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Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower
The United States has been the world's dominant power for more than a century. Now many analysts believe that other countries are rising and the United States is in decline. Is the unipolar moment over? Is America finished as a superpower?
In this book, Michael Beckley argues that the United States has unique advantages over other nations that, if used wisely, will allow it to remain the world’s sole superpower throughout this century. We are not living in a transitional, post-Cold War era. Instead, we are in the midst of what he calls the unipolar era—a period as singular and important as any epoch in modern history. This era, Beckley contends, will endure because the US has a much larger economic and military lead over its closest rival, China, than most people think and the best prospects of any nation to amass wealth and power in the decades ahead.
Deeply researched and brilliantly argued, this book covers hundreds of years of great power politics and develops new methods for measuring power and predicting the rise and fall of nations. By documenting long-term trends in the global balance of power and explaining their implications for world politics, the book provides guidance for policymakers, businesspeople, and scholars alike.
In this book, Michael Beckley argues that the United States has unique advantages over other nations that, if used wisely, will allow it to remain the world’s sole superpower throughout this century. We are not living in a transitional, post-Cold War era. Instead, we are in the midst of what he calls the unipolar era—a period as singular and important as any epoch in modern history. This era, Beckley contends, will endure because the US has a much larger economic and military lead over its closest rival, China, than most people think and the best prospects of any nation to amass wealth and power in the decades ahead.
Deeply researched and brilliantly argued, this book covers hundreds of years of great power politics and develops new methods for measuring power and predicting the rise and fall of nations. By documenting long-term trends in the global balance of power and explaining their implications for world politics, the book provides guidance for policymakers, businesspeople, and scholars alike.
248 pages, Hardcover
Published September 15, 2018
About the author
Michael Beckley
12 books20 followersMichael Beckley is a Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University.
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June 4, 2021
During the past twenty years, we have seen pundits in world affairs talk about the United States as a declining superpower and why China will take its place. They have offered much evidence to support this theory. In the past decades, the US spent a trillion dollars in a futile war in Afghanistan only to retreat in defeat. Hundreds of billions went down in Iraq only to enable Iran, the US’ arch-enemy, as the regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf. The massive economic crisis of 2008 cost the US close to a trillion dollars in bailing out banks. Then, we had the disastrous handling of Covid-19 in 2020, making the US look like an unscientific, bumbling nation. To this, when you add the US is seventh in literacy, eleventh in infrastructure, and twenty-eighth in government efficiency, it seems likely that it is a declining superpower. In contrast, China seems to have controlled the Covid-19 outbreak with professionalism. Its economy has recovered well from the Covid shock. They have been posting double-digit or above six percent growth for much of the 21st century so far. They have three trillion dollars in reserve. China has deep pockets to spend a trillion dollars, building modern infrastructure in almost seventy countries through the Belt and Road Initiative and the Maritime Silk Road. They are investing more than the US as a percentage of GDP in R&D for Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Computing. They are getting close to the US in military might and are flexing muscles in Asia.
Does it mean China will be the new hegemon in the next decade? “Not so fast”, says author Michael Beckley, an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University, in this fascinating, analytical study. He does not believe great powers have predictable life spans or they rise and fall as though it is their destiny. In the foreseeable future, he does not see any country gaining the means to challenge the US for global supremacy. Unipolarity will continue to reign for decades, well into this century. These are audacious pronouncements. I have read several books on the subject, arguing both ways. Most of them followed familiar lines of reasoning. Some books brought new concepts, such as Graham Allison’s invocation of the ‘Thucydides trap’. However, few of them broke new ground. I found this book refreshing and innovative as it gives us a couple of new frameworks and methods to grasp and analyze the parameters of this question. Using his approach, the author makes persuasive arguments for why the US will remain the sole superpower for decades.
Prof. Beckley says most studies size up countries using gross indicators of economic and military resources, such as GDP and military spending. These indicators tally countries’ resources without deducting the costs countries pay to police, protect, and provide services for their people. As a result, these indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries like China and India. Such countries produce vast output and field large armies. They also bear massive welfare and security burdens that drain their resources. Instead, we must measure power in net resources rather than gross and create a balance sheet for each country. Assets and liabilities go on either side of the ledger. We calculate net resources, subtracting the latter from the former. When we do this, we find America’s economic and military lead over other countries is much larger than assumed. The future trends are also in its favor. Population size is the chief element of these costs. So, Beckley captures the net assets as the product of GDP and GDP per capita. He calls it the ‘primitive proxy’ and it is an insightful contribution by the author.
The book comprises three sections. They are:
Measuring the power of nations and assessing the current balance of power.
Predicting power trends and assessing future prospects of today’s great powers.
Implications of these findings for US policy and world politics.
Prof. Beckley defines power in terms of resources. A country’s assets are its economic and military resources. Its liabilities are production, welfare, and security costs. Net resources are the remains after subtracting these costs from the assets. Production costs are the price a nation pays to generate wealth and military capabilities. They include the raw materials consumed, and the pollution spewed out, during the production process. Welfare costs are subsistence costs. They are the expenses a nation pays to keep its people alive and include outlays on basic items like food, healthcare, education, and social security. Security costs are the price a government pays to police, protect its citizens, and defend its borders. These costs tie down large chunks of every country’s assets. To assess the balance of power, analysts must deduct them. Power derives from the net stocks of resources.
Using this approach and an impressive amount of data, Beckley exposes the fallacy of arguments that see the US in decline and China rising to the pre-eminent position. We may marvel at the rapid pace at which China has built its high-speed rail network or the speed with which they pull of big infrastructural projects. But Beckley says that China is generating lesser and lesser output per unit of input each year. Most of China’s growth has come from greater investment and not productivity growth. Its productivity growth reduced last decade and became negative of late. Excess capacity and purposeless investment have made some 30% of China’s production go to waste, like ghost cities and ghost highways. China also has substantial security costs. It shares a border with fourteen countries, not all of them friendly, such as India and Vietnam. Nations like Pakistan and Afghanistan, though friendly, harbor Islamists who could trouble China in Xinjiang. North Korea, though friendly, is unpredictable and China has to watch its borders for refugees trying to flee to South Korea. Russia is not hostile but would not like China to encroach on its Central Asian backyard. Beckley says that China has much internal strife because of dictatorship. It imposes unnecessary security costs besides pacifying restive regions like Xinjiang and Tibet. Thirty-five percent of China’s military budget goes for homeland security operations. Welfare costs are also high because China has to feed, clothe, provide employment, healthcare, and educate one-fifth of humanity. Communism imposes wasteful costs like having to prop up loss-making public sector enterprises. In contrast, the US enjoys seven times the productivity of an average Chinese worker. It borders two friendly nations and two vast oceans, making its external security benign in comparison. Prof. Beckley shows its internal security environment demands a lot fewer costs compared to China. When you put it all together, the US comes far ahead in net resources and is increasing the gap between itself and other challenging powers.
In the military sphere, Prof. Beckley shows with impressive statistics, the US is about five to ten times more capable than China now. This includes the vast combat experience the US gained by waging war somewhere in the world over the past half-century. The Chinese army has very limited actual combat experience in comparison. The last time they fought a limited war was in 1979 with Vietnam with mixed results. Corruption and professional decay riddle the People’s Liberation Army, according to Beckley. Research shows hundreds of senior officers to have purchased their positions by paying bribes to superiors.
Prof. Beckley concludes the book by proposing another framework to understand the rise and fall of nations. It bolsters his earlier arguments further and ends the book on an impressive note. Geography, institutions, and demography are the three primary drivers of long-run economic growth. He advances this view in opposition to the Balance-of-power and Convergence theories, which he critiques. With logical arguments and data, he shows the US has the best prospects for sustained future economic growth. Hence, it will widen the already substantial lead it holds in economic and military domains. In demography, unless the US puts a total stop to immigration, it will continue as a nation with young workers well into this century. China’s insularity and xenophobia would need enormous changes to combat the aging trend of its population through immigration. As for institutions, the US beats both its major adversaries, China and Russia, hands down. Excellent geography and benign borders are other blessings for the US.
The author is aware of the pitfalls in these projections. He is also not in love with a Unipolar era. However, this space is too small to discuss them. Prof. Beckley has provided two seminal frameworks in this book to probe the questions raised by China’s rise. I found it educational and innovative and applicable to assessing other nations which have pretensions to become a superpower. It is a favorite pastime of the Hindu Nationalists in India to fantasize about India becoming a superpower in two decades. When I apply Prof. Beckley’s methods, it is clear how the Hindu nationalists are sabotaging their own aspirations for India. By discriminating against minorities, trying to thrust Hindi as the national language on non-Hindi speaking citizens, and creating an adverse political atmosphere, they raise the costs of internal security. Adopting an aggressive posture towards both Pakistan and China, they raise the security costs of defending the borders. More and more of the national budget gets absorbed by keeping thousands of troops at high altitudes on the border just to maintain the status quo. It weakens the economy, reducing the quality of education, healthcare, and development. It harms the dream of becoming a richer nation and kicks the dream that much farther into the future.
The book is short, comprising only 150-odd pages. There are a hundred pages of Notes and References. Prof. Beckley argues his case with conviction, writes in an accessible style, creating a ground-breaking work.
Does it mean China will be the new hegemon in the next decade? “Not so fast”, says author Michael Beckley, an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University, in this fascinating, analytical study. He does not believe great powers have predictable life spans or they rise and fall as though it is their destiny. In the foreseeable future, he does not see any country gaining the means to challenge the US for global supremacy. Unipolarity will continue to reign for decades, well into this century. These are audacious pronouncements. I have read several books on the subject, arguing both ways. Most of them followed familiar lines of reasoning. Some books brought new concepts, such as Graham Allison’s invocation of the ‘Thucydides trap’. However, few of them broke new ground. I found this book refreshing and innovative as it gives us a couple of new frameworks and methods to grasp and analyze the parameters of this question. Using his approach, the author makes persuasive arguments for why the US will remain the sole superpower for decades.
Prof. Beckley says most studies size up countries using gross indicators of economic and military resources, such as GDP and military spending. These indicators tally countries’ resources without deducting the costs countries pay to police, protect, and provide services for their people. As a result, these indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries like China and India. Such countries produce vast output and field large armies. They also bear massive welfare and security burdens that drain their resources. Instead, we must measure power in net resources rather than gross and create a balance sheet for each country. Assets and liabilities go on either side of the ledger. We calculate net resources, subtracting the latter from the former. When we do this, we find America’s economic and military lead over other countries is much larger than assumed. The future trends are also in its favor. Population size is the chief element of these costs. So, Beckley captures the net assets as the product of GDP and GDP per capita. He calls it the ‘primitive proxy’ and it is an insightful contribution by the author.
The book comprises three sections. They are:
Measuring the power of nations and assessing the current balance of power.
Predicting power trends and assessing future prospects of today’s great powers.
Implications of these findings for US policy and world politics.
Prof. Beckley defines power in terms of resources. A country’s assets are its economic and military resources. Its liabilities are production, welfare, and security costs. Net resources are the remains after subtracting these costs from the assets. Production costs are the price a nation pays to generate wealth and military capabilities. They include the raw materials consumed, and the pollution spewed out, during the production process. Welfare costs are subsistence costs. They are the expenses a nation pays to keep its people alive and include outlays on basic items like food, healthcare, education, and social security. Security costs are the price a government pays to police, protect its citizens, and defend its borders. These costs tie down large chunks of every country’s assets. To assess the balance of power, analysts must deduct them. Power derives from the net stocks of resources.
Using this approach and an impressive amount of data, Beckley exposes the fallacy of arguments that see the US in decline and China rising to the pre-eminent position. We may marvel at the rapid pace at which China has built its high-speed rail network or the speed with which they pull of big infrastructural projects. But Beckley says that China is generating lesser and lesser output per unit of input each year. Most of China’s growth has come from greater investment and not productivity growth. Its productivity growth reduced last decade and became negative of late. Excess capacity and purposeless investment have made some 30% of China’s production go to waste, like ghost cities and ghost highways. China also has substantial security costs. It shares a border with fourteen countries, not all of them friendly, such as India and Vietnam. Nations like Pakistan and Afghanistan, though friendly, harbor Islamists who could trouble China in Xinjiang. North Korea, though friendly, is unpredictable and China has to watch its borders for refugees trying to flee to South Korea. Russia is not hostile but would not like China to encroach on its Central Asian backyard. Beckley says that China has much internal strife because of dictatorship. It imposes unnecessary security costs besides pacifying restive regions like Xinjiang and Tibet. Thirty-five percent of China’s military budget goes for homeland security operations. Welfare costs are also high because China has to feed, clothe, provide employment, healthcare, and educate one-fifth of humanity. Communism imposes wasteful costs like having to prop up loss-making public sector enterprises. In contrast, the US enjoys seven times the productivity of an average Chinese worker. It borders two friendly nations and two vast oceans, making its external security benign in comparison. Prof. Beckley shows its internal security environment demands a lot fewer costs compared to China. When you put it all together, the US comes far ahead in net resources and is increasing the gap between itself and other challenging powers.
In the military sphere, Prof. Beckley shows with impressive statistics, the US is about five to ten times more capable than China now. This includes the vast combat experience the US gained by waging war somewhere in the world over the past half-century. The Chinese army has very limited actual combat experience in comparison. The last time they fought a limited war was in 1979 with Vietnam with mixed results. Corruption and professional decay riddle the People’s Liberation Army, according to Beckley. Research shows hundreds of senior officers to have purchased their positions by paying bribes to superiors.
Prof. Beckley concludes the book by proposing another framework to understand the rise and fall of nations. It bolsters his earlier arguments further and ends the book on an impressive note. Geography, institutions, and demography are the three primary drivers of long-run economic growth. He advances this view in opposition to the Balance-of-power and Convergence theories, which he critiques. With logical arguments and data, he shows the US has the best prospects for sustained future economic growth. Hence, it will widen the already substantial lead it holds in economic and military domains. In demography, unless the US puts a total stop to immigration, it will continue as a nation with young workers well into this century. China’s insularity and xenophobia would need enormous changes to combat the aging trend of its population through immigration. As for institutions, the US beats both its major adversaries, China and Russia, hands down. Excellent geography and benign borders are other blessings for the US.
The author is aware of the pitfalls in these projections. He is also not in love with a Unipolar era. However, this space is too small to discuss them. Prof. Beckley has provided two seminal frameworks in this book to probe the questions raised by China’s rise. I found it educational and innovative and applicable to assessing other nations which have pretensions to become a superpower. It is a favorite pastime of the Hindu Nationalists in India to fantasize about India becoming a superpower in two decades. When I apply Prof. Beckley’s methods, it is clear how the Hindu nationalists are sabotaging their own aspirations for India. By discriminating against minorities, trying to thrust Hindi as the national language on non-Hindi speaking citizens, and creating an adverse political atmosphere, they raise the costs of internal security. Adopting an aggressive posture towards both Pakistan and China, they raise the security costs of defending the borders. More and more of the national budget gets absorbed by keeping thousands of troops at high altitudes on the border just to maintain the status quo. It weakens the economy, reducing the quality of education, healthcare, and development. It harms the dream of becoming a richer nation and kicks the dream that much farther into the future.
The book is short, comprising only 150-odd pages. There are a hundred pages of Notes and References. Prof. Beckley argues his case with conviction, writes in an accessible style, creating a ground-breaking work.
May 17, 2019
Graham Allison’s notion of the Thucydides Trap has fed the hubristic notion in polarizing policy debates that China’s rise in the world is in relative proportion to America’s decline. And although military conflict (economic and trade flaps notwithstanding) may in fact be avoidable as a result of the aggressive and interconnected aspects of other instruments of power being brought to bear, the authenticity of Great Power Competition with China may in fact be just a façade—in every respect of that debate. This view is the overarching thesis of Michael Beckley’s new book, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower, which was originally entitled, The Unipolar Era.
According to the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Beckley “is an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University and an associate in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center.” His work has been featured in numerous popular media (NPR, Washington Post, Harvard Business Review, among others) and he has served in academia, the think tank community (RAND, Carnegie Endowment) and in government (DoD)—all making this new analytical work and approach very credible, as much as it is also highly readable.
The central thesis of Beckley’s argument--that the U.S. will remain the world’s sole (emphasis added) superpower for many decades, and perhaps the rest of this century--rests on the supposition that current comparative measures and indices of power don’t sufficiently describe, and often fall well-short of, articulating relative power. Beckley argues that one of the primary measures, gross domestic product (GDP) for example, exaggerates the wealth and military power of populous countries whose vast output also bears enormous welfare, security and efficiency costs. Beckley debunks another supposition that all great powers have predictable life spans (as history demonstrates) by excepting the U.S. due to unique geographic, demographic and institutional factors combining to keep the U.S. in the pole position in perpetuity. These same arguments are also advanced in Zeihan’s The Accidental Superpower and Marshall’s Prisoners of Geography.
Beckley adeptly cautions that his argument is not about guaranteed perpetual U.S. dominance as the advantages that elevated and have kept the U.S. in its unipolar status could be squandered, say, by restricting high-skill immigration, or allowing special interests or demagogues to capture political institutions and run the country into the ground. To further balance his argument he also argues that a taming of American power could take several other forms, such as “denying the U.S. access to their domestic markets, suing the U.S. in international courts, bribing American politicians, bankrolling anti-American terrorist groups, hacking U.S. computer networks, and brandishing weapons of mass destruction,” among others. It would take a concerted, concurrent and persistent effort by a disinterested America to allow this to happen, which is highly unlikely. The supporting chapters clarify these counter arguments while also reinforcing his thesis.
To build his case, Beckley sets about developing his own framework for measuring power and assessing trends. He then builds another framework for predicting power trends, subsequently using it to “assess the future prospects of today’s great powers.” Lastly, he cogently ties the two together and discusses the implications of his findings on world politics and U.S. policy.
As noted earlier, measures such as GDP and the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) (an index combining military spending with data on troops, population and industrial output) alone do not aggregate and illustrate the true picture of power according to Beckley. He explains how he takes the advice of historian Paul Bairoch by “simply multiplying GDP by GDP per capita, creating an index that gives equal weight to a nation’s gross output and its output per person” to derive a more accurate measure of power. In Chapter 2 Beckley provides a history review, developing his argument via the framework and combined measure, which is quite convincing. He then builds upon this foundation in Chapters 3 and 4 to test and make comparisons between the U.S., and its closest and most-talked about power rival, China, through a thorough economic and military lens. The primary conclusion economically articulates that the U.S. has much lower costs—welfare and security—that traditional measures gloss over, creating the impression that China is overtaking the U.S. However, as Beckley demonstrates, China’s economy barely keeps pace as it backs profit-losing companies and tries desperately, but failingly, to fully provide the needs of one-fifth of the earth’s population. Likewise in Chapter 4, the results are stark. The U.S. has 5 to 10 times the military capabilities of China whose weapon systems are half as capable. Further, China’s limited operational experience, training and lack of combat—coupled with personnel costs 25% higher than similar U.S. costs—work against them. Beckley argues that for China to comparably compete in these areas they must grow much faster than they currently are, which he deems as unlikely.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the future prospects of great powers and their implications. In the former Beckley critiques two theories—balance-of-power and convergence—in furtherance of his argument in a fair and reasoned manner. In support of the argument he develops a new framework projecting the rise and fall of nations that draw on separate and credible economic studies underpinned by geography, institutions and demography. He concludes Chapter 5 noting that the U.S. “has the most potential for future growth, in addition to an enormous economic and military lead,” yet cautions like any astute political scientist that this will not guarantee future unipolarity. Beckley articulates 4 implications concerning U.S. unipolarity to bolster his thesis and arguments. He cautions that a perpetually unipolar U.S. is not all it’s cracked up to be, yet if handled properly, can allow the U.S. to prosper indefinitely—another astute argument.
If you are interested and/or work in the field of political science or foreign/international affairs, Beckley’s arguments will provide a new and refreshing look updating tired, older theses. At 248 pages long, it can easily be read over a weekend, too!
According to the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Beckley “is an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University and an associate in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center.” His work has been featured in numerous popular media (NPR, Washington Post, Harvard Business Review, among others) and he has served in academia, the think tank community (RAND, Carnegie Endowment) and in government (DoD)—all making this new analytical work and approach very credible, as much as it is also highly readable.
The central thesis of Beckley’s argument--that the U.S. will remain the world’s sole (emphasis added) superpower for many decades, and perhaps the rest of this century--rests on the supposition that current comparative measures and indices of power don’t sufficiently describe, and often fall well-short of, articulating relative power. Beckley argues that one of the primary measures, gross domestic product (GDP) for example, exaggerates the wealth and military power of populous countries whose vast output also bears enormous welfare, security and efficiency costs. Beckley debunks another supposition that all great powers have predictable life spans (as history demonstrates) by excepting the U.S. due to unique geographic, demographic and institutional factors combining to keep the U.S. in the pole position in perpetuity. These same arguments are also advanced in Zeihan’s The Accidental Superpower and Marshall’s Prisoners of Geography.
Beckley adeptly cautions that his argument is not about guaranteed perpetual U.S. dominance as the advantages that elevated and have kept the U.S. in its unipolar status could be squandered, say, by restricting high-skill immigration, or allowing special interests or demagogues to capture political institutions and run the country into the ground. To further balance his argument he also argues that a taming of American power could take several other forms, such as “denying the U.S. access to their domestic markets, suing the U.S. in international courts, bribing American politicians, bankrolling anti-American terrorist groups, hacking U.S. computer networks, and brandishing weapons of mass destruction,” among others. It would take a concerted, concurrent and persistent effort by a disinterested America to allow this to happen, which is highly unlikely. The supporting chapters clarify these counter arguments while also reinforcing his thesis.
To build his case, Beckley sets about developing his own framework for measuring power and assessing trends. He then builds another framework for predicting power trends, subsequently using it to “assess the future prospects of today’s great powers.” Lastly, he cogently ties the two together and discusses the implications of his findings on world politics and U.S. policy.
As noted earlier, measures such as GDP and the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) (an index combining military spending with data on troops, population and industrial output) alone do not aggregate and illustrate the true picture of power according to Beckley. He explains how he takes the advice of historian Paul Bairoch by “simply multiplying GDP by GDP per capita, creating an index that gives equal weight to a nation’s gross output and its output per person” to derive a more accurate measure of power. In Chapter 2 Beckley provides a history review, developing his argument via the framework and combined measure, which is quite convincing. He then builds upon this foundation in Chapters 3 and 4 to test and make comparisons between the U.S., and its closest and most-talked about power rival, China, through a thorough economic and military lens. The primary conclusion economically articulates that the U.S. has much lower costs—welfare and security—that traditional measures gloss over, creating the impression that China is overtaking the U.S. However, as Beckley demonstrates, China’s economy barely keeps pace as it backs profit-losing companies and tries desperately, but failingly, to fully provide the needs of one-fifth of the earth’s population. Likewise in Chapter 4, the results are stark. The U.S. has 5 to 10 times the military capabilities of China whose weapon systems are half as capable. Further, China’s limited operational experience, training and lack of combat—coupled with personnel costs 25% higher than similar U.S. costs—work against them. Beckley argues that for China to comparably compete in these areas they must grow much faster than they currently are, which he deems as unlikely.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the future prospects of great powers and their implications. In the former Beckley critiques two theories—balance-of-power and convergence—in furtherance of his argument in a fair and reasoned manner. In support of the argument he develops a new framework projecting the rise and fall of nations that draw on separate and credible economic studies underpinned by geography, institutions and demography. He concludes Chapter 5 noting that the U.S. “has the most potential for future growth, in addition to an enormous economic and military lead,” yet cautions like any astute political scientist that this will not guarantee future unipolarity. Beckley articulates 4 implications concerning U.S. unipolarity to bolster his thesis and arguments. He cautions that a perpetually unipolar U.S. is not all it’s cracked up to be, yet if handled properly, can allow the U.S. to prosper indefinitely—another astute argument.
If you are interested and/or work in the field of political science or foreign/international affairs, Beckley’s arguments will provide a new and refreshing look updating tired, older theses. At 248 pages long, it can easily be read over a weekend, too!
August 19, 2020
The thesis of this book is that the United States has, is, and will be (in the foreseeable future), unrivaled in terms of comprehensive national power vis-a-vis every other nation on Earth, but focused on China in particular. It was published in 2018 and was released within the greater context of the debate, in the US security policy circles, on the emerging Sino-US rivalry, and whether the US should intervene, and actively attempt to constrain China’s growth, or confound it’s ambitions, while the US still could. This thinking has largely prevailed among the current US administration. Yet, the author believes that such thinking is largely moot, and wrote this book to prove the case. The author’s conclusions are that no nation, including China, can realistically rival the United States within the accepted dimensions of comprehensive national power, which includes economics, political, technological, and geographic (including resources found within, or abut said geography) for at least another few decades.
First, let me state that I do happen to agree with the broad notion that some component of the current Sino-US competition debate is scare-mongering. In particular, the “China will surpass the US” narrative over-inflates the capabilities of China, and it’s military arm, the PLA, in a similar way the defense analyst of the Reagan era inflated the capabilities of the Soviet Armed forces (for a specific example, read the annotated corrected version of ‘Soviet Military Power’ from 1988), and it also erroneously assigns the will of the Chinese state to “rule the world”, much less it’s capacity to do so. That being said, I disagree with the author’s central thesis, and believe there is a real and material decline of the US’ comprehensive national strength vis-a-vis China, and this is mostly captured by a comparative analysis of the two economies, with an especial eye towards the growth of technologies found within those economies. Given a view of this, one can understand the likely trajectory of relative comprehensive national strengths between the two, and they are likely to converge well within the “many decades” declaration of the author, exactly because the technologies China is focused on, including AI, ML, computing (classical and Quantum), and associated engineering and mathematics that support these fields allow China to also accelerate/catch up in other allied fields that are currently deficient vis-a-vis the United States. So in this way, these technologies are a “two-for-one”, or more likely, a “many-for-one” investment for that nation.
However, before we focus on that dimension, there are a couple of problems I have with the author’s general analysis. First, he makes use of the term “net assessment” several times throughout the book, yet nothing in the book can be characterized as a true net assessment. The original motivation for “net assessments”, as described by the Office of Net Assessments (ONET), formerly led, and founded by, the late Andrew Marshall, was to engage in “alternative” analysis with respect to questions within the military domains. Such questions often would not yield to traditional approaches, which at the time were primarily accounting-driven studies, and econometric analysis. An example of such an analysis would be, to understand quantitatively, which of two opposing forces were likely to prevail in combat, given you understood the composition of each force, and had component-wise data of the units within each force. From a traditional perspective, one could simply assign weights to each unit in the force, say based on the cost of each unit, and sum those products together to generate a number. This linear combination however, is obviously far too simplistic, and ignores many of the critical dimensions of combat, especially the role uncertainty plays in the engagement (as well as geography, positioning, luck etc.). Instead of these simple tools, Marshall often leveraged apparatus from computer science, especially simulations, to provide a more realistic construction and forecast of the phenomena. Yet, despite the use of this appellation by the author, nothing like that level of sophistication shows up in these pages. In a real sense, what the author has done is collected a set of accounting facts, and is engaging in inference on those facts, that is he is doing the opposite of net assessment. Further there are challenges both with the veracity of these facts by virtue of their sourcing, and the way these facts are presented/transformed in the narrative that seems to distort the underlying nature of what is actually reflected in reality.
With respect to the sources for the accounting facts, many of the footnotes to them are citations from shallow news magazines e.g. Forbes, WSJ, the Economist etc., and having read many of these articles at the time of their original publications, around 2012-15, in retrospect, they were often more critical or skeptical of China’s economy/technology capabilities etc. than was merited. It is a well known phenomena that these sources, almost exclusively western, have a bias to discount China’s comparative progress, and inflate it’s comparative weakness. In fact, it’s often suggested that this works to the benefit of China’s leaders, who have at times encouraged the view that the country is weaker than it really is. Likewise, there have been objective instances where Chinese sources have engaged in this sort of subterfuge when engaging in comparative analysis between themselves and the US.
A more diverse set of sources, and some primary language sources within China itself would have helped make the author’s conclusions more convincing, at least from a citation stand point. Though, to be clear, the author does quote from more authoritative sources, mostly think-tanks like RAND, and organizations like the WHO, OECD, etc.. Specifically though, in the case of RAND, the author only mentions it to criticize the technical wargaming work they did with respect to conflict in the South China Sea (SCS), which showed the US not prevailing in such a conflict, but the author himself fails to retort with an equally rigorous counterwork. Unfortunately, more often I would have been comfortable with, as I was reading statements in the narrative about how China’s healthcare system is insufficient, or it’s university’s research output being problematic, these were often primarily cited from a newspaper or magazine vs. a research paper on the topic.
Further, some of the charts are strange. For instance, the author suggest early on of replacing GDP as a measure of comparative economic power, but instead using GDP * GDP-per-capita. The motivation behind this bizarre metric, I think, is there is some qualia that needs to be accounted for for nations with “more developed” citizenry, that should afford “extra” value to the economy. I can understand that sentiment. Yet, GDP * GDP-per-capita, is just GDP^2/total population. So when charting any two nations with this metric, it is trivial to say you’re going to see a “bigger difference” between them, approximately a quadratic difference (assuming the numerator dominates the denominator which it does in this case). Yet, it’s not clear that this metric means anything, since the underlying dynamics at hand is still primarily derived from the GDP, and it’s unclear to me why a comparative sectoral analysis of the respective macroeconomics would not be a better approach to deconstructing the relative strengths between the two nations, as well as understanding their likely trajectories relative to each other.
Another chart that caught my eye was in the section of the book dedicated to the comparative analysis of the militaries of China and the US. Here, figure 4.1, the author cites a chart from SIPRI which seems to compare the cumulative spending on defense/weapons systems/militaries between China and the US vs. the annual spendings, because, as the author states, in this case, the stock of military assets is more important than the flow. Further, the chart is just from the year 2000 to 2016 to discount older “Cold War” era weapons systems. Yet here, the accounting is incomplete. Even if one has discounted the assets prior to 2000, one should still discount assets from 2000 on, capital depreciation doesn’t stop. In any event, what does the cumulative spending really tell us with respect to the comprehensive military powers of either China or the US? Just because the US spends more on weapons systems or on the human capital of it’s soldiers vis-a-vis China, what relationship does it have on the efficaciousness of the two forces to accomplish their objectives in the field? China’s equipment is often far cheaper than their western counterparts, yet, it’s unclear that the equipment’s quality is really a linear mapping to it’s cost. Could it be that China’s equipment is 1:10 of the cost of the US (or even less), yet it’s field potency is closer to 1:4 of those of the US? If so, that would be a dramatically disfavorable value/cost quotient. These are the questions that must be answered, but nothing close to it is addressed in the text.
Similarly, the author also makes use of a Chinese global ranking of universities in another section, that shows that only 1 or 2 Chinese colleges make it to the top 100 of it’s comprehensive university chart. This is true, when I checked the link, yet when I specifically looked at the rankings of engineering and some physical sciences departments ranked on this site, Chinese universities were much more frequently represented in the top 10, 20, 50 of these charts. I would suggest that these are far more important when understanding the likely material convergence of science/technology/defense capabilities than raking good “generalist” /’well-rounded” schools, which is what the chart quoted by the author seeks to capture. Similarly, the author makes a baseless statement that the US’ advantages in liberal arts will afford it a tremendous benefit in the information economy. As someone who works in the data/information economy, I find this statement to be baseless and contrary to my observations circa 2020. Also, the author commits a simple fallacy by suggesting that tracking accumulated spend on human capital corresponds strongly to functional advantages in human capital that can be used to compare nations. This is the input-factor fallacy, and it should go without say just because you spend more money on something, doesn’t mean you get a commensurate amount out of that thing you spent your money on, and I would suspect marginal effects and institutional inertia must account for a much less efficient conversion of capital to output with respect to the US education system.
Overall, this book failed to convince me on the indomitable nature of the United States comprehensive national strength, especially in this 2 year retrospect in 2020. Many things which were assumed sacrosanct, like the societal stability of the country are clearly in doubt now. Further, there have been real objective progress made by Chinese firms and research since the publication of this book, and especially the publication of many of its sources, which as mentioned are mostly from the first half of this past decade, including it’s leadership in both machine learning and quantum technologies, as well as the nature of it’s convergence with 5th generation and some 6th generation weapons platforms. Clearly the kerfuffle with respect to Huawei and TikTok in 2020 demonstrate Chinese companies have yielded unique comparative advantages in both consumer and industrial grade high technologies. Lastly, the book focuses too much on the US-China competition. If history has taught us anything, things don’t always turn out the way you think it will, more material should have been focused analyzing the economies of the EU, Russia, India, and nations in Africa. Though contemporary thinking would think the later is far-fetched for this century, we should remember that just 20 - 30 years ago, China was viewed as a backwater nation, so clearly economic growth can operate on a time horizon much faster than what conventional wisdom might suggest.
Not recommended as a shallow analysis of the US and other nation’s comprehensive strengths/weaknesses. To do this book right, would take several volumes, and would have to be augmented by statistical analysis and formal models, with deeper integration of big data sets.
First, let me state that I do happen to agree with the broad notion that some component of the current Sino-US competition debate is scare-mongering. In particular, the “China will surpass the US” narrative over-inflates the capabilities of China, and it’s military arm, the PLA, in a similar way the defense analyst of the Reagan era inflated the capabilities of the Soviet Armed forces (for a specific example, read the annotated corrected version of ‘Soviet Military Power’ from 1988), and it also erroneously assigns the will of the Chinese state to “rule the world”, much less it’s capacity to do so. That being said, I disagree with the author’s central thesis, and believe there is a real and material decline of the US’ comprehensive national strength vis-a-vis China, and this is mostly captured by a comparative analysis of the two economies, with an especial eye towards the growth of technologies found within those economies. Given a view of this, one can understand the likely trajectory of relative comprehensive national strengths between the two, and they are likely to converge well within the “many decades” declaration of the author, exactly because the technologies China is focused on, including AI, ML, computing (classical and Quantum), and associated engineering and mathematics that support these fields allow China to also accelerate/catch up in other allied fields that are currently deficient vis-a-vis the United States. So in this way, these technologies are a “two-for-one”, or more likely, a “many-for-one” investment for that nation.
However, before we focus on that dimension, there are a couple of problems I have with the author’s general analysis. First, he makes use of the term “net assessment” several times throughout the book, yet nothing in the book can be characterized as a true net assessment. The original motivation for “net assessments”, as described by the Office of Net Assessments (ONET), formerly led, and founded by, the late Andrew Marshall, was to engage in “alternative” analysis with respect to questions within the military domains. Such questions often would not yield to traditional approaches, which at the time were primarily accounting-driven studies, and econometric analysis. An example of such an analysis would be, to understand quantitatively, which of two opposing forces were likely to prevail in combat, given you understood the composition of each force, and had component-wise data of the units within each force. From a traditional perspective, one could simply assign weights to each unit in the force, say based on the cost of each unit, and sum those products together to generate a number. This linear combination however, is obviously far too simplistic, and ignores many of the critical dimensions of combat, especially the role uncertainty plays in the engagement (as well as geography, positioning, luck etc.). Instead of these simple tools, Marshall often leveraged apparatus from computer science, especially simulations, to provide a more realistic construction and forecast of the phenomena. Yet, despite the use of this appellation by the author, nothing like that level of sophistication shows up in these pages. In a real sense, what the author has done is collected a set of accounting facts, and is engaging in inference on those facts, that is he is doing the opposite of net assessment. Further there are challenges both with the veracity of these facts by virtue of their sourcing, and the way these facts are presented/transformed in the narrative that seems to distort the underlying nature of what is actually reflected in reality.
With respect to the sources for the accounting facts, many of the footnotes to them are citations from shallow news magazines e.g. Forbes, WSJ, the Economist etc., and having read many of these articles at the time of their original publications, around 2012-15, in retrospect, they were often more critical or skeptical of China’s economy/technology capabilities etc. than was merited. It is a well known phenomena that these sources, almost exclusively western, have a bias to discount China’s comparative progress, and inflate it’s comparative weakness. In fact, it’s often suggested that this works to the benefit of China’s leaders, who have at times encouraged the view that the country is weaker than it really is. Likewise, there have been objective instances where Chinese sources have engaged in this sort of subterfuge when engaging in comparative analysis between themselves and the US.
A more diverse set of sources, and some primary language sources within China itself would have helped make the author’s conclusions more convincing, at least from a citation stand point. Though, to be clear, the author does quote from more authoritative sources, mostly think-tanks like RAND, and organizations like the WHO, OECD, etc.. Specifically though, in the case of RAND, the author only mentions it to criticize the technical wargaming work they did with respect to conflict in the South China Sea (SCS), which showed the US not prevailing in such a conflict, but the author himself fails to retort with an equally rigorous counterwork. Unfortunately, more often I would have been comfortable with, as I was reading statements in the narrative about how China’s healthcare system is insufficient, or it’s university’s research output being problematic, these were often primarily cited from a newspaper or magazine vs. a research paper on the topic.
Further, some of the charts are strange. For instance, the author suggest early on of replacing GDP as a measure of comparative economic power, but instead using GDP * GDP-per-capita. The motivation behind this bizarre metric, I think, is there is some qualia that needs to be accounted for for nations with “more developed” citizenry, that should afford “extra” value to the economy. I can understand that sentiment. Yet, GDP * GDP-per-capita, is just GDP^2/total population. So when charting any two nations with this metric, it is trivial to say you’re going to see a “bigger difference” between them, approximately a quadratic difference (assuming the numerator dominates the denominator which it does in this case). Yet, it’s not clear that this metric means anything, since the underlying dynamics at hand is still primarily derived from the GDP, and it’s unclear to me why a comparative sectoral analysis of the respective macroeconomics would not be a better approach to deconstructing the relative strengths between the two nations, as well as understanding their likely trajectories relative to each other.
Another chart that caught my eye was in the section of the book dedicated to the comparative analysis of the militaries of China and the US. Here, figure 4.1, the author cites a chart from SIPRI which seems to compare the cumulative spending on defense/weapons systems/militaries between China and the US vs. the annual spendings, because, as the author states, in this case, the stock of military assets is more important than the flow. Further, the chart is just from the year 2000 to 2016 to discount older “Cold War” era weapons systems. Yet here, the accounting is incomplete. Even if one has discounted the assets prior to 2000, one should still discount assets from 2000 on, capital depreciation doesn’t stop. In any event, what does the cumulative spending really tell us with respect to the comprehensive military powers of either China or the US? Just because the US spends more on weapons systems or on the human capital of it’s soldiers vis-a-vis China, what relationship does it have on the efficaciousness of the two forces to accomplish their objectives in the field? China’s equipment is often far cheaper than their western counterparts, yet, it’s unclear that the equipment’s quality is really a linear mapping to it’s cost. Could it be that China’s equipment is 1:10 of the cost of the US (or even less), yet it’s field potency is closer to 1:4 of those of the US? If so, that would be a dramatically disfavorable value/cost quotient. These are the questions that must be answered, but nothing close to it is addressed in the text.
Similarly, the author also makes use of a Chinese global ranking of universities in another section, that shows that only 1 or 2 Chinese colleges make it to the top 100 of it’s comprehensive university chart. This is true, when I checked the link, yet when I specifically looked at the rankings of engineering and some physical sciences departments ranked on this site, Chinese universities were much more frequently represented in the top 10, 20, 50 of these charts. I would suggest that these are far more important when understanding the likely material convergence of science/technology/defense capabilities than raking good “generalist” /’well-rounded” schools, which is what the chart quoted by the author seeks to capture. Similarly, the author makes a baseless statement that the US’ advantages in liberal arts will afford it a tremendous benefit in the information economy. As someone who works in the data/information economy, I find this statement to be baseless and contrary to my observations circa 2020. Also, the author commits a simple fallacy by suggesting that tracking accumulated spend on human capital corresponds strongly to functional advantages in human capital that can be used to compare nations. This is the input-factor fallacy, and it should go without say just because you spend more money on something, doesn’t mean you get a commensurate amount out of that thing you spent your money on, and I would suspect marginal effects and institutional inertia must account for a much less efficient conversion of capital to output with respect to the US education system.
Overall, this book failed to convince me on the indomitable nature of the United States comprehensive national strength, especially in this 2 year retrospect in 2020. Many things which were assumed sacrosanct, like the societal stability of the country are clearly in doubt now. Further, there have been real objective progress made by Chinese firms and research since the publication of this book, and especially the publication of many of its sources, which as mentioned are mostly from the first half of this past decade, including it’s leadership in both machine learning and quantum technologies, as well as the nature of it’s convergence with 5th generation and some 6th generation weapons platforms. Clearly the kerfuffle with respect to Huawei and TikTok in 2020 demonstrate Chinese companies have yielded unique comparative advantages in both consumer and industrial grade high technologies. Lastly, the book focuses too much on the US-China competition. If history has taught us anything, things don’t always turn out the way you think it will, more material should have been focused analyzing the economies of the EU, Russia, India, and nations in Africa. Though contemporary thinking would think the later is far-fetched for this century, we should remember that just 20 - 30 years ago, China was viewed as a backwater nation, so clearly economic growth can operate on a time horizon much faster than what conventional wisdom might suggest.
Not recommended as a shallow analysis of the US and other nation’s comprehensive strengths/weaknesses. To do this book right, would take several volumes, and would have to be augmented by statistical analysis and formal models, with deeper integration of big data sets.
August 24, 2018
Disclaimer - I received a free copy of this book in exchange for an unbiased review.
Michael Beckley’s Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower is a very balanced, considered and compelling argument against the view put forward by many commentators that American supremacy is on the wane and that China is destined to replace it. He does not argue that the US is invincible or that US hegemony will last forever, but that predictions of US decline have been overstated. It is difficult to argue with his assessment.
Beckley references the multitude of literature predicting the continued rise of China, gradually overtaking the USA in world predominance. He argues that such predictions suffer from two primary shortcomings that distort people’s perceptions of the balance of power. Firstly, that they use gross indicators such as GDP and military spending to measure power but do not take into account welfare and security burdens thereby exaggerating the wealth and power of poor, populous nations like China and India. Secondly, that they rely on historical notions about the rise and fall of great powers that do not really apply today. He argues that the USA “enjoys a unique set of geographic, demographic and institutional advantages that translate into a commanding geopolitical position.”
He is right on both counts. Technology has made the world smaller which, in turn, has given the US hegemony on a scale not seen before. It cannot be compared to the empires of the past. Only a few commentators seem to recognise these points; my compatriot David Kilcullen being one of them.
Beckley establishes a framework for measuring this amorphous concept called ‘power’ and examines future power trends using net, rather than gross, indicators. Much of his analysis compares the US to China as the only other world power that could conceivably challenge US hegemony in the foreseeable future. He examines their economies focussing on their relative efficiency, as well as their military capabilities taking into account the relative capability of weapon systems, training, and internal efficiencies and costs. He also discusses what he sees are the threats to US power, both internal and external.
He discusses the shortcomings of the two most common methods of trying to measure power; the power as resources approach, and the power as outcomes approach. Ultimately he attempts to develop a hybrid approach to provide a more accurate measure of relative power and uses historical examples of great power rivalries (such as the Opium Wars of the 1800s and the Cold War) to support his methodology. He then applies his methodology to the current rivalry between the US and China.
He examines many aspects of economic performance from industrial and agricultural productivity and innovation through to rates of incarceration, internal security, natural capital and pollution. His analysis reveals the US to be far ahead of China in almost every respect and, indeed, his assessment of China’s prospects are so bleak that it makes it impossible to see China as a real economic rival. He also examines other factors such as US control or influence over international financial markets. His analysis in this respect is very solid and compelling.
His military analysis, however, is not quite as strong. He illustrates, for example, a scenario of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Now there’s doubt that such a venture would be exceedingly difficult for the Chinese with a low probability of success. Beckley’s analysis, however, does seem overly optimistic about Taiwan’s ability, with US support of course, of repelling a Chinese attack. He examines each aspect of military capability in isolation from each other, which, of course, is not how things would work in a full blown invasion. He talks about how easy it would be to bomb Chinese transports as they cross the strait to Taiwan as if those transports would not have air and sea escorts. He talks about how easily Taiwanese forces could mass ashore to repel a Chinese amphibious landing with no mention of pre-landing bombardment or naval gunfire support. It’s not that I necessarily disagree with Beckley’s conclusions, but I do feel that his methodology in this instance is somewhat flawed, and therefore is not as compelling as it could be. The flaw in his analysis is revealed when he examines whether the Chinese could bomb Taiwan into submission stating that “no state has ever conquered another with air power alone.” This is indeed true, but no state would try to conquer another with air power alone. Rather, air power would form one essential part of a broader campaign. His analysis of the situations in the East and South China Sea, though, is much sounder.
Beckley goes on to use a number of economic and military indicators to predict the future prospects of the eight most powerful nations in the world. He identifies three main drivers of long-term economic growth; geography, institutions and demography, and identifies a number of different performance indicators within these drivers. While the US does not come out on top of all of the indicators, it ranks highly across the board. Beckley’s analysis is, again, well-researched and difficult to fault.
He concludes with some interesting foreign policy proposals which he believes would help to maintain US predominance, including some interesting proposals about how the US should engage with North Korea, and advocating a greatly diminished role in the Middle East. Many of his proposals may be seen as ‘hawkish’, such as providing numerous weapons systems to friendly countries in Europe and Asia in order to ‘contain’ Russia and China; however, he balances this with a conservative approach to the US’s perceived position as the ‘global policeman.’ He points to the combined costs and, at best, questionable outcomes of the conflicts in the Balkans, Middle East and Afghanistan to support his argument. He advocates the resurrection of the Powell Doctrine in this regard. He also advocates that Congress should resurrect its authority to regulate the use of force; an authority that it has largely abrogated since the end of the Cold War. And a reimplementation of a war tax for any military operations that require supplemental funding.
Beckley is very accomplished writer. He conveys his ideas clearly and is able to explain sometimes complex issues in a manner that is relatable and easy to understand. He also puts an interesting spin on his analysis, such as comparing military might to an extortion racket; “extracting concessions and favours from weaker countries through threats of violence and offers of protection.”
Overall, this is an excellent examination of the US’s current position as the world’s only great power, and its future prospects of remaining so. It is thoroughly researched, readable and compelling. There are, in my opinion, some flaws in Beckley’s military analysis, but that does not detract from his overall conclusions. A highly recommended read.
Michael Beckley’s Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower is a very balanced, considered and compelling argument against the view put forward by many commentators that American supremacy is on the wane and that China is destined to replace it. He does not argue that the US is invincible or that US hegemony will last forever, but that predictions of US decline have been overstated. It is difficult to argue with his assessment.
Beckley references the multitude of literature predicting the continued rise of China, gradually overtaking the USA in world predominance. He argues that such predictions suffer from two primary shortcomings that distort people’s perceptions of the balance of power. Firstly, that they use gross indicators such as GDP and military spending to measure power but do not take into account welfare and security burdens thereby exaggerating the wealth and power of poor, populous nations like China and India. Secondly, that they rely on historical notions about the rise and fall of great powers that do not really apply today. He argues that the USA “enjoys a unique set of geographic, demographic and institutional advantages that translate into a commanding geopolitical position.”
He is right on both counts. Technology has made the world smaller which, in turn, has given the US hegemony on a scale not seen before. It cannot be compared to the empires of the past. Only a few commentators seem to recognise these points; my compatriot David Kilcullen being one of them.
Beckley establishes a framework for measuring this amorphous concept called ‘power’ and examines future power trends using net, rather than gross, indicators. Much of his analysis compares the US to China as the only other world power that could conceivably challenge US hegemony in the foreseeable future. He examines their economies focussing on their relative efficiency, as well as their military capabilities taking into account the relative capability of weapon systems, training, and internal efficiencies and costs. He also discusses what he sees are the threats to US power, both internal and external.
He discusses the shortcomings of the two most common methods of trying to measure power; the power as resources approach, and the power as outcomes approach. Ultimately he attempts to develop a hybrid approach to provide a more accurate measure of relative power and uses historical examples of great power rivalries (such as the Opium Wars of the 1800s and the Cold War) to support his methodology. He then applies his methodology to the current rivalry between the US and China.
He examines many aspects of economic performance from industrial and agricultural productivity and innovation through to rates of incarceration, internal security, natural capital and pollution. His analysis reveals the US to be far ahead of China in almost every respect and, indeed, his assessment of China’s prospects are so bleak that it makes it impossible to see China as a real economic rival. He also examines other factors such as US control or influence over international financial markets. His analysis in this respect is very solid and compelling.
His military analysis, however, is not quite as strong. He illustrates, for example, a scenario of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Now there’s doubt that such a venture would be exceedingly difficult for the Chinese with a low probability of success. Beckley’s analysis, however, does seem overly optimistic about Taiwan’s ability, with US support of course, of repelling a Chinese attack. He examines each aspect of military capability in isolation from each other, which, of course, is not how things would work in a full blown invasion. He talks about how easy it would be to bomb Chinese transports as they cross the strait to Taiwan as if those transports would not have air and sea escorts. He talks about how easily Taiwanese forces could mass ashore to repel a Chinese amphibious landing with no mention of pre-landing bombardment or naval gunfire support. It’s not that I necessarily disagree with Beckley’s conclusions, but I do feel that his methodology in this instance is somewhat flawed, and therefore is not as compelling as it could be. The flaw in his analysis is revealed when he examines whether the Chinese could bomb Taiwan into submission stating that “no state has ever conquered another with air power alone.” This is indeed true, but no state would try to conquer another with air power alone. Rather, air power would form one essential part of a broader campaign. His analysis of the situations in the East and South China Sea, though, is much sounder.
Beckley goes on to use a number of economic and military indicators to predict the future prospects of the eight most powerful nations in the world. He identifies three main drivers of long-term economic growth; geography, institutions and demography, and identifies a number of different performance indicators within these drivers. While the US does not come out on top of all of the indicators, it ranks highly across the board. Beckley’s analysis is, again, well-researched and difficult to fault.
He concludes with some interesting foreign policy proposals which he believes would help to maintain US predominance, including some interesting proposals about how the US should engage with North Korea, and advocating a greatly diminished role in the Middle East. Many of his proposals may be seen as ‘hawkish’, such as providing numerous weapons systems to friendly countries in Europe and Asia in order to ‘contain’ Russia and China; however, he balances this with a conservative approach to the US’s perceived position as the ‘global policeman.’ He points to the combined costs and, at best, questionable outcomes of the conflicts in the Balkans, Middle East and Afghanistan to support his argument. He advocates the resurrection of the Powell Doctrine in this regard. He also advocates that Congress should resurrect its authority to regulate the use of force; an authority that it has largely abrogated since the end of the Cold War. And a reimplementation of a war tax for any military operations that require supplemental funding.
Beckley is very accomplished writer. He conveys his ideas clearly and is able to explain sometimes complex issues in a manner that is relatable and easy to understand. He also puts an interesting spin on his analysis, such as comparing military might to an extortion racket; “extracting concessions and favours from weaker countries through threats of violence and offers of protection.”
Overall, this is an excellent examination of the US’s current position as the world’s only great power, and its future prospects of remaining so. It is thoroughly researched, readable and compelling. There are, in my opinion, some flaws in Beckley’s military analysis, but that does not detract from his overall conclusions. A highly recommended read.
April 23, 2020
Convincing!
April 7, 2021
Unrivaled was a super-interesting look at the future of American global hegemony.
Author Michael Beckley is an associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Michael Beckley:
I'm generally a fan of contrarian voices, and the books produced by authors who think "outside the box". I find listening to the opinions and arguments of these heterodox thinkers helps to keep one's own biases and blind spots at bay, as well as potentially introducing ideas you may not have heard before.
To that end, I put this one on my list as soon as I came across it. I was interested to see how the author would make his case here.
The thesis of this book is a somewhat contrarian view; as much recent dialogue has focused on the threat of an emergent China to American hegemony. I have read a few books on this topic, including Stealth War: How China Took Over While America's Elite Slept, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America, and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
All of the above books portray a somewhat grim picture of American supremacy against an emergent China.
Unrivaled has a very good intro; where Beckley lays out the book's thesis in a clear and concise manner - telling the reader what the book will and will not cover.
The formatting of the book is also very effective; it is broken into clear chapters, and each chapter; into headers with relevant writing expanded below. I appreciate it when a book has clear formatting like this. I find it helps the reader to absorb the material in an easily digestible fashion.
Beckley takes the reader through very detailed and data-driven arguments here; citing many economic, demographic, and military trends and metrics to help him make his case.
Beckley argues the thesis for the book quite well here, and I enjoyed hearing him lay out this case.
A large chunk of the book deals with the most pressing threat to American global hegemony: China. Beckley examines many wide-ranging trends and metrics to compare China with the United States. Some of what he covers here:
* The large "brain drain" from China to the West.
* China's population is aging at a faster rate than the US.
* The health of the Chinese population is much worse than Americans on average; the Chinese also have limited access to healthcare, higher cancer and heart disease rates.
* China's massive debt problem.
* The lack of technological invention/innovation in China.
China is not the only rival country talked about here, however. Beckley also covers Russia and India in some detail. There is also some very good writing on the recent polarization of American politics towards the end of the book, where Beckley makes some recommendations for the future.
Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower was a very well researched, formatted, written, and delivered short book. Beckley raises some very significant points, and I found many of his arguments compelling.
I would definitely recommend this one to anyone interested.
5 stars.
Author Michael Beckley is an associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Michael Beckley:
I'm generally a fan of contrarian voices, and the books produced by authors who think "outside the box". I find listening to the opinions and arguments of these heterodox thinkers helps to keep one's own biases and blind spots at bay, as well as potentially introducing ideas you may not have heard before.
To that end, I put this one on my list as soon as I came across it. I was interested to see how the author would make his case here.
The thesis of this book is a somewhat contrarian view; as much recent dialogue has focused on the threat of an emergent China to American hegemony. I have read a few books on this topic, including Stealth War: How China Took Over While America's Elite Slept, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America, and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
All of the above books portray a somewhat grim picture of American supremacy against an emergent China.
Unrivaled has a very good intro; where Beckley lays out the book's thesis in a clear and concise manner - telling the reader what the book will and will not cover.
The formatting of the book is also very effective; it is broken into clear chapters, and each chapter; into headers with relevant writing expanded below. I appreciate it when a book has clear formatting like this. I find it helps the reader to absorb the material in an easily digestible fashion.
Beckley takes the reader through very detailed and data-driven arguments here; citing many economic, demographic, and military trends and metrics to help him make his case.
Beckley argues the thesis for the book quite well here, and I enjoyed hearing him lay out this case.
A large chunk of the book deals with the most pressing threat to American global hegemony: China. Beckley examines many wide-ranging trends and metrics to compare China with the United States. Some of what he covers here:
* The large "brain drain" from China to the West.
* China's population is aging at a faster rate than the US.
* The health of the Chinese population is much worse than Americans on average; the Chinese also have limited access to healthcare, higher cancer and heart disease rates.
* China's massive debt problem.
* The lack of technological invention/innovation in China.
China is not the only rival country talked about here, however. Beckley also covers Russia and India in some detail. There is also some very good writing on the recent polarization of American politics towards the end of the book, where Beckley makes some recommendations for the future.
Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower was a very well researched, formatted, written, and delivered short book. Beckley raises some very significant points, and I found many of his arguments compelling.
I would definitely recommend this one to anyone interested.
5 stars.
May 20, 2021
A well-researched and highly insightful treatise on the wellsprings of America’s relative global power in the modern era, and its unique positioning to hold sway as the singular unipolar entity on the world stage. Beckley’s Unrivaled provides a seasoned counter narrative to the threadbare and trite arguments that other countries’ resurgence, especially including China’s, is to the detriment of US power, and that the mantle for claiming the 21st century is for anyone’s taking.
March 11, 2020
Graham Allison’s concept of the Thucydides Trap has fed the hubristic notion in polarizing policy debates that China’s rise in the world is in relative proportion to America’s decline. While military conflict (economic and trade flaps notwithstanding) may in fact be avoidable as a result of the aggressive and interconnected aspects of other instruments of power, the authenticity of great power competition with China may in fact be just a facade—in every respect of that debate. This view is the overarching thesis of Michael Beckley’s new book Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower, originally titled The Unipolar Era.
Beckley is an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University and an associate in the International Security Program in the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School. His work has been featured in numerous popular media (NPR, Washington Post, and Harvard Business Review, among others). He has served in academia, the think tank community (RAND, Carnegie Endowment) and in government (DOD)—making this book as credible as it is highly readable.
The central thesis of Beckley’s argument—that the US will remain the world’s sole superpower for many decades and perhaps the rest of this century—rests on the supposition that current comparative measures and indices of power do not sufficiently describe, and often fall well short of, articulating relative power. He contends that one of the primary measures, gross domestic product (GDP), exaggerates the wealth and military power of populous countries whose vast output also bears enormous welfare, security, and efficiency costs. Beckley also debunks the supposition that all great powers have predictable life spans (as history demonstrates) by excepting the US due to unique geographic, demographic, and institutional factors combining to keep it in the lead position in perpetuity. These same arguments are also advanced in Peter Zeihan’s The Accidental Superpower and Tim Marshall’s Prisoners of Geography.
In chapter 2, Beckley provides a history review, developing his argument via the framework and combined measure, which is quite convincing. He then builds upon this foundation in chapters 3 and 4 to test and make comparisons between the US and its closest and most talked about power rival, China, through a thorough economic and military lens. The primary conclusion economically articulates that the US has much lower welfare and security costs that traditional measures gloss over, creating the impression that China is overtaking the US. However, as Beckley demonstrates, China’s economy barely keeps pace as it backs profit-losing companies and tries desperately, but failingly, to fully meet the needs of one-fifth of the earth’s population. Likewise, in chapter 4, the results are stark. The US has five to 10 times the military capabilities of China, whose weapon systems are half as capable. Further, China’s limited operational experience, training, and lack of combat—coupled with personnel costs 25 percent higher than similar US costs—work against it. Beckley argues that for China to successfully compete in these areas, it must grow much faster than it currently is, which he deems as unlikely.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the future prospects of great powers and their implications. In the former, Beckley critiques two theories—balance of power and convergence—in furtherance of his argument in a fair and reasoned manner. In support of the argument, he develops a new framework projecting the rise and fall of nations that draw on separate and credible economic studies underpinned by geography, institutions, and demography. He concludes chapter 5 by noting that the US “has the most potential for future growth, in addition to an enormous economic and military lead,” yet cautions like any astute political scientist that this will not guarantee future unipolarity. Beckley articulates four implications concerning US unipolarity to bolster his thesis and arguments. He advises that a perpetually unipolar US is not assured, yet, if handled properly, can allow the US to prosper indefinitely—another astute argument.
Beckley adeptly cautions that his argument is not about guaranteed perpetual US dominance. For example, the advantages that elevated and have kept the US in its unipolar status could be squandered by restricting high-skill immigration, or allowing special interests or demagogues to capture political institutions and run the country into the ground. To further balance his argument, Beckley notes that a taming of American power could take several other forms, such as other countries “denying the U.S. access to their domestic markets, suing the U.S. in international courts, bribing American politicians, bankrolling anti-American terrorist groups, hacking U.S. computer networks, and brandishing weapons of mass destruction,” among others. It would take a concerted, concurrent, and persistent effort by a disinterested America to allow this to happen, which is highly unlikely. The supporting chapters clarify these counterarguments while also reinforcing his thesis.
To make his case, Beckley sets about developing his own framework for measuring power and assessing trends. He then builds another framework for predicting power trends, subsequently using it to “assess the future prospects of today’s great powers.” Lastly, he cogently ties the two together and discusses the implications of his findings on world politics and US policy. As noted earlier, measures such as GDP and the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) (an index combining military spending with data on troops, population, and industrial output) alone do not aggregate and illustrate the true picture of power according to Beckley. He explains how he takes the advice of historian Paul Bairoch by “simply multiplying GDP by GDP per capita, creating an index that gives equal weight to a nation’s gross output and its output per person” to derive a more accurate measure of power.
For those interested in political science and/or foreign or international affairs, Beckley’s arguments will provide a new and refreshing look updating tired, older theses. At 248 pages, his book can easily be read over a weekend.
Brig Gen Chad Manske, USAF
Commandant, National War College
Beckley is an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University and an associate in the International Security Program in the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School. His work has been featured in numerous popular media (NPR, Washington Post, and Harvard Business Review, among others). He has served in academia, the think tank community (RAND, Carnegie Endowment) and in government (DOD)—making this book as credible as it is highly readable.
The central thesis of Beckley’s argument—that the US will remain the world’s sole superpower for many decades and perhaps the rest of this century—rests on the supposition that current comparative measures and indices of power do not sufficiently describe, and often fall well short of, articulating relative power. He contends that one of the primary measures, gross domestic product (GDP), exaggerates the wealth and military power of populous countries whose vast output also bears enormous welfare, security, and efficiency costs. Beckley also debunks the supposition that all great powers have predictable life spans (as history demonstrates) by excepting the US due to unique geographic, demographic, and institutional factors combining to keep it in the lead position in perpetuity. These same arguments are also advanced in Peter Zeihan’s The Accidental Superpower and Tim Marshall’s Prisoners of Geography.
In chapter 2, Beckley provides a history review, developing his argument via the framework and combined measure, which is quite convincing. He then builds upon this foundation in chapters 3 and 4 to test and make comparisons between the US and its closest and most talked about power rival, China, through a thorough economic and military lens. The primary conclusion economically articulates that the US has much lower welfare and security costs that traditional measures gloss over, creating the impression that China is overtaking the US. However, as Beckley demonstrates, China’s economy barely keeps pace as it backs profit-losing companies and tries desperately, but failingly, to fully meet the needs of one-fifth of the earth’s population. Likewise, in chapter 4, the results are stark. The US has five to 10 times the military capabilities of China, whose weapon systems are half as capable. Further, China’s limited operational experience, training, and lack of combat—coupled with personnel costs 25 percent higher than similar US costs—work against it. Beckley argues that for China to successfully compete in these areas, it must grow much faster than it currently is, which he deems as unlikely.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the future prospects of great powers and their implications. In the former, Beckley critiques two theories—balance of power and convergence—in furtherance of his argument in a fair and reasoned manner. In support of the argument, he develops a new framework projecting the rise and fall of nations that draw on separate and credible economic studies underpinned by geography, institutions, and demography. He concludes chapter 5 by noting that the US “has the most potential for future growth, in addition to an enormous economic and military lead,” yet cautions like any astute political scientist that this will not guarantee future unipolarity. Beckley articulates four implications concerning US unipolarity to bolster his thesis and arguments. He advises that a perpetually unipolar US is not assured, yet, if handled properly, can allow the US to prosper indefinitely—another astute argument.
Beckley adeptly cautions that his argument is not about guaranteed perpetual US dominance. For example, the advantages that elevated and have kept the US in its unipolar status could be squandered by restricting high-skill immigration, or allowing special interests or demagogues to capture political institutions and run the country into the ground. To further balance his argument, Beckley notes that a taming of American power could take several other forms, such as other countries “denying the U.S. access to their domestic markets, suing the U.S. in international courts, bribing American politicians, bankrolling anti-American terrorist groups, hacking U.S. computer networks, and brandishing weapons of mass destruction,” among others. It would take a concerted, concurrent, and persistent effort by a disinterested America to allow this to happen, which is highly unlikely. The supporting chapters clarify these counterarguments while also reinforcing his thesis.
To make his case, Beckley sets about developing his own framework for measuring power and assessing trends. He then builds another framework for predicting power trends, subsequently using it to “assess the future prospects of today’s great powers.” Lastly, he cogently ties the two together and discusses the implications of his findings on world politics and US policy. As noted earlier, measures such as GDP and the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) (an index combining military spending with data on troops, population, and industrial output) alone do not aggregate and illustrate the true picture of power according to Beckley. He explains how he takes the advice of historian Paul Bairoch by “simply multiplying GDP by GDP per capita, creating an index that gives equal weight to a nation’s gross output and its output per person” to derive a more accurate measure of power.
For those interested in political science and/or foreign or international affairs, Beckley’s arguments will provide a new and refreshing look updating tired, older theses. At 248 pages, his book can easily be read over a weekend.
Brig Gen Chad Manske, USAF
Commandant, National War College
March 23, 2022
This was an excellent book. A welcome breath of fresh air amongst all of the current books touting China as a great power that threatens America. The author told the story with numbers, something I understand. The crux of his argument is that while China may be big and rising, its cost structure (production, welfare and security) is very high, which diminishes how affective China can project power to its global competitors. This makes perfect sense, a profitable company can do much more than an unprofitable company.
China has 14,000 miles of borders with not so friendly neighbors, while the US has two coast lines with two very large oceans and two friendly neighbors to the north and south. And while China has 1.3 billion people, it is projected that in 50 years 460 million will be aged over 65 (which will add enormous welfare costs). In contrast, the US has 330 million people and it is projected that in 50 years, it will have 40 million people in the 30 to 40 year age - working adults. The military analysis was also very interesting, which tips the hat to the US given its experience in recent wars and technological and manpower readiness.
I am more comfortable now about the US vs. China than in the past and this book did an excellent job explaining why we should not overstate China’s hand in the global order.
China has 14,000 miles of borders with not so friendly neighbors, while the US has two coast lines with two very large oceans and two friendly neighbors to the north and south. And while China has 1.3 billion people, it is projected that in 50 years 460 million will be aged over 65 (which will add enormous welfare costs). In contrast, the US has 330 million people and it is projected that in 50 years, it will have 40 million people in the 30 to 40 year age - working adults. The military analysis was also very interesting, which tips the hat to the US given its experience in recent wars and technological and manpower readiness.
I am more comfortable now about the US vs. China than in the past and this book did an excellent job explaining why we should not overstate China’s hand in the global order.
June 17, 2021
A fact-packed antidote to the doomsayers. With this well-organized analysis, I was convinced that the U.S. is, not so much unrivaled, but certainly the leading global power in an imperfect world. Most importantly, I was reminded that, far from occupying a comfortable position, the U.S. has a responsibility to continue to embody and strive for liberty for its citizens. While I didn’t agree with all the recommended policies for a unipolar power, the author did an excellent job of summarizing the major issues (Taiwan, for example) for the future.
November 13, 2021
Beckley provides a balanced account of the past, present, and future of the great power rivalry between the US and China. Beckley's book is, at least in part, a response to academic books like Allison's "Thucydides Trap" that suggests that China is more likely than not to overtake the US as a hegemon and non-academic, and sensationalist, books like Christian Brose's "The Kill Chain." Whereas Allison suggests that history and scholarship tell us where US/China relations are likely to go and books like Brose's are purely sensational, Beckley draws on his understanding of political science, history, and economics to tell us that when we look at the details, China is unlikely to overcome the US in global influence, either in the short-term or with its current government.
To draw his conclusions Beckley does avoid detailed discussions of certain dilemmas. For example, countries are often willing to absorb enormous costs to wage military conflicts for "core interests." Although Taiwan has some advantages in a conflict with China and the South China Sea is too vast for China to efficiently patrol, it is not hard to imagine limited conflicts escalating to larger ones that lead to small-scale, or larger, wars. Beckley considers the tangible factors of military conflict, such as who has better weapons and better training, but neglects the intangibles, such as the level of motivation for a country to commit forces and costs to a conflict. For example, the North Vietnamese were "militarily" defeated by the US over and over while the US placed artificial constraints on itself that saw politicians choosing bombing targets and prevented the military from counterattacking North Vietnamese past South Vietnam's borders. Any conflict with China would certainly see a similar imbalance of commitment and artificial political constraints, which could increase the likelihood of China achieving its aims.
Beckley also does not confront China's current strategy of "salami slicing" to incrementally increase its ability to assert military and economic power internationally. Ten years ago Chinese coast guard and naval patrols in three seas and perpetual patrols at disputed territories would have been unthinkable, but they are the reality today and for the indefinite future. Where will this trend end, and will it trigger a regional arms race? More sensationalistic thinkers like Brose see this scenario and argue strongly for the US to prevent the country from falling behind China in military technology, a concern Bleckley argues is overstated.
Bleckley also does not focus enough on another important aspect of US/China confrontation. China may be economically weaker when you consider per-capita measures and its military may be inexperienced, but China's size means that it can commit a great deal of military and economic forces to regional conflict. Bleckley rightly points out that other writers often ignore that China has to maintain readiness for conflict nearly across its entire border, from North Korea, to Russia, India, the South China Sea, and Taiwan while also being prepared to deploy domestically, perhaps in a similar way that the US maintains forces postured for major conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. It is a difficult to consider what risks China would make regarding its other borders to commit to a conflict, however limited, in the South China Sea, for example.
These weaknesses are minor considering Beckley's insight and ability to challenge the current conventional wisdom regarding US/China relations. Beckley takes on questions conveniently set aside by more prominent figures and rebuts their arguments in a balanced and measured manner. Beckley's writing should inspire policy makers and military and civilian officials to take a step back and consider how the US can use its considerable advantages to confront China's military challenges in Eastern Pacific and economic challenges concerning intellectual property while also cooperating on climate change and global economic stability.
To draw his conclusions Beckley does avoid detailed discussions of certain dilemmas. For example, countries are often willing to absorb enormous costs to wage military conflicts for "core interests." Although Taiwan has some advantages in a conflict with China and the South China Sea is too vast for China to efficiently patrol, it is not hard to imagine limited conflicts escalating to larger ones that lead to small-scale, or larger, wars. Beckley considers the tangible factors of military conflict, such as who has better weapons and better training, but neglects the intangibles, such as the level of motivation for a country to commit forces and costs to a conflict. For example, the North Vietnamese were "militarily" defeated by the US over and over while the US placed artificial constraints on itself that saw politicians choosing bombing targets and prevented the military from counterattacking North Vietnamese past South Vietnam's borders. Any conflict with China would certainly see a similar imbalance of commitment and artificial political constraints, which could increase the likelihood of China achieving its aims.
Beckley also does not confront China's current strategy of "salami slicing" to incrementally increase its ability to assert military and economic power internationally. Ten years ago Chinese coast guard and naval patrols in three seas and perpetual patrols at disputed territories would have been unthinkable, but they are the reality today and for the indefinite future. Where will this trend end, and will it trigger a regional arms race? More sensationalistic thinkers like Brose see this scenario and argue strongly for the US to prevent the country from falling behind China in military technology, a concern Bleckley argues is overstated.
Bleckley also does not focus enough on another important aspect of US/China confrontation. China may be economically weaker when you consider per-capita measures and its military may be inexperienced, but China's size means that it can commit a great deal of military and economic forces to regional conflict. Bleckley rightly points out that other writers often ignore that China has to maintain readiness for conflict nearly across its entire border, from North Korea, to Russia, India, the South China Sea, and Taiwan while also being prepared to deploy domestically, perhaps in a similar way that the US maintains forces postured for major conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. It is a difficult to consider what risks China would make regarding its other borders to commit to a conflict, however limited, in the South China Sea, for example.
These weaknesses are minor considering Beckley's insight and ability to challenge the current conventional wisdom regarding US/China relations. Beckley takes on questions conveniently set aside by more prominent figures and rebuts their arguments in a balanced and measured manner. Beckley's writing should inspire policy makers and military and civilian officials to take a step back and consider how the US can use its considerable advantages to confront China's military challenges in Eastern Pacific and economic challenges concerning intellectual property while also cooperating on climate change and global economic stability.
August 21, 2022
There's a lot of talk these days about the Thucydides Trap, and how we should manage a world in which China overtakes the US as the world's primary super power. This book does a great job presenting lots of evidence suggesting that this assumption is wrong. That instead, China's power has already peaked, and will likely diminish. The evidence includes data on demographics, economics, finance, political institutions and more. I've found myself feeling uncertain about how to understand the changes taking place in the world, and this book helped give me some perspective.
One thing to note is that this book was published in 2018, and while the thesis of the book is still relevant, China's advances and activities in the past four years are so significant that this book can feel slightly out-dated at times. Luckily, Michael Beckley just released a new book on the US and China that is also worth a read for anyone interested in diving into the subject.
One thing to note is that this book was published in 2018, and while the thesis of the book is still relevant, China's advances and activities in the past four years are so significant that this book can feel slightly out-dated at times. Luckily, Michael Beckley just released a new book on the US and China that is also worth a read for anyone interested in diving into the subject.
July 6, 2021
Michael Buckley’s “Unrivaled: Why America will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower” is a superbly written and researched work on the underlying reasons for American’s position as the unipolar superpower. The author does an excellent job laying out the data that undergirds the discussions of GDP, wealth, and more importantly “power” to present a compelling argument examining not just the “gross” parts of power determination, but really dives into the “net” parts. The author breaks the argument down into Economic, Military, and Political sections to examine where the strengths of American power derive from and expertly highlights what makes America different when compared to other potential rivals.
September 16, 2019
This book has unique distinction of covering some well known arguments a la Peter Zeihan, but with a slew of supporting points and evidence that I was not aware of before. Beckley's main focus is one noting that without a true net accounting of various potential rivals' (ie. China) strategic assets and liabilities one gets a distorted view of the true power balances in the world. Beckley argues that a nation like China has enormour gross strategic assets, but when you net out their costs and liabilities there are huge shortfalls. Shortfalls that Beckley doubts that China can catch up on for at least decades if ever.
February 21, 2019
An assault of statistics and figures providing an empirical review of state power. It provides solid reasoning why American will NOT be easily overtaken by its present rivals, China or Russia. The end turns into a plea against the current state of American government and while evocative, it does make some excellent points to ensure the case laid out in the first part of the book holds true.
Rich bibliography. Spent as much time looking at it as I did the main text.
Rich bibliography. Spent as much time looking at it as I did the main text.
June 4, 2022
Interesting take on China-US relations. Overall argument is fairly persuasive, although the author never fully addresses how differences in patriotism might play a role in US conflicts with other countries. The final chapter ("things that the US needs to do better") is boring, if only because his sensible proposals seem so improbable to come to pass.
Overall, a worthwhile antidote to the endless hype on China.
Overall, a worthwhile antidote to the endless hype on China.
January 20, 2023
This is an optimists view of the US situation with China backed up by some very good numbers and also by some careful theory building. His basic argument is that judging relative strengths has to be done on a balance sheet basis - not looking at raw numbers but more on net flows. When you account in the way he does the US becomes unrivaled unless we screw it up.
February 10, 2024
Impressive Read
Excellent analysis of the political landscape and foreign powers between the USA and China.
Took a very good look at regimes like China, and how their corruption and inaccurate GDP numbers affect their actual power.
Very important read, and timely too.
The best analysis on USA strong and soft power.
Excellent journalism! Inspiring read.
4.8/5
Excellent analysis of the political landscape and foreign powers between the USA and China.
Took a very good look at regimes like China, and how their corruption and inaccurate GDP numbers affect their actual power.
Very important read, and timely too.
The best analysis on USA strong and soft power.
Excellent journalism! Inspiring read.
4.8/5
March 6, 2024
A well-researched, interesting and very easy to read book. I found it well-grounded in history and current geo-politics and was fascinated by Beckley's conclusions. Although it was mostly current I found some recent events in the US would challenge some of his ideas, although to be fair, he did imply such things. Highly recommended.
September 12, 2019
This is the best book I have ever read on the sources of American supremacy and the myth of its decline. The others, including Josef Joffe’s excellent book “The Myth of America’s Decline” are put to shame by this one.
So well-written, so jam-packed with statistics and insight. Highly recommended.
So well-written, so jam-packed with statistics and insight. Highly recommended.
October 14, 2021
The title gives the impression of chest-thumping nationalism. The tone of this book is anything but. Beckley reads like the sober academic that he is. The arguments he presents reference hundreds of academic studies. I found them compelling.
November 30, 2022
Excellent work by Dr. Beckley, gives convincing empirical accounting for what are too often fuzzy IR concepts and ideas--"power" "capabilities" "the rise of china" etc. My only concern is that I so desperately want Beckley to be right that it's highly likely I'm missing the flaws in his argument.
December 17, 2019
Premise was interesting, desperately needs an editor in the last 1/3 or so.
January 5, 2020
This book is short and informative. It provides lot of good examples but nothing new to me.
May 25, 2020
Good analysis of the distinction between gross and net resources. Detailed analysis of military balance around the world and in East Asia. Domestic policy prescriptions uncreative and ideological.
November 8, 2020
Great Book.
Top score for the reasonable & in depth research. Explains it all to the point why America will stary at the top.
Top score for the reasonable & in depth research. Explains it all to the point why America will stary at the top.
May 21, 2021
This one’s for the data nerds. Will be interesting to scholars and practitioners alike- not overly theoretical. Nice nuance. Reminiscent of Brooks and Wohlforth.
Added bonus: gives peace of mind
Added bonus: gives peace of mind
June 11, 2021
The only thing that the US has to fear is the US itself.
June 26, 2021
I disagree on some points but still convincing!
June 22, 2022
Good book.
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