The war in Ukraine and China’s challenge to the global order have brought the Right’s foreign policy divide to the surface. Populists and libertarians, critical of Bush-era interventions in the Middle East, are trying to push the Republican Party into a retrenchment. Defenders of an active and energetic Western alliance keeping rogue states in check see the current conflicts as proof of concept.
Both sides, however, are correct about key aspects of the larger foreign policy debate. In this moment of international crisis, the Right should be creatively integrating insights from these differing camps to develop a sturdier strategic viewpoint. There is a path to an updated consensus on national security, and conservative leaders would do well to pursue it.
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While most Republicans on Capitol Hill remain strong supporters of Ukraine, some on the fringes of the party are expressing doubt about or even outright opposition to more funding. Since last year’s elections, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) has been walking a tightrope trying to satisfy both factions.
As this war rages in Eastern Europe, a new consensus is also emerging in Washington that the Chinese Communist Party is the single greatest threat to American security. A potentially imminent invasion of Taiwan has been the subject of intense speculation and planning in Congress and Washington think tanks. There is a surprising amount of agreement among American policymakers that CCP aggression must be countered. Where there is little consensus, though, is on how Russia, Ukraine, and Europe factor into the situation in the Pacific.
Some conservatives believe the United States can fend off Russian and Chinese revanchism simultaneously. Hudson Institute CEO John Walters, for instance, published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled “Ukraine Is No Distraction From Asia.” Walters argued that China, Iran, and Russia are forming a new “Eurasian Axis” opposed to the American-led world order. Walters believes that aggression must be met by strong American alliances with key countries, including both Taiwan and Ukraine, “on the front lines of the global struggle between freedom and tyranny.”
Walters’s views align roughly with the position of Republicans such as Sens. Tom Cotton (R-AR) and Roger Wicker (R-MS), who represent the thinking of a majority of the caucus. Providing robust support to both Ukraine and Taiwan fits well within the hawkish consensus that has defined Republican foreign policy since the Cold War. These traditional Republicans believe the U.S. is a force for good in the world and therefore should project power when necessary.
Others believe that American support for Ukraine will sap the resources and attention needed to defend Taiwan. Elbridge Colby, co-founder of the Marathon Initiative and a former Defense Department official, has become a leading voice for a new “pivot to Asia.” He wants to see the U.S. concentrate efforts on deterring war in the Pacific, even if that means abandoning European interests.
Colby, whose views align with the China-focused realism of Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) far more than the noninterventionism of Sens. Rand Paul (R-KY) and Mike Lee (R-UT), replied to Walters on Twitter by saying “there is a clear tradeoff” between supporting Ukraine and Taiwan and that Walters is “on the losing side of it.” He believes the U.S. simply does not have the capability for building the alliance system Walters envisions or supplying it with the requisite arms and ammunition to fight wars with two great powers at once.
Colby and Walters met for a debate at the Hudson Institute on April 24. The resolution under discussion was “winning in Ukraine is critically important for deterring a war in Taiwan,” with Walters arguing in its favor and Colby in opposition. While there was a surprising amount of agreement between the two men about what must be done to contain Chinese aggression, their disagreement on Ukraine is a microcosm for this larger argument about American foreign policy on the Right.
In the debate itself, Colby’s strongest points were about the sorry state of U.S. defense spending and industrial capacity. Arming the Ukrainians has already stretched U.S. supply chains very thin, and Colby sees little hope for an immediate increase in production. “It will take well into the 2030s before we’re in much better shape, at best,” he said. Until then, Colby said he hopes the U.S. will “rigorously and carefully husband our munitions and defense industrial based capacity.”
Colby insisted that every weapon or munition that goes to Ukraine is unavailable for use in Taiwan. “Ukraine and Taiwan require many of the same systems to defend themselves,” he said. He is particularly nervous about the U.S. ability to supply both countries with missiles for use on the battlefield, such as Stingers and Switchblades, or in air defense, such as Patriots and AMRAAMs.
Walters maintains the kinds of weapons needed in Ukraine and Taiwan are different enough that supplying one will not substantially affect the other. The war in Ukraine, he said, is a ground war, while a war in the Pacific would be fought in the naval, air, space, and cyber realms. Ships are more important for defending Taiwan than tanks.
While Walters may be right with regard to certain systems, overall, Colby’s concerns about the deficiencies of American defense production are widely shared. Policymakers are right to worry that the war in Ukraine is dwindling American stockpiles more quickly than they can be replenished, and Colby’s warnings should inspire them to look for creative solutions.
Where Colby’s case for a “pivot to Asia” begins to break down, however, is in its political and strategic outlook. He characterized the last few decades of American foreign policy as “a generation of forever wars” and suggested that unless the U.S. shows restraint in Europe, American leaders will be unable to persuade a “war-weary” public to support action in defense of Taiwan.
Not a single American service member, Walters reminded the audience, is fighting in Ukraine. The U.S. is not a belligerent power in the war in Ukraine, and so long as NATO continues providing Ukraine with the weaponry and aid it needs, there is no reason for Americans to enter harm’s way. “War-weary” as the public may be, policymakers do not have to convince it to support deploying troops to Bakhmut or Kherson. The political lift necessary to secure funding for Ukraine is not nearly as great as Colby supposes.
The overall debate also showed the strength of the consensus on China. Walters recommended that now, before Chinese leader Xi Jinping moves on Taiwan, the U.S. should put in place “immediate measures to attack the key segments of that CCP economic and military power.” In addition, Walters argued the U.S. “should speak directly to the people of China, recognize their aspirations, and let them know that we are allies in the common position and in a common opposition to a genocidal oligarchy.”
To that end, Walters views a Russian defeat in Ukraine as a blow against Chinese interests. “While there might be no joint Russian-Chinese military planning cell in Beijing or Moscow,” Walters said, “it would be naive in the extreme to think the two countries do not have some sort of mutual security understanding in place.” Discrediting Vladimir Putin would discredit Xi to some extent and take away the aura of strategic brilliance he has cultivated.
Colby and other skeptics of American support for Ukraine are right about many things. This war has shown the American defense industrial capacity is woefully inadequate. Currently, the U.S. would struggle to produce the arms and ammunition necessary to defend our allies or win a two- or three-front war. And Americans are falling behind in the technology race with China. Leaders in the public and private sectors should heed Colby’s warning and work around the clock to rearm and resupply U.S. and allied militaries.
Furthermore, Congress should significantly increase the defense budget, even if that means cuts to domestic spending. Amid a growing worldwide crisis, the U.S. should not be letting inflation chip away at military spending or reducing the number of vessels in the Navy’s fleet. The hard truth is that the only thing that will restore defense industrial capacity is more spending.
But Colby and his camp’s limited vision obscures the strategic moment. Walters is right that ceding ground to one anti-American power will strengthen the others. The modern world cannot be divided into distinct theaters of geopolitical conflict — technological developments have made the planet a much smaller place than it was a century or two ago. A different kind of thinking is necessary.
To defend the world order, Americans need to unite the free peoples of Europe and Asia in a grand coalition. Hawkish Eastern European leaders, notably in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, understand that the same neo-imperialist impulses motivating Putin’s invasion are behind Xi’s preparations to invade Taiwan. And their counterparts in Asia, including Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, have taken concrete steps to support the Ukrainian war effort.
The U.S. cannot defeat the emerging Eurasian axis on its own. American policy needs to prioritize building and sustaining these relationships. The U.S. must demonstrate a real commitment to protecting interests wherever they are threatened. Freedom and security can be preserved only by American power coupled with the willingness of friends and allies to fight alongside the U.S.
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Solutions to these vexing foreign policy problems cannot be found through tribal politics. Ronald Reagan beat the Soviet Union in part because he rejected infighting among competing factions of Cold Warriors. He was willing to carry out policies championed by realists and idealists alike because he was guided by national interest more than allegiance to a certain camp of foreign policy experts.
In that spirit, conservatives should be encouraged by the debate crystallized by Walters and Colby and the camps they represent in whole or in part. A sound national security strategy would implement insights from both sides of this debate. The U.S. needs statesmen who will acknowledge both the material limits on American power and the necessity of deploying it to protect vital interests. And the Walters-Colby debate suggests the Right is capable of producing those statesmen.
Michael Lucchese is the founder of Pipe Creek Consulting, a communications firm based in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was a communications aide to Sen. Ben Sasse.
