguistics, and skepticism. Aptly illustrating Putnam's willingness to revisit and revise past arguments, they contain important new insights and freshly illuminate formulations that will be familiar to students of his work: his rejection of the idea that an absolute conception of the world is obtainable; his criticism of a nihilistic view of ethics that claims to be scientifically based; his pathbreaking distinction between sensations and apperceptions; and his use of externalist semantics to invalidate certain forms of skepticism. Above all, Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity reflects Putnam's thinking on how to articulate a theory of naturalism which acknowledges that normative phenomena form an ineluctable part of human experience, thereby reconciling scientific and humanistic views of the world that have long appeared incompatible.
- GenresPhilosophy
248 pages, Hardcover
Published April 11, 2016
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About the author
Hilary Putnam
119 books135 followersHilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who was a central figure in analytic philosophy from the 1960s until his death, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws. As a result, he acquired a reputation for frequently changing his own position. Putnam was Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University.
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March 6, 2025
This is Putnum's last collection of essays, and reveals his latest view on naturalism, realism, and normativity. The essays concentrate more on realism than ethics and normativity, and most essays are connected to the first two essays.
The first essay is titled with the name of the book. He stated he likes the term "liberal naturalism". But it covers a family of views on naturalism including those he disagrees. He is sympathetic to a form of representationism mentioned by Hew Price according to which reference is a relation between linguistic terms and worldly objects. In terms of realism, he presented a metaphysical realism that is radically non-epistemic, namely nonverificationist. Truth is not the same as warranted assertibility under ideal conditions. He also presented a Tarskian notion of truth which is based on not just the T schema but also on the further property that the extension of "true" depends on the extension of "refers". Truth and reference are connected. With regard to normativity, he regards morality as a complex and evolving set of human interests that are not biologically given nor the mere product of contingencies. He likes Scanlon contractualism that use a notion of reason without some naturalisation project. It seems he would not be very sympathetic to morality based on neurobiological analysis or some evolution psychology.
The second essay on his exchanges with Bernard Williams fleshes out more on his realism. When Putnum uses the expression "the ultimate metaphysical truth", it is no more than just describing the world as it is. Williams thinks there can be such a thing as the "absolute conception of the world" that can fill that role because if physics operates ideally, it offers such an objective description of the world independent of perspective. Putnum thinks if Williams conception is to succeed, he has to reduce facts with intentionality to pure physical facts. Putnum does not see that sciences converge to a single theory which is an obstacle to Williams suggestion. The rest of the papers in the volume addresses issues pertaining to this exchange between Putnum and Williams. These essays feature a wealth of philosophers interacting with Putnum on the issues that makes the book so interesting to read like attending a conference to see them in dialogue.
Two essays on realism and ontology. One essay was Sosa on Putnum's earlier internal realism about his model theoretic notion of realism based on truth within a language. Sosa thinks Putnum suggesting reference as intentional. Putnum corrects his view as truth as intentional. The other essay was on discussion with Richard Boyd on his scientific realism which he still maintained that theories in mature sciences are approximately true, and terms in them refer; while principles in mature sciences can interpreted to be compatible verificationist semantics.
Another set of essays pertain to realism and verificationism. One essay is Putnum on Hans Reichenbach's testability and meaning in his probability theory of meaning. Putnum thinks Reichenbach has a more robust realism. Reichenbach allows prediction in science using a Bayesian approach with an induction from prior probability with a rationalist's "deductive vindication of induction". This seems to allow scientific realism induction to be conceived as deduction. Another essay is Putnum on Dummett's addressing realistic semantics using his "manifestation argument", which is the problem of manifesting our concept of truth if truth in realist conception is totally independent of verification. Dummett uses his truth about verifiability about statements of the past to deflect antirealism from verifiability standard.
Then, there is a collection of essays on naive realism, sensation, and apperception. This collection shows Putnum's theory of perception that is based on a naive realism that proposes direct perception of objects using apperception. In one essay, he addresses McDowell conceptualised version of perception. To address, McDowell on how perceptual experience is possible based on conceptualised experience with respect to new perceptions without prior concepts, Putnum suggest the notion of apperception which is just a recognition of what is conceptually shaped without conceptualised judgment. It seems to be similar to Chisholm's notion of "being appeared to in a certain way", e.g., being appeared to treely when seeing a tree. In this collection of essay, Putnum has another essay on perception without sense data in which he proposes direct perception of objects without Russellian sense data but again using apperception of objects with a disjunctive view of phenomenol experience according to which perceptions cannot be distinguished if they have the same phenomenol quality. A final essay in this collection, naive realism and quality, Putnum proposes a naive realism in which he suggests an externalist epistemology that treats qualia as objects of perceptual experiences guided by the cause of objects perceived in the external world. Qualia is relevant as long as it is part of a subject's perceptual experience connected causally to the objects in the world. This view of naive realism is interestingly led back to his semantic externalism in the meaning of "meaning" essay.
The last two essays in the book are not to be missed because they summarised Putnum's philosophical journey
The first essay is titled with the name of the book. He stated he likes the term "liberal naturalism". But it covers a family of views on naturalism including those he disagrees. He is sympathetic to a form of representationism mentioned by Hew Price according to which reference is a relation between linguistic terms and worldly objects. In terms of realism, he presented a metaphysical realism that is radically non-epistemic, namely nonverificationist. Truth is not the same as warranted assertibility under ideal conditions. He also presented a Tarskian notion of truth which is based on not just the T schema but also on the further property that the extension of "true" depends on the extension of "refers". Truth and reference are connected. With regard to normativity, he regards morality as a complex and evolving set of human interests that are not biologically given nor the mere product of contingencies. He likes Scanlon contractualism that use a notion of reason without some naturalisation project. It seems he would not be very sympathetic to morality based on neurobiological analysis or some evolution psychology.
The second essay on his exchanges with Bernard Williams fleshes out more on his realism. When Putnum uses the expression "the ultimate metaphysical truth", it is no more than just describing the world as it is. Williams thinks there can be such a thing as the "absolute conception of the world" that can fill that role because if physics operates ideally, it offers such an objective description of the world independent of perspective. Putnum thinks if Williams conception is to succeed, he has to reduce facts with intentionality to pure physical facts. Putnum does not see that sciences converge to a single theory which is an obstacle to Williams suggestion. The rest of the papers in the volume addresses issues pertaining to this exchange between Putnum and Williams. These essays feature a wealth of philosophers interacting with Putnum on the issues that makes the book so interesting to read like attending a conference to see them in dialogue.
Two essays on realism and ontology. One essay was Sosa on Putnum's earlier internal realism about his model theoretic notion of realism based on truth within a language. Sosa thinks Putnum suggesting reference as intentional. Putnum corrects his view as truth as intentional. The other essay was on discussion with Richard Boyd on his scientific realism which he still maintained that theories in mature sciences are approximately true, and terms in them refer; while principles in mature sciences can interpreted to be compatible verificationist semantics.
Another set of essays pertain to realism and verificationism. One essay is Putnum on Hans Reichenbach's testability and meaning in his probability theory of meaning. Putnum thinks Reichenbach has a more robust realism. Reichenbach allows prediction in science using a Bayesian approach with an induction from prior probability with a rationalist's "deductive vindication of induction". This seems to allow scientific realism induction to be conceived as deduction. Another essay is Putnum on Dummett's addressing realistic semantics using his "manifestation argument", which is the problem of manifesting our concept of truth if truth in realist conception is totally independent of verification. Dummett uses his truth about verifiability about statements of the past to deflect antirealism from verifiability standard.
Then, there is a collection of essays on naive realism, sensation, and apperception. This collection shows Putnum's theory of perception that is based on a naive realism that proposes direct perception of objects using apperception. In one essay, he addresses McDowell conceptualised version of perception. To address, McDowell on how perceptual experience is possible based on conceptualised experience with respect to new perceptions without prior concepts, Putnum suggest the notion of apperception which is just a recognition of what is conceptually shaped without conceptualised judgment. It seems to be similar to Chisholm's notion of "being appeared to in a certain way", e.g., being appeared to treely when seeing a tree. In this collection of essay, Putnum has another essay on perception without sense data in which he proposes direct perception of objects without Russellian sense data but again using apperception of objects with a disjunctive view of phenomenol experience according to which perceptions cannot be distinguished if they have the same phenomenol quality. A final essay in this collection, naive realism and quality, Putnum proposes a naive realism in which he suggests an externalist epistemology that treats qualia as objects of perceptual experiences guided by the cause of objects perceived in the external world. Qualia is relevant as long as it is part of a subject's perceptual experience connected causally to the objects in the world. This view of naive realism is interestingly led back to his semantic externalism in the meaning of "meaning" essay.
The last two essays in the book are not to be missed because they summarised Putnum's philosophical journey
Displaying 1 of 1 review