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Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy offers a powerful criticism of the inconsistencies of representative democracy. Described both as "the Hobbes of our age" and as "the philosophical godfather of Nazism," Carl Schmitt was a brilliant and controversial political theorist whose doctrine of political leadership and critique of liberal democratic ideals distinguish him as one of the most original contributors to modern political theory. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy offers a powerful criticism of the inconsistencies of representative democracy. First published in 1923, it has often been viewed as an attempt to destroy parliamentarism; in fact, it was Schmitt's attempt to defend the Weimar constitution. The introduction to this new translation places the book in proper historical context and provides a useful guide to several aspects of Weimar political culture. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy is included in the series Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy.
184 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1923
About the author
Carl Schmitt
155 books367 followersCarl Schmitt's early career as an academic lawyer falls into the last years of the Wilhelmine Empire. (See for Schmitt's life and career: Bendersky 1983; Balakrishnan 2000; Mehring 2009.) But Schmitt wrote his most influential works, as a young professor of constitutional law in Bonn and later in Berlin, during the Weimar-period: Political Theology, presenting Schmitt's theory of sovereignty, appeared in 1922, to be followed in 1923 by The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, which attacked the legitimacy of parliamentary government. In 1927, Schmitt published the first version of his most famous work, The Concept of the Political, defending the view that all true politics is based on the distinction between friend and enemy. The culmination of Schmitt's work in the Weimar period, and arguably his greatest achievement, is the 1928 Constitutional Theory which systematically applied Schmitt's political theory to the interpretation of the Weimar constitution. During the political and constitutional crisis of the later Weimar Republic Schmitt published Legality and Legitimacy, a clear-sighted analysis of the breakdown of parliamentary government Germany, as well as The Guardian of the Constitution, which argued that the president as the head of the executive, and not a constitutional court, ought to be recognized as the guardian of the constitution. In these works from the later Weimar period, Schmitt's declared aim to defend the Weimar constitution is at times barely distinguishable from a call for constitutional revision towards a more authoritarian political framework (Dyzenhaus 1997, 70–85; Kennedy 2004, 154–78).
Though Schmitt had not been a supporter of National Socialism before Hitler came to power, he sided with the Nazis after 1933. Schmitt quickly obtained an influential position in the legal profession and came to be perceived as the ‘Crown Jurist’ of National Socialism. (Rüthers 1990; Mehring 2009, 304–436) He devoted himself, with undue enthusiasm, to such tasks as the defence of Hitler's extra-judicial killings of political opponents (PB 227–32) and the purging of German jurisprudence of Jewish influence (Gross 2007; Mehring 2009, 358–80). But Schmitt was ousted from his position of power within legal academia in 1936, after infighting with academic competitors who viewed Schmitt as a turncoat who had converted to Nazism only to advance his career. There is considerable debate about the causes of Schmitt's willingness to associate himself with the Nazis. Some authors point to Schmitt's strong ambition and his opportunistic character but deny ideological affinity (Bendersky 1983, 195–242; Schwab 1989). But a strong case has been made that Schmitt's anti-liberal jurisprudence, as well as his fervent anti-semitism, disposed him to support the Nazi regime (Dyzenhaus 1997, 85–101; Scheuerman 1999). Throughout the later Nazi period, Schmitt's work focused on questions of international law. The immediate motivation for this turn seems to have been the aim to justify Nazi-expansionism. But Schmitt was interested in the wider question of the foundations of international law, and he was convinced that the turn towards liberal cosmopolitanism in 20th century international law would undermine the conditions of stable and legitimate international legal order. Schmitt's theoretical work on the foundations of international law culminated in The Nomos of the Earth, written in the early 1940's, but not published before 1950. Due to his support for and involvement with the Nazi dictatorship, the obstinately unrepentant Schmitt was not allowed to return to an academic job after 1945 (Mehring 2009, 438–63). But he nevertheless remained an important figure in West Germany's conservative intellectual scene to his death in 1985 (van Laak 2002) and enjoyed a considerable degree of clandestine influence elsewhere (Scheuerman 1999, 183–251; Müller 2003).
Unsurprisingly, the significance and value of Schmitt's works
Though Schmitt had not been a supporter of National Socialism before Hitler came to power, he sided with the Nazis after 1933. Schmitt quickly obtained an influential position in the legal profession and came to be perceived as the ‘Crown Jurist’ of National Socialism. (Rüthers 1990; Mehring 2009, 304–436) He devoted himself, with undue enthusiasm, to such tasks as the defence of Hitler's extra-judicial killings of political opponents (PB 227–32) and the purging of German jurisprudence of Jewish influence (Gross 2007; Mehring 2009, 358–80). But Schmitt was ousted from his position of power within legal academia in 1936, after infighting with academic competitors who viewed Schmitt as a turncoat who had converted to Nazism only to advance his career. There is considerable debate about the causes of Schmitt's willingness to associate himself with the Nazis. Some authors point to Schmitt's strong ambition and his opportunistic character but deny ideological affinity (Bendersky 1983, 195–242; Schwab 1989). But a strong case has been made that Schmitt's anti-liberal jurisprudence, as well as his fervent anti-semitism, disposed him to support the Nazi regime (Dyzenhaus 1997, 85–101; Scheuerman 1999). Throughout the later Nazi period, Schmitt's work focused on questions of international law. The immediate motivation for this turn seems to have been the aim to justify Nazi-expansionism. But Schmitt was interested in the wider question of the foundations of international law, and he was convinced that the turn towards liberal cosmopolitanism in 20th century international law would undermine the conditions of stable and legitimate international legal order. Schmitt's theoretical work on the foundations of international law culminated in The Nomos of the Earth, written in the early 1940's, but not published before 1950. Due to his support for and involvement with the Nazi dictatorship, the obstinately unrepentant Schmitt was not allowed to return to an academic job after 1945 (Mehring 2009, 438–63). But he nevertheless remained an important figure in West Germany's conservative intellectual scene to his death in 1985 (van Laak 2002) and enjoyed a considerable degree of clandestine influence elsewhere (Scheuerman 1999, 183–251; Müller 2003).
Unsurprisingly, the significance and value of Schmitt's works
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November 15, 2010
As usual with Schmitt, a well argued and interesting text.
Also as usual, (and perhaps to be expected from a right wing Catholic), the analysis
is carried out on a completely idealistic level, that of the "self-moving" history of ideas alone.
His assertion that Marx's fanatical pursuit of the "critique of political economy" was motivated by a need to show that the
bourgeoisie as a social phenomena was fully comprehensible and thus outmoded in a Hegelian sense, strikes me as dubious to say the least and indicative of what was probably a very shallow grasp of the relevant writings on Schmitt’s part.
When it comes to his examination of irrational myth, he makes a connection in terms of intellectual lineage between Proudhon and Bakunin to Mussolini through the mediation of Sorel.
The family relation of fascism with both elements of anarchism and the broader scene of non-Marxist socialism and syndicalism is indisputable, and has been covered in depth by Sternhell, however to concentrate as Schmitt does in thus text upon classical anarchist thought as an anti-rational negation of the Enlightenment is incredibly
one sided and misleading.
The culture of pre WW1 anarchism was permeated by a naïve faith in science, progress and reason quite comparable to that of liberal positivism, everyone from union organizers to individualist expropriators finding common ground in the redemptive power of reason.
His description of democracy is vivid and appropriately cynical, however he stumbles when it comes to the assumption of a necessary contradiction between democracy and parliamentary bourgeoisie liberalism, failing to see that the homogonous social body he postulates as requisite for democracy is in fact provided by liberalism’s world of commodity producing citizens nominally equal in the sphere of exchange ( with the revolutionary proletariat as perhaps the “worst” heterogeneous element of them all).
Also as usual, (and perhaps to be expected from a right wing Catholic), the analysis
is carried out on a completely idealistic level, that of the "self-moving" history of ideas alone.
His assertion that Marx's fanatical pursuit of the "critique of political economy" was motivated by a need to show that the
bourgeoisie as a social phenomena was fully comprehensible and thus outmoded in a Hegelian sense, strikes me as dubious to say the least and indicative of what was probably a very shallow grasp of the relevant writings on Schmitt’s part.
When it comes to his examination of irrational myth, he makes a connection in terms of intellectual lineage between Proudhon and Bakunin to Mussolini through the mediation of Sorel.
The family relation of fascism with both elements of anarchism and the broader scene of non-Marxist socialism and syndicalism is indisputable, and has been covered in depth by Sternhell, however to concentrate as Schmitt does in thus text upon classical anarchist thought as an anti-rational negation of the Enlightenment is incredibly
one sided and misleading.
The culture of pre WW1 anarchism was permeated by a naïve faith in science, progress and reason quite comparable to that of liberal positivism, everyone from union organizers to individualist expropriators finding common ground in the redemptive power of reason.
His description of democracy is vivid and appropriately cynical, however he stumbles when it comes to the assumption of a necessary contradiction between democracy and parliamentary bourgeoisie liberalism, failing to see that the homogonous social body he postulates as requisite for democracy is in fact provided by liberalism’s world of commodity producing citizens nominally equal in the sphere of exchange ( with the revolutionary proletariat as perhaps the “worst” heterogeneous element of them all).
Read
January 19, 2022Ezber bozan bir kitap.
Read
October 18, 2020Parlamenter Demokrasinin Krizi, 20. yüzyılda demokrasi ve parlamentarizmin anlamı üzerine bilindik iddialardan farklı savlara yer veren bir kitap. Yine de kitap boyunca Schmitt'in "Hitler'in filozofları"ndan biri olduğu zihnimin bir köşesindeydi.
Kendime kısa notlar olması için, Schmitt, liberalizm ile demokrasinin aynı anlama gelmediğini, diktatörlüğün demokrasinin zıttı olmadığını, demokratik bir diktatörlüğün de var olabileceğini, 19. yüzyılda demokrasinin adeta bir "moda" haline geldiğini, ilericilikle eş anlamda sayıldığını; fakat bunun aslında böyle olmadığını ifade etmiştir. Ayrıca Schmitt'e göre parlamentarizm, aleniyet ve müzakereyi şart koşmaktadır; fakat siyasî partilerin ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte kararlar "kapalı kapılar ardında" yapılan pazarlıklarla alınmaya başlamıştır. Bu da parlamentolarının işlevlerini kaybetmelerine neden olmuştur.
Kendime kısa notlar olması için, Schmitt, liberalizm ile demokrasinin aynı anlama gelmediğini, diktatörlüğün demokrasinin zıttı olmadığını, demokratik bir diktatörlüğün de var olabileceğini, 19. yüzyılda demokrasinin adeta bir "moda" haline geldiğini, ilericilikle eş anlamda sayıldığını; fakat bunun aslında böyle olmadığını ifade etmiştir. Ayrıca Schmitt'e göre parlamentarizm, aleniyet ve müzakereyi şart koşmaktadır; fakat siyasî partilerin ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte kararlar "kapalı kapılar ardında" yapılan pazarlıklarla alınmaya başlamıştır. Bu da parlamentolarının işlevlerini kaybetmelerine neden olmuştur.
June 22, 2021
Ah, Carl Schmitt, Carl Schmitt! No man like him exists today. Political philosophy in our time is, and for many decades past has been, largely the domain of intellectual pygmies and outright morons; the age of gold has degenerated into the age of brass, or of plastic with yellow paint. Schmitt is dead, but his work is not, and this, one of his series of books published during the early Weimar period in Germany, illuminates much of our own present condition. That’s not to say The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy is an easy read. Like much of Schmitt’s writing, it is somewhat elliptical, alternating great insight with moments of “where are we going with this?” But the payoff is worth the effort.
This is the only translation in English, done in 1985, of the 1926 (second) edition of Schmitt’s Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, first published in 1923. The word “crisis” does not appear in the original German title; rather, the term used is roughly “spiritual-historical situation,” in the non-religious sense of “spiritual,” for which there is no equivalent English word (but there is in Hungarian, lelki, as my mother never tires of reminding me). Moreover, it’s a bit strange that the German word for “parliamentarianism” was translated as “parliamentary democracy,” given that Schmitt spends a good portion of the book distinguishing parliamentarianism and democracy.
To be sure Schmitt saw fatal problems, if not yet precisely a crisis, in the foundation of the German parliamentary system. Schmitt does mention a crisis of parliamentarianism within the text, but he means that not in the sense of an existential crisis of the nation (although famously much of Schmitt’s political thought revolved around what a sovereign might do, legitimately or not, in such a crisis) but in the sense of unbridgeable contradictions having surfaced in what was once thought to be a clearly-defined system. He says the same of both democracy and the modern liberal state, which is why one of his aims is to explore alternatives to played-out systems of the time. Whether he saw a crisis in his day or not, it is certain Schmitt would be horrified, but not surprised, at the utter degradation of today’s politics. But the wreckage of liberal democracy we see all around us is merely the inevitable end state of the contradictions and debilities Schmitt analyzes in this book.
It is hard for us to recapture the degree to which the Western European ruling classes in the early twentieth century worshipped the parliamentary system, and had faith that the end of political organization had arrived, just needing a little polishing here and adjustment there. After a century of struggle against monarchy and aristocracy, it seemed to most elites as if history had evolved to a modern system that truly represented the nation (though there were more than a few dissenters, mostly outside the elites, some of whom Schmitt covers in this book). Schmitt is famous in part because he broke that spell, and soundly spanked parliamentarianism, in its then-existent form, as outdated and inadequate for the challenges facing Germany. Parliamentarianism was an integral manifestation of liberalism, however, so Schmitt’s criticism went deeper than mere political form, or the mechanisms of political decision making. Schmitt thereby heralded both the looming troubles of the decades immediately following this work, and the troubles that have resurfaced after the end of the Cold War.
The translator, Ellen Kennedy, offers an excellent and lengthy Introduction. The edition she translates begins with a Preface, in which Schmitt responds to criticism of the first edition by one Richard Thoma, a law professor, who accused Schmitt of crypto-papism and a lust for dictatorship, which are pretty much the stock attacks on Schmitt to this day (although his Catholicism assumed less importance in his later thought than it had occupied in his earliest works). Despite Thoma’s attack, this book is in fact a turn away from the focus on dictatorship and the imposition of good government by a sovereign above the people, found in three earlier books (Political Romanticism; The Dictator; and Political Theology), towards a more favorable view of popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Preface, putatively a response to Thoma, actually most clearly pulls together the threads of Schmitt’s claim in the rest of the book that parliamentarianism is contradictory to democracy, and should be re-read after the book in order to grasp the practical realities of Schmitt’s theoretical analysis.
Schmitt’s original Introduction outlines his project. He notes that since the inception of the parliamentary system, it has been intermittently criticized, despite its general acceptance. Some criticism comes from those who would restore the absolutism of monarchy. More importantly, in the world of the Germany of 1923 (almost all of Schmitt’s focus is Germany, occasionally touching on France, but mostly for theory, not practice), were criticisms from those on the Left who desired some form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and those on the Right who desired some form of corporatism. Although he acknowledges many and varied currents criticizing parliamentary theory and, even more, practice, Schmitt’s purpose is not to himself critique the parliamentary system, even if that’s the effect of much of what he says. He rather wants to “find the ultimate core of the institution of modern parliament,” which he regards as being very different from its original conception and practice. “[T]he institution itself has lost its moral and intellectual foundation and only remains standing through sheer mechanical perseverance as an empty apparatus.” To understand why this is, Schmitt tells us, we must clearly define and distinguish parliamentarianism and related concepts, “such as democracy, liberalism, individualism, and rationalism.” He wants to “shift away from tactical and technical questions to intellectual principles and a starting point that does not once again lead to a dead end.” He wants to offer a positive way forward, by examining the system and alternatives, not merely carp about problems in the politics of his society.
Taking the bull by the horns, the first chapter tackles democracy. Legitimacy is associated, Schmitt says, with democracy, and legitimacy at the time Schmitt wrote meant recognizing the people’s right to self-determination. Popular sovereignty had been the wave of the nineteenth century, it “appeared to have the self-evidence of an irresistible advancing and expanding force.” It seemed allied to “liberalism and freedom”—but was not, because democracy is only an organizational form without content. Only by linking democracy with another concept, such as social or economic relationships, or a national will, or national homogeneity, does democracy acquire content, and even then the content can be wholly inconsistent from place to place, depending on the characteristics and heterogeneity of the population. (In fact, in the Preface, Schmitt denies that a more than nominally heterogenous polity, to the extent it extends the franchise across different groups in society, can be a democracy at all, something modern America is proving him correct about. Schmitt’s focus in other works on the inherency of enmity in any polity also suggests democracy is never workable, as does his point that political equality of all, which he regards as “irresponsible stupidity, leading to the worst chaos, and therefore to even worse injustice,” is “a liberal, not a democratic, idea,” but those are topics for another day.)
What then are the core realities of democracy? First, the actual will of each citizen, however he votes, is the same as the result obtained through majority vote. Failure to vote with the majority merely shows a voter has mistaken the general will. There is therefore “an identity between law and the people’s will.” Second, “all democratic arguments rest logically on a series of identities,” including “the identity of governed and governing . . . the identity of the people with their representatives . . . and finally an identity of the quantitative (the numerical majority or unanimity) with the qualitative (the justice of the laws).”
Of course, these identities are theoretical and never fully realized in practice, and the single most significant problem for theorists of democracy is that the will of the people as expressed may be deceived or malformed, in which case it is the minority which actually represents the will of the people. Thus democratic methods can be used to defeat or destroy democracy itself (Schmitt gives the example of newly-enfranchised women voters who commonly voted for authoritarian government), and if a theorist with power believes that democracy has, in itself, “self-sufficient value,” this cannot be permitted. This problem was identified since the Levellers of 1649, who as a result wanted to restrict power and voting to the “well-affected.” The “solution” usually adopted is that the people must be educated to know their true will, and such education will be conducted, if necessary, by a dictatorship, one that nonetheless remains democratic, because the will of the people is still the exclusive criterion of what is democratic, and the will of the people is thereby being correctly revealed. This is the key identity, that of democracy with the real will of the people, and the aim of every modern political power of every stripe, from royalists to Bolsheviks (with the exception of Italian Fascism, Schmitt notes) is to achieve that identity with itself. The ongoing problem of democracy is that it is impossible to disprove this “Jacobin argument” that the minority is qualitatively the legitimate representative of the will of the people if they have not yet been adequately informed and educated.
Next, of the principles of parliamentarianism—what are its “ultimate intellectual foundations”? Crucially, parliamentarianism is not democracy; it is not popular sovereignty in its pure form, and does not contain the core realities, the identities, Schmitt identifies in democracy. Schmitt notes that a representative of a parliamentary system is not, or should not be, a direct representative; he more than once cites Article 21 of the Weimar constitution, “members are representatives of the whole people; they are only responsible to their own consciences and not bound by any instructions.” (Although Schmitt does not mention it, not infrequently you hear this view ascribed to Edmund Burke, in his speech to the electors of Bristol, but according to Schmitt, this is the very essence of parliamentarianism, and nothing new.) Counterposed to this is not only the sometimes-found idea that representatives should, in fact, reflect the desires of constituents, but also the party system, which constrains parliamentarians from making individuated decisions.
What justifies the parliamentary system? The oldest, and once standard, justification for parliamentary rule is expediency—if a polity contains many people, an “elected committee of responsible people” can make decisions for the whole. This appears democratic, an extension of an assembly on the village green, but it is not, for “If for practical and technical reasons the representatives of the people can decide instead of the people themselves, then certainly a single trusted representative could also decide in the name of the same people. Without ceasing to be democratic, the argument would justify an antiparliamentary Caesarism.” So it would.
Then what is the justification for parliamentary rule? Schmitt identifies the modern “liberal rationalist” justification as the “dynamic-dialectic, that is, in a process of confrontation of differences and opinions, from which the real political will results. The essence of parliament is therefore public deliberation of argument and counterargument, public debate and public discussion, parley, and all this without taking democracy into account.” This is merely an extension of the broader liberal idea that the free market, competition, “will produce harmony,” and that truth is “a mere function of the eternal competition of opinion.” Such competition manifests in two principles which are, at root, contradictory—the paramount importance of openness, particularly of the press, allowing public opinion to surface and compete, and the division of powers, another type of competition, but one that thwarts the democratic will, because parliament, the fruit of openness, as a result only has legislative, not plenary, power. In Western thought, division of powers has become synonymous with constitutionalism (and dictatorship is a suspension of the division of powers), yet this is actually a retrenchment from Enlightenment rationalism, which posited the general will as the touchstone of proper governmental authority.
This contradiction exists because the division of powers is inherent in the intellectual distinction between legislation and executive action. Schmitt repeats his famous formulation, the first sentence of Political Theology, “Sovereign is whoever decides what constitutes an exception”; the division of powers is a pushback against this reality. Law, the absolute norm, is distinct from authority, the active application of the law. Seeking context for these abstractions, Schmitt surveys a wide range of thinkers, from Aristotle to James Madison, noting that the closer a system came to true Enlightenment rationalism, the more this key distinction was denied and the more parliament, the legislative power, became unitarily supreme. But to the extent the executive has power, openness and discussion do not determine its actions; here the idea of rationalism based on openness reaches its limit.
For decades, Schmitt says, openness and discussion “seemed to be essential and indispensable. What was to be secured through the balance guaranteed by openness and discussion was nothing less than truth and justice itself.” Society was to achieve “discussion in place of force.” In practice, however, “the reality of parliamentary and party political life and public convictions are today far removed from such beliefs.” Parliament is a facade; all real work is done in committees or in parties, far from public view and public discussion; thus parliament “is losing its rationale.” “Small and exclusive committees of parties or of party coalitions make their decisions behind closed doors, and what representatives of the big capitalist interest groups agree to in the smallest committees is more important for the fate of millions of people, perhaps, than any political decision.” To the extent public opinion, or the sovereignty of the people, is valued, society is worse off than under “the cabinet politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” Equally corrosively for the theoretical principles of parliamentarianism, modern mass action techniques, such as radio, have “made argumentative public discussion an empty formality.” “There are certainly not many people today who want to renounce the old liberal freedoms, particularly freedom of speech and the press. But on the European continent there are not many more who believe that these freedoms still exist where they could actually endanger the real holders of power.” Zing. (It’s certainly no better today. Nobody would say that any modern Western system is one revolving around rational discourse. To enunciate the idea is to refute it.) “[P]arliament, as it developed in the nineteenth century, has also lost its previous foundation and its meaning.” Thus, by implication, parliament has a crisis of legitimacy for, after all, any number of other forms of government could allow the same type of system, forms that did not falsely claim to implement popular sovereignty—such as, let’s say, Mussolini’s corporatism.
So what does that mean? What can replace the empty shell of parliamentarianism? Rather than talk of Mussolini, Schmitt turns to two great currents of his age that both claimed to represent the general will: Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism. Schmitt never mentions it, but none of this analysis in the second half of the book was abstract in the years leading up to 1923; great currents rocked the German scene, of which these two held pride of place, with violent Communist rebellion and general strikes in many big cities, all capped by hyperinflation and the destruction of much of the German middle class. Mussolini had marched on Rome in 1922. Thus, Schmitt knew perfectly well that his bloodless analysis had real world implications and consequences, and these real-world events no doubt dictated the choice of what he would analyze.
He first examines Marxism . . . . [Review completes as first comment.]
This is the only translation in English, done in 1985, of the 1926 (second) edition of Schmitt’s Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, first published in 1923. The word “crisis” does not appear in the original German title; rather, the term used is roughly “spiritual-historical situation,” in the non-religious sense of “spiritual,” for which there is no equivalent English word (but there is in Hungarian, lelki, as my mother never tires of reminding me). Moreover, it’s a bit strange that the German word for “parliamentarianism” was translated as “parliamentary democracy,” given that Schmitt spends a good portion of the book distinguishing parliamentarianism and democracy.
To be sure Schmitt saw fatal problems, if not yet precisely a crisis, in the foundation of the German parliamentary system. Schmitt does mention a crisis of parliamentarianism within the text, but he means that not in the sense of an existential crisis of the nation (although famously much of Schmitt’s political thought revolved around what a sovereign might do, legitimately or not, in such a crisis) but in the sense of unbridgeable contradictions having surfaced in what was once thought to be a clearly-defined system. He says the same of both democracy and the modern liberal state, which is why one of his aims is to explore alternatives to played-out systems of the time. Whether he saw a crisis in his day or not, it is certain Schmitt would be horrified, but not surprised, at the utter degradation of today’s politics. But the wreckage of liberal democracy we see all around us is merely the inevitable end state of the contradictions and debilities Schmitt analyzes in this book.
It is hard for us to recapture the degree to which the Western European ruling classes in the early twentieth century worshipped the parliamentary system, and had faith that the end of political organization had arrived, just needing a little polishing here and adjustment there. After a century of struggle against monarchy and aristocracy, it seemed to most elites as if history had evolved to a modern system that truly represented the nation (though there were more than a few dissenters, mostly outside the elites, some of whom Schmitt covers in this book). Schmitt is famous in part because he broke that spell, and soundly spanked parliamentarianism, in its then-existent form, as outdated and inadequate for the challenges facing Germany. Parliamentarianism was an integral manifestation of liberalism, however, so Schmitt’s criticism went deeper than mere political form, or the mechanisms of political decision making. Schmitt thereby heralded both the looming troubles of the decades immediately following this work, and the troubles that have resurfaced after the end of the Cold War.
The translator, Ellen Kennedy, offers an excellent and lengthy Introduction. The edition she translates begins with a Preface, in which Schmitt responds to criticism of the first edition by one Richard Thoma, a law professor, who accused Schmitt of crypto-papism and a lust for dictatorship, which are pretty much the stock attacks on Schmitt to this day (although his Catholicism assumed less importance in his later thought than it had occupied in his earliest works). Despite Thoma’s attack, this book is in fact a turn away from the focus on dictatorship and the imposition of good government by a sovereign above the people, found in three earlier books (Political Romanticism; The Dictator; and Political Theology), towards a more favorable view of popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Preface, putatively a response to Thoma, actually most clearly pulls together the threads of Schmitt’s claim in the rest of the book that parliamentarianism is contradictory to democracy, and should be re-read after the book in order to grasp the practical realities of Schmitt’s theoretical analysis.
Schmitt’s original Introduction outlines his project. He notes that since the inception of the parliamentary system, it has been intermittently criticized, despite its general acceptance. Some criticism comes from those who would restore the absolutism of monarchy. More importantly, in the world of the Germany of 1923 (almost all of Schmitt’s focus is Germany, occasionally touching on France, but mostly for theory, not practice), were criticisms from those on the Left who desired some form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and those on the Right who desired some form of corporatism. Although he acknowledges many and varied currents criticizing parliamentary theory and, even more, practice, Schmitt’s purpose is not to himself critique the parliamentary system, even if that’s the effect of much of what he says. He rather wants to “find the ultimate core of the institution of modern parliament,” which he regards as being very different from its original conception and practice. “[T]he institution itself has lost its moral and intellectual foundation and only remains standing through sheer mechanical perseverance as an empty apparatus.” To understand why this is, Schmitt tells us, we must clearly define and distinguish parliamentarianism and related concepts, “such as democracy, liberalism, individualism, and rationalism.” He wants to “shift away from tactical and technical questions to intellectual principles and a starting point that does not once again lead to a dead end.” He wants to offer a positive way forward, by examining the system and alternatives, not merely carp about problems in the politics of his society.
Taking the bull by the horns, the first chapter tackles democracy. Legitimacy is associated, Schmitt says, with democracy, and legitimacy at the time Schmitt wrote meant recognizing the people’s right to self-determination. Popular sovereignty had been the wave of the nineteenth century, it “appeared to have the self-evidence of an irresistible advancing and expanding force.” It seemed allied to “liberalism and freedom”—but was not, because democracy is only an organizational form without content. Only by linking democracy with another concept, such as social or economic relationships, or a national will, or national homogeneity, does democracy acquire content, and even then the content can be wholly inconsistent from place to place, depending on the characteristics and heterogeneity of the population. (In fact, in the Preface, Schmitt denies that a more than nominally heterogenous polity, to the extent it extends the franchise across different groups in society, can be a democracy at all, something modern America is proving him correct about. Schmitt’s focus in other works on the inherency of enmity in any polity also suggests democracy is never workable, as does his point that political equality of all, which he regards as “irresponsible stupidity, leading to the worst chaos, and therefore to even worse injustice,” is “a liberal, not a democratic, idea,” but those are topics for another day.)
What then are the core realities of democracy? First, the actual will of each citizen, however he votes, is the same as the result obtained through majority vote. Failure to vote with the majority merely shows a voter has mistaken the general will. There is therefore “an identity between law and the people’s will.” Second, “all democratic arguments rest logically on a series of identities,” including “the identity of governed and governing . . . the identity of the people with their representatives . . . and finally an identity of the quantitative (the numerical majority or unanimity) with the qualitative (the justice of the laws).”
Of course, these identities are theoretical and never fully realized in practice, and the single most significant problem for theorists of democracy is that the will of the people as expressed may be deceived or malformed, in which case it is the minority which actually represents the will of the people. Thus democratic methods can be used to defeat or destroy democracy itself (Schmitt gives the example of newly-enfranchised women voters who commonly voted for authoritarian government), and if a theorist with power believes that democracy has, in itself, “self-sufficient value,” this cannot be permitted. This problem was identified since the Levellers of 1649, who as a result wanted to restrict power and voting to the “well-affected.” The “solution” usually adopted is that the people must be educated to know their true will, and such education will be conducted, if necessary, by a dictatorship, one that nonetheless remains democratic, because the will of the people is still the exclusive criterion of what is democratic, and the will of the people is thereby being correctly revealed. This is the key identity, that of democracy with the real will of the people, and the aim of every modern political power of every stripe, from royalists to Bolsheviks (with the exception of Italian Fascism, Schmitt notes) is to achieve that identity with itself. The ongoing problem of democracy is that it is impossible to disprove this “Jacobin argument” that the minority is qualitatively the legitimate representative of the will of the people if they have not yet been adequately informed and educated.
Next, of the principles of parliamentarianism—what are its “ultimate intellectual foundations”? Crucially, parliamentarianism is not democracy; it is not popular sovereignty in its pure form, and does not contain the core realities, the identities, Schmitt identifies in democracy. Schmitt notes that a representative of a parliamentary system is not, or should not be, a direct representative; he more than once cites Article 21 of the Weimar constitution, “members are representatives of the whole people; they are only responsible to their own consciences and not bound by any instructions.” (Although Schmitt does not mention it, not infrequently you hear this view ascribed to Edmund Burke, in his speech to the electors of Bristol, but according to Schmitt, this is the very essence of parliamentarianism, and nothing new.) Counterposed to this is not only the sometimes-found idea that representatives should, in fact, reflect the desires of constituents, but also the party system, which constrains parliamentarians from making individuated decisions.
What justifies the parliamentary system? The oldest, and once standard, justification for parliamentary rule is expediency—if a polity contains many people, an “elected committee of responsible people” can make decisions for the whole. This appears democratic, an extension of an assembly on the village green, but it is not, for “If for practical and technical reasons the representatives of the people can decide instead of the people themselves, then certainly a single trusted representative could also decide in the name of the same people. Without ceasing to be democratic, the argument would justify an antiparliamentary Caesarism.” So it would.
Then what is the justification for parliamentary rule? Schmitt identifies the modern “liberal rationalist” justification as the “dynamic-dialectic, that is, in a process of confrontation of differences and opinions, from which the real political will results. The essence of parliament is therefore public deliberation of argument and counterargument, public debate and public discussion, parley, and all this without taking democracy into account.” This is merely an extension of the broader liberal idea that the free market, competition, “will produce harmony,” and that truth is “a mere function of the eternal competition of opinion.” Such competition manifests in two principles which are, at root, contradictory—the paramount importance of openness, particularly of the press, allowing public opinion to surface and compete, and the division of powers, another type of competition, but one that thwarts the democratic will, because parliament, the fruit of openness, as a result only has legislative, not plenary, power. In Western thought, division of powers has become synonymous with constitutionalism (and dictatorship is a suspension of the division of powers), yet this is actually a retrenchment from Enlightenment rationalism, which posited the general will as the touchstone of proper governmental authority.
This contradiction exists because the division of powers is inherent in the intellectual distinction between legislation and executive action. Schmitt repeats his famous formulation, the first sentence of Political Theology, “Sovereign is whoever decides what constitutes an exception”; the division of powers is a pushback against this reality. Law, the absolute norm, is distinct from authority, the active application of the law. Seeking context for these abstractions, Schmitt surveys a wide range of thinkers, from Aristotle to James Madison, noting that the closer a system came to true Enlightenment rationalism, the more this key distinction was denied and the more parliament, the legislative power, became unitarily supreme. But to the extent the executive has power, openness and discussion do not determine its actions; here the idea of rationalism based on openness reaches its limit.
For decades, Schmitt says, openness and discussion “seemed to be essential and indispensable. What was to be secured through the balance guaranteed by openness and discussion was nothing less than truth and justice itself.” Society was to achieve “discussion in place of force.” In practice, however, “the reality of parliamentary and party political life and public convictions are today far removed from such beliefs.” Parliament is a facade; all real work is done in committees or in parties, far from public view and public discussion; thus parliament “is losing its rationale.” “Small and exclusive committees of parties or of party coalitions make their decisions behind closed doors, and what representatives of the big capitalist interest groups agree to in the smallest committees is more important for the fate of millions of people, perhaps, than any political decision.” To the extent public opinion, or the sovereignty of the people, is valued, society is worse off than under “the cabinet politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” Equally corrosively for the theoretical principles of parliamentarianism, modern mass action techniques, such as radio, have “made argumentative public discussion an empty formality.” “There are certainly not many people today who want to renounce the old liberal freedoms, particularly freedom of speech and the press. But on the European continent there are not many more who believe that these freedoms still exist where they could actually endanger the real holders of power.” Zing. (It’s certainly no better today. Nobody would say that any modern Western system is one revolving around rational discourse. To enunciate the idea is to refute it.) “[P]arliament, as it developed in the nineteenth century, has also lost its previous foundation and its meaning.” Thus, by implication, parliament has a crisis of legitimacy for, after all, any number of other forms of government could allow the same type of system, forms that did not falsely claim to implement popular sovereignty—such as, let’s say, Mussolini’s corporatism.
So what does that mean? What can replace the empty shell of parliamentarianism? Rather than talk of Mussolini, Schmitt turns to two great currents of his age that both claimed to represent the general will: Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism. Schmitt never mentions it, but none of this analysis in the second half of the book was abstract in the years leading up to 1923; great currents rocked the German scene, of which these two held pride of place, with violent Communist rebellion and general strikes in many big cities, all capped by hyperinflation and the destruction of much of the German middle class. Mussolini had marched on Rome in 1922. Thus, Schmitt knew perfectly well that his bloodless analysis had real world implications and consequences, and these real-world events no doubt dictated the choice of what he would analyze.
He first examines Marxism . . . . [Review completes as first comment.]
June 11, 2011
I will admit - I enjoy reading Schmitt. He hates everyone, and has an appropriately pessimistic view of political institutions and our calcified system of parliament.
January 21, 2022
Deze review betreft dit boek en het begrip politiek.
https://ongeduld.com/2022/01/21/carl-...
De houdbaarheid van de democratie evenals de opkomst van identiteitspolitiek en steeds verdere polarisatie op een gehele reeks onderwerpen motiveerde mij de werken te lezen van een denker met een zekere alternatieve opinie dan doorgaans gewoonlijk is. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was een Duitse politiek filosoof van de vorige eeuw, en een van de meest controversiële. Waarom? Openlijk uitte hij zijn steun voor het Nationaal Socialisme en met de machtsovername van Hitler week Schmitt er niet voor uit om juridisch de beweging te steunen evenals Joodse wetenschappers uit zijn werk te schrappen. Desondanks denk ik dat Schmitt waardevol is om te lezen om verschillende redenen, zijn kritiek op Liberalisme, de kritiek op de democratie en meest belangrijk van al, zijn vriend-vijand concept binnen de politiek.
Eerst wil ik enige context geven voordat we duiken in Schmitt zijn kritiek op Liberalisme. Waar leefde Schmitt? In wat voor tijd? Wat kan zijn ideeën beïnvloed hebben? Schmitt studeerde af in 1910, enkele jaren voor de eerste wereldoorlog startte. Over zijn vroege volwassen jaren zag Schmitt het keizerrijk Duitsland in oorlog vervallen met Frankrijk, England en Rusland, om zelf in 1916 de wapens op te pakken en de loopgraven in te duiken. Na de eerste wereldoorlog kwam Schmitt in een van de meest turbulente tijd van Duitsland terecht, het interbellum met de Weimar Republiek. Met het aftreden van de Duitse keizer probeerde men in Duitsland een democratische parlementaire republiek te creëren. Aan de grondslag hiervan lag een zeer democratische en liberale constitutie, maar deze verandering ging gepaard met veel problemen. Duitsland bevond zich in een zwakke positie met veel ontevreden burgers na de oorlog. Veteranen keerde terug van het front, vele families waren uiteengevallen door sterfte en tegelijkertijd kwam het communisme op in Rusland dat zijn invloed uitte in Duitsland. Dit alles zorgde voor een gevaarlijke cocktail van ideologieën, gefrustreerde burgers en vele volkstemmers die van mening waren dat zij de weg voorwaarts predikten. Deze periode verliep dan ook vrij bloedig met momenten van politieke knokploegen op de straten en politici die het leven niet zeker waren door politieke tegenstanders.
Dit is de tijd waarin Schmitt zich bevond, ervaringen op deed en schreef [1]. Wat vond Schmitt van het Liberalisme dat uiteindelijk de basis van de Weimar constitutie vormde? Het korte antwoord is, niet positief. In zijn gebonden essaybundel Parlement, Democratie, Dictatuur start Schmitt met een uiteenzetting van de eerste fout die men heeft begaan, de combinatie van parlementairsisme, democratie en het Liberalisme. Schmitt probeert deze te ontleden om de tegenstellingen bloot te geven. Het parlementairisme dat streefde naar discussie[2] en openbaarheid is geïnfiltreerd door de massademocratie. Schmitt beschrijft dat als volgt, “De situatie van het parlementarisme is op dit moment daarom zo kritisch, omdat de ontwikkeling van de moderne massa democratie de op argumenten gebaseerde publieke discussie tot een
[1] Wellicht is het opvallend om te zien dat zowel Schmitt als Hobbes (een van zijn inspiratiebronnen) schreven over een sterke staat terwijl zij leefde in tijden van onstabiliteit en bloedvergiet.
[2] Discussie ziet Schmitt niet als de huidige vorm van uitwisseling van ideeën, maar als een strijd. Hier zal later op terug gekomen worden. Men moet de discussie benaderen als een uitwisseling van argumenten, waarbij een partij uiteindelijk de ander zal overwinnen.
lege formaliteit heeft gemaakt.”[1]. Buiten de discussie die is weggevallen benoemt Schmitt dat de massa tegenwoordig beïnvloed wordt door propaganda waarmee wordt ingespeeld op de directe belangen en lusten. Dit ontneemt de effectiviteit van het parlement. Met deze ontwikkeling vervalt de ‘waarheid’ of ‘juistheid’ van de argumenten en valt men terug op het simpelweg behalen van een meerderheid. Maar het Liberalisme dan, vraag je je af. Het Liberalisme heeft volgens Schmitt deze massademocratie geïntroduceerd met de gedachten van de gelijkheid van de mens. Dit is volgens Schmitt geen democratische gedachten, maar een Liberale.
Hier komt een van Schmitts zijn meest omstreden ideeën op. Schmitt stelt dat democratie niet gegrond is in de gelijkheid van de mensheid. De democratie volgens Schmitt, is iets dat homogeniteit benodigd van zijn burgers. Kortom, de democratie benodigd een bepaalde eis die het aan de burger stelt dat de bevolking homogeen maakt. Dit kan een bepaald soort burgerschap zijn zoals ze bezaten in de Romeinse tijd, maar dit kan ook etniciteit zijn[2]. Om Schmitt zijn gedachten helder te maken:
Het parlementarisme werkt niet, want het is beïnvloed door massademocratie dat geen waarde meer hecht aan juistheid, waarheid en discussie, maar draait om het winnen van een meerderheid.
De democratie werkt niet, want ze benodigd homogeniteit en dat kan het Liberalisme haar niet geven, omdat het uitgaat van een gelijkheidsprincipe.
Het Liberalisme werkt niet, want het kan nergens voor staan.
Laat mij dit laatste punt verder toelichten. We moeten even een sprong maken in Schmitts denken. In zijn boek “Het Begrip Politiek” breidt Schmitt zijn concept vriend-vijandschap verder uit. Schmitt is van de fundamentele veronderstelling dat er een ‘waarheid’ of ‘juistheid’ in de politiek is, dit drijft zijn gedachten over de politiek dan ook. Schmitt stelt dat de discussie zoals die in het parlement gevoerd behoorde te worden, draaide om overtuiging niet om compromissen, wat Schmitt uiteindelijk concludeert is dat politiek draait om vrienden en vijanden. Schmitt benoemt het als volgt, “Vijand is dus niet de concurrent of de tegenstander in het algemeen. Vijand is ook niet de tegenstander die men privé en vol antipathie gevoelens haat. Vijand is enkel een collectiviteit die ‘minstens eventueel’- dat wil zeggen op grond van een reële mogelijkheid-, strijdend tegenover een andere collectiviteit komt te staan.” [3] . Zoals te lezen is oorlog een zekere optie binnen dit vijandschap en is dit volgens Schmitt ‘maar’ het uiterste van vijandschap. Vriend- en vijandschap vormt dus de het menselijk handelen binnen de politiek. Volgens Schmitt vormde de staat in eerste instantie de vormende eenheid achter deze binaire distinctie. Het Liberalisme heeft de staat echter zijn kracht ontnomen, sterker nog, de staat is nu in dienst van het liberale individu en doet niets anders dan het delegeren van problemen binnen de
[1] Parlement, Democratie, Dictatuur, bladzijden 37.
[2] Hier is wellicht Schmitt zijn antisemitisme te herleiden evenals zijn inmenging met de Nationaal Socialistische Duitse Arbeiders Partij.
[3] Het Begrip Politiek, bladzijden 39 en 40.
maatschappij, waarbij alle conflicten terugkomen op de verantwoording van het individu. Dit laat allereerst een machtsvacuüm open binnen de samenleving. Als de staat geen orde geeft aan de vriend-vijand distinctie, dan kan een andere partij dit opvullen. Verder heeft de staat volgens Schmitt als enige het recht om zijn burgers te vragen te sterven voor de collectiviteit, echter zal niemand dit verrichten in een liberale samenleving gezien er geen spraken is van een cohesieve collectiviteit. Het ergste is dan nog wel dat het Liberalisme, het vrije individu en het kapitalisme in elkaar verwikkeld, want wat heeft het Liberalisme gedaan, het heeft probeerde de politiek vanuit de ethiek te binden en aan het economische ondergeschikt te maken. Kortom, binnen de politiek draait het nu, zoals eerder benoemd, om het winnen van zielen voor een meerderheid. Dit zou doormiddel van rationaliteit en discussie gedaan kunnen worden, maar Schmitt herleidt dat dit gemakkelijker gaat door het gebruik van financiële middelen zoals omkoping en propaganda.
Schmitt stelt uiteindelijk dat het Liberalisme niet succesvol is geweest in het uitbannen van de vriend-vijandschap distinctie, want stelt Schmitt, er is geen enkele democratie die geen vreemde, vijand of ongewenste kent. We gebruiken alleen andere terminologie, we kennen geen ‘oorlog’, maar ‘sancties’, ‘internationale politie’, ‘vrede vaststellen’ of ‘het beschermen van verdragen’. Schmitt waarschuwt ons verder voor het ontkennen van het vijandbeginsel, want benoemt hij, de Franse edel kende geen vijandschap en verheerlijkte het bestaan van het Franse platteland evenals de Russische prinsen de boer als christelijk ideaal zagen en beide werden overrompeld door revolutie[1].
Ondanks zijn scherpe uiteenzetting is het Liberalisme nog steeds dominant evenals de ontkenning van vijandschap en Schmitt waarschuwt ons aan het eind van het essay hiervoor, “Een leven dat niets anders dan dood meer tegenover zich heeft, is geen leven meer maar onmacht en hulpeloosheid. Wie geen andere vijand meer kent dan de dood en in zijn vijand niets dan een lege mechaniek ziet, staat dichter bij de dood dan bij het leven.”[2]. De uiteindelijke uitweg voor Schmitt was een sterke leider die de eenheid van de politiek weer kon vormen en de binnenlandse strijd ontnam. Een leider die homogeniteit bracht, op een verschrikkelijke wijze en een leider die zich verzette tegen het Liberalisme en streed voor de collectiviteit. Volgens Schmitt was Hitler niemand anders dan de democratische vertolking van het volk dat uiteindelijk zijn rechtmatige plek opeiste om de Duitse fragmenten bij een te houden.
Persoonlijk denk ik dat Schmitt zijn kritiek op het Liberalisme nog steeds vlijmscherp is. De constante compromissen waar Nederland om bekend staat, zonder harde discussies, de zogenaamde polderpolitiek. Het doorschuifluik van verantwoordelijkheid in het Nederlandse parlement. Zelfs de identiteitspolitiek die voortkomt uit het gebrekkige staatsvormende kracht valt te verklaren vanuit Schmitts denkwijze en ik sluit mij er deels bij aan. Het is ook een beeld van de mensheid dat aansluit op modernere kennis op psychologisch en sociologisch vlak en waar ik mij kan vinden. Het ziet het denken van de mens in termen van binaire distincties
[1] Schmitt is dan ook verbazingwekkend positief over Marx en Engels, omdat hij de distinctie tussen het proletariaat en de bourgeoisie ziet als een van de meest succesvolle vriend-vijand splitsingen.
[2] Het Begrip Politiek, bladzijden 110.
(tegenstellingen zoals koud en warm, goed en kwaad of schoonheid en walging), en dit zit geïntegreerd in hoe de mens zich opstelt in de wereld en vormt een groot deel van ons referentiekader. Hier past vriend-vijand perfect bij en niet ver gezocht. De mens is nu eenmaal geneigd te denken in heuristieken[1]. Buiten dat is binnen de sociale psychologie het concept van in- en outgroups steeds concreter gevormd. Dit komt neer op het vormen van een groep die bepaald eigenschappen deelt (zoals hobby’s of interesses, maar dit kan ook een etniciteit of religie zijn). Bij het vormen van deze groep kan een bepaalde identificatie ontstaan met de in-group en over tijd kan zelfs een out-group ontstaan, de groep die tegenover de in-group staat. Dit kan gepaard gaan met daadwerkelijk nadelige effecten zoals het minder geneigd zijn de ander te helpen of vijandige gevoelens[2]. Zo is Schmitt zijn beeld zeer realistisch.
Als we geheel eerlijk zijn richting de politieke theorie van Schmitt dan behoren we ook te erkennen dat zelfs de West-Europese landen zoals Nederland inderdaad nog steeds naar een vijandbeeld handelen. Al houden wij ons het beeld van het tolerante land voor, kunnen wij zien dat ook Nederland nog handelt vanuit vijandschap principes, alhoewel wij geneigd zijn de pacifistische termen te gebruiken als sancties en het beschermen van verdragen[3]. Ik ben echter wel van mening dat het polariserende beeld dat hij schept, een zogenaamde conflicttheorie, geen gezonde theorie is voor een maatschappij. Ja er moet kritisch gekeken worden naar onderliggende problematiek en ja er moet verbaal gestreden worden om ‘juistheid’ te herleiden. Echter is een theorie van constante strijd in mijn optiek een theorie die tekortdoet aan het empathische en liefdevolle aspect van de mens evenals de lange traditie van coöperatie die tirannie en dictatorschap heeft overleefd.
Helaas moet ik toch erkennen dat ik bang ben dat in tijden van verveling, onrust en instabiliteit men zal overstappen van deze coöperatie naar vriend-vijandschap en hoewel dit in de politiek (als in directe discussies) naar mijn inzien productief is, is dit een gevaarlijk fenomeen wanneer dit overslaat naar de bredere volksbewegingen die, antiparlementair, aan de hand van volkstemmers, invulling geven aan vijandschap.
[1] Heuristieken zijn mentale short-cuts die zorgen voor het nemen van snelle beslissingen. Dit kan ten goede komen in momenten waarbij snelle beslissingen van groot belang zijn, maar kan ook mentale luiheid veroorzaken wanneer dit toegepast word bij alledaagse beslissingen.
[2] Een van de meest concrete voorbeelden hiervan zijn voetbalsupporters.
[3] Men kan zelfs beargumenteren dat wij indirecte vijanden voorhouden die wij niet met de terminologie vijand benoemen, maar wel zo benaderen. Zo kan je bijvoorbeeld de vluchtelingen zien als een groep die geen vijand is, maar wel zo wordt behandeld.
https://ongeduld.com/2022/01/21/carl-...
De houdbaarheid van de democratie evenals de opkomst van identiteitspolitiek en steeds verdere polarisatie op een gehele reeks onderwerpen motiveerde mij de werken te lezen van een denker met een zekere alternatieve opinie dan doorgaans gewoonlijk is. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was een Duitse politiek filosoof van de vorige eeuw, en een van de meest controversiële. Waarom? Openlijk uitte hij zijn steun voor het Nationaal Socialisme en met de machtsovername van Hitler week Schmitt er niet voor uit om juridisch de beweging te steunen evenals Joodse wetenschappers uit zijn werk te schrappen. Desondanks denk ik dat Schmitt waardevol is om te lezen om verschillende redenen, zijn kritiek op Liberalisme, de kritiek op de democratie en meest belangrijk van al, zijn vriend-vijand concept binnen de politiek.
Eerst wil ik enige context geven voordat we duiken in Schmitt zijn kritiek op Liberalisme. Waar leefde Schmitt? In wat voor tijd? Wat kan zijn ideeën beïnvloed hebben? Schmitt studeerde af in 1910, enkele jaren voor de eerste wereldoorlog startte. Over zijn vroege volwassen jaren zag Schmitt het keizerrijk Duitsland in oorlog vervallen met Frankrijk, England en Rusland, om zelf in 1916 de wapens op te pakken en de loopgraven in te duiken. Na de eerste wereldoorlog kwam Schmitt in een van de meest turbulente tijd van Duitsland terecht, het interbellum met de Weimar Republiek. Met het aftreden van de Duitse keizer probeerde men in Duitsland een democratische parlementaire republiek te creëren. Aan de grondslag hiervan lag een zeer democratische en liberale constitutie, maar deze verandering ging gepaard met veel problemen. Duitsland bevond zich in een zwakke positie met veel ontevreden burgers na de oorlog. Veteranen keerde terug van het front, vele families waren uiteengevallen door sterfte en tegelijkertijd kwam het communisme op in Rusland dat zijn invloed uitte in Duitsland. Dit alles zorgde voor een gevaarlijke cocktail van ideologieën, gefrustreerde burgers en vele volkstemmers die van mening waren dat zij de weg voorwaarts predikten. Deze periode verliep dan ook vrij bloedig met momenten van politieke knokploegen op de straten en politici die het leven niet zeker waren door politieke tegenstanders.
Dit is de tijd waarin Schmitt zich bevond, ervaringen op deed en schreef [1]. Wat vond Schmitt van het Liberalisme dat uiteindelijk de basis van de Weimar constitutie vormde? Het korte antwoord is, niet positief. In zijn gebonden essaybundel Parlement, Democratie, Dictatuur start Schmitt met een uiteenzetting van de eerste fout die men heeft begaan, de combinatie van parlementairsisme, democratie en het Liberalisme. Schmitt probeert deze te ontleden om de tegenstellingen bloot te geven. Het parlementairisme dat streefde naar discussie[2] en openbaarheid is geïnfiltreerd door de massademocratie. Schmitt beschrijft dat als volgt, “De situatie van het parlementarisme is op dit moment daarom zo kritisch, omdat de ontwikkeling van de moderne massa democratie de op argumenten gebaseerde publieke discussie tot een
[1] Wellicht is het opvallend om te zien dat zowel Schmitt als Hobbes (een van zijn inspiratiebronnen) schreven over een sterke staat terwijl zij leefde in tijden van onstabiliteit en bloedvergiet.
[2] Discussie ziet Schmitt niet als de huidige vorm van uitwisseling van ideeën, maar als een strijd. Hier zal later op terug gekomen worden. Men moet de discussie benaderen als een uitwisseling van argumenten, waarbij een partij uiteindelijk de ander zal overwinnen.
lege formaliteit heeft gemaakt.”[1]. Buiten de discussie die is weggevallen benoemt Schmitt dat de massa tegenwoordig beïnvloed wordt door propaganda waarmee wordt ingespeeld op de directe belangen en lusten. Dit ontneemt de effectiviteit van het parlement. Met deze ontwikkeling vervalt de ‘waarheid’ of ‘juistheid’ van de argumenten en valt men terug op het simpelweg behalen van een meerderheid. Maar het Liberalisme dan, vraag je je af. Het Liberalisme heeft volgens Schmitt deze massademocratie geïntroduceerd met de gedachten van de gelijkheid van de mens. Dit is volgens Schmitt geen democratische gedachten, maar een Liberale.
Hier komt een van Schmitts zijn meest omstreden ideeën op. Schmitt stelt dat democratie niet gegrond is in de gelijkheid van de mensheid. De democratie volgens Schmitt, is iets dat homogeniteit benodigd van zijn burgers. Kortom, de democratie benodigd een bepaalde eis die het aan de burger stelt dat de bevolking homogeen maakt. Dit kan een bepaald soort burgerschap zijn zoals ze bezaten in de Romeinse tijd, maar dit kan ook etniciteit zijn[2]. Om Schmitt zijn gedachten helder te maken:
Het parlementarisme werkt niet, want het is beïnvloed door massademocratie dat geen waarde meer hecht aan juistheid, waarheid en discussie, maar draait om het winnen van een meerderheid.
De democratie werkt niet, want ze benodigd homogeniteit en dat kan het Liberalisme haar niet geven, omdat het uitgaat van een gelijkheidsprincipe.
Het Liberalisme werkt niet, want het kan nergens voor staan.
Laat mij dit laatste punt verder toelichten. We moeten even een sprong maken in Schmitts denken. In zijn boek “Het Begrip Politiek” breidt Schmitt zijn concept vriend-vijandschap verder uit. Schmitt is van de fundamentele veronderstelling dat er een ‘waarheid’ of ‘juistheid’ in de politiek is, dit drijft zijn gedachten over de politiek dan ook. Schmitt stelt dat de discussie zoals die in het parlement gevoerd behoorde te worden, draaide om overtuiging niet om compromissen, wat Schmitt uiteindelijk concludeert is dat politiek draait om vrienden en vijanden. Schmitt benoemt het als volgt, “Vijand is dus niet de concurrent of de tegenstander in het algemeen. Vijand is ook niet de tegenstander die men privé en vol antipathie gevoelens haat. Vijand is enkel een collectiviteit die ‘minstens eventueel’- dat wil zeggen op grond van een reële mogelijkheid-, strijdend tegenover een andere collectiviteit komt te staan.” [3] . Zoals te lezen is oorlog een zekere optie binnen dit vijandschap en is dit volgens Schmitt ‘maar’ het uiterste van vijandschap. Vriend- en vijandschap vormt dus de het menselijk handelen binnen de politiek. Volgens Schmitt vormde de staat in eerste instantie de vormende eenheid achter deze binaire distinctie. Het Liberalisme heeft de staat echter zijn kracht ontnomen, sterker nog, de staat is nu in dienst van het liberale individu en doet niets anders dan het delegeren van problemen binnen de
[1] Parlement, Democratie, Dictatuur, bladzijden 37.
[2] Hier is wellicht Schmitt zijn antisemitisme te herleiden evenals zijn inmenging met de Nationaal Socialistische Duitse Arbeiders Partij.
[3] Het Begrip Politiek, bladzijden 39 en 40.
maatschappij, waarbij alle conflicten terugkomen op de verantwoording van het individu. Dit laat allereerst een machtsvacuüm open binnen de samenleving. Als de staat geen orde geeft aan de vriend-vijand distinctie, dan kan een andere partij dit opvullen. Verder heeft de staat volgens Schmitt als enige het recht om zijn burgers te vragen te sterven voor de collectiviteit, echter zal niemand dit verrichten in een liberale samenleving gezien er geen spraken is van een cohesieve collectiviteit. Het ergste is dan nog wel dat het Liberalisme, het vrije individu en het kapitalisme in elkaar verwikkeld, want wat heeft het Liberalisme gedaan, het heeft probeerde de politiek vanuit de ethiek te binden en aan het economische ondergeschikt te maken. Kortom, binnen de politiek draait het nu, zoals eerder benoemd, om het winnen van zielen voor een meerderheid. Dit zou doormiddel van rationaliteit en discussie gedaan kunnen worden, maar Schmitt herleidt dat dit gemakkelijker gaat door het gebruik van financiële middelen zoals omkoping en propaganda.
Schmitt stelt uiteindelijk dat het Liberalisme niet succesvol is geweest in het uitbannen van de vriend-vijandschap distinctie, want stelt Schmitt, er is geen enkele democratie die geen vreemde, vijand of ongewenste kent. We gebruiken alleen andere terminologie, we kennen geen ‘oorlog’, maar ‘sancties’, ‘internationale politie’, ‘vrede vaststellen’ of ‘het beschermen van verdragen’. Schmitt waarschuwt ons verder voor het ontkennen van het vijandbeginsel, want benoemt hij, de Franse edel kende geen vijandschap en verheerlijkte het bestaan van het Franse platteland evenals de Russische prinsen de boer als christelijk ideaal zagen en beide werden overrompeld door revolutie[1].
Ondanks zijn scherpe uiteenzetting is het Liberalisme nog steeds dominant evenals de ontkenning van vijandschap en Schmitt waarschuwt ons aan het eind van het essay hiervoor, “Een leven dat niets anders dan dood meer tegenover zich heeft, is geen leven meer maar onmacht en hulpeloosheid. Wie geen andere vijand meer kent dan de dood en in zijn vijand niets dan een lege mechaniek ziet, staat dichter bij de dood dan bij het leven.”[2]. De uiteindelijke uitweg voor Schmitt was een sterke leider die de eenheid van de politiek weer kon vormen en de binnenlandse strijd ontnam. Een leider die homogeniteit bracht, op een verschrikkelijke wijze en een leider die zich verzette tegen het Liberalisme en streed voor de collectiviteit. Volgens Schmitt was Hitler niemand anders dan de democratische vertolking van het volk dat uiteindelijk zijn rechtmatige plek opeiste om de Duitse fragmenten bij een te houden.
Persoonlijk denk ik dat Schmitt zijn kritiek op het Liberalisme nog steeds vlijmscherp is. De constante compromissen waar Nederland om bekend staat, zonder harde discussies, de zogenaamde polderpolitiek. Het doorschuifluik van verantwoordelijkheid in het Nederlandse parlement. Zelfs de identiteitspolitiek die voortkomt uit het gebrekkige staatsvormende kracht valt te verklaren vanuit Schmitts denkwijze en ik sluit mij er deels bij aan. Het is ook een beeld van de mensheid dat aansluit op modernere kennis op psychologisch en sociologisch vlak en waar ik mij kan vinden. Het ziet het denken van de mens in termen van binaire distincties
[1] Schmitt is dan ook verbazingwekkend positief over Marx en Engels, omdat hij de distinctie tussen het proletariaat en de bourgeoisie ziet als een van de meest succesvolle vriend-vijand splitsingen.
[2] Het Begrip Politiek, bladzijden 110.
(tegenstellingen zoals koud en warm, goed en kwaad of schoonheid en walging), en dit zit geïntegreerd in hoe de mens zich opstelt in de wereld en vormt een groot deel van ons referentiekader. Hier past vriend-vijand perfect bij en niet ver gezocht. De mens is nu eenmaal geneigd te denken in heuristieken[1]. Buiten dat is binnen de sociale psychologie het concept van in- en outgroups steeds concreter gevormd. Dit komt neer op het vormen van een groep die bepaald eigenschappen deelt (zoals hobby’s of interesses, maar dit kan ook een etniciteit of religie zijn). Bij het vormen van deze groep kan een bepaalde identificatie ontstaan met de in-group en over tijd kan zelfs een out-group ontstaan, de groep die tegenover de in-group staat. Dit kan gepaard gaan met daadwerkelijk nadelige effecten zoals het minder geneigd zijn de ander te helpen of vijandige gevoelens[2]. Zo is Schmitt zijn beeld zeer realistisch.
Als we geheel eerlijk zijn richting de politieke theorie van Schmitt dan behoren we ook te erkennen dat zelfs de West-Europese landen zoals Nederland inderdaad nog steeds naar een vijandbeeld handelen. Al houden wij ons het beeld van het tolerante land voor, kunnen wij zien dat ook Nederland nog handelt vanuit vijandschap principes, alhoewel wij geneigd zijn de pacifistische termen te gebruiken als sancties en het beschermen van verdragen[3]. Ik ben echter wel van mening dat het polariserende beeld dat hij schept, een zogenaamde conflicttheorie, geen gezonde theorie is voor een maatschappij. Ja er moet kritisch gekeken worden naar onderliggende problematiek en ja er moet verbaal gestreden worden om ‘juistheid’ te herleiden. Echter is een theorie van constante strijd in mijn optiek een theorie die tekortdoet aan het empathische en liefdevolle aspect van de mens evenals de lange traditie van coöperatie die tirannie en dictatorschap heeft overleefd.
Helaas moet ik toch erkennen dat ik bang ben dat in tijden van verveling, onrust en instabiliteit men zal overstappen van deze coöperatie naar vriend-vijandschap en hoewel dit in de politiek (als in directe discussies) naar mijn inzien productief is, is dit een gevaarlijk fenomeen wanneer dit overslaat naar de bredere volksbewegingen die, antiparlementair, aan de hand van volkstemmers, invulling geven aan vijandschap.
[1] Heuristieken zijn mentale short-cuts die zorgen voor het nemen van snelle beslissingen. Dit kan ten goede komen in momenten waarbij snelle beslissingen van groot belang zijn, maar kan ook mentale luiheid veroorzaken wanneer dit toegepast word bij alledaagse beslissingen.
[2] Een van de meest concrete voorbeelden hiervan zijn voetbalsupporters.
[3] Men kan zelfs beargumenteren dat wij indirecte vijanden voorhouden die wij niet met de terminologie vijand benoemen, maar wel zo benaderen. Zo kan je bijvoorbeeld de vluchtelingen zien als een groep die geen vijand is, maar wel zo wordt behandeld.
August 3, 2023
A scathing, lucid interrogation into the fundamental presuppositions behind parliamentarianism.
It speaks volumes that the left has found so much to value here, even in spite of Schmitt’s completely opposing political agenda. It’s not hard to see why what’s ultimately a rather damning assessment of liberalism in practice resonates with Marxists, especially towards the end where Schmitt adapts Sorelian concepts of myth to reveal how parliament’s facade of rationally open discussion, the pursuit of the most applicable truth via a sort of Hegelian ‘dynamic-dialectic’, has in turn fostered this palpable desire for an ‘irrationalist’ transformation of society.
To this end, his characterisation of Marxist philosophy is quite fascinating, if not a little dodgy at points, especially as concerns the dictatorship of the proletariat. Plenty of value to glean from this text, even if seems to imply that Fascism and Bolshevism are somehow equally dangerous ideologies.
History has been rather frank about this mistake.
It speaks volumes that the left has found so much to value here, even in spite of Schmitt’s completely opposing political agenda. It’s not hard to see why what’s ultimately a rather damning assessment of liberalism in practice resonates with Marxists, especially towards the end where Schmitt adapts Sorelian concepts of myth to reveal how parliament’s facade of rationally open discussion, the pursuit of the most applicable truth via a sort of Hegelian ‘dynamic-dialectic’, has in turn fostered this palpable desire for an ‘irrationalist’ transformation of society.
To this end, his characterisation of Marxist philosophy is quite fascinating, if not a little dodgy at points, especially as concerns the dictatorship of the proletariat. Plenty of value to glean from this text, even if seems to imply that Fascism and Bolshevism are somehow equally dangerous ideologies.
History has been rather frank about this mistake.
May 8, 2018
Carl Schmitt- Kanunilik ve Mesruiyet çevirisinden sonra hukukçular çeviri yapmasın noktasına gelmiştim ki imdada Emre Zeybekoğlu'nun Carl Schmit- Parlamenter Demokrasinin Krizi çevirisi yetişti((: Kitap ince gibi görünsede epey bilgi barındırıyordu içinde; Hegel'den Marx'a, Sorel'den Proudhon'a kadar.. Yalnız Schmitt'in mevzuyu sosyalizmden alıp milliyetçiliğe bağlaması olağanüstüydü. Fikirlerine katılmasam da adam zeki yapacak bir şey yok((:
November 6, 2022
Liberals: DESTROYED.
September 7, 2023
Carl Schmitts Demokratieverständnis beruht auf dem Identitätsprinzip von Rousseau. Also der Auflösung des Gegensatzes von Herrschern und Beherrschten. Besteht eine homogene Bevölkerung, könne diese auch durch nur einen Führer regiert werden. Das Parlament wiederum sei nicht identitätsstiftend, sondern ein Instrument, welches die Bevölkerung künstlich spaltet, letztlich nur den Machtinteressen einzelner Interessengruppen dienlich ist und die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates einschränkt. Schmitt verklärt die Diktatur daher zur „wahren“ Demokratie.
Schmitt bleibt jedoch die Antwort auf die Frage schuldig, wie in einem System ohne Herrschaftskontrolle und Machtteilung; Machtmissbrauch und Unterdrückung der Bevölkerung gewährleistet werden können. Die Schrecken des NS-Systems zeigen, wie ein solches System tatsächlich funktioniert. Bevölkerung und Institutionen wurden entsprechend der Vorstellungen des Führers gleichgeschaltet, Andersdenkende wurden verfolgt und umgebracht. Wer eine konstruktive, demokratisch gesinnte Parlamentarismuskritik lesen möchte, sollte sich daher lieber bei Habermas oder anderen bedienen, als bei Carl Schmitt.
Schmitt bleibt jedoch die Antwort auf die Frage schuldig, wie in einem System ohne Herrschaftskontrolle und Machtteilung; Machtmissbrauch und Unterdrückung der Bevölkerung gewährleistet werden können. Die Schrecken des NS-Systems zeigen, wie ein solches System tatsächlich funktioniert. Bevölkerung und Institutionen wurden entsprechend der Vorstellungen des Führers gleichgeschaltet, Andersdenkende wurden verfolgt und umgebracht. Wer eine konstruktive, demokratisch gesinnte Parlamentarismuskritik lesen möchte, sollte sich daher lieber bei Habermas oder anderen bedienen, als bei Carl Schmitt.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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April 29, 2021"If for practical and technical reasons the representatives of the people can decide instead of the people themselves, then certainly a single trusted representative could also decide in the name of the same people.? Without ceasing to be democratic, the argument would justify an antiparliamentary Caesarism."
"The crucial distinction always remains whether the law is a general rational principke or a measure, a concrete decree, an order."
I feel as though this wasn't the ideal entrance into Carl Schmitt's philosophy but that is not to say I didn't take away anything from this reading. I found many aspects of Schmitt's argument illuminating and persuasive, while some others lacked the vitality and explosiveness I'd expected from a 20th century critique of liberal democracy. At any rate, in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt parses out the differences in liberalism and democracy to demonstrate that the Weimar Constitution pulls from both traditions. Further, he argues that the parliament as an organ designed so that debate may illuminate the truth is a sham, that the parliament is in fact only the antechamber to the true chambers of power as represented by secretive committees and the wills of party bosses.
What is the purpose of parliamentary government? Assuming that democracy can and has taken many forms, what is the advantage of this particular form? Schmitt argues, citing Locke and other bourgeois philosophers, that it came into existence out of the belief that truth and the Common Will are best revealed through discussion. The problem is that this doesn't fully resolve the problem of determining the Will of the People, as Schmitt states "The minority might express the true will of the people. The people can be deceived, and one has long been familiar with the techniques of propaganda and the manipulation of public opinion." Here is the problem with vanguardism and political revolutionary education. Faced with popular opposition to democracy, what does the democrat do?
Parliamentarism is defined here as being composed of and supported by several ideas or principles: openness, balance of powers, a specific concept of law and legislation, a limiting of parliament to legislation, and the inherent value of discussion. Openness appears as the "wonder cure" to the secrecy and corruption of absolutist government. It represents both transparency and the power of public opinion and freedom of speech as government correctives. That being said, public opinion is capable of being felt in other types of government systems, as "in every system of Enlightened despotism, public opinion plays the role of absolute corrective." The balance of powers is a critical aspect of the system, as is evidenced by a proclamation in the Declaration of the Rights of Man: "Any society in which the separation of powers and rights is not guaranteed has no constitution." Owing to this theory, popular dictatorship is seen as both undemocratic and inherently unconstitutional. The chambers must be balanced against each other and as much as possible within each chamber. The parliament balances as the legislative arm of a government and is itself balanced, being bicameral and likely bisected within both chambers by a party system.
The concept of law is law governed and guided by reason and not desire or passion. Thus, a perfect law is as eternal as reason or truth. The laws passed by the parliamentary method have a "logically different character from that of commands that are only based on authority" owing to the fact that they have been debated over by a popular assembly. The assembly is limited to legislation and kept distinct form the executive branch where difference of opinion is less useful. The parliament is rational but the executive, inaccessible to rational discussion, is "irrational." The legislative is intellectual and the executive is active. The contradiction here for Schmitt is that the "dialectic-dynamic process of discussion can certainly be applied to the legislative but scarcely to the executive." The executive balances but is itself unbalanced. It hardly needs to be said, relating to his last point, that parliamentary discussion is a farce and that few if any minds are changed on the debating floor.
Following this section, Schmitt analyzes dictatorship in Marxist thought and thus Hegelianism as well. I found this section uninteresting, perhaps because I'm already familiar with the Marxist dialectic and the science of class struggle and so on. It also feels fairly disjointed from the previous sections.
In his final section on Irrationalist Theories of the Direct Use of Force, Schmitt surveys anarchist and syndicalist theories of power. With this, he argues that "the theory of myth is the most powerful symptom of the decline of the relative rationalism of parliamentary thought" for Sorel's Myth relies on a total opposition that itself stands in opposition to the more accomodating parliamentarism. Syndicalism, socialism, and anarchism each represent a threat to discussion itself, as well as to the idea that parliamentarism is the only viable system of government.
"The crucial distinction always remains whether the law is a general rational principke or a measure, a concrete decree, an order."
I feel as though this wasn't the ideal entrance into Carl Schmitt's philosophy but that is not to say I didn't take away anything from this reading. I found many aspects of Schmitt's argument illuminating and persuasive, while some others lacked the vitality and explosiveness I'd expected from a 20th century critique of liberal democracy. At any rate, in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt parses out the differences in liberalism and democracy to demonstrate that the Weimar Constitution pulls from both traditions. Further, he argues that the parliament as an organ designed so that debate may illuminate the truth is a sham, that the parliament is in fact only the antechamber to the true chambers of power as represented by secretive committees and the wills of party bosses.
What is the purpose of parliamentary government? Assuming that democracy can and has taken many forms, what is the advantage of this particular form? Schmitt argues, citing Locke and other bourgeois philosophers, that it came into existence out of the belief that truth and the Common Will are best revealed through discussion. The problem is that this doesn't fully resolve the problem of determining the Will of the People, as Schmitt states "The minority might express the true will of the people. The people can be deceived, and one has long been familiar with the techniques of propaganda and the manipulation of public opinion." Here is the problem with vanguardism and political revolutionary education. Faced with popular opposition to democracy, what does the democrat do?
Parliamentarism is defined here as being composed of and supported by several ideas or principles: openness, balance of powers, a specific concept of law and legislation, a limiting of parliament to legislation, and the inherent value of discussion. Openness appears as the "wonder cure" to the secrecy and corruption of absolutist government. It represents both transparency and the power of public opinion and freedom of speech as government correctives. That being said, public opinion is capable of being felt in other types of government systems, as "in every system of Enlightened despotism, public opinion plays the role of absolute corrective." The balance of powers is a critical aspect of the system, as is evidenced by a proclamation in the Declaration of the Rights of Man: "Any society in which the separation of powers and rights is not guaranteed has no constitution." Owing to this theory, popular dictatorship is seen as both undemocratic and inherently unconstitutional. The chambers must be balanced against each other and as much as possible within each chamber. The parliament balances as the legislative arm of a government and is itself balanced, being bicameral and likely bisected within both chambers by a party system.
The concept of law is law governed and guided by reason and not desire or passion. Thus, a perfect law is as eternal as reason or truth. The laws passed by the parliamentary method have a "logically different character from that of commands that are only based on authority" owing to the fact that they have been debated over by a popular assembly. The assembly is limited to legislation and kept distinct form the executive branch where difference of opinion is less useful. The parliament is rational but the executive, inaccessible to rational discussion, is "irrational." The legislative is intellectual and the executive is active. The contradiction here for Schmitt is that the "dialectic-dynamic process of discussion can certainly be applied to the legislative but scarcely to the executive." The executive balances but is itself unbalanced. It hardly needs to be said, relating to his last point, that parliamentary discussion is a farce and that few if any minds are changed on the debating floor.
Following this section, Schmitt analyzes dictatorship in Marxist thought and thus Hegelianism as well. I found this section uninteresting, perhaps because I'm already familiar with the Marxist dialectic and the science of class struggle and so on. It also feels fairly disjointed from the previous sections.
In his final section on Irrationalist Theories of the Direct Use of Force, Schmitt surveys anarchist and syndicalist theories of power. With this, he argues that "the theory of myth is the most powerful symptom of the decline of the relative rationalism of parliamentary thought" for Sorel's Myth relies on a total opposition that itself stands in opposition to the more accomodating parliamentarism. Syndicalism, socialism, and anarchism each represent a threat to discussion itself, as well as to the idea that parliamentarism is the only viable system of government.
April 11, 2020
"The situation of parliamentarism is critical today because the development of modern mass democracy has made argumentative public discussion an empty formality.... Parties do not face each other today discussing opinions but as social or economic power groups calculating their mutual interests and opportunities for power."
The book has too many gems to list here. The introduction details the context behind Schmitt's book, in particular how his focus was on the German liberal constitution and its problematic aspects. The preface to second edition, which is essentially a thorough response by Schmitt to Thoma's critique, is worth reading twice. Schmitt has a blunt style of writing, and overall he's a pessimist, not expecting anything from the parliamentary democracy of the time, but a lot of his valuable observations carry weight in today's systems as well. The book has four parts, the first two focusing on the parliamentarism and the latter two critiquing Marxism and dictatorships such as Mussolini's fascism. The appendix has Thoma's critique, which is fairly weak in comparison to Schmitt's arguments. I'd recommend reading the preface to second edition afterwards again, I found it valuable.
The book is thin but heavy, and not for light-hearted reader. Drawing many arguments from Hobbes, Marx, Tocqueville, Rousseau, Burke, Montesquieu, Mill, and others, Schmitt builds his argument solidly. If you are into politics or political theory, this is a great read for you.
The book has too many gems to list here. The introduction details the context behind Schmitt's book, in particular how his focus was on the German liberal constitution and its problematic aspects. The preface to second edition, which is essentially a thorough response by Schmitt to Thoma's critique, is worth reading twice. Schmitt has a blunt style of writing, and overall he's a pessimist, not expecting anything from the parliamentary democracy of the time, but a lot of his valuable observations carry weight in today's systems as well. The book has four parts, the first two focusing on the parliamentarism and the latter two critiquing Marxism and dictatorships such as Mussolini's fascism. The appendix has Thoma's critique, which is fairly weak in comparison to Schmitt's arguments. I'd recommend reading the preface to second edition afterwards again, I found it valuable.
The book is thin but heavy, and not for light-hearted reader. Drawing many arguments from Hobbes, Marx, Tocqueville, Rousseau, Burke, Montesquieu, Mill, and others, Schmitt builds his argument solidly. If you are into politics or political theory, this is a great read for you.
April 25, 2024
A thorough examination of the intellectual principles of Democracy and Liberalism, and how they have been enmeshed in a system we understand as parliamentary democracy, Schmitt’s study and critique of parliamentary democracy is insightful on numerous levels. The consolidation of power within parliamentary or extra-parliamentary committees, growing disillusionment with the system, and monied interests interfering with the parliamentary order are observable today in many liberal democracies. The intellectual contradictions of democracy and liberalism are also highlighted, scathing and harsh as they may be, and demonstrate the imperfection of the system as created.
The issue is that Schmitt only briefly suggests an alternative that may fix some of these ailments; beyond using this book as a diagnosis of illnesses of parliamentary democracy, there is no medicine which he proposes. The entrenched clauses, bans on anti-constitutional parties, and other measures designed to fortify and legitimise the democratic order come much later in Legality and Legitimacy (1932). I agree with some of his interpretations of the contradictions of liberalism and democracy; however, he does not offer fixes. A good interpretation without a substantial counter is no better than having a football team with excellent strikers and wingers but without a single defender or goalkeeper.
The issue is that Schmitt only briefly suggests an alternative that may fix some of these ailments; beyond using this book as a diagnosis of illnesses of parliamentary democracy, there is no medicine which he proposes. The entrenched clauses, bans on anti-constitutional parties, and other measures designed to fortify and legitimise the democratic order come much later in Legality and Legitimacy (1932). I agree with some of his interpretations of the contradictions of liberalism and democracy; however, he does not offer fixes. A good interpretation without a substantial counter is no better than having a football team with excellent strikers and wingers but without a single defender or goalkeeper.
February 9, 2024
An old read log here but been thinking about and returning to this work in conjunction with Schmitt's Political Theology. I've said what I think about Schmitt in that review. I think this is a fascinating and important text in political theory, even if I find it ultimately entirely unpersuasive (in fact I wrote a grad school paper on this work in connection with Lenin!). What it does challenge the contemporary reader to do however is methodically think through what the foundations of democracy and representation truly are.
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April 7, 2024the most unsatisfactory part of the book was Schmitt's assumptions regarding the concept of democratic homogeneity, which he takes from Rousseau more or less as given.
the preface to the second edition clarified a lot.
his identification of the opposition between mass democracy and liberalism seemed to me to be basically correct.
I've been mostly using The Storygraph this year, so I have a few readings to add to Goodreads when I have time.
the preface to the second edition clarified a lot.
his identification of the opposition between mass democracy and liberalism seemed to me to be basically correct.
I've been mostly using The Storygraph this year, so I have a few readings to add to Goodreads when I have time.
December 4, 2017
An undoubtably very interesting historical document to understand the political crisis in 1920s Germany. Further, Carl Schmitt skilfully criticises the rationalism of 'western' liberal ideals and exposes the faults and inconsistencies of parliamentary democracy.
January 20, 2021
Say what you will about Schmitt, the man understood the issue with parliamentarianism. Perhaps, however, his ultimate solution was wrong. Read for an understanding of the authoritarian critique of democracy.
February 8, 2019
Çeviriden mi yoksa yazarın dilinden mi bilemem ama bazı bölümlerde metnin içine bir türlü giremedim. O nedenle de anlamakta güçlük çektim. İleride tekrar okumak gerek.
November 12, 2020
Charmingly dangerous or dangerously charming?
February 10, 2021
I hope we can all agree that his diagnosis of the problems that can arise with parliamentary democracies was reasonable, but that his remedy was a defeatist abomination.
November 28, 2021
Interesting ruminations on the intellectual foundations of democracy and parliamentarism, but it really picked up steam with the analysis of marxist dictatorship and Georges Sorel.
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February 20, 2023Thoma surely correct.
March 30, 2024
Quite interesting analysis on parlamentarism, but also superficial
December 24, 2022
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy is a book written by Carl Schmitt, a German legal scholar and political theorist. The book was published in 1923 and is a critique of parliamentary democracy and the liberal-democratic political system that emerged in Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt argues that parliamentary democracy is inherently unstable and prone to crisis, and that it is unable to effectively address the major challenges facing society. He suggests that the system is overly formalistic and unable to adapt to changing circumstances, and that it fails to adequately reflect the will of the people. Schmitt also critiques the concept of popular sovereignty, which is at the heart of liberal-democratic theory, and argues that it is inherently flawed. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy is considered a classic work of political thought and has had a significant influence on the development of authoritarian and illiberal ideologies.
GPT
GPT
November 2, 2014
Provocative line of argument that adds great insight into the distinction between conventional parliamentary practices and the seemingly-apparent democratic thought that underpins them in an attempt to question and answer what the people might really want. Nonetheless, a little tautological and text requires a more comprehensive range of evidence to back his assertions up.
January 17, 2016
satır aralarında güzel konulara giren ancak yeterince tartışmadan bir başkasına geçen bir kitap. Konuyla ilgili araştırma yapanlar, yazara ilgi duyanlar açısından belki okunabilir ancak günümüz gündelik okuyucusuna, parlamenter sistem, açmazları ve alternatifleri için yeterince bilgi sunmaktan uzak.
January 3, 2015
Ok, I admit I didn't make it past the first chapter... But I enjoyed what I did read! If you have an interest in theorists like Agamben, it is good to start with Schmitt. After all, he was the one to coin the phrase "state of exception."
May 28, 2012
Schmitt's always insightful but often provides terrible arguments. This book is no different, though he also provides some good arguments. One of the better takeaways is a decent understanding of how liberalism and democracy are incompatible.
August 11, 2015
Introductions by McCarthy and Kennedy are very impressive. The work itself looks disjointed, but there is a logic behind the fact that it seems almost like two books forced into one. Plenty of quotable Schmitt lines (or paragraphs). The book is just a little impressionistic, however.
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