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The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945
This Pulitzer Prize–winning history of WWII chronicles the dramatic rise & fall of the Japanese empire, from the invasion of Manchuria & China to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima & Nagasaki. Told from a Japanese perspective, The Rising Sun is, in the author’s words, “a factual saga of people caught up in the flood of the most overwhelming war of mankind, told as it happened—muddled, ennobling, disgraceful, frustrating, full of paradox.” In weaving together the historical facts & human drama leading up to & culminating in the war in the Pacific, Toland crafts an unbiased narrative history. In his Foreword, he writes that if we're to draw any conclusion from The Rising Sun, it's “that there are no simple lessons in history, that it is human nature that repeats itself, not history.”
954 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1970
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About the author
John Toland
65 books186 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.
John^Toland - 17th century theologian, Philosopher & Satirist
John^^Toland - American writer and historian (WWII & Dillinger)
John^^^Toland - Article: "The Man who Reads Minds"
John Willard Toland (June 29, 1912 in La Crosse, Wisconsin - January 4, 2004 in Danbury, Connecticut) was an American author and historian. He is best known for his biography of Adolf Hitler.[1]
Toland tried to write history as a straightforward narrative, with minimal analysis or judgment. This method may have stemmed from his original goal of becoming a playwright. In the summers between his college years, he travelled with hobos and wrote several plays with hobos as central characters, none of which achieved the stage.[2] At one point he managed to publish an article on dirigibles in Look magazine; it proved extremely popular and led to his career as a historian.
One exception to his general approach is his Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath about the Pearl Harbor attack and the investigations of it, in which he wrote about evidence that President Franklin Roosevelt knew in advance of plans to attack the naval base but remained silent. The book was widely criticized at the time. Since the original publication, Toland added new evidence and rebutted early critics. Also, an anonymous source, known as "Seaman Z" (Robert D. Ogg) has since come forth to publicly tell his story.
Perhaps his most important work, for which he won the Pulitzer Prize in 1971, is The Rising Sun. Based on original and extensive interviews with high Japanese officials who survived the war, the book chronicles Imperial Japan from the military rebellion of February 1936 to the end of World War II. The book won the Pulitzer because it was the first book in English to tell the history of the war in the Pacific from the Japanese point of view, rather than from an American perspective.
The stories of the battles for the stepping stones to Japan, the islands in the Pacific which had come under Japanese domination, are told from the perspective of the commander sitting in his cave rather than from that of the heroic forces engaged in the assault. Most of these commanders committed suicide at the conclusion of the battle, but Toland was able to reconstruct their viewpoint from letters to their wives and from reports they sent to Tokyo. Toland died in 2004 of pneumonia.
While predominantly a non-fiction author, Toland also wrote two historical novels, Gods of War and Occupation. He says in his autobiography that he earned little money from his Pulitzer Prize-winning, The Rising Sun, but was set for life from the earnings of his biography of Hitler, for which he also did original research.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Tol...
John^Toland - 17th century theologian, Philosopher & Satirist
John^^Toland - American writer and historian (WWII & Dillinger)
John^^^Toland - Article: "The Man who Reads Minds"
John Willard Toland (June 29, 1912 in La Crosse, Wisconsin - January 4, 2004 in Danbury, Connecticut) was an American author and historian. He is best known for his biography of Adolf Hitler.[1]
Toland tried to write history as a straightforward narrative, with minimal analysis or judgment. This method may have stemmed from his original goal of becoming a playwright. In the summers between his college years, he travelled with hobos and wrote several plays with hobos as central characters, none of which achieved the stage.[2] At one point he managed to publish an article on dirigibles in Look magazine; it proved extremely popular and led to his career as a historian.
One exception to his general approach is his Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath about the Pearl Harbor attack and the investigations of it, in which he wrote about evidence that President Franklin Roosevelt knew in advance of plans to attack the naval base but remained silent. The book was widely criticized at the time. Since the original publication, Toland added new evidence and rebutted early critics. Also, an anonymous source, known as "Seaman Z" (Robert D. Ogg) has since come forth to publicly tell his story.
Perhaps his most important work, for which he won the Pulitzer Prize in 1971, is The Rising Sun. Based on original and extensive interviews with high Japanese officials who survived the war, the book chronicles Imperial Japan from the military rebellion of February 1936 to the end of World War II. The book won the Pulitzer because it was the first book in English to tell the history of the war in the Pacific from the Japanese point of view, rather than from an American perspective.
The stories of the battles for the stepping stones to Japan, the islands in the Pacific which had come under Japanese domination, are told from the perspective of the commander sitting in his cave rather than from that of the heroic forces engaged in the assault. Most of these commanders committed suicide at the conclusion of the battle, but Toland was able to reconstruct their viewpoint from letters to their wives and from reports they sent to Tokyo. Toland died in 2004 of pneumonia.
While predominantly a non-fiction author, Toland also wrote two historical novels, Gods of War and Occupation. He says in his autobiography that he earned little money from his Pulitzer Prize-winning, The Rising Sun, but was set for life from the earnings of his biography of Hitler, for which he also did original research.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Tol...
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September 4, 2024
“[Shigenori] Togo had just arrived at the Palace grounds. Stars shone brilliantly. It was going to be a fine day. The Foreign Minister was immediately ushered into the Emperor’s presence. It was almost at the exact moment that [Ambassador Kichisaburo] Nomura…[was] supposed to see [Secretary of State Cordell] Hull. Togo read [President] Roosevelt’s message and the proposed draft of the Emperor’s reply. The Emperor approved the reply, and his countenance, Togo thought, reflected a ‘noble feeling of brotherhood with all peoples…’ The spacious plaza outside the Sakashita Gate was deserted, and as Togo drove away, the sole noise in the city was the crunching of gravel under the car tires. His mind was far away: in a few minute one of the most momentous days in the history of the world would begin…”
- John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945
By my last count, there were one gazillion books on World War II, with more coming out every week. And it will never stop. World War II will continue to be refought between the covers – and on Kindles – long after human memory of the event is gone. It will be told for as long as there are people to tell stories.
The question, then, is which of those books to read? You can spend your entire life reading World War II books and not even scratch the surface. Besides, there are other things to do in life. Like drinking or reading about the American Civil War or doing both at the same time.
Thankfully, there are a few landmark books, the ones that everyone can name, the ones that are certified as classic, that stand out from the pack, like a guy wearing an Armani suit at a clown college (or a clown at an Armani store, if you prefer).
In the European Theater of Operations, one of those classics is William Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Shirer was a journalist who spent time in prewar Nazi Germany, and even followed the Nazis into France. Concerned that the Gestapo was going to arrest him, Shirer fled Germany in 1940 and later wrote his seminal account, a history of the Second World War as seen through the eyes of Hitler and his henchmen. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich has its shortcomings (among them an archaic and heavily belabored homophobia), but there is no denying its place in the firmament. All books coming after had to deal with its shadow.
John Toland’s The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire is a Pacific Theater counterpoint to Shirer’s masterwork. It tells the tale of the other side of World War II, and does so (mainly) from the point of view of the Japanese. Upon publication, it won the Pulitzer Prize, and can be found in the endnotes and bibliography of just about every subsequent book written about the Pacific War.
More than anything, though, it is a book that finds that perfect balance between macro and micro, between general and private (and civilian). It always strives to hold the big picture clear, but never fails to remind you of the individuals who collectively made that big picture. As such, this is a rare history, one that is scholarly and massively researched, yet also shot-through with empathy, compassion, and humanism.
It is one of the best books I’ve read on World War II.
***
Toland begins in 1936, with young Japanese radicals bent on assassinating several of the Emperor’s advisers. These men were practicing gekokujo, or insubordination, a semi-legitimate form of rebellion. In this opening chapter, Toland briskly (sometimes too briskly) outlines the background that fomented gekokujo: the fall of monarchies after World War I; the competition between democracy, socialism, and Communism that came in its wake; the rapid westernization of Japan (and the resulting scandals and corruption); Japan’s population explosion; and the inevitable blowback by conservatives and nationalists.
During Japan’s rise as a Pacific power, it invaded Manchuria – which it saw as a buffer against the Soviet Union (with whom they’d warred at the beginning of the century) and as a source of raw materials – and, in 1932, established the puppet state of Manchukuo. The creation of Manchukuo obviously heightened tensions between China and Japan. Those tensions came to a head in 1937 at the Marco Polo Bridge, in an “incident” that better marks the actual beginning of World War II (as opposed to the September 1, 1939 invasion of Poland by Hitler).
The clash at the Marco Polo Bridge led to full scale war, including the infamous Nanking Massacre.
***
The only real criticism I have with The Rising Sun is in Toland’s handling of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Part of the reason I bought this book was to learn more about this forgotten theater. Unfortunately, however, Toland deals with China in a cursory fashion. He does not take the time to develop the strategy of the war, or explain in great detail how it unfolded. The fall of Nanking merits barely a page. This stands in stark contrast to the space devoted to the American-Japanese conflict beginning in 1942. For instance, Toland devotes an entire (and yes, brilliant) chapter to the battle of Guadalcanal.
In other words, despite the broad claims of its cover, The Rising Sun is mainly focused on the war between American and Japan. This means less attention (though it’s not entirely ignored) paid to China’s dual struggle (against Japan, and themselves), Britain’s collapse in Singapore, the Burma Campaign, and the massive battles of Kohima and Imphal in India.
***
Even though Toland decides to place his heaviest emphasis on familiar territory, it nevertheless manages to be revelatory. After the earlier chapters, which felt compressed, The Rising Sun hits its stride in the run-up to Pearl Harbor. You get to see the rationale behind Japan’s decisions, its attempts to negotiate with America (especially through Prince Konoye), and the different factions within the Japanese ministry.
When we think of Japan in World War II, we think of Nanking and Pearl Harbor, of the Bataan Death March and kamikazes. Prime Minister Tojo has become a caricature of evil, divorced from any of the human traits that even Hitler has posthumously been granted.
These conceptions do little to broaden our understanding of what actually happened. By taking us into the backrooms of Japanese policymaking, we get to see the world – and its perils – as they did. They faced many difficulties as a small, overcrowded island-nation, a net importer of just about everything. When President Roosevelt decided to turn of the oil spigot, it was as grave a threat to Japan as Khrushchev’s October missiles were to the United States in 1962.
To be sure, Japan’s colonial impulses were brutal – encompassing some of the most infamous atrocities in history – but they were emulating a brutal western tradition, even if they tended to scale up the horrors. It is also interesting, as Toland notes, how Japan’s pan-Asian ambitions did not fall entirely on deaf ears. There were many people for whom an Asian power in the Pacific was preferable to the white powers that had dominated for a hundred years or more, using their human capital and removing their resources for exploitation elsewhere. After the war, of course, that pan-Asian spark was enough to incite anti-colonial movements all over Asia, including Indochina and India.
***
The risk of writing from the perspective of Japan is in unintentionally soft-peddling their very real crimes, in much the same way that Euro or American-centric books might hand-wave area bombing. For the most part, I think Toland gets the balance right, providing Japanese rationalizations or explanations, but seldom forgetting the consequences of their actions.
A good example of this is the Bataan Death March. Toland does not skimp on the horrors suffered by MacArthur’s captured troops, but does place it in a milieu divorced from contemporary propaganda. He shows how the overarching cause of the Death March was Japan’s poor planning and its utter surprise at America’s collapse in the Philippines. They were simply not prepared for the influx of tens of thousands of starving, disease-ridden soldiers. At the same time, there were certainly Japanese soldiers who had practiced cruelty for its own sake, a product of training methods that included being beaten by superiors, and being imbued with the belief that capture was dishonor, and that the way of the warrior was death.
***
Toland was an author especially suited – as far as a white American could be – to tell this story, as he was married to a Japanese woman named Toshiko, who assisted as his interpreter. By giving an account of the Pacific War from Japanese eyes, he gave them a humanity denied by wartime hyperbole of unthinking, unfeeling, murderous fanatics. Toland quotes their letters and diaries, stands with them in their pillboxes, and is with them on the street the day a bomb exploded with “the light of a thousand suns.”
***
My greatest surprise in reading The Rising Sun was its emotional impact. It begins as a straightforward, chronological history, marked by tremendous research, but structurally run-of-the mill. As the book progresses, though, you recognize the elegance of Toland’s construction, how he weaves the stories of heretofore unknown participants into the grander narrative. Part of the reason The Rising Sun is so effective, so powerful, is the way Toland threads the mini-arcs of participants into the larger story. During the Battle of Saipan, for instance, Toland follows the travails of a young Japanese nurse:
Toland was able to tell stories like this because of his diligent primary research. In the source section, you will find ten pages filled with names, noting all the people with whom he’d conducted interviews. The names include prime ministers, admirals, and also Shizuko Miura.
For this reason alone, The Rising Sun is a touchstone of World War II writing. The firsthand information gathered from these participants, many of whom might have been forgotten, has proven invaluable to historians and writers who have followed in Toland’s footprints.
But this is not the only reason to read The Rising Sun, or even the best. Rather, it is a testament to humanity in the midst of the most inhuman period of human existence. In Toland’s own words, it is a story that is “muddled, ennobling, disgraceful, frustrating, full of paradox.”
- John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945
By my last count, there were one gazillion books on World War II, with more coming out every week. And it will never stop. World War II will continue to be refought between the covers – and on Kindles – long after human memory of the event is gone. It will be told for as long as there are people to tell stories.
The question, then, is which of those books to read? You can spend your entire life reading World War II books and not even scratch the surface. Besides, there are other things to do in life. Like drinking or reading about the American Civil War or doing both at the same time.
Thankfully, there are a few landmark books, the ones that everyone can name, the ones that are certified as classic, that stand out from the pack, like a guy wearing an Armani suit at a clown college (or a clown at an Armani store, if you prefer).
In the European Theater of Operations, one of those classics is William Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Shirer was a journalist who spent time in prewar Nazi Germany, and even followed the Nazis into France. Concerned that the Gestapo was going to arrest him, Shirer fled Germany in 1940 and later wrote his seminal account, a history of the Second World War as seen through the eyes of Hitler and his henchmen. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich has its shortcomings (among them an archaic and heavily belabored homophobia), but there is no denying its place in the firmament. All books coming after had to deal with its shadow.
John Toland’s The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire is a Pacific Theater counterpoint to Shirer’s masterwork. It tells the tale of the other side of World War II, and does so (mainly) from the point of view of the Japanese. Upon publication, it won the Pulitzer Prize, and can be found in the endnotes and bibliography of just about every subsequent book written about the Pacific War.
More than anything, though, it is a book that finds that perfect balance between macro and micro, between general and private (and civilian). It always strives to hold the big picture clear, but never fails to remind you of the individuals who collectively made that big picture. As such, this is a rare history, one that is scholarly and massively researched, yet also shot-through with empathy, compassion, and humanism.
It is one of the best books I’ve read on World War II.
***
Toland begins in 1936, with young Japanese radicals bent on assassinating several of the Emperor’s advisers. These men were practicing gekokujo, or insubordination, a semi-legitimate form of rebellion. In this opening chapter, Toland briskly (sometimes too briskly) outlines the background that fomented gekokujo: the fall of monarchies after World War I; the competition between democracy, socialism, and Communism that came in its wake; the rapid westernization of Japan (and the resulting scandals and corruption); Japan’s population explosion; and the inevitable blowback by conservatives and nationalists.
During Japan’s rise as a Pacific power, it invaded Manchuria – which it saw as a buffer against the Soviet Union (with whom they’d warred at the beginning of the century) and as a source of raw materials – and, in 1932, established the puppet state of Manchukuo. The creation of Manchukuo obviously heightened tensions between China and Japan. Those tensions came to a head in 1937 at the Marco Polo Bridge, in an “incident” that better marks the actual beginning of World War II (as opposed to the September 1, 1939 invasion of Poland by Hitler).
The clash at the Marco Polo Bridge led to full scale war, including the infamous Nanking Massacre.
***
The only real criticism I have with The Rising Sun is in Toland’s handling of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Part of the reason I bought this book was to learn more about this forgotten theater. Unfortunately, however, Toland deals with China in a cursory fashion. He does not take the time to develop the strategy of the war, or explain in great detail how it unfolded. The fall of Nanking merits barely a page. This stands in stark contrast to the space devoted to the American-Japanese conflict beginning in 1942. For instance, Toland devotes an entire (and yes, brilliant) chapter to the battle of Guadalcanal.
In other words, despite the broad claims of its cover, The Rising Sun is mainly focused on the war between American and Japan. This means less attention (though it’s not entirely ignored) paid to China’s dual struggle (against Japan, and themselves), Britain’s collapse in Singapore, the Burma Campaign, and the massive battles of Kohima and Imphal in India.
***
Even though Toland decides to place his heaviest emphasis on familiar territory, it nevertheless manages to be revelatory. After the earlier chapters, which felt compressed, The Rising Sun hits its stride in the run-up to Pearl Harbor. You get to see the rationale behind Japan’s decisions, its attempts to negotiate with America (especially through Prince Konoye), and the different factions within the Japanese ministry.
When we think of Japan in World War II, we think of Nanking and Pearl Harbor, of the Bataan Death March and kamikazes. Prime Minister Tojo has become a caricature of evil, divorced from any of the human traits that even Hitler has posthumously been granted.
These conceptions do little to broaden our understanding of what actually happened. By taking us into the backrooms of Japanese policymaking, we get to see the world – and its perils – as they did. They faced many difficulties as a small, overcrowded island-nation, a net importer of just about everything. When President Roosevelt decided to turn of the oil spigot, it was as grave a threat to Japan as Khrushchev’s October missiles were to the United States in 1962.
To be sure, Japan’s colonial impulses were brutal – encompassing some of the most infamous atrocities in history – but they were emulating a brutal western tradition, even if they tended to scale up the horrors. It is also interesting, as Toland notes, how Japan’s pan-Asian ambitions did not fall entirely on deaf ears. There were many people for whom an Asian power in the Pacific was preferable to the white powers that had dominated for a hundred years or more, using their human capital and removing their resources for exploitation elsewhere. After the war, of course, that pan-Asian spark was enough to incite anti-colonial movements all over Asia, including Indochina and India.
***
The risk of writing from the perspective of Japan is in unintentionally soft-peddling their very real crimes, in much the same way that Euro or American-centric books might hand-wave area bombing. For the most part, I think Toland gets the balance right, providing Japanese rationalizations or explanations, but seldom forgetting the consequences of their actions.
A good example of this is the Bataan Death March. Toland does not skimp on the horrors suffered by MacArthur’s captured troops, but does place it in a milieu divorced from contemporary propaganda. He shows how the overarching cause of the Death March was Japan’s poor planning and its utter surprise at America’s collapse in the Philippines. They were simply not prepared for the influx of tens of thousands of starving, disease-ridden soldiers. At the same time, there were certainly Japanese soldiers who had practiced cruelty for its own sake, a product of training methods that included being beaten by superiors, and being imbued with the belief that capture was dishonor, and that the way of the warrior was death.
***
Toland was an author especially suited – as far as a white American could be – to tell this story, as he was married to a Japanese woman named Toshiko, who assisted as his interpreter. By giving an account of the Pacific War from Japanese eyes, he gave them a humanity denied by wartime hyperbole of unthinking, unfeeling, murderous fanatics. Toland quotes their letters and diaries, stands with them in their pillboxes, and is with them on the street the day a bomb exploded with “the light of a thousand suns.”
***
My greatest surprise in reading The Rising Sun was its emotional impact. It begins as a straightforward, chronological history, marked by tremendous research, but structurally run-of-the mill. As the book progresses, though, you recognize the elegance of Toland’s construction, how he weaves the stories of heretofore unknown participants into the grander narrative. Part of the reason The Rising Sun is so effective, so powerful, is the way Toland threads the mini-arcs of participants into the larger story. During the Battle of Saipan, for instance, Toland follows the travails of a young Japanese nurse:
In Garapan a young volunteer nurse by the name of Shizuko Miura – a tomboy with a round merry face – flinched as the first shells landed. She peered out the window of the first-air station into the dim light. The Americans were bombarding the town again. As the explosions moved closer she helped transfer those wounded in the earlier shelling to a dugout. With daylight came enemy planes and an even more violent barrage from the ships. It is June 14, Shizuko thought calmly. I have lived for eighteen years and my time to die has come. A shell shook the dugout like an earthquake and knocked her to the ground. She staggered outside. The first-aid station was obliterated. She saw a piece of red metal – it was shrapnel – and, curious, touched it with her finger. It burned her. Planes droned overhead but no one was firing at them. Garapan was aflame. The heat was so intense that she could hardly breathe. She started to make her way through the rubbled streets strewn with bodies…
Toland was able to tell stories like this because of his diligent primary research. In the source section, you will find ten pages filled with names, noting all the people with whom he’d conducted interviews. The names include prime ministers, admirals, and also Shizuko Miura.
For this reason alone, The Rising Sun is a touchstone of World War II writing. The firsthand information gathered from these participants, many of whom might have been forgotten, has proven invaluable to historians and writers who have followed in Toland’s footprints.
But this is not the only reason to read The Rising Sun, or even the best. Rather, it is a testament to humanity in the midst of the most inhuman period of human existence. In Toland’s own words, it is a story that is “muddled, ennobling, disgraceful, frustrating, full of paradox.”
May 4, 2025
“With the seizure of Manchuria and the invasion of North China, the gulf widened as America denounced Japanese aggression with increasingly forceful words. This moral denunciation only hardened the resolve of the average Japanese. Why should there be a Monroe Doctrine in the Americas and an Open Door Policy in Asia? The Japanese takeover of bandit infested Manchuria was no different from American armed intervention in the Caribbean. Why was it perfectly acceptable for England and Holland to occupy India, Hong Kong, Singapore and the East Indies, but a crime for Japan to follow their example? Why should America, which had grabbed its lands from Indians by trickery, liquor and massacre, be so outraged when Japan did the same in China?” - John Toland, ‘The Rising Sun’
Emperor Hirohito: “Will you win a great victory? Like the Battle of Tsushima?”
Admiral Nagano: “I’m sorry, but that will not be possible.”
Emperor Hirohito: “Then the war will be a desperate one.”
- Before the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941
The following morning Stimson [US Secretary of War] brought the report to Churchill, who was exhilarated. The Prime Minister leaned forward. "What was gunpowder?" he asked, brandishing his cigar. "Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in wrath. Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn't understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and got off and generally bossed the whole meeting." - Churchill’s reaction to the test of the A-Bomb, Potsdam Conference on July 18, 1945
General Dwight Eisenhower also took vehement issue with [Army Chief of Staff] Marshall's conclusion. He told Stimson privately that Japan was already defeated. Dropping the bomb was "completely unnecessary." Moreover, America should avoid rousing world condemnation by using a weapon which "was no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives." - John Toland, ‘The Rising Sun’
Kido immediately informed the Emperor that Hiroshima was laid waste by a secret weapon. "Under the circumstances we must bow to the inevitable," said His Majesty. He could not hide his anguish. "No matter what happens to me, we must put an end to this war as soon as possible. This tragedy must not be repeated." But both agreed the moment had not come for the Emperor to take personal action. - August 6, 1945
MacArthur, the first to leave the plane, paused at the top of the ladder. He lit his corncob and descended, pipe clenched between teeth. Later that evening he told his staff "Boys, this is the greatest adventure in military history. Here we sit in the enemy's country with a handful of troops, looking down the throats of nineteen fully armed divisions and seventy million fanatics. One false move and the Alamo would look like a Sunday school picnic." - August 30, 1945
“A new era is upon us. Even the lesson of victory itself brings with it profound concern, both for our future security, and the survival of civilization. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we do not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door.” - General Douglas MacArthur, radio broadcast after the Japanese surrender on September 2 1945
************
John Toland begins this massive volume with a thumbnail history of Japan since its opening by Commodore Perry in 1853 through the Meiji Restoration and modernization of the military and industrial means, war with Russia and seizure of the Liaoning peninsula in 1905, annexation of Korea in 1910 and the conquest of Manchuria in 1931. Japan was in an economic depression and hard line militarists pressed for expansion, assassinating moderate politicians including the Prime Minister. Toland won a Pulitzer Prize for the book in 1971 and his writing is clear and compelling. Using newly released diaries and records, interviewing eyewitnesses, he attempts to tell the story from a Japanese point of view.
Roots of War
A 1936 army insurrection seized control of the government, under the guise of restoring power to the Emperor that had been subverted by politicians and businessmen. Hirohito, although commander-in-chief of the armed forces, was unaware of the plot and disapproved. Thought to be a living god and father of the nation, he was an unassuming and retiring man who would rather study biology and play golf than deal with the autocratic army and navy chiefs of staff. Part of their demands were to see military action to restore the honor and achieve glory for the Emperor. Many military leaders posited the only way to maintain order and improve the economic conditions would be by armed conquest.
Bridge To War
A puppet government had been formed in 1931 with Puyi, the deposed emperor of China, installed on the throne in a new state named Manchukuo. By 1936 the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was making plans to capture north China without the approval of its civilian government or central command. China was battling between the nationalist troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the communists led by Mao Zedong and regional warlords. The Japanese case for war was to provide a buffer zone from Russians and protect traders in Manchuria. A brief detente was made between Chinese factions in 1937 to expel the Japanese from north China where they were taking more territory. A skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge ignited war.
War in China
Bombers began to strike cities in the Beijing region, troops invaded by ground. China appealed to the League of Nations as FDR made a speech condemning the aggression. Japan claimed it was saving Asia from western domination and communism. Within months Japan seized Shanghai and Chiang’s capital in Nanjing, 300,000 civilians slaughtered. Toland suggests government in Tokyo knew less about the massacre but it was front page headlines in the news. Japan took Wuhan, drove Chiang west to Chongqing and occupied Canton in the south. Resentment of Roosevelt’s 1905 denial of war reparations to Japan and Wilson’s 1920 League of Nations rejection of racial equality provisions rankled Japan.
Axis of War
As Japan fought border battles with Russia in north China, it considered Hitler’s invitation to join a pact with Germany and Italy. Policy was thrown into confusion by a 1939 non-aggression treaty between the Nazis and Soviets. Hitler’s astonishing 1940 advances in Western Europe encouraged leaders in Japan to wage all out war in Asia. Since Britain and France were tied up in Europe, they began to make plans to take Singapore and Indochina. Prime Minister Konoe formed a cabinet with Matsuoka as Foreign Minister and Tojo as War Minister, key characters in the impending conflict. Designs for a Greater East Asia with Japan as leader formed, the Axis joined, a treaty with Russia drafted and the nation mobilized.
Diplomacy of War
The Tripartite Pact caused the US to tighten embargoes on Japan while Churchill recklessly reduced troops in Singapore. Matsuoka met Hitler, who urged an attack on Singapore, and Stalin to sign a non-aggression treaty. Diplomats were sent to Washington to push for a Japanese “Monroe Doctrine” in the Far East and the recognition of Manchukuo, in return for Japan’s withdrawal from China. As they disembarked in New York the US had passed a Lend-Lease Act to arm enemies of the Axis. The US wanted firm commitment of no more armed aggression from Japan. Matsuoka ended negotiations with a demand that if Japan went to war with Britain the US would remain neutral, anticipating a Japanese attack on Singapore.
War in Russia
With the German invasion of Russia Japan was caught off guard although Ribbentrop had hinted about it to Matsuoka weeks earlier. Germany devastated Soviet air and ground defenses in the first few hours. Matsuoka pressed to attack Russia and Singapore simultaneously, but opposed by the military the decision was made seize Indochina. Hirohito is depicted as passively approving the action. Matsuoka had become so belligerent dealing with the US and other cabinet members that he was ousted by Konoe and Tojo, replaced as foreign minister by Toyoda, a Navy Admiral. FDR, Secretary of State Hull and the Navy began to plan for war, seizing Japanese assets in America, Britain and the Netherlands.
A Desperate War
All trade with Japan was frozen including the steel and oil imports, the most critical resources. The Navy Chief of Staff Nagano predicting depletion of reserves counseled Hirohito to take initiative in Southeast Asia and seize oil and rubber resources in the Dutch East Indies. PM Kanoe urged talks with FDR to negotiate a peaceful settlement and tried to convince Tojo and others odds against winning a war with the US were 10:1. They agreed to the Four Principles FDR had sent to Japan, but the State Dept. didn’t believe they would negotiate in good faith. Hirohito questioned the six week deadline for a diplomatic resolution or attack. FDR and Hull stalled for more time, all while the war clock was ticking.
Clouds of War
As the US delayed talks and reinforced the Pacific, PM Kanoe and American Ambassador Grew became more anxious to begin, knowing the narrow window to avert war was closing. Minister of War General Tojo pressed Kanoe and Hirohito to end the pursuit of peace, his sympathies with the radical wing of the Army. The Navy Minister Oikawa, doubting the ability to win the war, favored negotiations. In the course of their disagreements Kanoe resigned as Prime Minister and Tojo appointed, the only man considered able to control the Army if peace was negotiated. Sugiyama, the Army Chief of Staff, played the role Tojo had, pressing for swift military action while Tojo tried to advance diplomacy as Kanoe had.
War of Words
Arguing amongst themselves, the military/civilian leaders backed each other into an artificial deadline of midnight November 30 to reach an agreement with the US or attack. More than half of the concerns centered around how to keep the army from rebelling and saving face, instead of avoiding an unwinnable war, as the US was busy building aircraft and training pilots in China. Japan sent diplomats to Washington in hopes to reach an agreement. Counter proposals by FDR were offered but rejected by the Allies, and Hull issued an ultimatum to remove all troops from China (mistakenly thought to include Manchuria) and Indochina for releasing frozen assets and resuming trade, a proposal certain to fail.
Folly of War
After Pearl Harbor Toland continues with the naval battles, island hopping, jungle warfare, internment camps, death marches, fire bombings and A-bomb devastation. Critical decisions had been made by an inordinately small group of politicians and military men. How things could have come to this is told convincingly by Toland. The peer relationships, personalities, psychology and political stage all played their part. If Japan had stayed in Manchuria, its original objective, and continued to occupy Korea everyone in the region might be speaking Japanese now. Imperial overreach would not allow that scenario, as an uncontrolled cancer kills its host. Rising from ashes Japan remains the third largest economy.
Toland’s take on the Japanese war seems to be the standard one, out of control factions of militarists and industrialists, a weak emperor and moderate parliament. It’s contradicted by Herbert Bix’s ‘Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan’, also a Pulitzer Prize winner in Non-Fiction (2001) which viewed the imperial house as complicit. Likely the truth lies somewhere in between. John Toland’s ‘The Rising Sun’ is a modern narrative history and deserves its high place in the extensive Pacific War canon. Herbert Bix’s ‘Hirohito’ is not a traditional biography, it is a political history and compares well to this book. The two accounts are valuable as side by side bookends to one of the great 20th century catastrophes.
Emperor Hirohito: “Will you win a great victory? Like the Battle of Tsushima?”
Admiral Nagano: “I’m sorry, but that will not be possible.”
Emperor Hirohito: “Then the war will be a desperate one.”
- Before the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941
The following morning Stimson [US Secretary of War] brought the report to Churchill, who was exhilarated. The Prime Minister leaned forward. "What was gunpowder?" he asked, brandishing his cigar. "Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in wrath. Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn't understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and got off and generally bossed the whole meeting." - Churchill’s reaction to the test of the A-Bomb, Potsdam Conference on July 18, 1945
General Dwight Eisenhower also took vehement issue with [Army Chief of Staff] Marshall's conclusion. He told Stimson privately that Japan was already defeated. Dropping the bomb was "completely unnecessary." Moreover, America should avoid rousing world condemnation by using a weapon which "was no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives." - John Toland, ‘The Rising Sun’
Kido immediately informed the Emperor that Hiroshima was laid waste by a secret weapon. "Under the circumstances we must bow to the inevitable," said His Majesty. He could not hide his anguish. "No matter what happens to me, we must put an end to this war as soon as possible. This tragedy must not be repeated." But both agreed the moment had not come for the Emperor to take personal action. - August 6, 1945
MacArthur, the first to leave the plane, paused at the top of the ladder. He lit his corncob and descended, pipe clenched between teeth. Later that evening he told his staff "Boys, this is the greatest adventure in military history. Here we sit in the enemy's country with a handful of troops, looking down the throats of nineteen fully armed divisions and seventy million fanatics. One false move and the Alamo would look like a Sunday school picnic." - August 30, 1945
“A new era is upon us. Even the lesson of victory itself brings with it profound concern, both for our future security, and the survival of civilization. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we do not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door.” - General Douglas MacArthur, radio broadcast after the Japanese surrender on September 2 1945
************
John Toland begins this massive volume with a thumbnail history of Japan since its opening by Commodore Perry in 1853 through the Meiji Restoration and modernization of the military and industrial means, war with Russia and seizure of the Liaoning peninsula in 1905, annexation of Korea in 1910 and the conquest of Manchuria in 1931. Japan was in an economic depression and hard line militarists pressed for expansion, assassinating moderate politicians including the Prime Minister. Toland won a Pulitzer Prize for the book in 1971 and his writing is clear and compelling. Using newly released diaries and records, interviewing eyewitnesses, he attempts to tell the story from a Japanese point of view.
Roots of War
A 1936 army insurrection seized control of the government, under the guise of restoring power to the Emperor that had been subverted by politicians and businessmen. Hirohito, although commander-in-chief of the armed forces, was unaware of the plot and disapproved. Thought to be a living god and father of the nation, he was an unassuming and retiring man who would rather study biology and play golf than deal with the autocratic army and navy chiefs of staff. Part of their demands were to see military action to restore the honor and achieve glory for the Emperor. Many military leaders posited the only way to maintain order and improve the economic conditions would be by armed conquest.
Bridge To War
A puppet government had been formed in 1931 with Puyi, the deposed emperor of China, installed on the throne in a new state named Manchukuo. By 1936 the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was making plans to capture north China without the approval of its civilian government or central command. China was battling between the nationalist troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the communists led by Mao Zedong and regional warlords. The Japanese case for war was to provide a buffer zone from Russians and protect traders in Manchuria. A brief detente was made between Chinese factions in 1937 to expel the Japanese from north China where they were taking more territory. A skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge ignited war.
War in China
Bombers began to strike cities in the Beijing region, troops invaded by ground. China appealed to the League of Nations as FDR made a speech condemning the aggression. Japan claimed it was saving Asia from western domination and communism. Within months Japan seized Shanghai and Chiang’s capital in Nanjing, 300,000 civilians slaughtered. Toland suggests government in Tokyo knew less about the massacre but it was front page headlines in the news. Japan took Wuhan, drove Chiang west to Chongqing and occupied Canton in the south. Resentment of Roosevelt’s 1905 denial of war reparations to Japan and Wilson’s 1920 League of Nations rejection of racial equality provisions rankled Japan.
Axis of War
As Japan fought border battles with Russia in north China, it considered Hitler’s invitation to join a pact with Germany and Italy. Policy was thrown into confusion by a 1939 non-aggression treaty between the Nazis and Soviets. Hitler’s astonishing 1940 advances in Western Europe encouraged leaders in Japan to wage all out war in Asia. Since Britain and France were tied up in Europe, they began to make plans to take Singapore and Indochina. Prime Minister Konoe formed a cabinet with Matsuoka as Foreign Minister and Tojo as War Minister, key characters in the impending conflict. Designs for a Greater East Asia with Japan as leader formed, the Axis joined, a treaty with Russia drafted and the nation mobilized.
Diplomacy of War
The Tripartite Pact caused the US to tighten embargoes on Japan while Churchill recklessly reduced troops in Singapore. Matsuoka met Hitler, who urged an attack on Singapore, and Stalin to sign a non-aggression treaty. Diplomats were sent to Washington to push for a Japanese “Monroe Doctrine” in the Far East and the recognition of Manchukuo, in return for Japan’s withdrawal from China. As they disembarked in New York the US had passed a Lend-Lease Act to arm enemies of the Axis. The US wanted firm commitment of no more armed aggression from Japan. Matsuoka ended negotiations with a demand that if Japan went to war with Britain the US would remain neutral, anticipating a Japanese attack on Singapore.
War in Russia
With the German invasion of Russia Japan was caught off guard although Ribbentrop had hinted about it to Matsuoka weeks earlier. Germany devastated Soviet air and ground defenses in the first few hours. Matsuoka pressed to attack Russia and Singapore simultaneously, but opposed by the military the decision was made seize Indochina. Hirohito is depicted as passively approving the action. Matsuoka had become so belligerent dealing with the US and other cabinet members that he was ousted by Konoe and Tojo, replaced as foreign minister by Toyoda, a Navy Admiral. FDR, Secretary of State Hull and the Navy began to plan for war, seizing Japanese assets in America, Britain and the Netherlands.
A Desperate War
All trade with Japan was frozen including the steel and oil imports, the most critical resources. The Navy Chief of Staff Nagano predicting depletion of reserves counseled Hirohito to take initiative in Southeast Asia and seize oil and rubber resources in the Dutch East Indies. PM Kanoe urged talks with FDR to negotiate a peaceful settlement and tried to convince Tojo and others odds against winning a war with the US were 10:1. They agreed to the Four Principles FDR had sent to Japan, but the State Dept. didn’t believe they would negotiate in good faith. Hirohito questioned the six week deadline for a diplomatic resolution or attack. FDR and Hull stalled for more time, all while the war clock was ticking.
Clouds of War
As the US delayed talks and reinforced the Pacific, PM Kanoe and American Ambassador Grew became more anxious to begin, knowing the narrow window to avert war was closing. Minister of War General Tojo pressed Kanoe and Hirohito to end the pursuit of peace, his sympathies with the radical wing of the Army. The Navy Minister Oikawa, doubting the ability to win the war, favored negotiations. In the course of their disagreements Kanoe resigned as Prime Minister and Tojo appointed, the only man considered able to control the Army if peace was negotiated. Sugiyama, the Army Chief of Staff, played the role Tojo had, pressing for swift military action while Tojo tried to advance diplomacy as Kanoe had.
War of Words
Arguing amongst themselves, the military/civilian leaders backed each other into an artificial deadline of midnight November 30 to reach an agreement with the US or attack. More than half of the concerns centered around how to keep the army from rebelling and saving face, instead of avoiding an unwinnable war, as the US was busy building aircraft and training pilots in China. Japan sent diplomats to Washington in hopes to reach an agreement. Counter proposals by FDR were offered but rejected by the Allies, and Hull issued an ultimatum to remove all troops from China (mistakenly thought to include Manchuria) and Indochina for releasing frozen assets and resuming trade, a proposal certain to fail.
Folly of War
After Pearl Harbor Toland continues with the naval battles, island hopping, jungle warfare, internment camps, death marches, fire bombings and A-bomb devastation. Critical decisions had been made by an inordinately small group of politicians and military men. How things could have come to this is told convincingly by Toland. The peer relationships, personalities, psychology and political stage all played their part. If Japan had stayed in Manchuria, its original objective, and continued to occupy Korea everyone in the region might be speaking Japanese now. Imperial overreach would not allow that scenario, as an uncontrolled cancer kills its host. Rising from ashes Japan remains the third largest economy.
Toland’s take on the Japanese war seems to be the standard one, out of control factions of militarists and industrialists, a weak emperor and moderate parliament. It’s contradicted by Herbert Bix’s ‘Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan’, also a Pulitzer Prize winner in Non-Fiction (2001) which viewed the imperial house as complicit. Likely the truth lies somewhere in between. John Toland’s ‘The Rising Sun’ is a modern narrative history and deserves its high place in the extensive Pacific War canon. Herbert Bix’s ‘Hirohito’ is not a traditional biography, it is a political history and compares well to this book. The two accounts are valuable as side by side bookends to one of the great 20th century catastrophes.
March 22, 2021
Despite its title, John Toland's work is not a history of the Japanese Empire's fall, but rather a step-by-step account of the war as seen from the Japanese point of view. It is a long story of muddled negotiations (for which America was also to be blamed) and a disgraceful, frustrating, paradoxical war.
"America's greatest mistake in World War II," Toland argues," was in failing to recognize that she was fighting two different kinds of war simultaneously: one in Europe against another Western power and philosophy, Nazism, and one in Asia which was not only a struggle against an aggressive nation fighting for survival as a modern power but an ideological contest against an entire continent. Millions of Orientals saw Japan's battle as their own, as a confrontation of race and color; they also saw in Japan's victories their own liberation from Western domination."
Thus, instead of securing peace, the negotiations of 1941 ended in war, after which we came to see General Tojo, the other Japanese leaders – and the Japanese people as a whole – as the Nazi's Asian counterparts, no better than Hitler in any way, who deserved severe punishment.
The narrative begins with the rebellion of February 26 1936 – the attempted assasinations of the high Japanese officials by a group of insurgent junior army officers. With his characteristic humor and eye for the small details, Toland describes the assasinations of politicians by emphasizing the paradoxical nature of the Japanese rebels' behavior – after they burst into the houses of their victims and murdered them, they always apologized to the wives and the rest of the household for the "inconvenience".
Minister Takahashi was alone in a spacious ten-mat bedroom. ....
Finally the lieutenant entered the minister's room brandishing a pistol. He kicked the quilt off Takashi, crying "Tenchu!" (Punishment of Heaven!). Takashi looked up unafraid and shouted "Idiot!" at the lieutenant, who hesitated before emptying the pistol into the old man. .... Mrs. Takahashi burst from her room in the attached Western-style section, and at the sight of her disemboweled husband, cried out in anguish. As the lieutenant shouldered through the crowd of servants gathered horrified in the corridors, he said, "Excuse me for the annoyance I have caused."
The result of the "2/26" rebellion was the beginning of misunderstandings between the USA and Japan. Understanding little or nothing of the power wielded by the dedicated young rebels, informed Americans mistakenly assumed that the takeover in Manchuria and the foray into China were steps plotted by military leaders who, like Hitler, wished to conquer the whole world.
Here, Toland begins the endless saga of muddled Japanese-American negotiations, spinning a very detailed, often humorous, sometimes exasperating, and based exclusively on factual conversations tale of personal ambition, wrong translations from Japanese to English, unwanted initiatives, and everything else that hindered the two countries' attempts to end the negotiations in peace. He believes that if Prince Konoye, who had been persuaded to re-enter politics and form a new cabinet, had met with Roosevelt in 1941, war might have been avoided: "Both men were gentlemen from honorable families and they could reach an honorable settlement." Instead, Hull and Nomura waded through the quagmire of mutual misunderstanding and diplomatic blunders, sinking deeper and deeper until the negotiations were so messed up their grim outcome seemed inevitable.
Toland briefly but dramatically narrates the attack on Pearl Harbor and Clark Field in the Philippines, focusing on the string of impressive Japanese victories during the initial months of the war when they extended an empire from the Aleutians in the north to the border ot India. Included in this realm were the Solomons, most of New Guinea, Thailand, Burma, and French Indochina.
Yet, Toland doesn't forget to quote Emperor Hirohito's ominous conversation with Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Navy General of Staff:
The Emperor cut through the tangle with one question: "Will you win a great victory? Like the battle of Tsushima?"
"I am sorry, but that will not be possible."
"Then," said the Emperor grimly, "the war will be a desperate one."
He was right. Japan had made a terrible mistake: she had entangled herself into a war she could not win. In mid-1942 the tables turned. In the Naval battle of the Midway Yamamoto lost the main striking force of the combined fleet – four carriers with their planes and pilots.
"We started the war and we are responsible for this disaster," [Captain Oishi] said. "We should all commit hara-kiri!" He added that the entire staff agreed with him and he wanted [Admiral] Kusaka to tell Nagumo.
"Bakayaro!" said Kusaka. "Assemble all the other idiots in the staff room." ... "You men cheer when the battle is successful. When it isn't, you threaten hara-kiri. You're acting like hysterical women." They faced a long war and he forbade "such nonsense".
A long war they faced, indeed, but from this battle on, the Japanese tide of victory was ebbing steadily.
Toland's narrative is especially remarkable for the vivid, manifold account of the fruitless efforts of the Japanese to halt the American advance every step of the way. He recreates every detail, from battle talk to the design of uniforms to hara-kiri, and when it comes to descriptions of jungle marches, civillian massacres, POW brutalities, fanatical kamikazes, and the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, his account is no-holds-barred.
Another aspect of The Rising Sun that impressed me highly was the cinematographic way in which Toland sketches the portraits of eminent figures, such as Prince Konoye, Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, president of the South Manchurian Railway, etc.
“Whereas Tojo was a man of few words, Marsuoka was an orator of extraordinary eloquence," writes he about the Foreign Minister, "who deserved his nicknames 'Mr. 50,000 Words' and 'the Talking Machine.' He good-naturedly denied he was loquacious. 'Being verbose means trying to cancel out or excuse what one just said. I'd never do that. Therefore I'm not verbose.' 'I have never known anyone talk so much to say so little,' observed Amabassador Craigie, who judged him also to be stubborn and determined man with an acute mind.
Matsuoka was small and swarthy, and his clipped bullethead, mustache, big tortoise-shell glasses and flare to be dramatic had brought him world attention when he precipitously stalked out of the League of Nations Assembly during the debate on Manchuria. .... Prince Konoye listened to practically everybody, Matsuoka to practically nobody. .... An intellectual gymnast, he would often say something contrary to what he believed and propose something he opposed in order to get his own way by default. .... A man of broad visions, he seldom explained these visions, or if he did, talked at such cross-purposes that it was no wonder he left a wake of confusion behind him; even those who thought him one of the most brilliant men in Japan watched anxiously as he nimbly played his dangerous diplomatic games. He assured his associates he was pro-American, yet talked insultingly about America; he distrusted Germany, yet courted Hitler; he was against the rise of militarism, yet spouted his arguments for war. .... In his home he also played the paradox. He shouted at his seven children, and let them ride on his back; he was autocratic, yet gave unstintingly of his love and attention. .... On days he was 'not at home', a visitor would sometimes insist on seeing the master and the shosei [a combination of secretary and personal servant] would announce him to Matsuoka. 'How can a man who isn't here see anyone!' he would yell."
John Toland draws upon an enormous amount of documents and interviews with commanders, prisoners, politicians, and enlisted men to create a brilliantly written and meticulously researched history with an extensive bibliography. His work is a comprehensive and compelling account of the Japanese side of WWII. The book is remarkable for the author's overly sympathetic attitude towards Japan's leaders and the occasional glossing over of the actual extent of Japanese war crimes, but this is a minor complaint as compared to the highly faborable overall impression The Rising Sun left on me. Recommendable.
"America's greatest mistake in World War II," Toland argues," was in failing to recognize that she was fighting two different kinds of war simultaneously: one in Europe against another Western power and philosophy, Nazism, and one in Asia which was not only a struggle against an aggressive nation fighting for survival as a modern power but an ideological contest against an entire continent. Millions of Orientals saw Japan's battle as their own, as a confrontation of race and color; they also saw in Japan's victories their own liberation from Western domination."
Thus, instead of securing peace, the negotiations of 1941 ended in war, after which we came to see General Tojo, the other Japanese leaders – and the Japanese people as a whole – as the Nazi's Asian counterparts, no better than Hitler in any way, who deserved severe punishment.
The narrative begins with the rebellion of February 26 1936 – the attempted assasinations of the high Japanese officials by a group of insurgent junior army officers. With his characteristic humor and eye for the small details, Toland describes the assasinations of politicians by emphasizing the paradoxical nature of the Japanese rebels' behavior – after they burst into the houses of their victims and murdered them, they always apologized to the wives and the rest of the household for the "inconvenience".
Minister Takahashi was alone in a spacious ten-mat bedroom. ....
Finally the lieutenant entered the minister's room brandishing a pistol. He kicked the quilt off Takashi, crying "Tenchu!" (Punishment of Heaven!). Takashi looked up unafraid and shouted "Idiot!" at the lieutenant, who hesitated before emptying the pistol into the old man. .... Mrs. Takahashi burst from her room in the attached Western-style section, and at the sight of her disemboweled husband, cried out in anguish. As the lieutenant shouldered through the crowd of servants gathered horrified in the corridors, he said, "Excuse me for the annoyance I have caused."
The result of the "2/26" rebellion was the beginning of misunderstandings between the USA and Japan. Understanding little or nothing of the power wielded by the dedicated young rebels, informed Americans mistakenly assumed that the takeover in Manchuria and the foray into China were steps plotted by military leaders who, like Hitler, wished to conquer the whole world.
Here, Toland begins the endless saga of muddled Japanese-American negotiations, spinning a very detailed, often humorous, sometimes exasperating, and based exclusively on factual conversations tale of personal ambition, wrong translations from Japanese to English, unwanted initiatives, and everything else that hindered the two countries' attempts to end the negotiations in peace. He believes that if Prince Konoye, who had been persuaded to re-enter politics and form a new cabinet, had met with Roosevelt in 1941, war might have been avoided: "Both men were gentlemen from honorable families and they could reach an honorable settlement." Instead, Hull and Nomura waded through the quagmire of mutual misunderstanding and diplomatic blunders, sinking deeper and deeper until the negotiations were so messed up their grim outcome seemed inevitable.
Toland briefly but dramatically narrates the attack on Pearl Harbor and Clark Field in the Philippines, focusing on the string of impressive Japanese victories during the initial months of the war when they extended an empire from the Aleutians in the north to the border ot India. Included in this realm were the Solomons, most of New Guinea, Thailand, Burma, and French Indochina.
Yet, Toland doesn't forget to quote Emperor Hirohito's ominous conversation with Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Navy General of Staff:
The Emperor cut through the tangle with one question: "Will you win a great victory? Like the battle of Tsushima?"
"I am sorry, but that will not be possible."
"Then," said the Emperor grimly, "the war will be a desperate one."
He was right. Japan had made a terrible mistake: she had entangled herself into a war she could not win. In mid-1942 the tables turned. In the Naval battle of the Midway Yamamoto lost the main striking force of the combined fleet – four carriers with their planes and pilots.
"We started the war and we are responsible for this disaster," [Captain Oishi] said. "We should all commit hara-kiri!" He added that the entire staff agreed with him and he wanted [Admiral] Kusaka to tell Nagumo.
"Bakayaro!" said Kusaka. "Assemble all the other idiots in the staff room." ... "You men cheer when the battle is successful. When it isn't, you threaten hara-kiri. You're acting like hysterical women." They faced a long war and he forbade "such nonsense".
A long war they faced, indeed, but from this battle on, the Japanese tide of victory was ebbing steadily.
Toland's narrative is especially remarkable for the vivid, manifold account of the fruitless efforts of the Japanese to halt the American advance every step of the way. He recreates every detail, from battle talk to the design of uniforms to hara-kiri, and when it comes to descriptions of jungle marches, civillian massacres, POW brutalities, fanatical kamikazes, and the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, his account is no-holds-barred.
Another aspect of The Rising Sun that impressed me highly was the cinematographic way in which Toland sketches the portraits of eminent figures, such as Prince Konoye, Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, president of the South Manchurian Railway, etc.
“Whereas Tojo was a man of few words, Marsuoka was an orator of extraordinary eloquence," writes he about the Foreign Minister, "who deserved his nicknames 'Mr. 50,000 Words' and 'the Talking Machine.' He good-naturedly denied he was loquacious. 'Being verbose means trying to cancel out or excuse what one just said. I'd never do that. Therefore I'm not verbose.' 'I have never known anyone talk so much to say so little,' observed Amabassador Craigie, who judged him also to be stubborn and determined man with an acute mind.
Matsuoka was small and swarthy, and his clipped bullethead, mustache, big tortoise-shell glasses and flare to be dramatic had brought him world attention when he precipitously stalked out of the League of Nations Assembly during the debate on Manchuria. .... Prince Konoye listened to practically everybody, Matsuoka to practically nobody. .... An intellectual gymnast, he would often say something contrary to what he believed and propose something he opposed in order to get his own way by default. .... A man of broad visions, he seldom explained these visions, or if he did, talked at such cross-purposes that it was no wonder he left a wake of confusion behind him; even those who thought him one of the most brilliant men in Japan watched anxiously as he nimbly played his dangerous diplomatic games. He assured his associates he was pro-American, yet talked insultingly about America; he distrusted Germany, yet courted Hitler; he was against the rise of militarism, yet spouted his arguments for war. .... In his home he also played the paradox. He shouted at his seven children, and let them ride on his back; he was autocratic, yet gave unstintingly of his love and attention. .... On days he was 'not at home', a visitor would sometimes insist on seeing the master and the shosei [a combination of secretary and personal servant] would announce him to Matsuoka. 'How can a man who isn't here see anyone!' he would yell."
John Toland draws upon an enormous amount of documents and interviews with commanders, prisoners, politicians, and enlisted men to create a brilliantly written and meticulously researched history with an extensive bibliography. His work is a comprehensive and compelling account of the Japanese side of WWII. The book is remarkable for the author's overly sympathetic attitude towards Japan's leaders and the occasional glossing over of the actual extent of Japanese war crimes, but this is a minor complaint as compared to the highly faborable overall impression The Rising Sun left on me. Recommendable.
June 10, 2023
From Dawn until Dusk.
The Rising Sun by John Toland is often described as the most important book of the War in the Pacific. The book won The Pulitzer Prize when it was first published in 1970 as it addressed the Second World War from a purely Japanese narrative. It lives up to its reputation and provides a gripping read through its 954 pages. Although, for me a slow read and one that requires full concentration and cross referencing to understand who everyone was, I can say I enjoyed this book.
Starting with the Meiji Restoration, then the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and then the aftermath of the First World War, Toland is able to set the backdrop of the rise of the Japanese Empire and infamous attack on Pearl Harbour on 07/12/1941. Toland explains that Imperial Japan was a combination of feudalism and modern technology as the country was catapulted into the 19th century following Commodore Matthew C. Perry landing with warships in 1853. From there the cult of the Samurai still dominated the armed forces. Particularly the story of the 47 Ronin, the story of the masterless Samurai who’s Lord had been murdered and they took years planning his revenge before all committing seppuku, the ritual suicide, once this was complete. For many this was the idealised way to live their lives. Total obedience to the eternal, the emperor who was a living deity and honour to themselves.
With this Japan’s war aims are explained. Tensions with the west had been building ever since the Meiji restoration. White imperialism dominated Eastern Asia and Japan wanted to release the shackles as Asia for the Asians. After being sold short in the First World War, Woodrow Wilson’s self determination only mattering to white peoples of Europe, allegiance with the allies would only ever place Japan as a second class state. Barbara Tuchman’s Zimmerman Telegram excellently explains these tensions and the racial discrimination against Japanese immigration into the USA at this time. Japan wanted land and influence too, much like any other power and after success in 1905 and domination of Manchuria she wanted more. If it was okay for the French, British and Americans then why wasn’t it okay for them?
From there the attacks on Pearl Harbour and Singapore are explained. Alongside the embarrassing expulsion of the British from Burma and mass spread of influence a the way to the Solomon Islands. We see the debates at court with Hideki Tojo and high command over whether to attack America and the attempts to hold the Midway Atoll. This was the turning point. Luck had run out and trying to secure the airbase there would have been impossible to defend afterwards. But Yama Moto lost four aircraft carriers with their planes and pilots. The steady decline has begun. Then Guadalcanal followed, with Japanese victory at sea, but eventual defeat on land. General Douglas MacArthur’s plan was to conduct a series of flanking manoeuvres up the Philippines, leaving Japanese land forces stranded and eventually landing on Leyte. Here in one of the most controversial battles of the war with the infamous Breakneck Ridge, the Japanese Imperial Fleet was shattered beyond recovery.
From here the two great battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa are described. Both with appalling loss of life, especially the civilians on Okinawa. The most famous photograph of the war, the raising of the flag on Mount Suribachi by Joe Rosenthal is explained and we learn that three of the six men in the photograph would be killed in the battle. Okinawa was the penultimate battle of the war and gathered the largest US forces in the Pacific theatre. After the bombing of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki and the unprecedented intervention of Emperor Hirohito did an unconditional surrender come. With many military personnel trying to fight on or commit seppuku.
Examination of such a subject, Japan in WWII is beyond the scope of any single book. But in my opinion this does as good as anyone will be able to offer. Toland having writing it only 25 years after the surrender of the Japanese had the advantage of interviewing many of those who were caught up in the events described. Toland is able to provide humanity to the Japanese and describes the futile attempts to slow down the crawling and inevitable advances of the allied forces. This book is not solely a Japanese perspective, as Toland provides context with conferences of Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta. Alongside the internal conflicts between FDR, WSC and Josef Stalin. His attention to detail is second to none, even if for some this would seem tedious in places. One problem is the references to his sources, which are not provided and as such one cannot follow up on his work, it is always important to know the source. Another issue, is the conversations ‘remembered’ 25 years after the events. These should not be taken for gospel as most of us cannot properly remember what we spoke about the previous day. Apart from some of these misgivings I have, this is a great piece of work and is essential for anyone reading about Japan or the Second World War.
The Rising Sun by John Toland is often described as the most important book of the War in the Pacific. The book won The Pulitzer Prize when it was first published in 1970 as it addressed the Second World War from a purely Japanese narrative. It lives up to its reputation and provides a gripping read through its 954 pages. Although, for me a slow read and one that requires full concentration and cross referencing to understand who everyone was, I can say I enjoyed this book.
Starting with the Meiji Restoration, then the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and then the aftermath of the First World War, Toland is able to set the backdrop of the rise of the Japanese Empire and infamous attack on Pearl Harbour on 07/12/1941. Toland explains that Imperial Japan was a combination of feudalism and modern technology as the country was catapulted into the 19th century following Commodore Matthew C. Perry landing with warships in 1853. From there the cult of the Samurai still dominated the armed forces. Particularly the story of the 47 Ronin, the story of the masterless Samurai who’s Lord had been murdered and they took years planning his revenge before all committing seppuku, the ritual suicide, once this was complete. For many this was the idealised way to live their lives. Total obedience to the eternal, the emperor who was a living deity and honour to themselves.
With this Japan’s war aims are explained. Tensions with the west had been building ever since the Meiji restoration. White imperialism dominated Eastern Asia and Japan wanted to release the shackles as Asia for the Asians. After being sold short in the First World War, Woodrow Wilson’s self determination only mattering to white peoples of Europe, allegiance with the allies would only ever place Japan as a second class state. Barbara Tuchman’s Zimmerman Telegram excellently explains these tensions and the racial discrimination against Japanese immigration into the USA at this time. Japan wanted land and influence too, much like any other power and after success in 1905 and domination of Manchuria she wanted more. If it was okay for the French, British and Americans then why wasn’t it okay for them?
From there the attacks on Pearl Harbour and Singapore are explained. Alongside the embarrassing expulsion of the British from Burma and mass spread of influence a the way to the Solomon Islands. We see the debates at court with Hideki Tojo and high command over whether to attack America and the attempts to hold the Midway Atoll. This was the turning point. Luck had run out and trying to secure the airbase there would have been impossible to defend afterwards. But Yama Moto lost four aircraft carriers with their planes and pilots. The steady decline has begun. Then Guadalcanal followed, with Japanese victory at sea, but eventual defeat on land. General Douglas MacArthur’s plan was to conduct a series of flanking manoeuvres up the Philippines, leaving Japanese land forces stranded and eventually landing on Leyte. Here in one of the most controversial battles of the war with the infamous Breakneck Ridge, the Japanese Imperial Fleet was shattered beyond recovery.
From here the two great battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa are described. Both with appalling loss of life, especially the civilians on Okinawa. The most famous photograph of the war, the raising of the flag on Mount Suribachi by Joe Rosenthal is explained and we learn that three of the six men in the photograph would be killed in the battle. Okinawa was the penultimate battle of the war and gathered the largest US forces in the Pacific theatre. After the bombing of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki and the unprecedented intervention of Emperor Hirohito did an unconditional surrender come. With many military personnel trying to fight on or commit seppuku.
Examination of such a subject, Japan in WWII is beyond the scope of any single book. But in my opinion this does as good as anyone will be able to offer. Toland having writing it only 25 years after the surrender of the Japanese had the advantage of interviewing many of those who were caught up in the events described. Toland is able to provide humanity to the Japanese and describes the futile attempts to slow down the crawling and inevitable advances of the allied forces. This book is not solely a Japanese perspective, as Toland provides context with conferences of Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta. Alongside the internal conflicts between FDR, WSC and Josef Stalin. His attention to detail is second to none, even if for some this would seem tedious in places. One problem is the references to his sources, which are not provided and as such one cannot follow up on his work, it is always important to know the source. Another issue, is the conversations ‘remembered’ 25 years after the events. These should not be taken for gospel as most of us cannot properly remember what we spoke about the previous day. Apart from some of these misgivings I have, this is a great piece of work and is essential for anyone reading about Japan or the Second World War.
January 17, 2013
An epic account of the Japanese war. Toland tells the story from many different perspectives – from the Emperor and his aides to the lowly soldier trapped in Guadalcanal. It is all here – the prelude to Pearl Harbour to the finale of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Many aspects are of interest – the Japanese were continually obsessed with striking the fatal knock-out blow. At Pearl Harbour they believed they had accomplished that. They tried again at Midway, Tarawa (to be held for one thousand years), Saipan and on and on... They even believed they could destroy the enemy on the Japanese mainland. Another aspect is the ferociousness of the combatants who refused to surrender – and viewed suicide as the honourable way to leave life. There were always substantially more Japanese deaths than American ones in most of the conflicts.
John Toland’s varying montages of the agony of battles, of prisoners of war, of the victims of fire-bombing are all very poignant. The build-up to the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the frustration and miscues on both sides is very well told. The end, with the Potsdam Proclamation that was completely rejected by the Japanese government, followed by the dropping of the atomic bombs well documents the legacy of the wars’ ending. I feel at times that Mr. Toland is too lenient with Hirohito’s performance; he could have prevented Pearl Harbour and the subsequent Japanese onslaught in Asia. The Japanese had signed the Tri-partite Pact with Hitler and Mussolini – and this was ill-received by the Anglo-American democracies. This was somewhat overlooked by Mr. Toland. Nevertheless this book is a great accomplishment and presents the war, with all its’ detailed planning, from the Japanese viewpoint.
Many aspects are of interest – the Japanese were continually obsessed with striking the fatal knock-out blow. At Pearl Harbour they believed they had accomplished that. They tried again at Midway, Tarawa (to be held for one thousand years), Saipan and on and on... They even believed they could destroy the enemy on the Japanese mainland. Another aspect is the ferociousness of the combatants who refused to surrender – and viewed suicide as the honourable way to leave life. There were always substantially more Japanese deaths than American ones in most of the conflicts.
John Toland’s varying montages of the agony of battles, of prisoners of war, of the victims of fire-bombing are all very poignant. The build-up to the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the frustration and miscues on both sides is very well told. The end, with the Potsdam Proclamation that was completely rejected by the Japanese government, followed by the dropping of the atomic bombs well documents the legacy of the wars’ ending. I feel at times that Mr. Toland is too lenient with Hirohito’s performance; he could have prevented Pearl Harbour and the subsequent Japanese onslaught in Asia. The Japanese had signed the Tri-partite Pact with Hitler and Mussolini – and this was ill-received by the Anglo-American democracies. This was somewhat overlooked by Mr. Toland. Nevertheless this book is a great accomplishment and presents the war, with all its’ detailed planning, from the Japanese viewpoint.
March 27, 2013
Looking for a relatively light read I picked this off the shelves where it had been sitting for years. Having read a couple of his other books, I was pretty sure that Toland would be interesting.
Indeed, he was--even more interesting than I had expected, neither expecting that this book would be so sympathetic to the Japanese perspective nor that Toland's wife was Japanese. No expert, but certainly not unread about the war in the Pacific, I was rather blown away by the presentation, the other books I'd read being very much pro-Allies, anti-Axis.
Among the propositions put to the reader by Toland's text are how Japanese policy was substantially independent of that of the other Axis powers and how the Pacific war might well have been avoided had the U.S. State Department another secretary at the time. Other contentious positions taken by the author include a rather critical portrayal of MacArthur and a rather positive one of Emperor Hirohito. Roosevelt and Ambassador Grew come across well. Rumors that Roosevelt knew beforehand of the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor are discounted.
Most particularly, however, I liked how Toland used, and defined, a number of Japanese terms and expressions, employing this as one means to get at the Japanese mindset, something few in the U.S. government or military understood.
Like the original Tora, Tora motion picture, coproduced by citizens of both countries, or like Clint Eastwood's recent diptych on one battle of the war, this book is unusually balanced and is to be highly recommended.
Now I just have to find the second volume as this one ends with Guadalcanal, arguably the turning point of the Pacific War.
--I have since found this edition, a combination of both volumes, and have given the first volume of the other edition away to a Japanese friend for her reactions.
Indeed, he was--even more interesting than I had expected, neither expecting that this book would be so sympathetic to the Japanese perspective nor that Toland's wife was Japanese. No expert, but certainly not unread about the war in the Pacific, I was rather blown away by the presentation, the other books I'd read being very much pro-Allies, anti-Axis.
Among the propositions put to the reader by Toland's text are how Japanese policy was substantially independent of that of the other Axis powers and how the Pacific war might well have been avoided had the U.S. State Department another secretary at the time. Other contentious positions taken by the author include a rather critical portrayal of MacArthur and a rather positive one of Emperor Hirohito. Roosevelt and Ambassador Grew come across well. Rumors that Roosevelt knew beforehand of the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor are discounted.
Most particularly, however, I liked how Toland used, and defined, a number of Japanese terms and expressions, employing this as one means to get at the Japanese mindset, something few in the U.S. government or military understood.
Like the original Tora, Tora motion picture, coproduced by citizens of both countries, or like Clint Eastwood's recent diptych on one battle of the war, this book is unusually balanced and is to be highly recommended.
Now I just have to find the second volume as this one ends with Guadalcanal, arguably the turning point of the Pacific War.
--I have since found this edition, a combination of both volumes, and have given the first volume of the other edition away to a Japanese friend for her reactions.
July 15, 2015
This book explores Japan’s involvement in World War II. It focuses upon the Pacific theater and upon battles, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and finally it explains in detail why it took so long for the Japanese to surrender. All related to the Japanese involvement is covered in detail. It is not hard to follow because it written in a narrative voice projecting the views thoughts and words of those who fought, both Americans and Japanese. What is difficult is the slaughter. Slaughter on both sides, mind you. I felt it was balanced, neither pro-Western nor pro-Eastern.
Keep in mind - that I should be able to read a book from start to finish that so closely follows battle after battle is pretty darn amazing. This is proof that it somehow was able to keep my attention. It was clear even to me, someone who shies away from books focused upon military battles and thus scarcely knows military terms. You follow - in detail - Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, the fall of Singapore, Midway, Guadalcanal, Saipan, the Battles of Leyte Gulf, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima. Other battles too, but those named are covered in great detail. You learn the Pacific Islands.
If you listen to the audiobook you must dig up your own maps, but that is really no problem. It would have been nice if a word or two were added about the location of the particular islands. When it gets to the Battles of Leyte Gulf there are so many islands and so many fleets that I went to Wiki to get the movements on paper!
The reason why you can follow these battles is that the soldiers speak, and joke and talk to the reader. Some change their mind; you follow their thoughts. I did wonder sometimes how in the world the author got this information. This is supposedly non-fiction..... Letters? Survivors' stories afterwards? This is not explained in an afterword or introduction. Maybe the printed book has notes? Harakiri, now this is exemplified many, many times in the text. This is a concept difficult to understand for Westerners. You need umpteen examples of particular individuals and situations to begin to understand the shame coupled with defeat in Eastern mentality. I understand better, but not completely.
I am very glad I chose this book. Well worth the time and effort invested. I personally think it is a book better read on paper than listened to. There are so many names and details to absorb. Maybe you are fluent in Japanese names, but I am not. My audiobook was narrated by Tom Weiner. Even if he does a good job, I would have preferred a snail's pace.
What did I like best? Maybe learning why it took so long for Japan to surrender. What do I think on closing the book? There should be strong controls on the military. Mistakes were made on both sides. On every side and by all parts.
I learned a lot.
One more thing. The author’s wife is Japanese and the book received the Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction in 1971.
Keep in mind - that I should be able to read a book from start to finish that so closely follows battle after battle is pretty darn amazing. This is proof that it somehow was able to keep my attention. It was clear even to me, someone who shies away from books focused upon military battles and thus scarcely knows military terms. You follow - in detail - Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, the fall of Singapore, Midway, Guadalcanal, Saipan, the Battles of Leyte Gulf, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima. Other battles too, but those named are covered in great detail. You learn the Pacific Islands.
If you listen to the audiobook you must dig up your own maps, but that is really no problem. It would have been nice if a word or two were added about the location of the particular islands. When it gets to the Battles of Leyte Gulf there are so many islands and so many fleets that I went to Wiki to get the movements on paper!
The reason why you can follow these battles is that the soldiers speak, and joke and talk to the reader. Some change their mind; you follow their thoughts. I did wonder sometimes how in the world the author got this information. This is supposedly non-fiction..... Letters? Survivors' stories afterwards? This is not explained in an afterword or introduction. Maybe the printed book has notes? Harakiri, now this is exemplified many, many times in the text. This is a concept difficult to understand for Westerners. You need umpteen examples of particular individuals and situations to begin to understand the shame coupled with defeat in Eastern mentality. I understand better, but not completely.
I am very glad I chose this book. Well worth the time and effort invested. I personally think it is a book better read on paper than listened to. There are so many names and details to absorb. Maybe you are fluent in Japanese names, but I am not. My audiobook was narrated by Tom Weiner. Even if he does a good job, I would have preferred a snail's pace.
What did I like best? Maybe learning why it took so long for Japan to surrender. What do I think on closing the book? There should be strong controls on the military. Mistakes were made on both sides. On every side and by all parts.
I learned a lot.
One more thing. The author’s wife is Japanese and the book received the Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction in 1971.
May 12, 2020
4 Stars. This is probably one of the best one volume history of the Pacific war that I have read. It doesn't make the mistake of beginning with Japan's war with the West but starts with the positioning before the Marco Polo bridge incident. It mixes the military campaigns and battles with the politics at home. This includes detailed accounts of the political and military manoeuvring of the Japanese leaders with the Prime Minister and the Emperor. There is a lot of depth here which continues woven through the narrative of the war right up to the surrender of Japan.
This is balanced with the view from the Allies, albeit in less detail. This is heavily slanted toward US participation which is understandable but also covers the UK, Australia and New Zealand. The Soviet Union is also covered here in both the political and espionage aspects as well as the history of the countries interaction pre-WW2 right through to the end game when the Soviets attacked.
The atomic bomb attack descriptions are terrifying and captivating. Following Toland's use of first person accounts I felt empathy for the people at ground zero and yes he made them feel like people, not statistics. The contrast between the survivors matter of fact sounding descriptions and the horror of what they went through was confronting.
At times it was frustrating when I wanted more detail but remembering this is a 1 volume history I realised I wasn't being fair. This perspective change will always be an issue when you have read detailed accounts of campaigns and are re-approaching it from a broader perspective. I just had to adjust my point of view.
This is balanced with the view from the Allies, albeit in less detail. This is heavily slanted toward US participation which is understandable but also covers the UK, Australia and New Zealand. The Soviet Union is also covered here in both the political and espionage aspects as well as the history of the countries interaction pre-WW2 right through to the end game when the Soviets attacked.
The atomic bomb attack descriptions are terrifying and captivating. Following Toland's use of first person accounts I felt empathy for the people at ground zero and yes he made them feel like people, not statistics. The contrast between the survivors matter of fact sounding descriptions and the horror of what they went through was confronting.
At times it was frustrating when I wanted more detail but remembering this is a 1 volume history I realised I wasn't being fair. This perspective change will always be an issue when you have read detailed accounts of campaigns and are re-approaching it from a broader perspective. I just had to adjust my point of view.
December 27, 2020
Mammoth history of Japan's involvement in the Second World War. Toland seeks to emulate the sweep, if not the editorial tone of Shirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, mixing high-level cabinet deliberations and diplomacy with military strategy and the on-the-ground experience of Japanese soldiers and sailors. Toland's portrait shows a Japanese leadership eager to exploit China but agonizing over their decision to attack America and Britain, the division among Japan's military and political leadership, and their wholehearted commitment once war's actually declared. Toland relishes details, from the importance of mistranslation in deteriorating diplomatic relations, to the slang and attitudes of Japanese troops. Because of its scope, the book's somewhat spotty on certain subjects: the Sino-Japanese War's barely touched on, while the Anglo-Chinese campaign in Burma's reduced to a brief chapter. There's a long section on the founding of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and its popularity among pan-Asians, but no follow up on the movement's dissolving as Japan's brutality became evident. For that matter, Japanese atrocities are heavily downplayed, reduced to a sentence or two amidst detailed, multipage battle accounts. If Toland seems overly sympathetic to Japanese aspirations, he deserves credit at least for his comprehensive, multilayered approach.
January 28, 2016
I generally avoid histories of WWII. I enjoy history immensely but between Hollywood, the History Channel, and the vast array of fictions and histories this war has been done to death. I would guess the reason for this is that it is still in our living memories, it was the last war with a clear line between good and evil, and because it was readily captured by contemporary visual media and preserved for us to see everyday. Having said that I still occasionally pick-up a WWII history if it has something that piques my interest. The last WWII book to really do that for me was James Bradley's "Flyboys" which I thought was the fairest treatment of the war in the Pacific I had read up until now. I found this book, a Pulitzer Prize winner of some time ago, thanks to reading a review by another GR friend (thanks Matt). The POV of the book is what caught my interest. It is written primarily from the Japanese side of the war. After reading Bradley's book I became aware for the first time that there was another side to WWII that I had never heard or read about and it was a legitimate point of view. This book promised to increase my knowledge of that aspect of the war so I ordered a copy (thanks Amazon). Unfortunately, I was not aware of the size of this tome and I do mean tome. It is just short of 1,000 pages, 877 pages of text and then about another 100 pages of notes, bibliography, sources, and index. To put it mildly this is not a book that is easy to get physically comfortable with. I wish the author and publisher had considered publishing it in more than one volume just for the sake of old bones. It also obviously will take a commitment to finish a book of this length but I can't imagine anybody seriously interested in the history of WWII not reading this book. It expands my understanding of the Japanese culture of that time and the psychology of their people and their military. The book also explains the Japanese motivations for beginning the war. This was something that had been hinted at in Bradley's book but was really explored in detail in this book. What really struck me was the aspect of WWII as it affected the native populations in the countries where the war was fought. I was never aware of the undercurrent of hostility of the native populations for the white colonial governments and military. That the Japanese entered this war carrying the banner of unity and freedom for Asians and the overthrow of the European overlords was very surprising. As a boy growing up in the 50's I remember the dismantling of the British Empire and how our world maps seemed to change every year when another country had gained independence. I also recall reading about the European double cross of the people of the Middle East after WWI and now was reading that the Asians weren't going to let this happen to them. The Asians were really caught in the middle with a choice between the Europeans that treated them with disdain or going with the Japanese who probably weren't going to be much better and maybe worse. Fortunately, they, for the most part, opted to back the Allies but they expected to be paid back after the war and that is the subject of another book that I may have to look for. It would appear, however, that what took place in the world during the 50's and early 60's was the result of an antiquated colonial system and outright racism in which the U.S. was a fully participating actor. That President Truman rejected the idea of independence for Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Viet Nam in favor of restoring French colonial rule came back to bite both France and the U.S. in the figurative ass. Another thing that strikes me about what I have read is how avoidable this war was. Of course that isn't really a fair judgment since I am using hindsight. But like almost all wars, including those we are fighting today, they are usually the result of cultural ignorance and an inability to view things from the other side. The Japanese under estimated the people of the U.S. and the U.S. under estimated the Japanese and probably all Asian peoples. This book is a must read for any student of history or any reader that enjoys reading about WWII. What I would love to now discover is that this author has written a book following the aftermath of this war in the Pacific and what transpired in Asia. Some us old enough know what happened as we lived through it but knowing why things happened as they did would be enlightening. I guess I'll have to explore GR and Amazon to see if this book or one like it exists.
January 6, 2016
This is the third big book on the Pacific War I have read recently. Ian Toll's first two books (of a planned trilogy), Pacific Crucible and The Conquering Tide, were a magnificent historical account of the war from both sides. So given that this book covers much the same ground, though it was written much earlier, I will do a lot of comparing with Toll's books, though I think Toland's book is equally good and you will not find it at all repetitive to read both authors.
As thick as this book is, it's only one volume, whereas Ian Toll is writing three whole volumes on the entire war in the Pacific. Thus, while Toll devotes a great deal of attention to the politics and individual political and military leaders on both sides of the conflict, The Rising Sun, as its title indicates, focuses mostly on Japan. Naturally the planning and personalities on the American and British (and later Chinese and Soviet) sides are mentioned, but mostly only inasmuch as they were pitted against their Japanese counterparts.
One of the things most striking about Toland's narrative is that he lays out all the blunders that were made by both Japan before, during, and after the war. These margins where the errors occurred and where history could have been changed are one of the things I find most interesting in non-fiction histories, when competently examined. Let's start with whether or not war was inevitable.
Did we have to go to war with Japan?
The basic historical facts are well understood: the Japanese wanted a colonial empire, and Europe and the US didn't want them to have one. When the Japanese invaded China, the US put an oil embargo on them. This would inevitably strangle the Japanese economy, as for all its rising technical prowess, Japan remained a tiny resource-impoverished island. So the Japanese pretty much had no choice but to give up their ambitions or go to war. We know which one they chose.
The question for historians is whether or not this could have been averted.
Ian Toll seems to think that war was inevitable - the Japanese and the West simply had irreconcilable designs. But John Toland seems to, not exactly argue, but present a great deal of evidence, that miscommunication and misfortune had as much to do with Japan and the US being put on a collision course as intransigence. Of course Japan was never going to give up their desire to be a world-class power, which means there was no way they would have accepted the restrictions imposed on them forbidding them fleets or territory on a par with the West. Whether the West could have been persuaded to let Japan take what it saw as its rightful place at the grown-ups table is debatable. But in the first few chapters of The Rising Sun, John Toland describes all the negotiating that went on between Japanese and American diplomats. The Japanese were split into factions, just as the Americans were. Some wanted peace no matter what; some were hankering to go to war and really believed their jingoistic propaganda that the spiritual essence of the Japanese people would overcome any enemy. But most Japanese leaders, from the Imperial Palace to the Army and Navy, were more realistic and knew that a war with the US would be, at best, a very difficult one. So there were many frantic talks, including backchannel negotiations among peacemakers on both sides when it became apparent that Secretary of State Henry Stimson and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo were not going to deescalate.
There were a number of tragedies in this situation. Sometimes the precise wording of some of the phrases used in Japanese or American proposals and counter-proposals were mistranslated, resulting in their being interpreted as more inflexible, or disingenuous, than they were intended, causing both sides to mistrust the other. Sometimes communications arrived late. There was also a lot of particularly labyrinthine political maneuvering on the Japanese side, where political assassinations were commonplace at that time and the position of the Emperor was always ambiguous. Toland apparently interviewed a very large number of people and read first-hand accounts and so is able to reconstruct many individual talks, even with the Emperor himself, putting the reader in the Imperial throneroom as Hirohito consults with his ministers, and then in telegraph offices where communiques are sent from embassies back to Washington.
Toland doesn't definitively state that war could have been avoided, because it's still not clear what mutually agreeable concessions might have been made by either side, but what is clear is that both Japan and the US could see that war was looming and neither side really wanted it. At least initially, everyone except a few warmongers in the Japanese military did everything they could to avoid it.
Unfortunately, diplomatic efforts were for naught, and the Emperor was eventually persuaded to give his blessing to declare war.
Admiral Yamamoto knew very well that Japan had no hope of winning a prolonged war, which was why when war happened and he was put in charge of the Japanese fleet, he planned what he hoped would be quick, devastating knock-out punches - Pearl Harbor and Midway - that would sink the US back on its heels and persuade the Americans to negotiate an honorable peace before things went too far.
This was unlikely after Pearl Harbor. Nobody on the Japanese side seemed to realize just how pissed off America would be by this surprise attack (though the unintentionally late formal declaration of war - delivered hours after the attack when it was supposed to have been delivered just prior - certainly didn't help). But it was a forlorn hope after the debacle at Midway in which, aided by superior intelligence from broken Japanese codes, the US fleet sank four Japanese carriers. Many military historians grade Yamamoto poorly for this badly-executed offensive, which rather than delivering a knockout punch to the US fleet, proved true his prophecy that "The Americans can lose many battles - we have to win every single one."
The bulk of the book covers the war itself, including all the familiar names like Guam, Guadalcanal, Wake Island, Corregidor, Saipan, Okinawa, Iwo Jima. Toland does not neglect the British defense of India, the tragic fate of Force Z, which blundered on ahead to its doom despite lack of air cover and thus heralded in the new reality that air power ruled above all, and the multi-sided war in China in which communists and nationalists were alternately fighting each other and the Japanese, with both sides being courted by the Allies. Any military history will cover the battles, but Toland describes them vividly, especially the first-hand accounts from the men in them - the misery and terror, and also the atrocities, like the Bataan Death March, and the miserable conditions of POWs taken back to Japan
One of the things evident in many of these battles was just how much is a roll of the dice. Human error, weather, malfunctioning equipment, pure luck, over and over snatched defeat from the jaws of victory or vice versa. Inevitably, the US had to win - they simply had more men, more equipment, more resources. The Japanese began going hungry almost as soon as the war began, while the Allies, initially kicked all over the Pacific because they were caught off-guard, began pouring men and ships and, often most importantly (!), food - well-fed troops - into the theater. Still, individual battles often turned on whether or not a particular ship was spotted or whether torpedoes hit. Luck seemed to favor the Americans more often than not, but I found Toland's descriptions particularly informative in recounting how little details about equipment, and the human factor - decisions made by individual commanders, and how the willingness to take risks or an unwillingness to change one's mind - often determined the outcome of a fight.
Who were the war criminals?
Two of the other big questions I find most interesting about World War II are the ones that will probably never be answered satisfactorily.
First: was Emperor Hirohito a war criminal?
I was in college in 1989 when Emperor Hirohito (more properly known as the Showa Emperor) died. I had a friend who was a Japanese exchange student. She was grief-stricken. All of Japan mourned.
There is a particular narrative I heard growing up. It is one that was pushed heavily by the Japanese from approximately the moment the decision was made to surrender until about the time Hirohito died. According to this version of history, Hirohito was a figurehead, a puppet of Japanese military leaders. He had no real decision-making power, and any active resistance on his part would have led to his being killed. Thus, he was not responsible for the war or any of Japan's war crimes; he was an innocent, born to assume a hereditary throne and assume a position of purely symbolic importance.
I was a little shocked when I read an article in some British tabloid denouncing Hirohito upon his death and cheering that the "war criminal" was now in hell.
Yet while neither view is strictly accurate, it is certainly more complicated than the sanitized version that was accepted for so long. This sanitized version was in fact produced in part by the US, particularly Douglas MacArthur, from the moment the war ended, as a deliberate strategy to secure faster Japanese cooperation and reconciliation. It was predicted that trying Hirohito as a war criminal - as about one-third of the American public wanted to do at the time - would have resulted in widespread guerrilla warfare and the need for a much longer and more active occupation of the Japanese homeland. When the Japanese finally began negotiating terms of surrender, one of the sticking points, the one thing they tried to carve out of the demand for an "unconditional" surrender, was that the Emperor would retain his status (and, by implication, not be charged with war crimes).
So, how active was Hirohito in the war planning? According to Toland, he was very much involved from the beginning, and had far more than symbolic influence over his cabinet, ministers, and military. Could he have simply forestalled a war by telling them not to go to war? Maybe. While political assassination was common, it seems unlikely that anyone would have dared laying a hand on His Majesty himself. And according to the cabinet meetings and private conferences Toland describes, even the most zealous Japanese leaders felt unable to proceed without getting a final say-so from the Emperor. So if Hirohito had been resolutely against a war, it seems likely that the militarists would have had a much harder time getting one.
At the same time, Hirohito was in many ways bound by his position. Traditionally, the Emperor did not make policy, he simply approved it. He wasn't supposed to veto anything or offer his opinion, he was just supposed to bless the decisions that had already been made. Hirohito, especially later in the war, departed from this tradition more than once, shocking his advisors by taking an active role or asking questions during ceremonies that were supposed to be mere formalities.
Personally, he seemed to be a rather quiet, studious man who would have been much happier as a scholarly sovereign and not the Emperor of an expansionist empire. He possessed a genuine, if abstract, concern for the Japanese people, and this motivated him later to accept surrender and even put himself in the hands of the Allies, whatever they might decide to do with him.
Almost certainly, he also had no direct knowledge of Japanese atrocities. So, Hirohito was no Hitler. Still, neither was he the uninvolved innocent that it became politically expedient to portray him as after the war.
Hideki Tojo, on the other hand, the Minister of War and Prime Minister, who was tried and executed as a war criminal, probably deserved it. Initially lukewarm about going to war with the US, he became a zealous prosecutor of the war, as well as an increasingly megalomaniacal one who seized more and more authority for himself, quashed all dissent, and most damningly, towards the end, when most Japanese leaders were seeing reality and talking about terms of surrender, was one of the hold-outs who insisted Japan should fight to the end. Along with a few other generals who were willing to see Japanese civilians take up bamboo spears and die by the millions fighting off an Allied invasion, Tojo deliberately prolonged the fighting well after it was obvious to all that Japan was finished. I think it is not unfair to say that he caused hundreds of thousands of needless deaths on both sides.
Did we have to drop the bomb?
Toland spends only a little time, in the last few chapters, talking about Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the decision leading up to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan. This is another very loaded historical question in which there are people with strong opinions on both sides. Some have argued that the US didn't need to use the bomb - Japan was already negotiating surrender - and that we did for reasons ranging from racism to a desire to demonstrate them as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. Others claim that Japan was fully willing to fight to the last spear-carrying civilian, and that the atomic bombs saved millions of lives on both sides by preventing the need for an invasion.
Entire books have been written about this subject, and Toland, as I said, does not try to dig into it too deeply, but he does represent much of what the Americans and Japanese were thinking and saying at the time. The case he presents would suggest that the truth, unsurprisingly, is somewhere in between.
Yes, the Japanese knew they were going to have to surrender and were already trying to negotiate an "honorable peace." But it's not at all clear that it was the dropping of atomic bombs (I was surprised to learn the Japanese actually knew what they were, and indeed, Japan had already started its own nuclear program, though it hadn't gotten very far) that convinced the holdouts to agree to an unconditional surrender. At the time, the atomic bombs did not seem all that impressive to them - they were already willing to endure horrific casualties, and the firebombing of Tokyo had killed many more people than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was more likely the declaration of war by the Soviet Union, when Japan had been hoping the Russians would help them negotiate peace, that was the deciding factor. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki just drove home their inevitable defeat.
Could we have gotten an unconditional surrender when we did without the atomic bombs? We will probably never know. But only a few people at the time really appreciated what new era had been ushered in. Harry Truman, interestingly, said afterwards, and continued to say, that he gave very little thought to the decision to use the bombs, and felt no moral angst about it. Indeed, two more bombs were being prepared for use when the Japanese finally did surrender.
If you want one volume that covers the entire span of the war against Japan, I think this monumental work by John Toland leaves very little out, and I highly recommend it to WWII historians. However, I also encourage interested readers to then seek out the more recent works by Ian Toll, who devotes more pages to the American commanders as well, and talks about some of the political issues among the Allies that Toland treats more briefly, as well as going into even more detail about individual battles.
As thick as this book is, it's only one volume, whereas Ian Toll is writing three whole volumes on the entire war in the Pacific. Thus, while Toll devotes a great deal of attention to the politics and individual political and military leaders on both sides of the conflict, The Rising Sun, as its title indicates, focuses mostly on Japan. Naturally the planning and personalities on the American and British (and later Chinese and Soviet) sides are mentioned, but mostly only inasmuch as they were pitted against their Japanese counterparts.
One of the things most striking about Toland's narrative is that he lays out all the blunders that were made by both Japan before, during, and after the war. These margins where the errors occurred and where history could have been changed are one of the things I find most interesting in non-fiction histories, when competently examined. Let's start with whether or not war was inevitable.
Did we have to go to war with Japan?
The basic historical facts are well understood: the Japanese wanted a colonial empire, and Europe and the US didn't want them to have one. When the Japanese invaded China, the US put an oil embargo on them. This would inevitably strangle the Japanese economy, as for all its rising technical prowess, Japan remained a tiny resource-impoverished island. So the Japanese pretty much had no choice but to give up their ambitions or go to war. We know which one they chose.
The question for historians is whether or not this could have been averted.
Ian Toll seems to think that war was inevitable - the Japanese and the West simply had irreconcilable designs. But John Toland seems to, not exactly argue, but present a great deal of evidence, that miscommunication and misfortune had as much to do with Japan and the US being put on a collision course as intransigence. Of course Japan was never going to give up their desire to be a world-class power, which means there was no way they would have accepted the restrictions imposed on them forbidding them fleets or territory on a par with the West. Whether the West could have been persuaded to let Japan take what it saw as its rightful place at the grown-ups table is debatable. But in the first few chapters of The Rising Sun, John Toland describes all the negotiating that went on between Japanese and American diplomats. The Japanese were split into factions, just as the Americans were. Some wanted peace no matter what; some were hankering to go to war and really believed their jingoistic propaganda that the spiritual essence of the Japanese people would overcome any enemy. But most Japanese leaders, from the Imperial Palace to the Army and Navy, were more realistic and knew that a war with the US would be, at best, a very difficult one. So there were many frantic talks, including backchannel negotiations among peacemakers on both sides when it became apparent that Secretary of State Henry Stimson and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo were not going to deescalate.
There were a number of tragedies in this situation. Sometimes the precise wording of some of the phrases used in Japanese or American proposals and counter-proposals were mistranslated, resulting in their being interpreted as more inflexible, or disingenuous, than they were intended, causing both sides to mistrust the other. Sometimes communications arrived late. There was also a lot of particularly labyrinthine political maneuvering on the Japanese side, where political assassinations were commonplace at that time and the position of the Emperor was always ambiguous. Toland apparently interviewed a very large number of people and read first-hand accounts and so is able to reconstruct many individual talks, even with the Emperor himself, putting the reader in the Imperial throneroom as Hirohito consults with his ministers, and then in telegraph offices where communiques are sent from embassies back to Washington.
Toland doesn't definitively state that war could have been avoided, because it's still not clear what mutually agreeable concessions might have been made by either side, but what is clear is that both Japan and the US could see that war was looming and neither side really wanted it. At least initially, everyone except a few warmongers in the Japanese military did everything they could to avoid it.
Unfortunately, diplomatic efforts were for naught, and the Emperor was eventually persuaded to give his blessing to declare war.
Admiral Yamamoto knew very well that Japan had no hope of winning a prolonged war, which was why when war happened and he was put in charge of the Japanese fleet, he planned what he hoped would be quick, devastating knock-out punches - Pearl Harbor and Midway - that would sink the US back on its heels and persuade the Americans to negotiate an honorable peace before things went too far.
This was unlikely after Pearl Harbor. Nobody on the Japanese side seemed to realize just how pissed off America would be by this surprise attack (though the unintentionally late formal declaration of war - delivered hours after the attack when it was supposed to have been delivered just prior - certainly didn't help). But it was a forlorn hope after the debacle at Midway in which, aided by superior intelligence from broken Japanese codes, the US fleet sank four Japanese carriers. Many military historians grade Yamamoto poorly for this badly-executed offensive, which rather than delivering a knockout punch to the US fleet, proved true his prophecy that "The Americans can lose many battles - we have to win every single one."
The bulk of the book covers the war itself, including all the familiar names like Guam, Guadalcanal, Wake Island, Corregidor, Saipan, Okinawa, Iwo Jima. Toland does not neglect the British defense of India, the tragic fate of Force Z, which blundered on ahead to its doom despite lack of air cover and thus heralded in the new reality that air power ruled above all, and the multi-sided war in China in which communists and nationalists were alternately fighting each other and the Japanese, with both sides being courted by the Allies. Any military history will cover the battles, but Toland describes them vividly, especially the first-hand accounts from the men in them - the misery and terror, and also the atrocities, like the Bataan Death March, and the miserable conditions of POWs taken back to Japan
One of the things evident in many of these battles was just how much is a roll of the dice. Human error, weather, malfunctioning equipment, pure luck, over and over snatched defeat from the jaws of victory or vice versa. Inevitably, the US had to win - they simply had more men, more equipment, more resources. The Japanese began going hungry almost as soon as the war began, while the Allies, initially kicked all over the Pacific because they were caught off-guard, began pouring men and ships and, often most importantly (!), food - well-fed troops - into the theater. Still, individual battles often turned on whether or not a particular ship was spotted or whether torpedoes hit. Luck seemed to favor the Americans more often than not, but I found Toland's descriptions particularly informative in recounting how little details about equipment, and the human factor - decisions made by individual commanders, and how the willingness to take risks or an unwillingness to change one's mind - often determined the outcome of a fight.
Who were the war criminals?
Two of the other big questions I find most interesting about World War II are the ones that will probably never be answered satisfactorily.
First: was Emperor Hirohito a war criminal?
I was in college in 1989 when Emperor Hirohito (more properly known as the Showa Emperor) died. I had a friend who was a Japanese exchange student. She was grief-stricken. All of Japan mourned.
There is a particular narrative I heard growing up. It is one that was pushed heavily by the Japanese from approximately the moment the decision was made to surrender until about the time Hirohito died. According to this version of history, Hirohito was a figurehead, a puppet of Japanese military leaders. He had no real decision-making power, and any active resistance on his part would have led to his being killed. Thus, he was not responsible for the war or any of Japan's war crimes; he was an innocent, born to assume a hereditary throne and assume a position of purely symbolic importance.
I was a little shocked when I read an article in some British tabloid denouncing Hirohito upon his death and cheering that the "war criminal" was now in hell.
Yet while neither view is strictly accurate, it is certainly more complicated than the sanitized version that was accepted for so long. This sanitized version was in fact produced in part by the US, particularly Douglas MacArthur, from the moment the war ended, as a deliberate strategy to secure faster Japanese cooperation and reconciliation. It was predicted that trying Hirohito as a war criminal - as about one-third of the American public wanted to do at the time - would have resulted in widespread guerrilla warfare and the need for a much longer and more active occupation of the Japanese homeland. When the Japanese finally began negotiating terms of surrender, one of the sticking points, the one thing they tried to carve out of the demand for an "unconditional" surrender, was that the Emperor would retain his status (and, by implication, not be charged with war crimes).
So, how active was Hirohito in the war planning? According to Toland, he was very much involved from the beginning, and had far more than symbolic influence over his cabinet, ministers, and military. Could he have simply forestalled a war by telling them not to go to war? Maybe. While political assassination was common, it seems unlikely that anyone would have dared laying a hand on His Majesty himself. And according to the cabinet meetings and private conferences Toland describes, even the most zealous Japanese leaders felt unable to proceed without getting a final say-so from the Emperor. So if Hirohito had been resolutely against a war, it seems likely that the militarists would have had a much harder time getting one.
At the same time, Hirohito was in many ways bound by his position. Traditionally, the Emperor did not make policy, he simply approved it. He wasn't supposed to veto anything or offer his opinion, he was just supposed to bless the decisions that had already been made. Hirohito, especially later in the war, departed from this tradition more than once, shocking his advisors by taking an active role or asking questions during ceremonies that were supposed to be mere formalities.
Personally, he seemed to be a rather quiet, studious man who would have been much happier as a scholarly sovereign and not the Emperor of an expansionist empire. He possessed a genuine, if abstract, concern for the Japanese people, and this motivated him later to accept surrender and even put himself in the hands of the Allies, whatever they might decide to do with him.
Almost certainly, he also had no direct knowledge of Japanese atrocities. So, Hirohito was no Hitler. Still, neither was he the uninvolved innocent that it became politically expedient to portray him as after the war.
Hideki Tojo, on the other hand, the Minister of War and Prime Minister, who was tried and executed as a war criminal, probably deserved it. Initially lukewarm about going to war with the US, he became a zealous prosecutor of the war, as well as an increasingly megalomaniacal one who seized more and more authority for himself, quashed all dissent, and most damningly, towards the end, when most Japanese leaders were seeing reality and talking about terms of surrender, was one of the hold-outs who insisted Japan should fight to the end. Along with a few other generals who were willing to see Japanese civilians take up bamboo spears and die by the millions fighting off an Allied invasion, Tojo deliberately prolonged the fighting well after it was obvious to all that Japan was finished. I think it is not unfair to say that he caused hundreds of thousands of needless deaths on both sides.
Did we have to drop the bomb?
Toland spends only a little time, in the last few chapters, talking about Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the decision leading up to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan. This is another very loaded historical question in which there are people with strong opinions on both sides. Some have argued that the US didn't need to use the bomb - Japan was already negotiating surrender - and that we did for reasons ranging from racism to a desire to demonstrate them as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. Others claim that Japan was fully willing to fight to the last spear-carrying civilian, and that the atomic bombs saved millions of lives on both sides by preventing the need for an invasion.
Entire books have been written about this subject, and Toland, as I said, does not try to dig into it too deeply, but he does represent much of what the Americans and Japanese were thinking and saying at the time. The case he presents would suggest that the truth, unsurprisingly, is somewhere in between.
Yes, the Japanese knew they were going to have to surrender and were already trying to negotiate an "honorable peace." But it's not at all clear that it was the dropping of atomic bombs (I was surprised to learn the Japanese actually knew what they were, and indeed, Japan had already started its own nuclear program, though it hadn't gotten very far) that convinced the holdouts to agree to an unconditional surrender. At the time, the atomic bombs did not seem all that impressive to them - they were already willing to endure horrific casualties, and the firebombing of Tokyo had killed many more people than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was more likely the declaration of war by the Soviet Union, when Japan had been hoping the Russians would help them negotiate peace, that was the deciding factor. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki just drove home their inevitable defeat.
Could we have gotten an unconditional surrender when we did without the atomic bombs? We will probably never know. But only a few people at the time really appreciated what new era had been ushered in. Harry Truman, interestingly, said afterwards, and continued to say, that he gave very little thought to the decision to use the bombs, and felt no moral angst about it. Indeed, two more bombs were being prepared for use when the Japanese finally did surrender.
If you want one volume that covers the entire span of the war against Japan, I think this monumental work by John Toland leaves very little out, and I highly recommend it to WWII historians. However, I also encourage interested readers to then seek out the more recent works by Ian Toll, who devotes more pages to the American commanders as well, and talks about some of the political issues among the Allies that Toland treats more briefly, as well as going into even more detail about individual battles.
January 29, 2016
Winner of the 1971 Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction, this book covers the War in the Pacific from a Japanese perspective. Extensive, well researched and readable, covering the timeframe from the invasion of Manchuria and China to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
After the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, the book starts of with the efforts of the American ambassador and the Foreign Minister of Japan to try to prevent war due to the boycot that the Western powers have established. It is painful to see read how the good intentions are hampered by ignorance, impatience and indignation on the American side and militairy extremism on the Japanese side. Inevetibly, this flows into the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbour and the consequent campaign.
What struck me was the underestimation of the Japanese of the Western powers, the wishful thinking of the generals and admirals. Seeking the decisive battle it happened time and time again that the Japanese thought they had destroyed the enemy fleets and their carriers, only to find them still active after each battle. After Midway, Japan was doomed but it seemed not to be realised by the Japanese Army and Navy.
The book quotes several eye witness accounts of Japanese soldiers, mainly focussing on the battle of Guadalcanal, Okinawa and the Philippines. Other than the title might suggest, this is not a study of the fall and decline of the Japanese empire, but a war account. For example the American successes against the Japanese merchant fleet is only sparsely mentioned, while in my eyes this was one of the deciding factors.
For someone who needs a good introduction for the War in the Pacific, this is a good introduction and highly reccomended. For someone already well known with the aspects of the Pacific War, this book may have requirend some more depth.
Let me finish with a quote by Japanese general Kawabe, after he witnessed the respect the Americans showed him after the Japanese defeat:
"If human beings were to sincerely exercise justice and humanity in their relations with one another, the horrors of war in all likelihood could be avoided, and even if a war unfortunately broke out, the victor would not become arrogant and the suffering of the losers would be alleviated immediately. A truly great cultural nation in the first requisite."
3,5 stars.
After the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, the book starts of with the efforts of the American ambassador and the Foreign Minister of Japan to try to prevent war due to the boycot that the Western powers have established. It is painful to see read how the good intentions are hampered by ignorance, impatience and indignation on the American side and militairy extremism on the Japanese side. Inevetibly, this flows into the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbour and the consequent campaign.
What struck me was the underestimation of the Japanese of the Western powers, the wishful thinking of the generals and admirals. Seeking the decisive battle it happened time and time again that the Japanese thought they had destroyed the enemy fleets and their carriers, only to find them still active after each battle. After Midway, Japan was doomed but it seemed not to be realised by the Japanese Army and Navy.
The book quotes several eye witness accounts of Japanese soldiers, mainly focussing on the battle of Guadalcanal, Okinawa and the Philippines. Other than the title might suggest, this is not a study of the fall and decline of the Japanese empire, but a war account. For example the American successes against the Japanese merchant fleet is only sparsely mentioned, while in my eyes this was one of the deciding factors.
For someone who needs a good introduction for the War in the Pacific, this is a good introduction and highly reccomended. For someone already well known with the aspects of the Pacific War, this book may have requirend some more depth.
Let me finish with a quote by Japanese general Kawabe, after he witnessed the respect the Americans showed him after the Japanese defeat:
"If human beings were to sincerely exercise justice and humanity in their relations with one another, the horrors of war in all likelihood could be avoided, and even if a war unfortunately broke out, the victor would not become arrogant and the suffering of the losers would be alleviated immediately. A truly great cultural nation in the first requisite."
3,5 stars.
June 9, 2015
With a Nobel prize winning book, John Toland accomplishes telling the Japanese side of WWII.
The 1930’s were an interesting time in Asia. Japan had an exploding population and no natural resources. They also had a very dangerous enemy in Communist Soviet Union threatening her. Japan’s solution laid in Northern China’s Manchuria. They occupied Manchuria easily because China was too weak to defend it. Japanese business moved in and Japanese populated it. Manchuria provided a number of benefits to Japan. They included not only a territory to expand into but also had some natural resources. More importantly, however, it was a buffer between the Soviet Union and Japan itself. China’s fear of further Japanese aggression led their weak governmental military forces to combine with (the government’s inner-enemy) the Chinese Communist forces in a joint effort against Japan.
Soon menacing Chinese forces fired on the Japanese at the Marco Polo Bridge. Japan retaliated thrashing the Chinese forces and occupying vast Chinese territory including Nanking. However, some poorly disciplined Japanese soldiers, unbeknown to their Commander General Jwane Mastui, raped, murdered and massacred as many as 300,000 Chinese civilians.
With this background the book gives us a good detail of the history of American/Japanese relations. They began in 1853 when Mathew Perry’s ships pulled into Tokyo Bay with a letter from President Milliard Fillmore asking Japan to open its doors to American goods. Good relations continued with America’s support for Japan in the Russo Japanese War. American Investment Bank Kuhn, Loeb and Co. financed much of the war for Japan. And in 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace prize for brokering the end of the Russo Japanese War. Also, in doing so saved Japan from economic collapse. However, the Japanese people were never told by their government of their pending economic collapse (due to the cost of the war) so they correspondingly held the U.S. accountable because the war was stopped while Japan was clearly winning.
Now back to the story. Japan had taken control of Northern China (Manchuria) and Vietnam where she had a place to populate her growing citizenry. As a result, America instituted restricting exports to Japan. Oil was the main restricted export. In fact, Japan received 100% of its oil from the U.S.A. Without oil Japan could not maintain its expanding territory. Japan had also partnered with Germany and Italy because she feared an Anglo Saxon takeover of the World by America and England. She also correctly held the view that the West held her to a double standard specifically because of her race. What Japan meant was that England had colonies in the Caribbean, Central America and elsewhere. America had taken Texas and California from Mexico as well as annexing Hawaii and the Philippines. Yet, Japan had no right to expand.
Japan had intensively prepared for the Pearl Harbor attack. They also tried to avoid attacking America through diplomacy. However, combinations of forces worked against a diplomatic solution. First, FDR’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull did not trust the Japanese. Second, America’s friendship with England and Japan’s alliance with Germany did not bode well for the Japanese. England had already been at war with Germany at the time of Japan’s attempted diplomacy. Third, Japanese atrocities committed against the Chinese provided a less sympathetic American government. Fourth, bad translations of messages turned sincere attempts at reconciliation into belligerently viewed intelligence.
In addition, Japan had been running out of oil, so the longer they waited for a diplomatic solution the more dire their situation got.
With those conditions, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was very successful from their point of view. They had killed 2403 Americans, sunk 18 ships and destroyed 188 planes.
When Winston Churchill found out, he immediately called President Roosevelt. When the President confirmed Winston hung up went to bed and had a good night sleep. America was now in the war, England was now saved.
The war in the Pacific did not start out well for the Allies (America and England). First, the Japanese stunned the English with a victory at the Battle of Singapore. In 7 days Japan inflicted upon England their largest surrender in their very active military history. That followed with a Japanese Sea victory at Java, an island south of Borneo.
The Allies luck changed with the Battle of Midland. The Allies learned of the coming Japanese attack and planned a brilliant counter by surprising Japan with a bombing raid on Japan’s homeland. This was planned and implemented by James Doolittle. This attack shook Japan’s air of invincibility. The Allies triumphant victory followed.
As the war went on America saw more victories. Long lasting military heroes such as Douglass MacArthur, Bull Halsey and Chester Nimitz emerged as a result. Mr. Toland vividly describes the atrocities of all of the major battles with spine chilling accuracy. The fact that the Japanese belief that surrender was worse than death was something that only made their state worse. Mr. Toland describes the compassion American soldiers had on Japanese prisoners of war. Feeding, nursing and treating their captives with respect were the typical American prison camp norms.
When America developed the Atomic bomb, it was calculated that using it would end the war and save thousands of lives. However, leaflets dropped on Japan about the dire consequences that America’s new weapon would bring were ignored. And still, after the A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima they refused to surrender. The second bomb dropped on Nagasaki would finally and reluctantly convince Japan to capitulate.
At the surrender ceremony MacArthur gave an absolutely brilliant speech which left the Japanese newspaper Nippon Times to say “a new Japan which will vindicate our pride by winning the respect of the world.”
The 1930’s were an interesting time in Asia. Japan had an exploding population and no natural resources. They also had a very dangerous enemy in Communist Soviet Union threatening her. Japan’s solution laid in Northern China’s Manchuria. They occupied Manchuria easily because China was too weak to defend it. Japanese business moved in and Japanese populated it. Manchuria provided a number of benefits to Japan. They included not only a territory to expand into but also had some natural resources. More importantly, however, it was a buffer between the Soviet Union and Japan itself. China’s fear of further Japanese aggression led their weak governmental military forces to combine with (the government’s inner-enemy) the Chinese Communist forces in a joint effort against Japan.
Soon menacing Chinese forces fired on the Japanese at the Marco Polo Bridge. Japan retaliated thrashing the Chinese forces and occupying vast Chinese territory including Nanking. However, some poorly disciplined Japanese soldiers, unbeknown to their Commander General Jwane Mastui, raped, murdered and massacred as many as 300,000 Chinese civilians.
With this background the book gives us a good detail of the history of American/Japanese relations. They began in 1853 when Mathew Perry’s ships pulled into Tokyo Bay with a letter from President Milliard Fillmore asking Japan to open its doors to American goods. Good relations continued with America’s support for Japan in the Russo Japanese War. American Investment Bank Kuhn, Loeb and Co. financed much of the war for Japan. And in 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace prize for brokering the end of the Russo Japanese War. Also, in doing so saved Japan from economic collapse. However, the Japanese people were never told by their government of their pending economic collapse (due to the cost of the war) so they correspondingly held the U.S. accountable because the war was stopped while Japan was clearly winning.
Now back to the story. Japan had taken control of Northern China (Manchuria) and Vietnam where she had a place to populate her growing citizenry. As a result, America instituted restricting exports to Japan. Oil was the main restricted export. In fact, Japan received 100% of its oil from the U.S.A. Without oil Japan could not maintain its expanding territory. Japan had also partnered with Germany and Italy because she feared an Anglo Saxon takeover of the World by America and England. She also correctly held the view that the West held her to a double standard specifically because of her race. What Japan meant was that England had colonies in the Caribbean, Central America and elsewhere. America had taken Texas and California from Mexico as well as annexing Hawaii and the Philippines. Yet, Japan had no right to expand.
Japan had intensively prepared for the Pearl Harbor attack. They also tried to avoid attacking America through diplomacy. However, combinations of forces worked against a diplomatic solution. First, FDR’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull did not trust the Japanese. Second, America’s friendship with England and Japan’s alliance with Germany did not bode well for the Japanese. England had already been at war with Germany at the time of Japan’s attempted diplomacy. Third, Japanese atrocities committed against the Chinese provided a less sympathetic American government. Fourth, bad translations of messages turned sincere attempts at reconciliation into belligerently viewed intelligence.
In addition, Japan had been running out of oil, so the longer they waited for a diplomatic solution the more dire their situation got.
With those conditions, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was very successful from their point of view. They had killed 2403 Americans, sunk 18 ships and destroyed 188 planes.
When Winston Churchill found out, he immediately called President Roosevelt. When the President confirmed Winston hung up went to bed and had a good night sleep. America was now in the war, England was now saved.
The war in the Pacific did not start out well for the Allies (America and England). First, the Japanese stunned the English with a victory at the Battle of Singapore. In 7 days Japan inflicted upon England their largest surrender in their very active military history. That followed with a Japanese Sea victory at Java, an island south of Borneo.
The Allies luck changed with the Battle of Midland. The Allies learned of the coming Japanese attack and planned a brilliant counter by surprising Japan with a bombing raid on Japan’s homeland. This was planned and implemented by James Doolittle. This attack shook Japan’s air of invincibility. The Allies triumphant victory followed.
As the war went on America saw more victories. Long lasting military heroes such as Douglass MacArthur, Bull Halsey and Chester Nimitz emerged as a result. Mr. Toland vividly describes the atrocities of all of the major battles with spine chilling accuracy. The fact that the Japanese belief that surrender was worse than death was something that only made their state worse. Mr. Toland describes the compassion American soldiers had on Japanese prisoners of war. Feeding, nursing and treating their captives with respect were the typical American prison camp norms.
When America developed the Atomic bomb, it was calculated that using it would end the war and save thousands of lives. However, leaflets dropped on Japan about the dire consequences that America’s new weapon would bring were ignored. And still, after the A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima they refused to surrender. The second bomb dropped on Nagasaki would finally and reluctantly convince Japan to capitulate.
At the surrender ceremony MacArthur gave an absolutely brilliant speech which left the Japanese newspaper Nippon Times to say “a new Japan which will vindicate our pride by winning the respect of the world.”
November 2, 2021
I dropped this book about three chapters in.
This isn't really an overview of the Decline of the Japanese Empire per se, so much as it is the Pacific Theater of the Second World War from the Japanese perspective. And yes, there is a difference. The annexation of Korea and brutality of the colonization is barely even mentioned. I was very disappointed that this book skimmed over the Japanese invasion of China, failing to even mention battles like "the Stalingrad of the Yangtze", the Battle of Shanghai.
The author is also one of those sorts of people who believes, borderline conspiratorially, that FDR provoked the Japanese, and it shows. Not only are Japanese war crimes in China rushed through (Nanking is mentioned, but only in broad strokes with little to none of the horrendous details), but there is also a bit where the author argues out of the blue that pro-Chinese sentiment in the United States was condescending and naive. The joining of the Axis powers is then portrayed as a defensive move against American aggression, ignoring the obvious counter solution of the Japanese just withdrawing from China, which they could have done at any time. The Second Sino-Japanese war was an utterly genocidal, completely one-sided slaughter, yet based on this book you'd think that the Chinese were a genuine threat and the Japanese had no choice but to continue fighting them.
It definitely seems like the author is trying to portray Japan as a victim of fate rather than as an active aggressor in the war. This has become a common view, but it's based in Western Cold War propaganda started looking to rehabilitate the Japanese image in order to secure popular support for an anti-communist ally in Asia. The age of the book may be to blame, as I can perhaps generously assume this is just very, very dated.
Perhaps this book gets better later on, but I was extremely disappointed. I was hoping for an in-depth exploration of the politics, society, and occupation policies of WWII era Japan, but it seems the author leaned too strongly towards a narrow depiction of a narrow part of that history with a Cold War era apologist bent for my tastes. I can really only recommend it for people who have a wealth of knowledge about the Japanese Empire and are looking to see a generous view that isn't just pure propaganda, a la Nanking Denialism. For your average reader, I would be extremely worried by the ways this could easily mislead.
This isn't really an overview of the Decline of the Japanese Empire per se, so much as it is the Pacific Theater of the Second World War from the Japanese perspective. And yes, there is a difference. The annexation of Korea and brutality of the colonization is barely even mentioned. I was very disappointed that this book skimmed over the Japanese invasion of China, failing to even mention battles like "the Stalingrad of the Yangtze", the Battle of Shanghai.
The author is also one of those sorts of people who believes, borderline conspiratorially, that FDR provoked the Japanese, and it shows. Not only are Japanese war crimes in China rushed through (Nanking is mentioned, but only in broad strokes with little to none of the horrendous details), but there is also a bit where the author argues out of the blue that pro-Chinese sentiment in the United States was condescending and naive. The joining of the Axis powers is then portrayed as a defensive move against American aggression, ignoring the obvious counter solution of the Japanese just withdrawing from China, which they could have done at any time. The Second Sino-Japanese war was an utterly genocidal, completely one-sided slaughter, yet based on this book you'd think that the Chinese were a genuine threat and the Japanese had no choice but to continue fighting them.
It definitely seems like the author is trying to portray Japan as a victim of fate rather than as an active aggressor in the war. This has become a common view, but it's based in Western Cold War propaganda started looking to rehabilitate the Japanese image in order to secure popular support for an anti-communist ally in Asia. The age of the book may be to blame, as I can perhaps generously assume this is just very, very dated.
Perhaps this book gets better later on, but I was extremely disappointed. I was hoping for an in-depth exploration of the politics, society, and occupation policies of WWII era Japan, but it seems the author leaned too strongly towards a narrow depiction of a narrow part of that history with a Cold War era apologist bent for my tastes. I can really only recommend it for people who have a wealth of knowledge about the Japanese Empire and are looking to see a generous view that isn't just pure propaganda, a la Nanking Denialism. For your average reader, I would be extremely worried by the ways this could easily mislead.
April 18, 2023
One of the best book of WW2.
It was mainly written from Japanese perspectives.
Author interviewed a lot of people for this book and this make it a truly well balanced book.
You can hear the voices of high officials who were in daily contact with Divine Emperor as well as some officers in the fields, lowly foot soldiers, a young nurse, victims of fire and nuclear bombs.
Author never try to make heady in-depth analysis which are sometime tiresome.
But as John Toland is an American he tended to focus on the events which are more relatable to Americans. He wrote in great lengths about Bataan, Guadalcanal but rarely touch on Sino-Japanese war, battle for Singapore, Burma campaign, fight for Dutch East Indies, India Ocean raid, battle of Imphal etc. In my opinion, that is the only drawback of this book. By doing this one of an interesting player in the book is disappeared half way through the book, Colonel Tsuji. He was a very nasty character and he continued his mischiefs in Burma, including eating the flash of a downed US pilot, until the war end.
All in all I give this book 5 stars.
It was mainly written from Japanese perspectives.
Author interviewed a lot of people for this book and this make it a truly well balanced book.
You can hear the voices of high officials who were in daily contact with Divine Emperor as well as some officers in the fields, lowly foot soldiers, a young nurse, victims of fire and nuclear bombs.
Author never try to make heady in-depth analysis which are sometime tiresome.
But as John Toland is an American he tended to focus on the events which are more relatable to Americans. He wrote in great lengths about Bataan, Guadalcanal but rarely touch on Sino-Japanese war, battle for Singapore, Burma campaign, fight for Dutch East Indies, India Ocean raid, battle of Imphal etc. In my opinion, that is the only drawback of this book. By doing this one of an interesting player in the book is disappeared half way through the book, Colonel Tsuji. He was a very nasty character and he continued his mischiefs in Burma, including eating the flash of a downed US pilot, until the war end.
All in all I give this book 5 stars.
October 4, 2016
This is one of the best books on Pacific War especially from a Japanese point of view that I have read. A detailed description of the Japanese aggression (in short form) and collapse (in long form) in World War Ii, told from the perspective of "inside the Japanese governmental and military command structures. I will not forget the build up to the Pearl Harbor attack and the strategy that was employed. The Japanese high command, both the Army as well as the Navy knew that they were waking up a sleeping giant.
The book tries to give a balanced account of events, giving perspectives of the major players (Japanese, American, Russian, Chinese and British), as well as fascinating insight into the political/diplomatic maneuvering that lead to key strategic, political, and military decisions in the war and their outcomes.
This is a must read for anyone interested in the second world war.
The book tries to give a balanced account of events, giving perspectives of the major players (Japanese, American, Russian, Chinese and British), as well as fascinating insight into the political/diplomatic maneuvering that lead to key strategic, political, and military decisions in the war and their outcomes.
This is a must read for anyone interested in the second world war.
October 12, 2019
One of the most impressive books that I have read based upon the 2nd World War within the Asian zone. contains lots of details and information that I had not read about before, the author as put in allot of time and effort towards producing this book. The author must have spent hours upon hours conducting research before putting pen to paper. The book covers hov the Japanese moved towards war, the reasons behind this, and their path, route throughout the war years. Very well written, very well presented, maybe the book cover could have been better, but this is just finding a nagative within the book just for the sake of it For any person interested in the 2nd world war, reading this book would be very worthwhile.
November 25, 2024
The book certainly deserves respect. Toland did a lot of research and he is a good writer. Also, he wrote this when Japan was still considered our great enemy of World War II, before the Holocaust narrative fully took hold. That said it is interesting what is left out or at least gets little attention. There is a lot on the battle of Leyte but very little on Luzon. The book being broadly pro MacArthur that might have played a part since Luzon did not go well. The fighting at Saipan is written in detail, but Palau, Guam, and Burma not so much or even at all in places. Still, a good book particularly for understanding the actions of the Japanese high command, particularly the failed August 1945 coup.
August 6, 2023
Feeling very proud rn, because at 976 pages, this is the longest book I’ve ever read. This feels better than graduating and will probably feel better than my wedding. Warning; the following will be a very very long review, no one feel obligated to read it.
In the 20’s and 30’s, the Japanese economy was suffering, politicians were corrupt and many in the military felt frustrated at what they thought was Japan’s impotence. Following an unsuccessful (but influential) coup, Japan invaded Manchuria 1931. Manchuria was a way for Japan to grow its economy and create a buffer between them and Soviet/Chinese Communism. At the time, the rest of China was fragmented between Mao’s Communist, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists and varying Warlords. Although the Communists and Nationalists united to fight Japan, Japan was successful in conquering large chunks of Eastern China, including the capital Nanjing.
In 1940, Japan conquered French Indochina, without conflict because France had been conquered by the Germans.(strange fact; they considered going north and invading the Soviet Union instead of going south and conquering the Pacific. Didn’t happen, but a crazy what-if moment) The USA thought this was a step too far and embargoed Japan, which was devastating to them because they couldn't continue their expansion or their occupation of China without American oil. Negotiations went back and forth, but American demanded the immediate removal of Japanese troops in China, which was unacceptable to the Japanese. Japan was in a pickle; one on one hand, they didn’t have the industrial capacity or resources to fight America, but on the other, America’s embargo had made it impossible for them to continue their war. Eventually, Japanese leadership settled on a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This would cripple the US Pacific Fleet, giving Japan enough time to expand into Southeast Asia and take the rubber and oil they needed to continue their war and also buy them enough time to fortify their defenses.
Pearl Harbor was a surprise, the American fleet was temporarily crippled and Japan was extremely successful in its invasion of South East Asia. In a matter of months, they took the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma and the Philippines. Japanese leadership got too cocky and tried to go hundreds of miles East, but lost a huge naval battle at Midway. It was a huge turning point, and from then, everything went downhill for Japan. American naval and air power totally outmatched Japan and barring a handful of battles, won victory after victory until they were able to build land bases on the Islands near Japan. The atom bombs were dropped, Japan surrendered, and the rest is history.
It was really gruesome reading about how the Japanese fought. Surrender was taboo, so even when battles were clearly lost, Japanese armies would use human wave attacks, kamikaze pilots, and even strap bombs to their backs and act as living tank mines. At first, their fighting spirit was admirable, but past a certain point it was just gruesome; so much totally unnecessary death. In 1905, Japan destroyed the Russian Navy in the Battle of Tsushima, and many in the Japanese navy wanted to recreate this Decisive Battle, a single moment in the war that would destroy the American Navy. It never worked, leading to lots of needless death on both sides, even after the war was clearly lost.
Finally, should America have dropped the atom bombs? On one hand, it really did not seem like Japan was going to surrender. Even after both bombs were dropped, a faction of the military attempted a coup to prevent surrender, and the proposed invasion of Japan would have caused millions of deaths on both sides. Plus, the firebombing of Tokyo had killed more people than the bomb in Nagasaki and probably more than the bomb in Hiroshima. On the other hand, many in the Japanese military were more scared of the Soviet declaration of war against Japan (shortly after the Hiroshima bombing) than the atom bomb and many in the US military thought the bomb's power could be demonstrated without killing so many innocents. Very difficult issue, and the descriptions of the bombings were the worst part of the book.
Random thoughts
- Backdrop of European colonialism created a lot of resentment in Asia against the British/Dutch/Americans and made it so that Japan did find collaborators, like Ba Maw of Burma or Chandra Bose in India.
- In China, Chiang Kai Shek was (at times) kind of shitty ally because he kept on reserving his manpower for the upcoming war against Mao. ALSO the Communists kidnapped Chiang Kai Shek and FORCED him to sign a ceasefire, which is insane.
- At the end of the war in China, Japan tried (and failed) to switch their propaganda to be pro-China, anti-Britsh/American, which didn't work because of how brutal Japanese rule had been in China
- Not a lot about Japanese rule in Korea/Taiwan before the war, kinda disappointing
- Toland relies on diary entries, lots of great, personal history writing,
- Tbh, this book made me a patriot, I'm saluting anyone who risked their life to fight in the Pacific, it really seemed like hell
Quotes
A large portion of the land-based planes had been destroyed by marauding American carrier pilots flying the new Hellcat fighter.* It could outclimb and outdive the Zero and was heavily armed. The pilot was protected by heavy armor plating behind, and a thick, bulletproof wind shield ahead. “I love this airplane so much,” said one Navy pilot, “that if it could cook I’d marry it.”
In the 20’s and 30’s, the Japanese economy was suffering, politicians were corrupt and many in the military felt frustrated at what they thought was Japan’s impotence. Following an unsuccessful (but influential) coup, Japan invaded Manchuria 1931. Manchuria was a way for Japan to grow its economy and create a buffer between them and Soviet/Chinese Communism. At the time, the rest of China was fragmented between Mao’s Communist, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists and varying Warlords. Although the Communists and Nationalists united to fight Japan, Japan was successful in conquering large chunks of Eastern China, including the capital Nanjing.
In 1940, Japan conquered French Indochina, without conflict because France had been conquered by the Germans.(strange fact; they considered going north and invading the Soviet Union instead of going south and conquering the Pacific. Didn’t happen, but a crazy what-if moment) The USA thought this was a step too far and embargoed Japan, which was devastating to them because they couldn't continue their expansion or their occupation of China without American oil. Negotiations went back and forth, but American demanded the immediate removal of Japanese troops in China, which was unacceptable to the Japanese. Japan was in a pickle; one on one hand, they didn’t have the industrial capacity or resources to fight America, but on the other, America’s embargo had made it impossible for them to continue their war. Eventually, Japanese leadership settled on a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This would cripple the US Pacific Fleet, giving Japan enough time to expand into Southeast Asia and take the rubber and oil they needed to continue their war and also buy them enough time to fortify their defenses.
Pearl Harbor was a surprise, the American fleet was temporarily crippled and Japan was extremely successful in its invasion of South East Asia. In a matter of months, they took the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma and the Philippines. Japanese leadership got too cocky and tried to go hundreds of miles East, but lost a huge naval battle at Midway. It was a huge turning point, and from then, everything went downhill for Japan. American naval and air power totally outmatched Japan and barring a handful of battles, won victory after victory until they were able to build land bases on the Islands near Japan. The atom bombs were dropped, Japan surrendered, and the rest is history.
It was really gruesome reading about how the Japanese fought. Surrender was taboo, so even when battles were clearly lost, Japanese armies would use human wave attacks, kamikaze pilots, and even strap bombs to their backs and act as living tank mines. At first, their fighting spirit was admirable, but past a certain point it was just gruesome; so much totally unnecessary death. In 1905, Japan destroyed the Russian Navy in the Battle of Tsushima, and many in the Japanese navy wanted to recreate this Decisive Battle, a single moment in the war that would destroy the American Navy. It never worked, leading to lots of needless death on both sides, even after the war was clearly lost.
Finally, should America have dropped the atom bombs? On one hand, it really did not seem like Japan was going to surrender. Even after both bombs were dropped, a faction of the military attempted a coup to prevent surrender, and the proposed invasion of Japan would have caused millions of deaths on both sides. Plus, the firebombing of Tokyo had killed more people than the bomb in Nagasaki and probably more than the bomb in Hiroshima. On the other hand, many in the Japanese military were more scared of the Soviet declaration of war against Japan (shortly after the Hiroshima bombing) than the atom bomb and many in the US military thought the bomb's power could be demonstrated without killing so many innocents. Very difficult issue, and the descriptions of the bombings were the worst part of the book.
Random thoughts
- Backdrop of European colonialism created a lot of resentment in Asia against the British/Dutch/Americans and made it so that Japan did find collaborators, like Ba Maw of Burma or Chandra Bose in India.
- In China, Chiang Kai Shek was (at times) kind of shitty ally because he kept on reserving his manpower for the upcoming war against Mao. ALSO the Communists kidnapped Chiang Kai Shek and FORCED him to sign a ceasefire, which is insane.
- At the end of the war in China, Japan tried (and failed) to switch their propaganda to be pro-China, anti-Britsh/American, which didn't work because of how brutal Japanese rule had been in China
- Not a lot about Japanese rule in Korea/Taiwan before the war, kinda disappointing
- Toland relies on diary entries, lots of great, personal history writing,
- Tbh, this book made me a patriot, I'm saluting anyone who risked their life to fight in the Pacific, it really seemed like hell
Quotes
A large portion of the land-based planes had been destroyed by marauding American carrier pilots flying the new Hellcat fighter.* It could outclimb and outdive the Zero and was heavily armed. The pilot was protected by heavy armor plating behind, and a thick, bulletproof wind shield ahead. “I love this airplane so much,” said one Navy pilot, “that if it could cook I’d marry it.”
April 20, 2011
I took far too many notes on this book trying to remember the events and people that dot these pages. But what resounds more than these pages of notes, is my belief that Tolland's greatest success is in what he didn't do: Tolland avoided the Cold War lens and the Great Man theory. In avoiding these pit falls, he has not only written a fascinating, highly readable book (especially considering it's length), but he has set a standard by which I think all history books should be held.
The Cold War lens is when writers apply the Cold War--the ideologies, cultures and people that were at war for decades--to explain most 20th century events. I was born just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and as a result the Cold War doesn't loom as big. But I think many history books written before the Wall's fall apply the Cold War lens too freely and too often. The Cold War is used to explain and understand events that are more diverse than this lens. Tolland does not ignore the Cold War altogether--and towards the end of the book, he explains how World War 2 shaped and affected the bipolar world that followed. But he does not let this lens overwhelm the true subject matter--Japan--and the key relationship to this book: the US and Japan. Having written this book in the 1960s, this is an impressive feat.
The Great Man theory is the idea that a single man or woman changed the course of history. By this logic, if another man or woman was in power at a certain moment in history, events would've played out differently. This is a pretty appealing theory; if Hitler had never existed, Germany would not have tried to take over Europe. If not for Truman, the US would not have dropped the atomic bomb. But it can be used too liberally. It's a lot more fun to read about big personalities, and it's much easier to explain events through the Great Men than through multiple, smaller causes. As a result I think history writers sometimes hyperbolize their characters and simplify their narratives. I personally think that most events in history are a result of greater, bigger forces (I'm not trying to make this too dense, but see Graham Allison for more info). Put anyone in the president's shoes and in the same political context, and they'd make the same decision that the "Great Man" made. And if they are the kind of person that would make a different decision, then the context they lived in would not have allowed them to become president in the first place. This means that there would've been World War without Hitler, and the bomb would've dropped without Truman. In short, context determines history more than a single person and context itself is determined by a web of people and forces greater than just one man. Tolland does an admirable job of capturing these greater forces, and in so doing he not only creates a fascinating, readable tome on modern Japanese history, but he also sets a standard for the care and seriousness to which all history writing should aim.
I originally picked up this book because I wanted to read about the Japanese in Indonesia. I've been living in Indonesia for the past year and people here sometimes say that the 3 years the Japanese were in power in Indonesia were worse than the 300 years of Dutch colonialism. This book doesn't give much information about the Japanese in Indonesia, or for that matter the Japanese in East Asia as a whole. This book was mostly about American-Japanese relations and was heavy on battle details and political details. But it was nonetheless fascinating. If you had told me I’d read a combined 300 pages about battles for tiny, forgotten Pacific Islands I’d probably be skeptical. But somehow even the maneuvers the charges and retreats and naval squirmishes all kept my interest and were imbued with both thoughtful analysis and emotion.
I wrote mid-read, "For a ~900 page book this is very readable. Still, man is it long." This is a pretty worthy assessment. You don't need me to tell you this. This is a long book. But it's about as readable as any history book can be. It's a smart and emotional tome. A long cast of characters (most of whom Tolland personally interviewed) string Tolland's writing together, and the result is a wide reaching history book that still manages to carry an intimacy to it. Letters and personal journals pick up the narrative of history and then are lightly put down. They make this dense book personal while still being full of information.
4.5
Also, here are some additional notes on 3 things that I learned from this book that I'd like to hold on to. They are unique mini-theses that Tolland presents. Feel free to skip this.
1) One of the reasons that Japan and America collided was Japan was a growing nation that needed land and resources. In Japan, an aggressive military clique rose to power and these vital national needs (land, energy) became an attempt to establish hegemony in Asia. Many thought, if the US is allowed to establish hegemony in America and mine other nations for needed resources, why can't we? Many people besides Tolland have argued this, but it's still an interesting point. Especially the details that Tolland gives about Japan's too-powerful military.
2) Japan for all its imperialistic aggression was also a liberator. This is an incredibly interesting point. Many outside the military saw the war in the pacific as a war where Japan would liberate Asia from Western colonialism. And although this point was pumped up with propaganda, there was a lot of truth to it. Japan gave independence to many nations that it conquered and it recognized the rebel governments fighting for independence in Western-colonized nations (like India). They were doing some remarkably forward thinking, democratic stuff. While the US and Britain were writing the Atlantic Charter but not following through with it (still holding colonies, still selling Polish sovereignty to Russia), Japan was gathering Asian leaders, declaring their sovereignty and pledging a mission to Asian freedom from the Western colonial yoke. During the war Japan held the Greater East Asia Conference” in Tokyo for all foreign Asian, anti-colonial leaders. There was a lot of propaganda to this--especially since Indonesia was considered an exception, and Japan deemed not-ready for independence while it mined it for resources--but it's still powerful, inspiring stuff.
3) Truman did not need to drop the bomb, and Japan's military elite were sort of nuts. Truman did not need to drop the bomb. There were plenty in Japan that were ready for peace and actively wanted it. The Emperor was close to publicly espousing peace, and Japanese diplomats were already contacting Russian and European nations to help mediate a peace. The US could've detonated a bomb on a deserted island or in the air, to push these leaders to faster action. At the same time, Japan's military elite was pretty nuts. Many of the top most leaders believed that this had to be a fight to the death, a fight to the last man. They wanted to arm men, women, and children on the mainland to at least make the US suffer. They believed 100 million were prepared to die, and should die to defend Japan. Surrendering was out of the question.
The Cold War lens is when writers apply the Cold War--the ideologies, cultures and people that were at war for decades--to explain most 20th century events. I was born just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and as a result the Cold War doesn't loom as big. But I think many history books written before the Wall's fall apply the Cold War lens too freely and too often. The Cold War is used to explain and understand events that are more diverse than this lens. Tolland does not ignore the Cold War altogether--and towards the end of the book, he explains how World War 2 shaped and affected the bipolar world that followed. But he does not let this lens overwhelm the true subject matter--Japan--and the key relationship to this book: the US and Japan. Having written this book in the 1960s, this is an impressive feat.
The Great Man theory is the idea that a single man or woman changed the course of history. By this logic, if another man or woman was in power at a certain moment in history, events would've played out differently. This is a pretty appealing theory; if Hitler had never existed, Germany would not have tried to take over Europe. If not for Truman, the US would not have dropped the atomic bomb. But it can be used too liberally. It's a lot more fun to read about big personalities, and it's much easier to explain events through the Great Men than through multiple, smaller causes. As a result I think history writers sometimes hyperbolize their characters and simplify their narratives. I personally think that most events in history are a result of greater, bigger forces (I'm not trying to make this too dense, but see Graham Allison for more info). Put anyone in the president's shoes and in the same political context, and they'd make the same decision that the "Great Man" made. And if they are the kind of person that would make a different decision, then the context they lived in would not have allowed them to become president in the first place. This means that there would've been World War without Hitler, and the bomb would've dropped without Truman. In short, context determines history more than a single person and context itself is determined by a web of people and forces greater than just one man. Tolland does an admirable job of capturing these greater forces, and in so doing he not only creates a fascinating, readable tome on modern Japanese history, but he also sets a standard for the care and seriousness to which all history writing should aim.
I originally picked up this book because I wanted to read about the Japanese in Indonesia. I've been living in Indonesia for the past year and people here sometimes say that the 3 years the Japanese were in power in Indonesia were worse than the 300 years of Dutch colonialism. This book doesn't give much information about the Japanese in Indonesia, or for that matter the Japanese in East Asia as a whole. This book was mostly about American-Japanese relations and was heavy on battle details and political details. But it was nonetheless fascinating. If you had told me I’d read a combined 300 pages about battles for tiny, forgotten Pacific Islands I’d probably be skeptical. But somehow even the maneuvers the charges and retreats and naval squirmishes all kept my interest and were imbued with both thoughtful analysis and emotion.
I wrote mid-read, "For a ~900 page book this is very readable. Still, man is it long." This is a pretty worthy assessment. You don't need me to tell you this. This is a long book. But it's about as readable as any history book can be. It's a smart and emotional tome. A long cast of characters (most of whom Tolland personally interviewed) string Tolland's writing together, and the result is a wide reaching history book that still manages to carry an intimacy to it. Letters and personal journals pick up the narrative of history and then are lightly put down. They make this dense book personal while still being full of information.
4.5
Also, here are some additional notes on 3 things that I learned from this book that I'd like to hold on to. They are unique mini-theses that Tolland presents. Feel free to skip this.
1) One of the reasons that Japan and America collided was Japan was a growing nation that needed land and resources. In Japan, an aggressive military clique rose to power and these vital national needs (land, energy) became an attempt to establish hegemony in Asia. Many thought, if the US is allowed to establish hegemony in America and mine other nations for needed resources, why can't we? Many people besides Tolland have argued this, but it's still an interesting point. Especially the details that Tolland gives about Japan's too-powerful military.
2) Japan for all its imperialistic aggression was also a liberator. This is an incredibly interesting point. Many outside the military saw the war in the pacific as a war where Japan would liberate Asia from Western colonialism. And although this point was pumped up with propaganda, there was a lot of truth to it. Japan gave independence to many nations that it conquered and it recognized the rebel governments fighting for independence in Western-colonized nations (like India). They were doing some remarkably forward thinking, democratic stuff. While the US and Britain were writing the Atlantic Charter but not following through with it (still holding colonies, still selling Polish sovereignty to Russia), Japan was gathering Asian leaders, declaring their sovereignty and pledging a mission to Asian freedom from the Western colonial yoke. During the war Japan held the Greater East Asia Conference” in Tokyo for all foreign Asian, anti-colonial leaders. There was a lot of propaganda to this--especially since Indonesia was considered an exception, and Japan deemed not-ready for independence while it mined it for resources--but it's still powerful, inspiring stuff.
3) Truman did not need to drop the bomb, and Japan's military elite were sort of nuts. Truman did not need to drop the bomb. There were plenty in Japan that were ready for peace and actively wanted it. The Emperor was close to publicly espousing peace, and Japanese diplomats were already contacting Russian and European nations to help mediate a peace. The US could've detonated a bomb on a deserted island or in the air, to push these leaders to faster action. At the same time, Japan's military elite was pretty nuts. Many of the top most leaders believed that this had to be a fight to the death, a fight to the last man. They wanted to arm men, women, and children on the mainland to at least make the US suffer. They believed 100 million were prepared to die, and should die to defend Japan. Surrendering was out of the question.
October 15, 2017
I love John Toland. He may be one of the most prolific historians during my lifetime. Possibly a precursor to the popular historians such as McCullough or Ambrose. I read his well received, but not academically praised biography of Hitler, and the controversial Day of Infamy and I thought that those books were both well done and convincing; however, I have shied away from The Rising Sun, more from its intimidating length than its content. It is immense - running nearly a thousand pages with ample footnotes. The book is well worth the time and effort.
Toland begins with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and he does not sugar coat the barbarity of that conflict. He describes in detail the atrocity in Nanjing and the mindset of the troops that led up to the war crimes. He follows chronologically the border conflicts with the Soviets, joining the Axis powers, the desperation and fear of isolation after the US declared an oil embargo. Tojo's decision to attack Pear Harbor and the victorious march down the Malaysian Peninsular. I found it fascinating the Japanese warlords thought that it might even be possible to conquer India and meet up with the Nazis in the Caucuses. The defeat of Shanghai and the conquest of the Philippines is described in detail and the Death March of Bataan and Corrigidor is absolutely heartbreaking.
At this point, Japan lost the war. True, there would be further victories as vastly distant as the Aleutians and New Guinea; but from this point, the might of US production was going to crush the territory of the Empire. It is hard not to feel for the ordinary Japanese soldiers and the civilians who were driven by a Bushido code to suffer unimaginable hardships. It was that determination and fanaticism that would ultimately sway the decision to drop the atomic bombs. The military, moral and political decision to drop the bombs is outlined and well done. The suffering of the civilians are balanced by the what exactly President Truman was trying to accomplish and the information he had in front of him predicting an unbelievably bloody invasion of the home islands.
It is also telling that a palace coup nearly imprisoned the Emperor and forced a continuation of the war. This is a sad and violent history that is a difficult read. The book on the whole is an amazing accomplishment and well deserving of the Pulitzer it won. If there is a problem with the book, and it is a small one, the book seemed heavily weighted to tell the story of the fighting between the Americans and the Japanese. I would have loved to learned more about the campaigns in Burma and India that seemed a bit short-shifted.
Still this is an excellent read.
Toland begins with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and he does not sugar coat the barbarity of that conflict. He describes in detail the atrocity in Nanjing and the mindset of the troops that led up to the war crimes. He follows chronologically the border conflicts with the Soviets, joining the Axis powers, the desperation and fear of isolation after the US declared an oil embargo. Tojo's decision to attack Pear Harbor and the victorious march down the Malaysian Peninsular. I found it fascinating the Japanese warlords thought that it might even be possible to conquer India and meet up with the Nazis in the Caucuses. The defeat of Shanghai and the conquest of the Philippines is described in detail and the Death March of Bataan and Corrigidor is absolutely heartbreaking.
At this point, Japan lost the war. True, there would be further victories as vastly distant as the Aleutians and New Guinea; but from this point, the might of US production was going to crush the territory of the Empire. It is hard not to feel for the ordinary Japanese soldiers and the civilians who were driven by a Bushido code to suffer unimaginable hardships. It was that determination and fanaticism that would ultimately sway the decision to drop the atomic bombs. The military, moral and political decision to drop the bombs is outlined and well done. The suffering of the civilians are balanced by the what exactly President Truman was trying to accomplish and the information he had in front of him predicting an unbelievably bloody invasion of the home islands.
It is also telling that a palace coup nearly imprisoned the Emperor and forced a continuation of the war. This is a sad and violent history that is a difficult read. The book on the whole is an amazing accomplishment and well deserving of the Pulitzer it won. If there is a problem with the book, and it is a small one, the book seemed heavily weighted to tell the story of the fighting between the Americans and the Japanese. I would have loved to learned more about the campaigns in Burma and India that seemed a bit short-shifted.
Still this is an excellent read.
July 15, 2015
The definitive source regarding the view of WWII from the Japanese perspective. An amazing amount of insight and information. Cannot recommend highly enough for those interested in WWII.
June 20, 2019
On the plus side, it is easy to see why it is a classic, being written in a very engaging style that draws you in nicely.
Of course it also suffers from the defects any 'classic' work will with long outdated information, such as the 3rd Wave at Pearl Harbor.
But more deep-seated of a problem is that it utterly fails to deliver on the premise. This is not a history of the Japanese Empire. This is a history of the war between Japan and America. Britain and the Commonwealth is a barely mentioned sideshow, but even worse is the almost complete non-coverage of the Sino-Japanese conflict. 1936-1940 gets less time than Pearl Harbor alone does, and once America enters the picture, China might as well have been a non-entity. Perhaps to be expected from a popular history book, written for an American audience, in the '70s, but nevertheless, a decidedly critical shortcoming of the book which significantly mars what value it might otherwise have.
Of course it also suffers from the defects any 'classic' work will with long outdated information, such as the 3rd Wave at Pearl Harbor.
But more deep-seated of a problem is that it utterly fails to deliver on the premise. This is not a history of the Japanese Empire. This is a history of the war between Japan and America. Britain and the Commonwealth is a barely mentioned sideshow, but even worse is the almost complete non-coverage of the Sino-Japanese conflict. 1936-1940 gets less time than Pearl Harbor alone does, and once America enters the picture, China might as well have been a non-entity. Perhaps to be expected from a popular history book, written for an American audience, in the '70s, but nevertheless, a decidedly critical shortcoming of the book which significantly mars what value it might otherwise have.
September 17, 2020
Kitabı okurken, neden II. Dünya Savaşı'nın Pasifik Cephesi ile ilgili en yetkin (authoritative) kitap ya da kitaplardan birisi olarak anıldığını anlıyorsunuz. Muazzam detaylı bir anlatı sunuyor kitap. Savaşın özellikle Japonya tarafından nasıl göründüğünü anlamak için çok faydalı.
Kitap boyunca en çok üzüldüğüm, Japon halkının ordu ve ABD generallerinin iki dudağı arasına sıkışmış kaderi oldu. Faşist bir askeri yönetimin karar alma mekanizmalarında yarattığı problemlerin milyonlarca insanı nasıl göz göre göre yıkıma götürdüğünü okurken dert sahibi oldum.
Kitabın asla bitmemesi gibi bir sorun var. Bu tür devasa kitapların genel sorunu daha doğrusu... Storytel'den 41 saat dinledim. Richard J. Evans'ın Third Reich üçlemesini ve William L. Shirer'ın The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich kitapları ile devam etmeyi düşünüyordum ama gerçekten dermanım kalmadı. Biraz kısa kitaplarla devam etmeye ihtiyacım var. İnsan ne kadar zevk alıyor olsa da bir noktada bitirmek ve başka bir şeye geçmek istiyor.
Kitap boyunca en çok üzüldüğüm, Japon halkının ordu ve ABD generallerinin iki dudağı arasına sıkışmış kaderi oldu. Faşist bir askeri yönetimin karar alma mekanizmalarında yarattığı problemlerin milyonlarca insanı nasıl göz göre göre yıkıma götürdüğünü okurken dert sahibi oldum.
Kitabın asla bitmemesi gibi bir sorun var. Bu tür devasa kitapların genel sorunu daha doğrusu... Storytel'den 41 saat dinledim. Richard J. Evans'ın Third Reich üçlemesini ve William L. Shirer'ın The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich kitapları ile devam etmeyi düşünüyordum ama gerçekten dermanım kalmadı. Biraz kısa kitaplarla devam etmeye ihtiyacım var. İnsan ne kadar zevk alıyor olsa da bir noktada bitirmek ve başka bir şeye geçmek istiyor.
May 2, 2023
A massive book that thoroughly explains how Japan went to Pacific War and lost it. Japan's actions in China are also discussed but the main focus is on the war against the Allies which is covered maybe even too extensively.
The book is full of anecdotes about individuals and dialogue which is simultaneously a strength and a weakness. Discussions between leaders are very interesting and explain why certain moves were made at different points of war. However, it was sometimes difficult to understand what happened in some battles.
As someone who doesn't know much about Japanese society, history and culture, I was astonished about their brutality and their will to self-sacrifice. Toland explains well what happened but could sometimes explain better why things happened.
I have respect for Toland's comprehensive research and can believe that the book has been influential but I'm sure there are better structured and more compact books on the same topic.
The book is full of anecdotes about individuals and dialogue which is simultaneously a strength and a weakness. Discussions between leaders are very interesting and explain why certain moves were made at different points of war. However, it was sometimes difficult to understand what happened in some battles.
As someone who doesn't know much about Japanese society, history and culture, I was astonished about their brutality and their will to self-sacrifice. Toland explains well what happened but could sometimes explain better why things happened.
I have respect for Toland's comprehensive research and can believe that the book has been influential but I'm sure there are better structured and more compact books on the same topic.
June 11, 2017
I found this to be two books in one. The first half covers the diplomatic, military, and economic reasons that led to World War II. It does so by weaving accounts of Japanese officers and government officials with the historical record all while appearing to avoid the narrative fallacy. The second half of this book covers the war in the Pacific. Unfortunately, it does so at a more tactical level filled with anecdotes and human interest stories as opposed to the macro level approach that made the first half of the book so enjoyable. Overall, an interesting book for someone who slept through multiple history classes.
“America’s greatest mistake in World War II, I believe, was in failing to recognize that she was fighting two different kinds of war simultaneously: one in Europe against another Western people and philosophy, Nazism, and one in Asia which was not only a struggle against an aggressive nation fighting for survival as a modern power but an ideological contest against an entire continent.” 138
“And a moral policeman’s lot is not a happy one, particularly when his own morality is in question.” 145
“The Americans were inspired by three motives: a desire to trade, spread the Gospel to the yellow pagans and export the ideals of 1776.” 1306
“With the seizure of Manchuria and the invasion of North China, the gulf widened as America denounced Japanese aggression with increasingly forceful words. This moral denunciation only hardened the resolve of the average Japanese. Why should there be a Monroe Doctrine in the Americas and an Open Door principle in Asia?” 1335
“The Japanese takeover in bandit-infested Manchuria was no different from American armed intervention in the Caribbean. Moreover, how could a vast country like the United States even begin to understand the problems that had beset Japan since World War I? Why was it perfectly acceptable for England and Holland to occupy India, Hong Kong, Singapore and the East Indies, but a crime for Japan to follow their example? Why should America, which had grabbed its lands from Indians by trickery, liquor and massacre, be so outraged when Japan did the same in China?” 1338
“All this emotional turmoil was worsened by marked differences between East and West in morality, religion and even patterns of thinking. Western logic was precise, with axioms, definitions, and proofs leading to a logical conclusion. Born dialecticians, the Japanese held that any existence was a contradiction. In everyday life they instinctively practiced the concept of the contradiction of opposites, and the means of harmonizing them. Right and wrong, spirit and matter, God and man—all these opposing elements were harmoniously united. That was why a thing could be good and bad at the same time.” 1345
“Unlike Westerners, who tended to think in terms of black and white, the Japanese had vaguer distinctions, which in international relations often resulted in “policies” and not “principles,” and seemed to Westerners to be conscienceless. Western logic was like a suitcase, defined and limited. Eastern logic was like the furoshiki, the cloth Japanese carry for wrapping objects. It could be large or small according to circumstances and could be folded and put in the pocket when not needed.” 1350
“To the Japanese, a man without contradictions could not be respected; he was just a simple person. The more numerous the contradictions in a man, the deeper he was. His existence was richer the more acutely he struggled with himself.” 1356
“This was all expressed in the word sayonara (sayo—so, nara—if), that is, “So be it.” The Japanese said sayonara every moment to everything, for he felt each moment was a dream. Life was sayonara. Empires could rise or fall, the greatest heroes and philosophers crumble to dust, planets come and go, but Change never changed, including Change itself.” 1369
"Understanding little or nothing of either the Wheel of Causality or the power wielded by the dedicated young rebels, informed Americans mistakenly assumed that the takeover in Manchuria and the foray into China were steps plotted by military leaders who, like Hitler, wished to seize the world for themselves.” 1376
“Thus philosophy was brutalized and brutality was philosophized.” 1379
“There were also numerous petty differences between East and West that needlessly aggravated matters. If a Westerner asked, “This isn’t the road to Tokyo, is it?” the Japanese would reply yes, meaning, “What you say is correct; it is not the road to Tokyo.” Confusion also resulted when the Japanese agreed with the Westerner just to be agreeable or to avoid embarrassment, or gave wrong information rather than admit his ignorance.” 1385
“This embarrassing rehearsal for war not only caused a revolution in Japanese weaponry and military tactics but drove Japan closer to an alliance with Germany and Italy, since she felt that the Soviet Union, England, China and America might combine against her at any moment.” 1403
“In the last war the United States made use of Japan through the Ishii-Lansing agreement, and when the war was over, the United States broke it. This is an old trick of theirs.” 1698
“On the night of July 26 he ordered all Japanese assets in America frozen, and Britain and the Netherlands soon followed suit. In consequence, not only did all trade with the United States cease, but the fact that America had been Japan’s major source of oil imports now left Japan in an untenable situation.” 1941
“They had secured the bases in Indochina by negotiation with Vichy France, a country recognized if not approved by America, and international law was on their side; the freezing was the last step in the encirclement of the empire by the ABCD (American, British, Chinese, Dutch) powers, a denial to Japan of her rightful place as leader of Asia and a challenge to her very existence.” 1944
“Then he warned that Japan’s oil stock would only last for two years, and once war came, eighteen months, and concluded, “Under such circumstances, we had better take the initiative. We will win.””1950
“We should not lose sight of the fact, deplorable but true, that no practical and effective code of international morality upon which the world can rely has yet been discovered, and that the standards of morality of one nation in given circumstances have little or no relation to the standards of the individuals of the nations in question. To shape our foreign policy on the unsound theory that other nations are guided and bound by our present standards of international ethics would be to court sure disaster.” 1964
“For three decades Americans had held a highly idealized picture of the Chinese, looking upon them as childlike innocents who needed protection against the imperialism of Britain and Japan. China was a helpless, deserving nation whose virtues America alone understood.” 1986
“There was no way to “checkmate the enemy’s king”—industrial potential—and a decisive initial victory was essential.” 2199
“While I was in France, Pétain and Clemenceau told me, ‘Germany was an eyesore to the United States in Europe and it did away with her in the Great War. In the next war it will try to get rid of another eyesore, this one in the Orient, Japan. America knows how inept Japan is diplomatically, so she’ll make moves to abuse you inch by inch until you start a fight. But if you lose your temper and start a war you will surely be defeated, because America has great strength. So you must bear anything and not play into her hands.’ The present situation is exactly as Petain and Clemenceau predicted. At this time we must persevere so that we won’t get into war with America. You’re a member of the Konoye Cabinet. In the Army, an order must be obeyed. Now the Emperor and the Prime Minister want to bring about the negotiations. As war minister, you should either follow their line of policy or resign.” 2357
“Of course, we may lose,” he said, “but if we don’t fight, we’d just have to bow to the United States. If we fight, there’s a chance we can win. If we don’t fight, wouldn’t that be the same as losing the war?” 2954
“How could you trust a nation that played the two-faced game of talking peace while preparing for war?” 3062
“What particularly infuriated every man in the room was the categoric demand to quit all of China. Manchuria had been won at the cost of considerable sweat and blood. Its loss would mean economic disaster. What right did the wealthy Americans have to make such a demand? What nation with any honor would submit? 3331
“Who was to blame—the United States or Japan? The latter was almost solely responsible for bringing herself to the road of war with America through the seizure of Manchuria, the invasion of China, the atrocities committed against the Chinese people, and the drive to the south. But this course of aggression had been the inevitable result of the West’s efforts to eliminate Japan as an economic rival after World War I, the Great Depression, her population explosion, and the necessity to find new resources and markets to continue as a first-rate power. Added to all this were the unique and undefined position of the Emperor, the explosive role of gekokujo, and the threat of Communism from both Russia and Mao Tse-tung which had developed into paranoiac fear.” 3343
“How could a nation rich in resources and land, and free from fear of attack, understand the position of a tiny, crowded island empire with almost no natural resources, which was constantly in danger of attack from a ruthless neighbor, the Soviet Union?” 3353
“America herself had, moreover, contributed to the atmosphere of hate and distrust by excluding the Japanese from immigration and, in effect, flaunting a racial and color prejudice that justifiably infuriated the proud Nipponese. America should also have perceived and admitted the hypocrisy of taking such a moral stand on the four principles.b Her ally, Britain, certainly did not observe them in India or Burma, nor did she herself in Central America where “gunboat diplomacy” was still upholding the Monroe Doctrine.” 3354
“Her self-righteousness was also self-serving; what was morality at the top became self-interest at the bottom.” 3358
“Finally, America made a grave diplomatic blunder by allowing an issue not vital to her basic interests—the welfare of China—to become, at the last moment, the keystone of her foreign policy.” 3359
“Until that summer America had had two limited aims in the Far East: to drive a wedge between Japan and Hitler, and to thwart Japan’s southward thrust. She could easily have attained both these objectives but instead made an issue out of no issue at all, the Tripartite Pact, and insisted on the liberation of China. For this last unattainable goal America’s diplomats were forcing an early war that her own militarists were hoping to avoid—a war, paradoxically, she was in no position to wage. America could not throw the weight of her strength against Japan to liberate China, nor had she ever intended to do so. Her major enemy was Hitler. Instead of frankly informing Chiang Kai-shek of this, she had yielded to his urgings and pressed the policy that led to war in the Far East—and the virtual abandonment of China. More important, by equating Japan with Nazi Germany, her diplomats had maneuvered their nation into two completely different wars, one in Europe against Fascism, and one in the Orient that was linked with the aspirations of all Asians for freedom from the white man’s bondage.” 3361
“There were no heroes or villains on either side. Roosevelt, for all his shortcomings, was a man of broad vision and humanity; the Emperor was a man of honor and peace. Both were limited—one by the bulky machinery of a great democracy and the other by training, custom and the restrictions of his rule. Caught up in a medieval system, the Japanese militarists were driven primarily by dedication to their country. They wanted power for it, not war profits for themselves; Tojo himself lived on a modest scale. Prince Konoye’s weaknesses came largely from the vulnerable position of a premier in Japan, but by the end of his second cabinet he had transformed his natural tendency for indecisiveness into a show of purpose and courage which continued until his downfall. Even Matsuoka was no villain. Despite his vanity and eccentricities this man of ability sincerely thought he was working for the peace of the world when he saddled Japan with the Tripartite Pact; and he wrecked the negotiations in Washington out of egotism, not malice.” 3369
“Nor were Stimson and Hull villains, though the latter, with his all-or-nothing attitude, had committed one of the most fatal mistakes a diplomat could make—driven his opponents into a corner with no chance to save face and given them no option to capitulation but war.” 3376
“The villain was the times. Japan and America would never have come to the brink of war except for the social and economic eruption of Europe after World War I and the rise of two great revolutionary ideologies—Communism and Fascism. These two sweeping forces, working sometimes in tandem and sometimes at odds, ultimately brought about the tragedy of November 26. America certainly would never have risked going to war solely for the sake of China. It was the fear that Japan in partnership with Hitler and Mussolini would conquer the world that drove America to risk all. And the ultimate tragedy was that Japan had joined up with Hitler mainly because she feared the Anglo-Saxon nations were isolating her; hers was a marriage in name only.” 3379
“A war that need not have been fought was about to be fought because of mutual misunderstanding, language difficulties, and mistranslations as well as Japanese opportunism, gekokujo, irrationality, honor, pride and fear—and American racial prejudice, distrust, ignorance of the Orient, rigidity, self-righteousness, honor, national pride and fear.” 3384
“Perhaps these were essentially the answers to Händel’s question: “Why do the nations so furiously rage together?” In any case, America had made a grave mistake that would cost her dearly for decades to come. If Hull had sent a conciliatory answer to Proposal B, the Japanese (according to surviving Cabinet members) would have either come to some agreement with America or, at the least, been forced to spend several weeks in debate. And this hiatus would in turn have compelled postponement of their deadline for attack until the spring of 1942 because of weather conditions. By this time it would have been obvious that Moscow would stand, and the Japanese would have been eager to make almost any concessions to avoid going into a desperate war with an ally which now faced inevitable defeat. If no agreement had been reached, America would have gained precious time to strengthen the Philippines with more bombers and reinforcements. Nor would there have been such a debacle at Pearl Harbor. There is little likelihood that the implausible series of chances and coincidences that brought about the December 7 disaster could have been repeated.” 3386
“Morality is an unstable commodity in international relations. The same America that took a no-compromise stand on behalf of the sanctity of agreements, maintenance of the status quo in the Orient, and the territorial integrity of China, reversed herself a few years later at Yalta by promising Russia territory in the Far East as an inducement to join the war in the Pacific.” 3431
“The idea for a surprise attack was based on the tactics of his hero, Admiral Togo, who had, without any declaration of war, assaulted the Second Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur in 1904 with torpedo boats while its commander, an Admiral Stark, was at a party. The Russians never recovered from this loss—two battleships and a number of cruisers—and the following year almost their entire fleet was destroyed in the Battle of Tsushima during which, incidentally, young Ensign Yamamoto lost two fingers on his left hand.” 3460
“(The concept of achieving decisive victory by one surprise blow lay deep in the Japanese character. Their favorite literary form was the haiku, a poem combining sensual imagery and intuitive evocation in a brief seventeen syllables; a rapier thrust that expressed, with discipline, the illumination sought in the Japanese form of Buddhism. Similarly, the outcome in judo, sumo [wrestling] and kendo [fencing with bamboo staves], after long preliminaries, was settled by a sudden stroke.)” 3464
“This message, which would have meant a warning of attack on Pearl Harbor to anybody reading it, was intercepted in Hawaii and passed on to the cryptographers in Washington for decoding, but since it concerned Hawaii and had nothing to do with diplomacy, its low priority sent it to the bottom of somebody’s basket.” 4218
*Quotes are a selection of the 32 pages taken from my exported Kindle highlights and bookmarks. The numbers refer to the location in the Kindle version and not to page numbers.
“America’s greatest mistake in World War II, I believe, was in failing to recognize that she was fighting two different kinds of war simultaneously: one in Europe against another Western people and philosophy, Nazism, and one in Asia which was not only a struggle against an aggressive nation fighting for survival as a modern power but an ideological contest against an entire continent.” 138
“And a moral policeman’s lot is not a happy one, particularly when his own morality is in question.” 145
“The Americans were inspired by three motives: a desire to trade, spread the Gospel to the yellow pagans and export the ideals of 1776.” 1306
“With the seizure of Manchuria and the invasion of North China, the gulf widened as America denounced Japanese aggression with increasingly forceful words. This moral denunciation only hardened the resolve of the average Japanese. Why should there be a Monroe Doctrine in the Americas and an Open Door principle in Asia?” 1335
“The Japanese takeover in bandit-infested Manchuria was no different from American armed intervention in the Caribbean. Moreover, how could a vast country like the United States even begin to understand the problems that had beset Japan since World War I? Why was it perfectly acceptable for England and Holland to occupy India, Hong Kong, Singapore and the East Indies, but a crime for Japan to follow their example? Why should America, which had grabbed its lands from Indians by trickery, liquor and massacre, be so outraged when Japan did the same in China?” 1338
“All this emotional turmoil was worsened by marked differences between East and West in morality, religion and even patterns of thinking. Western logic was precise, with axioms, definitions, and proofs leading to a logical conclusion. Born dialecticians, the Japanese held that any existence was a contradiction. In everyday life they instinctively practiced the concept of the contradiction of opposites, and the means of harmonizing them. Right and wrong, spirit and matter, God and man—all these opposing elements were harmoniously united. That was why a thing could be good and bad at the same time.” 1345
“Unlike Westerners, who tended to think in terms of black and white, the Japanese had vaguer distinctions, which in international relations often resulted in “policies” and not “principles,” and seemed to Westerners to be conscienceless. Western logic was like a suitcase, defined and limited. Eastern logic was like the furoshiki, the cloth Japanese carry for wrapping objects. It could be large or small according to circumstances and could be folded and put in the pocket when not needed.” 1350
“To the Japanese, a man without contradictions could not be respected; he was just a simple person. The more numerous the contradictions in a man, the deeper he was. His existence was richer the more acutely he struggled with himself.” 1356
“This was all expressed in the word sayonara (sayo—so, nara—if), that is, “So be it.” The Japanese said sayonara every moment to everything, for he felt each moment was a dream. Life was sayonara. Empires could rise or fall, the greatest heroes and philosophers crumble to dust, planets come and go, but Change never changed, including Change itself.” 1369
"Understanding little or nothing of either the Wheel of Causality or the power wielded by the dedicated young rebels, informed Americans mistakenly assumed that the takeover in Manchuria and the foray into China were steps plotted by military leaders who, like Hitler, wished to seize the world for themselves.” 1376
“Thus philosophy was brutalized and brutality was philosophized.” 1379
“There were also numerous petty differences between East and West that needlessly aggravated matters. If a Westerner asked, “This isn’t the road to Tokyo, is it?” the Japanese would reply yes, meaning, “What you say is correct; it is not the road to Tokyo.” Confusion also resulted when the Japanese agreed with the Westerner just to be agreeable or to avoid embarrassment, or gave wrong information rather than admit his ignorance.” 1385
“This embarrassing rehearsal for war not only caused a revolution in Japanese weaponry and military tactics but drove Japan closer to an alliance with Germany and Italy, since she felt that the Soviet Union, England, China and America might combine against her at any moment.” 1403
“In the last war the United States made use of Japan through the Ishii-Lansing agreement, and when the war was over, the United States broke it. This is an old trick of theirs.” 1698
“On the night of July 26 he ordered all Japanese assets in America frozen, and Britain and the Netherlands soon followed suit. In consequence, not only did all trade with the United States cease, but the fact that America had been Japan’s major source of oil imports now left Japan in an untenable situation.” 1941
“They had secured the bases in Indochina by negotiation with Vichy France, a country recognized if not approved by America, and international law was on their side; the freezing was the last step in the encirclement of the empire by the ABCD (American, British, Chinese, Dutch) powers, a denial to Japan of her rightful place as leader of Asia and a challenge to her very existence.” 1944
“Then he warned that Japan’s oil stock would only last for two years, and once war came, eighteen months, and concluded, “Under such circumstances, we had better take the initiative. We will win.””1950
“We should not lose sight of the fact, deplorable but true, that no practical and effective code of international morality upon which the world can rely has yet been discovered, and that the standards of morality of one nation in given circumstances have little or no relation to the standards of the individuals of the nations in question. To shape our foreign policy on the unsound theory that other nations are guided and bound by our present standards of international ethics would be to court sure disaster.” 1964
“For three decades Americans had held a highly idealized picture of the Chinese, looking upon them as childlike innocents who needed protection against the imperialism of Britain and Japan. China was a helpless, deserving nation whose virtues America alone understood.” 1986
“There was no way to “checkmate the enemy’s king”—industrial potential—and a decisive initial victory was essential.” 2199
“While I was in France, Pétain and Clemenceau told me, ‘Germany was an eyesore to the United States in Europe and it did away with her in the Great War. In the next war it will try to get rid of another eyesore, this one in the Orient, Japan. America knows how inept Japan is diplomatically, so she’ll make moves to abuse you inch by inch until you start a fight. But if you lose your temper and start a war you will surely be defeated, because America has great strength. So you must bear anything and not play into her hands.’ The present situation is exactly as Petain and Clemenceau predicted. At this time we must persevere so that we won’t get into war with America. You’re a member of the Konoye Cabinet. In the Army, an order must be obeyed. Now the Emperor and the Prime Minister want to bring about the negotiations. As war minister, you should either follow their line of policy or resign.” 2357
“Of course, we may lose,” he said, “but if we don’t fight, we’d just have to bow to the United States. If we fight, there’s a chance we can win. If we don’t fight, wouldn’t that be the same as losing the war?” 2954
“How could you trust a nation that played the two-faced game of talking peace while preparing for war?” 3062
“What particularly infuriated every man in the room was the categoric demand to quit all of China. Manchuria had been won at the cost of considerable sweat and blood. Its loss would mean economic disaster. What right did the wealthy Americans have to make such a demand? What nation with any honor would submit? 3331
“Who was to blame—the United States or Japan? The latter was almost solely responsible for bringing herself to the road of war with America through the seizure of Manchuria, the invasion of China, the atrocities committed against the Chinese people, and the drive to the south. But this course of aggression had been the inevitable result of the West’s efforts to eliminate Japan as an economic rival after World War I, the Great Depression, her population explosion, and the necessity to find new resources and markets to continue as a first-rate power. Added to all this were the unique and undefined position of the Emperor, the explosive role of gekokujo, and the threat of Communism from both Russia and Mao Tse-tung which had developed into paranoiac fear.” 3343
“How could a nation rich in resources and land, and free from fear of attack, understand the position of a tiny, crowded island empire with almost no natural resources, which was constantly in danger of attack from a ruthless neighbor, the Soviet Union?” 3353
“America herself had, moreover, contributed to the atmosphere of hate and distrust by excluding the Japanese from immigration and, in effect, flaunting a racial and color prejudice that justifiably infuriated the proud Nipponese. America should also have perceived and admitted the hypocrisy of taking such a moral stand on the four principles.b Her ally, Britain, certainly did not observe them in India or Burma, nor did she herself in Central America where “gunboat diplomacy” was still upholding the Monroe Doctrine.” 3354
“Her self-righteousness was also self-serving; what was morality at the top became self-interest at the bottom.” 3358
“Finally, America made a grave diplomatic blunder by allowing an issue not vital to her basic interests—the welfare of China—to become, at the last moment, the keystone of her foreign policy.” 3359
“Until that summer America had had two limited aims in the Far East: to drive a wedge between Japan and Hitler, and to thwart Japan’s southward thrust. She could easily have attained both these objectives but instead made an issue out of no issue at all, the Tripartite Pact, and insisted on the liberation of China. For this last unattainable goal America’s diplomats were forcing an early war that her own militarists were hoping to avoid—a war, paradoxically, she was in no position to wage. America could not throw the weight of her strength against Japan to liberate China, nor had she ever intended to do so. Her major enemy was Hitler. Instead of frankly informing Chiang Kai-shek of this, she had yielded to his urgings and pressed the policy that led to war in the Far East—and the virtual abandonment of China. More important, by equating Japan with Nazi Germany, her diplomats had maneuvered their nation into two completely different wars, one in Europe against Fascism, and one in the Orient that was linked with the aspirations of all Asians for freedom from the white man’s bondage.” 3361
“There were no heroes or villains on either side. Roosevelt, for all his shortcomings, was a man of broad vision and humanity; the Emperor was a man of honor and peace. Both were limited—one by the bulky machinery of a great democracy and the other by training, custom and the restrictions of his rule. Caught up in a medieval system, the Japanese militarists were driven primarily by dedication to their country. They wanted power for it, not war profits for themselves; Tojo himself lived on a modest scale. Prince Konoye’s weaknesses came largely from the vulnerable position of a premier in Japan, but by the end of his second cabinet he had transformed his natural tendency for indecisiveness into a show of purpose and courage which continued until his downfall. Even Matsuoka was no villain. Despite his vanity and eccentricities this man of ability sincerely thought he was working for the peace of the world when he saddled Japan with the Tripartite Pact; and he wrecked the negotiations in Washington out of egotism, not malice.” 3369
“Nor were Stimson and Hull villains, though the latter, with his all-or-nothing attitude, had committed one of the most fatal mistakes a diplomat could make—driven his opponents into a corner with no chance to save face and given them no option to capitulation but war.” 3376
“The villain was the times. Japan and America would never have come to the brink of war except for the social and economic eruption of Europe after World War I and the rise of two great revolutionary ideologies—Communism and Fascism. These two sweeping forces, working sometimes in tandem and sometimes at odds, ultimately brought about the tragedy of November 26. America certainly would never have risked going to war solely for the sake of China. It was the fear that Japan in partnership with Hitler and Mussolini would conquer the world that drove America to risk all. And the ultimate tragedy was that Japan had joined up with Hitler mainly because she feared the Anglo-Saxon nations were isolating her; hers was a marriage in name only.” 3379
“A war that need not have been fought was about to be fought because of mutual misunderstanding, language difficulties, and mistranslations as well as Japanese opportunism, gekokujo, irrationality, honor, pride and fear—and American racial prejudice, distrust, ignorance of the Orient, rigidity, self-righteousness, honor, national pride and fear.” 3384
“Perhaps these were essentially the answers to Händel’s question: “Why do the nations so furiously rage together?” In any case, America had made a grave mistake that would cost her dearly for decades to come. If Hull had sent a conciliatory answer to Proposal B, the Japanese (according to surviving Cabinet members) would have either come to some agreement with America or, at the least, been forced to spend several weeks in debate. And this hiatus would in turn have compelled postponement of their deadline for attack until the spring of 1942 because of weather conditions. By this time it would have been obvious that Moscow would stand, and the Japanese would have been eager to make almost any concessions to avoid going into a desperate war with an ally which now faced inevitable defeat. If no agreement had been reached, America would have gained precious time to strengthen the Philippines with more bombers and reinforcements. Nor would there have been such a debacle at Pearl Harbor. There is little likelihood that the implausible series of chances and coincidences that brought about the December 7 disaster could have been repeated.” 3386
“Morality is an unstable commodity in international relations. The same America that took a no-compromise stand on behalf of the sanctity of agreements, maintenance of the status quo in the Orient, and the territorial integrity of China, reversed herself a few years later at Yalta by promising Russia territory in the Far East as an inducement to join the war in the Pacific.” 3431
“The idea for a surprise attack was based on the tactics of his hero, Admiral Togo, who had, without any declaration of war, assaulted the Second Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur in 1904 with torpedo boats while its commander, an Admiral Stark, was at a party. The Russians never recovered from this loss—two battleships and a number of cruisers—and the following year almost their entire fleet was destroyed in the Battle of Tsushima during which, incidentally, young Ensign Yamamoto lost two fingers on his left hand.” 3460
“(The concept of achieving decisive victory by one surprise blow lay deep in the Japanese character. Their favorite literary form was the haiku, a poem combining sensual imagery and intuitive evocation in a brief seventeen syllables; a rapier thrust that expressed, with discipline, the illumination sought in the Japanese form of Buddhism. Similarly, the outcome in judo, sumo [wrestling] and kendo [fencing with bamboo staves], after long preliminaries, was settled by a sudden stroke.)” 3464
“This message, which would have meant a warning of attack on Pearl Harbor to anybody reading it, was intercepted in Hawaii and passed on to the cryptographers in Washington for decoding, but since it concerned Hawaii and had nothing to do with diplomacy, its low priority sent it to the bottom of somebody’s basket.” 4218
*Quotes are a selection of the 32 pages taken from my exported Kindle highlights and bookmarks. The numbers refer to the location in the Kindle version and not to page numbers.
May 24, 2025
So fascinating very informative
January 15, 2019
This book is a lost epoch, the historical details are now out of date and inaccurate owing to the scholarship of recent years.
Coming to the narrative this book is about Gekkukujo
Samurai Insubordination that is.
Kwantung Army to the many coups during the war So many Prime Ministers cut down by junior officers.
Imperial Japanese homefront politics was bloody too.
Its a ride, it's an indulgence.
Hana wa Sakuragi Hito wa Bushi
Coming to the narrative this book is about Gekkukujo
Samurai Insubordination that is.
Kwantung Army to the many coups during the war So many Prime Ministers cut down by junior officers.
Imperial Japanese homefront politics was bloody too.
Its a ride, it's an indulgence.
Hana wa Sakuragi Hito wa Bushi
January 15, 2022
a fine and classic work. Japan's war history from her engagement in China to the surrender in Tokyo Bay. flows well, seems meticulously researched. engaging.
15 January 2022 re-read
I don't know why the book is titled "Rising Sun," when it is about the decline and fall of the Japanese empire. anyway, the book is a 4/5. solid historical well-written, fluent, impressive, engaging.
15 January 2022 re-read
I don't know why the book is titled "Rising Sun," when it is about the decline and fall of the Japanese empire. anyway, the book is a 4/5. solid historical well-written, fluent, impressive, engaging.
September 23, 2019
The Rising Sun is a deserved classic, one of the first popular accounts of Japan's side of the Second World War. Toland takes us from the highest levels of Toyko policy-making to the frontlines of the deadly island battles of the Pacific campaign, humanizing an enemy that was derided in racist terms during the war.
Japan in the run-up to the war was beset with problems. As an island nation, they imported almost everything and were vulnerable to blockades and sanctions. They were stuck in a grinding counter-insurgency war in China. And a cult of reconstructed bushido emphasized glorious battle as the solution to all problems. Ambitious junior officers, or fear of ambitious junior officers, pushed Japan to the brink of war against America and Britain. In 1941, with Nazi power at its height, the militarists decided that if they did not act now they would be unable to share in the spoils of a fascist victory, and as American industrial power grew this was the only chance to knock America out of the war.
Toland builds the tension leading up to Pearl Harbor masterfully. The attack achieved total tactical surprise, though strategically America expected an attack somewhere. But it was a sneak attack trough a bleak comedy of errors in decryption and translation the declaration of war, which was supposed to arrive just before the first wave of bombers. The attack killed thousands, lead to Roosevelt's famous 'Day of Infamy' speech, and turned American public opinion decisively against Japan. It would be a hard war.
Following victories in the Singapore and Philippines has Allied fortresses falling like dominoes, and 1942 saw Japan in charge of furthest extent of what would be the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But Imperial Japan had two cults, the first that of bushido and the Emperor, and the second that of the Decisive Battle. In 1905, at the Battle of Tsushima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian fleet and caused their collapse. Both the Navy and the Army would seek one great battle, where exceptional bravery would carry them forwards.
But America was not Tsarist Russia. At Midway, American carriers dealt a mortal blow to the Kido Butai. At Guadalcanal, a war of attrition ripped the guts out of the elite forces the Navy and Army. From there on out, it was a terrible war of attrition. On island after island, starving under-supplied Japanese forces died almost the last man.
By 1945, defeat was evident. Nazi Germany was being ground to dust. Iwo Jima and Okinawa had fallen. General LeMay's XXI bomber command was destroying a city a night. The desperate tactics of kamikaze attacks could not turn back American invasion fleets. Yet fear of a military uprising prevented serious peace-feelers. Even after two atomic bombs, junior officers staged a coup to prevent the Emperor's statement of surrender from being broadcast.
I'm sure that in the subsequent decades, better archival work has changed the historical argument. But Toland had access to the subjects themselves, and the voices from the front are stark and terrifying. This is a long book, and even so I wish it had more on China and Army-Navy rivalries, but for anyone interested in the Pacific Front it is the first stop.
Japan in the run-up to the war was beset with problems. As an island nation, they imported almost everything and were vulnerable to blockades and sanctions. They were stuck in a grinding counter-insurgency war in China. And a cult of reconstructed bushido emphasized glorious battle as the solution to all problems. Ambitious junior officers, or fear of ambitious junior officers, pushed Japan to the brink of war against America and Britain. In 1941, with Nazi power at its height, the militarists decided that if they did not act now they would be unable to share in the spoils of a fascist victory, and as American industrial power grew this was the only chance to knock America out of the war.
Toland builds the tension leading up to Pearl Harbor masterfully. The attack achieved total tactical surprise, though strategically America expected an attack somewhere. But it was a sneak attack trough a bleak comedy of errors in decryption and translation the declaration of war, which was supposed to arrive just before the first wave of bombers. The attack killed thousands, lead to Roosevelt's famous 'Day of Infamy' speech, and turned American public opinion decisively against Japan. It would be a hard war.
Following victories in the Singapore and Philippines has Allied fortresses falling like dominoes, and 1942 saw Japan in charge of furthest extent of what would be the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But Imperial Japan had two cults, the first that of bushido and the Emperor, and the second that of the Decisive Battle. In 1905, at the Battle of Tsushima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian fleet and caused their collapse. Both the Navy and the Army would seek one great battle, where exceptional bravery would carry them forwards.
But America was not Tsarist Russia. At Midway, American carriers dealt a mortal blow to the Kido Butai. At Guadalcanal, a war of attrition ripped the guts out of the elite forces the Navy and Army. From there on out, it was a terrible war of attrition. On island after island, starving under-supplied Japanese forces died almost the last man.
By 1945, defeat was evident. Nazi Germany was being ground to dust. Iwo Jima and Okinawa had fallen. General LeMay's XXI bomber command was destroying a city a night. The desperate tactics of kamikaze attacks could not turn back American invasion fleets. Yet fear of a military uprising prevented serious peace-feelers. Even after two atomic bombs, junior officers staged a coup to prevent the Emperor's statement of surrender from being broadcast.
I'm sure that in the subsequent decades, better archival work has changed the historical argument. But Toland had access to the subjects themselves, and the voices from the front are stark and terrifying. This is a long book, and even so I wish it had more on China and Army-Navy rivalries, but for anyone interested in the Pacific Front it is the first stop.
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