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To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design
"Reading Petroski's fine book is not only a delight, it is a necessity."
--Houston Chronicle
How did a simple design error cause one of the great disasters of the 1980s—the collapse of the walkways at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel? What made the graceful and innovative Tacoma Narrows Bridge twist apart in a mild wind in 1940? How did an oversized waterlily inspire the magnificent Crystal Palace, the crowning achievement of Victorian architecture and engineering? These are some of the failures and successes that Henry Petroski, author of the acclaimed The Pencil, examines in this engaging, wonderfully literate book. More than a series of fascinating case studies, To Engineer Is Human is a work that looks at our deepest notions of progress and perfection, tracing the fine connection between the quantifiable realm of science and the chaotic realities of everyday life.
"Alert, inquisitive, unspecialized, wholly human...refreshingly eclectic."
--The Spectator
"Henry Petroski is an ardent engineer, and if he writes more good books like this, he might find himself nominated to become the meistersinger of the guild. [This is] a refreshing plunge into the dynamics of the engineering ethos...as straightforward as an I-beam."
--Science
--Houston Chronicle
How did a simple design error cause one of the great disasters of the 1980s—the collapse of the walkways at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel? What made the graceful and innovative Tacoma Narrows Bridge twist apart in a mild wind in 1940? How did an oversized waterlily inspire the magnificent Crystal Palace, the crowning achievement of Victorian architecture and engineering? These are some of the failures and successes that Henry Petroski, author of the acclaimed The Pencil, examines in this engaging, wonderfully literate book. More than a series of fascinating case studies, To Engineer Is Human is a work that looks at our deepest notions of progress and perfection, tracing the fine connection between the quantifiable realm of science and the chaotic realities of everyday life.
"Alert, inquisitive, unspecialized, wholly human...refreshingly eclectic."
--The Spectator
"Henry Petroski is an ardent engineer, and if he writes more good books like this, he might find himself nominated to become the meistersinger of the guild. [This is] a refreshing plunge into the dynamics of the engineering ethos...as straightforward as an I-beam."
--Science
251 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1985
About the author
Henry Petroski
31 books242 followersHenry Petroski was an American engineer specializing in failure analysis. A professor both of civil engineering and history at Duke University, he was also a prolific author.
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October 17, 2021
If we wanted to design machines and structures that never failed, cars would last fifty years yet cost half a million dollars. There would be no DC-10's falling from the sky, but people couldn't afford to travel in them. But nature, indifferent engineering and excessive innovation sometimes throw us dirty curves, as witness the suspension bridge across Puget Sound that bucked and wiggled so in cross-winds that it garnered the nickname "Galloping Gertie" and failed spectacularly in 1940, making for the great cover photo of this book. (On the other hand, the much wider Golden Gate Bridge outside San Francisco has a similar design, but has not been prone to catastrophic failure.)
An example of too much innovation came when two pedestrian walkways in the atrium of the Hyatt Regency - Kansas City suddenly collapsed in 1981, instantly killing over 100 people. Author Henry Petroski takes up a great deal of this book with that disaster, and why it took so long to figure things out. (The law and constrained economics had a lot to do with it.)
In late June of 2021 half of an ocean-side condominium in southern Florida unexpectedly and spectacularly collapsed, with similar loss of life. New books will follow on that subject -- written by other structural engineers if not by Petroski himself -- and if they are as well written as Henry Petroski's many prior books explaining structural engineering to the layman, they will likely prove easily understandable if not necessarily fully comforting.
An example of too much innovation came when two pedestrian walkways in the atrium of the Hyatt Regency - Kansas City suddenly collapsed in 1981, instantly killing over 100 people. Author Henry Petroski takes up a great deal of this book with that disaster, and why it took so long to figure things out. (The law and constrained economics had a lot to do with it.)
In late June of 2021 half of an ocean-side condominium in southern Florida unexpectedly and spectacularly collapsed, with similar loss of life. New books will follow on that subject -- written by other structural engineers if not by Petroski himself -- and if they are as well written as Henry Petroski's many prior books explaining structural engineering to the layman, they will likely prove easily understandable if not necessarily fully comforting.
September 22, 2022
Perhaps I rate this too highly. Problem is I love technology and its issues and Petroski is one of my favorite writers on civil engineering.
On the 50th anniversary of the Golden Gate Bridge, May 27, 1987, almost 1,000,000 people showed up to celebrate and to walk across a bridge that was designed using the same basic technology as the infamous Tacoma Narrows bridge. Only about 250,000 were able to squeeze on the bridge, and fortunately no panic occurred as the Golden Gate Bridge began to sway gently from side to side. Hangar cables became slack -- something that was not supposed to happen, and the main span's arch flattened out to a "noticeable degree." The bridge had been over-designed with an ample margin of safety, unlike the walkways at the Hyatt in Kansas City, which were essentially small bridges. Over 100 people were killed when the walkways collapsed. Engineers determined quickly that a change made to make installation of the walkways simpler reduced the ability of the walkways to handle even their own weight let alone that of several hundred people.
Henry Petroski, in To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design, is interested in engineering failures. He suggests these are terribly important to study, for they provide the clues to resolving the inherent paradox in engineering, which is that "...successful structural concepts devolve into failures, while the colossal failures contributed to the evolution of innovative and inspiring structures."
Structures that never fail -- actually they all will eventually, if one takes them beyond their intended life -- are assumed to be over-designed, i.e., they are much stronger than need be. Engineers, in order to be more economical and aesthetic, will make changes in the design that may ultimately lead to sensational failures like that of the Tacoma Narrows bridge. It's designers ignored considerable evidence that was readily available on the effect of wind on non-stiffened structures.
Petroski is concerned that the current atmosphere of liability and law suits will lead to a suppression of free discussion of the reasons behind structural (and now computer program) failures. "Engineering is a human endeavor and thus subject to error." Catastrophes are rare, but Petroski discusses why failures may be impossible to avoid and also why, paradoxically, we may not want to make them impossible.
On the 50th anniversary of the Golden Gate Bridge, May 27, 1987, almost 1,000,000 people showed up to celebrate and to walk across a bridge that was designed using the same basic technology as the infamous Tacoma Narrows bridge. Only about 250,000 were able to squeeze on the bridge, and fortunately no panic occurred as the Golden Gate Bridge began to sway gently from side to side. Hangar cables became slack -- something that was not supposed to happen, and the main span's arch flattened out to a "noticeable degree." The bridge had been over-designed with an ample margin of safety, unlike the walkways at the Hyatt in Kansas City, which were essentially small bridges. Over 100 people were killed when the walkways collapsed. Engineers determined quickly that a change made to make installation of the walkways simpler reduced the ability of the walkways to handle even their own weight let alone that of several hundred people.
Henry Petroski, in To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design, is interested in engineering failures. He suggests these are terribly important to study, for they provide the clues to resolving the inherent paradox in engineering, which is that "...successful structural concepts devolve into failures, while the colossal failures contributed to the evolution of innovative and inspiring structures."
Structures that never fail -- actually they all will eventually, if one takes them beyond their intended life -- are assumed to be over-designed, i.e., they are much stronger than need be. Engineers, in order to be more economical and aesthetic, will make changes in the design that may ultimately lead to sensational failures like that of the Tacoma Narrows bridge. It's designers ignored considerable evidence that was readily available on the effect of wind on non-stiffened structures.
Petroski is concerned that the current atmosphere of liability and law suits will lead to a suppression of free discussion of the reasons behind structural (and now computer program) failures. "Engineering is a human endeavor and thus subject to error." Catastrophes are rare, but Petroski discusses why failures may be impossible to avoid and also why, paradoxically, we may not want to make them impossible.
February 13, 2013
Here, "engineering" primarily means big structures that can carry people: bridges, building, airplanes. Of course, in the real world, there are many other categories of engineering.
Message of the book can be summarized in a few lines: Engineering is a trade-off between meeting requirements safely, and cost (design cost, materials cost, labor cost), and aesthetics (dramatic bridges, buildings, ...). Primarly, it goes into depth about how a structure doesn't just "follow from requirements"; there are countless judgements made by the designer on cost and aesthetic grounds. Further, one cannot fully test for all the conditions that the structure will undergo, and hence there will always be failures. Further, failures teach us a lot about how do it the next time.
For someone who understands the above thesis, the book is kind of boring and repetitive. It's probably a good book for someone who is not aware of engineering tradeoffs.
One of the last few chapters is about the negative effects of moving from slide rules to electronic calculators and computers. First, engineers have lost the intuitive feel of numbers, i.e., in slide rule days, a bad number (perhaps due to a bad calculation) would smell funny, because the slide rule teaches you to understand expected orders of magnitude (where is the decimal point) and number of significant digits; with electronic calculation, people just take the number at face value. Second, before computers the sheer labor of calculation was so much that people stuck to a few tried and tested
designs and typically "overdesigned" everything. With computers, people try funky designs, and try to optimize the last extra pound and dollar out of the design, making them much riskier. I'm ok with this
thesis, but he does not mention the benefits of the computer, namely that certain calculation mistakes don't occur any more, and the computer can "test" the structure in a lot more scenarios than was feasible earlier. I think he goes overboard on the negatives and gives too short shrift to the positives.
Message of the book can be summarized in a few lines: Engineering is a trade-off between meeting requirements safely, and cost (design cost, materials cost, labor cost), and aesthetics (dramatic bridges, buildings, ...). Primarly, it goes into depth about how a structure doesn't just "follow from requirements"; there are countless judgements made by the designer on cost and aesthetic grounds. Further, one cannot fully test for all the conditions that the structure will undergo, and hence there will always be failures. Further, failures teach us a lot about how do it the next time.
For someone who understands the above thesis, the book is kind of boring and repetitive. It's probably a good book for someone who is not aware of engineering tradeoffs.
One of the last few chapters is about the negative effects of moving from slide rules to electronic calculators and computers. First, engineers have lost the intuitive feel of numbers, i.e., in slide rule days, a bad number (perhaps due to a bad calculation) would smell funny, because the slide rule teaches you to understand expected orders of magnitude (where is the decimal point) and number of significant digits; with electronic calculation, people just take the number at face value. Second, before computers the sheer labor of calculation was so much that people stuck to a few tried and tested
designs and typically "overdesigned" everything. With computers, people try funky designs, and try to optimize the last extra pound and dollar out of the design, making them much riskier. I'm ok with this
thesis, but he does not mention the benefits of the computer, namely that certain calculation mistakes don't occur any more, and the computer can "test" the structure in a lot more scenarios than was feasible earlier. I think he goes overboard on the negatives and gives too short shrift to the positives.
December 31, 2020
O livro tem uma ideia central muito boa: grande obras de engenharia, grandes feitos da tecnologia ou da construção não surgem sem erros. E é a análise desses erros que mais informa sobre por onde podemos avançar. Mas é uma ideia central prolongada demais, revisitada e apresentada de muitas formas diferentes, mas que acabam ficando redundantes.
Adorei a explicação sobre como novos materiais e novas técnicas são implementados aos poucos em cima do que já se sabia, como a análise de grandes falhas e acidentes contribuem muito para melhorar uma tecnologia e como o ideal é sempre andar próximo da falha, fazendo algo seguro o suficiente e com redundância para ter poucas chances de dar errado, mas ao mesmo tempo não fazer algo tão seguro ou tão planejado e reforçado que se torna inviável financeiramente. O que acho que conta menos a favor do livro é que tudo isso poderia ser explicado em um terço das páginas usadas. Talvez quem é da área de engenharia não concorde :)
Adorei a explicação sobre como novos materiais e novas técnicas são implementados aos poucos em cima do que já se sabia, como a análise de grandes falhas e acidentes contribuem muito para melhorar uma tecnologia e como o ideal é sempre andar próximo da falha, fazendo algo seguro o suficiente e com redundância para ter poucas chances de dar errado, mas ao mesmo tempo não fazer algo tão seguro ou tão planejado e reforçado que se torna inviável financeiramente. O que acho que conta menos a favor do livro é que tudo isso poderia ser explicado em um terço das páginas usadas. Talvez quem é da área de engenharia não concorde :)
November 27, 2009
The first third of this book tried to explain why we need to learn from our mistakes. Um . . . I really didn't need a hundred pages to know this. The examples of the failures was interesting. But, then the last third of the book was again kind of boring. Unfortunately, this isn't going to be my parting gift to my intern as I'd hoped. I have to find something else to give him.
July 25, 2011
What attracted me to this book when I bought it 17 years ago? Between the introduction and the back of the book, I got the idea that "To Engineer Is Human" would give me a greater understanding about the reasoning and effort that engineers put into their structures. Then and now, I am awed by the bridges and buildings I come across, and at times a voice in my head echoes that of Djimon Hounsou's character in "Gladiator," who, upon seeing the Coliseum for the first time, whispers, "I didn't know that men could build such things." Next time you drive over a suspension bridge that crosses a body of water, ask yourself, "How did they erect that concrete wall?"
Petroski does not answer such questions, per se. He does give some detailed accounts about some of histories more notorious structural failures (the Kansas City Hyatt Skywalk collapse in 1981; the Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse in 1940). He also talks about the limitations about design, and possible sources for human error. Unfortunately, Petroski only skims most of these subjects, and devotes most of his pages to other material that does little to illuminate his subject.
For instance, Petroski proposes that the creative effort that goes into engineering design is akin to that which an artist pours into a painting, a statue, a novel. It's a nice sentiment, but it does little to support his efforts to explain the where and why and how of failure in engineering design. Worse, Petroski is enamored with his own metaphors and writes about them at length, as in the instance when he draws similarities between the writer's proverbial waste basket overloaded with unwanted drafts and the frequent revisions that go into a structural design. Again, this is a quaint picture and no more. The comparison does not offer any new insight into a lay understanding of either writing or engineering. Who is going to be surprised that a bridge is preceded by multiple designs and revisions?
Where Petroski shines most is when he gives a detailed account about an engineering failure and the subsequent post-mortem. This is where he highlights and exposes material that most lay readers (including yours truly) are not aware of--the kind of material that exists in the trade journals and technical papers that are available for a public consumption that nevertheless rarely happens. His overview of the Kansas City Hyatt Skywalk disaster of 1981 is insightful and intriguing, and it opens up a line of questioning that readers can take with them for the rest of their lives. Perhaps as a measure of relief, Petroski also offers an account of an engineering success as embodied by the design, execution, and successful use of the Crystal Palace in the first International World Exposition in 1851; the story is fascinating in its own right, and Petroski adds color to the account by sharing his expertise in civil engineering.
I wish Petroski had put more emphasis on this kind of material. Rather than insist that engineering design yields the same kind of elegance as the arts, he could have proven this point with more concrete (pun intended) examples and anecdotes. I would have also appreciated more biographical details about the designers and builders behind failed structures. For someone who seems to love a synthesis between the arts and sciences, Petroski only goes so far towards humanizing his subject. Early on, he says that engineers are human and therefore fallible; agreed--so why not tell us more about these human beings, so that when we ask, "How did you build that?" we have some idea.
Petroski does not answer such questions, per se. He does give some detailed accounts about some of histories more notorious structural failures (the Kansas City Hyatt Skywalk collapse in 1981; the Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse in 1940). He also talks about the limitations about design, and possible sources for human error. Unfortunately, Petroski only skims most of these subjects, and devotes most of his pages to other material that does little to illuminate his subject.
For instance, Petroski proposes that the creative effort that goes into engineering design is akin to that which an artist pours into a painting, a statue, a novel. It's a nice sentiment, but it does little to support his efforts to explain the where and why and how of failure in engineering design. Worse, Petroski is enamored with his own metaphors and writes about them at length, as in the instance when he draws similarities between the writer's proverbial waste basket overloaded with unwanted drafts and the frequent revisions that go into a structural design. Again, this is a quaint picture and no more. The comparison does not offer any new insight into a lay understanding of either writing or engineering. Who is going to be surprised that a bridge is preceded by multiple designs and revisions?
Where Petroski shines most is when he gives a detailed account about an engineering failure and the subsequent post-mortem. This is where he highlights and exposes material that most lay readers (including yours truly) are not aware of--the kind of material that exists in the trade journals and technical papers that are available for a public consumption that nevertheless rarely happens. His overview of the Kansas City Hyatt Skywalk disaster of 1981 is insightful and intriguing, and it opens up a line of questioning that readers can take with them for the rest of their lives. Perhaps as a measure of relief, Petroski also offers an account of an engineering success as embodied by the design, execution, and successful use of the Crystal Palace in the first International World Exposition in 1851; the story is fascinating in its own right, and Petroski adds color to the account by sharing his expertise in civil engineering.
I wish Petroski had put more emphasis on this kind of material. Rather than insist that engineering design yields the same kind of elegance as the arts, he could have proven this point with more concrete (pun intended) examples and anecdotes. I would have also appreciated more biographical details about the designers and builders behind failed structures. For someone who seems to love a synthesis between the arts and sciences, Petroski only goes so far towards humanizing his subject. Early on, he says that engineers are human and therefore fallible; agreed--so why not tell us more about these human beings, so that when we ask, "How did you build that?" we have some idea.
April 28, 2022
This book fucking blows. It portrays every engineer as heroes and never considers any social or economic factors for why managers want to cut costs/cut corners, or that planned obsolescence in technology exists. Everything that fails is because of a "mistake" and not intentional decisions somewhere along the chain of command to ignore or force someone to do something. It never considers that it is often cheaper to accept fines and pollute the environment than to design things that meet the regulatory standards. In this book, corporations and profit motive don't exist. There is zero class analysis on why poor neighborhoods have disproportionately failing infrastructure. Hehe I guess engineers just happened to make more mistakes there for no reason at all. Bad luck! This book is an engineer jerking himself off about how "rational" and "objective" and "scientific" his job is. Fuck outta here
June 15, 2021
There was a lot of good information here, but too much repetition. Petroski was a college engineering teacher & must have had a lot of very dimwitted students over the years. Often the overall points were so overburdened with examples that I almost missed them. I'd recommend this in text format rather than audio even though it was well narrated.
This was published in 1985 & that added rather than detracted which is unusual for a book about technology. His discussion of the issues facing engineers as they moved from slide rules to calculators to computers fits in well with current essays I'm reading about in What to Think About Machines That Think: Today's Leading Thinkers on the Age of Machine Intelligence. When we rely entirely on a machine because we no longer have a feel for nor comprehend the overall project, we rely entirely on it being programmed properly & that's dicey business especially when hundreds or thousands of lives can be at stake.
A theme that ran throughout was how instructive failure can be. As a woodworker & sometime teacher of it, I agree heartily. The old saw about the master making more mistakes than the novice attempts is true. Success is often taken for granted & quickly forgotten, but mistakes tend to stick & make me more watchful in the future. It's unfortunate that our litigious society means mistakes are often hidden, especially in cases where a computer program might be at fault & thus continue to propagate it.
I'll recommend this to anyone interested in engineering. There's a lot of good history, but there are a lot of places worthy of skimming.
This was published in 1985 & that added rather than detracted which is unusual for a book about technology. His discussion of the issues facing engineers as they moved from slide rules to calculators to computers fits in well with current essays I'm reading about in What to Think About Machines That Think: Today's Leading Thinkers on the Age of Machine Intelligence. When we rely entirely on a machine because we no longer have a feel for nor comprehend the overall project, we rely entirely on it being programmed properly & that's dicey business especially when hundreds or thousands of lives can be at stake.
A theme that ran throughout was how instructive failure can be. As a woodworker & sometime teacher of it, I agree heartily. The old saw about the master making more mistakes than the novice attempts is true. Success is often taken for granted & quickly forgotten, but mistakes tend to stick & make me more watchful in the future. It's unfortunate that our litigious society means mistakes are often hidden, especially in cases where a computer program might be at fault & thus continue to propagate it.
I'll recommend this to anyone interested in engineering. There's a lot of good history, but there are a lot of places worthy of skimming.
November 22, 2014
A very well-written book that explains a lot about engineering in terms non-engineers can easily understand. This book is full of simple explanations that shed light on things I thought I knew, as well as informing me of many things I did not previously know. To give one example, I had read before about the collapse of the Hyatt Regency walkways in Kansas City. I thought I understood pretty well an explanation with diagrams showing showing how a design change in the connections by which the walkways were suspended resulted in the catastrophic collapse. I knew it was because they had abandoned the original plan to connect both walkways by means of individual long rods, and switched to using two shorter rods, one connecting the top walkway to the ceiling and the other connecting the second walkway to the first. But this author put in terms I found much easier to grasp. If two people are hanging on to a suspended rope, the rope is probably strong enough to support the weight of both people. If instead, one person is hanging on to the rope, and a second person is hanging onto a second rope tied around the ankles of the first person, what matters is not the strength of the rope so much as the grip-strength of the top person. In Kansas City, it was the connections that failed.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in knowing more about just what it is that engineers do, and about how engineers learn from their predecessors mistakes.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in knowing more about just what it is that engineers do, and about how engineers learn from their predecessors mistakes.
Shelved as 'partly-read'
August 25, 2018I am an English graduate who makes his living in IT, working a lot with engineers. I came into this looking for specific insights I could use on how to make the things I build less prone to failure.
Ironically, I gave up on it because it was excessively poetic and metaphorical in places, and wordy throughout. The audiobook narrator's voice wasn't especially pleasant, either.
Not terrible, but not good enough for me to want to persist with it.
Ironically, I gave up on it because it was excessively poetic and metaphorical in places, and wordy throughout. The audiobook narrator's voice wasn't especially pleasant, either.
Not terrible, but not good enough for me to want to persist with it.
January 25, 2009
The premise really is interesting: that it is from engineering failures that the most learning can be derived. Sadly (at least as a non-engineer reader), the writing shifted from pulled-me-into-it fascinating to merely slogging through.
Probably not something you'd want to pick up unless the topic itself really appealed to you.
Probably not something you'd want to pick up unless the topic itself really appealed to you.
January 13, 2013
This slim volume covers some of the most notable failures in engineering history up to the mid-1980s, and makes learning about engineering engaging. The comments about how computers will change the engineering profession are oddly prescient, and make me wish for an updated book.
April 18, 2024
The explanation of engineering as a cross between art and science is a powerful message conveyed by the author. Just as artists create masterpieces from techniques and successes of others in combination with their own style, so too can engineers realize new and innovative technology through the study of past engineering failures and successes along with the bravery to try something that has never been done.
Took one star off because some of the wording can get dense and a bit dry.
Took one star off because some of the wording can get dense and a bit dry.
January 4, 2019
This book is purportedly an attempt to explain to the layman what engineering means and how it is done. It is really more like a primer written to the first-year engineering student, but it is certainly non-technical. Rather, this book is the author's ideas about the philosophy of engineering and how it should and shouldn't be done based on what has and hasn't happened on past projects. There is nothing that I take particular exception with in this book, but there is also nothing particularly interesting or insightful. For anyone that has spent time thinking about engineering or certainly practicing it, this book's main points are already obvious.
It doesn't help that this book is somewhat dated, having been initially written over 30 years ago. Since most of this book is on general philosophy of engineering, much of it is equally valid today although the case studies are not the well-known touchstones they would have been for the original audience. Where the age really shows is in sections discussing the trends in computer aided design and the concerns about what is being lost by reliance on computers. While the concerns about what is being lost due to reliance on new technology is in some sense evergreen, what are presented here as speculations and open questions have largely been addressed in the intervening decades.
It doesn't help that this book is somewhat dated, having been initially written over 30 years ago. Since most of this book is on general philosophy of engineering, much of it is equally valid today although the case studies are not the well-known touchstones they would have been for the original audience. Where the age really shows is in sections discussing the trends in computer aided design and the concerns about what is being lost by reliance on computers. While the concerns about what is being lost due to reliance on new technology is in some sense evergreen, what are presented here as speculations and open questions have largely been addressed in the intervening decades.
December 24, 2021
I took this book on understanding about engineering.
Petroski explains engineering failures with stories from the previous century. He says failure helps to advance engineering knowledge. He stresses on learning from them especially in engineering.
I liked, how he used a Poet crafting a poetry with an Engineer.
Both conceive in their mind and perfect it, yet they know they cannot make it perfect.
His example of, "Failure by fatigue" by using paper clip was thought-provoking.
A Great book and quick read. Absolute certainty is not possible in structural or any types of engineering.
When railways were introduced; Writers and Poets were concerned about how it was impacting society. They made fun of failures of engineering. This seems to run parallel with our own lives in our age.
Something, that I can take away from this writing, is looking into a lot of failures and learning from it. In other words, looking at failed projects, failed engineering structures.
Overall, I would recommend this book to any layman who is interested in Engineering, failures.
This Book has memory of my time in Orlando, Florida with me.
Deus Vult,
Gottfried
Petroski explains engineering failures with stories from the previous century. He says failure helps to advance engineering knowledge. He stresses on learning from them especially in engineering.
I liked, how he used a Poet crafting a poetry with an Engineer.
Both conceive in their mind and perfect it, yet they know they cannot make it perfect.
His example of, "Failure by fatigue" by using paper clip was thought-provoking.
A Great book and quick read. Absolute certainty is not possible in structural or any types of engineering.
When railways were introduced; Writers and Poets were concerned about how it was impacting society. They made fun of failures of engineering. This seems to run parallel with our own lives in our age.
Something, that I can take away from this writing, is looking into a lot of failures and learning from it. In other words, looking at failed projects, failed engineering structures.
Overall, I would recommend this book to any layman who is interested in Engineering, failures.
This Book has memory of my time in Orlando, Florida with me.
Deus Vult,
Gottfried
Read
June 30, 2010A friend of mine once described this book as 'like self-help for geeks.' I love it.
June 3, 2022
Feels like the author is really aware of how smart and studious he is. Book is unorganized and seems to lack focus. There are also too many references to nursery rhymes.
March 27, 2019
Although my work world has not reflected my educational background in engineering for some time, from time to time I enjoy reading books about engineering, and this author's works are certainly one I will keep an eye out for in the future because of his insights as well as his skill in asking the right questions of himself and of the larger world [1]. What is most interesting about the author's approach to engineering is his recognition that engineers are not merely stodgy and conservative but feel within themselves a tension between often well-disguised daring and a strong desire to avoid failure, and between the poetry of the artist and the abstract knowledge of the scientist. The author's ability not only to understand this tension but also to discuss the iterative back and forth where success breeds failure as people trim from factors of safety until something breaks and where failure breeds success as it leads people to research what went wrong so that they can do it better next time makes this a book that ought to be required reading for engineers, and for those who wish to understand the human tendency to reach for the stars and to rise up after failure over and over again.
This book is organized as a series of connected essays that deal with the issues of failure (mostly) and success within a wide variety of engineering disciplines, especially but not limited to structural engineering. He writes about what it means to be human, about how falling down (failing) is a part of growing up. He writes about lessons from play and from life, and includes in his text "The Deacon's Masterpiece" by Oliver Wendell Holmes. He discusses engineering designs as hypotheses that succeed as they last and are disproven when they fail. He discusses design as being similar to one's choice about how to get from one place to another, and as a process of revision similar to an author working on a novel. He discusses the way that some failures are accidents waiting to happen, and how there is safety in numbers of successful trials that demonstrate that one's factors of safety are reasonable. He discusses how cracks become breakthroughs as they inspire others to solve problems and achieve advances, gives a discussion of the success of the Crystal Palace in London's great exhibition, the ups and downs of bridges, and the importance of forensic engineering and engineering fiction. As the book closes the author makes some critical comments about our reliance on computers as well as discussions about chaos and the limits of design.
The contents of the book demonstrate that not only is the author aware of the way that engineering is both an art and a science, but that the human desire to grow and improve, which often means learning from failure, is something that engineering shares with a variety of subjects, many of which I am fond of and interested in. In life, it is our struggles that help us to grow and improve, as those who have little or no struggles have nothing to test their resolve and to build their strength and give them insight into what works, which can often be understood by what does not work. Yet at the same time the author reflects that as people we can heap too great of burdens upon ourselves just as surely as we do the same to our structures and our creations, with disastrous results. It is in developing a sound intuition for what works even as we seek to better understand our world and go beyond what has been done before, while remaining humble in the face of our ignorance, that we grow. This book is a sound reminder that we are not as wise as we think we are, and that our arrogance and our disinterest in learning about history often lead us over and over again into the same types of failures until we finally get it right.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
Second Review:
There is in this particular book a sense of the dynamic nature of engineering and the sort of tension that exists between a desire for safety and a desire to transcend previous efforts as well as economize in various practices, all of which leads to risk of failure. Using both familiar and unfamiliar examples, the author does a good job here of discussing the pivotal role of failure in leading to successful designs, revealing the paradoxical truth that learning from failure leads to future successes, while success often brings with it a strong sense of complacency that in turn leads to future failure, and that our own contemporary efforts at design are hindered by a lack of understanding of the importance of learning from history and deep problems in communicating and even understanding what is being designed because of the complexity of what is being done and the ineffectiveness of various computer models at approximating reality. The author thus shows himself to be temperamentally conservative, which is a very good thing, even as he is deeply learned in the ways that failure has shaped design and how constraints are present in any sort of design efforts.
This particular book of around 250 pages or so is full of interest and even some surprises. The author begins with an understanding that design and engineering are a part of what it means to be human (1) and that falling down is a part of growing up (2), whether one is a toddler trying to learn how to walk better or whether one is an engineer working on a bridge or vehicle design. The author then uses "The Deacon's Masterpiece" as a way of discussing lessons about design from both play and life (3) and discusses the nature of every design as a hypothesis (4). The author discusses the importance of foreseeing failure and accounting for its possibility in leading to success (5) and that design helps us get from where we are to where we want to be (6). The author reminds us that design is often a revision of what has come before (7) in some fashion that that reality places us with accidents that are waiting to happen (8) that can wreck our plans and designs. The author discusses safety in numbers (9) as well as the problem of cracks (10), and gives a humorous story of buses and knife blades in trying to build things cheaply (11). An interlude about the success of the Crystal Palace (12) leads to a discussion of bridge failures (13) as well as the importance of forensic engineering and engineering fiction in teaching an understanding of failure (14). The author as a chance to grouse about the failure of people to understand how design used to be done in the face of the transition between slide rules and computers (15), the discussion of people as connoisseurs of chaos (16), and the limits of design (17) in addressing factors of safety and economic concerns. This version of the book then concludes with a new afterword that discusses the Challenger failure.
Why is it that engineering seems so remote from the experience of most people? After all, the basic structures that we use in design are things that are familiar to human beings seeking to interact with the world. Moreover, the attitude of learning from failure and dealing with the tension of our desires for safety and our desires for novelty as well as efficiency is something that is present in many aspects of our lives and not merely in our mechanical and structural designs. The author examines how it is that some failures, like that of the first Tacoma Narrows bridge, came about because of a failure to learn from history when it came to overly elegant bridge design that failed to take wind loads and the problem of resonance into consideration. All of this entertaining discussion is included with a wealth of humane and gentle humor that puts the reader at ease and that allows even those who have little familiarity with engineering design to understand what the author is getting at and be able to think at least a little more soundly about engineering failures and why they happen.
This book is organized as a series of connected essays that deal with the issues of failure (mostly) and success within a wide variety of engineering disciplines, especially but not limited to structural engineering. He writes about what it means to be human, about how falling down (failing) is a part of growing up. He writes about lessons from play and from life, and includes in his text "The Deacon's Masterpiece" by Oliver Wendell Holmes. He discusses engineering designs as hypotheses that succeed as they last and are disproven when they fail. He discusses design as being similar to one's choice about how to get from one place to another, and as a process of revision similar to an author working on a novel. He discusses the way that some failures are accidents waiting to happen, and how there is safety in numbers of successful trials that demonstrate that one's factors of safety are reasonable. He discusses how cracks become breakthroughs as they inspire others to solve problems and achieve advances, gives a discussion of the success of the Crystal Palace in London's great exhibition, the ups and downs of bridges, and the importance of forensic engineering and engineering fiction. As the book closes the author makes some critical comments about our reliance on computers as well as discussions about chaos and the limits of design.
The contents of the book demonstrate that not only is the author aware of the way that engineering is both an art and a science, but that the human desire to grow and improve, which often means learning from failure, is something that engineering shares with a variety of subjects, many of which I am fond of and interested in. In life, it is our struggles that help us to grow and improve, as those who have little or no struggles have nothing to test their resolve and to build their strength and give them insight into what works, which can often be understood by what does not work. Yet at the same time the author reflects that as people we can heap too great of burdens upon ourselves just as surely as we do the same to our structures and our creations, with disastrous results. It is in developing a sound intuition for what works even as we seek to better understand our world and go beyond what has been done before, while remaining humble in the face of our ignorance, that we grow. This book is a sound reminder that we are not as wise as we think we are, and that our arrogance and our disinterest in learning about history often lead us over and over again into the same types of failures until we finally get it right.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
Second Review:
There is in this particular book a sense of the dynamic nature of engineering and the sort of tension that exists between a desire for safety and a desire to transcend previous efforts as well as economize in various practices, all of which leads to risk of failure. Using both familiar and unfamiliar examples, the author does a good job here of discussing the pivotal role of failure in leading to successful designs, revealing the paradoxical truth that learning from failure leads to future successes, while success often brings with it a strong sense of complacency that in turn leads to future failure, and that our own contemporary efforts at design are hindered by a lack of understanding of the importance of learning from history and deep problems in communicating and even understanding what is being designed because of the complexity of what is being done and the ineffectiveness of various computer models at approximating reality. The author thus shows himself to be temperamentally conservative, which is a very good thing, even as he is deeply learned in the ways that failure has shaped design and how constraints are present in any sort of design efforts.
This particular book of around 250 pages or so is full of interest and even some surprises. The author begins with an understanding that design and engineering are a part of what it means to be human (1) and that falling down is a part of growing up (2), whether one is a toddler trying to learn how to walk better or whether one is an engineer working on a bridge or vehicle design. The author then uses "The Deacon's Masterpiece" as a way of discussing lessons about design from both play and life (3) and discusses the nature of every design as a hypothesis (4). The author discusses the importance of foreseeing failure and accounting for its possibility in leading to success (5) and that design helps us get from where we are to where we want to be (6). The author reminds us that design is often a revision of what has come before (7) in some fashion that that reality places us with accidents that are waiting to happen (8) that can wreck our plans and designs. The author discusses safety in numbers (9) as well as the problem of cracks (10), and gives a humorous story of buses and knife blades in trying to build things cheaply (11). An interlude about the success of the Crystal Palace (12) leads to a discussion of bridge failures (13) as well as the importance of forensic engineering and engineering fiction in teaching an understanding of failure (14). The author as a chance to grouse about the failure of people to understand how design used to be done in the face of the transition between slide rules and computers (15), the discussion of people as connoisseurs of chaos (16), and the limits of design (17) in addressing factors of safety and economic concerns. This version of the book then concludes with a new afterword that discusses the Challenger failure.
Why is it that engineering seems so remote from the experience of most people? After all, the basic structures that we use in design are things that are familiar to human beings seeking to interact with the world. Moreover, the attitude of learning from failure and dealing with the tension of our desires for safety and our desires for novelty as well as efficiency is something that is present in many aspects of our lives and not merely in our mechanical and structural designs. The author examines how it is that some failures, like that of the first Tacoma Narrows bridge, came about because of a failure to learn from history when it came to overly elegant bridge design that failed to take wind loads and the problem of resonance into consideration. All of this entertaining discussion is included with a wealth of humane and gentle humor that puts the reader at ease and that allows even those who have little familiarity with engineering design to understand what the author is getting at and be able to think at least a little more soundly about engineering failures and why they happen.
August 26, 2021
Bardziej humanistyczne, momentami filozoficzne, spojrzenie na inżynierię. Błądzić jest rzeczą ludzką, a Petrosky przypomina nam, że inżynier jest tylko człowiekiem. Czy inżynieria to coś pomiędzy nauką, sztuką, a projektowaniem (design)? Czy powinniśmy odtwarzać tylko te udane i bezpieczne projekty czy próbować nowych wyzwań, obarczonych większym ryzykiem.
Można na inżynierię patrzeć jak na ciągłą walkę pomiędzy chęcią tworzeniem nowego (postęp, nowe możliwości), a wyborem sprawdzonych rozwiązań (bezpieczeństwo).
W architekturze, gdzie sprowadza nas na ziemię dosłownie siła grawitacji - doskonale widać, że każdy projekt jest zaledwie hipotezą. Nieprzewidziane przez inżynierów okoliczności mogą unieważnić prawie każdy z nich. Jedynie porażki i błędy są pewną wiedzą. Co więcej, dopiero najgorsze błędy pozwalają na poprawę bezpieczeństwa i poszerzenie wiedzy dla kolejnych pokoleń.
Książka napisana została ponad 35 lat temu. Bezpieczeństwo mostów, centrów handlowych czy samolotów poprawiło się ogromnie od tamtego czasu. Mimo to, inżynieria zawsze będzie na froncie walki z czymś na tyle nowym (loty w kosmos, zmiany klimatu), gdzie nieprzewidziane błędy strukturalne mogą zniweczyć wszystko.
Można na inżynierię patrzeć jak na ciągłą walkę pomiędzy chęcią tworzeniem nowego (postęp, nowe możliwości), a wyborem sprawdzonych rozwiązań (bezpieczeństwo).
W architekturze, gdzie sprowadza nas na ziemię dosłownie siła grawitacji - doskonale widać, że każdy projekt jest zaledwie hipotezą. Nieprzewidziane przez inżynierów okoliczności mogą unieważnić prawie każdy z nich. Jedynie porażki i błędy są pewną wiedzą. Co więcej, dopiero najgorsze błędy pozwalają na poprawę bezpieczeństwa i poszerzenie wiedzy dla kolejnych pokoleń.
Książka napisana została ponad 35 lat temu. Bezpieczeństwo mostów, centrów handlowych czy samolotów poprawiło się ogromnie od tamtego czasu. Mimo to, inżynieria zawsze będzie na froncie walki z czymś na tyle nowym (loty w kosmos, zmiany klimatu), gdzie nieprzewidziane błędy strukturalne mogą zniweczyć wszystko.
July 3, 2023
Myślałem że nigdy tego nie skończę XD generalnie książka o civil engineering, dla mnie szczególnie niełatwa bo czytałem po angielsku.
Ale podchodząc obiektywnie to raczej dobra książka, z różnymi przykładami sukcesów i porażek inżynierów, nawet Dedala i Ikara. Główne wnioski z książki - trzeba się uczyć na błędach (kto nie zna historii ten ją powtórzy); każda wytwór ma swoje limity (np. Dedal wiedział o limitach swoich skrzydeł); innowacje nowości i rozwój tworzą błędy, testują hipotezy, ale bez nich nie będzie rozwoju.
Zmienia trochę sposób patrzenia na codzienne rzeczy np. mosty i budynki, z większym podziwem i wyrozumiałością. Fajna poważna analiza Dedala i Ikara jakby to się wydarzyło naprawdę (np. odległość między wyspą Ikara a morzem wskazuje że leciał na wysokości 1000 m).
Ale podchodząc obiektywnie to raczej dobra książka, z różnymi przykładami sukcesów i porażek inżynierów, nawet Dedala i Ikara. Główne wnioski z książki - trzeba się uczyć na błędach (kto nie zna historii ten ją powtórzy); każda wytwór ma swoje limity (np. Dedal wiedział o limitach swoich skrzydeł); innowacje nowości i rozwój tworzą błędy, testują hipotezy, ale bez nich nie będzie rozwoju.
Zmienia trochę sposób patrzenia na codzienne rzeczy np. mosty i budynki, z większym podziwem i wyrozumiałością. Fajna poważna analiza Dedala i Ikara jakby to się wydarzyło naprawdę (np. odległość między wyspą Ikara a morzem wskazuje że leciał na wysokości 1000 m).
April 2, 2020
Petroski's book focuses on the process of learning and the nature of innovation. He emphasizes that the principal objective of designing is obviating failure, rather than approximating an ideal.
From "The Three Little Pigs" fable, through the myth of Icarus and Daedalus to more modern "Galloping Gertie" Collapse story, he shows how gaining knowledge is a process manly involving learning from the mistakes that come from trying something that has never been done before. Hence, failure has long been a catalyst for technology innovation.
He also advocates a culture of openness and accountability, stressing the importance of the data collection and analysis efforts as well as information accessibility. The more opportunities to reflect on past mistakes, the better solutions are implemented in the future.
From "The Three Little Pigs" fable, through the myth of Icarus and Daedalus to more modern "Galloping Gertie" Collapse story, he shows how gaining knowledge is a process manly involving learning from the mistakes that come from trying something that has never been done before. Hence, failure has long been a catalyst for technology innovation.
He also advocates a culture of openness and accountability, stressing the importance of the data collection and analysis efforts as well as information accessibility. The more opportunities to reflect on past mistakes, the better solutions are implemented in the future.
Want to read
February 21, 2021I've been meaning to read this book since back in the 80s when it was first published. But back then I mostly read mystery novels. I should just, you know, read it. Finally.
Engineering is truly all about Design Failure Modes & Effects Analysis, right? ... and this looks like it gets to the heart of that.
Engineering is truly all about Design Failure Modes & Effects Analysis, right? ... and this looks like it gets to the heart of that.
January 9, 2019
This is the first time I read a book that I felt bored by but kept learning something.
March 7, 2020
Written in the 80s but has timeless application. Important information for engineer and "normal" people alike. So far I've listened to 2 of Henry Petroski's books. I will eventually work my way through all of them. He has very important information to share.
October 23, 2020
A well-written book on engineering technologies and learnings from failure. There are some really interesting examples of engineering failures. An interesting concept Petroski points out is the failure database. While this is a really valuable concept amongst professionals and academics, it's unambiguous with the modern state of affairs. Overall, a good read on engineering without getting into technical details and just enough for me to get curious about engineering fiction.
February 22, 2020
To Engineer is Human (1985) by Henry Petrovski is a well written study of how structural engineering advances. Petrovksi is a professor of Civil Engineering who specialises in looking at the difference between success and failure in design.
The book goes into detail about what happened in various engineering failures and in turn how they have been learnt from. Failures from the quite regular failure of iron bridges for railroads in the 19th century to the rarer but still significant failures of more structures such as the Tacoma Narrows bridge and Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkway collapse are all described as are the lessons from these failures. The structural weakness of the British Comet airliner is another engineering failure that Petrovski meticulously describes.
The book also describes totable successes of new techniques, such as the Crystal Palace and how the techniques there were later used extensively for larger buildings.
Finally Petrovski makes the case that design is all about trade offs and to extent limiting 'failure' in certain degrees. For example by making something more expensive, or more heavy compared to what is desirable. Petrovski describes engineering as something that is both an art and a science.
To Engineer is Human is an excellent read that makes structural engineering come to life. It's a great example of non-fiction where an expert in a field makes the field come alive in an accessible way.
The book goes into detail about what happened in various engineering failures and in turn how they have been learnt from. Failures from the quite regular failure of iron bridges for railroads in the 19th century to the rarer but still significant failures of more structures such as the Tacoma Narrows bridge and Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkway collapse are all described as are the lessons from these failures. The structural weakness of the British Comet airliner is another engineering failure that Petrovski meticulously describes.
The book also describes totable successes of new techniques, such as the Crystal Palace and how the techniques there were later used extensively for larger buildings.
Finally Petrovski makes the case that design is all about trade offs and to extent limiting 'failure' in certain degrees. For example by making something more expensive, or more heavy compared to what is desirable. Petrovski describes engineering as something that is both an art and a science.
To Engineer is Human is an excellent read that makes structural engineering come to life. It's a great example of non-fiction where an expert in a field makes the field come alive in an accessible way.
August 3, 2013
A very enjoyable read. I sometimes enjoy reading books by expert professionals who's main area of expertise is not necessarily in writing. The author is a structural engineering professor, thus my initial interest in the book, as I am a practicing structural engineer. The book is sort of an exploration into various engineering failures of the past several centuries and how those failures have served to enhance our understanding and improve future designs. He very expertly explains the oft-heard idea that we learn more from our failures than we do from our successes. It was enjoyable for me as I am familiar with all of the case studies he used and have studied several of them in depth myself. The best point of the book for me though, was the understanding that innovation inherently carries with it a certain amount of risk. Anytime we try to do something that's never been done before there is a risk that we didn't think of all the possible ways in which it could fail, because of course, we are human and humans make mistakes! A Great read.
April 6, 2018
Petroski's background is in civil engineering, and the result is that this book contains almost exclusively examples of civil engineering failure. Sure, most of the engineering principles covered can extend to other forms of engineering, but civil engineering anecdotes make up a solid 80% of this book.
Outside of this, I don't think there's anything particularly insightful about this book. If you've been a professional engineer, then you should have already grasped the fundamentals it presents. Professional engineering is full of compromise due to requirements, budget, time, and aesthetics. The engineering world constantly improves by studying past failures and learning from them. These last two sentences encompass the majority of what the book hammers home.
This book might be for you if you're not already a professional engineer but find yourself interested in studying the way engineering industries move. It's much more likely to be for you if you're particularly interested in civil engineering, as this book is full of civil engineering history.
Outside of this, I don't think there's anything particularly insightful about this book. If you've been a professional engineer, then you should have already grasped the fundamentals it presents. Professional engineering is full of compromise due to requirements, budget, time, and aesthetics. The engineering world constantly improves by studying past failures and learning from them. These last two sentences encompass the majority of what the book hammers home.
This book might be for you if you're not already a professional engineer but find yourself interested in studying the way engineering industries move. It's much more likely to be for you if you're particularly interested in civil engineering, as this book is full of civil engineering history.
December 24, 2021
To Engineer is Human is a dated, and often repetitive read. The first seven chapters were a slog, at least as a practicing engineer - perhaps a non-engineer would find them more interesting. Later chapters get into case studies which provide some interest, but the book is entirely focused around structural engineering, and thus every failure discussed is some variation on crack propagation due to fatigue.
Originally published in 1982, the book predates modern computer aided design and analysis tools, and discusses them with distrust and disdain. That lack of foresight is somewhat offset by the off-handed prediction of a nuclear reactor failure due to an earthquake (Fukushima, Japan).
A practicing engineer will find the material mundane. The general message is: we learn from failure.
Originally published in 1982, the book predates modern computer aided design and analysis tools, and discusses them with distrust and disdain. That lack of foresight is somewhat offset by the off-handed prediction of a nuclear reactor failure due to an earthquake (Fukushima, Japan).
A practicing engineer will find the material mundane. The general message is: we learn from failure.
December 19, 2007
The first book by Petroski that I read was The Pencil, a book about the engineering of the pencil. I think To Engineer is Human was the second of his books that I read, and in it he again shows a flair for popular engineering writing. For whatever reason, popular engineering writing is more rare than popular science writing, which makes Petroski's work all that much more to be treasured. In this particular book, Petroski looks at how the study of failures informs the engineering design cycle, and draws on many examples from structural engineering to illustrate his point.
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