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The Nicomachean Ethics
‘One swallow does not make a summer; neither does one day. Similarly neither can one day, or a brief space of time, make a man blessed and happy’
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out to examine the nature of happiness. He argues that happiness consists in ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’, for example with moral virtues, such as courage, generosity and justice, and intellectual virtues, such as knowledge, wisdom and insight. The Ethics also discusses the nature of practical reasoning, the value and the objects of pleasure, the different forms of friendship, and the relationship between individual virtue, society and the State. Aristotle’s work has had a profound and lasting influence on all subsequent Western thought about ethical matters.
J. A. K. Thomson’s translation has been revised by Hugh Tredennick, and is accompanied by a new introduction by Jonathan Barnes. This edition also includes an updated list for further reading and a new chronology of Aristotle’s life and works.
Previously published as Ethics
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out to examine the nature of happiness. He argues that happiness consists in ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’, for example with moral virtues, such as courage, generosity and justice, and intellectual virtues, such as knowledge, wisdom and insight. The Ethics also discusses the nature of practical reasoning, the value and the objects of pleasure, the different forms of friendship, and the relationship between individual virtue, society and the State. Aristotle’s work has had a profound and lasting influence on all subsequent Western thought about ethical matters.
J. A. K. Thomson’s translation has been revised by Hugh Tredennick, and is accompanied by a new introduction by Jonathan Barnes. This edition also includes an updated list for further reading and a new chronology of Aristotle’s life and works.
Previously published as Ethics
329 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 351
About the author
Aristotle
3,447 books4,803 followers384 BC–322 BC
Greek philosopher Aristotle, a pupil of Plato and the tutor of Alexander the Great, authored works on ethics, natural sciences, politics, and poetics that profoundly influenced western thought; empirical observation precedes theory, and the syllogism bases logic, the essential method of rational inquiry in his system, which led him to see and to criticize metaphysical excesses.
Empirical, scientific, or commonsensical methods of an Aristotelian, also Aristotelean, a person, tends to think. Deductive method, especially the theory of the syllogism, defines Aristotelian logic. The formal logic, based on that of Aristotle, deals with the relations between propositions in terms of their form instead of their content.
Commentaries of well known Arab philosopher, jurist, and physician Averroës ibn Rushd of Spain on Aristotle exerted a strong influence on medieval Christian theology.
German religious philosopher Saint Albertus Magnus later sought to apply his methods to current scientific questions. Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the most influential thinker of the medieval period, combined doctrine of Aristotle within a context of Christianity.
Aristotle numbers among the greatest of all time. Almost peerless, he shaped centuries from late antiquity through the Renaissance, and people even today continue to study him with keen, non-antiquarian interest. This prodigious researcher and writer left a great body, perhaps numbering as many as two hundred treatises, from which 31 survive. His extant writings span a wide range of disciplines from mind through aesthetics and rhetoric and into such primary fields as biology; he excelled at detailed plant and animal taxonomy. In all these topics, he provided illumination, met with resistance, sparked debate, and generally stimulated the sustained interest of an abiding readership.
Wide range and its remoteness in time defies easy encapsulation. The long history of interpretation and appropriation of texts and themes, spanning over two millennia within a variety of religious and secular traditions, rendered controversial even basic points of interpretation.
Greek philosopher Aristotle, a pupil of Plato and the tutor of Alexander the Great, authored works on ethics, natural sciences, politics, and poetics that profoundly influenced western thought; empirical observation precedes theory, and the syllogism bases logic, the essential method of rational inquiry in his system, which led him to see and to criticize metaphysical excesses.
Empirical, scientific, or commonsensical methods of an Aristotelian, also Aristotelean, a person, tends to think. Deductive method, especially the theory of the syllogism, defines Aristotelian logic. The formal logic, based on that of Aristotle, deals with the relations between propositions in terms of their form instead of their content.
Commentaries of well known Arab philosopher, jurist, and physician Averroës ibn Rushd of Spain on Aristotle exerted a strong influence on medieval Christian theology.
German religious philosopher Saint Albertus Magnus later sought to apply his methods to current scientific questions. Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the most influential thinker of the medieval period, combined doctrine of Aristotle within a context of Christianity.
Aristotle numbers among the greatest of all time. Almost peerless, he shaped centuries from late antiquity through the Renaissance, and people even today continue to study him with keen, non-antiquarian interest. This prodigious researcher and writer left a great body, perhaps numbering as many as two hundred treatises, from which 31 survive. His extant writings span a wide range of disciplines from mind through aesthetics and rhetoric and into such primary fields as biology; he excelled at detailed plant and animal taxonomy. In all these topics, he provided illumination, met with resistance, sparked debate, and generally stimulated the sustained interest of an abiding readership.
Wide range and its remoteness in time defies easy encapsulation. The long history of interpretation and appropriation of texts and themes, spanning over two millennia within a variety of religious and secular traditions, rendered controversial even basic points of interpretation.
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December 1, 2021
The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
The Nicomachean Ethics is the name normally given to Aristotle's best-known work on ethics.
The work, which plays a pre-eminent role in defining Aristotelian ethics, consists of ten books, originally separate scrolls, and is understood to be based on notes from his lectures at the Lyceum.
The title is often assumed to refer to his son Nicomachus, to whom the work was dedicated or who may have edited it (although his young age makes this less likely).
Alternatively, the work may have been dedicated to his father, who was also called Nicomachus.
تاریخ نخستین خوانش: ماه مارس سال2007میلادی
عنوان: علم اخلاق نیکوماخوسی؛ نویسنده: ارسطو؛ مترجم: صلاح الدین سلجوقی (زاده سال1274هجری خورشیدی، در افغانستان، درگذشته سال1349هجری خورشیدی)؛ وزارت علوم افغانستان، در330ص؛ چاپ دیگر شریعتی افغانستانی، محمد ابراهیم اشک شیرین، در610ص؛ شابک9789640407622؛ موضوع: اخلاق، از نویسندگان یونان - سده4پیش از میلاد
عنوان: اخلاق نیکوماخوس؛ نویسنده: ارسطو؛ مترجم: محمدحسن لطفی؛ تهران، طرح نو، سال1378، در414ص؛ چاپ دوم سال1385؛ شابک9645625696؛
در میان فرهیختگان، و نخبگان علمی «افغانستان»؛ در سده ی گذشته، «صلاح الدین سلجوقی (زاده سال1274هجری خورشیدی، درگذشته سال1349هجری خورشیدی)» از جایگاه بلند، و ممتازی، برخوردار بوده اند، برهان آن هم مشخص است، «علامه سلجوقی» محدود به یک حوزه نبودند؛ ایشان شاعری زبردست، و مترجمی توانمند بودند، مطالعات فلسفی ژرفی داشتند، و یک روزنامه نگار حرفه ای نیز، به شمار میرفتند؛ کتابهای «افکار شاعر»، «اخلاق ارسطو»، «نقد بیدل»، «التهذیب» و ...؛ همه کتابهایی هستند، که بارها در داخل و خارج از «افغانستان» منتشر شده اند؛ «سلجوقی» در کل، همانند یک «دائرة المعارف (دانشنامه)» بودند، ایشان جدای از زبان مادری، به زبانهای «عربی»، «انگلیسی»، «فرانسوی»، «آلمانی»، و «اردو» هم تسلط داشتند
فهرست ترجمه روانشاد «صلاح الدین سلجوقی»: «یادداشت ناشر ص هفت»؛ «تمهید ص نه»؛ «معرفی ص یکصد و بیست و یک»؛ یادآوری ص یکصد چهل و هفت»؛ «کتاب اول ص1»؛ «کتاب دوم ص43»؛ «کتاب سوم ص73»؛ «کتاب چهارم ص141»؛ «کتاب پنجم ص165»؛ «کتاب ششم ص213»؛ «کتاب هفتم ص247»؛ «کتاب هشتم ص297»؛ «کتاب نهم ص323»؛ «کتاب دهم ص457»؛ «فهرست تفصیلی کتاب، ص433»؛ «نامنامه ص457»؛ «نقشه نقاط زندگی ارسطو، ص463»؛
اخلاق «نیکوماخوسی»، عنوان شناخته شده ترین اثر «ارسطو»، در زمینه ی اخلاق است؛ این اثر که نقش برجسته ای در معرفی اخلاق «ارسطویی» دارد، از ده کتاب تشکیل، و بر مبنای یادداشت برداری از سخنان «ارسطو» در «لیسیوم» شکل گرفته است؛ این اثر، یا توسط «نیکوماخوس (پسر ارسطو)»، ویرایش شده، یا به ایشان تقدیم شده است
سجیه یا همان خلق و خوی نیک از شرایط لازم، برای دستیابی به سعادت، و سعادت، غایت نهایی انسانهاست؛ پس غایت همه ی اعمال افراد، خواه فردی، و خواه اجتماعی این است، که بزرگترین سعادت، برای بزرگترین و بیشترین افراد بشر، حاصل شود؛ «ارسطو»، هیچ نوع تفاوتی، بین خیر فرد، و خیر افراد نمیشناسند، بلکه خیر فرد را، بدون اجتماع، خیلی ضعیف میدانند؛ خواه فرد، به این خیر، آگاه باشد یا نباشد؛ پس بهترین و سعادتمندترین زندگی، از دید «ارسطو» آن است، که جامعه آن را، به وجود آورده باشد؛ از دیدگاه «ارسطو» مملکت، یک مرکز بزرگ و قوی، برای تعلم و تربیت است، که به فرد فرصت مضاعفی را، برای کشف خویش میدهد؛ فرقی که «ارسطو»، بین دو مرحله ی زندگی اجتماعی، باور دارد، عبارت است از: مرحله ی استعداد، برای هیات کامل مدنی، و مرحله ی بهره گیری عملی از مدنیت؛ هسته ی اصلی «رساله ی اخلاق ارسطو» این است، که سجیه تشکیل شود؛ بدینترتیب، که انسان، برای حیات در یک جامعه ی مدنی، آماده میشود؛ کتاب حاضر، ترجمه ای است از «اخلاق نیکوماخوس»، اثر «ارسطو» که از کتاب اول تا کتاب دهم را، شامل میشود
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 20/11/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ 09/09/1400هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
The Nicomachean Ethics is the name normally given to Aristotle's best-known work on ethics.
The work, which plays a pre-eminent role in defining Aristotelian ethics, consists of ten books, originally separate scrolls, and is understood to be based on notes from his lectures at the Lyceum.
The title is often assumed to refer to his son Nicomachus, to whom the work was dedicated or who may have edited it (although his young age makes this less likely).
Alternatively, the work may have been dedicated to his father, who was also called Nicomachus.
تاریخ نخستین خوانش: ماه مارس سال2007میلادی
عنوان: علم اخلاق نیکوماخوسی؛ نویسنده: ارسطو؛ مترجم: صلاح الدین سلجوقی (زاده سال1274هجری خورشیدی، در افغانستان، درگذشته سال1349هجری خورشیدی)؛ وزارت علوم افغانستان، در330ص؛ چاپ دیگر شریعتی افغانستانی، محمد ابراهیم اشک شیرین، در610ص؛ شابک9789640407622؛ موضوع: اخلاق، از نویسندگان یونان - سده4پیش از میلاد
عنوان: اخلاق نیکوماخوس؛ نویسنده: ارسطو؛ مترجم: محمدحسن لطفی؛ تهران، طرح نو، سال1378، در414ص؛ چاپ دوم سال1385؛ شابک9645625696؛
در میان فرهیختگان، و نخبگان علمی «افغانستان»؛ در سده ی گذشته، «صلاح الدین سلجوقی (زاده سال1274هجری خورشیدی، درگذشته سال1349هجری خورشیدی)» از جایگاه بلند، و ممتازی، برخوردار بوده اند، برهان آن هم مشخص است، «علامه سلجوقی» محدود به یک حوزه نبودند؛ ایشان شاعری زبردست، و مترجمی توانمند بودند، مطالعات فلسفی ژرفی داشتند، و یک روزنامه نگار حرفه ای نیز، به شمار میرفتند؛ کتابهای «افکار شاعر»، «اخلاق ارسطو»، «نقد بیدل»، «التهذیب» و ...؛ همه کتابهایی هستند، که بارها در داخل و خارج از «افغانستان» منتشر شده اند؛ «سلجوقی» در کل، همانند یک «دائرة المعارف (دانشنامه)» بودند، ایشان جدای از زبان مادری، به زبانهای «عربی»، «انگلیسی»، «فرانسوی»، «آلمانی»، و «اردو» هم تسلط داشتند
فهرست ترجمه روانشاد «صلاح الدین سلجوقی»: «یادداشت ناشر ص هفت»؛ «تمهید ص نه»؛ «معرفی ص یکصد و بیست و یک»؛ یادآوری ص یکصد چهل و هفت»؛ «کتاب اول ص1»؛ «کتاب دوم ص43»؛ «کتاب سوم ص73»؛ «کتاب چهارم ص141»؛ «کتاب پنجم ص165»؛ «کتاب ششم ص213»؛ «کتاب هفتم ص247»؛ «کتاب هشتم ص297»؛ «کتاب نهم ص323»؛ «کتاب دهم ص457»؛ «فهرست تفصیلی کتاب، ص433»؛ «نامنامه ص457»؛ «نقشه نقاط زندگی ارسطو، ص463»؛
اخلاق «نیکوماخوسی»، عنوان شناخته شده ترین اثر «ارسطو»، در زمینه ی اخلاق است؛ این اثر که نقش برجسته ای در معرفی اخلاق «ارسطویی» دارد، از ده کتاب تشکیل، و بر مبنای یادداشت برداری از سخنان «ارسطو» در «لیسیوم» شکل گرفته است؛ این اثر، یا توسط «نیکوماخوس (پسر ارسطو)»، ویرایش شده، یا به ایشان تقدیم شده است
سجیه یا همان خلق و خوی نیک از شرایط لازم، برای دستیابی به سعادت، و سعادت، غایت نهایی انسانهاست؛ پس غایت همه ی اعمال افراد، خواه فردی، و خواه اجتماعی این است، که بزرگترین سعادت، برای بزرگترین و بیشترین افراد بشر، حاصل شود؛ «ارسطو»، هیچ نوع تفاوتی، بین خیر فرد، و خیر افراد نمیشناسند، بلکه خیر فرد را، بدون اجتماع، خیلی ضعیف میدانند؛ خواه فرد، به این خیر، آگاه باشد یا نباشد؛ پس بهترین و سعادتمندترین زندگی، از دید «ارسطو» آن است، که جامعه آن را، به وجود آورده باشد؛ از دیدگاه «ارسطو» مملکت، یک مرکز بزرگ و قوی، برای تعلم و تربیت است، که به فرد فرصت مضاعفی را، برای کشف خویش میدهد؛ فرقی که «ارسطو»، بین دو مرحله ی زندگی اجتماعی، باور دارد، عبارت است از: مرحله ی استعداد، برای هیات کامل مدنی، و مرحله ی بهره گیری عملی از مدنیت؛ هسته ی اصلی «رساله ی اخلاق ارسطو» این است، که سجیه تشکیل شود؛ بدینترتیب، که انسان، برای حیات در یک جامعه ی مدنی، آماده میشود؛ کتاب حاضر، ترجمه ای است از «اخلاق نیکوماخوس»، اثر «ارسطو» که از کتاب اول تا کتاب دهم را، شامل میشود
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 20/11/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ 09/09/1400هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
May 2, 2022
Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle postulates the highest human good is eudaimonia or what is loosely translated into English as happiness. And a substantial component in the path to such human happiness is acting with the appropriate virtues over the course of an entire lifetime. The details of these Aristotelean teachings form the Nicomachean Ethics, one of the most influential works in the entire history of Western Civilization.
As a way of sharing but a small example of Aristotle’s extensive philosophy outlined in these pages, I will focus on Book IV Chapter 8 where the eminent Greek philosopher addresses the virtue of being witty, sensitive to others, discerning and perceptive, particularly when we are at our leisure. Here are six Aristotle quotes and my brief accompanying comments:
“Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is included leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse which is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying- and again listening to- what one should and as one should.”
Aristotle’s focus on time spent outside of work, what we nowadays refer to as ‘leisure time’, makes this section of his ethical teachings particularly relevant for us today, most especially since we are bombarded by a nonstop barrage of advertisements, store signs, billboards, Muzak, etc. etc., some subtle, many not so subtle.
“The kind of people one is speaking to or listening to will also make a difference.”
Very important who we associate with both at work and outside of work. Aristotle is optimistic that we can actively participate in society and exercise discrimination as we develop wisdom to speak as we should and listen as we should. In contrast, another Greek philosopher, Epicurus, was not so optimistic on this point. Epicurus judged conventional society as blind and dumb, particularly as it pertains to men and women expounding values regarding such things as riches and fame and what constitutes our true human needs. The answer for Epicurus: withdraw into a separate community with like-minded friends and philosophers.
“Regarding people’s views on humor there is both an excess and a deficiency as compared with the mean. Those who carry humor to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after humor at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun while those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished.”
Sounds like Aristotle attended the same junior high school and high school as I did. Again, he is optimistic that someone who aspires to philosophic excellence, virtue and the mean (maintaining a middle position between two extremes) can live among buffoons and boors without being pulled down to their level. The question I would pose to Aristotle: What happens when we live in an entire society dominated by vulgar buffoon and uptight boors, where the buffoons and boors set the standards for what it means to be human? Particularly, what happens to the development of children and young adults?
“But those who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of readiness to turn this way and that; for such sallies are thought to be movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so too are characters.”
I had an opportunity to see the Dalai Lama speak. You will be hard pressed to find someone with a more lively sense of humor. If you haven’t seen him speak, you can check out YouTube.
“The ridiculous side of things is not far to seek, however, and most people delight more than they should in amusement and in jestingly and so even buffoons are called ready-witted because they are found attractive; but that they differ from the ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is clear from what has been said.”
Ha! So Aristotle sees, in fact, how buffoonery can easily lapse into the social norm. Thus our challenge is how to retain our integrity when surrounded by slobs and buffoons.
“To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful man to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for there are some things that it befits such a man to say and to hear by way of jest, and the well-bred man's jesting differs from that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an educated man from that of an uneducated.”
Aristotle’s overarching observation on how the wisdom of the middle way between two extremes applies here – not good acting at either extreme, being a boor or being a buffoon. Unfortunately, speaking and otherwise communicating in a buffoonish or boorish way is in no way restricted to the uneducated or dull – I’ve witnessed numerous instances of buffoonery and boorishness among the highly educated and intellectually astute.
The entire Nicomachean Ethics is available online: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nic...
February 1, 2024
When I was young I had an idée fixe - an obsession.
Oh, it’s easy to be like that if you were brought up in 1950’s Mainstream Christianity, or later, if - like Cherilyn’s Dad in the amazing new Chasing Eden - you were influenced at some point or another, by a fundamentalist splinter group.
Then you might have had the idée fixe of a retributive God - a PUNISHING God.
And, though my choice was always mainstream theology, when my life went into a tailspin it was ALL BECAUSE OF THIS IDEA. Because we ALL seemed back then to be tarred with its brush!
Now, I just had to escape all that. So, in 1985, I sought relief in reading and meditation... Certainly, over time that clarified my thought.
Maybe too much, for I was then faced with a bustling plethora of variegated POV’s! So I started to pay more attention to the simple directness of the ancient classics, and it became the confusing plethora’s originary panacea.
And eventually I reread the great philosophers who made Christianity, ALONG with the Bible, the forces that gave Christianity its intellectual chutzpah - Plato and Aristotle.
Things became clear AND easy.
Now, Aristotle said Good can come in any package. And any human being.
Because, like Plato and Socrates, he was an Essentialist. And EVERY form of Good is Essentially (ie Intrinsically) Good. He saw it ALL... as Good like anything or anybody. Any Human Being.
What does it mean for everyone to be Good in the Modern World? For we’re NOT essentially good. Modern Science, and subsequently, the constant news feeds - who, of course, seem to promote guys like Richard Dawkins, or hype them (which is the same thing) - have warped it all outta shape. It’s all, at Best, a “Mixture of Frailties” (as the great novelist Robertson Davies said).
In Modern Physics, for example, the ‘official?’ version is that we humans are basically and randomly set adrift in a meaningless world, because, it says, it sees the big picture through the lens of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. We’re without hope. So our sources, like the news media, pooh-pooh Hope.
Isn’t THAT a much smaller and more incomplete picture? For to a Transcendent First Mover, such conflictual behaviour is background noise.
But ALL OUR sources make it sound like it is EXACTLY as the news wags suggest.
Well, this is where Aristotle comes in.
He sees EVERYTHING and EVERYBODY as Essentially Good, even in spite of his incomplete (given his time, though nevertheless tough-minded like our own) scientific picture.
My grandmother used to say “be good and you’ll be happy.” Aristotle would have agreed. Goodness IS the way to Happiness - a larger container for life’s ordinary social joy. Mere pleasure imposes limits to joy: it implies a beginning and a NECESSARY end. An end which can be sudden.
And, I’m sure, Aristotle would see it in the same way today. For he would STILL see the big picture, Modern Science transcended.
For he sees it in much the same way as Job saw it when God spoke to Job from the Whirlwind! Where does Job find happiness? Nowhere. But all that miraculously changed...
Now, Job, as we know, had had all Hell and High Water thrown at him.
It BROKE him.
He was FINISHED -
CAPUT.
And in the same way - despite the repeated ‘consolations‘ his friends tried to feed him - Job remained unrelentingly Broken. And so he had to be, because he had run out of get-up-and go.
But God - in the whirlwind of Job’s emotional collapse - SPOKE to him.
And Life was suddenly GOOD again for Job. Because he now saw the BIG PICTURE. A larger container.
All his life, Job had been following carrots of pleasure hanging from a stick - money, family, possessions - and when they were gone, he needed to see his previous life had been too LITTLE. He needed a Bigger Container.
“C’mon now!” you say.
“How could you even HEAR someone in a storm - even saying for the sake of argument that God CAN speak in the First Place? Gimme a break....”
Well, what would Aristotle say? What did JOB See and Hear?
Aristotle, if he were here, would say...
“When you say Life is Good, you mean it’s INTRINSICALLY good. It’s Essence is good, from the point of view of our Intelligence. And, naturally, the Supreme Being also sees Life and all Beings as intrinsically Good. And ALL the time.”
Job doesn’t see Life as Morally or Aesthetically or Emotively Good. But he now knows, looking at it as God sees it, it’s INTRINSICALLY good.
So Job does now INDEED see Life is Good. And ALL PEOPLE are likewise. Flawed - often deeply - but Good.
You see, because as kids we read the Old - retributive - Testament AND the New - Loving - Testament, we were subconsciously conflictual.
And we JUDGED automatically.
But if everyone’s LOVED, there are no bad people.
Only flawed, BROKEN people.
As well as, thank Heaven, those who are becoming WHOLE again!
BECAUSE of the Right Attitude.
Oh, it’s easy to be like that if you were brought up in 1950’s Mainstream Christianity, or later, if - like Cherilyn’s Dad in the amazing new Chasing Eden - you were influenced at some point or another, by a fundamentalist splinter group.
Then you might have had the idée fixe of a retributive God - a PUNISHING God.
And, though my choice was always mainstream theology, when my life went into a tailspin it was ALL BECAUSE OF THIS IDEA. Because we ALL seemed back then to be tarred with its brush!
Now, I just had to escape all that. So, in 1985, I sought relief in reading and meditation... Certainly, over time that clarified my thought.
Maybe too much, for I was then faced with a bustling plethora of variegated POV’s! So I started to pay more attention to the simple directness of the ancient classics, and it became the confusing plethora’s originary panacea.
And eventually I reread the great philosophers who made Christianity, ALONG with the Bible, the forces that gave Christianity its intellectual chutzpah - Plato and Aristotle.
Things became clear AND easy.
Now, Aristotle said Good can come in any package. And any human being.
Because, like Plato and Socrates, he was an Essentialist. And EVERY form of Good is Essentially (ie Intrinsically) Good. He saw it ALL... as Good like anything or anybody. Any Human Being.
What does it mean for everyone to be Good in the Modern World? For we’re NOT essentially good. Modern Science, and subsequently, the constant news feeds - who, of course, seem to promote guys like Richard Dawkins, or hype them (which is the same thing) - have warped it all outta shape. It’s all, at Best, a “Mixture of Frailties” (as the great novelist Robertson Davies said).
In Modern Physics, for example, the ‘official?’ version is that we humans are basically and randomly set adrift in a meaningless world, because, it says, it sees the big picture through the lens of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. We’re without hope. So our sources, like the news media, pooh-pooh Hope.
Isn’t THAT a much smaller and more incomplete picture? For to a Transcendent First Mover, such conflictual behaviour is background noise.
But ALL OUR sources make it sound like it is EXACTLY as the news wags suggest.
Well, this is where Aristotle comes in.
He sees EVERYTHING and EVERYBODY as Essentially Good, even in spite of his incomplete (given his time, though nevertheless tough-minded like our own) scientific picture.
My grandmother used to say “be good and you’ll be happy.” Aristotle would have agreed. Goodness IS the way to Happiness - a larger container for life’s ordinary social joy. Mere pleasure imposes limits to joy: it implies a beginning and a NECESSARY end. An end which can be sudden.
And, I’m sure, Aristotle would see it in the same way today. For he would STILL see the big picture, Modern Science transcended.
For he sees it in much the same way as Job saw it when God spoke to Job from the Whirlwind! Where does Job find happiness? Nowhere. But all that miraculously changed...
Now, Job, as we know, had had all Hell and High Water thrown at him.
It BROKE him.
He was FINISHED -
CAPUT.
And in the same way - despite the repeated ‘consolations‘ his friends tried to feed him - Job remained unrelentingly Broken. And so he had to be, because he had run out of get-up-and go.
But God - in the whirlwind of Job’s emotional collapse - SPOKE to him.
And Life was suddenly GOOD again for Job. Because he now saw the BIG PICTURE. A larger container.
All his life, Job had been following carrots of pleasure hanging from a stick - money, family, possessions - and when they were gone, he needed to see his previous life had been too LITTLE. He needed a Bigger Container.
“C’mon now!” you say.
“How could you even HEAR someone in a storm - even saying for the sake of argument that God CAN speak in the First Place? Gimme a break....”
Well, what would Aristotle say? What did JOB See and Hear?
Aristotle, if he were here, would say...
“When you say Life is Good, you mean it’s INTRINSICALLY good. It’s Essence is good, from the point of view of our Intelligence. And, naturally, the Supreme Being also sees Life and all Beings as intrinsically Good. And ALL the time.”
Job doesn’t see Life as Morally or Aesthetically or Emotively Good. But he now knows, looking at it as God sees it, it’s INTRINSICALLY good.
So Job does now INDEED see Life is Good. And ALL PEOPLE are likewise. Flawed - often deeply - but Good.
You see, because as kids we read the Old - retributive - Testament AND the New - Loving - Testament, we were subconsciously conflictual.
And we JUDGED automatically.
But if everyone’s LOVED, there are no bad people.
Only flawed, BROKEN people.
As well as, thank Heaven, those who are becoming WHOLE again!
BECAUSE of the Right Attitude.
May 16, 2021
I’m a bit annoyed – I wrote up my review to this last night and thought I’d posted it, but it seems to have gone to god…not happy about that (amusingly enough). This is my reconstruction of last night’s review.
There is a story that is almost certainly apocryphal about a French woman (in the version I know, this is Madame De Gaulle) who is in England towards the end of her husband’s career and is asked at some sort of official function what she wants most from life. She answers, ‘a penis’ – which, unsurprisingly, brings a near complete silence over the room, something see seems completely confused by. Charles De Gaulle then says to his wife, ‘I think they pronounce it ‘appiness’, darling’
Aristotle is writing about how to live a good life – pretty much what ‘ethics’ means – and his answer is that a good life is a happy life. Well, sort of. Actually, the Greek word that is translated as ‘happiness’ here (not unlike Madame De Gaulle’s mis-pronunciation) doesn’t necessarily mean what we would normally take ‘happiness’ to mean. Eudaimonia is made up of two words meaning ‘good’ and ‘soul’, but can also be translated as meaning ‘human flourishing’. Now, if you asked me how I was going and I said, ‘I’m flourishing’, that doesn’t necessarily mean ‘I’m happy’. It is not that the two ideas are a million miles apart, but even Roget would be unlikely to slam them together in his little book of synonyms.
This is a remarkably practical book – not so much in that it tells you exactly how to behave at all times and in all circumstances, it isn’t practical in that sense, but rather that it sets about giving you tools to help make a rational judgement about how you ought to behave given various circumstances.
It does this by discussing Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the mean’. Aristotle says that every virtue falls between two extremes which are excesses of qualities that also go to make up that virtue. So, if you think of courage, for example, it falls between cowardice and foolhardiness. In one case you have an exaggerated regard for your own life (despite being seen as a coward and the likely humiliation that will bring) and in the other you are too prepared to throw your life away and therefore not giving your life its proper value. Now, the point is that Aristotle isn’t saying all that much here about how you might behave in a given situation, but rather giving you guiding lines to watch out for – his point is that if you are called upon to be brave there may be times when it is rational to behave in ways that might otherwise look foolhardy, and at other times in ways that might look cowardly – but a wise and happy person would do so on the basis of a rational assessment of where the mean lies given the time, place and circumstance – and knowing there are extremes you need to avoid is useful here.
There are bits of this that I found much more annoying this time around than I did when I read it years ago (30 years ago, now – yuck… how did that happen?). In fact, I can’t quite tell if Aristotle has become more reactionary over the years or if I’ve become more progressive – but it’s one or the other.
For instance, I found a lot of his discussions about women particularly annoying this time around. Take this as a case in point from Book VIII, “Sometimes, however, women rule, because they are heiresses; their rule is thus not in accordance with virtue, but due to wealth and power” (page 157). People will tell you that one of the problems with Aristotle and Plato is the fact that they could never conceive of a society in which there were no slaves – but one of the advantages of Plato is that he did think women could, and probably should, be educated. Aristotle clearly does not – but the point I would really like to make is that he notices when women rule due to their wealth and power, but not when men do the same. Given so many more men rule at all and so many of them rule due to the access their position gives them – it seems an odd thing for someone like Aristotle not to notice.
Because this is quite a practical ethics, he spends a lot of time talking about the sorts of things people ought to have in their lives to make them happy – and this is why so much of the book is devoted to friendship. I won’t go over his arguments for the various types of friends one might have, but do want to talk about love and lovers. I think I could mount a case for saying that Aristotle is arguing against having a lover. Not that he is advocating a life of celibacy or even of abstinence, but rather that lovers come in what I like to think of as pairs (after McCullers or Somerset Maugham – who both said that there are lovers and the beloved and of the two everyone wants to be the lover, rather than the beloved) – and that since being either the lover or a beloved is basically irrational, given we fall in love by lightning strike as much as anything else, it might stop just as quickly as it all started, and then a lover who doesn’t love any more leaves a beloved who is no longer beloved – not the basis for a lasting relationship. The point being that friendship is based more rationally on mutual benefits and mutual care – if it was me, I’d pick the latter over the former (friendship over love) every time – if these things allowed for choices like that, that is.
Now, I want to end by quoting a longer bit from Book X (page 200).
“Some think we become good by nature, some by habit, and others by teaching. Nature's contribution is clearly not in our power, but it can be found in those who are truly fortunate as the result of some divine dispensation. Argument and teaching, presumably, are not powerful in every case, but the soul of the student must be prepared beforehand in its habits, with a view to its enjoying and hating in a noble way, like soil that is to nourish seed. For if someone were to live by his feelings he would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, nor could he even understand it. How can we persuade a person in a state like this to change his ways? And, in general, feelings seem to yield not to argument but to force. There must, therefore, somehow be a pre-existing character with some affinity for virtue through its fondness for what is noble and dislike of what is disgraceful.
“But if one has not been reared under the right laws it is difficult to obtain from one's earliest years the correct upbringing for virtue, because the masses, especially the young, do not find it pleasant to live temperately and with endurance. For this reason, their upbringing and pursuits should be regulated by laws, because they will not find them painful once they have become accustomed to them.”
I find this really interesting for a whole range of reasons. Okay, so, he starts off by saying that nature is the main thing to ensure that one is capable of learning – but it is interesting that this alone is not enough. Nature is essential, but left on its own will not get you very far. The other is teaching, but teaching too may not help unless you have been prepared to hear the lesson – something Gramsci talks about at some length saying working class children need to be given discipline (that they are unfamiliar with) if they are to have any hope of succeeding in education. What is stressed here is the development of habits and dispositions and that these are what allows the other two (nature and teaching) to be given any chance of success.
Aristotle is keen to stress that he is talking about virtues – but again, the Greek word here (arête) doesn’t just mean morally good behaviours, but rather something closer to the excellences that we associate with different kinds of behaviours – so that a fisherman has virtues too, not in the sense of being morally upright, but rather, at knowing what is good for a fisherman to do and be.
A lot of this reminded me of Pascal’s Pensées. There is a bit in that where Pascal says that happiness really isn’t related to the outcome, but more to the process. That is, that you won’t make a hunter happy by giving him a couple of rabbits at the start of the day and saying to him, ‘now you don’t have to go out hunting today, relax, enjoy yourself’. Rather, even a mangy rabbit caught through the effort of the hunt will be worth more to the hunter than a dozen plump ones handed over without effort at the start of the day. Not always true, of course, but I’m exaggerating to make the point. In a lot of ways that is Aristotle’s ethics – find out what you are meant to do and do that as best you can and that will make you happy – or good souled – or flourishing – one of those.
There is a story that is almost certainly apocryphal about a French woman (in the version I know, this is Madame De Gaulle) who is in England towards the end of her husband’s career and is asked at some sort of official function what she wants most from life. She answers, ‘a penis’ – which, unsurprisingly, brings a near complete silence over the room, something see seems completely confused by. Charles De Gaulle then says to his wife, ‘I think they pronounce it ‘appiness’, darling’
Aristotle is writing about how to live a good life – pretty much what ‘ethics’ means – and his answer is that a good life is a happy life. Well, sort of. Actually, the Greek word that is translated as ‘happiness’ here (not unlike Madame De Gaulle’s mis-pronunciation) doesn’t necessarily mean what we would normally take ‘happiness’ to mean. Eudaimonia is made up of two words meaning ‘good’ and ‘soul’, but can also be translated as meaning ‘human flourishing’. Now, if you asked me how I was going and I said, ‘I’m flourishing’, that doesn’t necessarily mean ‘I’m happy’. It is not that the two ideas are a million miles apart, but even Roget would be unlikely to slam them together in his little book of synonyms.
This is a remarkably practical book – not so much in that it tells you exactly how to behave at all times and in all circumstances, it isn’t practical in that sense, but rather that it sets about giving you tools to help make a rational judgement about how you ought to behave given various circumstances.
It does this by discussing Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the mean’. Aristotle says that every virtue falls between two extremes which are excesses of qualities that also go to make up that virtue. So, if you think of courage, for example, it falls between cowardice and foolhardiness. In one case you have an exaggerated regard for your own life (despite being seen as a coward and the likely humiliation that will bring) and in the other you are too prepared to throw your life away and therefore not giving your life its proper value. Now, the point is that Aristotle isn’t saying all that much here about how you might behave in a given situation, but rather giving you guiding lines to watch out for – his point is that if you are called upon to be brave there may be times when it is rational to behave in ways that might otherwise look foolhardy, and at other times in ways that might look cowardly – but a wise and happy person would do so on the basis of a rational assessment of where the mean lies given the time, place and circumstance – and knowing there are extremes you need to avoid is useful here.
There are bits of this that I found much more annoying this time around than I did when I read it years ago (30 years ago, now – yuck… how did that happen?). In fact, I can’t quite tell if Aristotle has become more reactionary over the years or if I’ve become more progressive – but it’s one or the other.
For instance, I found a lot of his discussions about women particularly annoying this time around. Take this as a case in point from Book VIII, “Sometimes, however, women rule, because they are heiresses; their rule is thus not in accordance with virtue, but due to wealth and power” (page 157). People will tell you that one of the problems with Aristotle and Plato is the fact that they could never conceive of a society in which there were no slaves – but one of the advantages of Plato is that he did think women could, and probably should, be educated. Aristotle clearly does not – but the point I would really like to make is that he notices when women rule due to their wealth and power, but not when men do the same. Given so many more men rule at all and so many of them rule due to the access their position gives them – it seems an odd thing for someone like Aristotle not to notice.
Because this is quite a practical ethics, he spends a lot of time talking about the sorts of things people ought to have in their lives to make them happy – and this is why so much of the book is devoted to friendship. I won’t go over his arguments for the various types of friends one might have, but do want to talk about love and lovers. I think I could mount a case for saying that Aristotle is arguing against having a lover. Not that he is advocating a life of celibacy or even of abstinence, but rather that lovers come in what I like to think of as pairs (after McCullers or Somerset Maugham – who both said that there are lovers and the beloved and of the two everyone wants to be the lover, rather than the beloved) – and that since being either the lover or a beloved is basically irrational, given we fall in love by lightning strike as much as anything else, it might stop just as quickly as it all started, and then a lover who doesn’t love any more leaves a beloved who is no longer beloved – not the basis for a lasting relationship. The point being that friendship is based more rationally on mutual benefits and mutual care – if it was me, I’d pick the latter over the former (friendship over love) every time – if these things allowed for choices like that, that is.
Now, I want to end by quoting a longer bit from Book X (page 200).
“Some think we become good by nature, some by habit, and others by teaching. Nature's contribution is clearly not in our power, but it can be found in those who are truly fortunate as the result of some divine dispensation. Argument and teaching, presumably, are not powerful in every case, but the soul of the student must be prepared beforehand in its habits, with a view to its enjoying and hating in a noble way, like soil that is to nourish seed. For if someone were to live by his feelings he would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, nor could he even understand it. How can we persuade a person in a state like this to change his ways? And, in general, feelings seem to yield not to argument but to force. There must, therefore, somehow be a pre-existing character with some affinity for virtue through its fondness for what is noble and dislike of what is disgraceful.
“But if one has not been reared under the right laws it is difficult to obtain from one's earliest years the correct upbringing for virtue, because the masses, especially the young, do not find it pleasant to live temperately and with endurance. For this reason, their upbringing and pursuits should be regulated by laws, because they will not find them painful once they have become accustomed to them.”
I find this really interesting for a whole range of reasons. Okay, so, he starts off by saying that nature is the main thing to ensure that one is capable of learning – but it is interesting that this alone is not enough. Nature is essential, but left on its own will not get you very far. The other is teaching, but teaching too may not help unless you have been prepared to hear the lesson – something Gramsci talks about at some length saying working class children need to be given discipline (that they are unfamiliar with) if they are to have any hope of succeeding in education. What is stressed here is the development of habits and dispositions and that these are what allows the other two (nature and teaching) to be given any chance of success.
Aristotle is keen to stress that he is talking about virtues – but again, the Greek word here (arête) doesn’t just mean morally good behaviours, but rather something closer to the excellences that we associate with different kinds of behaviours – so that a fisherman has virtues too, not in the sense of being morally upright, but rather, at knowing what is good for a fisherman to do and be.
A lot of this reminded me of Pascal’s Pensées. There is a bit in that where Pascal says that happiness really isn’t related to the outcome, but more to the process. That is, that you won’t make a hunter happy by giving him a couple of rabbits at the start of the day and saying to him, ‘now you don’t have to go out hunting today, relax, enjoy yourself’. Rather, even a mangy rabbit caught through the effort of the hunt will be worth more to the hunter than a dozen plump ones handed over without effort at the start of the day. Not always true, of course, but I’m exaggerating to make the point. In a lot of ways that is Aristotle’s ethics – find out what you are meant to do and do that as best you can and that will make you happy – or good souled – or flourishing – one of those.
February 23, 2023
O carte fundamentală. Am ales doar una dintre problemele discutate de Stagirit, fericirea.
Dacă omul vrea să atingă fericirea trebuie să-i urmeze pe zei. Numai zeul e fericit şi asta întrucît existenţa divinității se rezumă la purul exerciţiu contemplativ. A filosofa înseamnă a încerca să devii asemănător zeului, după cum a spus și Platon, în dialogul Theaitetos.
Aristotel a preluat ideea şi a dezvoltat-o în Etica nicomahică (dar şi în Protreptikos): omul e îndemnat să-l imite pe zeu, pe cît îi stă în putinţă, prin virtute şi contemplaţie. În acest mod, omul ajunge să se „imortalizeze” [athanatizein e termenul folosit de Aristotel]. Ierarhia fiinţelor şi a scopurilor şi faptul că dintre toate activităţile omului cea mai nobilă şi „profitabilă” este contemplarea [= theoria] rezultă din următorul fragment [cartea X, VII: 1177a-1178a):
„Această activitate [conformă cu virtutea şi aducătoare de fericire: eudaimonia] este contemplativă… [Şi] afirmaţia noastră pare să concorde atît cu cele spuse anterior, cît şi cu adevărul. Ea [contemplaţia, teoria] este activitatea cea mai elevată, pentru că intelectul [= nous] este ceea ce avem mai elevat în noi, iar dintre obiectele cognoscibile, cele ale intelectului sînt cele mai înalte… În sfîrşit, credem cu toţii că fericirea [= eudaimonia] trebuie să fie contopită cu plăcerea; or, toată lumea este de acord că cea mai plăcută dintre activităţile conforme cu virtutea este filosofia. În orice caz, este un fapt recunoscut că studiul filosofiei oferă plăceri de o admirabilă puritate…” (pp.253-254).
Am făcut unele adăugiri pentru a ușura lectura acestui text dificil.
Dacă omul vrea să atingă fericirea trebuie să-i urmeze pe zei. Numai zeul e fericit şi asta întrucît existenţa divinității se rezumă la purul exerciţiu contemplativ. A filosofa înseamnă a încerca să devii asemănător zeului, după cum a spus și Platon, în dialogul Theaitetos.
Aristotel a preluat ideea şi a dezvoltat-o în Etica nicomahică (dar şi în Protreptikos): omul e îndemnat să-l imite pe zeu, pe cît îi stă în putinţă, prin virtute şi contemplaţie. În acest mod, omul ajunge să se „imortalizeze” [athanatizein e termenul folosit de Aristotel]. Ierarhia fiinţelor şi a scopurilor şi faptul că dintre toate activităţile omului cea mai nobilă şi „profitabilă” este contemplarea [= theoria] rezultă din următorul fragment [cartea X, VII: 1177a-1178a):
„Această activitate [conformă cu virtutea şi aducătoare de fericire: eudaimonia] este contemplativă… [Şi] afirmaţia noastră pare să concorde atît cu cele spuse anterior, cît şi cu adevărul. Ea [contemplaţia, teoria] este activitatea cea mai elevată, pentru că intelectul [= nous] este ceea ce avem mai elevat în noi, iar dintre obiectele cognoscibile, cele ale intelectului sînt cele mai înalte… În sfîrşit, credem cu toţii că fericirea [= eudaimonia] trebuie să fie contopită cu plăcerea; or, toată lumea este de acord că cea mai plăcută dintre activităţile conforme cu virtutea este filosofia. În orice caz, este un fapt recunoscut că studiul filosofiei oferă plăceri de o admirabilă puritate…” (pp.253-254).
Am făcut unele adăugiri pentru a ușura lectura acestui text dificil.
March 3, 2022
Nicomachean Ethics (349 BCE) deals with assessing and defining the finest behavior of humans toward themselves, others, and their surroundings. Aristotle seeks to distinguish and construct an ideal person using selected character traits known as virtues. These virtues are both intellectual and moral (intellectual ranking above moral) and are best attained through the act of repetitiveness and from an adequate role model. Achieving these virtuous principles will guide one to do the right thing, hence, become a better person.
Yet, how do we know what is good or bad and how can we assess what is right or wrong? Since virtues are the building blocks of goodness, Aristotle claims that they are found between the two extreme vices. A midpoint between the deficiency and excess of a particular virtue. For instance, courage is the midpoint between its deficiency, which is cowardliness, and its excess, which is recklessness. Thus, reaching the highest pinnacle of good, will require a person of moderate behavior.
But what's in it for us? Why should one live an ethical life and be good? Well, in order to reach the ultimate goal, life's most meaningful purpose, the utmost reward. No, not necessarily eternal bliss in the hereafter, but primarily to attain happiness in this lifetime. Besides the virtues, having a few good friends, enjoying some permissible pleasures, and having good fortuity will make happiness more achievable.
For those of you, like myself, who wondered why the book is titled "Nicomachean" Ethics. For starters, the term was never mentioned in the book, but, apparently, Aristotle dedicated the book to his father and or son that were both named Nicomachus, hence, Nicomachean.
Yet, how do we know what is good or bad and how can we assess what is right or wrong? Since virtues are the building blocks of goodness, Aristotle claims that they are found between the two extreme vices. A midpoint between the deficiency and excess of a particular virtue. For instance, courage is the midpoint between its deficiency, which is cowardliness, and its excess, which is recklessness. Thus, reaching the highest pinnacle of good, will require a person of moderate behavior.
But what's in it for us? Why should one live an ethical life and be good? Well, in order to reach the ultimate goal, life's most meaningful purpose, the utmost reward. No, not necessarily eternal bliss in the hereafter, but primarily to attain happiness in this lifetime. Besides the virtues, having a few good friends, enjoying some permissible pleasures, and having good fortuity will make happiness more achievable.
For those of you, like myself, who wondered why the book is titled "Nicomachean" Ethics. For starters, the term was never mentioned in the book, but, apparently, Aristotle dedicated the book to his father and or son that were both named Nicomachus, hence, Nicomachean.
September 17, 2022
Happiness is the activity of a rational soul in accordance with virtue, writes Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. Activity means living. Rational soul means a human being. And virtue means human excellence. So happiness means a human living excellently.
How does one live excellently? One learns to be good at these things called "virtues". In fact, one cultivates habits that contribute to virtuous living. Aristotle discusses many virtues, but four are primary: courage, temperance, justice and practical wisdom.
Courage is how we deal with pain and disappointment. Courage is an example of the "golden mean". Courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness.
Temperance is how we deal with pleasure. Temperance is the mean between gluttony and abstinence.
Justice is how we deal with human relationships. Essentially, it means to give every person their due, which will be defined by their relationship to you.
Practical wisdom is the knowledge to understand how to discern the moderate path or the mean and how to moderate passions in order to think clearly and make good decisions.
But my favorite thing about the Ethics is that Aristotle devotes many pages to a discussion of friendship, which is fundamental to happiness. Some scholars argue that Aristotle's discussion of friendship comes from a separate book. That is, when scrolls with the Ethics were first discovered, early scholars mistakenly mixed two books together. Perhaps, this is true. But it is heartening to read about happiness and find that much of the discussion has to do with being a good friend.
One more thing about this great book. It is difficult to read. I am told that this is due to the fact that it was compiled from notes of Aristotle's students and was not written by Aristotle. That is, these are notes of his lectures.
They read like it.
My way of dealing with the impenetrability was to lean on secondary sources. In particular, I listened to lectures from the Teaching Company as I re-read the Ethics a few years ago. That made all the difference. The Nichomachean Ethics is arguably the most important work on ethics in western culture. But you might not be able read it on your own without constantly fogging out. So figure out a way to get through it with patience and attention. You will be rewarded for your effort.
How does one live excellently? One learns to be good at these things called "virtues". In fact, one cultivates habits that contribute to virtuous living. Aristotle discusses many virtues, but four are primary: courage, temperance, justice and practical wisdom.
Courage is how we deal with pain and disappointment. Courage is an example of the "golden mean". Courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness.
Temperance is how we deal with pleasure. Temperance is the mean between gluttony and abstinence.
Justice is how we deal with human relationships. Essentially, it means to give every person their due, which will be defined by their relationship to you.
Practical wisdom is the knowledge to understand how to discern the moderate path or the mean and how to moderate passions in order to think clearly and make good decisions.
But my favorite thing about the Ethics is that Aristotle devotes many pages to a discussion of friendship, which is fundamental to happiness. Some scholars argue that Aristotle's discussion of friendship comes from a separate book. That is, when scrolls with the Ethics were first discovered, early scholars mistakenly mixed two books together. Perhaps, this is true. But it is heartening to read about happiness and find that much of the discussion has to do with being a good friend.
One more thing about this great book. It is difficult to read. I am told that this is due to the fact that it was compiled from notes of Aristotle's students and was not written by Aristotle. That is, these are notes of his lectures.
They read like it.
My way of dealing with the impenetrability was to lean on secondary sources. In particular, I listened to lectures from the Teaching Company as I re-read the Ethics a few years ago. That made all the difference. The Nichomachean Ethics is arguably the most important work on ethics in western culture. But you might not be able read it on your own without constantly fogging out. So figure out a way to get through it with patience and attention. You will be rewarded for your effort.
March 12, 2019
This re-read was perhaps a slight bit superfluous. I remembered reading it way back in high school - on my own - just because I was that kind of geek.
Get the foundations read, kid! Know what the whole line of thought is all about! Use it later to trounce your fellow debaters!
Yeah, whatever. Logic and an examined life have since then been more of an end rather than a means.
Case in point: This is about examining Happiness. It does so in a fairly exhaustive but not exhausting way. Aristotle just lays down the foundations, brings up the various opinions people usually hold about WHAT happiness entails, and then tries to pare away the flawed answers.
Usually, a normal adventure tale is never about the end destination. End destinations are usually a let-down. The effort to get there is usually a lot more satisfying.
Same for Aristotle. It turns out I remembered the first journey perfectly. And it brought me happiness. :)
Get the foundations read, kid! Know what the whole line of thought is all about! Use it later to trounce your fellow debaters!
Yeah, whatever. Logic and an examined life have since then been more of an end rather than a means.
Case in point: This is about examining Happiness. It does so in a fairly exhaustive but not exhausting way. Aristotle just lays down the foundations, brings up the various opinions people usually hold about WHAT happiness entails, and then tries to pare away the flawed answers.
Usually, a normal adventure tale is never about the end destination. End destinations are usually a let-down. The effort to get there is usually a lot more satisfying.
Same for Aristotle. It turns out I remembered the first journey perfectly. And it brought me happiness. :)
September 13, 2022
Veo el valor, veo el aporte, veo todo el pensamiento aristotélico que ha servido como influencia para Occidente pero aún así, a mí esto me ha hecho más mal que bien sinceramente. Objetivamente merece más nota, pero subjetivamente me ha parecido un ladrillo para su corta extensión.
October 25, 2015
The Nicomachean Ethics is one of the greatest works of Aristotle, the famous philosopher who was really much more of a scientist than a philosopher. This is the book where he indulges in the discussion of happiness, virtue, ethics, politics, and really anything else describing the way in which human beings functioned together in the society of a Greek city-state of early Antiquity.
Especially in the field of politics, this work excels, and Aristotle puts forth a particularly interesting theory on the forms of government. According to him, there are really only three different forms of government, but each of them comes with a corresponding corrupt deviation. The finest form of government, he says, is the monarchy, the rule of one. But its corresponding deviation, which is tyranny, is the worst form of government, and the line between the two is thin and sinuous. Likewise, the second finest form of government is the aristocracy, the rule of the best. And aristocracy in its corrupted form is oligarchy, the second worst form of government. Lastly, the third finest form of government is timocracy, the rule of property-owners, which was strikingly similar to the political system already existing in Aristotle's Athens. But the corrupt form of timocracy, he says, is democracy, a system in which society has deviated into a constant squabble where everyone seeks to advance their own interests rather than the interests of the state. The conclusion seems to be that as long as long as the rulers of the state are just and competent, it is better the fewer they are. But if the rulers are unjust and incompetent, the opposite is true. To those as interested in political theory as I am, I would recommend just reading Book VIII, and skipping all the rest.
The most interesting thing about the book, however, is that the writing is absolutely terrible. Not the language, mind you, but the style in which the book is written. What is truly incredible is that the writing here is exactly how an average academic writer today would write his or her books. On one hand, that made this book ridiculously boring to read. On the other, it was really interesting because it proves how much modern academics owe to the legacy of Aristotle. And that they should find another source of inspiration, since for instance Plato was a far better writer than his most famous pupil.
I would recommend this book only to those particularly interested in philosophical, political and ethical theory, and even then I would suggest just opening the book and reading the parts that sound interesting to you instead of attempting the dreary business of reading it as a whole.
Especially in the field of politics, this work excels, and Aristotle puts forth a particularly interesting theory on the forms of government. According to him, there are really only three different forms of government, but each of them comes with a corresponding corrupt deviation. The finest form of government, he says, is the monarchy, the rule of one. But its corresponding deviation, which is tyranny, is the worst form of government, and the line between the two is thin and sinuous. Likewise, the second finest form of government is the aristocracy, the rule of the best. And aristocracy in its corrupted form is oligarchy, the second worst form of government. Lastly, the third finest form of government is timocracy, the rule of property-owners, which was strikingly similar to the political system already existing in Aristotle's Athens. But the corrupt form of timocracy, he says, is democracy, a system in which society has deviated into a constant squabble where everyone seeks to advance their own interests rather than the interests of the state. The conclusion seems to be that as long as long as the rulers of the state are just and competent, it is better the fewer they are. But if the rulers are unjust and incompetent, the opposite is true. To those as interested in political theory as I am, I would recommend just reading Book VIII, and skipping all the rest.
The most interesting thing about the book, however, is that the writing is absolutely terrible. Not the language, mind you, but the style in which the book is written. What is truly incredible is that the writing here is exactly how an average academic writer today would write his or her books. On one hand, that made this book ridiculously boring to read. On the other, it was really interesting because it proves how much modern academics owe to the legacy of Aristotle. And that they should find another source of inspiration, since for instance Plato was a far better writer than his most famous pupil.
I would recommend this book only to those particularly interested in philosophical, political and ethical theory, and even then I would suggest just opening the book and reading the parts that sound interesting to you instead of attempting the dreary business of reading it as a whole.
August 17, 2017
دوستانِ گرانقدر، متأسفانه بارها دیده ام که عده ای بیسواد و نادان، یا به عمد و یا از روی بیسوادی، نوشته های <ارسطو> را همچون دیگر فلاسفه، یا تحریف کرده اند و یا سانسور نموده اند و حتی به قولِ خودشان ترجمه های عجیب و غریبی انجام داده اند که نمیدانم آن جملات را از کجایشان درآورده اند .. لذا تصمیم گرفتم تا در مورد این کتاب که ارسطو در آن به موضوعِ مهم <اخلاق> پرداخته است، تا جایی که ریویو خسته کننده نشود، برایتان بنویسم... در مورد کتابهای دیگر فلسفی نیز، این کار را خواهم کرد و پیش از این نیز اینکار را انجام داده ام
در زیر به برخی از مهمترین نظرات و عقاید ارسطو در این کتاب پرداخته و خلاصه ای از آنچه دریافتم را برای شما خردگرایان مینویسم
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عزیزانم، به طورِ کلی ارسطو در این کتاب اصرار دارد که بگوید: اخلاق برایِ این است که بتوانیم هدفِ زندگی را کشف کنیم.. باید به دنبالِ خوبی ها و نیکی ها باشیم تا به خوشبختی برسیم... پس هدفِ اصلیِ این زندگی رسیدن به خوشبختی میباشد و برایِ کسبِ خوشبختی باید دارایِ برتری و دانایی و افزونی باشیم و بَس
رسیدن به برتری و دانایی، تنها به واسطهٔ بهره بردن از خرد و عقل، ایجاد میشود
انسان برایِ آنکه بتواند به بهترین شکلِ ممکن از خرد بهره برده و ژرف اندیش باشد، باید در اجتماعی زندگی کند که از همه نظر برایِ زندگی کردنِ انسانی مناسب بوده و از موهومات و بیخردی ها، پاک باشد و آزادانه بیاندیشد
این اجتماع و محیطِ زندگیِ مناسب را تنها حکومتی شایسته میتواند برایِ انسانها ایجاد کند... هر انسانِ خردمندی این را میداند که
بدونِ تردید حکومت هایِ دینی و مذهبی، تواناییِ ایجادِ چنین محیطی را برایِ انسانها ندارند، چراکه آنها از اندیشیدنِ انسانها در هراس هستند
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ارسطو در این کتاب توضیحاتی در موردِ غرور و همچنین فروتنی میدهد، امّا روش بیان آن میتواند جالب توجه باشد.... ارسطو در بحثِ مربوط به خوبی ها، از "فرا اندیشی" سخن میگوید و "فرا اندیشی" را یک نوع خوبی به حساب می آورد و میگوید: انسانِ "فرا اندیش" کسی است که گمان میکند، شایستهٔ چیزهای بزرگ است و در واقع همینطور است.. او شایستگی چیزهایِ بزرگ را دارد ... حال این شایستگی چه میبا��د!! ارسطو میگوید: انسانِ "فرا اندیش"، شایستهٔ دریافتِ تمامیِ <دارایی هایِ بیرونی> میباشد.. بالاترین <دارایی هایِ بیرونی>، آبرو و اعتبار است.... پس یک انسانِ "فرا اندیش"، شایستهٔ این است که از آبرو و اعتبارِ بسیار زیادی برخوردار باشد.. لذا انسانی که "فرا اندیش" است، میتواند تمامی خوبی هایِ اخلاقی را یکجا داشته باشد... ارسطو میگوید: "فرا اندیشی"، تاجِ شاهانهٔ همهٔ خوبی هاست.... انسانِ "فرا اندیش" این حق را دارد که زیردست داشته باشد، چراکه او تمامِ خوبی ها را دارد و میتواند پندارِ نیک و درستی از دیگران و زیردستانِ خود داشته باشد
اینجاست که متوجه میشویم این اندیشه های ارسطو چگونه میتواند شاگردِ دوازده ساله اش، <اسکندرِ مقدونی> را تبدیل به موجودی کند که تصور میکند میتواند بر تمامِ این کرهٔ خاکی حکومت کرده و همه را تبدیل به زیر دستِ خویش سازد و هرکجا برود با خود غارت و ویرانی و کشتار را به ارمغان بیاورد و خود را یک "فرا اندیش" بداند
و امّا در مقابلِ این "فرا اندیش" که از دیدگاه ارسطو دارایِ تمامی خوبی هاست و میتواند فرمانروایی کند، انسانی قرار دارد به نامِ "فرو اندیش" ... شخصِ "فرو اندیش" کسی است که خود را دستِ کم میگیرد، لذا شایستگیِ کمتر و ارزشِ کمتری دارد... و حتی اگر ارزشِ راستینِ او بالا باشد، بازهم او یک "فرو اندیش" است .... مشخص است که ارسطو میانهٔ خوبی با فروتنی ندارد و فروتن را لایقِ تمامیِ خوبی ها و ارزش ها نمیداند
نکته ای که بسیار جالب است، این است که ارسطو میگوید: خوشبختی، پیشکش و هدیه ای است که به "فرا اندیشان" ارزانی گشته است ... از آنجا که دارا بودن و ثروتمند بودن و آبرومندی، از خصوصیاتِ اشراف زادگان است، اشراف زادگان میتوانند "فرا اندیش" باشند، لذا اشراف زادگان شایستهٔ این سربلندی هستند که به آنها به صورتِ خوشبختی، ارزانی گشته است
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ارسطو میگوید: کشمکش و نبرد، میانِ انسان و دیدگاهِ او، از زندگی خوب نشأت میگیرد
در وجود یک انسانِ پرهیزگار، هم خرد وجود دارد و هم شهوت.. اما هرکدام بجا و بخوبی استفاده میشوند... پس میتوان گفت: در وجودِ یک انسانِ پرهیزگار، هرچیزی با آوایِ خرد، در هماهنگیِ کامل میباشد
ارسطو بر این باور است که سرچشمهٔ تمامیِ ناهماهنگی ها و ناهمسانی ها در زندگیِ انسان ها، این است که از کودکی به انسان ها تلقین شده است که زیاد خواه نباشند و همچنین کم ارزش خواه باشند... که این موضوع ناهمسانی هایِ چشمگیری را به وجود آورده است،.. در این میان انسانی میتواند به خوبی ها و نیکی ها، نزدیک شود که از خرد، بهره میبرد و میتواند از دیدگاهِ اخلاقی بهتر عمل کند
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ارسطو میگوید: بسیاری از کنش ها و کردارهایِ یک انسانِ اخلاق گرا، برای سودرسانی به دوستان و سرزمین و میهنش انجام میشود و اگر نیاز باشد، جانش را در این راه فدا خواهد کرد
انسانِ اخلاق گرا، اگر بداند دوستش بیشتر به سود میرسد، حاضر است تا مال و ثروت خود را ببخشد.. زیرا بدین صورت، دوستِ او دارا میشود و خودش نیز به تصورش با شرافت باقی خواهد ماند... او شریف بودن را خوبتر از دارا بودن، میبیند
انسانِ اخلاق گرا، این تصور را دارد که چنانچه با شرافت بمیرد، خوبی و روشنیِ بزرگی را برای خویش برگزیده است
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ارسطو معتقد است که اگر شخصی همه چیزش را فدایِ خوشی هایِ جنسی کند، دیگر زندگی اش مناسبِ زندگیِ یک انسان نیست، بلکه آن زندگی مناسبِ چهارپایان است... ارسطو در اظهارِ نظری عجیب میگوید: حتی یک برده نیز میتواند از خوشی های جنسی و لذت جنسی بهره مند شود، امّا هیچکس نمیتواند ادعا کند که یک برده، سهمی از شادی دارد
در این اظهارِ نظر، ارسطو برده را پایین تر از انسان میداند و آنرا در ردیفِ چهارپایان، قرار میدهد
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عزیزانِ من، ارسطو کتابش را اینگونه آغاز میکند که: به نظر میرسد که هر هنر و یا هر دانشِ کاربردی و هر بررسی سازماندهی شده و هر کنش و گزینشی، به سویِ برخی خوبی ها نشانه رفته اند
ارسطو میخواهد بگوید که: برخی رفتارها و کنش ها، به خودیِ خود، خوب و نیک هستند.. یعنی برخی از رفتارها خوب هستند، حتی اگر هیچ پیامدی نداشته باشند... ارسطو مثالی که در انتهایِ کتاب برایِ سخنِ آغازینِ کتابش می آورد، این است که ژرف اندیشی نمونه ای از رفتارهایی است که به خودیِ خود، خوب هستند و ژرف اندیشیدن را ارزشمندترین کنش و کردارِ انسانی میداند و میگوید: کنش و کردارِ ایزدی که نیکبختیِ آن بر تمامیِ کنش هایِ دیگر برتری دارد، ژرف اندیشی میباشد و کردار و کنش انسانی که نزدیکترین خویشاوندی را با آن دارد، بایستی بزرگترین دلیلِ خوشنودی باشد... لذا ارسطو بالاترین ستایش در مقابلِ ایزد و یا ایزدان را کردار و کنشِ فیلسوفانه و دانشمندانه و خردمندانه، برمیگزیند.... یعنی هرچه را که می آموزیم، در آن به صورتِ عمیقی بیاندیشیم، که همان ژرف اندیشی میباشد
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شاید بخاطر بیان همین عقاید بوده است که عده ای بیخرد و متعصب، ارسطو را کافر نام نهادند و او را محکوم به مرگ کردند و ارسطو مجبور شد تا به جزیرهٔ اوبوآ بگریزد
سپاسگزارم که این ریویو را تا پایان خواندید و امیدوارم این ریویو در جهتِ شناختِ این کتاب و بخشی از اندیشه هایِ ارسطو، مفید ��وده باشه
<پیروز باشید و ایرانی>
در زیر به برخی از مهمترین نظرات و عقاید ارسطو در این کتاب پرداخته و خلاصه ای از آنچه دریافتم را برای شما خردگرایان مینویسم
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عزیزانم، به طورِ کلی ارسطو در این کتاب اصرار دارد که بگوید: اخلاق برایِ این است که بتوانیم هدفِ زندگی را کشف کنیم.. باید به دنبالِ خوبی ها و نیکی ها باشیم تا به خوشبختی برسیم... پس هدفِ اصلیِ این زندگی رسیدن به خوشبختی میباشد و برایِ کسبِ خوشبختی باید دارایِ برتری و دانایی و افزونی باشیم و بَس
رسیدن به برتری و دانایی، تنها به واسطهٔ بهره بردن از خرد و عقل، ایجاد میشود
انسان برایِ آنکه بتواند به بهترین شکلِ ممکن از خرد بهره برده و ژرف اندیش باشد، باید در اجتماعی زندگی کند که از همه نظر برایِ زندگی کردنِ انسانی مناسب بوده و از موهومات و بیخردی ها، پاک باشد و آزادانه بیاندیشد
این اجتماع و محیطِ زندگیِ مناسب را تنها حکومتی شایسته میتواند برایِ انسانها ایجاد کند... هر انسانِ خردمندی این را میداند که
بدونِ تردید حکومت هایِ دینی و مذهبی، تواناییِ ایجادِ چنین محیطی را برایِ انسانها ندارند، چراکه آنها از اندیشیدنِ انسانها در هراس هستند
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ارسطو در این کتاب توضیحاتی در موردِ غرور و همچنین فروتنی میدهد، امّا روش بیان آن میتواند جالب توجه باشد.... ارسطو در بحثِ مربوط به خوبی ها، از "فرا اندیشی" سخن میگوید و "فرا اندیشی" را یک نوع خوبی به حساب می آورد و میگوید: انسانِ "فرا اندیش" کسی است که گمان میکند، شایستهٔ چیزهای بزرگ است و در واقع همینطور است.. او شایستگی چیزهایِ بزرگ را دارد ... حال این شایستگی چه میبا��د!! ارسطو میگوید: انسانِ "فرا اندیش"، شایستهٔ دریافتِ تمامیِ <دارایی هایِ بیرونی> میباشد.. بالاترین <دارایی هایِ بیرونی>، آبرو و اعتبار است.... پس یک انسانِ "فرا اندیش"، شایستهٔ این است که از آبرو و اعتبارِ بسیار زیادی برخوردار باشد.. لذا انسانی که "فرا اندیش" است، میتواند تمامی خوبی هایِ اخلاقی را یکجا داشته باشد... ارسطو میگوید: "فرا اندیشی"، تاجِ شاهانهٔ همهٔ خوبی هاست.... انسانِ "فرا اندیش" این حق را دارد که زیردست داشته باشد، چراکه او تمامِ خوبی ها را دارد و میتواند پندارِ نیک و درستی از دیگران و زیردستانِ خود داشته باشد
اینجاست که متوجه میشویم این اندیشه های ارسطو چگونه میتواند شاگردِ دوازده ساله اش، <اسکندرِ مقدونی> را تبدیل به موجودی کند که تصور میکند میتواند بر تمامِ این کرهٔ خاکی حکومت کرده و همه را تبدیل به زیر دستِ خویش سازد و هرکجا برود با خود غارت و ویرانی و کشتار را به ارمغان بیاورد و خود را یک "فرا اندیش" بداند
و امّا در مقابلِ این "فرا اندیش" که از دیدگاه ارسطو دارایِ تمامی خوبی هاست و میتواند فرمانروایی کند، انسانی قرار دارد به نامِ "فرو اندیش" ... شخصِ "فرو اندیش" کسی است که خود را دستِ کم میگیرد، لذا شایستگیِ کمتر و ارزشِ کمتری دارد... و حتی اگر ارزشِ راستینِ او بالا باشد، بازهم او یک "فرو اندیش" است .... مشخص است که ارسطو میانهٔ خوبی با فروتنی ندارد و فروتن را لایقِ تمامیِ خوبی ها و ارزش ها نمیداند
نکته ای که بسیار جالب است، این است که ارسطو میگوید: خوشبختی، پیشکش و هدیه ای است که به "فرا اندیشان" ارزانی گشته است ... از آنجا که دارا بودن و ثروتمند بودن و آبرومندی، از خصوصیاتِ اشراف زادگان است، اشراف زادگان میتوانند "فرا اندیش" باشند، لذا اشراف زادگان شایستهٔ این سربلندی هستند که به آنها به صورتِ خوشبختی، ارزانی گشته است
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ارسطو میگوید: کشمکش و نبرد، میانِ انسان و دیدگاهِ او، از زندگی خوب نشأت میگیرد
در وجود یک انسانِ پرهیزگار، هم خرد وجود دارد و هم شهوت.. اما هرکدام بجا و بخوبی استفاده میشوند... پس میتوان گفت: در وجودِ یک انسانِ پرهیزگار، هرچیزی با آوایِ خرد، در هماهنگیِ کامل میباشد
ارسطو بر این باور است که سرچشمهٔ تمامیِ ناهماهنگی ها و ناهمسانی ها در زندگیِ انسان ها، این است که از کودکی به انسان ها تلقین شده است که زیاد خواه نباشند و همچنین کم ارزش خواه باشند... که این موضوع ناهمسانی هایِ چشمگیری را به وجود آورده است،.. در این میان انسانی میتواند به خوبی ها و نیکی ها، نزدیک شود که از خرد، بهره میبرد و میتواند از دیدگاهِ اخلاقی بهتر عمل کند
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ارسطو میگوید: بسیاری از کنش ها و کردارهایِ یک انسانِ اخلاق گرا، برای سودرسانی به دوستان و سرزمین و میهنش انجام میشود و اگر نیاز باشد، جانش را در این راه فدا خواهد کرد
انسانِ اخلاق گرا، اگر بداند دوستش بیشتر به سود میرسد، حاضر است تا مال و ثروت خود را ببخشد.. زیرا بدین صورت، دوستِ او دارا میشود و خودش نیز به تصورش با شرافت باقی خواهد ماند... او شریف بودن را خوبتر از دارا بودن، میبیند
انسانِ اخلاق گرا، این تصور را دارد که چنانچه با شرافت بمیرد، خوبی و روشنیِ بزرگی را برای خویش برگزیده است
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ارسطو معتقد است که اگر شخصی همه چیزش را فدایِ خوشی هایِ جنسی کند، دیگر زندگی اش مناسبِ زندگیِ یک انسان نیست، بلکه آن زندگی مناسبِ چهارپایان است... ارسطو در اظهارِ نظری عجیب میگوید: حتی یک برده نیز میتواند از خوشی های جنسی و لذت جنسی بهره مند شود، امّا هیچکس نمیتواند ادعا کند که یک برده، سهمی از شادی دارد
در این اظهارِ نظر، ارسطو برده را پایین تر از انسان میداند و آنرا در ردیفِ چهارپایان، قرار میدهد
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عزیزانِ من، ارسطو کتابش را اینگونه آغاز میکند که: به نظر میرسد که هر هنر و یا هر دانشِ کاربردی و هر بررسی سازماندهی شده و هر کنش و گزینشی، به سویِ برخی خوبی ها نشانه رفته اند
ارسطو میخواهد بگوید که: برخی رفتارها و کنش ها، به خودیِ خود، خوب و نیک هستند.. یعنی برخی از رفتارها خوب هستند، حتی اگر هیچ پیامدی نداشته باشند... ارسطو مثالی که در انتهایِ کتاب برایِ سخنِ آغازینِ کتابش می آورد، این است که ژرف اندیشی نمونه ای از رفتارهایی است که به خودیِ خود، خوب هستند و ژرف اندیشیدن را ارزشمندترین کنش و کردارِ انسانی میداند و میگوید: کنش و کردارِ ایزدی که نیکبختیِ آن بر تمامیِ کنش هایِ دیگر برتری دارد، ژرف اندیشی میباشد و کردار و کنش انسانی که نزدیکترین خویشاوندی را با آن دارد، بایستی بزرگترین دلیلِ خوشنودی باشد... لذا ارسطو بالاترین ستایش در مقابلِ ایزد و یا ایزدان را کردار و کنشِ فیلسوفانه و دانشمندانه و خردمندانه، برمیگزیند.... یعنی هرچه را که می آموزیم، در آن به صورتِ عمیقی بیاندیشیم، که همان ژرف اندیشی میباشد
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شاید بخاطر بیان همین عقاید بوده است که عده ای بیخرد و متعصب، ارسطو را کافر نام نهادند و او را محکوم به مرگ کردند و ارسطو مجبور شد تا به جزیرهٔ اوبوآ بگریزد
سپاسگزارم که این ریویو را تا پایان خواندید و امیدوارم این ریویو در جهتِ شناختِ این کتاب و بخشی از اندیشه هایِ ارسطو، مفید ��وده باشه
<پیروز باشید و ایرانی>
August 11, 2023
I was so impressed with how down-to-earth and practical this book was. Aristotle begins pragmatically by breaking down a simple question (well not in these exact words, but in essence), what is the purpose of man? Or, What is the characteristic function of man? Everything in the world works according to it's function and everything seemingly fulfills it's function. You can't change the characteristic function of a rock to go upward instead of down no matter how many times you throw it into the air. The rock will not change. It just sits there doing it’s thing, being extremely rock-like. Aristotle didn’t know about the universal law of gravity, but you get the picture. What is that for man? What is man made for? What is man's function? According to our nature? Aristotle posits the idea that our function is to be virtuous. The ideal form of a man will be the man that is most virtuous, and the pursuit of a virtuous life is equated by Aristotle to the good life. Because it is what we are made to do. How do we know that the epicurean pursuit of happiness is not equated to the ultimate good? Because we also value temperance and self control as "good". If pleasure=happiness=good there would be no need for temperance. Yet we do value both temperance and the experience of pleasure as good! So, it seems that the virtuous good is in a sort of balancing act.
So how do we know what the virtuous good is? Well, according to Aristotle it is not so easily expressed as this or that specifically because it is found as a mean between two vices—one of excess and one of deficiency. So that in almost anything there is a balance where the virtue lies between two kinds of vices. For example the overindulgence of food is on the extreme end of excess what we call gluttony, yet the one who starves themselves for one reason or another would also be in a vice of deficiency, maybe even to the point of self harm, so that we find the truly virtuous man to be the mean between the two extremes. This example can be extrapolated to almost anything. Anger, action, sexual pleasure, thinking, talking, being a tough-guy, etc. Another example given by Aristotle is that of a courageous man. The excess vice being rashness, and the deficient vice that of cowardice, so that true virtue lies between the two extremes, i.e. courage. He extrapolates this idea with several more examples, pride, ambition, friendliness, truthfulness, etc. He even brings this idea into the realm of the arts and talks a bit about comedy, so that there is is the extreme comic who tries to always get a laugh in at the expense of anything and everything, versus the sort of guy who's a complete bore and can't take a joke even when it is executed wittily and at the precise time, and once again we find the virtuous man in the middle.
I have to say, I really love this way of looking at virtue as a sort of mean on a scale between vices, so that the truly virtuous man is one who we could call 'well-adjusted.' I think this also makes a lot of sense why some people would think differently about what virtue looks like, as if morality was relative, when it is not. If someone naturally finds themselves on one of the extreme sides of the scale they will interpret the truly virtuous as the extreme on the other side. For example, if we look at courage again, if I am naturally on the rash side acting before thinking always and basically being dumb in the name of courageous virtue when the truly virtuous man weighs out the situation before acting, I will likely call him a coward. Likewise if I am naturally a coward, and the virtuous man acts in confidence and is truly courageous, I would be apt to call him rash. Yet, true virtue is a mean between vices, despite what we think about it. The well-adjusted man is, according to Aristotle, the most virtuous.
Following this, Aristotle begins to speak about continence and incontinence. Which, as far as I can understand is that there are basically four types of people and only one of them is completely lost with no hope of redemption.
There is the virtuous man, the continent man, the incontinent man, and the irredeemable.
The virtuous man is someone who knows that something is wrong for him, DOESN'T desire to do it based on his knowledge, and does not do it.
The continent man is someone who knows something is wrong, DOES desire to do it, but lets his wisdom guide him, and does not do it.
The Incontinent man is someone who knows something is wrong, DOES desire to do it, and against his better judgement DOES it.
And the irredeemable man is someone who thinks that the wrong thing is right, DOES desire to do the thing, and does it according to his judgement and wishes.
He is considered irredeemable because his judgement is wrong, and in order to seek repentance from doing an evil act one would need to judge the thing as wrong to begin with. So this man will never be able to repent.
As a reformed protestant this break down was pretty eye-opening for me. I loved this way of thinking about the moral categories of sin, and I think this is similar to the Christian view of sin. The only truly virtuous man was Christ, the perfect man, the exemplar of virtue, the second Adam who was not corrupted by sin, but perfect in all ways. And Christians dealing with the battle of incontinence in their sin and straddling the line between continence and incontinence, and those who believe that evil is good are irredeemable not because their sins are graver, but because they see no need in repentance, because they find evil to be good, and they see no need for Jesus. Yet, the Christian would argue that if God opens this man's eyes to see his evil he then is granted the option to repent.
Following this, Aristotle speaks on friendship, and once again Aristotle is refreshingly pragmatic. He looks at all kinds of friendship, and differentiates between different types of friendships, including the relationships between people who are alike, or different, joyous, or sad, friends who are there for a sort of economic agreement where both receive an equal amount of benefit from the friendship, etc. He differentiates between these friendships and the friendship a lover shares with his or her spouse, or a father to his son, or a son to his father, or a brother to his brother, etc. And he explores what the best version of all of these friendships is. What the virtuous man should look for and find in a friendship. How many friends is too many? etc etc. He truly leaves no stones unturned.
He then looks at the parallels between different friendships and different government systems claiming that each government system is based on a different type of friendship. A timocracy is based on a brotherhood type of friendship in it's honor based ruling, where-as a democracy is based on a more economical type of friendship where the focus is equality, and the monarchy a sort of patriarchal friendship and so on and so forth. I found this part to be truly insightful, and it is the part of this book that I'm most excited to revisit, because he seems to be riffing on Plato's four types of government at the end of The Republic and the how they revolve endlessly from one to the next, yet Aristotle has a different idea about which governments evolve into others, and as far as I could tell (already wanting to re-read this part to clarify) Aristotle seems to be saying that all of these governments are flawed because they function within the framework of only one type of friendship, yet humans are diverse and different, so we need several types of relationships within a government to function correctly. There needs to be "mothers" and "fathers" and "sons" and "daughters" and "friendships on an equal standing" all together. A democracy fails because there is only one type of friendship, that between equals that is purely economical in nature. Yet, we don't respect the people who are authorities above us because we don't believe in authority we hammer everyone down to fit into the same hole, yet it is a fabrication created by the government that tells us that we are all equal when we are not. Likewise in the other forms of government they lack the full spectrum of human relations so that in the end they always fail. That is, if I understood him correctly.
Yet I think his point here, and in the whole book in general is once again unrelentingly pragmatic, wouldn't the perfect governance (just like virtue itself) be a sort of balancing act just like friendship in that it is concerned solely with the good, with the virtuous and by pursuing virtue all parties are benefitted and happy because of the good. One that promotes the self (not in a capitalist/materialist sense but in the sense that virtue is the ultimate good for the self, worth a million times more than material possessions) and by doing so promotes everyone else. One that pursues the happiness and the good of all people by the virtuous pursuit of each individual. It is not black or white. This or that. It is more of a mean between this, this, and that.
So how do we know what the virtuous good is? Well, according to Aristotle it is not so easily expressed as this or that specifically because it is found as a mean between two vices—one of excess and one of deficiency. So that in almost anything there is a balance where the virtue lies between two kinds of vices. For example the overindulgence of food is on the extreme end of excess what we call gluttony, yet the one who starves themselves for one reason or another would also be in a vice of deficiency, maybe even to the point of self harm, so that we find the truly virtuous man to be the mean between the two extremes. This example can be extrapolated to almost anything. Anger, action, sexual pleasure, thinking, talking, being a tough-guy, etc. Another example given by Aristotle is that of a courageous man. The excess vice being rashness, and the deficient vice that of cowardice, so that true virtue lies between the two extremes, i.e. courage. He extrapolates this idea with several more examples, pride, ambition, friendliness, truthfulness, etc. He even brings this idea into the realm of the arts and talks a bit about comedy, so that there is is the extreme comic who tries to always get a laugh in at the expense of anything and everything, versus the sort of guy who's a complete bore and can't take a joke even when it is executed wittily and at the precise time, and once again we find the virtuous man in the middle.
I have to say, I really love this way of looking at virtue as a sort of mean on a scale between vices, so that the truly virtuous man is one who we could call 'well-adjusted.' I think this also makes a lot of sense why some people would think differently about what virtue looks like, as if morality was relative, when it is not. If someone naturally finds themselves on one of the extreme sides of the scale they will interpret the truly virtuous as the extreme on the other side. For example, if we look at courage again, if I am naturally on the rash side acting before thinking always and basically being dumb in the name of courageous virtue when the truly virtuous man weighs out the situation before acting, I will likely call him a coward. Likewise if I am naturally a coward, and the virtuous man acts in confidence and is truly courageous, I would be apt to call him rash. Yet, true virtue is a mean between vices, despite what we think about it. The well-adjusted man is, according to Aristotle, the most virtuous.
Following this, Aristotle begins to speak about continence and incontinence. Which, as far as I can understand is that there are basically four types of people and only one of them is completely lost with no hope of redemption.
There is the virtuous man, the continent man, the incontinent man, and the irredeemable.
The virtuous man is someone who knows that something is wrong for him, DOESN'T desire to do it based on his knowledge, and does not do it.
The continent man is someone who knows something is wrong, DOES desire to do it, but lets his wisdom guide him, and does not do it.
The Incontinent man is someone who knows something is wrong, DOES desire to do it, and against his better judgement DOES it.
And the irredeemable man is someone who thinks that the wrong thing is right, DOES desire to do the thing, and does it according to his judgement and wishes.
He is considered irredeemable because his judgement is wrong, and in order to seek repentance from doing an evil act one would need to judge the thing as wrong to begin with. So this man will never be able to repent.
As a reformed protestant this break down was pretty eye-opening for me. I loved this way of thinking about the moral categories of sin, and I think this is similar to the Christian view of sin. The only truly virtuous man was Christ, the perfect man, the exemplar of virtue, the second Adam who was not corrupted by sin, but perfect in all ways. And Christians dealing with the battle of incontinence in their sin and straddling the line between continence and incontinence, and those who believe that evil is good are irredeemable not because their sins are graver, but because they see no need in repentance, because they find evil to be good, and they see no need for Jesus. Yet, the Christian would argue that if God opens this man's eyes to see his evil he then is granted the option to repent.
Following this, Aristotle speaks on friendship, and once again Aristotle is refreshingly pragmatic. He looks at all kinds of friendship, and differentiates between different types of friendships, including the relationships between people who are alike, or different, joyous, or sad, friends who are there for a sort of economic agreement where both receive an equal amount of benefit from the friendship, etc. He differentiates between these friendships and the friendship a lover shares with his or her spouse, or a father to his son, or a son to his father, or a brother to his brother, etc. And he explores what the best version of all of these friendships is. What the virtuous man should look for and find in a friendship. How many friends is too many? etc etc. He truly leaves no stones unturned.
He then looks at the parallels between different friendships and different government systems claiming that each government system is based on a different type of friendship. A timocracy is based on a brotherhood type of friendship in it's honor based ruling, where-as a democracy is based on a more economical type of friendship where the focus is equality, and the monarchy a sort of patriarchal friendship and so on and so forth. I found this part to be truly insightful, and it is the part of this book that I'm most excited to revisit, because he seems to be riffing on Plato's four types of government at the end of The Republic and the how they revolve endlessly from one to the next, yet Aristotle has a different idea about which governments evolve into others, and as far as I could tell (already wanting to re-read this part to clarify) Aristotle seems to be saying that all of these governments are flawed because they function within the framework of only one type of friendship, yet humans are diverse and different, so we need several types of relationships within a government to function correctly. There needs to be "mothers" and "fathers" and "sons" and "daughters" and "friendships on an equal standing" all together. A democracy fails because there is only one type of friendship, that between equals that is purely economical in nature. Yet, we don't respect the people who are authorities above us because we don't believe in authority we hammer everyone down to fit into the same hole, yet it is a fabrication created by the government that tells us that we are all equal when we are not. Likewise in the other forms of government they lack the full spectrum of human relations so that in the end they always fail. That is, if I understood him correctly.
Yet I think his point here, and in the whole book in general is once again unrelentingly pragmatic, wouldn't the perfect governance (just like virtue itself) be a sort of balancing act just like friendship in that it is concerned solely with the good, with the virtuous and by pursuing virtue all parties are benefitted and happy because of the good. One that promotes the self (not in a capitalist/materialist sense but in the sense that virtue is the ultimate good for the self, worth a million times more than material possessions) and by doing so promotes everyone else. One that pursues the happiness and the good of all people by the virtuous pursuit of each individual. It is not black or white. This or that. It is more of a mean between this, this, and that.
December 22, 2023
Everyday we make a choice as to how we will interact with others; but often that choice is not predicated on reciprocation...WE want to be treated in a certian way; but WE often do not see the need to treat OTHERS in that same way. Aristotle looks at this dilemma and forces us to step back and get perspective - should be required reading for all politicians and CEOs.
July 1, 2021
Nicomachean Ethics ~ Aristotle
First Impression of Aristotle
I first read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in college over twenty years ago. My first experience with Aristotle was reading from a scientific work of his that was perhaps only twelve pages long. Twelve pages, I thought, what a break! Normally our readings were much longer. I could take it easy this week, I thought. Big mistake! Twelve pages of Aristotle meant twelve hours of intense study to work out what he was saying as best I could, and in some spots to confess defeat and at least mark where my questions were. This is a common first experience with Aristotle, but one gets faster as one gets to know him.
Aristotle, or Plato?
In those early college days where students were far more interested in reading books and understanding what their authors were saying, and were not interested in cancelling anything, a frequent question among the studentry, used to better get to know another was Whom do you prefer, Plato or Aristotle? How could anyone prefer Aristotle, I thought. The writing is awful––his defenders must apologize for it (the sloppy organization, the frequent repetitions, the extreme concision and the use of pronouns that makes it tough sometimes to keep track of antecedents) on the grounds that his books were meant merely to be his own personal lecture notes, and had no literary pretensions. Plato, on the other hand wrote so beautifully, and he crafts such artful dialogues, which reflect the nature of philosophical objects in the structure of his dramatic framework. Plato, one of the fathers of Greek prose style, not only writes beautiful prose, but places his art at the service of conveying philosophical truth.
In short, I was in love with Plato, because I was a lover of beauty, and the whole experience of reading Plato, of sitting in a dramatic scene to listen to the interesting conversations of Socrates and his friends or foils, was much more entertaining. The lovers of Aristotle, on the other hand, were not insensitive to beauty, but rather discovered beauty in the straightforwardness of Aristotle, who states how things are, and even states that though Plato is his friend, a greater friend is truth. This was the beauty that lies in the clarity and directness of truth stated and explained. Plato on the other hand forces the reader patiently to sit through the meandering course of a discussion in pursuit of truth, which at least leads to a better understanding of the questions. Aristotle, however, has already figured things out, and explains them directly to the reader. That is not to say that his material is for that reason easy. No, the reader must still figure out what Aristotle means. Plato, on the other hand, is more entertaining. The effort to understand either of them pays off well in the joyful experience of acquired understanding, but Plato can be enjoyable even if one has understood little, while Aristotle will never be enjoyable without the success in figuring him out. Put another way, I believe that Plato rejoices in the means to the end, and Aristotle only in the end achieved.
In my later, more mature years I thought that I had come to love Aristotle more than Plato. Perhaps, because I had been reading Aquinas, I had come to enjoy more of the hard philosophical stuff. Aquinas understood Aristotle well, and his use of Aristotle would mean that Aristotle should become much more influential on the future philosophical history of the west than Plato.
It is perhaps best to reflect that no matter how one feels about the two, Plato and Aristotle have been depicted by Raphael as the central focus of his School of Athens fresco, because the two of them, together with their teacher Socrates, reclining on the steps below them, are the foundation upon which the rest of western philosophy is built. So, why should one read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics?
For whom is this book written?
Aristotle has written his Ethics with a practical end in mind. It is designed with the purpose of helping his audience to become better persons. If this were not possible it would all be a waste of time. That being said, it is not a book for those who do not like to read, think, deliberate, or use their intellect. If you are willing to do these things and you want to know how to discover happiness, and learn how you may live a good life, then this is a book for you. Perhaps the most beautiful part of the book involves friendship.
Some concepts covered in The Nicomachean Ethics
What is virtue, can it be taught? With words such as these Plato’s Meno had begun. By the end of that dialogue, we had come to understand perhaps that an example of virtue might be given, which others may learn to follow, but we still weren’t very sure what virtue was. In the Protagoras we also come to wonder why, though Pericles is such a great and virtuous man, his sons are worthless louts.
In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle actually defines and explains virtue. Virtue is a state of the soul. The soul, like Plato’s model of the soul, has three parts, but they are not the same three. There is a vegetative / nutritive part of the soul which is involved with absorption of nutrients necessary for life. That part of the soul does what it needs to do automatically, and there is no more need to elaborate upon it. The two remaining parts are the part with reason, and the part without reason, which involves appetite and desire. This last part without reason, still participates in reason, however, in that it is able to listen to reason and is open to persuasion.
Aristotle considers why people act. Every action is undertaken with a view to the pursuit of some perceived good. The final aim of all action is happiness. There are, however, many complications, e.g. distinctions between voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions. Involuntary actions are considered to be such either when the cause of the action is external, or when it is owing to ignorance. There is then a distinction between an action performed in ignorance, and through ignorance. I’m wandering about on the terrain here, merely to give you an idea of some of the complexity you will encounter, but now back to virtue.
Aristotle describes virtue as a mean existing between two extremes, one of deficiency, and another of excess. This is perhaps easiest to see with the examples of courage and temperance. Courage is defined as the mean existing between cowardice (a deficiency of courage) and rashness (in appearance, an excess of courage). A human being, however, can not actually have more of the quality of courage than what exists at that mean point. For any departure from the mean, either in the direction of deficiency or excess, is less of courage, so that the means are actual superlative states of the virtues in question (temperance, courage, generosity, and so forth). It is necessary to mention that my example here relates to that part of the soul “without reason,” which has its respective virtues relating to appetite, desire, and the experience of the human being in relation to pain and pleasure. There are other virtues belonging properly to the part of the soul “with reason” and these are the intellectual virtues. All of them are essential to leading a good and happy life.
So, Aristotle says that virtue is a mean, but he also defines virtue as a state of the soul. What state your soul is in with respect to courage is observed by others with the sudden emergence of an unexpected danger, for there will be no time to deliberate at that moment about what to do. When the wild beast emerges from the edge of the forest and attacks your family picnic, do you turn and run or stand to fight to defend the young and old? So, what if you lack courage? What if as a result of poor training, poor education, and bad experience, you have never developed courage? How can you improve? The short answer is by performing courageous acts, and slow habituation. One trains oneself in virtuous action. Well, I fear I should make a bad job of it were I to attempt to summarize the 200 pages of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but there is much more of interest: the idea of the great-souled man, justice, both distributive and corrective, reciprocity and the rôle of money (a unit of convertibility between disparate things), the difference between self-control and temperance, friendship, and happiness, "an activity of the soul in accordance with reason.”
But is it all true, supposing I actually took the time to figure it out?
I believe it is, though I’m not sure about the vegetative soul. The system of Aristotle’s moral ethics is practical but perhaps, like the laws of Physics, it breaks down at a quantum level and is no longer viable. For example, if an ethical courageous act, involves a deliberate choice to risk everything for the attainment of an end, then cowardice is no longer admissible, and there can be no question of rashness. There are no longer extremes, there is only the courageous ethical act. If this is so, it means that there is not really a sliding scale upon which to place cowardice, courage, and rashness, as though they each represented different quantities of the same quality. In other words, when virtue the mean is discovered, the extremes vanish. We have here something analogous to the set of laws in physics that are true for velocities lower than C, the speed of light, where discovering the mean is equivalent to surpassing C. If the analogy works, there may be more to discover, refinements or revisions to be made, but for practical purposes, given human experience––we don’t have experience of the speed of light either––the system works, and working through the treatise will make you more aware of all these things and set you on the path towards "an active life of the soul in accordance with reason.”
I recommend patience in reading, working it out, and digesting it slowly. Don’t attempt to read it in only three weeks, as I had to for a recent seminar, but plan instead for a long, slow, deliberate read. It will be best to have interested friends with whom you can discuss it as you go, for friends are essential to the happy life. 🙂
See also:
Plato’s Republic
First Impression of Aristotle
I first read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in college over twenty years ago. My first experience with Aristotle was reading from a scientific work of his that was perhaps only twelve pages long. Twelve pages, I thought, what a break! Normally our readings were much longer. I could take it easy this week, I thought. Big mistake! Twelve pages of Aristotle meant twelve hours of intense study to work out what he was saying as best I could, and in some spots to confess defeat and at least mark where my questions were. This is a common first experience with Aristotle, but one gets faster as one gets to know him.
Aristotle, or Plato?
In those early college days where students were far more interested in reading books and understanding what their authors were saying, and were not interested in cancelling anything, a frequent question among the studentry, used to better get to know another was Whom do you prefer, Plato or Aristotle? How could anyone prefer Aristotle, I thought. The writing is awful––his defenders must apologize for it (the sloppy organization, the frequent repetitions, the extreme concision and the use of pronouns that makes it tough sometimes to keep track of antecedents) on the grounds that his books were meant merely to be his own personal lecture notes, and had no literary pretensions. Plato, on the other hand wrote so beautifully, and he crafts such artful dialogues, which reflect the nature of philosophical objects in the structure of his dramatic framework. Plato, one of the fathers of Greek prose style, not only writes beautiful prose, but places his art at the service of conveying philosophical truth.
In short, I was in love with Plato, because I was a lover of beauty, and the whole experience of reading Plato, of sitting in a dramatic scene to listen to the interesting conversations of Socrates and his friends or foils, was much more entertaining. The lovers of Aristotle, on the other hand, were not insensitive to beauty, but rather discovered beauty in the straightforwardness of Aristotle, who states how things are, and even states that though Plato is his friend, a greater friend is truth. This was the beauty that lies in the clarity and directness of truth stated and explained. Plato on the other hand forces the reader patiently to sit through the meandering course of a discussion in pursuit of truth, which at least leads to a better understanding of the questions. Aristotle, however, has already figured things out, and explains them directly to the reader. That is not to say that his material is for that reason easy. No, the reader must still figure out what Aristotle means. Plato, on the other hand, is more entertaining. The effort to understand either of them pays off well in the joyful experience of acquired understanding, but Plato can be enjoyable even if one has understood little, while Aristotle will never be enjoyable without the success in figuring him out. Put another way, I believe that Plato rejoices in the means to the end, and Aristotle only in the end achieved.
In my later, more mature years I thought that I had come to love Aristotle more than Plato. Perhaps, because I had been reading Aquinas, I had come to enjoy more of the hard philosophical stuff. Aquinas understood Aristotle well, and his use of Aristotle would mean that Aristotle should become much more influential on the future philosophical history of the west than Plato.
It is perhaps best to reflect that no matter how one feels about the two, Plato and Aristotle have been depicted by Raphael as the central focus of his School of Athens fresco, because the two of them, together with their teacher Socrates, reclining on the steps below them, are the foundation upon which the rest of western philosophy is built. So, why should one read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics?
For whom is this book written?
Aristotle has written his Ethics with a practical end in mind. It is designed with the purpose of helping his audience to become better persons. If this were not possible it would all be a waste of time. That being said, it is not a book for those who do not like to read, think, deliberate, or use their intellect. If you are willing to do these things and you want to know how to discover happiness, and learn how you may live a good life, then this is a book for you. Perhaps the most beautiful part of the book involves friendship.
Some concepts covered in The Nicomachean Ethics
What is virtue, can it be taught? With words such as these Plato’s Meno had begun. By the end of that dialogue, we had come to understand perhaps that an example of virtue might be given, which others may learn to follow, but we still weren’t very sure what virtue was. In the Protagoras we also come to wonder why, though Pericles is such a great and virtuous man, his sons are worthless louts.
In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle actually defines and explains virtue. Virtue is a state of the soul. The soul, like Plato’s model of the soul, has three parts, but they are not the same three. There is a vegetative / nutritive part of the soul which is involved with absorption of nutrients necessary for life. That part of the soul does what it needs to do automatically, and there is no more need to elaborate upon it. The two remaining parts are the part with reason, and the part without reason, which involves appetite and desire. This last part without reason, still participates in reason, however, in that it is able to listen to reason and is open to persuasion.
Aristotle considers why people act. Every action is undertaken with a view to the pursuit of some perceived good. The final aim of all action is happiness. There are, however, many complications, e.g. distinctions between voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions. Involuntary actions are considered to be such either when the cause of the action is external, or when it is owing to ignorance. There is then a distinction between an action performed in ignorance, and through ignorance. I’m wandering about on the terrain here, merely to give you an idea of some of the complexity you will encounter, but now back to virtue.
Aristotle describes virtue as a mean existing between two extremes, one of deficiency, and another of excess. This is perhaps easiest to see with the examples of courage and temperance. Courage is defined as the mean existing between cowardice (a deficiency of courage) and rashness (in appearance, an excess of courage). A human being, however, can not actually have more of the quality of courage than what exists at that mean point. For any departure from the mean, either in the direction of deficiency or excess, is less of courage, so that the means are actual superlative states of the virtues in question (temperance, courage, generosity, and so forth). It is necessary to mention that my example here relates to that part of the soul “without reason,” which has its respective virtues relating to appetite, desire, and the experience of the human being in relation to pain and pleasure. There are other virtues belonging properly to the part of the soul “with reason” and these are the intellectual virtues. All of them are essential to leading a good and happy life.
So, Aristotle says that virtue is a mean, but he also defines virtue as a state of the soul. What state your soul is in with respect to courage is observed by others with the sudden emergence of an unexpected danger, for there will be no time to deliberate at that moment about what to do. When the wild beast emerges from the edge of the forest and attacks your family picnic, do you turn and run or stand to fight to defend the young and old? So, what if you lack courage? What if as a result of poor training, poor education, and bad experience, you have never developed courage? How can you improve? The short answer is by performing courageous acts, and slow habituation. One trains oneself in virtuous action. Well, I fear I should make a bad job of it were I to attempt to summarize the 200 pages of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but there is much more of interest: the idea of the great-souled man, justice, both distributive and corrective, reciprocity and the rôle of money (a unit of convertibility between disparate things), the difference between self-control and temperance, friendship, and happiness, "an activity of the soul in accordance with reason.”
But is it all true, supposing I actually took the time to figure it out?
I believe it is, though I’m not sure about the vegetative soul. The system of Aristotle’s moral ethics is practical but perhaps, like the laws of Physics, it breaks down at a quantum level and is no longer viable. For example, if an ethical courageous act, involves a deliberate choice to risk everything for the attainment of an end, then cowardice is no longer admissible, and there can be no question of rashness. There are no longer extremes, there is only the courageous ethical act. If this is so, it means that there is not really a sliding scale upon which to place cowardice, courage, and rashness, as though they each represented different quantities of the same quality. In other words, when virtue the mean is discovered, the extremes vanish. We have here something analogous to the set of laws in physics that are true for velocities lower than C, the speed of light, where discovering the mean is equivalent to surpassing C. If the analogy works, there may be more to discover, refinements or revisions to be made, but for practical purposes, given human experience––we don’t have experience of the speed of light either––the system works, and working through the treatise will make you more aware of all these things and set you on the path towards "an active life of the soul in accordance with reason.”
I recommend patience in reading, working it out, and digesting it slowly. Don’t attempt to read it in only three weeks, as I had to for a recent seminar, but plan instead for a long, slow, deliberate read. It will be best to have interested friends with whom you can discuss it as you go, for friends are essential to the happy life. 🙂
See also:
Plato’s Republic
October 8, 2008
Aristotle doesn't satisfy your whole soul, just the logical side, but here he is quite thorough. The Nicomachean Ethics is his most important study of personal morality and the ends of human life. He does little more than search for and examine the "good." He examines the virtue and vices of man in all his faculties. He believes that the unexamined life is a life not worth living; happiness is the contemplation of the good and the carrying out of virtue with solid acts. Among this book's most outstanding features are Aristotle's insistence that there are no known absolute moral standards and that any ethical theory must be based in part on an understanding of psychology and firmly grounded in the realities of human nature and daily life. Though the over 100 chapters (divided into ten books) flow and build upon each other, you can benefit from reading just one of them. One of my favorite philosophical reads, I cannot say enough for the depth of insight Aristotle has into living the "good" life.
November 21, 2019
November 20, 2019 - 5 stars
Aiiiiiii, look at me re-reading books in the same year. Definitely did not expect to be go back to this one so soon but glad I did. Context does amazing things for your understanding. Read this one as part of class instead of just 'cause and gained so much more out of it.
January 31st, 2019 Review - 4 stars
Dry but thought-provoking. Obviously, it is hard to rate someone like Aristotle. For the way it shaped Western thought, Ethics easily deserves 5 stars. Yet it also proved a dense and frequently uninteresting read, so in fairness to myself as an educated reader, I'm rating based on my personal understanding and appreciation. 4 stars it gets.
Aiiiiiii, look at me re-reading books in the same year. Definitely did not expect to be go back to this one so soon but glad I did. Context does amazing things for your understanding. Read this one as part of class instead of just 'cause and gained so much more out of it.
January 31st, 2019 Review - 4 stars
Dry but thought-provoking. Obviously, it is hard to rate someone like Aristotle. For the way it shaped Western thought, Ethics easily deserves 5 stars. Yet it also proved a dense and frequently uninteresting read, so in fairness to myself as an educated reader, I'm rating based on my personal understanding and appreciation. 4 stars it gets.
December 30, 2023
8.5/10.
An excellent book on how to live life well. The best section is on friendship, which really shined a light on my failed and successful friendships and why successful ones are so rare.
An excellent book on how to live life well. The best section is on friendship, which really shined a light on my failed and successful friendships and why successful ones are so rare.
December 24, 2011
Aristotle vs. Plato
Having just finished and enjoyed Plato's complete works, I find this book a bit annoying and uninspiring in comparison. Aristotle seems to take every opportunity to "correct" Plato, when in fact he is only attacking a strawman. His arguments, sometimes self-contradictory, often support and clarify Plato's ideas, albeit using his own terminology.
Aristotle seems to have great difficulty appreciating or understanding Plato’s abstractions (from species to genus, from the individual instances to the common patterns, i.e. Idea or Form). This is the cause of the majority of his attacks against Plato, as “piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.” How very noble of him!
I don't know whether the Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum charged their students fees. If not, there were no financial incentives in disparaging their rival. If it was purely intellectual rivalry, using straw man is often a sign of an inferior intellect or character. Since both Plato and Aristotle believed that the intellect was the best part of man or the true man, to attack and destroy another's ideas would be equivalent to murder (or Freudian parricide).
However, it could also be true that Aristotle was formulating his own philosophy through engagement with Plato's ideas, and intellectual competitions and debates help facilitate the development of sound ideas. Since this is the first book by Aristotle that I've read, it's very likely that I'm not giving him his due here. It may take some time to switch from Plato to Aristotle's way of thinking.
A Champion of Mediocrity
Aristotle's definitions of good, virtue and happiness are unsatisfactory to me. Good is "that at which all things aim". All people aim at happiness (or pleasure), therefore happiness is the supreme good. But, what exactly is happiness or pleasure? How can one hit his aim if he can't discern what he is aiming at? If virtue is "the mean between deficiency and excess", what is the difference between virtue and mediocrity?
"Pleasure perfects activity not as the formed state that issues in that activity perfects it, by being immanent in it, but as a sort of supervening [culminating] perfection, like the bloom that graces the flower of youth." How can a fleeting thing that lacks permanence be the object of a lifelong pursuit?
In the end, Aristotle agrees with Plato, perhaps begrudgingly as it was dictated by reason, that happiness is contemplation of the divine, which is pleasant, self-sufficient and continuous. He insists on making a distinction between activity and state, but in this instance the distinction is unclear to me.
An Acute Observer of Human Nature
There are a few things I do appreciate in this book. Aristotle's joie de vivre (his delight in learning, being alive and active), his insights into human nature, his clear and penetrating psychological portrayal of various character traits and the dynamic relationships or transactions between human beings. He also introduced me to Pythagorean's fascinating mathematical representation of equality, A:B = B:C and A-M = M -C.
Having just finished and enjoyed Plato's complete works, I find this book a bit annoying and uninspiring in comparison. Aristotle seems to take every opportunity to "correct" Plato, when in fact he is only attacking a strawman. His arguments, sometimes self-contradictory, often support and clarify Plato's ideas, albeit using his own terminology.
Aristotle seems to have great difficulty appreciating or understanding Plato’s abstractions (from species to genus, from the individual instances to the common patterns, i.e. Idea or Form). This is the cause of the majority of his attacks against Plato, as “piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.” How very noble of him!
I don't know whether the Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum charged their students fees. If not, there were no financial incentives in disparaging their rival. If it was purely intellectual rivalry, using straw man is often a sign of an inferior intellect or character. Since both Plato and Aristotle believed that the intellect was the best part of man or the true man, to attack and destroy another's ideas would be equivalent to murder (or Freudian parricide).
However, it could also be true that Aristotle was formulating his own philosophy through engagement with Plato's ideas, and intellectual competitions and debates help facilitate the development of sound ideas. Since this is the first book by Aristotle that I've read, it's very likely that I'm not giving him his due here. It may take some time to switch from Plato to Aristotle's way of thinking.
A Champion of Mediocrity
Aristotle's definitions of good, virtue and happiness are unsatisfactory to me. Good is "that at which all things aim". All people aim at happiness (or pleasure), therefore happiness is the supreme good. But, what exactly is happiness or pleasure? How can one hit his aim if he can't discern what he is aiming at? If virtue is "the mean between deficiency and excess", what is the difference between virtue and mediocrity?
"Pleasure perfects activity not as the formed state that issues in that activity perfects it, by being immanent in it, but as a sort of supervening [culminating] perfection, like the bloom that graces the flower of youth." How can a fleeting thing that lacks permanence be the object of a lifelong pursuit?
In the end, Aristotle agrees with Plato, perhaps begrudgingly as it was dictated by reason, that happiness is contemplation of the divine, which is pleasant, self-sufficient and continuous. He insists on making a distinction between activity and state, but in this instance the distinction is unclear to me.
An Acute Observer of Human Nature
There are a few things I do appreciate in this book. Aristotle's joie de vivre (his delight in learning, being alive and active), his insights into human nature, his clear and penetrating psychological portrayal of various character traits and the dynamic relationships or transactions between human beings. He also introduced me to Pythagorean's fascinating mathematical representation of equality, A:B = B:C and A-M = M -C.
July 24, 2017
"One lesson of our age is that barbarism persists under the surface, and that the virtues of civilized life are less deeply rooted than used to be supposed. The world is not too richly endowed with examples of perseverance and subtlety in analysis, of moderation and sanity in the study of human affairs. It will be a great loss if the thinker who, above all others, displays these qualities, is ever totally forgotten."
D.J. Allan, author of The Philosophy of Aristotle, (Oxford 1952) about Aristotle (384 BC - 323 BC)
D.J. Allan, author of The Philosophy of Aristotle, (Oxford 1952) about Aristotle (384 BC - 323 BC)
June 2, 2023
Such an impressive book that it's honestly hard to do it justice. The philosophical distinctions that Aristotle introduces here -- the three types of friendship, hexis as the key to understanding moral action, the vice/virtue distinction, the spoudaios, etc. etc. -- are impressive enough on their own that any one of them could be the basis of an entire philosophical school in any century.
But when you realize that Aristotle was literally the first writer in the Greek tradition to deeply consider any of these issues, his achievement becomes all the more difficult to comprehend; imagine being not only the inventor of a philosophical topic (ethics did not exist as a clearly demarcated field of study even in Plato), but also such a brilliant thinker that you're still deeply influential on all Western ethical thought, thousands of years later? (And that you also, incidentally, wrote 452 other works, basically invented natural science, etc. etc.)
But when you realize that Aristotle was literally the first writer in the Greek tradition to deeply consider any of these issues, his achievement becomes all the more difficult to comprehend; imagine being not only the inventor of a philosophical topic (ethics did not exist as a clearly demarcated field of study even in Plato), but also such a brilliant thinker that you're still deeply influential on all Western ethical thought, thousands of years later? (And that you also, incidentally, wrote 452 other works, basically invented natural science, etc. etc.)
September 24, 2018
It is rare that a philosophical book about ethics can be so investigation-based and have so much common sense in it.
November 30, 2020
تقریبا از ابتدای اردیبهشت امسال شروعش کردم و با مجموعه صوتی متن خوانی این کتاب با حضور خانم دکتر الهام کندری که چند سال پیش در یکی از پژوهشکده های علوم انسانی اصفهان برگزار شده بود پیش آمدم اما در نیمه راه مجبور شدم پیش رفتن با فایلهای صوتی را متوقف کنم. بعد دیگر خواندنم خیلی شلخته شد و لازم میدانم دو قسمت از کتاب را حتما در آینده باز مرور کنم. تقریبا کل کتاب را به خاطر همین دو بخش خواندم که برای خودم خیلی سوال برانگیز بوده و هست:
درباره نیکبختی
درباره پرهیزگاری
به ذکر این نکته اکتفا میکنم که با خواندن این کتاب اول گمان میکنید مسائل اخلاق از زمان ارسطو تا حالا تغییری نکرده اند بعد پی میبرید که واقعا نهایت اعتدال و نکته سنجی ارسطو باعث شده ��گاه بشر امروز کماکان به نگاه او نزدیک باشد. کتابی که کلیسا هم آن را قرن ها گرامی داشته و جای تعجب ندارد اگر بگوییم هنوز هم در جهانی نسبتا ارسطویی زندگی میکنیم
درباره نیکبختی
درباره پرهیزگاری
به ذکر این نکته اکتفا میکنم که با خواندن این کتاب اول گمان میکنید مسائل اخلاق از زمان ارسطو تا حالا تغییری نکرده اند بعد پی میبرید که واقعا نهایت اعتدال و نکته سنجی ارسطو باعث شده ��گاه بشر امروز کماکان به نگاه او نزدیک باشد. کتابی که کلیسا هم آن را قرن ها گرامی داشته و جای تعجب ندارد اگر بگوییم هنوز هم در جهانی نسبتا ارسطویی زندگی میکنیم
March 8, 2024
«Ética a Nicómaco» es un compendio de libros resultado de las clases que impartió Aristóteles a sus alumnos. En él se trata el desarrollo de la virtud —la virtud, comprendida como «la excelencia»—. La virtud —o excelencia— es dar con el modo de fomentar el alma, hacernos mejores, alcanzar el bienestar o, como lo llamaban en la antigua Grecia, la Eudaimonía (εὐδαιμονία) —o también traducido, aunque cuestionable, como «felicidad»—.
A diferencia de Sócrates, Aristóteles no se contenta con conocer lo que es bueno. No, Aristóteles fomenta la acción.
Aristóteles, a diferencia de sus predecesores —grandes teóricos—, sí que consigue trasladar sus ideas al mundo cotidiano, y eso es algo excelente porque sienta las bases para el futuro de la filosofía: «las virtudes no se originan por naturaleza ni contra naturaleza, sino que lo hacen en nosotros que, de un lado, estamos capacitados naturalmente para recibirlas y, de otro, las perfeccionamos a través de la costumbre».
La costumbre, precisamente, es algo esencial para Aristóteles: para ser virtuoso no basta con saber lo que es bueno, lo que es justo, lo que nos hace felices; es preciso obrar en consecuencia: debemos ser buenos, debemos ser justos, debemos ser generosos; en definitiva, debemos trasladar esa teoría a las situaciones de nuestra vida diaria. Si usted considera que es bueno ser justo, actúe con justicia.
Aristóteles hace una exhaustiva distinción entre las clases de virtudes diferenciándolas entre intelectuales y morales. Las primeras, corresponden a la sabiduría, la comprensión y la inteligencia; mientras que las segundas, corresponden a la generosidad y la templanza. Para Aristóteles, en el término medio reside el buen hacer. Por ejemplo, la templanza se encuentra en el término medio entre el desenfreno de las emociones y la ausencia de todas ellas. En los extremos, por contraposición, se encuentran el dolor y la tiranía. Por ejemplo, la generosidad se encuentra en el centro del derroche y de la avaricia.
Y, ¿cuál es para Aristóteles la forma más adecuada de lograr la Eudaimonía o «el buen vivir»? Pues como no podía ser de otro modo, mediante la contemplación o —en términos actuales— mediante la filosofía. La reflexión, sea de manera aislada o acompañado, es la forma más acertada de alcanzar la excelencia.
A diferencia de Sócrates, Aristóteles no se contenta con conocer lo que es bueno. No, Aristóteles fomenta la acción.
Por consiguiente es acertado decir que el hombre se hace justo por realizar acciones justas y templado por realizarlas templadas; y también que como consecuencia de no realizar éstas nadie podría ni siquiera estar en disposición de ser bueno. Sin embargo, la mayoría no llevan esto a la práctica, sino que se refugian en la teoría y creen que son filósofos y que así van a ser virtuosos, obrando de manera parecida a los enfermos que escuchan atentamente a los médicos, pero no hacen nada de lo que se les prescribe. Pues bien, lo mismo que éstos no van a estar bien con el cuerpo si reciben este tratamiento, tampoco aquéllos van a estar bien de alma si filosofan de esta manera.
Aristóteles, a diferencia de sus predecesores —grandes teóricos—, sí que consigue trasladar sus ideas al mundo cotidiano, y eso es algo excelente porque sienta las bases para el futuro de la filosofía: «las virtudes no se originan por naturaleza ni contra naturaleza, sino que lo hacen en nosotros que, de un lado, estamos capacitados naturalmente para recibirlas y, de otro, las perfeccionamos a través de la costumbre».
La costumbre, precisamente, es algo esencial para Aristóteles: para ser virtuoso no basta con saber lo que es bueno, lo que es justo, lo que nos hace felices; es preciso obrar en consecuencia: debemos ser buenos, debemos ser justos, debemos ser generosos; en definitiva, debemos trasladar esa teoría a las situaciones de nuestra vida diaria. Si usted considera que es bueno ser justo, actúe con justicia.
Por ejemplo: los hombres se hacen constructores construyendo y citaristas tocando la cítara. Pues bien, de esta manera nos hacemos justos realizando acciones justas y valientes.
Aristóteles hace una exhaustiva distinción entre las clases de virtudes diferenciándolas entre intelectuales y morales. Las primeras, corresponden a la sabiduría, la comprensión y la inteligencia; mientras que las segundas, corresponden a la generosidad y la templanza. Para Aristóteles, en el término medio reside el buen hacer. Por ejemplo, la templanza se encuentra en el término medio entre el desenfreno de las emociones y la ausencia de todas ellas. En los extremos, por contraposición, se encuentran el dolor y la tiranía. Por ejemplo, la generosidad se encuentra en el centro del derroche y de la avaricia.
E igualmente las bebidas y los alimentos acaban con la salud, si se producen en exceso o defecto, mientras que sin equilibrados la crean, la aumentan y la conservan. Pues bien, de esta manera sucede también con la templanza, la valentía y las demás virtudes. El que lo rehúye todo y es temeroso y no aguan nada se hace cobarde; y el que no teme nada en absoluto, sino que se enfrenta a todo, es temerario.
Y, ¿cuál es para Aristóteles la forma más adecuada de lograr la Eudaimonía o «el buen vivir»? Pues como no podía ser de otro modo, mediante la contemplación o —en términos actuales— mediante la filosofía. La reflexión, sea de manera aislada o acompañado, es la forma más acertada de alcanzar la excelencia.
Pero si la felicidad es actividad conforme a virtud, es lógico que lo sea conforme a la más importante: y ésta sería de lo más excelente. Pues bien, ya sea esto el intelecto o cualquier otra cosa que, en verdad, parece por naturaleza gobernar y conducir y tener conocimiento acerca de las cosas buenas y divinas, [...] la actividad de esto conforme a su virtud propia sería la felicidad perfecta. Y ya se ha dicho que ella es apta para la contemplación.
October 17, 2012
ابرز ما جاء فى الكتاب نظرية الوسط الأخلاقى لأرسطو، الذى أطلق عليه الوسط العادل القائم على تجنب الإفراط والتفريط، فإذا كانت خصائص الفضيلة هى التوسط، فإن خصائص الرذيلة هى الإفراط أو التفريط، ينطبق هذا على الأخلاق والسلوك والعادات، بل وعلى الجمال الحسى، ففضيلة كل شيء فى تحقيق الإعتدال، فالشجاعة متوسطة بين الخوف والتقحم، والسخاء وسط بين التبذير والتقتير، وقل مثل هذا فى الحلم والحياء وغير هذه من الأخلاق والإنفعالات والسلوك.
December 24, 2017
This is one of the more important of Aristotle's works; and, for me, one of the more practical and interesting ones. Here, Aristotle's pedantry does seem to yield better results. In any discussion of ethics, one should investigate as many facets and hypotheticals that may possibly be relevant and appropriate. Aristotle, to his credit, does the subject justice; and even if I may not totally agree with him in all of his conclusions, overall, I think I can assent to much that is here.
Prior to Aristotle, and even after, many philosophical schools (the Stoics especially) oversimplified the subject of ethics and/or morals. Pleasure itself was often seen as an evil that should be eradicated root and branch. Aristotle holds that this trivializes the nature of pleasure and treats all pleasures the same way. For Aristotle, there are pleasures that are healthy and some that are unhealthy. The most healthy is the pleasure that comes from contemplation and intellectual pursuits. The most unhealthy are those that come from fleshly lusts. I am mostly in agreement with Aristotle here. I think Aristotle trivializes the nature of anger though and does not recognize that it can be as bad, if not worse, than other so-called lusts of the flesh. I think it would be hard to argue against the assertion that most violence stems from anger in some manner. So I personally (counter to Aristotle) would list anger as one of the worst of the fleshly dispositions when it is not controlled.
Aristotle sees moderation as the key component of a healthy disposition. One needs to avoid extremes and find a happy medium. Indeed, Aristotle sees happiness as the goal of this moderation. One can only find this medium through a process of intellection. The mind must be actively engaged in the pursuit of ethics. Much of Aristotle's thought here presupposes a familiarity with his categories. So some acquaintance with Aristotle's logical works can help to understand Aristotle's approach to ethics.
The edition I read was from Dover and was translated by D. P. Chase. Chase left some important Greek terms untranslated, which I was very happy to see. He clarifies these Greek terms in the endnotes. His notes are incredibly illuminating; although, I am dissatisfied with the lack of proper footnoting. I would have rather that the Greek words, and other notable portions that are dealt with in the endnotes, were properly marked in the book so one could refer to the back as one reads. As it stands, I read the notes after I had finished the book. I encourage anyone who reads this edition to regularly refer to the endnotes while reading because they do offer some great insights into the text.
Nicomachean Ethics is definitely essential Aristotle and I do personally recommend it as a great philosophical work dealing with the subject of ethics. I personally feel that one can not approach this subject without love (agape/phileo) playing a more substantial role than it does for Aristotle, but one can certainly appreciate the insights Aristotle does offer regarding this subject.
Prior to Aristotle, and even after, many philosophical schools (the Stoics especially) oversimplified the subject of ethics and/or morals. Pleasure itself was often seen as an evil that should be eradicated root and branch. Aristotle holds that this trivializes the nature of pleasure and treats all pleasures the same way. For Aristotle, there are pleasures that are healthy and some that are unhealthy. The most healthy is the pleasure that comes from contemplation and intellectual pursuits. The most unhealthy are those that come from fleshly lusts. I am mostly in agreement with Aristotle here. I think Aristotle trivializes the nature of anger though and does not recognize that it can be as bad, if not worse, than other so-called lusts of the flesh. I think it would be hard to argue against the assertion that most violence stems from anger in some manner. So I personally (counter to Aristotle) would list anger as one of the worst of the fleshly dispositions when it is not controlled.
Aristotle sees moderation as the key component of a healthy disposition. One needs to avoid extremes and find a happy medium. Indeed, Aristotle sees happiness as the goal of this moderation. One can only find this medium through a process of intellection. The mind must be actively engaged in the pursuit of ethics. Much of Aristotle's thought here presupposes a familiarity with his categories. So some acquaintance with Aristotle's logical works can help to understand Aristotle's approach to ethics.
The edition I read was from Dover and was translated by D. P. Chase. Chase left some important Greek terms untranslated, which I was very happy to see. He clarifies these Greek terms in the endnotes. His notes are incredibly illuminating; although, I am dissatisfied with the lack of proper footnoting. I would have rather that the Greek words, and other notable portions that are dealt with in the endnotes, were properly marked in the book so one could refer to the back as one reads. As it stands, I read the notes after I had finished the book. I encourage anyone who reads this edition to regularly refer to the endnotes while reading because they do offer some great insights into the text.
Nicomachean Ethics is definitely essential Aristotle and I do personally recommend it as a great philosophical work dealing with the subject of ethics. I personally feel that one can not approach this subject without love (agape/phileo) playing a more substantial role than it does for Aristotle, but one can certainly appreciate the insights Aristotle does offer regarding this subject.
December 31, 2021
Kakva knjiga. Nakon 30-ak strana imao sam osećaj da sam ih pročitao nekoliko.
Erika vrline u centru (odsad se u svakoj situaciji pitam "Šta bi uradio Aristotel?"), ali koliko toga je ovde. Sreća (zapravo eudamonia, što i nije baš samo sreća), intelektualne i prirodne vrline (i mane kao suviše ili premalo toga), slobodna volja, krajnosti i umerenost, pravda kao dvosmislen pojam, jednakost, šest moralnih stanja i samokontrola, prijateljstvo (iz koristoljublja, zbog uživanja i zbog vrline), ljubav prema sebi, uživanje i vrednost razonode...
Napisano pre dva i po milenija. Ista vrednost i dandanas.
Erika vrline u centru (odsad se u svakoj situaciji pitam "Šta bi uradio Aristotel?"), ali koliko toga je ovde. Sreća (zapravo eudamonia, što i nije baš samo sreća), intelektualne i prirodne vrline (i mane kao suviše ili premalo toga), slobodna volja, krajnosti i umerenost, pravda kao dvosmislen pojam, jednakost, šest moralnih stanja i samokontrola, prijateljstvo (iz koristoljublja, zbog uživanja i zbog vrline), ljubav prema sebi, uživanje i vrednost razonode...
Napisano pre dva i po milenija. Ista vrednost i dandanas.
September 21, 2011
I think society would have progressed much faster if it weren't for guys like Aristotle being looked up to as much. He was extremely arrogant, and was obviously very good at expressing his ideas. Too bad his ideas weren't always backed by scientific reasoning, and should have been challenged.
I wish I had a time machine so I could go back and bitch-slap him.
I wish I had a time machine so I could go back and bitch-slap him.
May 13, 2022
اگر هدفتان لذت از یک متنِ فلسفی است افلاطون انتخابِ بهتری است.
August 25, 2019
Aristotle’s ethics spans three works: Ethica Nicomachea, Ethica Eudemia and Politica. The first two are works that are focused solely on ethics, and share three exactly similar books. Also, the subject is quite similar, although there are differences in the way Aristotle deals with these subjects. Nevertheless, the common opinion among scholars seems to be that to understand Aristotle’s ethics is to read Ethica Nicomachea. The Politica is quite another subject: at the end of the mentioned Ethica, Aristotle transitions from the study of individual life to the requirements for legislators – which is only natural, given Aristotle’s view is that moral and clever people should not only educate the brutish masses but also force them to lead a virtuous life through laws and punishment.
Anyway, Aristotle starts the lectures with the goal of the inquiry: it is a study of human good and happiness. And since happiness is an activity of our soul in accordance with virtue, it is necessary to study virtues first. The basis for Aristotle’s ethics thus lies in his conception of the soul as a principle of life, which possesses multiple faculties – some of which we share with plants and animals, some of which are uniquely human. Based on this division, Aristotle distinguishes moral virtues (which are associated with our irrational faculties) and intellectual virtues (which are associated with our reason).
What is a virtue? A virtue is a disposition, a state of character, that is associated with choices, and lying between excess and deficiency. In other words: virtue is a mean which lies between two vices. This mean is not absolute – it is intrinsically connected to our personal situation – and it is determined through our faculty of practical wisdom (more on that later). Determining the mean in a given situation is a hard task, and is not given to anyone. Moreover, virtue is not natural to man, we are not born with it – this means it has to be cultivated and taught to us when we’re young. Virtue is not doing good, but knowingly doing so, which means it can only come about – as disposition – through us actually doing it. We cultivate our dispositions to do good because it is good to do so, through doing these things throughout our life. So this means that virtues are habits (etike derives from ethos, habit). Now we see why the statesman is occupied with the task of educator and cultivator of the people, like a father ruling a family; now we also see the connection between ethics, politics and economics.
Moral judgements (what is good in this case?) require voluntariness and knowledge of the context. This means that ignorance and force are involuntary and hence are not causes of vices – for something to be a vice requires the explicit knowledge of the agent. You can’t be vicious without being aware of your actions. Choice, furthermore, is a form of voluntariness. Our object of choice is the result of deliberation, and acquiring this object of choice lies in our power. This is a radical statement, since it implies that virtue, or the accordance of our act with the good, as well as vice are always a choice. Aristotle seems to believe reason is the main spring from which both virtue and vice spring.
All of this is setting up the framework for the study of particular virtues and their related vices. Aristotle then proceeds to describe the moral virtues and subsequently the intellectual virtues. All virtues are deliberate actions aiming at some particular object as a goal. Also, all virtues are the mean between to extremes, which are both vices, albeit not a mathematical mean but an indeterminate mean – it is not clear how one can determine a mean between two extremes, since (as Aristotle admits) the more one approaches the mean, the more nuanced the situation becomes. For example, liberality is the mean between the extremes prodigality and frugality. One can spend all its money on others, or none at all – which are both vices – but it is hard to point to the exact amount of money one has to spend on others in particular situations to be liberal, i.e. virtues in an economic sense.
The main moral virtues Aristotle distinguishes are courage, temperance, economic virtues (liberality, magnificence), honourable virtues (pride, ambition), good-tempered, and social virtues (friendliness, truthfulness, ready-wittedness). Each of these has a particular object that a virtuous person desires, in the right amount and in the right circumstances. This is very important to understand Aristotle’s main message: a virtuous life is neither the life of an ascetic priest nor the life of a gluttonous despot. A virtuous person knowingly picks the moments he seeks out pleasure (more on that later) and in the right amount. This is best illustrated by the virtue temperance, which is connected solely to the bodily pleasures of eating, drinking and sex and is the mean between the extremes of self-indulgence and insensibility. The insensible person doesn’t want any pleasure, which is inhuman, Aristotle claims, while the self-indulgent person chooses to give in to all his bodily desires. The object of the virtuous person is respectability from his peers, and his means to acquire this is to apply his reason to the situation and reasonably indulge.
Once again, this example illustrates the impossibility of the Aristotelean ethics – or any ethics for that matter – to move from the general to the particular. It is easy, an feels almost intuitive, to claim temperance lies between indulgence and insensibility, but this doesn’t offer you any clue how much you should allow yourself to indulge in a particular pleasure in a particular situation at a particular time. Aristotle acknowledges this, since he claims the mean (virtue) is not a number, like the mean of 10 and 2 is 6, and leading a virtuous life requires an (almost) infinite string of experience. But at the same time he doesn’t offer more concrete guidelines than this – which makes his remarks quite superficial. (And this leaves out the question whether respectability should be an object of desire to begin with. One can as easily deny this claim as one can argue in favour it. Aristotle doesn’t address this problem aptly).
Justice is a moral virtue, but a rather peculiar one at that. This is because it is ambiguous – it can mean the totality of all virtues (justice as a whole, as is the object of a good legislation) or it can mean the mean between two extremes in a particular situation (as in a just person acting justly). Aristotle occupies himself solely with the second of these – justice as a moral virtue. And here too, particular justice is divided into two kinds: distributive and rectificatory justice. Distributive justice is associated with the distribution of wealth and honour between people, and inequality seems to be natural in this case. Some people are more wealthy or honourable than others. So inequality is not injustice in the case of distributive justice – the justice lies in proportionality; injustice is that which distorts the just ratio. So if a wealthy person acquires too much wealth it presumably distorts the natural inequality in a given state, so that this counts as an injustice and unjust act. (Once again we encounter the problem of indeterminacy – it remains unclear how much inequality is ‘natural’ to begin with).
The second type of particular justice, rectificatory justice, deals with transactions between people. Transactions are either voluntary (as in selling or buying stuff) or involuntary. Involuntary transactions are both unjust, and are either clandestine (as in stealing or cheating on someone’s wife) or violent (as in robbing or imprisoning someone). The object of rectificatory justice lies in restoring the equality between people – so when you cheat on someone’s spouse or lock someone up, the law will set things straight and restore the prior equality. You unjustly take some possession from someone else and profit; the law will take back what you acquired unjustly and give it back to your victim, whether in the form of money or punishment.
(A peculiar passage in the section on rectificatory justice deals with economics. Aristotle claims this type of justice is the mean between profit and loss. You unjustly take too much profit from someone else and so the other party loses – the mean has to be found. In voluntary transactions this balance-seeking objective cannot be practiced most of the time – this is because (1) it is hard to correlate the values of different things (how much shoes is a house worth?) and (2) because productions typically occur over time (shoes are made more frequent than grain is harvested). To deal with this problem people have invented money (the name deriving from nomisma, from nomos, indicating either habit or law). In a sense, money has the same objective as the judge: both enable the just transactions between people, the first voluntary and the second involuntary.)
To sum up: justice differs from the other moral virtues in that it (1) is both a whole and a particular, and (2) that the good lies in the middle of doing wrong and being done wrong – all other moral virtues lying in the middle of doing A or B.
After dealing with the moral virtues, Aristotle proceeds to deal with the intellectual virtues. These are of two kinds: contemplative and calculative, the difference lying (naturally) in the corresponding object. While the contemplative intellect has general, eternal truth as its object, the calculating intellect has particular truth corresponding with the right desire as its object. This distinction allows Aristotle to fit his own conception of knowledge neatly within the ethical framework: there are two types of knowledge corresponding with the two types of intellect. Philosophical wisdom, acquired through the contemplative intellect, is the highest form of wisdom and deals with necessary and eternal truths – truths as general truths, acquired through demonstrative knowledge. All other types of knowledge, like art, engineering and practical wisdom, are practical wisdom and are acquired through the calculating intellect. Thus the contemplative intellect is occupied with knowledge and the calculating intellect with individual practice and experience. The first presupposes the latter, but not vice versa. Here we see Aristotle’s distinction between the general and the particular and their corresponding roles in regard to scientific knowledge.
He ends the book on the intellectual virtue with mention some minor ones: excellence in deliberation (in relation to particular ends), understanding (grasping truths), and judgement (distinguishing the equitable). In effect this means that Aristotle views practical wisdom – i.e. intuition and knowledge of the particular in relation to human goods as objects – as the necessary precondition for the moral virtues. You can’t be morally virtuous without possessing the calculating virtues of the intellect. Contemplative virtues, although the most exalted ones, are not required to be morally virtuous and this will play a huge role both in Aristotle’s hierarchy of types of good life (later more) and his view on education and legislation (both requiring practical wisdom).
Now Aristotle has dealt with both the moral and intellectual virtues, the only thing remaining is to describe the other important features of human nature which are not in themselves virtues but function as context and foundation of a virtuous life. Put in other terms: books 2-6 deal with rational choices to acquire particular objects, while books 7-9 deal with human nature.
Book 7 is dedicated to continence, that is the degree to which one is, unconsciously, not giving in to animal desires. Most people are not fully continent, while there’s almost no human that is as brutish to not have any continence at all – most of us fall somewhere in between. The difference between incontinence and self-indulgence as moral vice is the conscious decision to pursue a desire. I am vicious if I knowingly am a glutton and lustful person, but usually I can’t resist my desire not be a glutton or lustful person and succumb to my animal weaknesses, so to speak. The difference lies my consciousness of my act and the subsequent feelings of regret I feel (or not). So if I set out to be a temperate man, yet I end up in bed with a woman without this being my conscious objective beforehand, I feel regret afterwards and am not vicious.
Incontinence is not a positive state since it reduces us to our animal nature but since it is not consciously willed by us to be this way, there is room for improvement: we consciously don’t want to be incontinent, so we can learn to be harder and persevere. (This would seem to suggest that if I consciously choose not to learn to be continent this would ‘upgrade’ my incontinence to a vice or transform my incontinence into self-indulgence – something Aristotle doesn’t touch on… It is also curious to note that the only exception Aristotle makes is anger, which he views as incontinence but much less shameful given the right circumstances, perhaps forming a part of both courage and temperance?)
Besides continence, Aristotle devotes two books to friendship. Friendship is a requirement to be virtuous, yet it is not a virtue itself. There are three types of friendship, based on three types of objects. I can start a friendship because the other person gives me pleasure or is useful to me, but these friendships presuppose inequality between me and the other person and is intrinsically unstable – the object differs in value over time. The third type friendship has as its object the good – loving someone because they are equal to me in virtue and goodness. This type of friendship is the perfect form of friendship.
Perfect friendship requires reciprocity, while reciprocity requires the ability to give in return, which leads to the conclusion that equality (in honour, wealth, intellectual capacity, etc.) is a necessary requirement for friendship. As with the virtues, this equality is neither absolute nor a number, but a proportionality. The right degree of equality or the limits of inequality are both hard to point out. Leading, again, to the problem of indeterminacy. It is easy to see a slave and a master cannot really be friends, but there is no exact equal in virtue and goodness to me neither – somewhere lies the sweet spot, yet where?
Anyway, this framework of relationships and friendship also applies to the family (oikos) and the state (polis), which means that both the household and the state have to deal with the same problems of reciprocity, equality, virtue and goodness. It also means that economics and legislation are intimately tied to ethics (which is in fact, why the Politica directly follows the Ethica Nicomachea).
Final part of review in comments.
Anyway, Aristotle starts the lectures with the goal of the inquiry: it is a study of human good and happiness. And since happiness is an activity of our soul in accordance with virtue, it is necessary to study virtues first. The basis for Aristotle’s ethics thus lies in his conception of the soul as a principle of life, which possesses multiple faculties – some of which we share with plants and animals, some of which are uniquely human. Based on this division, Aristotle distinguishes moral virtues (which are associated with our irrational faculties) and intellectual virtues (which are associated with our reason).
What is a virtue? A virtue is a disposition, a state of character, that is associated with choices, and lying between excess and deficiency. In other words: virtue is a mean which lies between two vices. This mean is not absolute – it is intrinsically connected to our personal situation – and it is determined through our faculty of practical wisdom (more on that later). Determining the mean in a given situation is a hard task, and is not given to anyone. Moreover, virtue is not natural to man, we are not born with it – this means it has to be cultivated and taught to us when we’re young. Virtue is not doing good, but knowingly doing so, which means it can only come about – as disposition – through us actually doing it. We cultivate our dispositions to do good because it is good to do so, through doing these things throughout our life. So this means that virtues are habits (etike derives from ethos, habit). Now we see why the statesman is occupied with the task of educator and cultivator of the people, like a father ruling a family; now we also see the connection between ethics, politics and economics.
Moral judgements (what is good in this case?) require voluntariness and knowledge of the context. This means that ignorance and force are involuntary and hence are not causes of vices – for something to be a vice requires the explicit knowledge of the agent. You can’t be vicious without being aware of your actions. Choice, furthermore, is a form of voluntariness. Our object of choice is the result of deliberation, and acquiring this object of choice lies in our power. This is a radical statement, since it implies that virtue, or the accordance of our act with the good, as well as vice are always a choice. Aristotle seems to believe reason is the main spring from which both virtue and vice spring.
All of this is setting up the framework for the study of particular virtues and their related vices. Aristotle then proceeds to describe the moral virtues and subsequently the intellectual virtues. All virtues are deliberate actions aiming at some particular object as a goal. Also, all virtues are the mean between to extremes, which are both vices, albeit not a mathematical mean but an indeterminate mean – it is not clear how one can determine a mean between two extremes, since (as Aristotle admits) the more one approaches the mean, the more nuanced the situation becomes. For example, liberality is the mean between the extremes prodigality and frugality. One can spend all its money on others, or none at all – which are both vices – but it is hard to point to the exact amount of money one has to spend on others in particular situations to be liberal, i.e. virtues in an economic sense.
The main moral virtues Aristotle distinguishes are courage, temperance, economic virtues (liberality, magnificence), honourable virtues (pride, ambition), good-tempered, and social virtues (friendliness, truthfulness, ready-wittedness). Each of these has a particular object that a virtuous person desires, in the right amount and in the right circumstances. This is very important to understand Aristotle’s main message: a virtuous life is neither the life of an ascetic priest nor the life of a gluttonous despot. A virtuous person knowingly picks the moments he seeks out pleasure (more on that later) and in the right amount. This is best illustrated by the virtue temperance, which is connected solely to the bodily pleasures of eating, drinking and sex and is the mean between the extremes of self-indulgence and insensibility. The insensible person doesn’t want any pleasure, which is inhuman, Aristotle claims, while the self-indulgent person chooses to give in to all his bodily desires. The object of the virtuous person is respectability from his peers, and his means to acquire this is to apply his reason to the situation and reasonably indulge.
Once again, this example illustrates the impossibility of the Aristotelean ethics – or any ethics for that matter – to move from the general to the particular. It is easy, an feels almost intuitive, to claim temperance lies between indulgence and insensibility, but this doesn’t offer you any clue how much you should allow yourself to indulge in a particular pleasure in a particular situation at a particular time. Aristotle acknowledges this, since he claims the mean (virtue) is not a number, like the mean of 10 and 2 is 6, and leading a virtuous life requires an (almost) infinite string of experience. But at the same time he doesn’t offer more concrete guidelines than this – which makes his remarks quite superficial. (And this leaves out the question whether respectability should be an object of desire to begin with. One can as easily deny this claim as one can argue in favour it. Aristotle doesn’t address this problem aptly).
Justice is a moral virtue, but a rather peculiar one at that. This is because it is ambiguous – it can mean the totality of all virtues (justice as a whole, as is the object of a good legislation) or it can mean the mean between two extremes in a particular situation (as in a just person acting justly). Aristotle occupies himself solely with the second of these – justice as a moral virtue. And here too, particular justice is divided into two kinds: distributive and rectificatory justice. Distributive justice is associated with the distribution of wealth and honour between people, and inequality seems to be natural in this case. Some people are more wealthy or honourable than others. So inequality is not injustice in the case of distributive justice – the justice lies in proportionality; injustice is that which distorts the just ratio. So if a wealthy person acquires too much wealth it presumably distorts the natural inequality in a given state, so that this counts as an injustice and unjust act. (Once again we encounter the problem of indeterminacy – it remains unclear how much inequality is ‘natural’ to begin with).
The second type of particular justice, rectificatory justice, deals with transactions between people. Transactions are either voluntary (as in selling or buying stuff) or involuntary. Involuntary transactions are both unjust, and are either clandestine (as in stealing or cheating on someone’s wife) or violent (as in robbing or imprisoning someone). The object of rectificatory justice lies in restoring the equality between people – so when you cheat on someone’s spouse or lock someone up, the law will set things straight and restore the prior equality. You unjustly take some possession from someone else and profit; the law will take back what you acquired unjustly and give it back to your victim, whether in the form of money or punishment.
(A peculiar passage in the section on rectificatory justice deals with economics. Aristotle claims this type of justice is the mean between profit and loss. You unjustly take too much profit from someone else and so the other party loses – the mean has to be found. In voluntary transactions this balance-seeking objective cannot be practiced most of the time – this is because (1) it is hard to correlate the values of different things (how much shoes is a house worth?) and (2) because productions typically occur over time (shoes are made more frequent than grain is harvested). To deal with this problem people have invented money (the name deriving from nomisma, from nomos, indicating either habit or law). In a sense, money has the same objective as the judge: both enable the just transactions between people, the first voluntary and the second involuntary.)
To sum up: justice differs from the other moral virtues in that it (1) is both a whole and a particular, and (2) that the good lies in the middle of doing wrong and being done wrong – all other moral virtues lying in the middle of doing A or B.
After dealing with the moral virtues, Aristotle proceeds to deal with the intellectual virtues. These are of two kinds: contemplative and calculative, the difference lying (naturally) in the corresponding object. While the contemplative intellect has general, eternal truth as its object, the calculating intellect has particular truth corresponding with the right desire as its object. This distinction allows Aristotle to fit his own conception of knowledge neatly within the ethical framework: there are two types of knowledge corresponding with the two types of intellect. Philosophical wisdom, acquired through the contemplative intellect, is the highest form of wisdom and deals with necessary and eternal truths – truths as general truths, acquired through demonstrative knowledge. All other types of knowledge, like art, engineering and practical wisdom, are practical wisdom and are acquired through the calculating intellect. Thus the contemplative intellect is occupied with knowledge and the calculating intellect with individual practice and experience. The first presupposes the latter, but not vice versa. Here we see Aristotle’s distinction between the general and the particular and their corresponding roles in regard to scientific knowledge.
He ends the book on the intellectual virtue with mention some minor ones: excellence in deliberation (in relation to particular ends), understanding (grasping truths), and judgement (distinguishing the equitable). In effect this means that Aristotle views practical wisdom – i.e. intuition and knowledge of the particular in relation to human goods as objects – as the necessary precondition for the moral virtues. You can’t be morally virtuous without possessing the calculating virtues of the intellect. Contemplative virtues, although the most exalted ones, are not required to be morally virtuous and this will play a huge role both in Aristotle’s hierarchy of types of good life (later more) and his view on education and legislation (both requiring practical wisdom).
Now Aristotle has dealt with both the moral and intellectual virtues, the only thing remaining is to describe the other important features of human nature which are not in themselves virtues but function as context and foundation of a virtuous life. Put in other terms: books 2-6 deal with rational choices to acquire particular objects, while books 7-9 deal with human nature.
Book 7 is dedicated to continence, that is the degree to which one is, unconsciously, not giving in to animal desires. Most people are not fully continent, while there’s almost no human that is as brutish to not have any continence at all – most of us fall somewhere in between. The difference between incontinence and self-indulgence as moral vice is the conscious decision to pursue a desire. I am vicious if I knowingly am a glutton and lustful person, but usually I can’t resist my desire not be a glutton or lustful person and succumb to my animal weaknesses, so to speak. The difference lies my consciousness of my act and the subsequent feelings of regret I feel (or not). So if I set out to be a temperate man, yet I end up in bed with a woman without this being my conscious objective beforehand, I feel regret afterwards and am not vicious.
Incontinence is not a positive state since it reduces us to our animal nature but since it is not consciously willed by us to be this way, there is room for improvement: we consciously don’t want to be incontinent, so we can learn to be harder and persevere. (This would seem to suggest that if I consciously choose not to learn to be continent this would ‘upgrade’ my incontinence to a vice or transform my incontinence into self-indulgence – something Aristotle doesn’t touch on… It is also curious to note that the only exception Aristotle makes is anger, which he views as incontinence but much less shameful given the right circumstances, perhaps forming a part of both courage and temperance?)
Besides continence, Aristotle devotes two books to friendship. Friendship is a requirement to be virtuous, yet it is not a virtue itself. There are three types of friendship, based on three types of objects. I can start a friendship because the other person gives me pleasure or is useful to me, but these friendships presuppose inequality between me and the other person and is intrinsically unstable – the object differs in value over time. The third type friendship has as its object the good – loving someone because they are equal to me in virtue and goodness. This type of friendship is the perfect form of friendship.
Perfect friendship requires reciprocity, while reciprocity requires the ability to give in return, which leads to the conclusion that equality (in honour, wealth, intellectual capacity, etc.) is a necessary requirement for friendship. As with the virtues, this equality is neither absolute nor a number, but a proportionality. The right degree of equality or the limits of inequality are both hard to point out. Leading, again, to the problem of indeterminacy. It is easy to see a slave and a master cannot really be friends, but there is no exact equal in virtue and goodness to me neither – somewhere lies the sweet spot, yet where?
Anyway, this framework of relationships and friendship also applies to the family (oikos) and the state (polis), which means that both the household and the state have to deal with the same problems of reciprocity, equality, virtue and goodness. It also means that economics and legislation are intimately tied to ethics (which is in fact, why the Politica directly follows the Ethica Nicomachea).
Final part of review in comments.
August 17, 2021
There has been, in recent years, a marked return to Aristotle among English-language ethical theorists. This return signals a revolt against the post-Kantian tradition that has dominated Anglo-American ethical thought since the 19th Century at least. Such prominent thinkers as Hubert Dreyfus, Alasdair MacIntyre, John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, Bernard Williams have looked to Aristotle to circumvent the questions of justification abstract norms of justice that preoccupied thinkers of the early-to-mid 20th Century. It is Aristotle’s work, and in particular the Nicomachean Ethics that provides them with the template for their own diverse research programs, from Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and MacIntyre’s take on virtue ethics to McDowell’s ethical particularism and Dreyfus’s moral phenomenology.
My own suspicion is that the return to Aristotle has less to do with the positive doctrines of the Nicomachean Ethics itself than with the foreignness of the material to modern Western audiences. Aristotle’s distance from both the Christian tradition with its divine commands and the Kantian tradition with its emphasis on formal justification might lend him a certain opaqueness to us, thus allowing different theorists to project their favoured ethical frameworks onto his writings. On a related note, it should be pointed out that the Ethics, like all of Aristotle’s surviving writings, are usually taken by scholars to consists in a series of lecture notes that were never intended to be published as a unified treatise. This results in several points of unclarity and tensions that probably go some way toward making it easier to appropriate Aristotle’s thought for one’s own purposes.
These remarks about contemporary readings of Aristotle should in no way take away from either the beauty of his thought or its interest for contemporary students of philosophy. If nothing else, reading him can at least serve to sensitize us to the historical contingency of our own way of thinking and arguing about ethics. Aristotle’s starting-point, which is conspicuously absent from contemporary ethical theorizing, is typical to the Greek outlook. His inquiry is concerned first and foremost with a search for the Highest Good. According to Aristotle, everything we do is a means to some good—some end (telos)—which can in turn be a means to some further end. If all of our actions tend toward a single good, for the sake of which we do all that we do, then this will turn out to be the Highest Good, the end of all human action. Following conventional wisdom, Aristotle identifies the Highest Good with eudaimonia, a concept generally (and misleadingly) translated into English as “happiness”.
In what, however, does happiness—the good particular to human beings —consist? Aristotle believes that, as with any object, the goodness of a human being must be assessed with respect to its function (ergon). The question for him therefore becomes: what is the proper function of a human being? Here Aristotle appeals to his theses in the Physics and De Anima. Every natural object possesses a soul or form. This consists in a certain organization of its matter with a view to particular functions. The human soul is divided into three parts: while plants possess a merely vegetative soul and animals both a vegetative and appetitive soul, the human soul also possesses a third part, namely the rational soul. It is crucial also that in human beings, the appetitive soul—the desires—is subject to the dictates of reason. This is what defines human nature and defines the kind of activity that is proper to it. From what precedes, it follows that the good peculiar to human beings lies in optimal performance on the part of the rational soul. This is what leads him to define happiness as “activity of the soul in accordance with excellence” ( aretê, alternatively translated as “virtue”) (1098a15).
Now contemporary questions pertaining to the meaning of value-terms, about the ontological status of values, and our epistemic access to them do not seem to occur to Aristotle. He is concerned rather with questions of moral education: how is it that virtue is acquired? On Aristotle’s view—and this is one of his most famous doctrines —while intellectual virtue can be acquired by teaching, moral virtue can only be acquired by habit: it is only by performing just acts and becoming accustomed to perform them unreflectively that we become just ourselves. To learn virtue is to learn to delight in what is good and be repulsed by what is bad. In other words, it is to feel pleasure at the right things. This is related to another celebrated tenet of Aristotelian ethics, namely the doctrine of the golden mean. For Aristotle, a morally virtuous action is always the mean between deficiency and excess. Thus courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, and temperance the mean between self-indulgence and licentiousness. To the virtuous man, the mean appears always in the right light as something worth pursuing for its own sake: this is what allows him unreflectively to choose it and to act upon it.
What is perhaps most interesting in Aristotle’s ethics, at least from a contemporary point of view, is the emphasis it places on character formation as the object of ethical upbringing. This is something that had largely dropped out of sight over the course of 20th Century ethical theorizing and that is only very gradually coming back into view. To emphasize upbringing is at the same time to highlight the role of culture in sensitizing us to the ethical demands that are leveled against us. Now this does not occur to Aristotle himself, writing as he does long before the emergence of historicism in the 19th Century. Nonetheless, it is undeniably present in his writings. The reason for which questions of justification do not occur to Aristotle is precisely that that he is writing in a cultural milieu where certain ideals and models for life are so entrenched that their value—their to-be-doneness, to use an expression from J.L. Mackie—seems as inescapably to be part of the very fabric of reality as any fact about the observable world. Indeed, the very notion of eudaimonia, which serves as the guideline for Aristotle’s ethical thought, can only be properly understood as an ideal of this sort and is distorted beyond recognition when translated as “happiness” in the modern sense.
At the same time, though, this also means that Aristotle’s ethical theory comes up a bit short in a contemporary context. While it is no doubt important, with for example John McDowell and Charles Taylor, to direct our attention to the oft-neglected role of culturally inflected ideals in the formation of ethical character, this perspective also fails to address the most pressing ethical needs of the present age, where those very ideals have lost their inescapability. In the context of pluralistic liberal democracies—not to mention the emerging a multicultural world society—where one is confronted with a plurality of competing and incompatible value-orientations and forms of life, the inescapable question is whether there are any norms or values that might be justified across cultural borders. And pace communitarians like Taylor and MacIntyre, it seems to me that questions like these require an extension of our moral perspective beyond the narrow provincialism of ethical discourses geared toward collective self-understanding and into the enlarged "moral point of view" of universal norms of justice. To employ a common distinction, it requires a move from an ethics of the good to a theory of the right. And ultimately, what that means is that we need to move from Aristotle and the Ancient Greek context to Kant and the Modern one.
My own suspicion is that the return to Aristotle has less to do with the positive doctrines of the Nicomachean Ethics itself than with the foreignness of the material to modern Western audiences. Aristotle’s distance from both the Christian tradition with its divine commands and the Kantian tradition with its emphasis on formal justification might lend him a certain opaqueness to us, thus allowing different theorists to project their favoured ethical frameworks onto his writings. On a related note, it should be pointed out that the Ethics, like all of Aristotle’s surviving writings, are usually taken by scholars to consists in a series of lecture notes that were never intended to be published as a unified treatise. This results in several points of unclarity and tensions that probably go some way toward making it easier to appropriate Aristotle’s thought for one’s own purposes.
These remarks about contemporary readings of Aristotle should in no way take away from either the beauty of his thought or its interest for contemporary students of philosophy. If nothing else, reading him can at least serve to sensitize us to the historical contingency of our own way of thinking and arguing about ethics. Aristotle’s starting-point, which is conspicuously absent from contemporary ethical theorizing, is typical to the Greek outlook. His inquiry is concerned first and foremost with a search for the Highest Good. According to Aristotle, everything we do is a means to some good—some end (telos)—which can in turn be a means to some further end. If all of our actions tend toward a single good, for the sake of which we do all that we do, then this will turn out to be the Highest Good, the end of all human action. Following conventional wisdom, Aristotle identifies the Highest Good with eudaimonia, a concept generally (and misleadingly) translated into English as “happiness”.
In what, however, does happiness—the good particular to human beings —consist? Aristotle believes that, as with any object, the goodness of a human being must be assessed with respect to its function (ergon). The question for him therefore becomes: what is the proper function of a human being? Here Aristotle appeals to his theses in the Physics and De Anima. Every natural object possesses a soul or form. This consists in a certain organization of its matter with a view to particular functions. The human soul is divided into three parts: while plants possess a merely vegetative soul and animals both a vegetative and appetitive soul, the human soul also possesses a third part, namely the rational soul. It is crucial also that in human beings, the appetitive soul—the desires—is subject to the dictates of reason. This is what defines human nature and defines the kind of activity that is proper to it. From what precedes, it follows that the good peculiar to human beings lies in optimal performance on the part of the rational soul. This is what leads him to define happiness as “activity of the soul in accordance with excellence” ( aretê, alternatively translated as “virtue”) (1098a15).
Now contemporary questions pertaining to the meaning of value-terms, about the ontological status of values, and our epistemic access to them do not seem to occur to Aristotle. He is concerned rather with questions of moral education: how is it that virtue is acquired? On Aristotle’s view—and this is one of his most famous doctrines —while intellectual virtue can be acquired by teaching, moral virtue can only be acquired by habit: it is only by performing just acts and becoming accustomed to perform them unreflectively that we become just ourselves. To learn virtue is to learn to delight in what is good and be repulsed by what is bad. In other words, it is to feel pleasure at the right things. This is related to another celebrated tenet of Aristotelian ethics, namely the doctrine of the golden mean. For Aristotle, a morally virtuous action is always the mean between deficiency and excess. Thus courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, and temperance the mean between self-indulgence and licentiousness. To the virtuous man, the mean appears always in the right light as something worth pursuing for its own sake: this is what allows him unreflectively to choose it and to act upon it.
What is perhaps most interesting in Aristotle’s ethics, at least from a contemporary point of view, is the emphasis it places on character formation as the object of ethical upbringing. This is something that had largely dropped out of sight over the course of 20th Century ethical theorizing and that is only very gradually coming back into view. To emphasize upbringing is at the same time to highlight the role of culture in sensitizing us to the ethical demands that are leveled against us. Now this does not occur to Aristotle himself, writing as he does long before the emergence of historicism in the 19th Century. Nonetheless, it is undeniably present in his writings. The reason for which questions of justification do not occur to Aristotle is precisely that that he is writing in a cultural milieu where certain ideals and models for life are so entrenched that their value—their to-be-doneness, to use an expression from J.L. Mackie—seems as inescapably to be part of the very fabric of reality as any fact about the observable world. Indeed, the very notion of eudaimonia, which serves as the guideline for Aristotle’s ethical thought, can only be properly understood as an ideal of this sort and is distorted beyond recognition when translated as “happiness” in the modern sense.
At the same time, though, this also means that Aristotle’s ethical theory comes up a bit short in a contemporary context. While it is no doubt important, with for example John McDowell and Charles Taylor, to direct our attention to the oft-neglected role of culturally inflected ideals in the formation of ethical character, this perspective also fails to address the most pressing ethical needs of the present age, where those very ideals have lost their inescapability. In the context of pluralistic liberal democracies—not to mention the emerging a multicultural world society—where one is confronted with a plurality of competing and incompatible value-orientations and forms of life, the inescapable question is whether there are any norms or values that might be justified across cultural borders. And pace communitarians like Taylor and MacIntyre, it seems to me that questions like these require an extension of our moral perspective beyond the narrow provincialism of ethical discourses geared toward collective self-understanding and into the enlarged "moral point of view" of universal norms of justice. To employ a common distinction, it requires a move from an ethics of the good to a theory of the right. And ultimately, what that means is that we need to move from Aristotle and the Ancient Greek context to Kant and the Modern one.
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