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Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition
How do we know a cat is a cat? And why do we call it a cat? How much of our perception of things is based on cognitive ability, and how much on linguistic resources? Here, in six remarkable essays, Umberto Eco explores in depth questions of reality, perception, and experience. Basing his ideas on common sense, Eco shares a vast wealth of literary and historical knowledge, touching on issues that affect us every day. At once philosophical and amusing, Kant and the Platypus is a tour of the world of our senses, told by a master of knowing what is real and what is not.
480 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1997
About the author
Umberto Eco
841 books10.9k followersUmberto Eco was an Italian writer of fiction, essays, academic texts, and children's books. A professor of semiotics at the University of Bologna, Eco’s brilliant fiction is known for its playful use of language and symbols, its astonishing array of allusions and references, and clever use of puzzles and narrative inventions. His perceptive essays on modern culture are filled with a delightful sense of humor and irony, and his ideas on semiotics, interpretation, and aesthetics have established his reputation as one of academia’s foremost thinkers.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 57 reviews
March 4, 2015
This book is hard to read. Eco uses many languages, long complex sentences, and a peculiar strain of humor which combine to make a complex topic extremely hard to understand. But it also makes it highly readable. Which is fortunate, because I think this is a really important topic and this is the only book I've read that addresses it directly.
If you make it all the way through, you'll come away with a deeper understanding of how people come to understand things and how they communicate those things to other humans. That might seem like common sense, but this book is a great example of how taking a philosophical approach to something that seems obvious can lead you to a deeper understanding. I use what I learned ever day. It's changed the way I approach people. That's about all you can ask from a book.
If you read this, and don't have a background in semiotics (like myself), my advice is to just run through it without stopping to look up ever word you don't understand. Let is wash over you and patterns will emerge that make it clear what is going on. It wont be easy, but it will be rewarding!
If you make it all the way through, you'll come away with a deeper understanding of how people come to understand things and how they communicate those things to other humans. That might seem like common sense, but this book is a great example of how taking a philosophical approach to something that seems obvious can lead you to a deeper understanding. I use what I learned ever day. It's changed the way I approach people. That's about all you can ask from a book.
If you read this, and don't have a background in semiotics (like myself), my advice is to just run through it without stopping to look up ever word you don't understand. Let is wash over you and patterns will emerge that make it clear what is going on. It wont be easy, but it will be rewarding!
February 26, 2016
Description: How we know that a cat is a cat is a nice philosophical poser, and has been since the time of Plato. Why we should all agree on calling the animal a cat is equally interesting, yet it throws up the problem that lies at the heart of all modern philosophy: how much do our perceptions of things depend on our cognitive ability, and how much on our linguistic resources?
Where, and how, do these two questions meet? Having decided against a systematic treatment of his subject, Umberto Eco undertakes a series of idiosyncratic and typically brilliant explorations, starting from the perceived data of common sense, from which flow an abundance of 'stories' or fables, often with animals as protagonists, to expound a clear critique of Kant, Heidegger and Peirce. And, as a beast designed specifically to throw spanners in the works of cognitive theory, the duckbilled platypus naturally takes centre stage
The demise of the author prompts me to take a tack through these essays, afterall, they have been on my shelf for nearly a decade. I also noticed Prague Cemetery gathering dust on the same shelf.
1. ON BEING
2. KANT, PIERCE, AND THE PLATYPUS
Where, and how, do these two questions meet? Having decided against a systematic treatment of his subject, Umberto Eco undertakes a series of idiosyncratic and typically brilliant explorations, starting from the perceived data of common sense, from which flow an abundance of 'stories' or fables, often with animals as protagonists, to expound a clear critique of Kant, Heidegger and Peirce. And, as a beast designed specifically to throw spanners in the works of cognitive theory, the duckbilled platypus naturally takes centre stage
The demise of the author prompts me to take a tack through these essays, afterall, they have been on my shelf for nearly a decade. I also noticed Prague Cemetery gathering dust on the same shelf. 1. ON BEING
1.1 SEMIOTICS AND THE SOMETHING
1.2 AN UNNATURAL PROBLEM
1.3 WHY IS THERE BEING: Why is there being rather than nothing? Because there is.
1.4 HOW WE TALK ABOUT BEING
1.5 THE APORIA OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE
1.6 THE DUPLICATION OF BEING
1.7 THE QUESTIONING OF THE POETS
1.8 A MODEL OF WORLD KNOWLEDGE
1.9 ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT BEING MIGHT ABSCOND
1.10 THE RESISTANCES OF BEING
1.11 THE SENSE OF CONTINUUM - there is no reason why one day humanity might not invent languages different from the known ones.
1.12 POSITVE CONCLUSIONS
2. KANT, PIERCE, AND THE PLATYPUS
2.1 MARCO POLO AND THE UNICORN
The way I started out, tapping out the chapter headings became labourious, and tied me to gadgets. I will say that some of the sections were beguiling, some puffed-up crap.
4* The Name of the Rose
5* Foucault's Pendulum
3* Baudolino
2* The Island of the Day Before
OH The Prague Cemetery
4* The Mysterious Flame of Queen Loana
4* How to Travel with a Salmon and Other Essays
CR Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition
TR Misreadings
April 6, 2020
Sono costretto ad ammetterlo, ho alla fine battuto la testa contro il muro invalicabile che protegge il nucleo interno della filosofia, quello che senza una formazione universitaria non si può passare.
La speranza era che Umberto Eco, viste le sue leggendarie doti di affabulatore, fosse in grado di produrre i suoi scritti di saggistica ad un livello comunque fruibile, se non divulgativo: "Kant e l' ornitorinco" ha dmostrato che non è affatto così. La filosofia semiotica è già di quelle che non si possono affrontare se non si è deciso di fare di questa una parte importante della propria vita.
Fino a che punto però l'incomprensibilità di questo saggio (mi è rimasta una idea abbastanza sfumata di che cosa la Semiotica veramente sia, e poco altro) è colpa mia, e quanta del saggio stesso, che di essere un testo non divulgativo non può essere considerato responsabile?
Alcune falle oggettive in realtà ci sono. Il testo riporta in punti chiave citazioni in tedesco, francese, inglese, latino e greco (di quest'ultima non sono sicuro). Senza la traduzione in calce (neanche nell'edizione cartacea, sono andato a controllare). Aspettarsi che per comprendere un testo il lettore debba parlare cinque lingue di cui due morte, mi sembra eccessivo.
Parimenti sbagliata è la decisione di proporre in formato audio le opere saggistiche di Umberto Eco. Ragionamenti di questo livello di profondità credo che abbiano bisogno del supporto cartaceo, di sottolineature, di segnalibri, di rimandi: per tacere del fatto che in alcuni punti l' autore utilizza immagini figurative per spiegarsi, che su supporto audio ovviamente non possono essere trasferite.
Un'idea editoriale infelice, ed anche un'idea di lettura infelice si sono congiunte per un' esperienza non positiva. Peccato, anche se salvo le spiritose e divertentissime incursioni nel mondo del racconto che il romanziere si concede strappando le pagine al filosofo; ugulmente mi lascia arricchito l'aver acquisito una competenza sufficiente su che cosa la Semiotica sia e su cosa si articoli il suo dibattito.
Ma è davvero troppo poco: chi non è del mestiere si goda i (bellissimi) romanzi del grande scrittore di Alessandria, e niente più.
La speranza era che Umberto Eco, viste le sue leggendarie doti di affabulatore, fosse in grado di produrre i suoi scritti di saggistica ad un livello comunque fruibile, se non divulgativo: "Kant e l' ornitorinco" ha dmostrato che non è affatto così. La filosofia semiotica è già di quelle che non si possono affrontare se non si è deciso di fare di questa una parte importante della propria vita.
Fino a che punto però l'incomprensibilità di questo saggio (mi è rimasta una idea abbastanza sfumata di che cosa la Semiotica veramente sia, e poco altro) è colpa mia, e quanta del saggio stesso, che di essere un testo non divulgativo non può essere considerato responsabile?
Alcune falle oggettive in realtà ci sono. Il testo riporta in punti chiave citazioni in tedesco, francese, inglese, latino e greco (di quest'ultima non sono sicuro). Senza la traduzione in calce (neanche nell'edizione cartacea, sono andato a controllare). Aspettarsi che per comprendere un testo il lettore debba parlare cinque lingue di cui due morte, mi sembra eccessivo.
Parimenti sbagliata è la decisione di proporre in formato audio le opere saggistiche di Umberto Eco. Ragionamenti di questo livello di profondità credo che abbiano bisogno del supporto cartaceo, di sottolineature, di segnalibri, di rimandi: per tacere del fatto che in alcuni punti l' autore utilizza immagini figurative per spiegarsi, che su supporto audio ovviamente non possono essere trasferite.
Un'idea editoriale infelice, ed anche un'idea di lettura infelice si sono congiunte per un' esperienza non positiva. Peccato, anche se salvo le spiritose e divertentissime incursioni nel mondo del racconto che il romanziere si concede strappando le pagine al filosofo; ugulmente mi lascia arricchito l'aver acquisito una competenza sufficiente su che cosa la Semiotica sia e su cosa si articoli il suo dibattito.
Ma è davvero troppo poco: chi non è del mestiere si goda i (bellissimi) romanzi del grande scrittore di Alessandria, e niente più.
April 16, 2018
Je ne sais pas pourquoi je n’ai pensé ni même un moment à la sémiose quand j’ai acheté Kant et l’ornithorynque, même si je m’attendais à ce que les catégories kantiennes soient mises en doute, mais d’une façon ironique- philosophique, disons, en connaissant le penchant d’Umberto Eco pour les paradoxes et les associations bizarres (vous rappelez-vous Comment voyager avec un saumon ?)
De toute façon, après cette lecture je me suis rendu compte que de la sémiose me reste quelques vagues notions de mes années universitaires même si à un moment donné elle m’a passionnée tellement que j’aurais aimé approfondir mes études dans cette direction. C’est-à-dire je possédais jadis un « Contenu Molaire » alimenté de plusieurs lectures de spécialité (dont Eco était le premier favori) que j’ai perdu graduellement au fil des années jusqu’à ce qu’il se transforme dans un « Contenu Nucléaire » assez rudimentaire (plus ou moins réduit à la définition « science des signes ») et qui coïncide avec mon « Type Cognitif ».
Ben oui, c’est autour de ces trois termes que l’auteur construit son étude, en offrant ainsi un modèle de sémantique cognitive qui postule la connaissance d’un objet par expérience et non par une détermination a priori comme l’affirmait Kant. A partir d’une histoire imaginée (les Aztèques décrivent à Montezuma un cheval qu’ils ont vu pour la première fois) il établit trois étapes de la sémiose en empruntant les termes de Peirce qu’il réinterprète : firstness – l’expérience perceptive, qui inclut automatiquement l’objet parmi ceux que nous connaissons déjà et auxquels il ressemble : les Aztèques ont vu un animal ; secondness – l’identification consciente de l’objet, qui permet la construction d’un Type Cognitif TC (semblable au schème kantien) : le TC du cheval des Aztèques (qui contenait sa caractéristique d’animalité, la faculté d’inspirer de la terreur, la caractéristique fonctionnelle d’être « chevauchable » etc.) leur a permis de reconnaître les autres chevaux comme chevaux (ont créé un type leur permettant de comparer différentes occurrences) qui ont nommés « maçatl »; thirdness – le jugement qui permet d’élaborer ce que Eco appelle le Contenu Nucléaire CN – c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des interprétations qui circonscrivent le signifié : les caractéristiques que les Aztèques attribuaient à l’expression maçatl. Par après, Eco parle aussi d’un Contenu Molaire CM qui serait la connaissance élargie d’une chose, là où a lieu la division du travail linguistique : le CM du zoologiste ou du jockey sur le cheval.
Je n’ai pas l’intention (ni l’espace d’ailleurs) de faire une critique approfondie de ce livre original et séduisant. Je préfère glaner quelques idées qui m’ont charmée et intriguée.
D’abord, c’est la réflexion sur l’être à partir de l’aporie aristotélicienne selon laquelle l’être fournit un discours sur tout, sauf lui-même. Donc sa tragédie, sentie à partir d’Aristote jusqu’à Cioran réside dans le fait qu’il est dit :
C’est pourquoi on peut parler de l’être seulement de façon poétique (évidemment dans le sens d’une synecdoque : Poète et Poésie pour Art et Artiste), même si de Platon à Baumgarten (de l’imitation de l’imitation à gnoseologia inferior) on considérait la connaissance artistique inférieure à la connaissance théorique et c’est seulement le à partir du Siècle des Lumières jusqu’au Siècle du Positivisme qu’on remet en question les limites de la connaissance scientifique et la Poésie est revalorisée tandis que la Philosophie est dépréciée.
Pourtant ni même les poètes ne peuvent parler de l’inconnaissable, et ils ne font qu’interpréter l’être (non le dire), de deux façons (ou esthétiques – selon Heidegger) : soit par une sorte de réalisme orphique – la paire de souliers peinte par Van Gogh nous montre ce qu’est une paire de souliers, soit par l’herméneutique – le temple grec comme une épiphanie de la Terre (on réinterprète le Quelque Chose dans lequel nous sommes). On pourrait ainsi dire que si le discours poétique ne répond pas à nos questions sur l’être, il soutient et encourage ces questions. De plus, les artistes corrigent souvent notre type de connaissance et notre schéma perspectif :
Ensuite, c’est la réinterprétation de la référence comme acte linguistique : la synonymie, par exemple, n’est pas une question de référent, mais de signification, car le référent ne résulte pas d’une désignation rigide mais d’un contrat négocié par rapport aux croyances (ou aux intentions) du locuteur et de la situation. Eco illustre cette théorie avec l’histoire de M. Verdi, qui demande à son employé Rossi d’espionner un autre employé, Bianchi, qui était toujours en retard après la pause du lunch. Rossi rapporte que chaque midi « Bianchi va a casa sua dove si intratiene con sua moglie » et parce que Verdi ne comprend pas pourquoi Bianchi irait voir sa femme qu’il voit chaque soir en allant à la maison, Rossi lui demande : « Posso dargle del tu ? »
Cette blague, dont l’humour basé sur une homonymie grammaticale entre le possessif et le pronom de politesse est possible seulement en italien, m’a rappelé une autre très à l’objet et toujours intraduisible, dont l’humour est basé sur une homonymie phonétique possible cette fois seulement en anglais, et en plus seulement dans l’anglais britannique :
Enfin ce sont les histoires, à faire rire comme celle de M. Verdi ou du « sarchiapone », à inciter l’imagination comme celle des chevaux de Montezuma ou à susciter la curiosité comme celles du rhinocéros-licorne de Marco Polo ou du rocher-montagne Ayers Rock d’Australie.
Comme d’habitude, le livre d’Umberto Eco n’est jamais une étude aride et super spécialisée, accessible seulement aux spécialistes. Au contraire, elle offre généreusement une vision nouvelle du monde, à la compréhension de chacun, mais en nous incitant de penser aux choses que souvent nous ne croyions pas qu’il vaille la peine d’y penser :
De toute façon, après cette lecture je me suis rendu compte que de la sémiose me reste quelques vagues notions de mes années universitaires même si à un moment donné elle m’a passionnée tellement que j’aurais aimé approfondir mes études dans cette direction. C’est-à-dire je possédais jadis un « Contenu Molaire » alimenté de plusieurs lectures de spécialité (dont Eco était le premier favori) que j’ai perdu graduellement au fil des années jusqu’à ce qu’il se transforme dans un « Contenu Nucléaire » assez rudimentaire (plus ou moins réduit à la définition « science des signes ») et qui coïncide avec mon « Type Cognitif ».
Ben oui, c’est autour de ces trois termes que l’auteur construit son étude, en offrant ainsi un modèle de sémantique cognitive qui postule la connaissance d’un objet par expérience et non par une détermination a priori comme l’affirmait Kant. A partir d’une histoire imaginée (les Aztèques décrivent à Montezuma un cheval qu’ils ont vu pour la première fois) il établit trois étapes de la sémiose en empruntant les termes de Peirce qu’il réinterprète : firstness – l’expérience perceptive, qui inclut automatiquement l’objet parmi ceux que nous connaissons déjà et auxquels il ressemble : les Aztèques ont vu un animal ; secondness – l’identification consciente de l’objet, qui permet la construction d’un Type Cognitif TC (semblable au schème kantien) : le TC du cheval des Aztèques (qui contenait sa caractéristique d’animalité, la faculté d’inspirer de la terreur, la caractéristique fonctionnelle d’être « chevauchable » etc.) leur a permis de reconnaître les autres chevaux comme chevaux (ont créé un type leur permettant de comparer différentes occurrences) qui ont nommés « maçatl »; thirdness – le jugement qui permet d’élaborer ce que Eco appelle le Contenu Nucléaire CN – c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des interprétations qui circonscrivent le signifié : les caractéristiques que les Aztèques attribuaient à l’expression maçatl. Par après, Eco parle aussi d’un Contenu Molaire CM qui serait la connaissance élargie d’une chose, là où a lieu la division du travail linguistique : le CM du zoologiste ou du jockey sur le cheval.
Je n’ai pas l’intention (ni l’espace d’ailleurs) de faire une critique approfondie de ce livre original et séduisant. Je préfère glaner quelques idées qui m’ont charmée et intriguée.
D’abord, c’est la réflexion sur l’être à partir de l’aporie aristotélicienne selon laquelle l’être fournit un discours sur tout, sauf lui-même. Donc sa tragédie, sentie à partir d’Aristote jusqu’à Cioran réside dans le fait qu’il est dit :
L’être, en tant que pensable, se présente à nous, depuis le début, comme un effet de langage. (s. a.)
C’est pourquoi on peut parler de l’être seulement de façon poétique (évidemment dans le sens d’une synecdoque : Poète et Poésie pour Art et Artiste), même si de Platon à Baumgarten (de l’imitation de l’imitation à gnoseologia inferior) on considérait la connaissance artistique inférieure à la connaissance théorique et c’est seulement le à partir du Siècle des Lumières jusqu’au Siècle du Positivisme qu’on remet en question les limites de la connaissance scientifique et la Poésie est revalorisée tandis que la Philosophie est dépréciée.
Pourtant ni même les poètes ne peuvent parler de l’inconnaissable, et ils ne font qu’interpréter l’être (non le dire), de deux façons (ou esthétiques – selon Heidegger) : soit par une sorte de réalisme orphique – la paire de souliers peinte par Van Gogh nous montre ce qu’est une paire de souliers, soit par l’herméneutique – le temple grec comme une épiphanie de la Terre (on réinterprète le Quelque Chose dans lequel nous sommes). On pourrait ainsi dire que si le discours poétique ne répond pas à nos questions sur l’être, il soutient et encourage ces questions. De plus, les artistes corrigent souvent notre type de connaissance et notre schéma perspectif :
Cézanne ou Renoir nous ont appris à regarder d’une façon différente, dans des circonstances particulières de bonheur et de fraicheur perceptive, des feuillages et des fruits, ou l’incarnat d’une jeune fille.
Ensuite, c’est la réinterprétation de la référence comme acte linguistique : la synonymie, par exemple, n’est pas une question de référent, mais de signification, car le référent ne résulte pas d’une désignation rigide mais d’un contrat négocié par rapport aux croyances (ou aux intentions) du locuteur et de la situation. Eco illustre cette théorie avec l’histoire de M. Verdi, qui demande à son employé Rossi d’espionner un autre employé, Bianchi, qui était toujours en retard après la pause du lunch. Rossi rapporte que chaque midi « Bianchi va a casa sua dove si intratiene con sua moglie » et parce que Verdi ne comprend pas pourquoi Bianchi irait voir sa femme qu’il voit chaque soir en allant à la maison, Rossi lui demande : « Posso dargle del tu ? »
Cette blague, dont l’humour basé sur une homonymie grammaticale entre le possessif et le pronom de politesse est possible seulement en italien, m’a rappelé une autre très à l’objet et toujours intraduisible, dont l’humour est basé sur une homonymie phonétique possible cette fois seulement en anglais, et en plus seulement dans l’anglais britannique :
During a Philosophy Class, the teacher asks one of his students :
‘John, can you tell me who wrote Critique of Pure Reason ? ‘
‘I can’t, Sir.’
‘Bravo, John, your first good answer this year.’
Enfin ce sont les histoires, à faire rire comme celle de M. Verdi ou du « sarchiapone », à inciter l’imagination comme celle des chevaux de Montezuma ou à susciter la curiosité comme celles du rhinocéros-licorne de Marco Polo ou du rocher-montagne Ayers Rock d’Australie.
Comme d’habitude, le livre d’Umberto Eco n’est jamais une étude aride et super spécialisée, accessible seulement aux spécialistes. Au contraire, elle offre généreusement une vision nouvelle du monde, à la compréhension de chacun, mais en nous incitant de penser aux choses que souvent nous ne croyions pas qu’il vaille la peine d’y penser :
Comment est-il possible que nous ayons deux TC distincts pour le moineau et la poule, et un seul pour les mésanges, courlis et alouettes confondus ? C’est à ce point possible que c’est réel (et par définition, tout ce qui est réel, est possible). Le TC pour les oiseaux est si « généreux » (ou vague, ou grossier) qu’il accueille tout animal ailé volant et se posant sur des arbres ou des fils électriques, de telles sorte que si nous apercevions un moineau au loin, nous ne pourrions pour l’instant qu’en faire un oiseau.
April 23, 2009
I am biased. I love Umberto Eco. This review is therefore useless.
Eco is brilliant. And funny. And a million times smarter than all of us. I admit to having to slog through some parts, due to my own ignorance of what he was discussing. This is the kind of book that exemplifies why I commit the sin of writing in the margins; in this case, mainly question marks beside the passages with seemingly matter-of-fact points that I felt oblivious about and needed to google. It was worth it though because when I finally did get the point, I felt just a little bit more brilliant myself.
Eco is brilliant. And funny. And a million times smarter than all of us. I admit to having to slog through some parts, due to my own ignorance of what he was discussing. This is the kind of book that exemplifies why I commit the sin of writing in the margins; in this case, mainly question marks beside the passages with seemingly matter-of-fact points that I felt oblivious about and needed to google. It was worth it though because when I finally did get the point, I felt just a little bit more brilliant myself.
January 6, 2022
Solo per Pierciani solidi
Saggio poderoso su alcuni aspetti della filosofia più contemporanea, un pò frammentato e decisamente per specialisti. Eco dipana in modo chiaro e competente le questioni più urgenti del dibattito culturale del tempo sulle teorie della conoscenza, che variano dall'ontologia più stretta a vie di fuga dal nichilismo più estremo passando per le interpretazioni di Kant. L'ornitorinco fa la funzione di esempio comprensibile ed immediato dei problemi intrinseci al concetto di "conoscenza", un intelligente e stimolante esercizio mentale.
Confesso però di aver sospeso la lettura, per dedicarmi ad opere più omogenee e in grado di darmi una maggior preparazione in vista di una ripresa di questo testo.
Saggio poderoso su alcuni aspetti della filosofia più contemporanea, un pò frammentato e decisamente per specialisti. Eco dipana in modo chiaro e competente le questioni più urgenti del dibattito culturale del tempo sulle teorie della conoscenza, che variano dall'ontologia più stretta a vie di fuga dal nichilismo più estremo passando per le interpretazioni di Kant. L'ornitorinco fa la funzione di esempio comprensibile ed immediato dei problemi intrinseci al concetto di "conoscenza", un intelligente e stimolante esercizio mentale.
Confesso però di aver sospeso la lettura, per dedicarmi ad opere più omogenee e in grado di darmi una maggior preparazione in vista di una ripresa di questo testo.
September 4, 2013
Ne ho letto alcune parti per la tesi... poi mi sono intestardita a leggerlo tutto. Ci sono voluti due anni, ma è stato gratificante.
September 17, 2015
Umberto Eco starts off in the first chapter with asking why is there something instead of nothing? Although he references much philosophy in this first go around, this is just a way for him to get to a more interesting question (he says that the fact that we can ask this question isn't to question Being itself, but to question common sense... that Being is the initial condition for common sense). So let's get to what he really wants to ask. Eco is really asking, how can we know that something is what it is and not something else.
As a semiotician, he is interesting in understanding why we get what we do, and how we come to learn about new things. This is not an easy task at all. While he strings together the disparate discourses of philosophy, piecean semiotics, linguistics, psychology and cognition in a complex and fascinating way, he eventually comes to hinge his articulation on the figure of the sign as a mediating device. He distinguishes between internal and shared external meanings, and then extended intensive "expert" modeling. What makes Eco so impressive isn't the vast range at which he runs, he also writes clearly and cleverly, demonstrating that a specific formulation of how to get from A to B can have a multitude of pathways, some of them contradictory but all consistent in their own logic.
This can wrap around itself however, as the articulation of new knowledge itself requires the continual deferral of old knowledge in the place of new knowledge. But knowledge isn't all that he is after; because knowledge is only the expression of an internal understanding. This is to say that he also creates new understanding in order to supply understanding to understanding itself! So in a very reductive way, he can't fully explain understanding except so much as to describe a possible path. If we accept it internally, then we can say that we understand it. If we reject it, we would claim it nonsensical or that we can't understand it. While I am getting a little astray from Eco's formulation, it is safe to say that Eco is best interested in trying to gasp the steps in formulation to get at any difference in deployment of any aspect of formulation.
In a way, I wish Eco had come up with a better conclusion. He did say what he wanted to say, but the crux of his discussion comes to us when we understand that the act of naming a difference is the creation of that spectrum. Between two differences, or between many discourses that may not connect (that he connects) if we are able to articulate a difference between them, then that difference appears. The difference between them is negligible, shrinking to nothing. If we however, do detect a difference then we can speak of it sideways, and that itself is a metaphor.
I think Eco should have encountered the work of Paul Ricoeur. It would have been interesting to see a conjunction between the two of them. Ricoeur is interested in the same things; although as a philosopher of language, a rhetorician, he approaches the formulation from a position of narrative... the root of which is metaphor. The connection of two unlike things is what metaphor is; and that generic connection can be what creates narrative, though the excuse of temporal displacement in which multiple events are strung together as one long "thing", a string of causation that is complete only if it has all its parts.
But that may be a sideline. Eco eventually ends up in the position of generic objects, which gives us back to semiotics and signs. From there, he utilizes generic objects to set up identity and knowledge. For this, he could connect to Alain Badiou's work in set theory, with the formulation of "naked" signs that are generic events... with their indiscernible aspect that allow them to be applied multiple times, anywhere without losing their connection to Truth. Once we get to this point, though we are only talking about icons, which are representations in themselves, without actuality. Their difference, their next step "down" is the hypoicon, which names the immediate first object, without representation but only the sensory form itself, which leaves us in limbo.
Perhaps this is why Eco did not write a conclusion. He had none. He could only leave us to our imagination as to how to connect the two. With the visual pun "Mexican on a bicycle" he leaves us to ponder the ambiguity of experience; that contextual changes or hypoiconic changes although different in type leads us with completely different understandings. While he wants to connect semiotics to philosophy (as an anterior buffering) and semiotics to cognition (as an internal marker of order, to relate sense datum to signs) he only at best manages a description. Never can we understand that connection without first naming it. And never can we name it without forcing it to become something other than what it might be otherwise, a way of plugging parts together. Not an easy task by any means for anyone to write about, and Eco does a great job of hammering through what could have been far much denser text.
I suppose this is what we get for being creatures of language. Language lets us model, but it only lets us model generics. When we subtract particularities from the object we get the generic, but adding those particularities back gets us identities, singletons which are unique and yet a different object. Mysterious that we can extract type from tokens and then speak only in types when talking about tokens. I forget where he says it, but we speak in generics even if we mean individual singletons. This is very much a root of racism, or an issue with categorization of how we can know anything, and the limits of what we know can be. And yet, often without really knowing, we are still able to speak and negotiate and navigate to come to new understandings, often without having to completely reconstruct the language we use at all.
This ability is very much a kind of miracle. I suppose then it is best that we can't find that missing piece that lets us connect the old to new, or create new from old. Lest if we did find it, and examine it, we would end up losing our very ability to create new narratives, formulate new metaphors and ultimately give rise to new words. We would in fact, lose the ability to create new history.
This is very much the wonder I wish to look at, and Eco gives us a great if somewhat long (yet relatively simply written) narrative for which to guide us about pondering this miracle. 5 stars!
As a semiotician, he is interesting in understanding why we get what we do, and how we come to learn about new things. This is not an easy task at all. While he strings together the disparate discourses of philosophy, piecean semiotics, linguistics, psychology and cognition in a complex and fascinating way, he eventually comes to hinge his articulation on the figure of the sign as a mediating device. He distinguishes between internal and shared external meanings, and then extended intensive "expert" modeling. What makes Eco so impressive isn't the vast range at which he runs, he also writes clearly and cleverly, demonstrating that a specific formulation of how to get from A to B can have a multitude of pathways, some of them contradictory but all consistent in their own logic.
This can wrap around itself however, as the articulation of new knowledge itself requires the continual deferral of old knowledge in the place of new knowledge. But knowledge isn't all that he is after; because knowledge is only the expression of an internal understanding. This is to say that he also creates new understanding in order to supply understanding to understanding itself! So in a very reductive way, he can't fully explain understanding except so much as to describe a possible path. If we accept it internally, then we can say that we understand it. If we reject it, we would claim it nonsensical or that we can't understand it. While I am getting a little astray from Eco's formulation, it is safe to say that Eco is best interested in trying to gasp the steps in formulation to get at any difference in deployment of any aspect of formulation.
In a way, I wish Eco had come up with a better conclusion. He did say what he wanted to say, but the crux of his discussion comes to us when we understand that the act of naming a difference is the creation of that spectrum. Between two differences, or between many discourses that may not connect (that he connects) if we are able to articulate a difference between them, then that difference appears. The difference between them is negligible, shrinking to nothing. If we however, do detect a difference then we can speak of it sideways, and that itself is a metaphor.
I think Eco should have encountered the work of Paul Ricoeur. It would have been interesting to see a conjunction between the two of them. Ricoeur is interested in the same things; although as a philosopher of language, a rhetorician, he approaches the formulation from a position of narrative... the root of which is metaphor. The connection of two unlike things is what metaphor is; and that generic connection can be what creates narrative, though the excuse of temporal displacement in which multiple events are strung together as one long "thing", a string of causation that is complete only if it has all its parts.
But that may be a sideline. Eco eventually ends up in the position of generic objects, which gives us back to semiotics and signs. From there, he utilizes generic objects to set up identity and knowledge. For this, he could connect to Alain Badiou's work in set theory, with the formulation of "naked" signs that are generic events... with their indiscernible aspect that allow them to be applied multiple times, anywhere without losing their connection to Truth. Once we get to this point, though we are only talking about icons, which are representations in themselves, without actuality. Their difference, their next step "down" is the hypoicon, which names the immediate first object, without representation but only the sensory form itself, which leaves us in limbo.
Perhaps this is why Eco did not write a conclusion. He had none. He could only leave us to our imagination as to how to connect the two. With the visual pun "Mexican on a bicycle" he leaves us to ponder the ambiguity of experience; that contextual changes or hypoiconic changes although different in type leads us with completely different understandings. While he wants to connect semiotics to philosophy (as an anterior buffering) and semiotics to cognition (as an internal marker of order, to relate sense datum to signs) he only at best manages a description. Never can we understand that connection without first naming it. And never can we name it without forcing it to become something other than what it might be otherwise, a way of plugging parts together. Not an easy task by any means for anyone to write about, and Eco does a great job of hammering through what could have been far much denser text.
I suppose this is what we get for being creatures of language. Language lets us model, but it only lets us model generics. When we subtract particularities from the object we get the generic, but adding those particularities back gets us identities, singletons which are unique and yet a different object. Mysterious that we can extract type from tokens and then speak only in types when talking about tokens. I forget where he says it, but we speak in generics even if we mean individual singletons. This is very much a root of racism, or an issue with categorization of how we can know anything, and the limits of what we know can be. And yet, often without really knowing, we are still able to speak and negotiate and navigate to come to new understandings, often without having to completely reconstruct the language we use at all.
This ability is very much a kind of miracle. I suppose then it is best that we can't find that missing piece that lets us connect the old to new, or create new from old. Lest if we did find it, and examine it, we would end up losing our very ability to create new narratives, formulate new metaphors and ultimately give rise to new words. We would in fact, lose the ability to create new history.
This is very much the wonder I wish to look at, and Eco gives us a great if somewhat long (yet relatively simply written) narrative for which to guide us about pondering this miracle. 5 stars!
February 26, 2011
Tempted to throw out the five-star rating on this one, but I do not believe that this is something that is going to be really life-changing or horizon-broadening, but it is just quite good.
What I really loved about these essays are their simplicity. Eco does an excellent job of explaining theories of language, cognition and semiotics without resorting to dense, technical language or dumbing down.
With so many essays its tough to sum up exactly what you'll find in this book, but I think it's worth a read whether you're new to the subject or (I imagine) have an academic involvement in semiotics.
What I really loved about these essays are their simplicity. Eco does an excellent job of explaining theories of language, cognition and semiotics without resorting to dense, technical language or dumbing down.
With so many essays its tough to sum up exactly what you'll find in this book, but I think it's worth a read whether you're new to the subject or (I imagine) have an academic involvement in semiotics.
August 10, 2017
Tu knížku jsem četl skoro rok. Na přeskáčku. A měl jsem z ní radost. Zdržovala mě jen má nevzdělanost. Tolik cizích slov a tápání. Ale když jsem četl, měl jsem pocit, že rozumím, že jsem Kant, když jsem knihu zavřel, stal se ze mě zase jen ptakopysk. Pět hvězdiček si ale kniha zaslouží.
November 19, 2019
I happen to like much of what I have read from Umberto Eco [1], and this book is no exception to that general enjoyment. Unlike many people in his field, Eco had a firm grasp of the fact that communication and cognition do not operate by building castles in the air, but have to address a reality that may not be perfectly understood but that provides a test of the mental theories that various people or groups make. This book is full of humorous references to the difficulty of understanding the platypus and the challenge such an animal possesses when it comes to proper categorization as an egg-laying animal with a duckbill that nevertheless otherwise resembles river-dwelling mammals. The author also has something interesting to say about the development of the model of the horse by the Aztecs who encountered Montezuma, and how it was the experience of the Spanish conquest cut off the chance that the Aztecs and their leaders had to respond to the reality of the horse and best deal with it as an element of the Spanish military efforts. These and other examples demonstrate Eco's profound interest in the relationship between reality and efforts to understand it and communicate about it.
This book of nearly 400 pages is divided into six chapters and numerous section within each chapter. The first chapter looks at the question of being and discusses the relationship between language and reality and how we talk about and deal with the problem of being (1). After that the author discusses Kant, Pierce, and the platypus, with a look at how the platypus' reputation was similar to the way that Polo claimed that the rhino was a unicorn (2). The third essay looks at the relationship between cognitive types and nuclear and molar content (3), spending special time on stories about animals like the horse and oysters as well as a hilarious look at the theory of knowledge among angels that led to success for the archangel Gabriel. There is a chapter on the place of the platypus between dictionary and encyclopedia, pointing out the problem of the negotiation of definitions (4). After that the author provides a chapter that looks at the nature of reference and contract (5) before closing the main contents of the book with a debate on iconism and reality (6), after which there are endnotes, a collection of works cited, and an index.
One thing this author does well is demonstrate that semiotics need not be divorced from other fields but that it can provide an important link between how we think and the external world that we have to deal with. By using animals (including the horse and platypus) as heroes of a journey into semiotics and its connections with other fields, the author does a good job at making the material relatable and deeply amusing. Platypuses, for example, are generally funny animals because of their mosaic nature, and the long time it took to understand how it was that an egg-laying mammal with milk glands that acted like sweat glands more than like the nipples of most mammals ended up still being a mammal. The word for horse in nahuatl was originally a word that was used to refer to deer, before the surviving Aztecs adopted words related to the Spanish caballo. What we know, or what we think we know, and what is present challenges to our language as our understanding is shaped by our experiences while also shaping the way we interpret the reality around us. If you want an enjoyable collection of essays about semiotics, this is certainly a worthwhile one.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
This book of nearly 400 pages is divided into six chapters and numerous section within each chapter. The first chapter looks at the question of being and discusses the relationship between language and reality and how we talk about and deal with the problem of being (1). After that the author discusses Kant, Pierce, and the platypus, with a look at how the platypus' reputation was similar to the way that Polo claimed that the rhino was a unicorn (2). The third essay looks at the relationship between cognitive types and nuclear and molar content (3), spending special time on stories about animals like the horse and oysters as well as a hilarious look at the theory of knowledge among angels that led to success for the archangel Gabriel. There is a chapter on the place of the platypus between dictionary and encyclopedia, pointing out the problem of the negotiation of definitions (4). After that the author provides a chapter that looks at the nature of reference and contract (5) before closing the main contents of the book with a debate on iconism and reality (6), after which there are endnotes, a collection of works cited, and an index.
One thing this author does well is demonstrate that semiotics need not be divorced from other fields but that it can provide an important link between how we think and the external world that we have to deal with. By using animals (including the horse and platypus) as heroes of a journey into semiotics and its connections with other fields, the author does a good job at making the material relatable and deeply amusing. Platypuses, for example, are generally funny animals because of their mosaic nature, and the long time it took to understand how it was that an egg-laying mammal with milk glands that acted like sweat glands more than like the nipples of most mammals ended up still being a mammal. The word for horse in nahuatl was originally a word that was used to refer to deer, before the surviving Aztecs adopted words related to the Spanish caballo. What we know, or what we think we know, and what is present challenges to our language as our understanding is shaped by our experiences while also shaping the way we interpret the reality around us. If you want an enjoyable collection of essays about semiotics, this is certainly a worthwhile one.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2019...
January 6, 2021
A difficult book , sometimes I had to stop and look up words and expressions unknown to me. This book was the most difficult of Umberto Eco many books , that I have read. Essentially it is theoretical and conceptual. Umberto Eco is undoubtedly a Genius . His conceptualization of semiotics is very deep and this book is really for scholars .
August 11, 2021
Somehow I believe this is a book that will never entirely leave your life if you managed to finish it
I did finish it, but then reread it, then skim-read it... Then went back to exclusive concepts just to see if I could gain any more... It shouldnt surprise you to know that since its this is philosophy you do leave with more questions than answers. Wait.....No, its true.
But! There are a few concrete ideas I have left with - and again this depends reader to reader... You may take away something completely different.
I gained an insight into the complicated intricacies of the events that take place between you spotting something and recognising it (as well as what happens before and after this of course).. Now zoom into this timeline of events closely to an impossible standard of detail!!!
But why is this book called Kant and the Platypus?? Well in a nutshell, Kant proposed the idea that we follow a schematic sequence from beginning to end when we see anything to the point of recognising it but the Platypus is a pretty unique animal that challenges logical classifications of animals (it has the bill of a duck, has webbed feet, looks like a beaver etc) so what would Kant make of it if he spotted it? How would he justify the way it challenges his schema theory.
It's complicated but interesting.. The ideas and questions you leave with open up a whole new way of looking at things, at looking at our lives which we lead heavily based on recognition, familiarity, routine and repetition.
I wouldnt recommend this book to anyone until they were sure they wanted to commit to it. It's not philosophy as the mainstream Joe Public might perceive, its a very specialised part of philosophy that pertains to Semiotics. If you're interested in Semiotics or if youre interested in Kant, then by all means..get ready to study this book hard. But if youre not sure, start elsewhere. Get a bit of background and then dive in.
If you get to the end you won't regret it, you may not understand all of it but it's an unforgettable book nonetheless.
I did finish it, but then reread it, then skim-read it... Then went back to exclusive concepts just to see if I could gain any more... It shouldnt surprise you to know that since its this is philosophy you do leave with more questions than answers. Wait.....No, its true.
But! There are a few concrete ideas I have left with - and again this depends reader to reader... You may take away something completely different.
I gained an insight into the complicated intricacies of the events that take place between you spotting something and recognising it (as well as what happens before and after this of course).. Now zoom into this timeline of events closely to an impossible standard of detail!!!
But why is this book called Kant and the Platypus?? Well in a nutshell, Kant proposed the idea that we follow a schematic sequence from beginning to end when we see anything to the point of recognising it but the Platypus is a pretty unique animal that challenges logical classifications of animals (it has the bill of a duck, has webbed feet, looks like a beaver etc) so what would Kant make of it if he spotted it? How would he justify the way it challenges his schema theory.
It's complicated but interesting.. The ideas and questions you leave with open up a whole new way of looking at things, at looking at our lives which we lead heavily based on recognition, familiarity, routine and repetition.
I wouldnt recommend this book to anyone until they were sure they wanted to commit to it. It's not philosophy as the mainstream Joe Public might perceive, its a very specialised part of philosophy that pertains to Semiotics. If you're interested in Semiotics or if youre interested in Kant, then by all means..get ready to study this book hard. But if youre not sure, start elsewhere. Get a bit of background and then dive in.
If you get to the end you won't regret it, you may not understand all of it but it's an unforgettable book nonetheless.
March 25, 2015
Per me questo libro é stato troppo difficile, le conoscenze che Eco considera preesistenti erano quasi totalmente assenti nel mio cervello, quindi la maggior parte del tempo mi sono messa a saltare dei lunghi passaggi che mi erano totalmente incomprensibili, peccato. Se invece la vostra conoscenza della filosofia soprattutto contemporanea é buona, penso che possiate apprezzare questa raccolta di saggi.
Read
November 9, 2017I only started it, it was very interesting but very... philosophy of language. There's a great story in it about galileo coming to the americas and discovering the unicorn. Upon writing back to his country he descries - We were quite mistaken about the unicorn, it is gray, large, and rather ugly. Not horselike at all.
Turns out he had been introduced to the Rhino.
Turns out he had been introduced to the Rhino.
April 27, 2022
Difficult for sure; I could Not finish it. Not for the lay reader of philosophy nor linguistics. Would benefit from seeing the wide use of hyperlinking. We are no longer constrained to allocate a topic entirely to a single categorization.
August 27, 2012
This is a difficult book, maybe I wasn't up to it at the time. But I don't think I will try to read it again.
March 12, 2014
Could barely understand it, but that's probably my stupid fault. I'm sure it is brilliant, however I couldn't get past first base. Did not finish.
May 9, 2013
A thoroughly worthwhile read .I love Ecos work he is better taken slowly like great wine
February 24, 2021
„De ce exista ființă mai curând decât nimic? De-aia. Acesta e un răspuns ce trebuie luat cu maxima seriozitate, nu ca o simplă poantă. Faptul însuși ca ne putem pune intrebarea (pe care n-am putea să ne-o punem dacă n-ar exista nimic, adică nici măcar noi cei care ne-o punem) înseamnă că condiția oricarei intrebări este să existe ființa. Ființa nu e o problemă de simț comun (sau simțul comun nu și-o pune ca problemă) pentru ea e condiția însăși a simțului comun. La începutul scrierii De veritate (1.1), Sf. Toma spune: „Illud autem quod primum intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens". Faptul cal exista ceva este primul lucru pe care intelectul nostru il concepe, drept cel mai cunoscut și evident, iar tot restul vine după aceea. Sau, altfel spus, n-am putea gândi clar pornind de la principiul (implicit) că gândim ceva. Ființa este orizontul, sau baia amniotică în care în chip firesc se mișcă gândirea noastră...”
August 23, 2018
I love Umberto Eco. He is one of my favorite novelists. This book was in no way a novel. Rather a collection of essays on semiotics. This book proved to be a very challenging read blamed primarily on my lack of formal education on the topic of semiotics. This book was written for individuals well versed in the topic and able to follow the threads of his arguments because they were versed in the subject. Difficult as it was, it was also at times rich with humor and very illuminating on perception, being and that ever elusive topic of semiotics.
March 4, 2020
I freely confess that I didn't understand half of what Eco was trying to tell me in this book. Linguistics is fascinating, but my background, despite a semester's worth of study in grad school, is too limited. Still, Eco is a fine writer, and his examples/illustrations are often entertaining.
This is a book meant for serious students of linguistics, and not the faint of heart (to coin a phrase).
This is a book meant for serious students of linguistics, and not the faint of heart (to coin a phrase).
May 29, 2018
amazing book, written in a beautiful way, enriching, forcing to focus on processes and meaning of thinking, perception, cognition etc. the only issue I've got with it - somewhere midway I've forgotten why I've picked it up :-)
September 28, 2022
An introduction to Semiotics. Kant and the Platypus is an extraordinarily interesting survey of the major topics in semiotics and linguistics during Eco's life time. There is some serious intellectual muscle here. Not an easy read.
November 26, 2023
Eco has a fascinating style of writing, but it is very dense and difficult. There are nested references in almost every paragraph that require a simultaneously broad and deep knowledge of the Western canon. I love the ideas in this book, but it is not something I would suggest to most people.
October 3, 2017
Had high expectations because I love Umberto Eco, but this one was SO hard to read - way above my level of understanding. Oh well, I'll try On Beauty next and hopefully fare better.
May 28, 2019
Ammetto che ci ho capito ben poco. Ma la lettura è scorrevole e piacevole (come qualsiasi cosa scritta da Umebrto Eco).
February 12, 2020
This book has many interesting concepts about cognition and language. Given only four stars because it is bit difficult to read.
June 4, 2020
Reading beyond my ability again.
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